Pelkmans Ch1 Outline

7222019 Pelkmans Ch1 Outline

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullpelkmans-ch1-outline 142

1

1

OUTLINE FOR AN ETHNOGRAPHY

OF DOUBT

Mathijs Pelkmans

If 20 years ago it was fashionable to hypothesize the lsquoend ofhistoryrsquo in the sense that (competing) ideologies had lost theirrelevance (eg Fukuyama 1992) this opinion is rarely voiced

today Te proliferation of new nationalisms fundamental-isms and (neo-)liberal civilizing missions underline that ideasand ideologies continue to play central roles in the collisionsand collusions of our globalized world Precisely because of theconspicuous presence of nationalisms populisms and funda-mentalisms it is essential not to take their strength for grantedbut to examine the dynamics of conviction and doubt through

which their effi cacy and affective qualities are made and unmadeReligious and secular convictions can have powerful effects buttheir foundations are often surprisingly fragile In fact the 1047297rmerthe endorsement of ideas the weaker the basis of these notionsmay be Recent converts are often particularly fervent in actingout their conviction precisely because of their greater need (andmomentary ability) to suspend lingering doubt And intense

ideological movements can only retain their fervour by activelydenying ambiguityTis volumersquos attention to experienced doubt serves to

unravel the ways in which convictions gain and lose their forceSeveral contributors analyse the dynamics by which loosely



2 Mathijs Pelkmans

held ideas are propelled into committed action a process inwhich doubt and ambiguity are sidelined Alpa Shah (Chapter7) demonstrates how doubt and hesitation surface in the daily

lives of Maoist revolutionaries in India ndash that is among actorswho tend to be depicted as insularly committed to an ideologicalcause By detailing their daily concerns Shah demonstrates notonly that lived reality is messier than it appears from a distancebut also that tremendous energy is required to produce un-ambiguous conviction Such painstakingly attained convictionfrequently offers no more than a fragile and temporary haven

For example the Muslim converts to Pentecostalism I studied inKyrgyzstan appeared to be unwavering and steadfast lsquofollowers of Jesusrsquo but in many instances this certainty was 1047298eeting the 1047298ashof conviction giving way to more complacent attitudes or evento complete withdrawal from church life after months of intenseengagement (Pelkmans 2009a) Another case in point is the initialenthusiasm for lsquocapitalist modernityrsquo which thrived in Hungary

around 1990 but which faded once the disillusioning reality offree market reform made itself known (see Bartha Chapter 8) Whether or not such instances affi rm Wittgensteinrsquos assertionthat lsquoDoubt comes after beliefrsquo (1969 statement 160) requiresfurther discussion but they do underline the extent to whichdoubt and belief are intertwined Terefore rather than seeingambivalence and hesitation as indications of lsquoimperfect convic-tionrsquo the chapters of this volume show that belief and disbeliefimplicate each other in important ways

Doubt does not exclusively point to ontological and epis-temological referents to the questions lsquowhat isrsquo and lsquowhat istruersquo Lived doubt points also (and sometimes more pressingly)to pragmatic referents to the question lsquowhat to dorsquo1 Questionsof being of truth and of action should always be seen in relationto each other both in the banal sense that a sense of lsquowhat isrsquo

provides direction (but not unilinear direction) to action andalso in the more profound sense that when nothing is worth1047297ghting for (when nothing is deemed to be true) apathy andhopelessness may set in Tis aspect is emphasized by DavidNapierrsquos discussion (2009) of how the unravelling of bonds of



Outline for an Ethnography of Doubt 3

trust between governments and citizens in Western Europe mayresult in apathy not least because the disappearance of trust hasimmediate epistemological consequences After all the distrusted

object is never believedSuch disorienting experiences occur on a grander scale when

entire ideological systems collapse Tis is true even when scepti-cism about those grand ideologies had been rampant such asin the former Soviet Union Te traumatic effect of the collapseof communism was re1047298ected in the 1990s in the widespreadcomplaint that lsquowe are not living we are just survivingrsquo (my ne

zhivem my tolrsquoko vyzhivaem) Tis phrase not only pointed tothe radical decline of living standards but also contrastedpurposeful meaningful living with animalistic pointlesssurviving But such rhetorical assertions of meaningless survivalhardly provide closure as Zigon (2009) aptly titles an essayabout the sense of disillusionment in Moscow lsquoHope Dies LastrsquoIndeed even in the direst situations people will 1047297nd new points

of orientation and aspiration By paying attention to such cyclesof hope belief doubt and disillusionment the chapters in thisvolume explore rather than assume the role of ideas in social andpolitical action In doing so they produce deeper insight intothe complex mechanisms and dynamics by which speci1047297c ideasgain and lose their credibility and show how ambiguous realityis acted upon to produce (temporary) conviction

Tese introductory re1047298ections prompt the question of de1047297ni-tion I am reluctant to de1047297ne doubt precisely because it is not theword as such that is of interest here but rather a range of socialphenomena which it is hoped can be better understood withreference to a quality called lsquodoubtrsquo Nevertheless the constraintsof writing in language require re1047298ection on the concept andits position in existing 1047297elds of meaning Doubt connotes anactive state of mind which is directed at a questioned object

and is unstable in the sense that it pushes for a resolution (whichpotentially erases doubt) Tis associative understanding directsattention to several analytic features that can serve as 1047297rst pointsof orientation (i) Te implied agency (directed at the questionedobject) sets lsquodoubtrsquo somewhat apart from the associated term



4 Mathijs Pelkmans

uncertainty Tat is uncertainty can be the context in whichdoubt is activated doubt cannot be at rest whereas uncertaintycannot be wilfully employed (ii) Although often equated with

scepticism doubt has more focus due to the implied presence ofan alternative At least that is what the presence of the numbertwo in dubitare ndash the Latin origin of the word ndash suggests echoedin the German zweifel and the French doter Doubt in thissense is about lsquobeing of two mindsrsquo about wavering betweenone possibility and another (iii) Instead of being the oppositeof belief doubt is often implicated in it After all belief without

doubt is the same as lsquoknowledgersquo (see oren 2007) (iv) Just asdoubt has a complicated relationship with belief so it does withaction rather than necessarily leading to inaction (although thatis certainly a possibility) doubt may also be a facilitator of actionby triggering a need for resolution

Tese suggestions imply that doubt underlies and mayalso energize many aspects of human thought and action and

thus that analytic attention to doubt is not only warranted butin fact long overdue in the social sciences including anthropol-ogy Te argument here is twofold First the 1047298ip side of whatis conventionally called conviction has not received appropriateattention in empirical sciences such as anthropology sociology andpolitical science Second studies of conviction (and its effects)are in need of a more dynamic and relational approach Asintimated above doubt and belief should not be seen as oppositesbut rather as co-constitutive parts Doubt highlights fragility andinstability but the act of doubting also entails a quest for anlsquoessencersquo In order to understand this complex relationship it isnecessary to capture the doubting moment Te challenge thenis to move beyond what Crapanzano (2004 8) dismissively callsa lsquotopographical approachrsquo one that 1047297xes and categorizes statesof mind and that labels actions to an approach that is able to

capture lsquoprocessesrsquo2 wo moves are necessary here Te 1047297rst isto acknowledge the relational nature of doubt and (dis)belief ofhesitation and (in)action Te second is to pay attention to thetemporal dimension and explore how hope belief doubt anddisillusionment may over time feed into and give way to each




other In other words the analysis needs to do justice to relationalas well as temporal connections

Tis indicates that the anthropological exploration of doubt

is fraught with diffi culties the most pertinent one being thatdoubt tends to vanish with articulation Tis is both an analyticand an empirical problem As I will argue in the next sectiondoubt has the tendency to disappear when analytically engageda feature which is particularly evident in the long conversa-tion that philosophy and theology have had with doubt Butthe diffi culty also has an empirical and methodological compo-

nent In order for people to verbally express their ideas they haveto order and thereby channel their thoughts and when peopleact they have already overcome or at least temporarily sidelinedwhatever hesitation and ambivalence may have existed Academicdisciplines working with a lsquonaturalisticrsquo (in contrast to an experi-mental) approach tend to register only articulated thought and performed action and catching doubt in midair is therefore far

from a straightforward task Nevertheless the ethnographicpractice of living for prolonged periods of time in the midst ofpeople who are pondering different options who are voicingtheir hopes frustrations and disillusionments can reveal impor-tant insights into the role of doubt in everyday life

Doubt in projects of truth

If doubt has rarely surfaced as an analytic theme in empiricaldisciplines like anthropology and sociology it is a differentmatter in other academic traditions Non-empirical disciplinessuch as theology and philosophy have a long-standing inter-est in the topic However they have tended to approach doubtinstrumentally Doubt especially in its variant of lsquosystematicdoubtrsquo has long been considered a helpful tool for gaining

epistemological certainty Alternatively when failing to producethe craved certainties doubt has commonly been depicted asan obstacle especially to faith For example the admonitions oflsquodoubting Tomasrsquo by successive early church fathers are illust-rative of negative attitudes to doubt and its assumed tendency



6 Mathijs Pelkmans

to erode faith (Bonney 2002 1ndash2 n 1)3 Such theologies andphilosophies are projects of truth and the participants in theseprojects can of course hardly remain disinterested observers

of doubt caught up as they are in the push for resolution Forthem doubt ultimately needs to be left behind Widespread asthis instrumental approach to doubt may be some key thinkershave realized its limitations Wittgenstein (1969) demonstratesthat radical doubt is ultimately bound to fail in projects of truthwhile Kierkegaard ([1843] 1985) asserts that doubt in matters of(religious) faith can never be overcome without making a hazard-

ous leap Tat is even systematic intellectual efforts are unable toput doubt completely to rest and it is this reappearance of doubtin philosophy (and theology) that is of particular interest to theethnography of doubt Starting with some straightforward appli-cations of doubt in projects of truth I will proceed by showinghow the seeming certainties unravel

Te instrumental use of doubt in (combined) projects of

knowledge and faith goes back to at least the fourth centurywhen Augustine of Hippo wrote about his disagreement withthe Academics on the question of whether or not ultimatetruth is attainable (1951) His opponents argued that ourperception is not suffi ciently reliable to serve as the basis for1047297rm knowledge and that therefore one cannot know truth Augustine however countered that the doubt of the Academ-ics was based on an unstated acknowledgement of truth andthat the truth can be ultimately known through inference ofthe divine Augustinersquos professed certainty was itself rootedin doubt and his si fallor sum (if I am mistaken I exist)(1950) is an early anticipation of Descartesrsquo famous cogitoergo sum4 Interestingly though when Augustine writes lsquoSeeknot to understand that you may believe but believe [so] thatyou may understandrsquo (1988) he implicitly acknowledges

the unavoidable need to make a leap of faith somethingthat Descartes would endeavour to overcome Tus if someaspects of Augustinersquos writings may be understood as antici-pations of Descartesrsquo cogito ergo sum other aspects resonatein Kierkegaardrsquos important work (see below)




Descartes is often presented as a solid point of referencein discussions of doubt Jennifer Hecht in her recent Doubt A History (2003) writes that the cogito ergo sum could have

been expressed more accurately as dubito ergo sum5 She has apoint because when Descartes re1047298ects on the characteristics oflsquoa thinking thingrsquo the aspect 1047297rst mentioned is that it is lsquoa thingthat doubtsrsquo which is then followed by a range of other mentalactivities (1996 II 8) However Descartes proceeds by appro-priating this valuable insight for his metaphysical project whichamounts to arti1047297cially staging doubt for the sake of constructing

a logical argument Tus when he questions the reliability ofhis faculties by positing the possibility that his perceptions arepart of a dream he is considering this possibility intellectuallybut not intimately Descartesrsquo doubt is merely hyperbolic it isin Skirryrsquos words lsquoan entertained doubt that serves to clear themind of preconceptions that might obscure the truthrsquo (2005)6 Te absence of lived doubt in lsquosystematic doubtrsquo is interestingly

revealed in some passages of his Meditations where he re1047298ects onthe purpose of his project

[A]nd from that time I was convinced of the necessity ofundertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions Ihad adopted and of commencing anew the work of buildingfrom the foundation if I desired to establish a 1047297rm andabiding superstructure in the sciences (1996 I 1)

What is striking here is that Descartesrsquo words imply theopposite of doubt Tat is he lsquowas convinced of the necessityrsquo ofquestioning all seeming certainties and he appeared certain aboutthe possibility of 1047297nding an abiding superstructure Descartesdid not seem to doubt that his lsquosystematic doubtrsquo was the rightapproach to arrive at truth he hardly wrote about uncertain-

ties that may have haunted him when writing his Meditations and he presented his conclusions with the steadfast authority ofthe academic writer7 Unavoidably informed by past (but alsopresent) academic stylistic conventions his written text refusesto hesitate and thereby reinforces the impression of Descartes



8 Mathijs Pelkmans

as an unwavering thinker who was able to reach truth throughlogical reasoning Tus even though Descartes dubbed himselfa lsquobeing that doubtsrsquo he was hardly interested in the process of

doubting itself or in the occurrence and implications of doubt inothers Instead doubt was his instrument to reach solid founda-tions of knowledge after which doubt ceased to be relevant andcould be discarded

Despite its limitations this systematic or entertained doubtis of key importance to any academic discipline Tis is sobecause without doubt it would be impossible to move beyond

onersquos own habitual ideas assumptions and truths rendering oneunable to advance knowledge Similar to philosophers anthro-pologists are trained to question their own assumptions in orderto gain new insights (see also Driessen Chapter 6) But as anempirical discipline anthropology differs from philosophy inthat its object is not only lsquothe abstractrsquo (of knowledge moralityaesthetics etc) but also the concrete ideas beliefs and activities

of various subjects With respect to this double object of inquiryand the twofold need to understand as well as represent foreignpoints of view it is useful to distinguish between two kinds ofentertained doubt in anthropology

First there is a need to question reveal and suspend onersquosown subjective and sensory knowledge (Kapferer 2001) Tedestabilization of this embodied knowledge allows the anthro-pologist to establish a connection with other peoplersquos truths andthereby to understand their worlds and worldviews As Kapferersuggests anthropologists need to combine lsquoradical doubt withthe phenomenological recommendation of the willing suspen-sion of disbelief rsquo as a way to overcome prejudices and unexaminedassumptions while simultaneously taking alternative realitiesseriously (2001 342)8 Examples of this abound in ethnogra-phy from Evans-Pritchardrsquos (1937) 1047298irtations with the logic and

rationality of Zande witchcraft to Hardingrsquos (1987) involun-tary thoughts about God Harding describes how when drivingaway from an interview with a Baptist pastor who had usedthe occasion to witness to her she almost ran into another carUnderstandably shaken by this near accident she found herself




involuntarily asking lsquoWhat is God trying to tell mersquo Tat is byopening herself up to the possibility of an alternative truth asshe did by listening attentively and intensely to a pastor trying

to convince her of lsquothe truthrsquo Harding found herself on the pathto conversion Te experience was discom1047297ting but also essen-tial for gaining insight into what Baptist conversion amounts to(1987 169ndash70) Harding (presumably) never fully convertedshe found herself straddling the boundary between belief anddisbelief Tis re1047298ects the disciplinary ideal of the anthropolo-gist almost lsquogoing nativersquo yet refraining from going all the way9

Complete identi1047297cation with onersquos research subject tends tobe looked at with a mixture of contempt and intrigue whichultimately converges in the opinion that those who lsquogo nativersquocease to be anthropologists because in those instances thecritical distance necessary for academic thinking and writing hascollapsed

Going native in the sense of fully internalizing another

system is not the only lsquoriskrsquo of opening oneself up to other truths Whereas a failure to suspend disbelief leads to a reproduction ofassumptions taking alternative realities too seriously leads to anequally problematic essentialization of lsquothe native point of viewrsquoto use Malinowskirsquos (1922) term So this is the second kind ofdoubt that needs to be entertained retaining a lsquohealthyrsquo doseof scepticism towards the assertions made by interlocutors (forexample that spirits exist) not necessarily by challenging theirontological status (do spirits really exist) but rather by question-ing how widely and intensely those ideas are shared (is lsquobeliefrsquoin spirits uniform and stable) In the past anthropologists havenot always fared well in this respect Half a century ago Firth(1959) for example intimated that anthropologists too easilyassumed uniformity He quotes the anthropologist Nadel whostated in one of his ethnographies that lsquoTere is no doubt in the

minds of the Nupe that God as he created the world so he canalso control it and intervene in its coursersquo (Nadel 1954 citedin Firth 1959 139) Firth concedes that such a statement maybe acceptable as a classi1047297catory act but adds that it is a lsquoboldthing to assert that in the minds of 300000 people there is ldquono



10 Mathijs Pelkmans

doubtrsquorsquo about Godrsquos powerrsquo (1959 139) Such a claim is un-helpful to say the least if the goal is to understand the intricaciesof religious experience Tat is questioning onersquos own assumptions

and questioning assertions made by others are equally importantin revealing the complexity of meaningful life Uncritical attitudesto lsquobeliefrsquo or any form of knowledge now largely belong in theanthropological dustbin As Engelke perhaps too optimisti-cally asserts few would still lsquoclaim after having worked in say aZulu village for eighteen months that ldquothe Zulu believerdquorsquo (2008S14) Indeed in long-term 1047297eldwork one becomes aware of the

contingencies ambivalences and variations in peoplersquos engage-ments with truth claims (but I donrsquot think that this awarenessalways 1047297nds its way into ethnographic texts)

Te twofold critical stance ndash towards internal assumptionsand external assertions ndash is not only important for generatinganalytical and empirical questions but also for reaching higherlevels of reliability Ethnographic data (like most empirical data

in the social sciences) is unavoidably incomplete limited inscope and in1047298uenced by the situated positioning of the researcherand the application of speci1047297c research techniques Rather thantrying to cover up these gaps or hiding from them behind themask of formal methodology (as in scientistic approaches)most anthropologists would argue that deeper understandingis served by explicating them (eg DeWalt and DeWalt 200281) In this volume (Chapter 6) Henk Driessen re1047298ects on theseissues when writing about the Spanish Civil War and the diffi cul-ties in 1047297nding out decades later what lsquoreally happenedrsquo at thelocal level Because of the tensions and secrecy surrounding thisviolent past both the ethnographer and most local residents hadonly piecemeal knowledge of what had happened Knowledgeremained fragmentary incomplete and unstable because thesensitivity of the topic prevented the pieces from being shared

and the dots from being connected Driessen points out that thislack of transparency was useful for maintaining lsquopeacersquo but wasalso deeply disturbing to the victimsrsquo descendants as it frustratedthem in their desire for closure Only 70 years after the eventsdid some of the long-hidden facts emerge and a public memorial




ceremony was organized Tis memorial provided closure forsome but for others the surfacing of lsquofactsrsquo unsettled an acceptedhistory triggering a contestation in which Falangist descend-

ants claimed that the representation of the past was unfair andone-sided

What is the position of the ethnographer when lsquothe truthrsquo isso blatantly out of reach Should topics about which one cannotspeak with authority be left out of scholarly work If so wouldthat not do injustice to the complexity of lived experience AsDriessen rightly points out the academic expectation of coher-

ence often results in texts (including ethnographic ones) that arecleansed of fragmentary and ill-1047297tting evidence thereby sidelin-ing the hesitations of the researcher and the ambivalence of hisor her subjects Tat is anthropologists are not to be absolvedof marginalizing doubt As producers of scholarly texts they arerequired to put their doubts aside the imprinting of words onpaper (after the last editorial correction) brings an end to the

wavering because certain words rather than others are chosento describe to interpret and to explain the world Te contrib-utors to this book for example cannot present their 1047297ndingswithout trying to convince the reader that the claims they makeare plausible and deserve at the very least the bene1047297t of doubtLikewise this introduction fails to doubt the relevance of thetopic at hand and makes unwavering statements (but no abso-lutist claims) about the subject As Hastrup says lsquoin analysis andwriting a sense of closure must be attainedrsquo and this amounts tolsquoa temporary objecti1047297cation of relational knowledge from whichothers may then proceedrsquo (2004 458) Tat is closure is notinherently problematic but it does need to be seen for what itis a pragmatic and temporary act that facilitates (and enables)scholarly presentation and communication

emporary objecti1047297cation is unavoidable but this does not

require all ambivalence uncertainty and doubt to be erasedfrom writing Most anthropologists certainly those writing inthe heuristic interpretive and phenomenological traditionstend to be less interested in systematically testing hypothesesthan in fostering insight and understanding Hence they do not







14 Mathijs Pelkmans

of radical doubt and the illusion of absolute certainty but alsopoint out the role of certainty in doubt and of doubt in certainty

Wittgenstein demonstrates the impossibility of ultimate

lsquoradical doubtrsquo in three steps Te 1047297rst is that doubt graduallyloses its meaning when the alternative becomes too unlikely(1969 56 and 93) Differently put when lsquoeverything speaks inits favour nothing against itrsquo (1969 4) doubt can only surviveat the logical level through a sustained cognitive effort Tesecond is the tendency to mistake logical statements for empiri-cal ones So even if one is able to doubt all propositions at the

logical level this does not imply that it is possible to do so atthe empirical level as well And this relates to the third andcrucial point namely that the weighing of alternatives mustrest on an (often unstated) sense of reality Tis last point refersto Wittgensteinrsquos lsquohingesrsquo which serve as anchors for doubt(1969 341 and 343) As he puts it lsquoIf you are not certain ofany fact you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words

either If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as faras doubting anything Te game of doubting itself presupposescertaintyrsquo (1969 114ndash15) Tis statement can not only beused to repudiate scepticism (see for example Moyal-Sharrock2003) but can also be applied to the study of lived or experienceddoubt attention to doubt simultaneously reveals the implicitcertainties on which this doubt is based For example if a manhas doubts about his love for a woman (does he love her doeshe love her more than another ) he reveals that love as such isan unquestioned reality for him He may subsequently startdoubting love itself but this new doubt is then hinged on anunstated certainty about (the value of ) life It is possible that hewill generalize his doubt even further but if he does so there willno longer be room for doubting (his) love12

If it is impossible to doubt everything it is equally an illusion

to think that absolute certainty can be reached (without doubtingit) Tis is less an epistemological than a sociological point Teissue is that truths that are absolutely certain (ie truisms) nolonger matter and therefore no longer require evidence or proof As Peirce writes lsquo[after full agreement] is reached the question




of certainty becomes an idle one because there is no one leftwho doubts itrsquo (1868 140) Absolute certainty fails to triggerre1047298ection (or any other intellectual effort) and therefore tends to

go unnoticed Tings that matter cannot be known with absolutecertainty Tis tension was astutely observed by Kierkegaard inhis discussion of subjectivity and objectivity claiming that objectivetruth is an lsquoindifferent truthrsquo (1941 182) Seeing that objectiv-ity and passion do not go together he stated that lsquoall interestlike all decisiveness is rooted in subjectivityrsquo (1941 173) Hisparticular preoccupation was with faith which he summarized

as being lsquoprecisely the contradiction between the in1047297nite passionof the individualrsquos inwardness and the objective uncertaintyrsquo Onthis basis he concludes lsquoIf I am capable of grasping God objec-tively I do not believe but precisely because I cannot do this Imust believersquo (Kierkegaard 1941 182) Although we need to becareful with generalizing the insights of a Danish theologian theenergizing quality of doubt in conviction is one that has wider

applicability as we will see belowI argued that the relevance of studying doubt lies in the factthat doubt connects belief and disbelief action and inactionand moreover that these underlying uncertainties may providethe energy needed to produce conviction and decisiveness justas they can produce scepticism and apathy Due to its unstablequalities doubt is always on the move as it were While one canconceive of belief and disbelief as remaining in position (evenif only a fragile one) it is diffi cult to imagine that doubt canstay put or to think of people resting in their doubt Tat is itwould be problematic to speak of untroubled or placid doubt(because the act of doubting presupposes interest) Doubt isabout wavering between different options and thus presumes anawareness of and a (somewhat) active stance towards the dubi-ous object Tis in turn tends to be resolved in or lead to stances

that lean towards either belief or disbelief Doubtrsquos propensityto be resolved in diametrically opposed directions is what makesits relation to action so intriguing It points to the role of shakyideas in haphazard action ndash and most ideas are shaky and mostaction is haphazard



16 Mathijs Pelkmans

Lived doubt

Te preceding pages outlined the relevance of doubt for ethno-

graphic research and the scholarly enterprise more generallyHowever the ethnography of doubt should not primarily beabout methodological issues or the systematic doubt of academicsbut rather about lived doubt doubt as it reveals itself in speci1047297csocial situations and points to questionable elements One of thecentral problems with the empirical study of doubt is that doubtis likely to disappear with articulation Tis is partly because wetend to register ideas only in so far as they are externalized andthis externalization is one of the mechanisms by which doubt canbe repressed or sidelined It is thus important to try and catchdoubt in midair something which is diffi cult but not impossibleBecause of their long-term and intensive engagement with thepeople they study anthropologists are particularly well placedto explore how people deal with the absence of absolute truthsand how they make choices between alternatives Rather than

restricting research to interview settings to stylized observationsor to one-off questionnaires the contributors to this volumefollowed people in their everyday lives and witnessed how theychanged their opinions how they tried to make sense of whatappeared meaningless and how they came to terms with notbeing certain Such an approach can reveal how doubt emergeswhen authority structures are eroding how it becomes immi-

nent when rapid changes in the political and social environmentdemand reinterpretations of reality and how uncertainties andambiguities are sidelined to make room for puri1047297ed convictionsand beliefs

Tis section of the introduction discusses the qualities andeffects of such experienced doubt and will revolve around fourtheses (i) Doubt is activated uncertainty Here I look at how

doubt emerges from the background how it dissipates but alsohow it attaches itself to dubious objects transforming them inthe process Terefore (ii) the doubted object is both ephemeraland unstable Tis means not only that the object of doubt isslippery but also that the act of doubting is unstable Moreover





18 Mathijs Pelkmans

condemned the mining activities while those who were involvedin mining tried to manipulate the unreliable elements (that isthe spirits) by making new and more powerful sacri1047297ces Despite

such attempts to tame danger the future continued to loom likean unpredictable cloud over the lives of pastoralists and minersalike Tis is not to say that all certainties had vanished In factunease with dubious human actions and concern about spiritsrsquounpredictable reactions reinforced awareness of the spiritsrsquo exist-ence leaving little room for doubting their potential to act uponthe world

A variation on this theme is the situation found in arapidly ageing village of Old Believers in the RomanianDanube delta (Chapter 4) Vlad Naumescu explores theconcerns that beleaguer this community of steadfast believersIn the wake of the economic transformation of the 1990s theyounger generations had left the village which meant that noone was available to replace the village priest after he became

incapacitated Without a priest to decide on religious mattersand to properly conduct the rituals the remaining mostlyelderly residents were driven to despair No matter howdevout their religious enactments without a priest they werelsquosimply not true rsquo as one of Naumescursquos interlocutors lamentedTe importance of ritual detail and correct practice in OldBeliever Christianity meant that villagers faced an lsquoincom-pleteness of their Christian existencersquo Te external doubts (asNaumescu calls them) that pertain to the question lsquowhat todo nowrsquo came to a climax when intersecting with the doubtthat is inherent to Christianity ndash in particular as expressedthrough the mystery of the resurrection ndash in the days beforeEaster But while intensifying the turmoil the resonance ofinternal and external doubt paradoxically also sparked hopefor a miracle in these times of decline and fear

Tese cases thus demonstrate how disruptive societal changetriggers doubts about what to do how to act and what will happenin the future Tey also show that some certainties were eitherleft untouched or even gained strength in the process Indeeddoubt about how spirits would react or about how to properly




conduct rituals projected conviction onto the existence of spiritsand Biblical truth respectively o link this back to Wittgenstein(1969) the act of doubting may strengthen the hinges to which

the doubts are attachedMaurice Bloch analyses the mechanisms by which doubt

is activated and deactivated at the micro-level (Chapter 2) Inthe course of a conversation triggered by this anthropologista group of Za1047297maniry forest dwellers in Madagascar foundthemselves engaging with the question of whether animalsare capable of thinking and whether or not one is conscious

while asleep Te conversation then entered increasingly uncer-tain territory can trees think Are ancestors who appear indreams alive Concomitantly the responses became less steadyInstead of pushing for the (always elusive) ultimate truth thoseinvolved acknowledged the limits of their knowledge and thusBloch argues remained in doubt Te momentarily heightenedsense of doubt blended into the background waiting to be

triggered againTese insights make an interesting comparison toHeideggerrsquos complaint that philosophers tend to lsquomake thingstoo conspicuousrsquo ndash an act with distorting effects because afundamental feature of being-in-the-world is that people arenot always explicitly aware of their surroundings or even ofthemselves When this tendency is ignored then lsquobeing in theworld is characterized far too explicitly and sharplyrsquo ([1953]2010) Applied to the topic at hand this means that systematicintellectual inquiries into doubt run the risk of simultaneouslytransforming it When taken out of the setting in which itoccurs doubt loses part of its original meaning and implica-tions14 Te ethnographic materials show that sharpness andblurredness correlate with the extent to which a concern ispressing In other words there are situations in which ethno-

graphic subjects (that is all humans) become philosophers And as I claimed above philosophizing is not without effectDoubt as activated uncertainty triggers re1047298ection and thismental activity in1047298uences the object on which it focuses aprocess to be covered in the next section



20 Mathijs Pelkmans

(ii) Te ephemeral dubious object (and the restlessness of doubt)Doubt is an awkward topic because it cannot stand the spot-light Doubt may lurk in the background it may rise up and

then plummet Once the dubious object is caught in the centreof attention it needs to be acted upon until it is tamed side-lined or transformed Te underlying question in this sectionis whether doubt can be at rest I have intimated above thatthis is not possible and yet Bloch (Chapter 2) argues that theZa1047297maniry being unable to force a resolution concerning thequestions that were addressed to them lsquoremain in doubtrsquo and

quite comfortably so Tese seemingly contradictory posi-tions can be reconciled though by pointing out that there aredifferent ways to deal with the restlessness of doubt Withoutpresuming to give an exhaustive enumeration I suggest thatrestlessness can be halted by (a) diverting onersquos attention sothat the object of doubt is no longer in the spotlight (b)reinterpreting the object of doubt in a way that makes it less

lsquodubiousrsquo (c) denying that doubt is doubt or (d) removingthe alternative when confronted with two possibilitiesBlochrsquos contribution offers an example of the 1047297rst method

Te Za1047297maniry accepted the limitations of their knowledge(in that sense they were not Cartesians) but their ability to doso re1047298ected the lack of importance attributed to the doubtedobject the topic of conversation was clearly intriguing to thoseinvolved but questions such as whether trees can think did nothave immediate practical relevance to their everyday existenceTe Za1047297maniry did not (need to) overcome their doubts bypushing for a resolution Te abstractness of the questions meantthat the object could be sidelined as soon as the conversationended as a result of which doubt was deactivated

Tis sidelining of doubt is not always an option as Binderrsquoschapter on spirit-mediums and their clientele in aiwan illustrates

Binder followed clients who sought fortune health and othersuccesses in life Teir attitude towards mediums tended to beambivalent not least because it was well known locally that manyof them were frauds and distinguishing between fraudulent andgenuine mediums was one of the clientsrsquo central preoccupations




Te result was a dance around the notions of authenticity ration-ality and mystery in which mediums tried to project and clientsdetect truth Te clientsrsquo efforts to detect truth underscored their

wish to gain certainty however this goal could never be completelyreached In apparent resignation several of Binderrsquos interlocutorsdepicted their stance towards mediums as lsquohalf belief half doubtrsquoTis seems to suggest similar to Blochrsquos assertion that it ispossible to rest in doubt without needing to push for a resolutionHowever Binder also observes that such lukewarm ambivalencebecomes impossible when too much is at stake Clients who had

established long-term relationships with one medium or were seek-ing solutions to particularly pressing problems could not afford torest in doubt Longing for clarity yet unable to wholeheartedlyaccept the mediumsrsquo claims to spiritual power some resorted toanother strategy they adjusted their expectations of what mediumscould achieve Tat is they rendered the object of their doubt lessmagical and more mundane by starting to see the mediums as

counsellors who were sometimes wrong in their assessments andpredictions but who nevertheless had a special gift or talent thatenabled them to provide valuable advice and support

Te process of reinterpretation in Liberatorersquos contribution(Chapter 9) is of a rather different nature here the alternative is made less attractive while the doubts of those involved aredenied the status of doubt Liberatore traces the trajectory ofyoung Somali women in London as they became practisingMuslims Teir religious quests were fraught with hesitationTey wondered if there would be shame in heaven and if heavenwould really be worth all the sacri1047297ces demanded in this worldIn order to progress on their spiritual journey the women learnedto rationalize their doubts by translating them into anotheridiom In conversations with religious authorities their doubtfulthoughts were interpreted as the result of insuffi cient iman (faith)

originating from Satan and were therefore not lsquogenuinersquo doubtTat is internal doubt was given an external explanation whichmade it liveable Meanwhile the allure of the girlsrsquo previous non-pious lives ndash one in which they went clubbing listened to R ampB music dressed differently ndash was diminished in at least two



22 Mathijs Pelkmans

distinct ways It was made less relevant socially as they becamepart of a relatively tight community of practising Muslims inwhich those desired elements were absent and conceptually

by joining in a discourse that interpreted lsquoworldly lifersquo as sinfulTat is the alternative partly shrivelled not so much becausethey overcame doubt but because they reinterpreted these doubtsand their referents In this process the alternative became lesspressing However it did not necessarily completely disappear

What these routes have in common is that they alleviatethe tension by lsquodomesticatingrsquo rather than overcoming doubt

However issues that are (made) irrelevant today may becomepressing again in the future Likewise the reinterpreted object mayresume its previous features And translating doubt into lsquolow faithrsquois a useful temporary move but does not in itself expel variousworries and qualms It is tempting then to conclude that doubtcan never be completely overcome in cases of subjective truth thattruly matter (cf Kierkegaard 1941 Peirce 1868) Doubt can be

domesticated transferred to an area beyond the horizon of ourimmediate consciousness but it resists disappearing entirely AsCrapanzano writes lsquoTe beyond is like shadows hellip It slips away ndashto appear again just when we have thought in relief or in despairthat we have 1047297nally done away with itrsquo (2004 16)

Tis does not mean that there cannot be a permanent escapefrom doubt Arguably the most effective way to get rid of doubthas not yet been mentioned ndash arriving at a situation from whichthere is no return Tis applies particularly to doubts that involvea choice between concrete alternatives ndash such as jobs belovedsor business deals ndash rather than subjective truths In the face ofindecision people may accept the advice of friends (or their innervoice) to lsquojust do somethingrsquo to make a haphazard decision thatusefully or tragically lsquodestroysrsquo the alternative Tat is in manypractical situations the way back may be blocked because the

objects of doubt are temporally restricted someone else has beenhired the other beloved is no longer in love (or has become aparent) money for a second business deal is unavailable In suchinstances doubt becomes irrelevant and gives way to other senti-ments possibly to relief and contentment with the choice that




was made perhaps to the acceptance of onersquos lsquodestinyrsquo or elseresulting in regret and other negative or bittersweet emotions inthe re1047298ection lsquoif only I had acted differentlyrsquo

(iii) Ambivalent energies stimulators moderators obstacles

Te thoughtless who never doubtMeet the thoughtful who never act (Brecht 1979)15

Te best lack all conviction while the worst Are full of passionate intensity (Yeats [1921] 2008)

Te tensions within and between these lines from twofamous poems introduce two aspects related to the energeticquality of doubt Te 1047297rst is about doubt as either a stimulantto or a detractor from action with Yeats and Brecht here leaningtowards the stance that doubt impedes action (for good or bad)Te second aspect is normative contrasting thoughtless passion

with thoughtful inaction Te ambivalence is palpable ndash leavingthe reader wondering which of the alternatives is less detestableTat is aside from the question of whether doubt stimulatesor hinders activity doubt also in1047298uences the quality of actionBerger and Zijderveld draw attention to this when stating thatdecisions are often made lsquoin a state of ignorancersquo (2009 140)Teir examples include laws about abortion without knowing

lsquowhen human life emergesrsquo and it is easy to think of policieswhose effects cannot be predicted In such instances they advo-cate lsquoa cautious prudent indeed doubting approachrsquo (2009 141)

Such considerations address the potentially debilitating andtempering effects of doubt In addition doubt also has an ener-gizing effect as was already noted with respect to the role ofdoubt in stimulating the quest for (academic) knowledge At 1047297rst

glance this realization creates an awkward situation If doubt isseen as energizing and tempering as well as debilitating thedisappointing conclusion might be that the role of doubt is wellambivalent But there is no need to halt there Aiming for moreclarity I will argue that in the 1047297rst instance doubt enables both



24 Mathijs Pelkmans

conviction and action It is only in the second instance when theneed to press beyond doubt emerges that it may play a temper-ing or an obstructing role It is important then to focus not

only on the role of doubt in building up energy but also on themechanisms by which this energy is released as this will revealthe interplay between the energizing tempering and debilitatingeffects of doubt

At this point it is helpful to consider the contradiction inher-ent in the idea of doubtless conviction Tis point has alreadybeen hinted at in connection with Peircersquos (1868) statement that

absolute certainty is idle and therefore dissipates Put differentlyit is pointless to believe things that are self-evident As Christinaoren suggests we would misrepresent our informants if welsquocasted as belief what our informants know rsquo because in contrastto knowledge belief refers to lsquoconsidering something to be truein the face of the possibility that it might be falsersquo (2007 308ndash9)Tis juxtaposition of lsquoknowledgersquo and lsquobeliefrsquo resonates with a

distinction made by Bloch in an earlier essay between lsquoun-examined intuitive beliefrsquo and lsquore1047298exive beliefsrsquo Te secondtype of beliefs lsquoare re1047298exive because they have to overcome thenagging doubt that perhaps it is not truersquo leading to an lsquoexag-gerated kind of ldquobeliefrdquo actrsquo (2005 110) Tus the atheist whoexclaims that God does not exist is making an lsquoexaggerated act ofdisbeliefrsquo which indicates imperfect or challenged knowledgeTat is expressions of conviction or belief are often manifesta-tions of doubt ndash of suspended doubt ndash because why else wouldthere be a need to express the thought Tis intertwining of (dis)belief and doubt has important consequences Although in somerespects it may be justi1047297ed to say that doubt is situated betweenbelief and disbelief such a statement is nonetheless problematicwhereas the 1047297rst two can be seen as lsquopositionsrsquo doubt is both aconnector and a precondition of belief and disbelief16

Examples of this energizing effect are easy to 1047297nd Tevigour enthusiasm and intensity of the novice or the convertare almost proverbial Berger and Zijderveld usefully suggestthat this is so because contrary to people who have grown upin a particular religion class or offi ce in the case of converts




lsquothe taken-for-granted-ness must be laboriously constructed andvigorously maintained For this reason converts are typicallymore fervent than ldquonativesrdquorsquo (2009 80) In line with this thought

several contributors to this volume indicate that it is precisely thelack of certainty that drives the quest for truth When Libera-tore (Chapter 9) writes about her Somali informantsrsquo waveringin becoming practising Muslims it is clear that their struggleis simultaneously a highly energized quest Te womenrsquos patchyknowledge and their doubts about lsquowhat is truersquo motivate themto seek information and advice from religious authorities and

indeed to incorporate these in their thinking and actingIn these examples the drive that produces conviction andaction stems from incompleteness meaning that the challengeemerges from within Te challenge can certainly also comefrom without in which case conviction (as energized lsquoknowl-edgersquo) is produced through encounters with those who do notshare in lsquothe truthrsquo Te missionary ndash as a generic type ndash is argu-

ably the avatar of such dialogically produced conviction TePentecostal missionaries I followed in Kyrgyzstan can serve asan example (Pelkmans 2009a 2009b 2010) Tey operated ina tense environment in which Islamic leaders as well as ordinaryMuslims disputed the missionariesrsquo religious claims Te some-times heated discussions between missionaries and Muslims werepresented in sermons and informal church gatherings as heroicencounters in which the Christian message and its spokesmenultimately prevailed Moreover these defences of lsquotruthrsquo ndash forexample against the allegation that the rinity indicates polythe-ism ndash were simultaneously attempts to try and convince Muslimsof the Christian message Te invigorating effects of externalchallenges were not only noticeable in the missionariesrsquo speechesand acts but sometimes expressed by the men themselves Asone Kyrgyz missionary told me in what came across as a particu-

larly frank moment lsquoWe pray for [local government] offi cialsto stop hindering us But this may not be Godrsquos way Our faiththrives when it is being repressedrsquo Tat is such external challengeswere a means to strengthen conviction while contributing to theintensity of Christian life (the opposite possibility in which the



26 Mathijs Pelkmans

external challenge undermines belief will be discussed in the lastsection of this introduction)

Tis example suggests that distinguishing between internal

and external challenges may be easier in theory than in practice AsColeman argues even when missionaries fail to convince otherstheir acts are not without effect lsquothey have an audience of at leastone given that the evangelical speaker is also perforce a listenerattending to a message that achieves an important part of itspurpose merely by being powerfully and passionately projectedout into the worldrsquo (2003 24) Efforts to convince others of

the truth ndash as in revolutionary and missionary movements ndashalso work (intentionally or not) to convince oneself In livedexperience external threats and internal doubts and convictionscannot be meaningfully separated

Te important point here is that convictions are not simplypresent but are rather produced in dialogue with challenges(challenges which may take the form of doubt) It is intriguing

and worrying then to see that systematic analytical attention tothe relation between doubt and conviction and between doubtand violent action is rare Alpa Shahrsquos contribution (Chapter 7)is an important exception She illustrates the fragility and thepatchiness of political conviction by following a young man whoponders joining the Maoist revolutionary army His journey is aquest not just for truth but for lsquoclarity in social relationshipsrsquoaiming to 1047297nd out who and what can be trusted While onto-logical certainty remained elusive conviction was produced (toan extent) by testing relationships which enabled this man tooccupy a more committed position In this process Shah writesconviction and certainty was being lsquocarved out of uncertaintyand ambivalencersquo

It is diffi cult to judge how widely Shahrsquos insights applyclearly more research needs to be conducted on the fragility of

conviction It is nevertheless worthwhile to re1047298ect on the appar-ent reluctance to analyse the role of doubt in committed action A partial (and rather impressionistic) insight can be gainedby typing the terms lsquodoubtrsquo and lsquoterrorismrsquo in various searchengines Intriguingly such searches mainly produce results that




pair terrorism with the absence of doubt17 which bespeaks notonly the wish (or at least tendency) to speak unambiguouslyabout terrorists and terrorism but also a failure to analyse how

committed action is produced Critical attitudes are perhaps morecommon in the arts for example in the work errorist by Iranianartist Khosrow Hassanzadeh which critiques the dominantstereoptypical notion of lsquoterroristrsquo by displaying the very peoplein which he has most faith ndash his mother sister himself ndash as terrorists (see Shatanawi 2006) Te artistic quality of this andsimilar artworks partly derives from the ability to upset dominant

discourses of terrorism and the underlying assumptions aboutcommitted political action By challenging such assumptionsartists may generate intense controversy A good example is the 1047297lmParadise Now (2005) directed by Abu-Assad Te 1047297lm followstwo young Palestinian men who are recruited to carry out suicideattacks in Israel and zooms in on their hesitations contradictoryfeelings and the ultimate haphazardness of their actions some

of which are left for the viewer to guess As Gana points out inher discussion of the 1047297lm lsquothe narrativization of suicide bomb-ingrsquo seeks to understand an act that is more conveniently seen asbeing lsquobeyond understandingrsquo while at the same time aimingto leave lsquointact its unthinkabilityrsquo (2008 23) Narrativizationunavoidably humanizes actors (terrorists in this case) creatingintense discomfort precisely because terrorism needs its exclamationmark to make sense as a concept

o return to the central point of this section while doubtplays a relatively straightforward role in building up energyimportant variation is found in how this energy is released Terelease is only possible by forcing a break and this is true as muchfor academic as it is for embodied doubt By radically sideliningdoubt at the moment of its greatest intensity truly committedaction can be produced ndash constructive as well as destructive In

comparison a gradual release of doubt tends to have temperingeffects In political decision-making such mechanisms exist inthe form of the lsquochecklistrsquo which allows doubts to be systemati-cally eliminated in order to allow for progressive action Finallyif doubt cannot be sidelined it may either cause an energetic (as



28 Mathijs Pelkmans

well as exhausting) wavering between options or have a debili-tating effect preventing any action from taking place

I started this section by highlighting the ambivalence in the

poetry of Yeats and Brecht yet quoted lines that stressed thenegative energy of doubt lsquothe thoughtless who never doubt Meet the thoughtful who never actrsquo (Brecht 1979) Tis is anintriguing and provocative thought but rather than entertainingthe possibility that the thoughtless never pondered analyti-cally it is more fruitful to think of lsquothoughtless actionrsquo as theresult of having broken with doubt Likewise do the thoughtful

ndash those who excessively doubt ndash really never act Elsewhere inhis poem Brecht writes lsquothe most beautiful of all doubts iswhen the downtrodden and despondent raise their heads and stop believing in the strength of their oppressorsrsquo (1979) HereBrecht ascribes revolutionary potential to doubt and I wouldargue that this potential exists precisely because these doubtsextend straight into new certainties ndash the downtrodden not only

becoming conscious of their oppression but moreover convincedthat the oppressive forces can be defeated Brechtrsquos revolution-ary doubt analytically coincides but normatively contrasts with Yeatsrsquo thought that lsquoTe best lack all conviction while the worst are full of passionate intensityrsquo Tat is while the mechanisms bywhich energy is released coincide ndash namely by dismissing doubtndash Yeats is not talking about subalterns striving for a fairer worldbut about oppressors who seek its destruction Evaluations ofthe moderating debilitating and energizing effects of doubt arenaturally based on a normative engagement with the object towhich doubt is attached

(iv) Relational ties and temporal cycles

lsquoTe Messiah will come only when he is no longer necessary

he will come only one day after his arrival he will not comeon the last day but on the last day of allrsquo (Kafka 1991)

Te cycles in which doubts play a part can no better beillustrated than by this rather mysterious passage from Franz




Kafka which appears as an isolated fragment in Te Tird Notebook(1991)18 Te passage can be read in various ways It can be readto refer to illusion in the sense that revelation will always be post-

poned but never delivered except perhaps lsquoon the last day of allrsquoEqually strong elements are the hope and disillusionment of theactor who after each realization that the Messiah has not appearedwill continue to expect his arrival destined to be disappointedagain Te passage also evokes doubt related to the uncertaintyabout if when and to what end the Messiah should be expectedBut perhaps most of all the fragment suggests that these qualities

feed into each other As such it is a powerful vignette not only forthis section but for the human condition in generalPrevious sections re1047298ected on the mechanisms by which

doubt and belief hesitation and action are linked Doubt risesfrom uncertainty and attaches itself to speci1047297c objects It has anagentive force which may provoke conviction but only by trans-forming the doubted object Doubt pushes for resolution but

this resolution may be haphazard or offer only temporary clarityTe relationships are complex fractured and multifaceted andyet there appears to be a cyclical patterning to hope belief doubtand disillusionment

Such cyclical patterning is central to Eszter Bartharsquos discus-sion of illusion and disillusionment in post-socialist Hungary(Chapter 8) Many of her interlocutors employees of theRaacuteba car factory had in the past felt committed to the socialistmodernist project and the associated forms of belonging buthad become disenchanted with socialism long before it witheredin the late 1980s As Yurchak (2006) has argued for the SovietUnion the growing discrepancy between pompous communistrhetoric and everyday reality undermined the effi cacy of offi -cial ideology which increasingly failed to produce the affectivequalities needed for collective action In Hungary the workers

became similarly disillusioned with the communist project andshifted their hopes onto the lsquocapitalist dreamrsquo Tis dream prom-ised not only a future of abundance but also an escape fromthe constraints of socialist bureaucracy However once lsquocapital-ismrsquo arrived the destabilizing effects of the market generated



30 Mathijs Pelkmans

widespread uncertainty and denied people the possibility (orillusion of that possibility) of making their mark on larger soci-etal issues

When talking about cycles disillusionment cannot be theendpoint Bartharsquos ethnography suggests three partly inter-linked responses to disillusionment apathy concerning thepresent situation coupled with a nostalgia for the socialist past1047298irtation with nationalist agendas that promise to domesticatethe uncontrollable 1047298ux of capitalism and 1047297rst and foremost areorientation of hopes and aspirations towards the social micro-

cosm of the family Te ethnography also suggests that cyclesof hope belief doubt and disillusionment will not continueendlessly with the same intensity Te new populist move-ments for example failed to invoke intense fervour amongstthose who had been disappointed with the grand politicalideologies of the past For them the cycles were running out ofsteam Most of Bartharsquos interlocutors ndash middle-aged and elderly

men and women ndash had become wary of all grand ideologiesand had lost all hope however illusory it might have been ofbeing able to in1047298uence society at large Instead they focusedon more concrete manageable goals like securing a good futurefor their children

Such distinctive cyclical patterning is absent in the othercontributions to this volume Despite this there are indica-tions that such patterns might have been found had the researchcontinued over a longer time span For example the Somaliwomen featured in Liberatorersquos chapter became interested inIslam at moments in which they had become disenchantedwith consumerism and lsquoworldly lifersquo Teir spiritual quests werefraught with challenges that spurred their conviction alongBut other challenges threatened to dissipate their convictionndash spending (too much) time with non-practising friends for

example Te chance that 1047297rm belief would ebb away was alwayspresent representing a move from belief to doubt On the otherhand in Naumescursquos chapter the Old Believer villagers foundthemselves at a low point in the cycle a point at which thereseemed to be no more hope But they were nevertheless inspired





32 Mathijs Pelkmans

ending let me 1047298esh out these aspects a bit more fully drawing onthe previous sections

I have argued that the ungraspable nature of doubt stems

from its tendency to disappear with the articulation of thoughtand the performance of action When overhearing what peoplesay or observing what they do we are presented with theoutcomes of complex processes of re1047298ection and formulation When we ask people to give opinions we push them to makeconclusions (at least provisional ones) Doubt slips even furtheraway when we register what people do ndash that is when we register

what they have decided to do Ethnographic research cannot fullyovercome this bias yet its long-term and intimate engagementwith subjects has the potential to register changes of opinion todocument the 1047298uctuating intensity of action or even to capturelsquostates of aphasiarsquo (Oushakine 2000) when people are left speechlessin the face of uncontrollable 1047298ux

Doubt is analytically challenging because acknowledging its

role means that lsquomapping the worldrsquo is insuffi cient in explain-ing why people think and act the way they do (see Crapanzano2004) Looking for correlations ndash the preoccupation of muchsocial science research ndash is a useful pragmatic step to generatequestions but rarely provides satisfying answers lsquobeliefrsquo cannotbe grasped without taking the alternative into considerationlsquoactionrsquo needs to be understood in reference to the emotiveforces that push it forward Belief and action are often best seenas responses to challenges For the researcher this means thatacknowledging the role of doubt adds demands to data collec-tion as it implies that statements of belief cannot be taken forgranted However it is a worthwhile investment if as Highpoints out (Chapter 3) by doing so we are able to lsquoportray morecomprehensively how our informants understand the worldrsquo andare better positioned to understand their efforts to navigate a

reality that is only partly knowableMore often than not doubt is politically inconvenient

Berger and Zijderveld (2009) are probably right in suggestingthat a lsquodoubting approachrsquo has the bene1047297t of enabling betterinformed judgement but political actors are generally expected




to take a stance rather than to sit on the fence Prolonged re1047298ectionis often seen negatively as a sign of indecisiveness and wavering (orlsquo1047298ip-1047298oppingrsquo the label that proved fatal to Senator Kerryrsquos elec-

tion bid in 2004) Most contemporary leaders certainly wonrsquotpresent themselves as doubters Terefore we tend to be shockedwhen learning that for instance Joseph Stalin was dramaticallyindecisive when faced with the German attack and some of us(myself included) sardonically watched the initial indecisive-ness of the self-proclaimed lsquodeciderrsquo George W Bush when newsof the 911 plane attacks reached him in an elementary school

classroom in Florida Te idea of hesitating commanders doubt-ing terrorists or wavering revolutionaries is confounding becauseit shatters con1047297dence in our ability to see things clearly andbecause it forcefully impresses on us the fragility and complexityof the world

A 1047297nal reason for why doubt is a challenging topic is that it isnot altogether clear what it produces While an essential ingredient

for making people disposed to act and commit it also has theability to detract from action and commitment Doubt thereforeappears to have unpredictable effects and this is ampli1047297ed by theinstability of both the act of doubting and the object of doubtMoreover the overcoming bracketing and eliminating of doubtis and can only be at most a temporary and partial lsquosolutionrsquo Attention to doubt is essential not only to do justice to complexitybut also for better understanding how people energized by theirdoubt and compelled to overcome it 1047297nd themselves makingdecisions committing to action or becoming paralysed

Doubt is not only a challenging topic it is also the embodi-ment of the challenge o make this claim requires re1047298ection onhow doubt relates to other challenges Of particular relevance arethe connections between internal and external challenges Doubtas an active state of mind directed towards a questioned object

is the ultimate internal challenge Te external challenge bycontrast is commonly understood as threat Tat is while doubtis a challenge that emerges from within the threat is generallyseen as a challenge from without However internal and externalchallenges can morph into one another due to the porosity of



34 Mathijs Pelkmans

the boundary between the internal and the external Moreoverdoubts and threats can both strengthen and weaken commit-ment depending on the solidity of the ideological structures and

the supporting social body Above I have shown that the externalchallenge can serve to overcome internal doubts as in the caseof a Pentecostal church in Kyrgyzstan where interactions witha hostile social environment invigorated faith and strengthenedthe cohesiveness of the congregation (Pelkmans 2009a) Externalchallenges can thus be bene1047297cial to produce shared convictionOr as Buck-Morss (2000 9) argues lsquoo de1047297ne the enemy is

simultaneously to de1047297ne the collective Indeed de1047297ning theenemy is the act that brings the collective into beingrsquo

However this is only one side of the story because other-wise external challenges could not be genuinely seen as threats As we saw acts of belief form a mechanism to address thechallenge aimed at domesticating doubts and averting threatsBut there is always the possibility that these acts will fail to

convince and that the external threat will morph into uncon-trollable doubt which spreads through the social body19 Tis isparticularly true for revolutionary movements Stephen Kotkin(1995) refers to this as the lsquoenemy withinrsquo and documents howin the 1047297rst decades of Soviet rule the most imminent dangerfor the communist leadership was not necessarily the physicalthreat posed by the capitalist or the Nazi enemy (at least before1941) but rather the possibility that members of the Commu-nist Party would harbour sympathies for these competing ideo-logical systems Te lsquoenemy withinrsquo is so dangerous preciselybecause it undermines erodes and may bring down the ideologicalsuperstructure As Buck-Morss writes in a chapter inspired byKotkinrsquos work even if the geographical boundary between theCold War absolute enemies was partly a mere physical bulwarkit also served lsquothe unstated purpose of isolating the political

imaginaries themselves protecting each from being under-mined by the logic of the otherrsquo (2000 36)20

In ideologically de1047297ned structures ndash be they communistnationalist or religious ndash campaigns against heretics and disbe-lievers tend to be particularly vicious due to their potential to




infect the social body from within undermining its ontologi-cal structure Te problematic insider needs to be cleansed aswell as expelled Pitt-Rivers has aptly suggested that the alien

and far-removed lsquobarbarianrsquo tends to be less problematic than thelsquostrangerrsquo who moves through the social body potentially infect-ing it (1977 94ndash112) Tis can be compared to Mary Douglasrsquofamous statement that lsquodirt is matter out of placersquo (1966 36)lsquoDirtrsquo which may take the guise of ideas people or objects thatdo not 1047297t the imagined order prompt attempts to cleanse thesocial body21 Challenges are most threatening when they come

from what is near (see Blok 2001 123) Tus when the exter-nal challenge impresses itself onto the social body it usefullystrengthens the collective and its ontological structures as longas it remains on the outside but the challenge becomes trulythreatening when it mixes with the social body infecting it andpotentially causing it to disintegrate

o bring these opening thoughts to a close let me revisit

my original line about the early church fathersrsquo negative atti-tude towards lsquodoubting Tomasrsquo (Bonney 2002 1ndash2 n 1) bysuggesting that they were right after all at least from their ownpoint of view It may appear that the church fathers did notrealize the energizing quality of doubt and its role in reachingconviction However even if this is the case their admonitionof the doubting (or unbelieving) apostle had its own ration-ale Doubtrsquos constructive potential is only maintained as longas it remains relatively isolated and will ultimately be able tobe sidelined Moreover from the perspective of church fatherswho wish order rather than revolution subdued faith may bepreferred over enthusiastic but unstable conviction Tat is theymay well have appreciated the revolutionary potential of doubtand realized that it was not in their interest o avoid chaos andto attain temporary closure people will always attempt to curtail

doubt But this does not mean that doubt will disappear Even inits lsquoabsencersquo doubt continues to peak through from lsquobeyond thehorizonrsquo and exert its in1047298uence (see Crapanzano 2004 16ndash17)Such hidden doubt the lsquopossibility of alternativersquo will continueto destabilize and prohibit complacency



36 Mathijs Pelkmans

Notes

1 In English these questions sound not even half as profound asin Russian as Lenin realized when naming his famous ([1902] 1945)pamphlet Chto delatrsquo (translated as What is to be done ) in whichquestions of action and truth are tightly entwined2 Crapanzano invokes William Jamesrsquo suggestion that traditionalpsychology has not been able to capture the lsquofree water of conscious-nessrsquo due to its obsession with labelling and categorizing elements ofthought (2004 18)3 Te story of lsquodoubting Tomasrsquo is that of the apostle who didnrsquot

believe reports about Jesusrsquo resurrection and was only able to lsquoovercomehis doubtsrsquo when Jesus provided the requested sensory proof during asubsequent appearance Intriguingly Tomas was never really in doubt he was never lsquoof two mindsrsquo but switched over from disbelief to beliefTis is re1047298ected in some languages like Dutch in which he is called lsquodis-believing Tomasrsquo which also underlines his negative status As thelsquoavatar of disbeliefrsquo Tomas has served as a warning that it is lsquowrong torequire supernatural evidence as a basis of onersquos faithrsquo (Bonney 2002 1ndash2)

4 Tere are other precursors to the cogito ergo sum Socrates and Aristotle for example are often cited as making statements that essen-tially convey the same idea5 Te idea of a lsquohistory of doubtrsquo appears to be a contradiction interms because doubt is neither an object nor an idea traceable throughhistory but rather a relational and temporal aspect of ideas and actionsIt is therefore unsurprising that Hechtrsquos book is not really about doubtor doubting but rather a history of critical stances towards the lsquodoubt-

fulrsquo idea of God and would have been more aptly titled (A)theism AHistory 6 Tis entertained doubt has been criticized by amongst othersPeirce who writes lsquoLet us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what wedo not doubt in our heartsrsquo (Peirce 1868 141)7 Some passages in Te Meditations give a different impression forexample lsquoTe Meditation of yesterday has 1047297lled my mind with somany doubts that it is no longer in my power to forget them Nor

do I see hellip any principle on which they can be resolvedrsquo (1996 II 1)But this is a practical doubt similar to frustration with being stuck ina (logical) puzzle or not knowing which direction to take when comingto a fork in a road




8 It can be argued that anthropological doubt is rarely lsquoradicalrsquo andis better described as lsquowonderrsquo in the sense of opening oneself up to arange of possible truths a process of moving back and forth between

different worlds without necessarily aiming to resolve their epistemo-logical status9 Tis ideal is tied up with the concept of participant observation Although sometimes seen as an oxymoron ndash complete participationand systematic observation exclude each other ndash an ethnographicapproach recognizes the tension but sees it as analytically productivein the sense that deeper insight is gained by moving back and forthbetween detached observation and intimate participation (see edlock

1991 for a useful discussion on the topic)10 Crapanzano highlights the limitations of expertise lsquoits narrowpurview its frequent failure to critically evaluate the way in whichit frames and categorizes its subject matter the blinkers it imposesrsquo(2004 5)11 Te lsquoCartesian Circlersquo refers to the problem that followingDescartesrsquo logic it appears that one can only be certain of the validityof onersquos perception if Godrsquos existence has been established but one can

only be certain of Godrsquos existence after having established that whatone perceives is true Tis interesting tension has been hotly debatedby generations of philosophers (see van Cleve 1979)12 Such re1047298ections can be lifted to the level of society As Bergerand Zijderveld point out a society in which every issue is lsquoa matter ofindividual choicersquo and thus a matter of doubt lsquowould lapse into chaosrsquo(2009 14)13 Another related term is lsquoambivalencersquo Like doubt ambivalenceis located in the actor but it connotes a more disinterested stance thandoubt Tat is doubt forces itself onto its object more than ambivalencedoes14 In the words of Hoffman a philosopher of doubt in1047298uenced byHeidegger lsquoWhen taken out of this ordinary setting the concepts ofdoubt and ignorance lose all their meaning to the man of commonsensersquo (1986 20)

15 lsquoDen Unbedenklichen die niemals zweifeln Begegnen die Beden-klichen die niemals handelnrsquo (Brecht 1979)16 alking about different issues but similar mechanisms SlavojŽižek speaks of the vital importance of lsquothe obstaclersquo which on the onehand prevents the full deployment of productive forces but is lsquosimul-taneously its ldquocondition of possibilityrdquorsquo because a complete realization



38 Mathijs Pelkmans

(of love for example) would remove the mystery and thereby de1047298ateinterest (Žižek 2001 18)17 ypical phrases are lsquothere is no doubtrsquo lsquowithout any (shadow

of) doubtrsquo and lsquodoubtlesslyrsquo Likewise the term lsquounwaveringrsquo ismore frequently used than lsquowaveringrsquo in discussions of terrorists andrevolutionaries18 I am indebted to Anton Blok for drawing my attention to thistext of Kafkarsquos19 It is important to note that the traffi c between external and inter-nal is lopsided Te question lsquocan the external threat become internaldoubtrsquo may be answered affi rmatively by contrast internal doubt is

unlikely to act as a bulwark against the external challenge and is evenless likely to cause the external threat to erode20 lsquoIt is the absolute political enemy that threatens the existence ofthe collective not only (and perhaps not mainly) in a physical sensebut rather in an ontological sense because it challenges the verynotion by which the identity of the collective has been formedrsquo (Buck-Morss 2000 36)21 Douglasrsquo metaphor of dirt has been frequently used to illumi-

nate the horrendous logic of genocidal regimes obsessed as they maybecome with their ideal of homogeneity setting in motion destructiveacts of puri1047297cation (see Appadurai 2006 44 Hayden 1996 784 Wolf1999 246)

References

Appadurai Arjun (2006) Fear of Small Numbers An Essay on theGeography of Anger Durham NC Duke University Press Augustine St (1950) Te City of God [De civitate Dei] London

Faber amp Fabermdashmdashmdash (1951) Against the Academics [Contra Academicos]

New York Paulus Pressmdashmdashmdash (1988) lsquoractate 29 on John 714ndash18rsquo in ractates on the

Gospel of John 1ndash10 trans J W Rettig Washington DC TeCatholic University of America Press

Berger Peter and Anton Zijderveld (2009) In Praise of DoubtHow to Have Convictions without Becoming a Fanatic New York Harper One




Bloch Maurice (2005) Essays on Cultural ransmission OxfordBerg

Blok Anton (2001) Honour and Violence Cambridge Polity

Bonney William (2002) Caused to Believe Te Doubting TomasStory at the Climax of Johnrsquos Christological Narrative LeidenBrill

Brecht Bertolt (1979) lsquoIn Praise of Doubtrsquo in J Willett and RManheim (eds) Poems 1913ndash1956 London Routledge

Buck-Morss Susan (2000) Dreamworld and Catastrophe TePassing of Mass Utopia in East and West Cambridge MA

MI PressCarrithers Michael (1990) lsquoIs Anthropology Art or SciencersquoCurrent Anthropology 31(3) 263ndash82

Coleman Simon (2003) lsquoContinuous Conversion Te RhetoricPractice and Rhetorical Practice of Charismatic ProtestantConversionrsquo in A Buckser and S Glazier (eds) Te Anthro- pology of Religious Conversion Lanham MD Rowman amp

Little1047297eldCrapanzano Vincent (2004) Imaginative Horizons An Essay inLiteraryndashPhilosophical Anthropology Chicago University ofChicago Press

Descartes Rene (1996) Meditations on the First PhilosophyWith Selections from the Objections and Replies ed JohnCottingham Cambridge Cambridge University Press

DeWalt K and B DeWalt (2002) Participant Observation AGuide for Fieldworkers Oxford Alta Mira Press

Douglas Mary (1966) Purity and Danger An Analysis ofConcepts of Pollution and aboo New York Frederick APraeger

Engelke Matthew (2008) lsquoTe Objects of Evidencersquo Journal ofthe Royal Anthropological Institute (NS) S1ndashS21

Evans-Pritchard E P (1937) Witchcraft Oracles and Magic

among the Azande Oxford Clarendon PressFirth Raymond (1959) lsquoProblem and Assumption in an

Anthropological Study of Religionrsquo Te Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 89(2)129ndash48



40 Mathijs Pelkmans

Fukuyama Francis (1992) Te End of History and the Last ManLondon Penguin

Gana Nouri (2008) lsquoReel Violence Paradise Now and the

Collapse of the Spectaclersquo Comparative Studies of South Asia Africa and the Middle East 28(1) 20ndash37

Golden-Biddle Karen and Karen Locke (1993) lsquoAppealing Work An Investigation of How Ethnographic exts ConvincersquoOrganization Science 4(4) 595ndash616

Harding Susan (1987) lsquoConvicted by the Holy Spirit Te Rhetoricof Fundamental Baptist Conversionrsquo American Ethnologist

14(1) 167ndash81Hastrup Kirsten (2004) lsquoGetting it Right Knowledge andEvidence in Anthropologyrsquo Anthropological Teory 4(4)455ndash72

Hayden Robert (1996) lsquoImagined Communities and RealVictims Self-determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslaviarsquo American Ethnologist 23(4) 783ndash801

Hecht Jennifer Michael (2003) Doubt A History New YorkHarper San FranciscoHeidegger Martin ([1953] 2010) Being and ime trans J

Stambaugh New York State University of New York PressHoffman Piotr (1986) Doubt ime Violence Chicago University

of Chicago PressKafka Franz (1991) lsquoTe Tird Notebook December 19 1917rsquo

in M Brod (ed) Te Blue Octavo Notebooks trans E Kaiserand E Wilkins Cambridge MA Exact Change

Kapferer Bruce (2001) lsquoAnthropology Te Paradox of theSecularrsquo Social Anthropology 9 341ndash44

Kierkegaard Soren ([1843] 1985) Fear and rembling DialecticalLyric by Johannes de Silentio trans Alastair Hannay LondonPenguin Books

mdashmdashmdash (1941) Kierkegaardrsquos Concluding Unscienti1047297c Postscript

trans D Swenson and W Lowrie Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Kotkin Stephen (1995) Magnetic Mountain Stalinism as a Civi-lization Berkeley University of California Press





42 Mathijs Pelkmans

Skirry Justin (2005) Descartes and the Metaphysics of HumanNature London Continuum

Spradley James (1980) Participant Observation New York Holt

Rhinehart and Winstonedlock Barbara (1991) lsquoFrom Participant Observation to the

Observation of Participation Te Emergence of NarrativeEthnographyrsquo Journal of Anthropological Research 41(1)69ndash94

oren Christina (2007) lsquoHow Do We Know What Is ruersquo inR Astuti J Parry and C Stafford (eds) Questions of Anthro-

pology Oxford BergVan Cleve James (1979) lsquoFoundationalism Epistemic Principlesand the Cartesian Circlersquo Te Philosophical Review 88(1) 55ndash91

Wilson R (2004) lsquoTe rouble with ruth Anthropologyrsquos Epis-temological Hypochondriarsquo Anthropology oday 20(5) 14ndash17

Wittgenstein Ludwig (1969) On Certainty [Uumlber Gewissheit]Oxford Blackwell

Wolf Eric (1999) Envisioning Power Ideologies of Dominanceand Crisis Berkeley CA University of California Press Yeats W B ([1921] 2008) lsquoTe Second Comingrsquo in Te Collected

Poems of W B Yeats Ware Hertfordshire Wordsworth Yurchak Alexei (2006) Everything Was Forever Until It Was No

More Te Last Soviet Generation Princeton NJ PrincetonUniversity Press

Zigon Jarrett (2009) lsquoHope Dies Last wo Aspects of Hopein Contemporary Moscowrsquo Anthropological Teory 9(3)253ndash71

Žižek Slavoj (1989) Te Sublime Object of Ideology London Versomdashmdashmdash (2001) On Belief London Verso



2 Mathijs Pelkmans

held ideas are propelled into committed action a process inwhich doubt and ambiguity are sidelined Alpa Shah (Chapter7) demonstrates how doubt and hesitation surface in the daily

lives of Maoist revolutionaries in India ndash that is among actorswho tend to be depicted as insularly committed to an ideologicalcause By detailing their daily concerns Shah demonstrates notonly that lived reality is messier than it appears from a distancebut also that tremendous energy is required to produce un-ambiguous conviction Such painstakingly attained convictionfrequently offers no more than a fragile and temporary haven

For example the Muslim converts to Pentecostalism I studied inKyrgyzstan appeared to be unwavering and steadfast lsquofollowers of Jesusrsquo but in many instances this certainty was 1047298eeting the 1047298ashof conviction giving way to more complacent attitudes or evento complete withdrawal from church life after months of intenseengagement (Pelkmans 2009a) Another case in point is the initialenthusiasm for lsquocapitalist modernityrsquo which thrived in Hungary

around 1990 but which faded once the disillusioning reality offree market reform made itself known (see Bartha Chapter 8) Whether or not such instances affi rm Wittgensteinrsquos assertionthat lsquoDoubt comes after beliefrsquo (1969 statement 160) requiresfurther discussion but they do underline the extent to whichdoubt and belief are intertwined Terefore rather than seeingambivalence and hesitation as indications of lsquoimperfect convic-tionrsquo the chapters of this volume show that belief and disbeliefimplicate each other in important ways

Doubt does not exclusively point to ontological and epis-temological referents to the questions lsquowhat isrsquo and lsquowhat istruersquo Lived doubt points also (and sometimes more pressingly)to pragmatic referents to the question lsquowhat to dorsquo1 Questionsof being of truth and of action should always be seen in relationto each other both in the banal sense that a sense of lsquowhat isrsquo

provides direction (but not unilinear direction) to action andalso in the more profound sense that when nothing is worth1047297ghting for (when nothing is deemed to be true) apathy andhopelessness may set in Tis aspect is emphasized by DavidNapierrsquos discussion (2009) of how the unravelling of bonds of













4 Mathijs Pelkmans




















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10 Mathijs Pelkmans























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16 Mathijs Pelkmans

Lived doubt











18 Mathijs Pelkmans

















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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















36 Mathijs Pelkmans

Notes
















38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans


























4 Mathijs Pelkmans




















6 Mathijs Pelkmans



















8 Mathijs Pelkmans



















10 Mathijs Pelkmans























14 Mathijs Pelkmans


















16 Mathijs Pelkmans

Lived doubt











18 Mathijs Pelkmans

















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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans



























6 Mathijs Pelkmans



















8 Mathijs Pelkmans



















10 Mathijs Pelkmans























14 Mathijs Pelkmans


















16 Mathijs Pelkmans

Lived doubt











18 Mathijs Pelkmans

















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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans


























8 Mathijs Pelkmans



















10 Mathijs Pelkmans























14 Mathijs Pelkmans


















16 Mathijs Pelkmans

Lived doubt











18 Mathijs Pelkmans

















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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















36 Mathijs Pelkmans

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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans

























10 Mathijs Pelkmans























14 Mathijs Pelkmans


















16 Mathijs Pelkmans

Lived doubt











18 Mathijs Pelkmans

















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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















36 Mathijs Pelkmans

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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans






























14 Mathijs Pelkmans


















16 Mathijs Pelkmans

Lived doubt











18 Mathijs Pelkmans

















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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















36 Mathijs Pelkmans

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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans
























16 Mathijs Pelkmans

Lived doubt











18 Mathijs Pelkmans

















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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















36 Mathijs Pelkmans

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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans


















18 Mathijs Pelkmans

















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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans

























20 Mathijs Pelkmans



















22 Mathijs Pelkmans






















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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans

























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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans




























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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans
























26 Mathijs Pelkmans




















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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















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References


























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References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans


















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34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























40 Mathijs Pelkmans





















42 Mathijs Pelkmans


























34 Mathijs Pelkmans



















36 Mathijs Pelkmans

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38 Mathijs Pelkmans





References


























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36 Mathijs Pelkmans

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Pelkmans Ch1 Outline

Documents

Transcript of Pelkmans Ch1 Outline