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What can Reasonably be Expected from a Truth Commission: A PreliminaryExamination of East Timorese ViewsEtienne Mullet a; Flix Neto b; Mara da Conceio Pinto ba Institute of Advanced Studies, France b Department of Social Psychology, Oporto University,

Online Publication Date: 01 October 2008

To cite this Article Mullet, Etienne, Neto, Flix and Pinto, Mara da Conceio(2008)'What can Reasonably be Expected from a TruthCommission: A Preliminary Examination of East Timorese Views',Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology,14:4,369 393To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/10781910802240717URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10781910802240717

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What can Reasonably be Expected froma Truth Commission: A PreliminaryExamination of East Timorese Views

Etienne MulletInstitute of Advanced Studies, France

Fe lix Neto and Mar a da Conceicao PintoDepartment of Social Psychology

Oporto University

A survey examining the personal views of a sample of 344 ordinary citizensliving in East Timor, and already familiarized with the concrete work of atruth commission on the possible objectives, functions, powers, and composi-tion of truth commissions, was conducted. The material consisted of 98 itemsthat referred to the global meaning, the composition, the functioning, and thepossible missions of a truth commission. The results seem to indicate that mostparticipants strongly valued the symbolic nature of truth commissions as dis-tinguished from their judicial or therapeutic nature. Strengthening the respectfor human rights everywhere, acquiring as much knowledge about past atro-cities as possible, and restoring the dignity of all those victims and perpetratorsinvolved in the atrocities were conceived as clear priorities. Most participantswere aware of the limited scope of the truth commissions and did not haveunrealistic expectations regarding the outcomes of such commissions.

This study was aimed at analyzing the viewpoints of a sample of participantsfrom East Timor on truth commissionson what ought to be theirstated objectives, their functions, their powers, and their composition. Theparticipants have been, for the most part, victims of human rights abuses.

Correspondence should be addressed to Etienne Mullet, Institute of Advanced Studies,Quefes 17 bis, F-31830 Plaisance du Touch, France. E-mail: [email protected]

Peace and Conflict, 14: 369393, 2008Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1078-1919 print =1532-7949 onlineDOI: 10.1080/10781910802240717

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The people of East Timor have endured the invasion of their territory andpolitical domination by Indonesia for 25 years, as well as the destruction

the militia and Indonesian army caused when leaving the country. The par-ticipants in this study were well aware of the functioning of truth commis-sions because a truth commission was operative in their country duringthe time of the survey.

TRUTH COMMISSIONS

Now in more than 30 countries (e.g., Chile, El Salvador, Germany,

Nigeria, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and the Honduras), truth commissionshave been a component of the process by which a nation has attemptedto rebuild itself after a period of division, violent conflict, or civil war(Borer, 2006; Hayner, 2002; Long & Brecke, 2003; Minow, 1998; Rothberg& Thompson, 2000; Skaar, Gloppen, & Suhrke, 2005; Villa-Vicencio &Verwoerd, 2000).

Minow (1998) identified 11 theoretical aspirations for truth commissions:

1. The overcoming of communal and official denial of the atrocity.

2. The gathering of detailed facts to meet the victims needs to know, tobuild a record for history, and to provide minimal accountability andvisibility of the perpetrators.

3. The end and prevention of future violence (the transformation of violence into words and institutional practices).

4. The creation of a sufficient basis for building a domestic democraticorder that respects and enforces human rights.

5. The consolidation and legitimization of a new democratic regime.6. The promotion of reconciliation among former opponents.

7. The promotion of psychological healing for individuals, groups,victims, bystanders, and offenders.8. The restoration of the victims dignity.9. The administration of the offenders punishment.

10. The expression that such collective violence should never occur again.11. The building of an international order that has the capacity to prevent

and respond to atrocities.

Other authors have subsequently endorsed part or all of Minows (1998)

objectives. Crocker (2000) suggested that the goals of truth commissionsmay include the establishment of truth about tragic past events, theprovision of a platform for the victims of these events, the apportionmentof perpetrators accountability and punishment, the achievement of the

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rule of law, the compensation of the victims, the recommendation of institutional and economic reforms, and the promotion of reconciliation

and democracy. Hayner (2002) suggested that truth commisions may haveany or all of the five basic aims: to discover, clarify, and formally ack-nowledge past abuse, to respond to specific needs of victims, to contributeto justice and accountability, to outline institutional responsibility andrecommend reforms, and to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict overthe past (p. 24). Long and Brecke (2003) suggested that truth commissionspuncture the impunity of privileged groups and open space for the othersteps involved in reconciliation, complement judicial processes and some-times substitute as a form of justice, restore societys ethical foundation,

and are sometimes a vehicle for the reconstruction of the identities of individual and key social groups.

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is prob-ably the best-known example of truth commissions. According to Jenkins(2002), it demonstrated

the possibility of progress toward bridging the divide peacefully in a post-conflict society. It facilitated the beginning of a dialogue between formeropponents, between victims and perpetrators; through its special hearings into

the role of different institutions in the apartheid era, it attempted to promoteunderstanding; through living examples of pain, grief, and cruelty, it encour-aged reflection on responsibility for past wrongs, whilst at the same time sup-porting the possibility of forgiveness; it understood the need for redress, butdid not seek to punish. In all these ways, and by the compassion and concernof the Commissioners, it offered hope for a better future. (p. 251)

Although the work of the truth commissions has systematically benefitedthe whole society, and further violence has usually been restricted to mini-mal, residual levels, the principle of these commissions has been criticized(Verwoerd, 2003).

SOME CRITICISMS LEVELED AGAINST TRUTH COMMISSIONS

The South African commission, the one most highly publicized around theworld, has sometimes been conceived as a model for other countriesinparticular, for the East Timorese commission. One type of criticism is thatthe truth commission was nothing more than a byproduct of a compromise

between old regimes and emerging forces (such as liberation movements). Itis well-known that the transition to democracy, which resulted in an agree-ment on an Interim Constitution that made provision for amnesty as part of a truth commission process, was a negotiated settlement between de Klerks

TRUTH COMMISSIONS 371

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National Party, Mandelas African National Congress, and other anti-apartheid movements. As a result, it is argued that the real question was

not whether to exchange justice for truth but to exchange justice for power(Jenkins, 2002). Some authors even argued that the powerful companies,who unconditionally backed the apartheid regime, supported the changeto escape the increasing international sanctions and to obtain better eco-nomic opportunities under the new regime (see Pilger, 1998). One of thedirect consequences of this phenomenon is that the pursuit of justice wasin danger of being sacrificed for the sake of achieving strictly political andeconomical purposes.

A second type of criticism is related to the concept of retributive justice;

namely, the commission has been accused of not prosecuting the authors of violence and displaying a high degree of complaisance toward some (e.g.,Mrs. Mandela), including granting amnesty for very serious crimes. Thiscould have the effect of convincing South Africans that even the new regimecan break the law and not apply justice (Wilson, 2001). These authors claimthat there is a direct link between the bad example set by the commissionand the daily violence that still goes on in South Africa (see Campbell,2005).

A third type of criticism is that financial compensation for victims of

gross violations was not sufficiently addressed by the commission (Jenkins,2002). Although in some cases material compensation has been offered, thefact that the victims rights can be ignored by an amnesty process may resultin great disappointment, especially for those still in need of urgent relief. Itseems, however, that this criticism is directed less at truth commissions thanat the government and international donor.

A fourth type of criticism is related to the supposed healing function of these commissions. Some authors have argued that the telling could consti-tute a second traumatic exposure which, just like apartheid, negates salient

understanding of the self (Van der Walt, Franchi, & Stevens, 2003, p. 263).Allan (2000) described, in detail, the trauma associated with the telling forthe victim, the victims family members, the truth commission staff, andthe audience. In many cases, the victims were selected by the commissionaccording to its own agenda (national reconciliation) and not necessarilyin accordance with what was best for the victims (Wilson, 2001). Insome cases, the victims were even prevented from mentioning the namesof their offenders (Verwoerd, 2003), which certainly was detrimental to theirwell-being.

A fifth type of criticism is that, despite the specification of its mandate,the TRC failed at developing a model of reconciliation at the most appro-priate levelthe intergroup level. The proponents of the TRC in SouthAfrica framed forgiveness as an interpersonal relationship between


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individual victims and perpetrators and not as an intergroup social relation-ship (Chapman, 2007, p. 52; see also Chapman & Spong, 2003).

Finally, it has been argued that truth commissions usually fail at render-ing a broad picture of the causes and consequences of the violence becauseof their tendency to focus on individual occurrences of violence (Mamdi,1998), which tends to obscure systemic or structural forms of violence(e.g., unequal distribution of land and wealth in the country and unequalaccess to education and health services). This criticism relates more to thevisible aspects of the commissions work (the hearings) than the conclusions(made public only after 1998). It should be added that the commissionsreport unequivocally condemned the previous regime and the underlying

causes of violence.

A LACK OF EMPIRICAL DATA

The diverse views and criticisms presented earlier may stem from thefact that very few empirical data exist on the attitudes of South Africanstoward the truth commissions and on the psychological impact of givingpublic testimony to the victims (Gibson, 2004b). In addition, the few

empirical data that are available do not support most of these criticisms.Gibson (2004b) showed that about 76% of Black South Africans inter-viewed in 2001 evaluated it favorably. Moreover, (a) more than 85% of them considered that the commission did a reasonable job of lettingfamilies know what happened to their loved ones, of providing a trueand unbiased account of the countrys history, and of ensuring that humanrights abuses would not happen again; and (b) more than 70% of themconsidered that the commission did a reasonable job of awarding compen-sation to victims and of punishing those guilty of atrocities. The claim that

South Africans were dissatisfied with their commission appeared largelylimited to White South Africans.Gibson (2002; see also Gibson, 2004b) showed that 72% of Black South

Africans agreed with granting amnesties decided by the commission, even if they were directed at other segments of the population. However, only aminority of Black South Africans (33%) considered the amnesties as just.These amnesties were, therefore, viewed as a result of political compromises,which, nevertheless, seemed to be acceptable to the majority of the popula-tion that had suffered most under the apartheid regime. Gibson (2004c)

showed that South Africans degree of respect for law was, on average, of the same level as that recorded in a Western country, like France. He alsoshowed a positive correlation between the respect for the law and the respectfor the commissions work. Also, Gibson (2004a) found that acknowledging


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that the apartheid system was a crime against humanity, and that manyatrocities had been committed for maintaining or fighting against this poli-

tical system, does in no way undermine reconciliation.Finally, Kaminer, Stein, Mbanga, and Zungu-Dirwayi (2001) showed

that between participation and current psychiatric status or current forgive-ness attitudes, the association was not significant. These authors realized adirect assessment of the impact of publicly testifying on participants levelsof posttraumatic stress disorder. In the group that gave public testimony,the percentage of participants with posttraumatic stress disorder was 24%.In the group that just gave a statement, this percentage was 48%. Theseresults can in no way support the idea that the telling had further trauma-

tized the victims.In summary, despite the massive political and sociological implications,

few empirical data are available on the short-term and long-term effectsof truth commissions. The empirical findings that were evidenced do notnecessarily sustain various common criticisms about truth commissions.

THIS STUDY

As stated by Verwoerd (2003), much of the criticism and confusion sur-rounding the TRC process is a sign of a deeper problem, namely a lack of consensus about what can and cannot reasonably be expected from this boldexperiment in responding to some of the wrongs of our past (p. 266). Ineffect, truth commissions have always been planned in a top-down way.The populations to whom these commissions were addressed have rarelybeen extensively consulted about the functions of such a commission; thatis, about what a truth commission ought to be, or even if it had to be atall, given the current situation in their country. Thus, it seemed very worth-

while to conduct a survey examining the personal views of a sample of ordinary citizens already familiarized with the concrete work of a truth com-mission on the possible objectives, functions, powers, and composition of truth commissions.

This study was conducted on a sample of East Timorese participants. Thechoice of East Timor was motivated by the fact that East Timor has, in fact,become one of the most recent countries to adopt a truth commission, estab-lishing a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation with theswearing-in of its commissioners at the beginning of 2002.

East Timor is located on the island of Timor, in southern Asia. Its capitalcity is Dili, and its population is about 1,000,000 inhabitants. It is borderedby Indonesia to the west. East Timor was a Portuguese colony from 1702 to1975. In 1859, the Portuguese who occupied the whole island ceded the


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western portion to the Netherlands. From 1942 to 1945, Japan occupied thecountry, which resulted in the deaths of 40,000 to 70,000 Timorese. In 1975,

East Timor gained its independence but, a few days later, was invaded andoccupied by Indonesian forces. It was reported that, during the invasion,mass killings and mass rapes took place. In 1976, the country became theIndonesian province of East Timor. Over the next two decades, between100,000 to 250,000 individuals were killed as result of the fighting againstthe occupation and the local militia.

In 1991, the public in the West was made aware by an unexpected TVreport that many East Timorese youngsters were killed at the Santa CruzCemetery in Dili. This massacre, and the publicity around it, attracted sym-

pathy for the Timorese cause. In 1996, Bishop Carlos Belo of Dili and Jose Manuel Ramos Horta, two leading activists for peace and independence,were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1997, South African presidentNelson Mandela visited Suharto and the imprisoned Xanana Gusmao, theleader of the National Front for the Liberation of Timor and future firstpresident of East Timor, and urged the liberation of East Timorese leaders.In 1998, President Suharto was led to resign, and President Habibie offeredEast Timor autonomy within Indonesia. In 1999, the international pressuregained momentum, and President Habibie was forced to announce the hold-

ing of a United Nations (U.N.) supervised referendum about the future of East Timor. An overwhelming majority of the East Timorese voted for inde-pendence from Indonesia. Infuriated with the results, anti-independenceTimorese militias, supported by the army of occupation, decided to pursuea scorched-earth policy. They launched a series of attacks against properties,irrigation and water supply systems, public buildings, hospitals, and schools.About 300,000 people were forcibly driven into West Timor as refugees, andabout 2,000 were assassinated. In late 1999, a multinational peacekeepingforce was sent by the U.N., which put an end to the violence.

In 2002, East Timor was recognized by the U.N. as an independent state.At the present time, the country is still in a state of unrest and Australia,Portugal, New Zealand, and, recently, Malaysia had to send troops toTimor in an effort to stop the violence between the government and partof the military. With about $1 a day for living expenses, the average EastTimorese citizen is the poorest citizen in the world.

It is highly likely that before a truth commission option was under con-sideration in East Timorthat is, before 2001very few of the participantsin this study, all ordinary citizens, would have been able to express clear

views about what a truth commission could be or ought to be. As a result,asking the East Timorese population about the missions and composition of truth commissions in 2001 would probably have been meaningless. How-ever, from 2002 to 2004, the population was able to familiarize itself with


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the work of a truth commission and, therefore, people in general were in abetter position in 2004 to express their views about what truth commissions

ought to be. They had been told about truth commissions. They had seenthe way a local truth commission worked. They had observed the successesand the limits of such commissions, and discussed them with their friendsand relatives. They had possibly attended local reconciliation initiatives(Babo Soares, 2005). In a certain way, they had become grass-root expertsabout truth commissions, and it was this expertise that we wanted tocapture.

If, owing to the lack of previous empirical work on this topic, precisehypotheses cannot be put forward, several clear research questions have

guided this study: (a) Are truth commissions really needed? (b) From themany possible missions suggested by Minow (1998) and other authors,which of them appear as necessary to the participants? (c) In particular,do offenders punishment, adequate reparations and compensations fromthem, and psychological healing appear as the main objectives for suchcommissions? (d) Should truth commissions be composed of individualsclose to the government or, by contrast, should it include independent-minded individuals? Finally, (e) Who can or should appear in front of suchcommissions?

METHOD

Participants

The sample of participants was composed of 160 (47%) women and 184(53%) men from the Dili region. Their ages ranged from 18 to 52, and themean age was 23 (SD 3.70). The sample was mainly composed of young,

educated persons who were able to complete a questionnaire: 4% had mas-ters degrees, 72% had completed secondary education, 13% had completedprimary education, and the remaining 11% had not completed primaryeducation. Forty-seven percent of the participants were students at DiliUniversity.

Two hundred sixty-seven participants declared that they had personallysuffered (e.g., being raped, severely hurt, tortured, detained) from the con-flicts, and 298 declared that a close family member had suffered from theconflicts (e.g., a close family member had been killed or severely hurt). Only

24 participants (7%) declared that they had notdirectly or indirectly suffered from the conflicts. These figures are consistent with Modviget al.s (2000) findings (see also Dunn, 2004). Thus, many of the participantswere either primary victims (they had personally suffered from the many


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conflicts in their areas) or secondary victims (they had indirectly sufferedthrough members of their family). Furthermore, all participants were

tertiary victims; that is, they had suffered from the brutal exploitation andpartial destruction of their country, even if they or their family were not per-sonally involved in the massacres. Thus, all participants were emotionallyinvolved in the study.

All participants were unpaid volunteers. They were approached in var-ious ways. Some were known by the experimenters or by a member of theirfamily. They were contacted directly, explained the aim of the study, andasked to participate. These first participants, after working with the experi-menters, helped to contact other people. Direct contact and mutual reassur-

ance convinced people to participate in the study. Special efforts were madeto contact people from different geographic areas. Out of 400 questionnairesthat were printed and distributed, 85% were returned.

Materials

The survey was largely based on Minows (1998) 11 theoretical aspirationsframework. Minows work has been criticized on the grounds that several of these aspirations are potentially contradictory, and no suggestion about the

way to resolve these contradictions has been indicated (Fletcher, 2001),Minows list of objectives constituted a useful basis for generating question-naire items covering a sufficiently broad spectrum of missions and functionsfor truth commissions.

Each of Minows (1998) theoretical objectives inspired one-to-severalquestionnaire items on the possible missions of a truth commission. Forexample, the first objective listed, the overcoming of denial, inspired itemssuch as, One of the main missions of these types of commissions must beto ensure that the atrocities are not denied that they occurred by anyone,

and One of the main missions of these types of commissions must be toensure that the atrocities are known in the whole country.Additional items were also created for allowing the participants to

express their own personal views, notably regarding (a) the compositionof the commission and the composition of the task force on which the com-mission should rely if necessary and (b) who can (or must) appear in thecommission and under which conditions. Examples of items were, Thecommission must include religious individuals, and The commission musthave at its disposal an external task force partly composed of journalists and

experts in communication.Finally, items aimed at obtaining an overall assessment of the necessityand potential dangers of truth commissions were also incorporated in thequestionnaire. Examples of items were, After a politically very troubled


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period, the recourse to these types of commissions is needed, and Thesetypes of commissions are, in most cases, an impediment to Justice.

Overall, the questionnaire was made up of 98 items. A 10-point scale wasprinted following each item. The two extremes of the scale were labeled dis-agree completely and completely agree . A large scale was chosen to provideparticipants with more latitude for responding. This questionnaire was firstwritten in Portuguese, then translated from Portuguese to Tetum (the maindialect in East Timor) by a bilingual translator, and then from Tetum toPortuguese by another translator. The material was also submitted to sev-eral knowledgeable individuals to detect any possible inconsistencies.

Procedure

The data were gathered from June to August 2004. Each participantresponded individually in his or her own home or at the university, depend-ing on what he or she found most convenient. The experimenters asked par-ticipants to read the questionnaires items expressing attitudes about themissions and functions of truth and reconciliation commissions and to ratehis or her degree of agreement with each statement. The participants weretold that it was their opinion that mattered and that they were free to com-pletely disagree with the content of the items.

RESULTS

Each rating by each participant was converted to a numerical valueexpressing the distance (from 010) between the mark on the responsescale and the origin. These numerical values were then subjected to statis-

tical analyses. First, we systematically computed correlation coefficientsbetween age, gender, educational level, and personal suffering, on theone hand, and each of the items of the questionnaire, on the other hand.Although some coefficients were significant, their magnitude was alwayssmallalways lower than .15. As a result, it was decided to pool all theparticipants into the same sample and to conduct the statistical analyseson this overall sample.

Are Truth Commissions Really Needed?

For the item, After a politically very troubled period, the recourse to thesetypes of commissions is needed, the mean level of agreement was reason-ably high. A majority of the responses (81%) was located between 7 and


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10, which was defined as the agreement range. A minority of the responses(7%) was located between 0 and 3, which was defined as the disagreement

range. Another minority (12%) of responses were in the intermediate zone;that is, they were undetermined. For the item, These types of commissionsare, in most cases, an impediment to Justice, the mean level of agreementwas low. A majority of responses (59%) was located in the disagreementrange. A substantial number of responses (28%) were, however, located inthe agreement range. In both cases, the percentage of participants whoagreed was significantly higher than the percentage of participants whodisagreed, p < .01 (chi-square test).

Who Might be the Members of the Commission?

The participants agreed with the idea that the members of the commissionmust be independent from the political system. In particular, religiouspersons, historians, journalists, lawyers, sociologists, philosophers, and psy-chologists were favored (from 72%82% agreement, p < .01). A majority of participants were hostile to the idea that the members should be designatedby the government or the U.N., or that the commission should includemembers of the police, the military, or the former government (from50%60% disagreement).

As for the independent task force on which the commission could haverecourse, the participants views were mixed. In descending order, partici-pants favored the presence of journalists and experts in communication(64% agreement), lawyers (55%), religious persons (54%), philosophers(48%), psychiatrists (47%), members of the police (47%), diplomats (46%),sociologists (45%), medical doctors (45%), political experts (45%), psychol-ogists (44%), and members of the military (42%).

Who Can Appear in Front of these Commissions?

The participants massively agreed with the idea that these types of commis-sions must hear any person who solicits a hearing (84% agreement vs. 5%disagreement, p < .01). The participants disagreed with the idea that thesetypes of commissions may force someone to appear and testify (68% dis-agreement vs. 19% agreement, p < .01). Regarding the authors of the atro-cities, views contrasted more: 55% of the participants agreed with the idea

that appearing in front of the commission must be mandatory for theauthors of the atrocities, and 41% agreed with the idea that appearingin front of the commission must be optional (on a voluntary basis) for theauthors of the atrocities.


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What Ought to be the Missions of these Commissions?

Because Minow (1998) warned that the 11 aspirations she suggested wereprobably overlapping, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted onthe corresponding 54 items. Based on the scree test, an eight-factor solutionwas retained and subjected to varimax rotation. Eigenvalues ranged from8.44 (1st principal component) to 1.61 (8th principal component), and theeigenvalues of the other components were lower than 1. The factors are pre-sented in the order that resulted from the analysis. The complete results of the factor analysis are shown in Table 1.

Identifying, denouncing, and banishing (4 % of the variance). This wasloaded with items such as, publicly denouncing the authors of the atroci-ties and permanently banishing the authors of the atrocities. Agreementpercentages ranged from 38% to 55%, with a mean value of 49%. Disagree-ment percentages ranged from 25% to 44%, with a mean value of 31%. Iden-tifying, denouncing, and banishing the authors of the atrocities was notunanimously considered a goal for truth commissions.

Shaming, punishing, and obtaining reparations (7 % ). This was loadedwith items such as, shaming the passive bystanders and reducing theauthors of the atrocities rights and privileges. Agreement percentages ran-ged from 28% to 43%, with a mean value of 35%. If only items which load-ings on the factor were higher than .40 were considered, disagreementpercentages ranged from 36% to 52%, with a mean value of 45%. Shaming,punishing, and obtaining reparations from the authors of the atrocities wasnot, in general, considered a goal for truth commissions.

Preventing political instability and collective violence (5 % ). This wasloaded with items such as, preventing the premature fall of the new gov-ernment and substituting an institutionalized response to individualrevenge. Agreement percentages ranged from 13% to 44%, with a meanvalue of 32%. Disagreement percentages ranged from 32% to 74%, with amean value of 51%. Preventing political instability and collective violencewas not, in general, considered a goal for truth commissions.

Restoring collective dignity (5 % ). This was loaded with items such asrestoring the collective dignity of the victims and restoring the authorsof the atrocities dignity. Agreement percentages ranged from 66% to73%, with a mean value of 70%. Disagreement percentages ranged from


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TABLE 1Results of Factor Analysis Conducted on the Items Regarding the Truth Commissions M

Factors

Items 1 2 3 4 5 6

Identifying, denouncing, and banishingPublicly denouncing the authors of the

atrocities.55 .24 .17 .13 .02 .22

Permanently banishing the authors of theatrocities

.51 .36 .05 .17 .05 .07

Permanently banishing the passivebystanders, those who had the capacityto intervene

.49 .25 .05 .19 .11 .04

Identifying and itemizing the authors of the atrocities

.48 .20 .01 .03 .02 .35

Shaming, punishing, and obtainingreparations

Shaming the passive bystanders .06 .67 .11 .07 .07 .00Reducing the authors of the atrocities

rights and privileges.13 .66 .07 .11 .08 .18

Punishing the passive bystanders, the oneswho did nothing to prevent theatrocities

.08 .65 .08 .10 .08 .12

Obtaining material restitution from the

authors of the atrocities

.12 .61 .14 .09 .09 .06

Reducing the passive bystanders rightsand privileges (those who had thecapacity to intervene)

.11 .57 .01 .07 .03 .16

Shaming the authors of the atrocities .24 .56 .04 .07 .20 .08 3 8 1

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TABLE 1Continued

Factors

Items 1 2 3 4 5 6

Dispossessing and expropriating theauthors of the atrocities

.17 .48 .19 .02 .16 .22

Equitably punishing the authors of theatrocities

.32 .35 .33 .05 .21 .10

Preventing political instability and collective violence

Preventing the return to power of theauthors of the atrocities

.05 .12 .71 .01 .00 .22

Preventing the premature fall of the new

government

.14 .20 .58 .22 .07 .17

Substituting an institutionalized responseto individual revenge

.01 .03 .52 .06 .06 .13

Ensuring that the authors of the atrocitiesare treated as human beings despitetheir crimes

.14 .03 .52 .22 .06 .04

Healing the victims moral wounds .24 .23 .45 .05 .04 .20Preventing violence toward the authors of

the atrocities.01 .09 .38 .11 .12 .28

Ensuring that the atrocities are not deniedthat they occurred by their authors

.05 .04 .34 .01 .08 .15

Restoring collective dignityRestoring the collective dignity of thevictims

.01 .01 .05 .78 .15 .13

Restoring the passive bystanders dignity .08 .14 .01 .64 .09 .17Restoring the authors of the atrocities

dignity.01 .05 .08 .52 .18 .09

3 8 2

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Restoring the victims dignity .18 .07 .12 .49 .34 .18Healing collective moral wounds of the

victims.10 .12 .06 .38 .38 .12

Relieving the victims moral and

psychological wounds

.04 .08 .10 .37 .29 .13

Reconciling opposing parties and strengthening the respect of human rights

Rebuilding the sense of communality inthe country

.14 .08 .09 .17 .67 .15

Ensuring that the authors of the atrocitiesapologize and repent

.26 .02 .03 .08 .62 .07

Ensuring that the future governmentsrespect human rights

.12 .13 .05 .15 .61 .11

Building links between former opposingparties

.15 .13 .05 .14 .59 .06

Restoring public morale .01 .05 .15 .18 .58 .14Reducing the divisions between former

opponent groups .29 .22 .13 .13 .58 .04

Ensuring that the atrocities are not deniedthat they occurred by futuregovernments

.23 .22 .20 .04 .56 .27

Gathering as much information aspossible about what really happened

.13 .16 .02 .09 .53 .18

Preventing the resumption of these acts of collective violence

.10 .13 .14 .17 .51 .24

Ensuring that the future governments areattentive to the respect of human rightseverywhere in the country

.10 .12 .16 .35 .49 .37

Ensuring that the victims are fully awareof what happened to them

.36 .16 .10 .04 .48 .33

3 8 3

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TABLE 1Continued

Factors

Items 1 2 3 4 5 6

Favoring forgiveness between formeropponent groups

.11 .13 .03 .01 .47 .22

Reducing the social gap between formeropponent groups

.07 .15 .25 .30 .45 .21

Contributing to the building of aninternational order likely to preventaggressions, tortures, and atrocitieseverywhere in the world

.17 .29 .12 .11 .44 .16

Ensuring that the authors of the atrocitiesare aware of their crimes

.19 .09 .12 .17 .43 .03

Establishing the basis of a new,democratic order in the country

.14 .18 .25 .01 .37 .02

Ensuring that the atrocities are known inthe whole world

.33 .30 .24 .13 .35 .32

Knowing and publicizing the truthEnsuring that the atrocities are not denied

that they occurred by anyone.07 .01 .07 .04 .24 .60

Ensuring that the atrocities are known inthe whole country

.21 .02 .13 .09 .15 .57

Obtaining the truth about the atrocities .12 .09 .04 .06 .33 .56Ensuring that the victims know who their

aggressor was.34 .02 .04 .01 .30 .50

3 8 4

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Substituting a civilized response in placeof brutal revenge

.08 .04 .35 .08 .00 .44

Writing the true history of the countryduring this time period

.23 .05 .02 .28 .32 .40

Terminating violence toward the authorsof the atrocities .01 .06

.18 .12 .08 .39

Healing perpetrators moral woundsHealing the authors of atrocities moral

wounds.14 .05 .03 .01 .04 .03

Healing the moral wounds of those whodid nothing to prevent the atrocities

.02 .13 .02 .17 .02 .05

Healing the passive bystanders moralwounds

.07 .17 .23 .20 .13 .07

Promoting reconciliation between formeropponent groups

.10 .01 .24 .08 .15 .26

Enforcing the new governmentEnforcing the stability of the new

government.09 .02 .07 .11 .28 .10

Strengthening the legitimacy of the newgovernment

.02 .04 .09 .20 .41 .03

Variance explained 2.34 3.67 2.76 2.73 5.88 3.19Percentage of explained variance .04 .07 .05 .05 .11 .06 Cronbachs alpha .60 .76 .61 .73 .65 .63

Note. A agreement; D disagreement. Bold-faced values are the ones that have been considered for com p < .05. p < .01.

3 8 5

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10% to 12%, with a mean value of 11%. Restoring collective dignity was, fora majority of the participants, considered a goal for truth commissions.

Reconciling opposing parties and strengthening the respect of human rights (11 % ). This was loaded with items such as, rebuilding the senseof communality in the country and ensuring that the future governmentsof the country respect human rights. Agreement percentages ranged from66% to 85%, with a mean value of 78%. Disagreement percentages rangedfrom 5% to 22%, with a mean value of 11%. Reconciling opposing partiesand strengthening the respect for human rights was, in general, considereda goal for truth commissions.

Knowing and publicizing the truth (6 % ). This was loaded with itemssuch as, ensuring that the atrocities are known in the whole countryand ensuring that the victims know who their aggressor was. Agreementpercentages ranged from 76% to 83%, with a mean value of 78%. Disagree-ment percentages ranged from 6% to 15%, with a mean value of 10%.Knowing and publicizing the truth was, in general, considered a goal fortruth commissions.

Healing perpetrators moral wounds (5 % ). This was loaded with itemssuch as, healing the moral wounds of those who did nothing to preventatrocities and healing the authors of atrocities moral wounds. Agree-ment percentages ranged from 56% to 64%, with a mean value of 60%. Dis-agreement percentages ranged from 14% to 20%, with a mean value of 16%.Healing the authors atrocities was, in general, considered a goal for truthcommissions.

Enforcing the new government (3 % ). This was loaded with items such

as, enforcing the stability of the new government. Agreement percentagesranged from 72% to 74%, with a mean value of 73%. Disagreement percen-tages were 12%. Enforcing the new government was considered a goal fortruth commissions.

The Publicizing of the Commissions Work

Participants overwhelmingly agreed that the work of the commission mustbe publicized on a regular basis by the national media (90% agreement vs.

5% disagreement, p < .01), and that the international media must beinformed on a regular basis of the work of the commission (83% agreementvs. 9% disagreement, p < .01). A majority of participants agreed with theidea that the commission should work in the country (70% agreement),


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and 48% of the participants opposed the idea that the commission shouldwork outside the country. The work of the commission was, however,

clearly conceived as being conducted in coordination with internationalinstitutions (73% agreement vs. 17% disagreement, p < .01).

DISCUSSION

A clear majority of East Timorese participants agreed with the idea that,after a politically very troubled period, recourse to truth commissionsmay be needed. This result was consistent with Gibsons (2004b) findings

that a majority of Black South Africans were, overall, satisfied with thework of their commission. A clear majority of participants agreed withthe idea that any individual who wants to appear in front of the commissionshould be heard. There was, however, a substantial minority who held theview that appearing in front of the truth commission must be made obliga-tory for the authors of atrocities. Furthermore, a majority disagreed withthe view that the truth commissions could be, in most cases, an impedimentto justice (although a substantial minority tended to agree with this view).The participants expressed strong views favoring members of the commis-

sion who could maintain their independence from political pressures. In par-ticular, religious persons, historians, journalists, lawyers, sociologists,philosophers, and psychologists were favored over members of the police,the military, or the government. As to the composition of the task forceon which the commission could rely in case of necessity, participants viewswere mixed. The overall impression was that they did not consider the pre-sence of such an additional task force very useful.

Participants expressed clearly structured views about the missions of thetruth commissions: Factor analysis of their responses showed eight interpre-

table factors. In other words, despite using a tool that was not necessarilyfamiliar to thema questionnairethe participants were able to respondin a sufficiently coherent way that a clear structure was evident. If theirresponses had been haphazard, no structure would have emerged, and theresults of the survey would have been highly questionable. The 11 possibleobjectives postulated by Minow (1998) were reduced to 8 practically non-overlapping ones. The participants mostly agreed with the views that thework of the commission must be aimed at strengthening, nationally andinternationally, respect for human rights; at obtaining the truth about what

really happened in the country during the troubled period; at legitimizingthe new government in its efforts to implement a new democratic order;and at restoring the dignity of all those involved in the atrocitiesthevictims as well as the passive bystanders and even the perpetrators. That


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knowing the truth was considered a major goal for truth commissions isconsistent with the strong tradition of history-telling among Timorese

(Rawski, 2002).In other words, participants were able to express clear priorities among

goals, which partly respond to Fletchers (2001) concerns. Among Minows(1998) 11 aspirations for truth commissions, 6 were indisputably consideredas priority goals: the overcoming of communal and official denial of theatrocity, the gathering of detailed facts to meet the victims needs to knowand to build a record for history, the creation of sufficient basis for thebuilding of a domestic democratic order respecting and enforcing humanrights, the consolidation and legitimization of the new democratic regime,

the promotion of reconciliation among former opponents (and opponentgroups), and the restoration of the victims dignity.

In contrast, participants clearly disagreed with the views that the work of the commission must be aimed at banishing the perpetrators and theiraccomplices from the country or from political life. This is consistent withthe views expressed by Babo-Soares (2005) that banishing the perpetratorswas considered by the East Timorese as counterproductive because, aswas the case in Rwanda, banished persons may endanger, even from abroad,the long-term stability of the country. They also expressed reservations

regarding the idea that the work of the commission should be aimed at sys-tematically identifying perpetrators or at shaming, punishing, or obtainingproper reparation from them. Participants were, in fact, concerned abouthealing the perpetrators themselves rather than condemning them. Thisfinding is consistent with grass-root observations reported by Babo-Soares(p. 225). For East Timorese, justice was considered as no more than anoption on the way to reconciliation (see also Kingston, 2006). This findingis also consistent with Thomas and Garrods (2002) observations that youngBosnians seemed unwilling to espouse hate and revenge toward the perpe-

trators of the ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia.Also, the participants agreed with the view that the work of the commis-sion should take place in the country, under international auspices, andmust be highly publicized, nationally and internationally. This view is con-sistent with some of Fletchers (2001) suggestions.

Most participants were seemingly aware of the limited scope of the truthcommissions and did not show unrealistic expectations about what could beobtained through such commissions. Although truth commissions are costlyenterprises, most participants supported the view that establishing a truth

commission after a very severe conflict was needed. It is interesting to notethat the percentage of participants who favored the presence of a truth com-mission closely matched the percentage of electors who voted for completeindependence in the 2002 ballot. This finding is also consistent with Long


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and Breckes (2003) observation that the truth commissions are efficient atpreventing the re-occurrence of intrastate violence, which is crucial to people

who have experienced violence and domination over two decades.It should also be added that most participants did not expect a truth

commission to exercise a therapeutic effect on victims of atrocities. Thisis not to say that the participants, most of whom had suffered directlyor indirectly from the conflict, were indifferent to matters such as psycho-logical suffering and physical illness resulting from atrocities. However, atthe time of the study, most participants may have realized that completehealing can only be attained after a long period of ordinary and peacefullife. They were also possibly aware that being offered a national and inter-

national platform for telling their story and being heard without interrup-tion or skepticism was crucial to most people and vital for survivors of trauma (Minow, 1998, p. 58). That most participants did not also attributeabsolute priority to personal healing through truth commissions may beanother reason for their lack of enthusiasm for the additional task force.This finding is consistent with the observation by Modvig et al. (2000) thatEast Timorese people look primarily at the local community and thechurch for assistance, and the findings by Kaminer et al. (2001; see alsoSilove, Zwi, & Le Touze, 2006).

However, it should be added that most participants agreed with the ideathat some short-term political goals can be part of the objectives of the truthcommissions, such as stabilizing the new democratic government. This resultis consistent with Gibsons (2002) findings.

It seems fair to conclude that most participants in this study strongly valuedthe symbolic nature of truth commissions. Strengthening the respect forhuman rights everywhere, acquiring as much knowledge about past atrocitiesas possible, and restoring the dignity of all, victims as well as perpetrators, whowere involved in the atrocities were conceived as clear priorities. This is con-

sistent with views expressed by Bhargava (2000) that truth commissions can,above all, collectively generate and reinforce the belief in the end of an era of gross injustice and officially celebrate the inauguration or the restoration of a minimally decent order. This is also consistent with views expressed byIgnatieff (1998) that, beyond this, truth commissions can do little.

If one practical recommendation can be suggested as a result of thissurvey, it would be that future truth commission planners should, whenfeasible, take some time to ensure that the necessarily limited aims of theplanned commission (a) match the aspirations and expectations of the popu-

lation; and (b) that these limitations are clearly understood by everyone,especially the ones who will actively participate. The moral significance of truth commissions may easily be undermined by too little consensus onthe nature of these processes (Verwoerd, 2003, p. 269).


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Limitations of the Study

This study has several limitations. The first resides in the way the samplewas constituted. Participants were volunteers and, although special effortswere made to contact people from different geographic areas and from dif-ferent educational levels, the sample was mainly composed of young, edu-cated persons. Although no notable difference as a function of gender,age, education, or personal suffering was observed (e.g., between-factorscores and age correlation coefficients ranged from .08 to .06), we areunsure about the degree of generalizability of our results. These resultsare, nevertheless, coherent and consistent with empirical results gatheredin others studies (Gibson, 2004b; Kadima Kadiangandu & Mullet, 2007;Neto, Pinto, & Mullet, 2007a, 2007b), with grass-root observations (BaboSoares, 2005), and with qualitative data obtained from the few persons inthe sample who spoke Portuguese. In addition, Chapman (2007) recentlyreported qualitative data gathered by Picker (n.d.) showing that (a) findingout the truth about human right violations, (b) gaining public acknowledg-ment, and (c) restoring honor and dignity were among the concerns thatmotivated the victims to participate in the TRC hearings.

Another limitation is that our survey was neither a pure prospectiveassessment nor a pure retrospective evaluation. On the one hand, conduct-ing a survey in East Timor about what can be expected from a truth com-mission before people can observe the functioning of the commission and judge its success and limitations would have probably been meaningless.Except for the elite, few people had ever heard about truth commissionsbefore 2001. As a result, we chose to conduct the survey once the peoplehad gained sufficient knowledge about the reality of a truth commission.On the other hand, directly asking people about what should have beendone instead of what was currently being done could have run the risk of our study being perceived as interfering with the work of the commission.Now that the commission has completed its work and sufficient time haselapsed, assessment of the degree of satisfaction of the East Timorese withtheir commission and its many components will become a realistic objectivefor future studies.

A third limitation is that context-specific information about theconflict situation in East Timor and the unique characteristics of the truthcommission in this country were minimized in an effort to keep the analysison a broader level; that is, one that can be generalized across contexts.

The eight-factor solution found in this study may constitute a useful basisfor creating a reduced set of items that could be applied in studies of otherpopulations that may, currently are, or have in the recent past experienced atruth commission. When we gather data from other countries using the same


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device, possibly complemented by additional items corresponding to objec-tives not considered in this study, and with measures clearly distinguishing

short term, mid-term, and long term effects of truth commissions, we will beable to make strong claims about what ordinary citizens in the worldcan expect from truth commissions. This study is a first step toward thisobjective.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was supported by POCTI =PSI=46245=2002, PTDC =PSI=

55336=2006, the Universite de Toulouse (CLLE-LTC, UTM, CNRS,EPHE), and the Centro Cognicao e Afectividade (Oporto University). Weare grateful to Luis Costa for the translations into Tetum, and to PhilipThorne for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Etienne Mullet received his Ph.D. in Psychology from the Sorbonne, France

in 1979. Currently, he works at the Institute of Advanced Studies, EcolePratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris, France. He is a member of ProfessorNetos research team.

Fe lix Neto received his Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of Coimbra, Portugal in 1983. He is currently Professor of Psychology, andDirector of the Affect and Cognition Centre at the University of Oporto.His current main interests involve cross-cultural psychology.

Mar a da Conceicao Pinto received her Ph.D. in Psychology from theOpen University of Lisbon, Portugal in 2005. She is currently research assis-

tant at the Affect and Cognition Centre at University of Oporto. She is amember of Professor Netos research team.

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Peace & Conflict Mullet Neto & Pinto 2008

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Transcript of Peace & Conflict Mullet Neto & Pinto 2008