Peace and Security Council Protocol Early Warning Issues ... · PDF filePSC Retrospective:...

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

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‘The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council’ – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union

‘Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC’ – PSC/PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE

Early Warning Issues for Nov 1

Country Analysis: Sudan 2

PSC Retrospective: Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) 10

Country Analysis: Eritrea 12

PSC Retrospective: African Women’s decade and the anniversary of the UN 1325 resolution 17

PSC Retrospective: The Relationship between the PSC and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 19

PSC Retrospective: African Union Peace Day 21

Important Forthcoming Dates 23

Livingstone Formula

Peace and Security Council Protocol

No. 16, November 2010

This Report is an independent publication of the Institute for Security Studies. It is also available on the ISS website and can be viewed together with Thematic Reports on the work of the PSC at www.issafrica.org. All documents referred to in this Report can also be found on the ISS website.

Early Warning Issues for November

The scheduled Rotating Chair of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of November is Libya. In the absence of a country’s representation at ambassadorial level, an alternate member will chair the Council for the month.

Sudan

All the signs show that the potential for escalating violence in the various parts of Sudan are very high. While the situation in Darfur has showed increasing deterioration over the course of the past few months, the North-South peace process has entered a critical phase with the referendum date fast approaching. Apart from the rising anxiety surrounding the preparation for, and the timely

holding of, the referendum, the three contested border areas of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile are potential major flash points. Tension is also high over issues inherent in the referendum process, including final-status arrangements. Additionally, in the North there are fears that the referendum in the South may lead to reduction of oil revenue and open a Pandora’s Box prompting other parts of Sudan to claim more rights, including self-determination and potentially triggering divisions in the NCP. In the South, the security and humanitarian situation remains fragile as inter-ethnic violence persists and LRA attacks continue unabated.

Eritrea

Eritrea is currently experiencing serious political and economic instability as well as isolation by the international community.

These days it is not unusual to read numerous reports and research articles that refer to Eritrea as a military state, a state under siege, a fragile country or a prison state. The intolerance of the Asmara government to any signs of opposition or dissent, coupled with the country’s poor economic performance and crippling United Nations sanctions, have contributed to an exodus of Eritrea’s youth to neighboring states. The state is in a situation of strife with its neighbors, and suffers both pressure and isolation from international and regional institutions and major super powers thereby creating excessive regional tensions. The Eritrean problem is exerting a negative impact on collaborative and coordinated efforts to respond to various other regional security crises in the Horn of Africa and beyond.


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COUNTRY ANALYSIS

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Sudan

Previous PSC Communiqués and other AU Pronouncements

In its Communiqué issued on 2 July 2010, PSC/PR/Comm (CCXXXV), the PSC reiterated the commitment of the AU to support the Sudanese parties in their efforts to overcome the many challenges facing Sudan. The Council also acknowledged the holistic approach that the AU High Implementation Panel advances in the search for comprehensive peace, justice and reconciliation in Sudan. In this regard the PSC noted the work to be done including the early convening of the Darfur-Darfur Conference (DDC), the support extended to the parties towards the implementation of the remaining provisions of the CPA, notably the North–South border, the issue of Abyei and transitional areas, and the facilitation of the negotiations on post-referendum arrangements, as required.

Speaking at the UN High Level Meeting on Sudan, the AU Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping, underscored the strategic importance of Sudan in Africa and the multiplicity of issues that need to be attended to in so short a period of time. He also stated the importance of accomplishing all the remaining tasks and said that Sudan leaders must rise up to the challenge of their historic responsibilities with the international community providing all the necessary support through the AU and the UN.

Crisis escalation potential

All the signs show that the potential for escalating violence

in the various parts of Sudan is very high. While the situation in Darfur has showed increasing deterioration over the course of the past few months, the North-South peace process has entered a critical phase with the referendum date fast approaching. Apart from the rising anxiety surrounding the preparation for, and the timely holding of, the referendum, the three contested border areas of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile are potential major flash points. Tension is also high over issues inherent in the referendum process, including final-status arrangements. Additionally, in the North there are fears that the referendum in the South may lead to reduction of oil revenue and open a Pandora’s Box prompting other parts of Sudan to claim more rights, including self-determination and potentially triggering divisions in the NCP. In the South, the security and humanitarian situation remains fragile as inter-ethnic violence persists and LRA attacks continue unabated.

Increasingly, the relationship between North and South is characterised by mistrust and mutual accusations of various kinds. The rhetoric of a return to war has also in recent weeks crept into the discourse on the referendum. Speaking at the Arab-Africa Summit in Libya, President El Bashir reportedly warned that a conflict that is more dangerous than the one that preceded the CPA will ensue if the two sides do not agree on outstanding issues before the referendum. The two sides have also been engaging in an arms race over the course of the past few years. Both have expanded their military forces, spending considerable amounts on military hardware. Steps are being taken to ensure that the referendum is held peacefully and credibly and that the parties reach agreement on various outstanding issues.

Given the potential for violence

in all regions of the country, there is a very high risk that civilians would in particular bear the brunt of such violence.

Key issues and Internal Dynamics: South Sudan Referendum

There have been major delays in making the necessary preparations for the referendum, ranging from adoption of the referendum law to the establishment of the referendum commission to the adoption of a schedule for the referendum. The secretary general of the referendum commission and members of the state referendum committees were only identified in September.

These delays have given rise to fears that the referendum in South Sudan may not be held as scheduled on 9 January 2011. Nevertheless, not holding the referendum on time is not a viable option. A delay would present a fatal legitimacy deficit particularly for the newly elected government of Salva Kiirr. The government is very well aware of this. According to President Kiirr, the scheduled time for the referendum is ‘sacrosanct and non-negotiable’. He has even confirmed that the South would hold the referendum as scheduled with or without the cooperation and participation of the North. At the same time, the fact that the process for the referendum started very late and there is a very tight period of time in which to finalize all the necessary preparations, presents a challenge for holding a credible referendum.

The Referendum Commission has announced the timetable for the various stages leading to the referendum vote. According to this schedule, voter registration will start on 14 November 2010 and will run for three weeks until 4 December 2010. This

COUNTRY ANALYSIS


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timetable will leave only a period of one month and a few days before the actual day of the referendum. Given that the voter register needs to be verified, legal challenges to it need to be addressed and the final voter lists need to be published, the time available for accomplishing all these processes appears very limited. It is envisaged that the final voter list will be ready by 31 December 2010. This means that the time for challenging the voter register and making necessary amendments will be between 4 and 31 December 2010, merely nine days away from the date of the referendum.

Given the limited time available to finalise all the necessary preparations, there is a possibility that the referendum may also face logistical problems. These problems might include processing the registration of voters, printing ballot papers, the identification and establishment of voting stations, the timely distribution of the required quantity of voter materials, the training and deployment of voter administering officials and so on. The sheer lack of communications infrastructure, including a public transportation system, the size of the territory, and insecurity in some parts of South Sudan, may further compound an already difficult situation. Re-energized engagement by the international community about this issue is imperative. In this regard, the UN Secretary-General’s appointment on 21 September of a panel to assist and monitor execution of the referendum, is commendable.

Apart from the problems surrounding the preparations, there are concerns that the outcome of the referendum may be contested. High-level officials in the North have threatened that they would not accept any outcome other than unity. Officials in the South, on their part, stated that a unilateral declaration of independence remains an option.

borders before the referendum. Southerners have indicated that the referendum should go ahead irrespective of any agreement on outstanding issues. In the time that is left before the referendum, the chances for arriving at agreement on these issues are very low. It is likely that some of the issues would take many months and sustained negotiations to resolve.

The three border territories – Abyei, South Kordofan, Blue Nile

From a perspective of the future of North-South relations, apart from the referendum in South Sudan, the fate of the three volatile, resources-rich and highly militarised border territories of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile is also critical, although it has not received as much media attention. According to the CPA, residents of Abyei will cast separate ballots on the same day that the referendum for Southern Sudan shall take place. The CPA further stipulates that residents of Abyei are members of the Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the area. The CPA however leaves the determination of the criteria for residency to the Abyei Referendum Commission. As the time for the referendum approaches, the heavily armed Missiriya, who side with the Government of Sudan, threatened that they would fight if they were not allowed to vote on the future of Abyei. With respect to the Missiriya and other nomadic people, the CPA merely provides that they have traditional rights to graze cattle and move seasonally across the territory of Abyei.

To resolve the issue of eligibility, the US facilitated a discussion in early October in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Unfortunately, the negotiation ended without any progress, but with a plan for another round of negotiations set to take place again in Addis

The relationship between the two parties to the Government of National Unity (NCP and SPLM) is generally characterised by mistrust and suspicion. As the referendum approaches, the lack of trust between the parties has deepened even further. A return to war has been invoked by both sides in the discourse about the referendum. While the two parties have been investing in arms and their respective military structures in the past few years, they have also continued to exchange accusations of reinforcing their military presence along their common borders.

Post-referendum issues

In addition to the referendum, the North and the South also need to agree on a number of post-referendum issues particularly if the South decides to secede and if such secession is to be orderly. Among key issues are the demarcation of the North-South border, the citizenship status of Southerners in the North and Northerners in the South, the division of national assets and debts, the status of the SPLM in the North and the NCP in the South, a formula for dividing oil revenues, the position of the South on the Nile waters agreement, and mutually acceptable arrangements for pastoralist groups to move north and south across their common border.

One of the advances made on this front following the April national elections was the signing of the Mekele Agreement of 24 June 2010, which paved the way for the commencement of post-referendum negotiations. The Mbeki Panel of the AU plays a key role in facilitating these negotiations.

Although these issues are identified as post-referendum, the North has expressed the need to achieve agreement on some of these issues such as oil and


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Ababa by the end of October. If the impasse is not overcome, disagreement over eligibility and potential delay of the referendum in Abyei is likely to lead to violence. In 2008, armies from the North and South clashed over Abyei, killing 100 people, displacing 50,000 and causing destruction to Abyei town. If violence erupts this time around, it may be more destructive and is likely to involve once again the two armies and allied militias.

The situation of the other two border areas is somewhat qualitatively different from Abyei. Both Blue Nile and South Kordofan are in Northern Sudan. Unlike Abyei, the CPA has accorded these two territories a much reduced right, limited to a process of ‘popular consultation’. This process is meant to ascertain the views of people in the two territories regarding the CPA as it applies to their territories and their relations with the Khartoum government. Unlike the referendum vote, this process is to be undertaken, on the basis of independent commissions, by the legislators of the two territories, who were elected during the historic April 2010 Sudanese elections. On the basis of the popular consultations, the two territories will decide whether their autonomous self-governing status and share of national wealth as stipulated in the CPA are adequate or should be revised. The CPA envisages that if the popular consultations should show popular dissatisfaction and if either of the legislatures of the two states should decide to rectify shortcomings in their constitutional, political and administrative arrangements, then such legislature should engage in negotiations with the Government of Sudan with a view to addressing those limitations.

In the event of the successful secession of the South, one scenario for these two territories is that their population

divisions among the rebel groups and people of Darfur. Although the JEM was part of the Doha process and signed a framework agreement with Khartoum in February 2010, it withdrew from the process in May 2010 as government forces continued to attack its bases. In May, ground attacks and aerial bombardments in the JEM stronghold of Jebel Moon forced the JEM to withdraw from the area. Similarly, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) of Abdul Wahid, which from the start rejected the Doha talks, has increasingly been put under pressure by government forces. The group reported two major attacks by Sudanese forces in Jebel Merra in the month of September, which continued into October.

Another problem is the deterioration of the security situation. Insecurity in the IDP camps has in recent months escalated with clashes between supporters and opponents of the Doha peace process. On 24 July fighting broke out in the Kalma IDP camp between IDP representatives who attended the latest round of Doha talks and those who did not participate. One person was injured, but no fatalities were reported. On 5 September, similar violence erupted in Al-Hamidiya camp, near Zalingei in which six people were reportedly killed. The deterioration of the security situation has also manifested itself in the rise in inter-ethnic violence as well as crime and banditry.

The referendums in South Sudan and Abyei have the potential to have important consequences for Darfur. There are some concerns that Darfur may cease to become a priority. The claim of some militant Darfurians to self-determination is also likely to increase. This is not unexpected; because Darfur has historically the strongest claim to separate statehood, having been

would invoke the right to self-determination. Many people in these territories have previously declared claims to their right to self-determination. It is therefore likely that the claim to self-determination would deepen in these territories in the context of Southern separation and potential weakening of the North.

Darfur

Following the withdrawal of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) from the Doha process in May, the peace process continued exclusively between the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), a coalition of smaller groups formed in February 2010, and the Government of Sudan. LJM and the Government of Sudan signed a framework agreement in March 2010. In July 2010, the two sides also signed a ceasefire agreement. Since then, five committees have been constituted for the five substantive subjects of negotiation identified in the March Agreement. These include wealth sharing; compensation and Return of IDPs and Refugees; Security Arrangements; power sharing and the administrative status of Darfur; and justice and reconciliation.

Early in October, the negotia-ting teams of the LJM and Government of Sudan returned to Doha. In this round of negotiations, they considered a preliminary draft peace agree-ment prepared by the mediating team. The expectation in this round of negotiations is for the two sides to sign a final peace agreement, based on and after making the necessary changes and adjustments to the most recent draft.

However, the Doha peace process continues to face serious challenges. One major challenge is the non-participation of the two major rebel groups and


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incorporated into Sudan only in 1916. Currently, only a small minority of radicals has openly proposed that Darfur should secede from Sudan, but Sudanese experts have pointed out that in the context of Southern secession, this number is sure to grow. Developments in South Sudan may also affect Darfur in another way, particularly if southerners vote for secession. It is possible that tension between Khartoum and Juba would play themselves out in Darfur taking the form of a proxy war, a defining feature of the relationship of many countries in the region. This would particularly be the case if the SPLM establishes links with the Darfur rebels and extends support to them such as allowing them to operate from South Sudan.

ICC, Justice and Reconciliation

In July 2010, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued another arrest warrant against El Bashir for the crime of genocide, a charge that the Pre-Trial Chamber previously rejected for lack of prime facia evidence. Since then, in defiance of the ICC arrest warrant, El Bashir travelled to Chad and Kenya. Although both countries are parties to the ICC treaty and Kenya held the vice-presidency of the Assembly of States Parties, the authorities in the two countries failed to act on the arrest warrants. On 27 August the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC issued two decisions informing the UNSC and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about EL Bashir’s visit to these two countries. The AU not only expressed its dismay about the additional arrest warrant but also defended the two countries, who it said acted in accordance with the July 2009 Decision of the AU assembly not to enforce the arrest warrant.

Outside of the ICC process, the issue of justice and reconciliation is also addressed in the AU High Panel on Darfur Report of 2009.

a unilateral declaration of independence by the South, possibly followed by violence between the north and the South.

Scenario 4:

The referendums in South Sudan and Abyei will be held and the outcome of the referendums will be accepted, but the eruption of a possible rebellion in the two border territories of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, added to disagreement over border demarcation, would lead the two sides into violent conflict with serious consequences for the entire region.

Early Response options

In the light of the above possible scenarios, the following options could be considered

Option 1:

The PSC could request the AU Commission to develop Sudan Scenarios and corresponding proposed policy options to be submitted for its consideration. This would enable the PSC to take an informed and well-considered position about the outcome of the referendum.

Option 2:

The PSC could undertake a visit to Sudan to maintain the current high level of diplomatic engagement in Sudan and nurture trust between the parties to encourage a timely, credible and peaceful referendum as well as to impress on the parties that potential losses far outweigh relatively limited gains as a consequence of not having a peaceful referendum and not accepting the outcome.

Although the task of facilitating the implementation of the recommendations is assigned to the AU High Implementation Panel, no major breakthrough has yet been achieved in this area as in the negotiation for peace. Now that much of the Panel’s attention has shifted to works relating to the referendum, these issues may not be given priority attention for some time to come.

Scenario Planning

Given the above analysis, the following are among many possible scenarios that may unfold in the coming months

Scenario 1:

In a best case scenario, the two parties to the CPA will realise that the loss to each one of them outweighs any gains that may be made from a return to conflict. Accordingly, they will, with the support of the AU and the international community, most notably the US, abandon their maximalist demands and cooperate to hold a peaceful referendum, but only after the North receives guarantees for a continued substantial share from the oil wealth.

Scenario 2:

The referendum in Southern Sudan will be held, but in the absence of any agreement over eligibility for voting in the Abyei referendum the referendum in Abyei will not be held as scheduled. This will most likely lead to violence.

Scenario 3:

Both referendums will be held in South Sudan and Abyei and people in the South will vote to be independent and those in Abyei would vote to join the South. However, the outcome of the result would subsequently be contested, thereby triggering >>page 6


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Option 3:

The PSC could, in consultation with the AU Commission Chairperson, identify priority areas for the AU’s engagement in Sudan in the coming months, including the deployment of AU observers through the AU High Implementation Panel and the electoral assistance unit of the Department of Political Affairs to assist the parties in their efforts both to achieve comprehensive peace in Darfur and to hold successful referendums in Southern Sudan and Abyei.

Option 4:

The PSC could also engage powerful nations and regions such as the US, China and the EU, to give to Khartoum diplomatic and economic incentives and guarantee that it’s economic and security interests will be protected if it facilitates peaceful and credible referendums in both South Sudan and Abyei and accepts the eventual outcome.

General of the Commission. Since June 2010, the Panel has been facilitating the post-referendum negotiation between the two parties of the CPA.

The AU is anxious about the prospect of South Sudan’s secession. There are fears that separation might set a precedent leading to demands in other parts of Africa challenging the AU’s principle of inviolability of colonial borders. Notwithstanding its concern, the AU Commission has not as yet developed and discussed Sudanese scenarios and corresponding policy options.

For IGAD, the AU and their member states, the current situation in Sudan presents a serious challenge, not least because it will directly affect the peace and security dynamics of the Horn of Africa as well as Central Africa. IGAD played a lead role in the negotiations that led to the CPA. Its contributions include brokering the 1994 Declaration of Principles, which laid down the framework for the subsequent negotiations. It has also been one of the actors supporting the implementation of the CPA. Early this year, the regional body held a summit to assess the implementation of the CPA. The decisions of the summit included plans for the IGAD Council of Ministers to undertake shuttle diplomacy to build confidence and trust between the parties to the CPA and for the IGAD Secretariat to open a Liaison Office in Juba. In July 2010, IGAD received support from Norway to open the liaison office. The 37th Extraordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers held in New York on 22 September 2010 noted the need to expedite the establishment of the Abyei Referendum Commission and the final demarcation of the Abyei area administration and North-South border. IGAD is also one of the regional organizations involved in the negotiations on post-referendum issues and

arrangements. IGAD’s current Chair, Ethiopia also hosted the talks between the North and South on Abyei in early October 2010.

UN dynamics

The UN has deepened its engagement in Sudan, which will remain in the coming few months as a top priority country. On the sidelines of the annual High-Level UN General Assembly Meeting, the Secretary-General convened a high-level meeting on Sudan on 24 September 2010. Addressing the meeting, attended by more than 30 nations and international organizations, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon emphasised that ‘the stakes are high for Sudan, Africa, for the international community.’ In the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the participants ‘noted the delays in the preparations for the referenda and called for the urgent establishment of the Abyei Referendum Commission and for the acceleration of the work of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission,’ and expressed their willingness to assist the efforts of the two parties to the CPA. Participants welcomed efforts for achieving comprehensive peace in Darfur and noted progress in the peace process of eastern Sudan. The Secretary General expressed the expectation of the international community for a peaceful referendum and for the parties to accept the results and to plan for the consequences, without unilateral acts on either side.

Building on the momentum of UN engagement, the 15 members of the UN Security Council undertook a mission to Juba, Darfur and Khartoum. During the visit, which was undertaken over the course of four days, UNSC members met with various stakeholders in Sudan including the President of South Sudan, regional authorities, UNMIS and

Geopolitical Dynamics

Pan African dynamics

The AU has been active both in the Darfur peace process and in supporting and supervising the implementation of the CPA. Apart from its involvement in the Darfur peace process through the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHLIP) under the leadership of former South African President Thabo Mbeki, the AU is also playing an important role in the discussions for holding a peaceful and credible referendum in January 2010. Through the AUHLIP, the AU facilitated the signing of the Mekele Framework Agreement for negotiation on post-referendum arrangements. The AUHLIP also played a key role in facilitating and supporting the establishment of the South Sudan referendum commission and the election of the Secretary


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UNAMID in Darfur as well as Vice President Taha in Khartoum. Council members called on the two parties to the CPA to speed up their preparations for the referendum and underlined the need for, and the possibility of, holding the referendum on time as well as to resolve outstanding issues including post-referendum arrangements. The UNSC members emphasised the importance of holding a credible and peaceful referendum and respecting the outcome. They also expressed their concern over the deterioration of the security situation in Darfur and urged the government of Sudan to improve security to enable UNAMID to implement its mandate.

The UN Secretary General also appointed a panel to help the referendum process. The Panel consists of three members, former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa as Head of the Panel, former Portuguese foreign minister Antonio Monteiro and former Nepalese election commission chairman Bhojraj Pokharel. On commencing its work, the Panel travelled to Sudan on 10 October 2010 to hold talks with senior officials from the national Government, the Government of Southern Sudan, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, the UN, the diplomatic corps, observer groups and civil society representatives.

Wider international community dynamics

The United States is not only one of the guarantors of the CPA and a leading member of the Sudan Troika but is also among the world’s most influential powers. The Obama administration designated Scott Gration as Obama’s special envoy to Sudan. As a manifestation of the increasing focus on Sudan, the US recently expanded its diplomatic presence in Juba. Senior US officials have been expressing their concern over the situation in Sudan, with Secretary

of State Hillary Clinton describing it as a ‘time bomb,’ and have been pushing for a peaceful referendum.

The US has been undertaking various diplomatic activities over the course of 2009 and 2010. In September, the US sent Scott Gration to Sudan to offer new incentives including the restoration of full diplomatic relations with the US to encourage a smooth referendum. The most recent diplomatic engagement by the US was to facilitate negotiations between the North and South to resolve their dispute about the Abyei referendum. . The talks facilitated by Gration and Ambassador Princeton Lyman were held between 3 and 12 October 2010. Although the referendum ended without agreement, in the statement they issued on 12 October the parties agreed to meet in Addis Ababa again for another round of talks by the end of October 2010.

On September 17, members of the Sudan Troika, the US, Norway and the UK, sent a letter to Sudanese First Vice President Salva Kiir and Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha. In the letter, while commending recent progress made on preparations for the referendum in South Sudan, they called on the CPA parties to take necessary action swiftly to ensure that peaceful referenda take place on time.

Civil Society dynamics

In Southern Sudan, a coalition of civil society organizations for the referendum in Southern Sudan has been formed. In a peaceful march, they staged on 23 September 2009, the CSOs called for timely, transparent and credible referenda. In a memorandum, which they handed over to the UNMIS at the end of the march, they reportedly called on the UN and the international community

to ensure that the CPA parties would respect implementation of the CPA, and hold the referendum on time. Early that week, the Southern Sudan Youth for Referendum launched a civic education program on the referendum for secondary schools in Juba. The coalition of civil society organizations is also preparing to observe the referendum on 9 January 2010.

In Darfur, civil society organiza-tions have been participating in the Doha negotiations in Qatar. A consultation meeting with civil society representatives was also held in Darfur. Civil society in Darfur and more particularly IDPs supporting different rebel groups in the territory are, however, divided over participation in the Doha process. Indeed, this has already ensured clashes in some of the IDP camps in Darfur, causing some deaths and injuries.


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Documentation:

RECs Docs

Communique of the 14th Extra-ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Sudan Peace Process Nairobi, Kenya 9 March 2010

Communiqué of the 37th Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers New York 22 September 2010

Relevant AU Documents:

PSC/PR/2(CCXXXVII) (21 July 2010) Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur

PSC/PR/2(CCXXXV) (2 July 2010) Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Activities of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Sudan

PSC/PR/COMM.(CCXXXV) (2 July 2010) Communique on Sudan and the work of AUHIP

PSC/PR/COMM-1 (CXCVII) (21 July 2010) Communique on the Situation in Darfur

Assembly/AU/Dec.296 (XV) Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Decision

Assembly/AU/Dec.270(XIV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Doc. Assembly/AU/10(XV)

PSC/PR/Comm (CCXXXV) (2 July 2010) Communique on the Situation in Sudan and the activities of the AU High Implementation Panel

PSC/PR/Comm (CCXIX) (10 March 2010) Communique on the Situation in Sudan

AU Commission Communiqué (9 January 2010) Acknowledging the Fifth Anniversary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Highlighting the Challenges and Opportunities for the Sudan

PSC/PR/Comm.1(CCXIII) (22 December 2009) Communiqué considering the Report of the

Mission undertaken by the PSC to the Sudan from 23 to 25 November 2009

PSC/PR/Comm.(CLXXV) (5 March 2009) Statement on the ICC arrest warrant against the

President of the Republic of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir

PSC/PR/Comm.1(CLIX) (24 November 2008) Communiqué on the implementation process of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

PSC/PR/2(CLIX) (24 November 2008) Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the implementation process of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

PSC/MIN/Comm.1(CII) (22 September 2008) Communiqué and report on the implementation of the of the communiqué of the 142nd meeting of the Peace and Security Council held on 21 July

PSC/PR/COMM(CXCVIII) (21 July 2009) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur

PSC/PR/2(CXCVIII),

(21 July 2009) Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Darfur

Assembly/AU/6(XIII), Report of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, Assembly of the African Union, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, 1-3 July 2009, Sirte, Libya.

PSC/PR/COMM(CLXXXV) (6 April 2009) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur and Mauritania

PSC/PR/COMM(CLI) (22 September 2008) Communiqué on the implementation of Communiqué of 142nd meeting of the PSC, on the Sudan Interim Report, the situation in Mauritania and the situation in Somalia

PSC/PR/BR(CXLII) (21 July 2008) Communiqué on the ICC indictment of Sudanese President Al Bashir

PSC/PR/2 (CXXXVI) (12 June 2008) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur and the Republic of Djibouti and the State of Eritrea

PSC/PR/2(CXII) (28th February 2008) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur.

PSC/PR/COMM.(LXXIX) (22 June 2007) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur

PSC/PR/COMM.(LXXV) (4-5 April 2007) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur

PSC/PR/COMM.(LXX) (12 February 2007) Communiqué on the relations between Chad and


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PSC/PR/COMM.(LXX) (12 February 2007) Communiqué on the relations between Chad and Sudan

PSC/PR/COMM.(XLVIII) (6 April 2006) Communiqué on Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the situation in Darfur

PSC/PR/COMM.(XVII) (20 October 2004) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur

PSC/PR/COMM.(XVI) (17 September 2004) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur and Somalia

PSC/PR/COMM.(XIV) (9 August 2004) Communiqué on crisis in Darfur

PSC/PR/COMM.(X) (25 May 2004) Communiqué on decisions in crisis in Darfur, Somaila and Cote d’Ivoire

PSC/PR/COMM.(V) (13 April 2004) Communiqué on the international conference on the Great Lakes region, AU liaison office in Liberia, crisis in Darfur, situation in Cote d’Ivoire and DRC

UN Documents:

S/2010/388 (19 July 2010) Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

S/2010/382 (14 July 2010) Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid

Operation in Darfur

S/RES/1870 (20 May 2009) Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan.

S/2009/352 (13 July 2009), Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.


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PSC Retrospective: Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)

The establishment of a Continen-tal Early Warning System (CEWS) is a requisite as detailed in Article 12 (1) of the PSC Protocol which states that, “in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, a Continental Early Warning System to be known as the Early Warning System shall be established”. After a long history of war and unrest, the African Union has put in place continental instruments for conflict prevention, early warning and early response.

These instruments comprise the AU Peace and Security Architecture (Continental Early Warning System), ECOWAS (ECOWARN), IGAD (CEWARN), ECCAS (MARAC) and also National Initiatives and world wide instruments like the UN Security Council Resolution 1625. The main purpose of The Early Warning System is provision of timely advice to several key institutions of the African Union, on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa, to enable the development of appropriate response strategies. As stipulated in article 12 (2) of the Protocol, the CEWS shall consist of:

(i) an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as “the Situation Room’’, which is located at the Conflict Management Division of the African Union and is responsible for data collection and analysis; and

(ii) observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which shall be linked directly through appropriate means of communication to the Situation Room and which shall collect and process data at their level and

transmit the same to the Situation Room.

Based on a PSC meeting that discussed operationalisation of the continental peace and security architecture, including the CEWS, held in June 2006, the Commission held another meeting as a follow up to the PSC meeting on early warning and conflict prevention. This meeting brought together governmental experts from AU Member States and representatives of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), namely the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and was held in Kempton Park, South Africa, from 17 to 19 December 2006. At the meeting, papers were discussed and a number of background documents were submitted, which resulted in the adoption of a Framework for the operationalisation of the CEWS, following up with recommendations to make the CEWS fully operational, for purposes of agreement on key steps that should be taken for the full operationalisation of the CEWS, including,

(i) the collection of data;

(ii) strategic analysis of the data collected, through an appropriate indicators module;

(iii) early warning reports and engagement with decision makers;

(iv) the coordination and collaboration with the Regional Mechanisms for conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and other stakeholders on conflict prevention and early warning in Africa; and

(v) adoption of a Roadmap that would clearly spell out the steps to be taken towards the operationalisation of the CEWS and the role of each of the stakeholders, as well as the timelines for implementation.

These arrangements were subsequently endorsed by the 10th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, Assembly/AU/DRAFT/DEC.171- 191(X) held in Addis Ababa January 2007. The Council requested the Commission to take all the necessary steps for the timely and full implementation of the Framework, including the mobilisation of the financial and technical resources required from both AU Member States. and partners, the speedy recruitment of the human resources needed and other relevant steps, within a timeframe of three years, to ensure that the CEWS became fully operational by 2009.

Going back to the historical background of the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System, in 1990, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) rededica-ted itself, “to work ..... towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts to develop and implement a continental-wide early warning system for its member states.

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PSC Retrospective: Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)(continued)

When the OAU began exploring the viability of an early warning system, some member states expressed fears that the warnings would be criticized or even suppressed by defensive governments not willing to entertain perceived external criticism. The OAU itself cast doubt on how it might realise the implementation of an effective early warning system, as its charter declared a commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states. The OAU would eventually give way to the creation of its successor, the African Union, which was established at the Durban Summit in 2002. A year later, in December 2003, the AU member states established the Peace and Security Council and mandated that organ to be able to “anticipate and prevent conflicts” through a functioning continental-wide Early Warning System (EWS).

In order to enhance cooperation and collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities a meeting was held in February/

March 2008. The purpose of the meeting was to review the steps taken at continental and regional levels to operationalise the CEWS and to share information on progress made regarding data collection, data analysis and other relevant aspects of continental early warning. The meeting agreed on a number of steps to be taken, including, the convening of quarterly technical meetings between the CEWS and the RECs.

Regarding the AU’s Peace and Security Council early warning initiative, researchers and practitioners in the field of conflict prevention have argued that the council is vulnerable in regard to political concerns, due in part to its leadership dominance by African politicians who cannot or will not initiate real progress. The need for information and intelligence sharing is a formidable challenge, particularly as the organization lacks the required resources and professional analytical ability to enable it to effectively address the many challenges of early warning. Some less generous commentators have even described

the AU’s “Situation Room” as merely a room set up with access to the CNN TV news channel. According to those commentators, the CEWS, is not proving to be an effective institution in regard to prediction or anticipation of conflict situations.

Regardless of the comments, the AU CEWS and specially the situation room is working hard to bring about change and to facilitate an easier way to acquire and process information. Given that it takes time to perfect such a system, the concept is a step in the right direction and should be seen as a modest beginning to a larger, more professional and more effective and useful undertaking in the interests of African Peace and Security.


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Eritrea

Previous AU Documents and Recommendations:

In recent years the AU has been critical of the role of Eritrea in regional and continental peace and security issues and in May 2010 the continental body officially requested the UN Security Council to impose sanctions against Eritrea for supporting Islamist insurgents in Somalia. The call, which manifested the tense relations between the AU and Eritrea, was strongly rejected by the Eritrean government in Asmara, which immediately suspended its membership of the Union.

Eritrea has featured on the agenda of the PSC in 2008 and 2009. At its 190th meeting held on 22 May 2009 PSC/P R/COMM.(C XC), the PSC discussed the situation in Somalia in the light of the outcome of the 33rd Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers on the security and political situation in Somalia, held in Addis Ababa on 20 May 2009. In addition to the many decisions it has passed on Somalia, the Council, expressed deep concern at the allegation that Eritrea had provided training, weapons and ammunition as well as funding for use by Somalian rebels, in deliberate violation of the United Nations arms embargo against forces fighting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The Council further supported the condemnation of Eritrea by the IGAD Extraordinary Session on Eritrea.

Earlier, on 29 June 2008, the PSC met at the level of Heads of State and Government and acknowledged the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission about the border tensions between the Republic of Djibouti and the State of Eritrea in its communiqué

PSC/HSG/2 (CXL). The Council condemned Eritrea’s military action against Djibouti and demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Eritrean forces from the territory they occupied. The PSC also recognised the UN Security Council Statement of 24 June 2008 that supported the AU’s efforts to facilitate a resolution of the crisis.

Crisis Escalation Potential:

Eritrea is currently experiencing serious political and economic instability as well as isolation by the international community. These days it is not unusual to read numerous reports and research articles that refer to Eritrea as a military state, a state under siege, a fragile country or a prison state. The intolerance of the Asmara government to any signs of opposition or dissent, coupled with the country’s poor economic performance and crippling United Nations sanctions, have contributed to an exodus of Eritrea’s youth to neighboring states. The state is in a situation of strife with its neighbors, and suffers both pressure and isolation from international and regional institutions and major super powers thereby creating excessive regional tensions. The Eritrean problem is exerting a negative impact on collaborative and coordinated efforts to respond to various other regional security crises in the Horn of Africa and beyond. As a manifestation of the deteriorating trust between the Eritrean government and Eritreans themselves, almost all the members of the national soccer team failed to return home from a tournament in Kenya in 2009. Ordinary citizens between the ages of eighteen and 50 cannot leave the country legally, other than in the most exceptional circumstances or through official connections. hence references by some to an Eritrean prison state.

In the course of the past decade Eritrea has become one of the most repressive governments in the world where values like the rule of

law and justice are compromised for ‘unity and cohesion’ and with little or no hope for the existence of democratic principles and the possibility of elections. Several countries have accused the government in Asmara of playing a deliberate destabilising role in the Horn of Africa and beyond. Reports of human rights violations, widespread murders, torture, rape, abductions and disappearances, expulsions, and other crimes attributable to the state are heightening the grievances and opposition locally while Eritrea’s brand of foreign policy is unwelcome to most neighboring states and major regional and international organisations. The country’s internal autocracy, coupled with an aggressive foreign policy, has escalated political, military and diplomatic tensions in Eritrea and in the greater Horn of Africa region with the potential to exacerbate violent confrontation between states.

Key Issues and Internal Dynamics:

Eritrea’s history and politics are very much oriented by its strategic importance and geo-political location due to its Red Sea coastline and mineral resources. Its importance increased further, following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. On January 1, 1880, Eritrea officially became a colony of Italy until 1941. Following World War Two, the British administered Eritrea under a UN Mandate until 1951 when Eritrea became Federated with Ethiopia as per UN resolution 390(A). In a move that divided popular views, Ethiopia effectively annexed Eritrea as its 14th province in 1952. The unionist movement supported the move while other sections of Eritrean society interpreted the action as an example of repression and imposition by Ethiopia’s imperial regime in Addis Ababa and a betrayal by the international community that

COUNTRY ANALYSIS


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should have been overseeing what the Eritreans anticipated; Eritrean autonomy with an independent elected government and its own constitution.

Ultimately, the cultural and political imposition, coupled with a lack of good governance, led to the formation of an independence movement in the early 1960s that later evolved into a 30-year war against successive Ethiopian governments; a war that ended in 1991. Following a UN-supervised referendum in which the Eritrean people overwhelmingly (98.9%) voted for independence, Eritrea became independent in 1991 and gained international recognition in 1993. Eritrea is ethnically and religiously mixed, with nine official ethnic groups and large Muslim, Orthodox Christian, Roman Catholic and Protestant communities. The country is divided into six regions (zobas) and subdivided into districts (“sub-zobas”). The geographical extent of the regions is based on their respective hydrological properties. The dual intent on the part of the Eritrean government is to provide each administration with sufficient control over its agricultural capacity, and to eliminate historical intra-regional conflicts, particularly over land and water rights.

In the mid-1990s, the Eritrean government promised to produce a constitution, introduce multi-party politics and hold national elections. Subsequently a constitutional commission drafted a constitution that was ratified by a constituent assembly in May 1997. However, the country still has no constitution. Although elections were promised, none has taken place so far. Presidential elections, planned for 1997, never took place. Eritrea is a one-party state, with the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PDJF), which evolved from the liberation movement. After independence, Eritrea had established a growing and healthy economy. However, the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia had a major

negative impact on the economy and discouraged investment. According to World Bank estimates, Eritrea lost livestock worth some $225 million and 55,000 homes worth $41 million during the war. Damage to public buildings, including hospitals, was estimated at $24 million. Much of the transportation and communications infrastructure is outmoded and deteriorating, although a large volume of intercity road-building activity is currently underway.

According to the World Bank’s Development Index, Eritrea is one of the poorest nations in the world, with an average yearly per capita income of $US 200 and ranking 157th out of 177 states in the world. The introduction of sanctions would have a crushing impact on trade and food security levels for the population of Eritrea. According to the World Bank, between 2005 and 2007 Eritrea had an average GDP growth rate of 1%. Experts have estimated that Eritrea requires a sustained real economic growth rate of 7% or higher in the long term, to reach its Millennium Goal to halve the current number of people living in extreme poverty by 2015.

The opposition against Eritrea’s political repression and worsening living conditions in the country started to gain momentum at the end of the devastating war with Ethiopia in 2000. In October 2000, professionals in the Eritrean diaspora met in Berlin and drafted a letter, referred to as ‘the Berlin Manifesto,’ addressed to President Isaias Afeworki, criticising the tendency toward one-man rule. However, their concerns were disregarded and, in 2001, the biggest political crackdown in the country’s history took place. In 2001 fifteen senior liberation war veterans, including founding members of the EPLF known as the “G15”, began to voice disquiet over the president’s conduct and published an open letter on the internet that condemned his high-handed

leadership and failure to consult the national assembly, especially over the war with Ethiopia (1998-2000). The criticism resulted in a crackdown in September 2001 that saw eleven of the fifteen imprisoned, including such senior figures as Petros Solomon (a former military commander who, since independence, had served successively, as defence, foreign and marine resources minister) and Haile Woldensae (ex-foreign minister, recently moved to trade and industry). Three of the group’s members were out of the country, so escaped detention. One recanted. The Asmara government has also attacked the independent press by closing newspapers and imprisoning a number of editors and journalists indefinitely. None of those arrested in September 2001 have ever been charged, let alone tried. An Eritrean former prison guard who defected to Ethiopia told Reporters without Borders, that six government officials and five journalists arrested in 2001 have died in prison, including a former vice president and a former army chief of staff, who were sent to isolated camps where conditions were inhuman.

The absence of a space for dissent and opposition is breeding rebel groups and liberation organisations in Eritrea and broadening opposition outside the country. Some of these opposition groups are based on ethnicity and religion, including the most notable factions, the Kunama and Afar movements. Though divided and weak, a number of exiled opposition movements are also present. Some advocate constitutional, negotiated, transition and thus a degree of engagement with the EPLF, while others call for renewal of armed struggle. The fact that some of the opposition groups are based in Addis Ababa has negatively affected their popular support. The only opposition movement of any significance that operates inside Eritrea, at least part of the time, is Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ),


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an armed, radical Islamic group. Founded in the early 1980s, it enjoyed the support of both the Sudanese government and Osama bin Laden’s Al Queda in the 1990s.

Eritrea’s foreign relations in the past decade have also been full of trouble and crisis. Eritrea has fought, directly or indirectly, with Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti and Sudan and involved itself in various ways in the conflicts in eastern Sudan, Darfur and Somalia. In a region known for interrelated proxy wars, Sudan and Eritrea hosted one another’s rebel movements and cut diplomatic ties in 1994. Athough they have since resumed contact, diplomatic relations have been murky between the two nations.

Yemen and Eritrea also fought a brief but intense war over the Hanish Islands in 1996. The dispute was referred to an international tribunal, and both parties abided by the ruling. Eritrea had minor clashes with Djibouti in 1996 and 1998. However relations collapsed during the war with Ethiopia, when Eritrea considered Djibouti an Ethiopian stooge, and contact was only restored following the Algiers Agreement that ended the major conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti. The border conflict escalated in 2008 when Eritrean forces allegedly occupied a strip of Djibouti’s land and fired on its troops. However, Eritrea’s internal and external situation was seriously affected by its devastating war with the formerly friendly Ethiopia from 1998-2000. The war seriously affected Eritrea’s economy and international relations. Some analysts believe that the alleged involvement of Eritrea in the Somali conflict is just a proxy extension of the Ethio-Eritrean war.

The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) announced its decision in April 2002. Demarcation was expected to begin in 2003, but did not progress due to disagreements between the parties. The EEBC announced a

demarcation decision effective as of November 2007. The situation currently remains at an impasse. In August 2009, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC) delivered its final awards regarding international law violations during the 1998-2000 border war. The Claims Commission awarded Eritrea $161 million for damages caused by Ethiopia with an additional $2 million for individual claims. Ethiopia was awarded $174 million for damages caused by Eritrea. Eritrea cited interference that impaired the administration of justice and challenged the plausibility of evidence but announced its acceptance of the award by the Claims Commission without equivocation.

At the 15th Assembly of the African Union Heads of State and Government in Kampala, President Sheikh Sharif officially accused Eritrea of supporting Al-Shabaab terrorists financially and logistically. He pointed out that Eritrea was at the forefront of support for the terrorists financially, through training and the provision of logistical support. The international isolation and presumed spoiler role of Eritrea in the Horn and beyond still revolves around its hostility toward Ethiopia and the consequence of the war with that country. Eritrea’s sole political party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and the President, Isaias Afewerki, continue to dominate Eritrean political affairs with no distinction between party, state and a virtual one-man executive with too much personal power on hand. The resulting militarisation of Eritrea moreover reflects, and in turn reinforces, the disastrous conviction of the Eritrean leadership that all the nation’s problems depend upon a military solution.

Geo-Political Dynamics:

Pan-African and RECs Dynamics:

Although, the Eritrean government

has repeatedly declared that the border issue with Ethiopia has been resolved, and that it has no quarrel with Ethiopia, its regional and continental foreign policy is still significantly determined by its relations with Ethiopia. Eritrea’s stance and role in Somalia and its involvement in other conflicts in the region, are believed to be founded on the strategy of a proxy war with Ethiopia. Eritrea’s actions and behaviour are believed to stem from its ambition to be a regional diplomatic and military powerhouse. To date, Eritrea has fought, directly or indirectly, with Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti and Sudan and involved itself in various ways in the conflicts in eastern Sudan, Darfur and Somalia.

The horn of Africa region has a long history of interrelated proxy wars and the legacy still lingers on in the current affairs and policies of the countries of the region. Eritrea supports the major rebel moments in Ethiopia, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The Sudanese have backed jihadists against Asmara, while Eritrea has supported the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) from the South and the Beja Congress and Rashaida Free Lions from the East. Eritrea’s alleged support for Islamic extremists is also a continuation of this legacy.

Eritrea has also had a difficult relationship with the sub regional grouping, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and suspended its membership in April 2007 over deteriorating relations between Asmara and regional countries over Somalia. Following the AU’s call in May 2010 for the UN Security Council to impose sanctions against Eritrea for supporting Islamist insurgents in Somalia, Asmara suspended its membership the African Union and the relationship between Asmara and the AU remains tense. Eritrean authorities, in different forums, have

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repeatedly and seriously challenged the independence and competence of IGAD and the AU to resolve conflicts in Africa, more specifically the Somali conflict.

UN Dynamics:

The relations Eritrea has with the UN are no different from the relations it has with other major international organisations. A UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), was established in September 2000 and monitored a 25-kilometer-wide Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) separating the two sides. Eritrea, which to date still complains that the UN was unable to accurately demarcate the border, eventually began to restrict the movements and activities of UNMEE. In this regard it cut off fuel supplies and made it impossible for the mission to continue carrying out its mandated tasks. Eritrea’s actions also put at risk the safety and security of UN personnel associated with this mission. Consequently, on 30 July 2008, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1827 terminating the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).

On 23 December 2009 the Security Council imposed arms and travel sanctions on Eritrea for supporting insurgents that were trying to topple the TFG government in Somalia. The resolution, which was supported by 13 of the 15 members of the Security Council, placed an arms embargo on Eritrea, imposed travel bans on its top political and military officials, and froze the assets of some of the country’s senior political and military officials. China, one of the five permanent members of the Council, abstained from voting for the resolution, while Libya voted against it.

Earlier, on 14 January 2009, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1862(2009), in which it urged Eritrea and Djibouti to resolve their border dispute

peacefully. At the same time, the Security Council, noting that Djibouti had withdrawn its forces, demanded that, within five weeks after the adoption of the resolution, Eritrea should address the following three points: firstly, withdraw its forces and all equipment to the positions of the status quo ante position; secondly, acknowledge its border dispute with Djibouti; and thirdly, engage actively in dialogue and diplomatic efforts to reach a solution. On 18 May 2009, the UN Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement in which it reaffirmed its support for the TFG as the legitimate authority in Somalia and expressed its concern about reports that Eritrea has supplied arms to those opposing the TFG in breach of the arms embargo. Wider International Community Dynamics:

Since the conclusion of the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000, the Government of Eritrea has become increasingly isolated and militarized. Although they had close and promising ties in the 1990s, relations between Eritrea and the US have deteriorated in the past decade. Relations worsened even further in October 2008 when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Dr Jendayi Frazer, called the nation a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ and said that the U.S. government might add Eritrea to its list of rogue states, along with Iran and Sudan, referring to the presence at a recent Somali opposition conference in Asmara of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, an exiled Somali Islamist leader, whom the U.S. suspects of having links to Al Qaeda. In her Africa visit of August 2009, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also claimed that Eritrea was supplying weapons to al-Shabaab and described the Eritrean action as a serious threat to regional stability in the Horn. Backing IGAD and the AU, the United Nations, having imposed sanctions and an arms embargo on Eritrea under

Resolution 1907 for that country’s alleged role in Somalia and refusal to withdraw troops from the border with Djibouti, intensified Eritrea’s international isolation. Eritrea retains modest relations with Italy and the European Union. .

China which has vocally opposed the sanctions against Eritrea has expanded its political and economic relations with Asmara and has repeatedly stated that the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution on sanctions against Eritrea should not replace diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiations. Eritrea also maintains good relations with Qatar and Iran. Civil Society Dynamics:

Eritrea’s ruling party dominates and controls the public and political spheres tightly and there is no independent civil society in the country. The country’s youth and students, women and workers’ associations are controlled by the government. Although independent civil society groups, trade unions and NGOs are permitted, strikes are not allowed under any circumstances and advocacy or lobby groups cannot be organised outside the control of the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). Religious organisations, both Christian and Muslim, are closely monitored. Their leaders are intimidated and take no public stance on government policy or any other social issue. The criticism in 2005 by the Patriarch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church about state interference in the church’s affairs was responded to by stripping him of his authority. He has been under house arrest ever since that time.

Eritrea is regarded as one of the worst offenders in terms of press freedom. At present Eritrea is the only country without a free

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Documentation

Relevant AU Documents:

PSC/HSG/COMM(CXL) (29 June 2008) Communiqué on the situation at the border between Djibouti and Eritrea.

PSC/PR/2 (CXXXVI) (12 June 2008) Communiqué on the situation the current situation

in Darfur and the Republic of Djibouti and the State of Eritrea.

PSC/PR/COMM(CXXI) (24 April 2008) Communiqué on the situation between Djibouti and Eritrea.

UN Documents

SC/9570/1862/2009 (14 January 2009) Security Council Urges Djibouti-Eritrea to Resolve Border Dispute Peacefully Unanimously Adopting Resolution

RECs Documents

IGAD Ministerial Statement (20 May 2009) Council of Ministers Extraordinary Session

Other Relevant Documents

The Eritrea-Djibouti Border Dispute”, Institute for Security Studies, situation report, September 2008.

Eritrea: The Siege State, The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) Africa Report N°163 – 21 September 2010

press in Africa. In 2009, Reporters Without Borders ranked Eritrea at the very bottom of its country-by-country ranking of press freedom, behind North Korea. Eritrea is the world’s fourth most prolific jailer of journalists, according to the US-based Committee to Protect Journalists. The public media in Eritrea does nothing but repeat and relay the repressive regime’s ultra-nationalist ideology and government propaganda. Freedom of speech and of the press is virtually non-existent. The government closed the independent press in 2001 for “endangering national security” and arrested many journalists after several publications printed the dissenting views of some National Assembly members.

Scenario Planning:

The situation in Eritrea could take a number of courses based on the actions taken by the various parties to the crisis. These are the possible scenarios:

Scenario 1: Domestic grievances and political oppression coupled with economic hardship could lead to internal instability in Eritrea. Consequently, political and ethnic groups who believe they have been marginalised may continue to mount violent attacks against the government.

Scenario 2: The current stalemate between Eritrea and its neighbors, Ethiopia and Djibouti, could escalate into violent confrontation between states, thereby worsening the fragile security system in the Horn of Africa

Scenario 3: Resorting to meaningful dialogue and constructive engagement could lead to a better understanding between Eritrea, its neighbors and the international community

Scenario 4: Eritrea could continue to reject any initiative being undertaken by the AU PSC, as the key inter-governmental forum for resolving disputes between countries in Africa, primarily, but not exclusively, due to the Organisation’s location in Ethiopia.

Early Response Options:

Given the above scenarios the following options could be considered by the PSC as possible ways to consolidate peace, stability and democracy in Eritrea.

Option 1: The PSC could work in tandem with stakeholders, notably IGAD and the UN Security Council, as well as other key stakeholders, and could consider adopting an integrated strategy to address the situation in the Horn of Africa. Such a strategy could effectively strive to improve relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and therefore indirectly also address the conflict situation in Somalia.

Option 2: The PSC in collaboration with the UNSC could deploy a Special Envoy, acceptable to all parties, who would be expected to pursue a comprehensive agreement addressing outstanding contentious historical, political and geographical issues in the Horn.


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PSC Retrospective: African Women’s decade and the anniversary of the UN 1325 resolution

UN resolution 1325 (2000) adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000, has been realized with the understanding that women are highly affected by armed conflicts all over the world, even though they are mostly not engaged directly in combat. The realities of attacks that targeted women in Rwanda and Bosnia and related reports of sexual violence against them, aided the council in its decision. In addition, Resolution 1325 recognized that women were combatants in many conflicts, and were a significant part of the support systems of armed groups, and therefore deserved special attention in demobilization and reintegration programs. The Resolution also highlighted the obligations under international law of parties to conflict to protect women in war situations. Accordingly, look-ing at the frightening pattern of gender-based violence, the security council agreed that it was important to ensure that women’s needs, and their views, were taken into account in the planning and execution of all aspects of conflict prevention, peace processes, peacekeeping operations and post-conflict recovery. The Council took the view that women had a critically important contribution to make regarding how peace could be achieved and maintained.

The resolution expressed concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including their status as refugees and internally displaced persons, and that they are increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements. The Resolution also recognized the consequent impact of attacks on women and children on durable peace and

reconciliation. It goes on to reaffirm the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, as well as the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Resolution 1325 made some very practical recommendations to the UN Secretariat and member states:

• increase the number of female peacekeepers; and

• increase the number of women leaders dealing with issues of peace and security both in national governments and the UN system.

The normative framework created by resolution 1325, both moral and legal, has guided work on gender ‘mainstreaming’ policies across the UN system and has thrown a spotlight on issues preventing gender equality within UN agencies. The framework also prompted the Council to continue taking up the thematic issue of women, peace and security in the ten years since the Resolution was introduced. In the last three years the UN adopted three further resolutions on this subject (resolutions 1820, 1888 as well as 1889 which focused on the importance of women’s involvement in post-conflict recovery). In 2010 alone, the Council was awaiting five different reports from the Secretary-General stemming from resolutions 1888 and 1889.

In seeking ways of improving implementation of the resolution,

consideration of the fact that addressing the impact of conflict on women falls largely on the efforts of a few Security Council members and individuals within the UN Secretariat should not be over looked.

In the African context, the African Union Peace and Security Council also made a reference to the UN resolution in its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CCXXIII), 223rd PSC meeting; and emphasized that, over the years, the AU had adopted a comprehensive human rights architecture that provides mechanisms for both preventing and addressing violence against women and children in armed conflicts, including international instruments such as the UN 1325 resolution. In that same meeting the Council urged Member States to include progress on the implementation of the Protocol on the Rights of Women within their annual reports to the Assembly of the African Union as required by the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa. The Council also encouraged civil society to contribute, in the most appropriate manner, to the implementation of the Protocol on the Rights of Women and the African Charter on the Protection and Welfare of the Child and to participate actively in the overall efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability, in conformity with the provisions of article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU.

As the UN 1325 tenth year anniversary dawned, the African women’s decade was also launched in Nairobi on October 15th 2010 in accordance with the African Union Assembly Declaration 229(XII) that

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PSC Retrospective: African Women’s decade and the anniversary of the UN 1325 resolution(continued)

designated 2010 – 2020 as the African Women’s Decade. The AU event was launched with an event and series of forums [NGO Forum: 10th, Experts Meeting 11th – 13th October, Ministers Meeting 14th October 2010] in Nairobi with a theme “Grassroots Approach to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment‘’. In attendance were African Union Commission and Civil Society organizations of Africa. Prior initiatives taken by the African Union, specifically the Assembly, include: The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa adopted in 2003 in Maputo; and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa adopted in Addis Ababa in July 2004, which requires States to respect normative standards on women’s human rights.

The official concept note and the road map for the launch of the African women’s decade state its objectives comprehensively as:

• To preserve and build on the African women’s strength in the women’s movement and leverage on global and regional political goodwill for the advancement of African women;

• To usurp the opportunity for African women to provide leadership in rejuvenating the global women’s movement, with a focus on youth and grassroots women; and

• To maintain the drive for empowering African women and marshal resources for the

performance and relevance of the Decade.

The goal and aim of the AWD as discussed in the road map for the AWD, in concrete terms, are the execution of commitments on gender equality and women’s empowerment from the grass roots, through national and regional to continental level and advancing gender equality by reinforcing equal partnerships between men and women between 2010 and 2020. The document also stresses the issue that in order to achieve the listed goals, existing instruments should be strengthened and supported through an inclusive grassroots bottom-up approach.

Over the decade ten thematic areas have been identified that will be emphasized and highlighted annually:

1) Fighting Poverty and Promoting Economic Empowerment of Women and Entrepreneurship,

2) Agriculture and Food Security,

3) Health, Maternal Mortality and HIV/AIDS,

4) Education, Science and Technology,

5) Environment, Climate Change and Sustainable Development,

6) Peace and Security and Violence against Women,

7) Governance and Legal Protection,

8) Finance and Gender Budgeting,

9) Women in Decision Making,

10) Young Women’s Movement

The initiative should be considered as a step in the right direction with regards to empowering women, main-streaming gender issues, exten-ding protection of civilians and advancing peacekeeping with an emphasis on women and young girls; the women's decade should also be giving detailed emphasis to the implementation of relevant programmes, that are well managed, closely monitored and regularly reported on with involvement at the grass roots level.

The African women's decade, as planned, should be the decade of opportunity for African women through the practical, moral and legal realization of a Grassroots Approach to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment that ought to set the stage for enhanced peace, security and equality of opportunity for women everywhere in the decades ahead.


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PSC Retrospective: The Relationship between the PSC and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

Cognizance of the close affinity between human rights violations and peace and security, in terms of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol) vests the PSC with a huge mandate with respect to human rights. As a mechanism for properly catering for human rights issues that emerge in the context of peace and security, the PSC Protocol additionally envisages a close working relationship between the PSC and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR). Article 19 of the PSC Protocol accordingly stipulates that the PSC ‘shall seek close cooperation’ with the ACHPR in all matters relevant to the mandate and objectives of the Council. Given that the ACHPR is the organ of the AU with the competence and expertise on human rights issues, this provision provides a framework to enable the PSC to make use of the ACHPR in those peace and security situations involving or revealing serious violations of human rights.

The ACHPR regularly receives complaints of violations of human rights including serious and massive violation of human rights. Although some of these situations may pose some threat to peace and security, the PSC may not seize of such matters early enough to take preventive measures. To cater for this scenario, Article 19 of the PSC further requires the ACHPR to bring to the attention of the PSC any information relevant to the objective and mandate of the Council.’

This provision in particular

gives an important framework for effectively operationalsing the protection mandate of the ACHPR under Article 58 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. This article stipulates that in cases of communication, which reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human rights, the ACHPR shall draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Given that the PSC is conferred with a power to look into such situations and address human rights issues in the context of peace and security and that it is the highest standing decision-making body, the PSC is better placed to receive the information on situations under Article 58 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and take necessary measures including, as per Article 58 (2), a request to the ACHPR to under-take an in-depth investigation and make a factual report with recommendations on measures to be taken.

One can conclude from the above that the PSC and the ACHPR have a complementary role to play and accordingly the two are expected to establish a harmonious and institutionalized working relationship. The provisions of Article 19 of the PSC Protocol and Article 58 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights envisage a two-way relationship in which the PSC refers cases to the ACHPR and the ACHPR alerts the PSC to the existence of certain situations of particular relevance for the work of the PSC.

There have been instances in which the PSC referred matters to the ACHPR. For example, in

a communiqué, PSC/AHG/Comm. (X), it adopted on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire at the tenth meeting of the PSC held on 25 May 2004, after noting its grave concern ‘over executions, killings and human rights violations perpetrated since the beginning of the crisis,’ the PSC ‘reiterates its request to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to carry out an investigation into human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire.’ In that communiqué, the PSC also requested the AU Commission to undertake a fact-finding mission to Darfur and submit a report. Similarly, when it considered the situation of the Republic of Guinea at its 71 meeting, PSC/PR/Comm(LXXI), the PSC condemned ‘… the disproportionate use of force and the repression of the civilian population and, in this regard, requested the opening of an independent inquiry, with the participation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in order to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of the atrocities and other acts of violence committed during these events.’

Both from Article 19 of the PSC and the practice of the PSC, it is clear that an important area of the relationship between the PSC and ACHPR relates to the investigation of violations of human rights particularly in the context of conflict situations. What is missing both from the PSC Protocol and the practice of the PSC in this area is the development of an established and more institutionalized mechanism for interaction and


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PSC Retrospective: The Relationship between the PSC and African

Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

feedback, including periodic meetings between the two bodies Accordingly, although the ACHPR undertook a fact-finding mission to Darfur and produced a report on the human rights situation in Darfur, there is no official record that this report has been submitted to and discussed by the PSC.

One aspect of the Conclusion of the Dakar Retreat of the PSC in 2007, PSC/PR/2(LXXXIII), addressed, albeit in a limited way, the establishment of a framework for interaction. The relevant part of the Conclusion envisages that ‘the Chairperson of the PSC will once a year invite the Chairperson of the ACHPR to brief the Council on the state of human rights in conflict areas.’

While this is an important development toward institutiona-lising the relationship between the two bodies, its scope seems to be much narrower than the relationship envisaged under Article 19 of the PSC Protocol. The latter document envisages a more regularized interaction and implies more avenues for interaction than is stipulated in the working method of the PSC. Accordingly, as and whenever it is necessary to activate the mandate of the PSC, the Council should engage the ACHPR. If such a robust interaction is required under Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, one should understand the annual briefing meeting stipulated in the PSC decision to be additional to more regularized interaction between the two bodies as and when necessary.

Clearly, there is a need to further clarify the modalities of implementing Article 19 of the PSC Protocol. As a step in this direction, the PSC should identify broad areas of its work whose accomplishment

requires the involvement of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. From the practice referred to above, for example, these areas may include investigation of serious violations of human rights in conflict situations. Other areas include advice on ways of addressing situations involving violation of human rights including serious violations of human rights provided for under Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act, and identification and determination of human rights situations with potential threats to peace and security (as per article 58 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights).

Additionally, in order to operationalise the provision of Article 19 of the PSC regarding the role of the ACHPR to draw the attention of the PSC to situations relevant to the Council’s mandate, the PSC should in consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights establish a mechanism that facilitates relevant activities of the African Commission to feed into the PSC. One such mechanism could be for the PSC to enable the ACHPR to submit to it, through the PSC Secretariat, reports about situations that require the attention of the PSC and to invite the ACHPR to brief the Council about such situations.

Although the decision to hold an annual briefing meeting between the two bodies was made in 2007, from the official records of the PSC there is no record of such a meeting having taken place as yet. Accordingly, a starting point for further clarifying the modalities for operationalising Article 19, including considering the measures proposed above, could be for the PSC to fix a date and time with the ACHPR for the annual briefing meeting. This could be an occasion that, apart from hearing the briefing

of the ACHPR on the human rights situation in conflict zones, provides the two bodies with the opportunity to discuss modalities for implementing Article 19, additional to the annual briefing meeting.

Reference

Solomon A. Dersso, Promotion of Human Security: The Role of African Human Rights Institutions, ISS Monograph No. 145 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, June 2008)


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>>page 22

PSC Retrospective: Africa Union Peace Day

In the past decade the African Union has made significant progress towards creating institutions and mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and realise sustainable peace and security on the continent. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), a comprehensive and holistic approach comprising various components is the manifestation of a continental effort to address the biggest challenge faced by Africa’s growing population. However, lack of peace and the existence of violent conflict still remains a painful reality in different parts of the continent. Consequently, such conflict remains one of the greatest impediments to sustainable development in Africa.

On 31 August 2009, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, during its Special Session on the Consideration and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa, held in Tripoli, Libya, declared 2010 as ‘the Year of Peace and Security in Africa’. On 9 January 2010, the AU Commission officially inaugurated the Year of Peace and Security. Paragraph 23 of the Declaration on the ‘Elimination of Conflicts in Africa and the Promotion of Sustainable Peace’ SP/Assembly/PS/Decl. (I) highlights the need to review and strengthen current peace efforts and, where necessary, launch new initiatives and mechanisms to advance stability on the continent. Furthermore, in its recent Kampala Summit in July 2010, the Assembly of the African Union [AU Assembly/ AU/DEC. 275 (XIV)] called on partners to work in partnership with the AU towards the realisation of the Year of Peace.

The AU campaign under the

The Hybrid mission has organised a series of events throughout the three Darfur states, under the theme “Make Peace Happen.” In addition to a cultural display by the locals and internally displaced people, a symposium entitled “Youth, Peace and Development” at the University of El Fasher, was conducted by state officials, humanitarian agency representatives and university students. The event was broadcast via radio to all three state capitals. Schoolchildren, who won an art competition for their depictions of the concept of peace, were also awarded prizes as part of the program. A symbolic moment of silence also observed to honor all those who died in defense of peace and security in Africa while white doves were released by children and peacekeepers. Music shows featuring Sudanese singers also promoted the idea that peace is possible and helped raise awareness of the Year of Peace and Security in Africa.

Following the appeal by the AU Assembly at its recent Kampala Summit, for partners, including the Institute for Peace and Security (ISS), to work in partnership with the AU towards the realisation of the Year of Peace, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) collaborated with the AU Commission, through a variety of outreach projects, to publicise the Year of Peace and Security. In addition, the ISS and the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD), was also observed the African Union Year of Peace and Security and celebrated International Peace Day with a Candlelight Vigil in Addis Ababa’s Meskel Square. that included the reading aloud of Peace Messages by students drawn from three

motto ‘2010 Make Peace Happen’ is being celebrated with various events and will continue until the beginning of 2011. As a rallying point for the year long celebration and in accordance with the 1982 UN decision to celebrate 21 September as an International Day of Peace, the day was celebrated in different parts of the continent by means of various events.

The International Day of Peace provides a single rallying point for the peoples and countries of the world and Africa to show that peace is possible. The declaration urges no violence, no conflict, and no fighting on that day and, hopefully, beyond that day. The cessation of hostilities on this most recent International Day of Peace made it possible for people, particularly in conflict zones, to receive vital food, water, mosquito nets and other emergency supplies. There were also many government, community and stakeholder activities to mark Peace Day.

A cessation of hostilities in all conflict areas and the ability to freely and peacefully distribute humanitarian supplies, materials and services to communities in such areas, as well as in non-conflict areas in equal critical need of such assistance, are among the major objectives of the Peace Day.

One of the most notable celebrations of International Peace Day took place in Darfur where the Day of Peace and the African Union’s Year of Peace and Security were commemorated and celebrated by UNAMID in the presence of the Chairperson of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel on Darfur, and former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, and the North Darfur State Wali (Governor), Osman Mohammed Yousif Kibir.


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PSC Retrospective: Africa Union Peace Day

local High schools. Religious leaders representing the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian Islamic Supreme Council, the Catholic Church and Ethiopian Protestant Churches also con-veyed peace messages that were transmitted by Ethiopia’s national television channel. Furthermore, a seminar was organised at the ISS office in Pretoria, South Africa, promoting the Year and the Peace Day.

Among other initiatives to publicise the Year of Peace and Security, the AU has supported a “Peace Caravan”, an expedition across some thirty African countries, with the aim of creating awareness and spreading the message of peace amongs the peoples of Africa. The “Peace Caravan” is an initiative by an NGO known as the Peace Journey in Africa 2000 Promotion. The Commission has also developed a Make Peace Happen Lesson Plan for use by schools and colleges throughout Africa. The lesson emphasises the benefits of peace and aims at inculcating a culture of peace in our communities in Africa.

The year long event seeks

to highlight the importance of addressing the root causes of conflicts in a holistic and systematic manner, including through the implementation, domestication and harmonisation of existing human rights instruments, the rule of law, democracy, elections, good governance, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation and positive Pan-African relations. The Year of Peace and Security also involves an emphasis on enhancing the role and visibility of civil society, Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and the international com-munity, in supporting peace initiatives.

The AU and its partners in the campaign are conducting a series of events raising awareness of various peace initiatives by engaging with the media, academia and civil society organisations. Numerous seminars, dialogue forums and roundtables in partnership with research and advocacy institutions, have already taken place with a view to providing an opportunity for African citizens to provide feedback on their perceptions of the AU and the PSC. The Year of Peace and Security will also create opportunities for AU member states to renew their commitment

toward accelerating the opera-tionalisation of the APSA and ratifying documents like the African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance which at present has 35 signatories with only three ratifications.

Peace must be fostered through innovative and inclusive partner-ships at all levels. Only when all women and men, civil society and the private sector, join hands with Governments and relevant international institutions will permanent peace become a reality. In his progress report Assembly/AU/Dec.275(XVI) delivered at the Kampala summit on July 2010, Chairperson Jean Ping stressed that the continent must measure its progress, not just in the symbolic activities undertaken and the diplomatic milestones reached, but also in the tangible improvements, in terms of peace and security, in the everyday lives of one billion citizens of Africa.


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Important Forthcoming Dates

6 November: International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict

16 November: International day of tolerance

29-30 November: Third Africa-EU Summit – theme economic growth, job creation, investment

1 December World AIDS Day

10 December International Human Rights Day

Country Election Date

ComorosPresidential Local

7 November 26 Dec 2010

Burkino Faso Presidential 21 November 2010

Egypt People’s Assembly Shura Council (half of the members)

28 November 2010

Sudan Referendum 9 January 2011

Cape VerdeNational Assembly Presidential

January 2011 February 2011

NigeriaNational Assembly Presidential State Assemblies and Governors

15 January 2011 22 January 2011 29 January 2011

Niger Presidential January 2011

MauritaniaNational Assembly, regional and local

January 2011

Central African RepublicPresidential and National Assembly

First Round 23 January 2011

ChadNational Assembly Local elections Presidential

20 February 2011 27 March 2011 8 May 2011


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© 2010, Institute for Security Studies

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of the Institute. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors.

Contact

Programme HeadPeace and Security Council Report ProgrammeInstitute for Security StudiesP.O. Box 2329Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Tel: +251-11-372-11-54Fax: +251-11-372-59-54Email: [email protected]

website: www.issafrica.org

Contributors to this Volume:

ISS PSC Report Programme, Addis Ababa: Dr. Duke Kent-Brown, Dr. Solomon Dersso, Mr Hallelujah Lulie and Ms Eden Yohannes Yoseph

Donors:

This Report is published through the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of Denmark, the Foundation Open Society Institute, and the Humanity United Foundation. In addition, the Institute for Security Studies receives core support from the Governments of Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.

As a leading African human security research institution, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security and gender mainstreaming.

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