Paths and Forks or Chutes and Ladders?: Negative Feedbacks and the Dynamics of Pension Regime Change...
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Transcript of Paths and Forks or Chutes and Ladders?: Negative Feedbacks and the Dynamics of Pension Regime Change...
Paths and Forks or Chutes and Ladders?: Negative Feedbacks and the Dynamics of Pension Regime Change
Kent Weaver
Georgetown University
and the Brookings Institution
Policy Regimes, defined:• A system of organizing, financing and
delivering policy that:– Has a distinctive distribution of costs and
benefits– Is relatively stable over time
• The German pension system• The U.S. health care system• Cheap energy policies• “Socialism market economy” in China
Examples:
The Questions:
1. How frequent is a major change in policy regimes?
2. How much do past choices constrain the range of future regime options? Do policymakers have significant discretion in shifting policy regimes?
Is the best metaphor for policy regime transitions…
Paths and Forks?
103
Old
Path Choice at Some Times and Not at Others?
Cul-de-sac or “No Exit”?
Boomerang or policy reversal?
..or Driving off a Cliff?
Cul-de-sac:Regime Type Regime
Type at t1 at t2
Regime Type 1
Regime Type 2
Regime Type 3
Regime Type 4
Regime Type 5
Regime Type 6
Regime Type 7
Unconstrained choice:Regime Type Regime
Type at t1 at t2
Regime Type 1
Regime Type 2
Regime Type 3
Regime Type 4
Regime Type 5
Regime Type 6
Regime Type 7
Paths and Forks:Regime Type Regime
Type at t1 at t2
Regime Type 1
Regime Type 2
Regime Type 3
Regime Type 4
Regime Type 5
Regime Type 6
Regime Type 7
Chutes and Ladders:Regime Type Regime
Type at t1 at t2
Regime Type 1
Regime Type 2
Regime Type 3
Regime Type 4
Regime Type 5
Regime Type 6
Regime Type 7
Mixed Patterns Across Regimes:Regime Type Regime
Type at t1 at t2
Regime Type 1
Regime Type 2
Regime Type 3
Regime Type 4
Regime Type 5
Regime Type 6
Regime Type 7
More choice at t1:Regime Type Regime Type Regime
Type at t1 at t2 at t3
Regime Type 1
Regime Type 2
Regime Type 3
Regime Type 4
Regime Type 5
Regime Type 6
Regime Type 7
More choice at t2:Regime Type Regime Type Regime
Type at t1 at t2 at t3
Regime Type 1
Regime Type 2
Regime Type 3
Regime Type 4
Regime Type 5
Regime Type 6
Regime Type 7
Boomerang:Regime Type Regime Type Regime
Type at t1 at t2 at t3
Regime Type 1
Regime Type 2
Regime Type 3
Regime Type 4
Regime Type 5
Regime Type 6
Regime Type 7
3. What factors determine whether policy regime change occurs?
The Conventional (Piersonian) Wisdom:• Once policies are in place they are
generally reinforced by:– Adaptive expectations and sunk costs (lock-in
effects)– Political support coalitions that grow up around
the policies– Multiple veto points in political systems
• So policy regime change mostly results from exogenous shocks
A Framework for Explaining Policy Regime Change:
Much policy regime change has endogenousroots, and depends on:• Balance between positive and negative
feedbacks from existing policy• Incremental reform options available to
policymakers—and whether they have been exhausted
• Regime transition opportunities available to policymakers
A Quick Overview of Pension Policy in Wealthy Countries
OECD countries vary substantially in what theyspend on pensions
Pension systems vary substantially across countries in their impact on poverty
Most western countries face a severe decline in
the ratio of workers to retirees….
….that gets worse the further out projections are made
And many countries have experienced falls in labor force participation for older men….
Source: Social Security Administration, An Aging World, 2001. The initial year is 1981 for Canada and New Zealand, 1982 for France. The final year is 1996 for France.
Male Labor Force Participation Ratesage 60 to 64 c. 1980 and 1999 (approx.)
68.8
39.144.2
29.1
45.7
65.9
86.4
60.4
46.6
16.4
30.3 31.7
57.4 55.552.2
54.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Canada France Germany Italy NewZealand
Sweden UnitedKingdom
UnitedStates
1980 1999
…while levels for older women are lower and show more uneven trends
Source: Social Security Administration, An Aging World, 2001. The initial year is 1981 for Canada and New Zealand, 1982 for France. The final year is 1996 for France.
Female Labor Force Participation Ratesage 60 to 64 c. 1980 and 1999 (approx.)
28.3
22.3
138
11.7
41.4
27.8
34
26
15.212.7
8.1
32.5
46.5
24.7
38.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Canada France Germany Italy NewZealand
Sweden UnitedKingdom
UnitedStates
1980 1999
A variety of incremental policy responses have been tried to address pension funding issues:
• Refinancing– Increase payroll tax base and rates– Add dedicated revenue sources or increase
general revenue subsidies
• Retrenchment– Change indexation formulas– Punish early retirement– Increase retirement ages
But what about more fundamental reforms―shifts in pension regimes?
The Questions on Pension Regime Change:
• How frequent is a major change in pension policy regimes?
• How much do past choices constrain the range of future pension regime options? Do policymakers have significant discretion in shifting pension policy paths?
• What are the forces that determine whether pension regime changes occur?
The Convention Wisdom on Pension Regime Change
Categorizing Pension Regimes:
• Welfare states can be divided into three categories– Universal/citizenship regimes
(Scandinavia)– Social insurance “Bismarckian” regimes
(continental Europe)– Residual regimes (U.K., Canada, United
States, Australia)
Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
The Frequency of Pension Regime Restructuring:
• Welfare states have survived recent economic and demographic pressures relatively intact
• Pension reform has been largely incremental rather than fundamental “regime change”
Myles and Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State
Explaining Patterns of Pension Restructuring:• “Positive policy feedbacks” limit the
pension reform options of policymakers:– Constrain choice sets– Create constituencies who resist any
change that would make them worse off
• Age and maturity of pension regime matter (e.g., “double payment problem”)
A Revised Approach
Categorizing Pension Regimes:• Esping-Andersen’s tripartite categories
are overly broad and misleading, e.g.:– Residual category is overly broad mixture of
• means-tested• “Bismarckian Lite”• mixed regimeswith distinctive challenges and regime
transition opportunities– New “Notional Defined Contribution” (NDC)
pension has different challenges and transition opportunities from continental/Bismarckian regimes
Recategorizing Pension Regimes:
– Universal/citizenship regimes (New Zealand)
– Social insurance “Bismarckian” regimes (continental Europe)
– “Bismarckian Lite” regimes (U.S.,Canada)– NDC regimes (Sweden, Italy)– Residual regimes (formerly Australia)– Mixed regimes (U.K., Netherlands,
Switzerland, Denmark)– Privatized regimes (none among rich
countries)
1950 1974 1985 1995 2009
NDC
Bismarckian
Bismarckian Lite
Universal
Mixed
Residual
Asterisk indicates that a country has added a small mandatory or quasi-mandatory defined contribution individual account tier.
Italy *Sweden *
Germany *AustriaFrance
U.S.Canada
Denmark
Australia
Ireland
Neth.
Switz.
N.Z.*
U.K.
Pension Regime Transitions
Available regime transition options depend on your starting point…
1950 1974 1985 1995 2009
NDC
Bismarckian
Bismarckian Lite
Universal
Mixed
Residual
Canada
Denmark
Australia
Residual (Means-Tested) Pension Regime Transitions
1950 1974 1985 1995 2009
NDC
Bismarckian
Bismarckian Lite
Universal
Mixed
Residual
Asterisk indicates that a country has added a small mandatory or quasi-mandatory defined contribution individual account tier.
Sweden *
Canada
DenmarkIreland
Switz.
N.Z.*
U.K.
Universal Pension Regime Transitions: Early exits and multiple destinations
1950 1974 1985 1995 2009
NDC
Bismarckian
Bismarckian Lite
Universal
Mixed
Residual
Asterisk indicates that a country has added a small mandatory or quasi-mandatory defined contribution individual account tier.
Italy *Sweden *
Germany *AustriaFrance
Bismarckian Pension Regime Transitions: Very late exits and only 1 destination (plus*)
1950 1974 1985 1995 2009
NDC
Bismarckian
Bismarckian Lite
Universal
Mixed
Residual
U.S.Canada
“Bismarckian Lite” Pension Regime Transitions: High durability
1950 1974 1985 1995 2009
NDC
Bismarckian
Bismarckian Lite
Universal
Mixed
Residual
Asterisk indicates that a country has added a small mandatory or quasi-mandatory defined contribution individual account tier.
Italy *Sweden *
Germany *
Denmark
AustraliaNeth.
Switz.
N.Z.*
U.K.
Mixed Pension Regime Transitions:Multiple Precursors, No Exits, and **
The Frequency of Pension Regime Restructuring:• Pension regime change is fairly frequent
– 9 of 14 countries in sample have at least one – Only four (Sweden, Canada, Denmark and New
Zealand) have more than one– Regime reversals (“Boomerangs”) are very rare
• Bismarckian systems are beginning to “thaw” with shifts to NDC regimes and addition of small DC tiers
• The U.S. is an outlier in having virtually no incremental or regime changes since 1983
Pension Regimes differ substantially in their durability:
• “Bismarckian Lite” and mixed regimes are highly durable (cul-de-sac) in post WW II period
• Universal and residual regimes virtually disappeared after World War II, with multiple destinations (paths and forks)
• Bismarckian regimes were very durable until mid-1990s when shift to NDC began (precursor to “Chutes and Ladders?”)
Pension Regime Restructuring—Timing:• Different types of regime transitions are
concentrated in different periods:– Shifts to Bismarckian regimes stop pre-
1973– Shifts to mixed regimes concentrated
post-1973– Shifts from Bismarckian to NDC regimes
post-1994 (after incremental reform options exhausted)
– Individual account account “add-ons” to dominant DB regimes grow beginning in 1990s
Argument: Prospects for pension regime change depend on:• The balance of positive and negative
feedbacks• The availability and efficacy of
incremental reforms to address those challenges
• The availability and political acceptability of regime transition options
which vary across specific pension regimes
Challenge and Change in Bismarckian Pension
Regimes
Challenges for Bismarckian social insurance systems are severe:• Severe sustainability issues with agingSevere sustainability issues with aging• Need to address problems of low labor Need to address problems of low labor
market participation in 55-64 age groupmarket participation in 55-64 age groupMale Labor Force Participation Rates
age 60 to 64 c. 1980 and 1999 (approx.)
39.144.2
29.1
60.4
65.9
32.3
16.4
30.3 31.7
54.8 55.5
18.6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
France Germany Italy US Sweden Belgium
1980 1999
Incremental reform options for Bismarckian social insurance systems are limited:
Social Security Contributions as % of GDP in 2000
5.1
16.414.8
11.9
16.1
12.4
14.115
6.16.9
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Belgium
Canad
a
Franc
e
Germ
any
Italy
Nethe
rland
s
Spain
Sweden UK US
%
• Payroll taxes perceived to hurt competitiveness• Less visible incremental benefit cuts mostly
exhausted, leaving only painful options (e.g. retirement age increase)
Transition Opportunities for Bismarckian regimes are highly constrained:
• Shift to mixed regime regimes unlikely due to double payment problem (only small DC “add-on” possible)
• Can’t shift to universal, residual, or Bismarckian Lite regimes because of adequacy concerns
• NDC regime is only remaining regime transition option (“single chute”)– and it is a recent innovation
Sweden in the 1990s—Policy Feedbacks in a Bismarckian System
• Universal pension
• Earnings-related pension on top
• Generous income-tested pension removes almost all seniors from poverty
Sweden--
Strong Negative Feedback Effects• Very serious fiscal challenge in both short run
and long run as population ages• Very high payroll taxes and overall tax burden
spark competition concerns
Exhausted Incremental reform options• Strong resistance to payroll tax increases• Strong union resistance to visible benefit cuts
Limited Regime Transition Opportunities:• Shift to a Mixed System very difficult given high
current commitments and payroll tax• Shift to NDC system compatible with existing
earnings-related system
Sweden Today—An NDC System with an Individual Account Add-On:
• NDC tier financed by 16% contribution rate-- risk of poor economic performance and increased longevity shifted from state to workers
• Individual account tier financed by 2.5% contribution rate
Challenge and Change in “Bismarckian Lite” Pension
Regimes
Challenges for “Bismarckian Lite” social insurance systems include:
• Developing adequate mechanisms to Developing adequate mechanisms to deal with senior povertydeal with senior poverty
• Adapting to changes in Adapting to changes in supplementary occupational and supplementary occupational and personal pension sectorspersonal pension sectors
• Addressing long-term pension Addressing long-term pension funding problems in the absence of funding problems in the absence of an immediate funding crisisan immediate funding crisis
“Bismarckian Lite” pension regimes contain room for refinancing without restructuring
Social Security Contributions as % of GDP in 2000
5.1
16.414.8
11.9
16.1
12.4
14.115
6.16.9
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Belgium
Canad
a
Franc
e
Germ
any
Italy
Nethe
rland
s
Spain
Sweden UK US
%
“Bismarckian Lite” pension regimes have multiple transition opportunities:
• Can shift to Bismarckian regime only before demographic crisis hits
• Can shift to mixed regime as “add-on” with higher contributions
• Can shift to NDC regime
But also have less need to shift because of availability of incremental reform options
United States:
Negative Feedbacks• Moderate fiscal challenge in short run and
relatively modest in longer run• Adequacy: High senior poverty rates
especially very old single women
Incremental reform options• Benefit cuts (e.g., retirement age
increases and increased income-testing at upper end)
• payroll tax increases off the table because of Republican opposition
United States:
Regime Transition Opportunities• Shift to mixed system inhibited by
financing constraints unless new revenues added
• NDC system possible but inhibited by internal cross-subsidies unless new revenues added
United States Today— “Bismarckian Lite” Stability :
Social Security in the U.S.:
• Incremental reform in 1977 and 1983 including benefit cuts and increases in standard retirement age
• Virtually no policy change since then
• Efforts by Bush II to get opt-out individual account reform on the agenda failed
Concluding Thoughts
1. How much pension regime change?:
• How much regime change you see depends on how you categorize regimes
• Tri-partite conceptualization of pension regimes is inadequate
• Amount of pension regime change over last fifty years has been substantial in OECD countries
2. Amount and direction of pension policy regime change depends in large part on:
• Balance between positive and negative policy feedbacks– Negative policy feedbacks can be strongly
transition-encouraging (e.g., affordability of Bismarckian regimes)
• Incremental reform options available to policymakers—and whether they have been exhausted
• Regime transition opportunities available to policymakers– Only available after invented (e.g., NDC)– Adoption depends in part on political resources
3. Prospects for specific pension regime transitions vary over time
(Most common timing of pension regime transitions is shown next time to the corresponding arrow. Pension regimes with a low probability of regime exit in the current “late” period of public pension development are shown with a shaded background)
No public
pensions
“Bismarckian Lite”regime
Universal regime
Residualregime
Mixed regime
Bismarckian regime
NDC regime
late
earlymiddle
middleor late
middle
middleor late
earlymiddle
middle
early
middle
4. Negative feedback effects are a necessary but not sufficient explanation of pension regime transitions, e.g., why:
• Some Bismarckian systems (e.g., Sweden, Italy) shift to NDC while others (e.g., France) do not
• New Zealand and Ireland remain outliers as residual systems
• Timing differs in regime transitions
5. A broader set of explanations of pension policy regime change includes:
Political Environments and
strategies (e.g.,macro- institutions, coalitions,
corporatism
Policy feedbacks (e.g., policy
regimes, program maturity, “micro”
rules)
Economic-demographic
variables (e.g., aging, competitiveness,
fiscal crisis
The Problem stream
Policy Implementation
Policy survival
Agenda-setting
The Politics stream
Policy Adoption
The Policy stream
But examining negative feedbacks is a good place to start!
6. A framework focused on negative feedbacks and reform options has wide applicability—e.g., where Marx and Engels went wrong:Balance of positive and negative feedback effects• Anticipated near-universal immiseration did not occur
Incremental Reform Options• Many incremental patches available (e.g., welfare state
programs, better regulation of business cycles)• Patches became more politically feasible as voting
franchise was expanded
Regime Transition Options• High costs of transition• Major opposition from entrenched interests • Socialist and communist alternatives proved to have
substantial negative impacts in practice• Redistributive welfare state (with great variations) proved
“easier regime transition option
The End– Finally!