A Matrix Approach to Comparing and Contrasting Some Differing Perspectives on

Emergency Management and Homeland Security in a Post-9/11 World

 and Some Suggested Reference Materials

Paula D. Gordon, Ph.D.Presentation

FEMA Higher Education Conference, Emmitsburg, Maryland, June 6 - 9, 2011

Using a Matrix Approach to Analysis to Enhance Understanding

• of different perspectives concerning some of the major challenges facing those in roles of public responsibility for homeland security and emergency management;

• of a range of different ways of looking at the role of the Federal, State, and local governments in recent major disasters, with an emphasis on Hurricane Katrina; and

• of some possible explanations concerning the basis of widely varying perspectives and some of the possible consequences of major differences in perspectives.  

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Some Differences Among Those in Positions of Responsibility

in Hurricane Katrina

• Differing levels of knowledge, experience, and skills with regard to addressing a moderate hurricane, let alone a catastrophic hurricane.

• Differing levels of knowledge, experience, and skills in emergency management.

• Differing views concerning what constitutes a catastrophe and what makes a catastrophic event exponentially more difficult to deal with than a disaster of lesser magnitude.

• Differing expectations concerning how effective emergency management efforts can be when all of the major elements of the critical infrastructure are in a state of failure in a 92,000 square mile area.

3

Comparing and Contrasting Some Differing Perspectives of a Few Actors and Analysts

with Regard to a Variety of Parameters• Don Kettl's views (as found in his book System under Stress ~

Homeland Security and American Politics)• The common view points found in the major government after

action reports• Michael Brown's views, including his February 11, 2006 Deposition• General Honore's views• One’s own views

(The list is short in order to accommodate the time frame for the presentation.)

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Some Typologies, Concepts, and ToolsUsed in this Matrix Analysis

• Todd Stewart’s Counter-Terrorism Strategic Model: Similarities between this depiction of the homeland security cycle and the emergency management cycle

• Paula Gordon’s All-Hazards Adaptation of Stewart’s Model

• A Typology of Emergencies of Differing Levels of Severity

• The Homeland Security Impact Scale and its Applicability to an All-Hazards Approach to Emergency Management

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The Nature of the Approach Being Taken

Are the actors or analysts taking a comprehensive or a less than holistic approach to emergency management and homeland security?

Are they taking a realistic approach?

Do they understand the differences between a medium scale disaster and a catastrophe?

Are they expecting that the response to a catastrophe can be micromanaged?

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Todd Stewart’s Counter-Terrorism Strategic Model:

• Todd Stewart's model is helpful in depicting a comprehensive approach to preventing as well as preparing for and responding to potential terrorist-related events.

• A model that helps clarify key similarities and differences between the homeland security cycle and the emergency management cycle

• A model that importantly includes mitigation. 7

Todd Stewart’s Counter-Terrorism Strategic Model

DeterrenceDeterrence

PredictionPrediction

PreventionPrevention(Pre-emption)(Pre-emption)

Detect &Detect &CharacterizeCharacterize

MitigationMitigation(Preparation(Preparation

and Protection)and Protection)

Crisis Crisis ManagementManagement

Forensics &Forensics &AttributionAttribution

Post-EventPost-EventResponseResponse

Recovery &Recovery &ReconstitutionReconstitution

TERRORISMTERRORISMEVENT OR EVENT OR CAMPAIGNCAMPAIGN

Identify & CharacterizeIdentify & CharacterizeThreatsThreats

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Paula Gordon’s All-Hazards Adaptation of Todd Stewart’s Strategic Model:

• The following adaptation of Todd Stewart's model is helpful in depicting a comprehensive approach to preventing as well as preparing for and responding to potential events involving all hazards, whatever their origin may be.

• A model that helps clarify key similarities and differences between the homeland security cycle and the emergency management cycle.

• A model that importantly includes preparedness mitigation, and situational awareness.

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PreparednessPreparedness

Remediation, Remediation, Protective Protective

Measures, & Measures, & MitigationMitigation

Contingency Contingency Planning &Planning &

Situational Awareness & Assessment Situational Awareness & Assessment When & If the Event is Foreseeable orWhen & If the Event is Foreseeable orImminent & When the Event Occurs Imminent & When the Event Occurs Paula D. Gordon, Ph.D, Paula D. Gordon, Ph.D,

http://gordonhomeland.com 5/20//2011 5/20//2011Modeled Loosely on an Adaptation of Todd Stewart’s Counter Terrorism Strategic ModelModeled Loosely on an Adaptation of Todd Stewart’s Counter Terrorism Strategic Model

Continuity ofContinuity of Operations PlanningOperations Planning

& Event & Event ResponseResponse

Post-EventPost-EventResponseResponse

Recovery &Recovery &ReconstitutionReconstitution

Plus Mitigation &Plus Mitigation &PreparednessPreparedness

MeasuresMeasuresfor the Futurefor the Future

AN ALL-AN ALL-HAZARDSHAZARDS

EMERGENCYEMERGENCYMANAGEMENTMANAGEMENT

CYCLECYCLE

Identify, Assess, &Identify, Assess, &Characterize HazardsCharacterize Hazards

Crisis Crisis ManagementManagement

A Typology of Emergencies of Differing Levels of Severity

• A typology that is pertinent to an all-hazards approach to emergency management as well as to a natural hazards approach to emergency management.

• A typology that helps clarify the differences in impacts of emergencies of differing levels of severity and the implications of those differences for the emergency management cycle.

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A Typology of Emergencies

Size ofEmergency

Number of Dead &Injured

Roles ofGovernment

Approach Characteristicsof Care

Skill &TrainingNeeds

Small Scale Scores Local, State,and Regional

Surge ofcapa-bilities

Manageable Surge capa-bility

MediumScale

Hundreds All levels ofgovernment

Modified Normal to minimal

Networkedsurge capability

LargeScale

Thousands All levels ofgovernment

Modified to makeshift

Normal to minimal

Networkedsurgecapability

CatastrophicScale

Millions All levels ofgovernment

Mostlymakeshift

Minimal orworse

Make docapability

Mega-Catastrophe

Multi-millions tobillions

Remaining vestiges ofgovernment

Totallymakeshift

Minimal if existent

Improvisa-tional skills

Adapted from P. Gordon " Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis: Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," Homeland Security Review, Vol. 1 No. 2 , 2006 (http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/options/Analysis.html )

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The Homeland Security Impact Scale: Its Applicability to an All-Hazards Approach to

Emergency Management

• The Homeland Security Impact Scale provides a common frame of reference that can be useful in considering and arriving at a consensus concerning the impacts of disasters.

• The Homeland Security Impact Scale provides a common frame of reference that can be useful in considering actions that can be taken to mitigate the impacts of disasters or emergencies of differing levels of severity or to address and help reverse them once they have occurred.

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Homeland Security Impact Scale

• 0 -- No real impact on national security, economic security, or personal security

• 1 -- Local impact in areas directly affected• 2 -- Significant impact in some areas that were not directly

affected• 3 -- Significant market adjustment (20% plus drop); some business

and industries destabilized; some bankruptcies, including increasing number of personal bankruptcies and bankruptcies of small businesses, and waning of consumer confidence

• 4 -- Economic slowdown spreads; rise in unemployment and underemployment accompanied by possible isolated disruptive incidents and acts, increase in hunger and homelessness

• 5 -- Cascading impacts including mild recession; isolated supply problems; isolated infrastructure problems; accompanied by possible increase in disruptive incidents and acts, continuing societal impacts

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Homeland Security Impact Scale(Continued)

• 6 -- Moderate to strong recession or increased market volatility; regional supply problems; regional infrastructure problems accompanied by possible increase in disruptive incidents and acts; worsening societal impacts

• 7 -- Spreading supply problems and infrastructure problems accompanied by possible increase in disruptive incidents and acts, worsening societal impacts, and major challenges posed to elected and non-elected public officials

• 8 -- Depression; increased supply problems; elements of infrastructure crippled accompanied by likely increase in disruptive incidents and acts; worsening societal impacts; and national and global markets severely impacted

• 9 -- Widespread supply problems; infrastructure verging on collapse with both national and global consequences; worsening economic and societal impacts accompanied by likely widespread disruptions

• 10 -- Possible unraveling of the social fabric, nationally and globally, jeopardizing the ability of governments to govern and keep the peace

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Homeland Security Impact Scale(Continued)

• "Disruptions" and "incidents" can include demonstrations, work stoppages, strikes, organized or spontaneous vandalism, looting, and riots. Also included are sabotage and terrorist acts and attacks. (The scale and these notations have been adapted by Paula D.Gordon from the Y2K Impact Scale developed by Bruce F. Webster of WDCY2K and sent by him to the membership of WDCY2K on March 4, 1998.)

• "Supply problems" and "infrastructure problems" may include food shortages; availability of potable water; degradation of water purity, water distribution and/or waste management; fuel/heating oil shortages, disruptions in utilities (power, gas, telecommunications), disruption in the financial sector, disruptions in transportation (airlines, trains, trucking, ports, ships); pharmaceutical shortages; disruption of health care services or emergency medical services; disruption of fire and public safety services; disruptions or inadequacies, or overwhelming of public works operations and services.

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Some Parameters Used to Compare and Contrast the Views of the Actors and Analysts

• Characterization of the individual's general perspective;• Stance with regard to Typology of Emergencies in and

assumptions concerning the level of severity of Katrina and what constitutes a catastrophe;

• Stance with regard to the Homeland Security Impact Scale and perceptions concerning the impacts of Katrina on all key elements of the critical infrastructure near term and long term;

• Capabilities and skills needed by those in various levels of public responsibility and assumptions concerning the capabilities and skills of those involved in Katrina.

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Some Parameters Used to Compare and Contrast the Views of the Actors and Analysts

(Continued)• Views concerning what went wrong and who or

what was responsible for what went wrong• Degree of realism in assessing the capacity of

any or all levels of government to deal with Katrina;

• Recognition of the existence of a cultural divide between homeland security and emergency management and DHS and FEMA;

• Understanding of the problems between DHS and FEMA before, during, and after Katrina.

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Some Parameters Used to Compare and Contrast the Views of the Actors and Analysts

(Continued)• Perceptions concerning the nature of the

intergovernmental challenges in Katrina;• Perspectives concerning the suitability of the

National Response Plan at the time of Katrina and the suitability of presently planned approaches to a revised NRP to potential catastrophic events in the future;

• Perspectives concerning whether or not the NRP was applicable at the time of Katrina, understanding of the extent to which the NRP was ignored or worked around.

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Some Parameters Used to Compare and Contrast the Views of the Actors and Analysts

(Continued)

• Assumptions concerning who's in charge or who should be in charge; and

• Views concerning lessons learned and where we go from here.

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The Matrix

Actors &Analysts 1) General Perspective 2) Stance re Typology of Emergencies

A)Don Kettl'sviews

Wide-ranging assessment of DHS/FEMA and Katrina featuring historical and organizational analysis with some emphasis on lessons learned and recommendations concerning some current challenges

Katrina viewed in part as a Large Scale Emergency and in part as an Emergency of Catastrophic Scale

B) Common viewpoints in reports Less wide-ranging assessment than Kettl's based on a more limited problem definition with less attention to historical and organizational analysis and with different prescriptions for change

Similar to Kettl

C)Michael Brown's views

Realistic assessment of emergency management challenges rooted in comprehensive all hazards approach to emergency management and the emergency management cycle and an understanding of the evolution of emergency management challenges since 9/11

Katrina was Katrina was an unprecedented Emergency of Catastrophic Scale impacting millions in a 92,000 square mile area

D)General Honore's views Extremely realistic assessment of

emergency management challenges presented by natural catastrophes

Similar to Brown's stancewith even greater emphasis on the

impact of the failure of all major elements of the critical

infrastructure 21

The Matrix (Continued)

Actors &Analysts 3) Stance re Homeland Security Impact Scale

4) Capabilitiesand Skills

A)Don Kettl'sviews

Likely rating of near term impacts: 5-6Likely rating of long term impacts: 3

Focus on improving processes, developing capabilities useful for large scale emergencies and "building nimble organizations capable of flexible response" that are needed for larger scale emergencies

B) Common viewpoints in reportsLikely rating of near term impacts: 5Likely rating of long term impacts: 1-3

Focus on improving logistics coupled along with the need to improve capabilities (primarily those best suited to Large Scale Emergencies)

C) Michael Brown's views Possible rating of near term

impacts: 5-10Possible rating of long term impacts: 3-5

Focus on the need to improve skills and capabilities across the board, including those involving planning and preparedness

D)General Honore's views

Possible rating of near term impacts: 5-9Possible rating of long term impacts: 3-4

Honore's Eleven Quick Fixes focus on problem solving skills and proactive approaches that would mitigate impacts

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The Matrix (Continued)

Actors &Analysts 5) What went wrong and who or whatwas responsible

6) Realistic assessment of govt's capacity

A)Don Kettl'sviews

Focus on correctable failures of government at all levels and the need for government to improve processes and develop a capability for "flexible response"

More realistic than most

B) Common viewpoints in reportsFocus on the failure of government at all levels, particularly the Federal government, and the need to make organizational changes and significantly improve technology and emergency management processes

Somewhat realistic, but rooted in a definition of the nature and scope of the challenges and of what is needed that is somewhat limited

C)Michael Brown's views

Recognition well before Katrina of the government's failure to be adequately prepared and belief that far more adequate preparation for potential catastrophic events along with a far more viable FEMA pre-Katrina could have made a difference

Far more realistic than most

D)General Honore's views Recognition of the catastrophic nature

of Katrina and focus on dealing as effectively as possible with future challenges

Extremely realistic

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The Matrix (Continued)

Actors &Analysts 9) Intergovernmental challenges of Katrina

10) Suitability of the National Response Plan (NRP) for Katrina

A)Don Kettl'sviews

Viewed largely in terms of the need to make significant changes in process

Not addressed in his book, only mentioned in passing on page 69

B) Common viewpoints in reportsReflective of varying views concerning what the nature of relations should be between Federal, State, and local entities, particularly in a worst case catastrophe

The NRP was not sufficient (The relevance to catastrophes of the yet to be completed revised version remains to be seen.)

C) Michael Brown's views Unable using best efforts to

develop effective working relationships with State and local governments in

The NRP was not suitable for Katrina.

D)General Honore's views

Was freer than Michael Brown to develop effective working relationships in that he was not constrained in the same ways that Brown was

Not a matter addressed directly but some recommendations for changes can be found in his list of Eleven Quick Fixes

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The Matrix (Continued)

Actors &Analysts 11) The NRP at the time of Katrina & the extent to which it was used

12) Who's in charge & who should be

A)Don Kettl'sviews

Kettl does not appear to recognize that the version of the NRP in place at the time of Katrina was "worked around" and not fully implemented and that it would have been impossible to implement that version of the NRP since it is not possible to "manage" an emergency the magnitude of Katrina using prescriptions that are inapplicable to catastrophic events

Dealt with in very general terms

B) Common viewpoints in reports The authors of the earliest published reports do not appear to recognize that the version of the NRP in place at the time of Katrina was "worked around" and not fully implemented and that it would have been impossible to implement that version of the NRP since it is not possible to "manage" an emergency the magnitude of Katrina using prescriptions that are inapplicable to catastrophic events

Question of when the military should be involved in catastrophic events raised and discussed. Plans concerning how potentially catastrophic events are to be handled in the future are as yet unclear

C) Michael Brown's views

Brown decided to work around the NRP based on his perception that the August 2005 version of the NRP was inapplicable in a catastrophic event (For specifics see Michael Brown's Deposition)

The military should be called out to deal with a catastrophic event

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The Matrix (Continued)

Actors &Analysts 7) Cultural divide between HS & EM, DHS & FEMA

8) Current DHS/FEMAEfforts

A)Don Kettl'sviews

Some recognition of some aspects of the cultural divide

Appears to be only somewhat aware of the nature and extent of the cleavages within DHS and between DHS and FEMA

B) Common viewpoints in reportsLittle recognition of the nature and scope of the cultural divide and how it might be bridged

Far less aware than Kettl of the nature of the cleavages within DHS and between DHS and FEMA

C) Michael Brown's views Considerable insight into the basis for and the manifestations of the cultural divide (See especially the testimony of Michael Brown and his Deposition)

Not apparent the extentto which he may be following current efforts

D)General Honore's views Far more focused on doing what

needs to be done than on analyzing organizational and professional cultural challenges

Not apparent what his interests might be in such matters

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Some of the Value in Using a Matrix Approach to Analysis

• The use of this kind of matrix approach to analysis can help deepen understanding of different perspectives, backgrounds, and experience that key actors have.

• The use of a matrix approach to analysis can also deepen our understanding of the

implications of those perspectives and to understand in a new light the difficulties that were faced in Katrina.

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Some Selected Reference Materials

The following are materials, websites, videos, and DVD’s that can be used in the development and implementation of courses and curricula focusing on an all-hazards approach to homeland security and emergency management. Complete references for these materials can be found in the “List of Homeland Security and Emergency Management References and Resources” compiled by Paula D. Gordon and posted at GordonPublicAdministration.com

(http://GordonPublicAdministration.com ). The 102 page List of References and Resources includes twenty-two categories and is posted in two parts in the File Section of the GordonPublicAdministration.com website.  

GordonHomeland.com (http://GordonHomeland.com) and GordonPublicAdministration.com (http://GordonPublicAdministration.com) include articles, reports, publications, and presentations on homeland security and emergency management and organizational, managerial, ethical, and educational issues. The websites have been developed by Paula D. Gordon and are provided as a free public service.

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Some Selected Materials (Continued)

• “Principles of Emergency Management” from FEMA: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/emprinciples.asp .

• Principles of Emergency Management October 10, 2008, 1 page.

• Principles of Emergency Management Brochure. September 11, 2007. 9 pages.

• Principles of Emergency Management Slide Presentation.  Developed by Jim Fraser, February 14, 2008.  18 Slides.  29

Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Claire B. Rubin, editor, Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900 – 2005, Public Entity Risk Institute, (http://riskinstitute.org ), 2007.

• Claire B. Rubin, 4/9/08 Transcript of Forum Presentation: Emergency Management: The American Experience, 1900 – 2005. View at  http://www.emforum.org/vlibrary/all.htm .

• David A. McEntire, Introduction to Homeland Security: Understanding Terrorism with an Emergency Management Perspective, Wiley, 2009.

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Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Stephen Flynn speaking on his book The Edge of Disaster ~ Rebuilding a Resilient Nation at the Houston World Affairs Council, March 27, 2007.  See video at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/197358-1 .

• Stephen Flynn, The Edge of Disaster, Random House, 2007.

• Secretary Mike Leavitt, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Emergency Preparedness Health Summit, National Press Club, April 18, 2006. View online at http://www.C-SPAN.org/videolibrary . ID#192090-1. 45 minutes.

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Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• April 2003 Frontline Program: Cyberwar (PBS) (Also see archived program, transcript, and interviews online at http://www.pbs.org .)

• Paula D. Gordon, "Infrastructure Threats and Challenges: Before and After September 11, 2001". PA TIMES, Vol. 24, Issue 12, December 2001. Reprinted as a commentary in the Journal of Homeland Security, April 16, 2002. Also posted at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/homeland_infra.html or see link at http://gordonhomeland.com .

• Paula D. Gordon, "A Matrix Approach to Comparing and Contrasting Some Differing Perspectives on the Federal Government’s Role in Hurricane Katrina and in Potential Catastrophic Events in the Future." Access at http://GordonPublicAdministration.com .

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Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Critical Infrastructure Task Force. Washington, DC: Homeland Security Advisory Council, January 2006 (50 pages). Access at: www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC_CITF_Report_v2.pdf

• Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security ~ Defending a Networked Nation, Wiley-Interscience, 2006.

• Naval Postgraduate School Course Materials and videos on radical extremism and the resources of the Homeland Security Digital Library. Access at https://www.hsdl.org .

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Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• *General Russel Honore, Presentation on Hurricane Katrina, a presentation before the Houston Forum on February 13, 2006. Access at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/155435 .

• *General Russel Honore, September 9, 2005 CNN transcript in which General Honore compares the crisis to a football game in which you cannot expect to win any ground in the first quarter.

• Michael Brown, Presentation on Hurricane Katrina and Weather Emergency Preparedness, January 18, 2006

Video can be viewed at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/153798 .

* For particularly significant insights into the massive challenges relating to catastrophic event planning, preparedness, mitigation, and response and the Federal approach to Hurricane Katrina

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Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Michael Brown, February 11, 2006, Congressional Deposition . Access at http://katrina.hours.gov/brown/depo.doc .

• Paula D. Gordon, "Thoughts about Katrina: Responses to Two Questions about Hurricane Katrina and America's Resilience,“ December 1, 2005 (Prepared for the December 19-21, 2005 Forum on Building America's Resilience to Hazards, sponsored by The American Meteorological Society in collaboration with The Space Enterprise Council of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.) Access at http://gordonhomeland.com .

  

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Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• *Susan B. Glasser and Michael Grunwald, "Department's Mission Was Undermined From Start", Washington Post, December 22, 2005. Access at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/21/AR2005122102327.html .

• *Michael Grunwald and Susan B. Glasser, "Brown's Turf Wars Sapped FEMA's Strength" Washington Post, December 23, 2005. Access at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/22/AR2005122202213.html?nav=hcmodule .

* For extraordinary insights into the background Federal homeland security efforts from after 9/11 through Hurricane Katrina.

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Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, “Improving Homeland Security & Critical Infrastructure Protection and Continuity Efforts.” Access athttp://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/hscipreport.pdf  or use link at http://gordonhomeland.com .

 

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Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, Presenter, "Improving Homeland Security - Continuing Challenges and Opportunities," transcript of Emergency Information Infrastructure Partnership (EIIP) Virtual Forum, March 24, 2004. Posted at http://gordonhomeland.com.

• Paula D. Gordon, "Transforming and Leading Organizations," (Examples from disaster management.) (Posted at http://gordonhomeland.com. Also published in Government Transformation, Winter 2004-05 issue.

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Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, "Capabilities and Skills Needed by Those in New Roles of Responsibility for Homeland Security at the Federal, State, and Local Levels of Government." Posted at http://gordonhomeland.com and published in the PA TIMES, Vol. 28, Issue 3, March 2005 (a publication of the American Society for Public Administration).

• Paula D. Gordon, "Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis: Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," Homeland Security Review, Vol. 1 No. 2, 2006. Posted at http://gordonhomeland.com or http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/optionsAnalysis.html.

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Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, “The Homeland Security Impact Scale:  An Alternative Approach toAssessing Homeland Security and Critical Infrastructure Protection Efforts and a Frame of Reference for Understanding and Addressing Current Challenges.” Access athttp://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/thehomelandsecurityimpactscale.htm or use link at http://gordonhomeland.com .

• Paula D. Gordon, “Strategic Planning and Y2K Technology Challenges:Lessons and Legacies for Homeland Security.” Access athttp://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/homeland_strat.html or use link at http://gordonhomeland.com .

.

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Some Selected Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, “Using E-Technology to Advance Homeland Security Efforts.” Access athttp://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/etechnology.html or use link at http://gordonhomeland.com .

• Paula D. Gordon, “A Common Goal for Contingency Planning and Management, Emergency Management, and Homeland Security: Building a Disaster Resilient Nation.” Access at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/CommonGoal.html or use link at http://gordonhomeland.com .

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Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, "The State of Emergency Management and Homeland Security," PA TIMES, Vol. 30, Issue 8, August 2007. Also posted at http://gordonhomeland.com or see or http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/stateofEM.html .

• Paula D. Gordon, “Challenges for the Future of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Education,” PA TIMES, Vol. 31, Issue 8, August 2008. Also see http://gordonhomeland.com .

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University Affiliations,Contact Information & Websites

Paula D. Gordon, Ph.D.

• Auburn University Emergency Management for Government & Private Sector Certificate Program

• University of Richmond• Eastern Kentucky University

E-Mail: pgordon@starpower.net Phone: (202) 241 0631

Websites: http://GordonPublicAdministration.com http://GordonHomeland.com and http://www.jhu.edu/pgordon

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