Pakistan and International Alliances: A Case Study of ...
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Pakistan and International Alliances: A Case Study of Pakistan’s Alliance with China and USA Supervisor: Dr. Shakil Akhtar Research Scholar: Sahrish Safdar Roll No: FA19A7LA020 M.Phil. Political Science Session: 2018-2020 IN THE PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF M. PHILL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE The Islamia University of Bahawalpur
Transcript of Pakistan and International Alliances: A Case Study of ...
Pakistan and International Alliances: A Case
Study of Pakistan’s Alliance with China and USA
Supervisor:
Dr. Shakil Akhtar
Research Scholar:
Sahrish Safdar
Roll No: FA19A7LA020
M.Phil. Political Science
Session: 2018-2020
IN THE PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF M. PHILL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
The Islamia University of Bahawalpur
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AUTHOR’S DECLARATION
I, Sahrish Safdar, Roll No. FA19A7LA020 in the Department of Political Science at the Islamia
University of Bahawalpur hereby declare that the research work entitled: “Pakistan and
International Alliances: A Case Study of Pakistan’s Alliance with China and USA” this is my
original work, which I submitted in partial fulfilment of the M.Phil. requirement in the field of
Political Science. I also officially confirm nothing has been incorporated into this research work
without acknowledgment, and that it does not comprise any content originally released or
published by any other individual, or any information earlier degree or examination at any
university where due reference is not made in the text, to the best of the knowledge and belief.
Sahrish Safdar
Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
The Islamia University of
Bahawalpur.
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FORWARDING CERTIFICATE
The research named “Pakistan and International Alliances: A Case Study of Pakistan’s Alliance
with China and USA” is done under my supervision, and the thesis is submitted to The Islamia
University of Bahawalpur in partial fulfilment of the M.Phil. Political Science degree requirement.
Dr. Shakil Akhtar
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
The Islamia University of Bahawalpur
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APPROVAL CERTIFICATE
This thesis entitled “Pakistan and International Alliances: A Case Study of Pakistan’s Alliance
with China and USA” by Ms. Sahrish Safdar is hereby approved in the partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the degree of M.Phil. of Political Science.
Supervisor: _____________________________
External Examiner: _____________________________
Chairman: _____________________________
Date: _____________________________
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ABSTRACT
Since the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, alliance strategy has been the bedrock
of Pakistan's foreign strategy. Nevertheless, little comprehensive research has been conducted on
this remarkable event in history. Previous literature on Islamabad's particular partnerships is
disjointed and inconsistent. Using Stephen Walt Balance of Threat theory principles, this research
study explores two important cases—Pakistan’s alliances with the US and China—in order to solve
flaws in the current literature and better explain Pakistan's alliance behaviour. As a result, the
primary goal of this study is to examine the roots of Pakistan's alliances with both the US and
China in order to identify a pattern of Pakistan's alliance. The phenomena is studied using both
primary and secondary sources.
Key Words: Balance of Threat Theory, Alliance, Pakistan, USA, China, and India.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
All thanks be to Almighty Allah, who allows us to learn about undiscovered aspects of the world
and aids us in overcoming a slew of challenges. All thanks to the Holy Prophet (PBUH), who made
a clear distinction between the good and bad paths to ensure our prosperity in life.
Dr. Shakil Akhtar, my research supervisor, deserves my deepest gratitude and admiration for his
encouragement, technical discussion, inspiring direction, outstanding recommendations, great
attention, and constructive criticism, all of which helped me to accomplish my research project.
My heartfelt thanks go out to my loving Husband, my children Ayaan Precious Hussain, Ayra
Zeynep Hussain, and Muhammad Aahil Hussain, whose chain of prayers and collaboration have
left an indelible mark on my life.
Finally, I want to express my gratitude to Almighty Allah for allowing me to complete my study.
Alhamdulillah.
Sahrish Safdar
Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
The Islamia University of
Bahawalpur.
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CONTENTS
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................ 2
FORWARDING CERTIFICATE ......................................................................................................................... 3
APPROVAL CERTIFICATE ............................................................................................................................... 4
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................................... 5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .................................................................................................................................. 6
FIGURES ...................................................................................................................................................... 10
ABREVIATIONS............................................................................................................................................ 11
Research Committee Presentation and Certificate ................................................................................... 13
Chapter One................................................................................................................................................ 14
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 14
1.1 Research Objectives ................................................................................................................... 15
1.2 Research Questions .................................................................................................................... 15
1.3 Pakistan’s Search for Security .................................................................................................... 16
1.3.1 A Succinct History of India-Pakistan Rivalry ...................................................................... 18
1.4 A Review of Existing Literature .................................................................................................. 23
1.5 Definitions of Alliance ................................................................................................................ 26
1.6 Theoretical Consideration .......................................................................................................... 27
1.6.1 Different Theories of Alliances .......................................................................................... 27
1.6.2 BOP Theories and Concept of Alliances ............................................................................. 28
1.6.3 Stephen M. Walt: Balance of Threat ................................................................................. 31
1.7 Walt’s Concept of Why Alliances Endure or Collapse. .............................................................. 33
1.7.1 Why Do Alliances End? ....................................................................................................... 34
1.7.2 Changing Perceptions of Threat ......................................................................................... 34
1.7.3 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 34
1.7.4 Why Alliances Persist. ........................................................................................................ 35
1.7.5 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 35
1.8 Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 35
1.9 Organization of Thesis ................................................................................................................ 36
Chapter Two ............................................................................................................................................... 37
Pakistan’s Alliance Making with the United States .............................................................................. 37
2 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 37
2.1 Pakistan and United States in Early Phase ................................................................................ 39
2.1.1 Pakistan-US alliance Challenges and problems 1954-1965 .............................................. 41
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2.1.2 Breakdown of Pakistan-US alliance between 1965-1979 ................................................. 44
2.1.3 Pakistan role in US-China rapprochement..................................................................... 44
2.1.4 US Sanctions on Pakistan post first Afghan War ............................................................... 47
2.1.5 Post 9/11, 2001 and Pakistan role in global war on terrorism (2001-2021) .................... 49
2.2 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 51
Chapter Three ............................................................................................................................................. 52
Pakistan’s Alliance Making with People’s Republic of China (PRC) ...................................................... 52
3. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 52
3 Pakistan-China Relations.................................................................................................................... 52
3.1 Ambiguity in the wake of Pakistan-China initial interaction: Initial era 1947-1963 ................ 52
3.2 Emergence of PRC ...................................................................................................................... 54
3.2.1 China’s Reactions on Pakistan’s Joining of SEATO And CENTO Agreements ................... 55
3.2.2 Bandung Meeting of Chinese and Pakistani Premier ........................................................ 55
3.2.3 Pakistan-China Relations Reached to Lowest Ebb ............................................................ 56
3.2.4 Birth of Sino-Pakistan alliance ........................................................................................... 59
3.3 Second Era: Beyond the Agreements (1963-1990).................................................................... 61
3.3.1 Indo-Pakistan war 1965 and China’s role .......................................................................... 62
3.3.2 Pakistan Shake the World- Sino-American Rapprochement ............................................ 65
3.3.3 Strategic Partnership Has Born Between Pakistan and China .......................................... 66
3.3.4 Nuclear Cooperation and International Community ........................................................ 68
3.3.5 Pakistan-China Converged on Soviet Invasion of Kabul ................................................... 69
3.4 Third era: Pakistan China relations in post-cold war era (1991-2001) ..................................... 70
3.5 Sino-Indian Rapprochement ...................................................................................................... 71
3.6 Pakistan’s Afghan Policy ............................................................................................................ 72
3.7 Fourth Era: from Geopolitics towards Geoeconomics (2001-2021) ......................................... 75
3.8 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 76
Chapter Four ............................................................................................................................................... 78
An Examination of Islamabad's Alliances with Washington and Beijing: Do They Failed or Survived?
................................................................................................................................................................ 78
4 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 78
4.1 Factors Responsible for Pakistan-USA Alliance Collapse .......................................................... 78
4.2 Endurance of Pakistan-China Alliance ....................................................................................... 83
4.3 Strong Military Connections ...................................................................................................... 83
4.4 From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics ........................................................................................... 84
4.5 Pakistan-China have Common Strategic Relations ................................................................... 84
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4.6 Pakistan-China has Established Joint Objectives and Goals ..................................................... 86
4.7 Pakistan-China have Defined Roles and Responsibilities ......................................................... 87
4.8 Pakistan-China has Established an effective communication system ...................................... 87
4.9 Pakistan-China has created a system for resolving conflicts. ................................................... 87
4.10 Pakistan-China has Establishment of Trust and Responsibilities ............................................. 87
4.11 Pakistan-China has Dedication in the Alliance .......................................................................... 88
4.12 Pakistan-China has established a norm Non-interference in each other affairs ..................... 88
4.13 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 88
Chapter Five ................................................................................................................................................ 90
Conclusion and Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 90
5 Summary of the Research .................................................................................................................. 90
5.1 Research Findings Mentioned Succinctly .................................................................................. 91
5.2 Chapter-by-Chapter Summary of Findings ................................................................................ 91
5.3 Chapter One and Two ................................................................................................................ 91
5.4 Chapter Three ............................................................................................................................. 94
5.5 Chapter Four ............................................................................................................................... 95
5.6 Have we achieved Research Objectives? .................................................................................. 96
5.7 Have we answered Research Questions? .................................................................................. 96
5.8 Recommendations ..................................................................................................................... 96
5.9 Need for Future Research .......................................................................................................... 98
5.10 Last Word .................................................................................................................................... 98
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................................. 100
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FIGURES
Figure 1: President Khan during his visit to US in 1961 ................................................................. 42
Figure 2: Mujahideen during the First Afghan war ........................................................................ 48
Figure 3: After the 9/11, 2001 General Mushraff and President Bush had developed close
interaction. .................................................................................................................................... 49
Figure 4: Pakistani president Ayub Khan and Chinese leader in 1960s ......................................... 60
Figure 5: A grand welcome to visiting Chinese President ............................................................. 71
Figure 6: China's Malacca Dilemma ............................................................................................... 86
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ABREVIATIONS
BOP Balance of Power
BoT Balance of Threat Theory
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPC Communist Party of China
EP East-Pakistan
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GWOT Global War on Terror
HIT Heavy Industries Taxila
HAK Henry A. Kissinger
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
INC Indian National Congress
IMF International Monitory Fund
JI Jamaat-i-Islami JUI (F)
JUI (F) Jamiat Ulma Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman)
JWG Joint Working Group
KANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power Plant
KKH Karakoram Highway
KMT Kuomintang
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KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KRL Khan Research Laboratories
LOC Line of Control
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OBOR One Belt One Road
PIA Pakistan International Airlines
PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
POF Pakistan Ordnance Factories
PRC People’s Republic of China
RAW Research and Analysis Wing
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
USSR Union of Soviet Socialists Republics
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban
USA United States of America
UN United Nations
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Research Committee Presentation and Certificate
It is hereby certified that M.Phil. candidate Ms. Sahrish Safdar presented his thesis to the research
committee prior to submission.
Chairman Research Committee: _____________________________________________
Member 1: ______________________________________________________________
Member 2: ____________________________________________________________
Member 3: ____________________________________________________________
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Chapter One
1 Introduction
Alliances are important in international relations because they are seen as an essential component
of statecraft. (Dwivedi 2012) Alliances are established when two or more countries group together
to confront a common enemy. (Walt 1987) Alliances have been a major study topic in international
relations theory. This is logical given that one of the most important foreign policy issues in any
country is which country to align with and for how long. Both strong and weak countries feel
compelled to join alliances. (Cheema 2013) Weak states form alliances when they require
protection from powerful governments, or when they need to defend themselves. Strong states
form alliances to challenge the dominance of other strong powers, or to maintain the balance of
power. (Kenneth N. Waltz 1979) During a crisis, states anticipate their allies to assist them
militarily and politically. The alliance's pledge may be official or unofficial, i.e., there may or may
not be agreements between them. As alliances occupy a very important place in the study of
international politics mainly because it is a vital tool of statecraft. Alliances help states in a “self-
help” world to enhance their capabilities and thereby to maintain their security and survival in the
anarchic international system. (D. Gopal 2021) Alliances can also be dangerous as they would
provoke counter alliance measures.
Disputes are the main factors of alliances when survival is the top consideration. Alliances are
formed in opposition to, and only tangentially in support of, someone or something. (Edwin H.
Fedder 1968) Alliances are result of coercive and conflict situations. Major power will tend to
form alliance to control the world BOP, and lesser power, regional weak states will wish to join a
major power or will wish to form a group of small states to challenge the hegemony of regional
power. (Bock 2014) So, the alliance gets impetus from conflict, prestige, security/ survival. The
first premise is rational and grounded in realpolitik, while the second is unintentionally true.
Enemy of my enemy is my friend actually work extremely important in international politics.
Trust, devotion, and shared interests are the foundations of strategic relationships. They necessitate
state cooperation and respect. And, like strong human connections, they need work on the part of
the state to establish. However, once in place, states may rely on them to a certain extent.
As is true for many other small states, security and survival have been the primary concerns of
Pakistan. Thought out its history, it has attempted to maintain regional BOP, to protect itself
against India and to guarantee the security to its border and national independence. Pakistan rulers
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since early days of independence realized that alliance provided the best guarantee for the
continued existence of their small weak state. Neutrality and non-alignment have been avoided
because Pakistan international capabilities are not enough to challenges regional hegemonic
tendencies. Nonetheless, since Pakistan's independence, external alliances have seemed appealing
due to the country's many security challenges. However, previous studies have failed to explain it
rationally, and this study attempts to bridge the gap. This research focuses on two main issues:
Pakistan's relationship with the US and China. To address these shortcomings, we will use two
conventional approaches to investigate the roots of Pakistan's unity in order to discover a pattern
of Pakistan's unity.
1.1 Research Objectives
The central focus of the research is:
1. To investigate Pakistan’s need for an external alliance,
2. To examine the way Pakistan formed alliance with the US and China,
3. And finally, to study the collapse and endurance of Pakistan’s alliances with China and
US.
1.2 Research Questions
The study attempts to answers following questions:
1. What are the security threats that make Pakistan to form an international alliance?
2. Why and How Pakistan formed alliance with the US and China,
3. And what were the reasons/factors which either collapsed and or endured Pakistan’s
alliance with the US and China.
This thesis uses Stephen Walt Balance of Threat (BoT) theory and Why Alliances Endure or
Collapse to elucidate Pakistan’s alliance pattern with two major nations of the world. Of all
Pakistan alliances, Pakistan alliance with the US has been volatile, oscillating between period of
normalization and extreme hostility, while with China, Pakistan relations has been as normal and
enduring. The formation and continuation of Islamabad’s alliances has mainly been dictated by
the leadership’s constant perceptions of external threat. Traditionally, Pakistan has never relaxed
its efforts to seek alliances in international politics, first with the United States and then with the
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Peoples’ Republic of China. Since its independence in 1947, while India has appeared as a major
threat, Afghanistan has posed a secondary albeit important threat.
In order to understand Pakistan alliance diplomacy a critical analysis of Pakistan threats perception
is needed. Therefore, in the proceeding paragraphs Pakistan’s security threats both form Eastern
(India) and Western (Afghanistan) neighbours are discussed. Once we have this analysis, it would
be suitable to learn Pakistan need for external alliances.
1.3 Pakistan’s Search for Security
For centuries, the Muslims of India ruled the Indian Empire, where they coexisted with Hindus
according to their religion. Mutual faith vanished when the British arrived, and Muslims and
Hindus were subjected to British rule. The two societies had the poorest relationship from 1857 to
1947. The British founded the Indian National Congress (INC) in 1885. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, an
influential Muslim leader, forbade Muslims from joining the INC, a Hindu-dominated party.
(Siddiqi 1967) Muslims and Hindus have formed disagreements about the future constitution of
British India over time. Muslims demanded civil rights, but Hindus rejected them. To obtain their
civil freedom, Muslims proposed a separate electorate. Jinnah entered politics in 1911 when he
joined the INC. He worked tirelessly to unite the two cultures of British India. His tireless efforts
resulted in the signing of the Lucknow Pact between Muslims and Hindus in 1916. (Zafar 1995)
The pact-built goodwill between the two major cultures, but only for a short time.
In this scenario, the British challenged the two communities to agree on a future constitution. In
this respect, Nehru submitted his proposal entitled Nehru report in 1929 completely disregarding
Muslim needs, with Jinnah opposing his own formula known as Jinnah fourteen points. Jinnah left
Indian politics and returned to England after learning he was unable to reconcile Hindus and
Muslims differences. The electoral triumph of 1937 granted Congress a mandate to form a
government in the majority of provinces, with the INC's two-year reign being the toughest for
Muslims. Congress has sought to subjugate Muslims religiously, politically, and economically.
(Sunil Chander 1987) During this time, Jinnah returned to Indian politics, but with the aim of
establishing a separate homeland. When the congress ministries resigned in 1939, Indian Muslims
celebrated this day as a day of deliverance. Congress rules persuaded Jinnah to claim a separate
homeland, and the Pakistan resolution was finely adopted in 1940. (R. J. Moore 1983) Within a
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span of seven years Jinnah founded Pakistan on August 14, 1947, ending a reign of terror and fear
under the Hindus and British.
Nevertheless, the creation of Pakistan was an immortal tribute to the political supremacy of
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (M.A. Jinnah), the father of the nation. The Pakistani people have awarded
Jinnah the title of Quaid-i-Azam (Great leader) for his authentic and incessant service to the nation.
In a short period of seven years, Jinnah succeeded in uniting the Muslims of India under the flag
of All India Muslim League (AIML) and secured unanticipated Pakistan. The Hindus were
reluctant to accept the changed reality but failed to defeat Jinnah's iron will. At the start of his
political career in 1913, Jinnah had a firm faith in Hindu-Muslim unity, but the discriminatory
Muslim policies of INC reluctantly changed his belief in uniting Hindus and Muslims on one
platform. When the idea of a separate homeland first appeared in his mind in 1940, he worked
diligently to achieve it. No one of lesser talent than Jinnah could have accomplished this
demanding task. Stanley Wolpert wrote in the story of Jinnah's life:
“Few individuals significantly alter the course of history, fewer still modify the map of the
world, hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state, M.A. Jinnah did all
three…Jinnah conjured that country into statehood by the force of his indomitable will”.
(Wolpert 2005, p. vii )
Jinnah and Muslim League, argued Bruce Riedel:
“Spearheaded Pakistan’s independence, Jinnah changed the map of the South Asia, without
him there would have been no Pakistan”. (Riedel 2012, p.4)
Stephen P. Cohen, an expert on Pakistani politics maintained:
“He was brilliant political strategist and speaker” and can be called “Tom Paine and George
Washington of Pakistan”. (Cohen 2006, p.28)
Pakistan is one of the few countries with a consistent foreign policy. Pakistan's foreign policy has
been influenced by its desire for security since its foundation as an independent state. Faced with
persistent hostility from a larger neighbor that first questioned the country's existence, Pakistan
sought security, first through foreign military alliances, and subsequently through indigenous
nuclear deterrent. Pakistan search for security has been consistence and overwhelming. Pakistan's
stance over the last 70 years has been consistent, ranging from cold war alignment in the 1950s to
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non-aligned in the 1970s, but the lode star has always been its search for security (M. Hussain
2006). It received a security threat from India right from the start. This overarching issue has
affected Pakistan's relations with numerous nations, including major powers China and the United
States. Security and national defense have been overriding concern in Pakistan. Pakistan security
threats derives mainly from the policies of its larger neighbor India. Since beginning Pakistan have
been concerned with the security of its essential structures.
All of its interactions either with the major powers, or Muslim nations have been designed to
achieve security objectives. The international policies it has pursued for example alignment of
non-alignment has been basically designed to achieve same objectives. Islamabad power’s range
of interest is regional. This is the immediate environment which concern it. Because of its limited
resources and deficient physical powers, the major concern of Islamabad is to secure its immediate
environment (Cheema 2013). As the perception of threat has been consistent from immediate
environment, Pakistan has been compelled to ally itself with great powers in order to either
enhance its own physical and economic power to balance the power of its immediate adversary
India, or to add the physical capabilities of great power to its side in order to deter New Delhi and
to a lesser extent Afghanistan.
In this part, we will firstly examine threats to Pakistan's security from India.
1.3.1 A Succinct History of India-Pakistan Rivalry
It is a dismal reality that India-Pakistan relationship, since their independence from Britain in 1947,
had always been a very bad story. A couple of war over the history and historical legacy, religious
differences and mutual distrust had seriously bedeviled their mutual relationship. The scholars
called it trust deficit. It is very hard to remove between them due to bitter realities of bloody
partition. However, since independence Pakistan has maintained that it would have a peaceful
relation with India. At the time of Pakistan's independence, inaugurating the broadcasting service,
the father of the nation described nation’s foreign policy in the following terms,
“It gives me an opportunity to demonstrate the world; our objective should be peace within
and peace without. We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial and friendly relations
with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large. We have no aggressive design
against anyone. We stand by the United Nations charter and will gladly make our full
contributions to the peace and prosperity of the world”. (Rafique Afzal 1966, p.429)
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When Pakistan was introduced to the United States and Australia, Jinnah spoke two times on
Pakistan radio and said,
“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards the nations of the world.
We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the
principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to
make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations
of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral
support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in upholding the
principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter”.(Pakistan Institute of Legislative
Development and Transparency 2004, p.10)
From these statements, we can learn that the father of the nation has fostered friendship with
everyone and enmity with no one. With this vision of the father of the nation in mind, the people
of Pakistan laid the foundation for their foreign policy in 1947. Ayub Khan in his political
autobiography wrote about the miseries and problems faced by the people of Pakistan,
“We crossed river of blood to achieve independence, people were uprooted and driven like
millions of dry leaves by a turbulent gust of fanaticism and blind passion. They were
trampled and crushed under the feet of communal fury. Hundreds of thousands of men,
women, and children were butchered and sub-continent was engulfed in civil war. What
sustained us was the abounding faith of our people in their destiny and their unflattering
devotion to the ideology for which they had secured a motherland of their own”. (Khan
1967, p.48)
Pakistan a weaker party accepted partition with a sense of fulfilment of dream spanned almost
hundred years. The father of nation had himself to have said that “I never dream of seeing Pakistan
in my life”. (Ziring 1973, p.9) On the other hand, Indian leaders refused to recognize Pakistan's
independence. They made statements that amounted to the dismemberment of Pakistan. These
statements, for example, by Nehru and Patel, instilled fear in the minds of Pakistanis that India
would never be able to reconcile with the reality that British India had been divided into two
dominions. (Ziring 1973) In such an environment defense and security against India has been
central in foreign policy making of Pakistan. In addition, Indian leadership forefathers has dreamed
of India to play a dominant role in Asian politics. In this connection, Indian hegemonic design in
South Asia has been prime reason for fears and problems of Pakistan.
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Historically, animosity of Hindus and Muslims has continued throughout centuries. The division
of the Asian subcontinent was unavoidable based on hundreds of years of animosity among these
two cultures. Pakistan became the Muslim nation state as the partition happened. As the Indian
Empire was divided by Great Britain religious lines came open. In the wake of this development
major upheavals and migration waves occurred as Muslims and Hindus migrated to the country of
their choice. Muslims fled India, Hindus and Sikhs fled Pakistan. Nobody was preparing for the
communal upheavals and the mass migration of people following the London declaration that
democracy and division became inevitable. The most pessimistic figures for this result suggested
that 250,000 people were killed and between 12 and 24 million were evacuated. Due to their
religious disparities, which persisted even before the Indian Empire, India and Pakistan became
enemies. (Ian Talbot 2019)
The division caused by the British brought not only uncertainty to the two newly created nations,
but also serious economic challenges. Pakistan lacked the new government's machinery, staff and
facilities. Karachi, the previous capital was too close to India. After breaking relations with India,
the Pakistani economy, which once seemed an enviable economy, lost its main commodity market.
(Iftikhar H. Malik 1994) For instance, West Pakistan historically produced more wheat than
consumed and supplied Indian deficit areas. In Mumbai and other western Indian cities, cotton
produced in western Pakistan was used in mills. Commodities such as coal and sugar have
historically come from regions that are now part of India and are short of supply in Pakistan. In
addition, for its commercial shipping Pakistan faced logistical challenges because its four main
ports were situated in British India; Pakistan only awarded Karachi. (Iftikhar H. Malik 1994) After
all, the issue that was most insurmountable was describing the ties between Pakistan's two wings
that had little pre-partition economic trade.
Pakistan's territory has been split in two independent parts, separated by an estimated 1,000
kilometers. East Pakistan was smaller, accounting for one seventh of the total territory, while its
45 million citizens accounted for 55 percent. It was just faith that had the two wings in common.
There were great variations between East and West Pakistan in terms of language, culture, and
economics. The West was made up of a tapestry of peoples of the four provinces: Sindh, Punjab,
NWF and Baluchistan, as well as of the semi-autonomous northern areas. India used this distance
between East and West Pakistan to its advantage and finally dismembered Pakistan in 1971 when
the differences between two wings could not reconciled. (Kemal A. Faruki 1971)
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Kashmir, a remote territory high in the Himalayas, was the most contentious area between India
and Pakistan. Independence has failed Kashmir, which comprises an 80-percent Muslim majority,
to decide whether to join India or Pakistan. Hari Singh was the Kashmir maharaja at the time of
Independence. He wanted to join Indian union, but Kashmir population wanted to join Pakistan.
A clash emerged within the state leading to chaos and disorder. Maharaja requested Indian state
for help, India agreed to help but with the condition that Kashmir stated would be acceded to India,
maharaja agreed, and India deployed forced to occupy Kashmir (Yasmeen 2002; Nasreen Akthar
2010). Pakistani leaders feared that they would risk it if they did not drive for Kashmir. The Pathan
tribesmen waged a sacred war to save their Muslim brothers and on 22 October 1947 they liberated
the portion known as Azad Kashmir. Hari Singh panicked and signed the agreement that Kashmir
had reached India.
In 1948, India went to war with Pakistan. Later, the United Nations established a Line of Control
through which Azad Kashmir was granted to Pakistan and the territories of Baltistan and Ladakh
were split. India and Pakistan reached a cease-fire agreement in 1949. The western third of
Kashmir was taken over by Pakistan, while the remainder remained under Indian repressive rule,
and the two sides decided to hold an UN-supervised referendum to decide the state's future.
(Shamsa Nawaz 2018) In 1964, India denied Kashmiris the right to vote freely, resulting in a war
in August 1965. The conflict lasted just 17 days. While the war itself ended in a draw, the vast
Muslim majority in Kashmir remained subjects of India.
Another conflict erupted between India and Pakistan in 1971, this conflict left huge scare on the
security apparatus of Pakistan. In the 1970 general elections, there were two major parties: the
Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which had acquired widespread support, and Awami League. Not
unexpectedly, the PPP won the majority of seats in the West, while the Awami League won by a
large margin in the East. Bengal had the bulk of the people, and the League believed it could
control the new National Assembly. The two sides were heading for a crash. Strikes broke out as
a result of the conflict, and the Awami League declared East Bengal a separate state in March
1971. The Pakistani government was able to hold the nation together, but the Awami League
rebelled. The internal conflict was resolved when India declared war on Pakistan on December 12,
1971 (Kemal A. Faruki 1971). Pakistan suffered a significant defeat, and by interfering actively in
the dispute, India aided in the creation of the new independent nation of Bangladesh. Pakistan-
India relations have declined further since the late 1970s because of the two countries' increasing
arms race. After India exploded a nuclear weapon in 1974, Pakistan decided to start its own nuclear
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program. (Samina Ahmed 1999) The problem has since had an impact on the trajectory of
Pakistan's ties with the US and China The nuclear problem is a source of contention between the
United States and Pakistan.
The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 led to the tensions in Indo-Pakistani
relations. India declined to criticize the Soviet intervention, though Pakistan hosted Afghan
refugees and served as a funnel for weapons from the United States. The Afghan mujahidin was
assisted by the United States and others. (Ludwig W. Adamec 1967) As a result, Pakistan felt a
greater challenge on both its eastern and northern borders during the Soviet Union's military
involvement in Afghanistan. The rise of extremist Hinduism in India, as well as the brutality it has
wrought against Muslims, has exacerbated tensions between the two countries.
The most serious skirmish in post India-Pakistan nuclear tests in Kashmir occurred in July 1999,
when India and Pakistan were on the verge of a new war in the contested area of Kargil. In October
1999, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered the return flight of then-Pakistani Army
Chief General Pervez Musharraf from Karachi to be diverted due to a lack of fuel to reach the
destination. As the army learned of the conspiracy, they overturned the orders, and Musharraf was
named ruler of Pakistan when he arrived in Karachi. Mr. Sharif, on the other hand, was fired from
his office and stripped of his rights. But Kargil crisis generated a lot of tension between the two
nations. (Farzana Shakoor 1999) In the post 9/11, 2001 the relationship has remained tense except
between 2004 to 2008. Since the inauguration of Prime Minister Narender Modi relationship has
reached to lowest ebb.
The second most threat external threat emanates from western neighbor Afghanistan. There are
following main issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan: Durand line and Pashtunistan.
Pashtunistan is almost dead issue, but Durand line has remained active. However, the Soviet Union
invasion of Afghanistan introduced many disturbing elements in its geostrategic environments.
The danger was manifold. Firstly, the invasion itself had generated fears and apprehensions among
the Pakistani policy makers that their nations could be next target of the society, they were of the
view that once the soviet consolidate their position in Afghanistan Russia would try to extend its
influence beyond Afghanistan borders.
There were concern that Soviet Union would try to destabilize or lop off Baluchistan from Pakistan
gain access to the warm waters. Second, given the enormous number of Afghan refugees on
Pakistani land, as well as the ongoing Afghan conflict and civil war, it cannot be ruled out that
23
Pakistan would get pulled into the Afghan cauldron, voluntarily or unwillingly. Third, the Soviet
Union may be inclined to exploit internal issues caused by dissenting groups in the neighboring
provinces of Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. (KPK).
1.4 A Review of Existing Literature
There is a growing body of knowledge about Pakistan's external ties. It examines Pakistan's
specific ties with these countries. Even the debate about Pakistan's affiliation with the United States
and China is splintered and unequal. It's also worth noting that there hasn't been much of an effort
to look at Pakistan's relationship with both the US and China. This research nearly fills up all of
these gaps. In the following paragraphs, we will review the literature on Pakistan-US ties before
moving on to Pakistan-China relations.
One current study looked into the nature of the US-Pakistan relationship, particularly following
the significant incident of 9/11 in the United States in 2001. It has emphasized the key differences
between Pakistan and the United States that have distracted them from achieving their mutual aims
in the area, which range from terrorist containment to ensuring security and democracy.
(Muhammad Imran Rashid, Umbreen Javaid 2018) The author argues that in order to influence
Pakistan, the United States has employed a punishing and rewarding strategy. On the one hand,
the United States provides economic assistance or incentives to Pakistan, and then withholds that
support in order to penalize Pakistan. (Rafique 2011)
This paper maps the continuity and change in the narrative and counter-narrative strategies of the
United States and Pakistan using Neoclassical Realism as a theoretical paradigm. The author
claims that the US has framed the war on terror and its relations with Pakistan in a specific way to
justify its foreign policy goals over the years. It has used both coercion and bribes to compel
Pakistan to comply with its foreign policy wishes. Pakistan, which has been the target of these
narratives for years, has demonstrated an unprecedented counter-narrative strategy (Muhammad
Nadeem Mirza 2020).
The book is a narrative as well as a careful consideration of his first-hand knowledge, observation
methods, and experiences dealing with Pakistan-US relations, illustrating the complexities in
Pakistan's decision-making process with regard to a number of major issues, including the Kashmir
dispute, the Afghanistan crisis, Pak-India tensions, Pakistan's nuclear programme, and internal
affairs. (Aman Ullah, 2020) Touqir Hussain discusses in his own words the Misunderstood History
24
of Pakistan-US Relations. He believes that Pakistan has sometimes been important to the U.S.,
sometimes not. Understanding the shifts of the past can help Islamabad plan for the future. (Touqir
Hussain, 2021)
The political–security interactions between the US and Pakistan in the post-Cold War era are
examined in this article. With the nuclear problem in 1990, the alliance connection between the
two nations was unexpectedly broken following the end of the Cold War in 1991, and the United
States implemented a series of sanctions against Pakistan. The connection was renewed after the
September 11 attacks of 2001 and the G. W. Bush administration's worldwide anti-terrorism battle.
Pakistan was once again one of the United States' most important friends, and bilateral political–
security relations were elevated to historic heights as a result of their anti-terrorism cooperation.
However, the fight against terrorism has resulted in several inconsistencies, resulting in
disagreements and crises in the two nations' relationship. (Khanh Van Nguyen, 2020)
In 1947, the United States and Pakistan maintained diplomatic relations. The US commitment to
give economic and military aid to Pakistan, as well as the latter's participation in CENTO and
SEATO, enhanced bilateral relations. However, the US suspension of military aid in 1965, 1971,
and 1975 created a widespread perception in Pakistan that the US was not a trustworthy partner.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 underlined Pakistan and the United States' shared
interest in South Asian peace in the region. (Javaid 2014)
There are chapter-length studies in foreign policy books written by Pakistani authors that detail
the formation and dissolution of the Pakistan-USA alliance as well as historical development since
1947. These books are excellent resources for learning about Pakistan-US relations (Ziring 1973;
Abdul Sattar Khan 2007; Shahid M.Amin 2000; Bhutto 1973; A.Z Hilali 2005; Sangat Singh
1970). Shahzad Akhtar elaborates the changing dynamics of USA-Pakistan Relations in the Post
9/11 Period. Akhter also discuss the hurdles and Future Prospects of the relationship.
Bruce Riedel describes Pakistan's relationship with the United States as a "deadly embrace." He
discusses the US viewpoint on Pakistan-US relations and elucidates various developments over
the years in which Pakistan, he claims, has backtracked while the US has remained firm. The
United States has attempted to stabilize Pakistan, but he has failed to describe how the United
States has betrayed Pakistan. (Riedel 2012) Pakistan's relations with the US have a tumultuous
history. National interests, socioeconomic and political disparities, sometimes aggravated by
diplomatic ineptness, as well as the inherent problems in interactions between a Superpower and
25
a developing country, have all contributed to this, while geopolitical issues and strategic
compulsions on both sides have appeared to bring the two countries closer together. In these pages,
an attempt will be made to evaluate Pakistan-US relations in historical context. (M. Raziullah
Azmi 1983)
The US persecutive is also provided by Alan Kronstadt he argues that a stable, democratic, and
economically prosperous Pakistan is regarded as critical to US interests in Asia. Key U.S. concerns
about regional terrorism, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, and weapons proliferation are all issues
in Pakistan. the ongoing Kashmir issue and tensions between Pakistan and India; human rights
protection; and Economic advancement. (Kronenfeld and Margesson 2006; Kronstadt 2006)
Daniel Markey has also weighed in on the debate, concluding that the United States is in a
quandary. Pakistan, like many other Asian countries, does not want to take sides, preferring to
maintain an equal relationship with both the United States and China. It is also unlikely that the
US will be able to persuade Pakistan to join the US in its fight against China. (Markey 2020)
With regard to Pakistan China relations, there is a dedicated literature. Which is discussed as
follows. Rasul Bus Rais book length work give us a detailed understanding of the Pakistan-China
relations in a historical perspective. These two book are really good for a student who wish to
understand the Sino-Pakistan relations in a historical perspective. (Rasul Bakhsh Rais 1977) While
Anwar Syed book also discuss foundation and future development of the relationship, but these
books were written during the 1960s and 1970s. Again, in terms of Pakistan-China relations, there
are chapters in books on Pakistan foreign policy that discuss how India has historically brought
the two countries closer together. (Ziring 1973; Shahid M.Amin 2000; Abdul Sattar Khan 2007;
Sangat Singh 1970)
There are some dedicated studies which discuss Pakistan-China relations though in excellent
terms, they believe that Pakistan-China relations are stable and all-weather. (Javaid and Jahangir
2015; Afridi 2014; Lee 2016; Chambers 2002; Khalid 2019; Javaid and Javaid 2016) The Pakistani
author has a habit of describing relationships in overly flattering terms. Using the phrase Pakistan-
China relations are second to none is an overly idealistic explanation; there are issues and
challenges in the Sino-Pakistan alliance that this research will discuss at some point in the chapters.
For example, author says that ‘Since the beginning of diplomatic relations their relations never
faced serious troubled’, but the relationship did face issues. (Shamsi and Ali, Ghulam Mustafa
2019)
26
In the previous literature Indian authors have also dedicated some research on Pakistan-China
relations though explaining with the Indian perspective. (M. Malik 2002) There are studies which
maintain that Sino-Pakistan strains are taking place. (Kardon 2011) Still other believe that
Pakistani security elites exaggerate their relationship with China, which is actually not the case,
China has certain limitations in its relationship with Pakistan. (Beckley 2012; Rakisits 2012) Some
have discussed trade, military relations between Pakistan and China. (Hartpence 2011; A. . Malik
2013; Aqeel 2016). Some have discussed the impact of Uighurs separatism on Pakistan-China
relations. (Ziad Haider 2005) Latest books in which authors have elaborated a holistic picture of
the relationship. (Small 2015)
Others have called the relationship a surprising development, owing to the fact that the two
countries have nothing in common, but they have managed to maintain an all-weather and
excellent relationship. (Blank 2015) The most latest book on Pakistan China relations examines
the relationships between Pakistan and China from the perspective of Pakistan's internal politics
in the post-9/11 period and suggests that the armed forces is the main source of coherence in the
link between the two countries. (Boni 2020)
According to the preceding discussion, previous studies have not used any theory in this
connection Balance of Threat Theory to study Pakistan's alliance formation with the major powers:
The United States and China. Furthermore, previous studies have ignored the study of Pakistan
alliance formation in one study, which this dissertation is attempting to do. However, previous
studies have not identified the pattern in Pakistan's international alliances. As said earlier, Pakistan
alliance with the US and China has not discussed in one package.
1.5 Definitions of Alliance
The lack of a widely accepted concept of alliance necessitates the development of a working
conceptual understanding of alliance for further analysis. Arnold Wolfers' definition is energizing;
as he puts it, an alliance is a partnership. “a promise of mutual military assistance between two or
more sovereign states”. (Arnold Wolfer 1968, p.268) Robert Osgood takes the same stance: an
alliance reflects a mutual interest. “latent war community, based on general cooperation that goes
beyond formal provisions and that the signatories must continually cultivate in order to preserve
mutual confidence in each other's fidelity to specified obligations”. (Michael Gunter 2005, p.113)
Both definitions emphasize military collaboration, which distinguishes alliances from other non-
military organizations. According to Stephen Walt, “A formal or informal relationship of security
27
cooperation between two or more sovereign states”.(Walt 1987, p.12) Some academics
emphasized the need for a formal alliance agreement. As Roger Dinger man insists, “The word
(alliance) refers to a written, formal agreement among two or more states which is designed to
serve, for a specified term, the interests of those states, or of their statesmen and bureaucrats, in
regard to national security”. Snyder insists view that "alliances ... are formal associations of states
for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of
their members, against specific other states...".(Glenn Snyder 1990, p.104)
Obviously, only Pakistan's alliances with the United States have been formally recognized in
agreements such as SEATO, CENTO, and the Mutual Defense Agreement of 1954. However, no
formal agreement or treaty has been signed between Pakistan and China, implying that they have
formed an official alliance. However, this peculiarity does not rule out the validity of Pakistan's
Chinese alliances.
The formality of confirming an alliance in a formal agreement was only a tactical move for
Pakistani leaders who received little education on foreign affairs, and it largely depended on the
international situation at the time. Both contracting parties may benefit greatly from a de facto
alliance. A genuine desire for close cooperation, even if expressed verbally, was more important
to the security elites in Islamabad than anything else. As a result, we will use Walt's definition for
the purposes of this thesis, which states that alliances are formal or informal agreements between
two or more sovereign states.
1.6 Theoretical Consideration
1.6.1 Different Theories of Alliances
A number of theories have been developed to explain the formation, performance and nature of
alliances. There are many different alliances: the conditions in which it has been operational, the
kind of undertakings it has made, the level and the scope of cooperation. It also contains ideology,
size, skills, etc.
Researchers have endeavored to advance all-inclusive theories of alliances: George Liska was the
first to do so, with his 1962 book Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence; in 1973,
Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan released Unity and Disintegration in
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International Alliances: Comparative Studies. The Origins of Alliances, written by Stephen Walt
and released in 1987, contains valuable theoretical insights.
Liska's work was the first in the field of alliance theory. In his own words: “It is impossible to
speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name”.
(George Liska 1968, p.3) Nations in Alliance by Liska emphasizes the importance of traditional
alliance patterns in the modern international system. Positively, states form alliances with one
another to supplement one another's capabilities. In the negative, an alliance is a means of lessening
the impact of antagonistic power, which is perceived as pressure and threatens one's independence.
He further states that “In economic terminology alliances aim at maximizing gains and sharing
liabilities. The decision to align, in what form, and with whom or not to align, as part of a deliberate
policy-is made with reference to national interests”. (George Liska 1968, p.40)
Alliance is also defined by international policy scholars as a military compact. Many regimes have
the primary goal of establishing satisfactory military capacity against external and internal foes,
which must be subordinated to many other needs. Wolfer notes that “an alliance is a promise of
mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states”. (Wolfers 1968, p268) The
Alliance is being reinforced by William Fox and Annette Baker Fox as a tool for the streamlining
of various foreign military policies. However, the formation or duration of the alliance is complex.
The primary motivation is to protect any nation or any combination of a nations a dominant
position. (Fox and Baker Fox 1967, p.6)
1.6.2 BOP Theories and Concept of Alliances
BoP theory is a useful starting point for understanding the policies of the Alliance. The power must
always be ascertained and evaluated according to a realistic conception in relation to the power of
another state. BoP is an analytical concept in the global context to evaluate the overall powers of
the states and coalitions. Morgenthau (1960), Kaplan (1957) are the earlier propagator of BoP
school. They presume that alliances are coalitions with a logically inspired consensus. In theory of
BoP, nations should be much more likely than to join the powerful in order to avoid dominant
formation in order to increase the chances of joining the victorious camps, i.e., bandwagoning, to
join the weaker coalition. In 1979, Waltz promoted this concept. He states “Balance of power
politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and
that it be populated by units wishing to survive”. (Kenneth N. Waltz 1979, p.121) According to
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Morgenthau, in the BoP theory, nations create alliances to compensate and balance the growing
powers. For him, an alliance is always a way to maintain balance. He talks about the alliance in
terms of means/ends and cost/reward calculations. (Hans Morgenthau 1948)
Another scholar, Quincy Wright stated BoP is a system designed in every country to retain the
constant convictions that it would meet an invulnerable combination of the other if it endeavored
aggression. (Wright 1942, p.254) A fundamental objective of creating a system of BoP is to protect
the security and independence of the particular nations. No entity should be permitted to dominate
the rest within the system. BoP is thus transformed into an analytical instrument. While BoP theory
does not stipulate a model of national or international instability, the main power layouts that
existed in the past can be described.
The theory shows whether their relation is global or is restricted to one region of the world, the
power relations of big states and groups of states graphically. However, internationally trained
scholars did not pay much attention to perceptions. The power of faith and perception, of ideas
and ways of thinking, has created a very efficient method for rivalry and competitive environment,
as States come into conflict for international politics.
Nonetheless, Kenneth Waltz's work on alliances was the most influential throughout the Cold War.
Waltz's structural neorealist balance of power Thus, in this part, we will give Waltz' fundamental
thesis on alliance formation. According to BOP theory, the distribution of capabilities is the most
important determinant in deciding whether or not an alliance will form and how many coalitions
will form. As a result, Waltz investigates alliances as a result of the global order. (Kenneth N.
Waltz 1979) For two reasons, according to this idea, nations establish alliances to counterbalance
stronger states/coalitions.
First, by aligning against the biggest power and prospective hegemon, nations guarantee that no
single state dominates the system, stabilizing the system and establishing a new equilibrium or
balance. Second, nations boost their relative power in the weaker coalition by joining the weaker
and more vulnerable side. Waltz claims that if secondary states have the freedom to choose, they
would gravitate toward the weaker side since the stronger side is the one that threatens them.
(Kenneth N. Waltz 1979, p.127)
30
A hypothesis of alliance formation derived from Waltz’ (1979) balance of power theory would be:
Independent variable Dependent variable
International distribution of power/structure of
the international system is anarchic
States counterbalance the strongest power
Alliances, according to Waltz, are a defensive strategy of survival, and alliances may be necessary
in the fight for security. The two major methods for governments to achieve security are to balance
internal (arms buildup) or external (allying), which Waltz describes as external balancing.
According to Waltz, alliances are formed by governments that share some but not all of their
interests. This shared interest is primarily based on apprehensions about other countries. Waltz
goes on to say that alliance plans are always the result of compromise since allies' interests and
ideas about how to protect them are never the same. Thus, according to Waltz, internal balancing
is more dependable and accurate; for example, during the Cold War, Russia and the United States
depended mostly on themselves and balanced each other through internal balancing. (Kenneth N.
Waltz 1979, p.166)
Among the further developments of Waltz’ ‘balance of power’ theory especially seven approaches
have been dominating: ‘offensive realism’ (Mearsheimer 2001), ‘underbalancing’(Schweller
2006) ‘alliance security dilemma’(Snyder 1997), ‘trade-off model & game theory’(James Morrow
1991; Smith 1995), ‘model of unipolarity’ (Hansen 2000), ‘soft balancing’ (Paul et. al. 2004; Pape
2005) and ‘constellation theory’. (Mouritzen & Wivel 2005) All these theorizations are built into
a Waltzian power theory based on a balance of power theory, according to which balance of power
has been elaborated and adjusted in different ways.
Power is indirectly maximised by balancing the strongest power, according to John Mearsheimer's
thesis. According to Mearsheimer, great powers think and behave aggressively because of the
international system's framework, not because of particular individual qualities of nations. As a
result, governments are cautious to collaborate for fear of giving the opposing side an undue edge.
Nations are revisionist power maximizers in an anarchic international system because the only
method for states to secure existence is to maximise relative strength with the ultimate objective
of (regional) hegemony. (Mearsheimer 2001, p.139), (Mearsheimer 2016). States typically employ
one of two strategies: direct power optimization (war, extortion, bait and bleed, or bloodletting) or
indirect power optimization (keeping others down) (buck-passing or balancing). Bandwagoning
and appeasement techniques are not mentioned by Mearsheimer. (Mearsheimer 2016;
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Mearsheimer 2001, p. 139). In contrast to Robert Dahl's more relational definition of power in
terms of result as the quantity of power in relation to others, Mearsheimer's idea of power is
material.
Randall Schweller's theory is compatible with his neoclassical realist assumption that systemic
forces are mediated by intermediate domestic variables, but not that the systemic level is
unimportant. (Schweller 2006, p.4; Schweller 2004) Structure, according to Schweller, both
constrains and allows for logical, intentional behaviour. He claims, however, that we don't know
the influence of structure before positing what nations wish. (Schweller 2006, p.189) A fractured
national political scene can obstruct effective political leadership and, as a result, effective
responses to foreign challenges. As a result, internal and exterior stability become a compromise.
As a result, underbalancing is more common than Waltz's theory of balance of power suggests.
(Schweller 2006, p.7) The more a factor is represented, the more probable underbalancing
behaviour will occur. (Schweller 2006)
1.6.3 Stephen M. Walt: Balance of Threat
Walt's BoT theory contributes significantly to neorealist thinking. His alliance study focuses on a
state's desire to balance against security concerns. States ally in reaction to power disparities,
according to BoP theory. It takes into account population, economic capacity, military might, and
political cohesiveness when distributing capacities. Walt alters Waltz's concept of alliance
formation by suggesting that nations balance against threats rather than strength. He introduced
the concept of perception and transitioned from BoP to BoT. It is not always the strongest
neighbour that poses a threat; a lesser country might also be a threat. (Walt 1987; Walt 1985a;
Walt 1998)
By examining patterns in Middle East alliances, he tried his theory of the BoT. In Walt's opinion,
nations sometimes cooperate, but cooperation is intended to face a strong threat from one or more
states when they do so. The cooperation also ends when the threat is ended. According to him,
“when there is an imbalance of threat, states will form alliances or increase their internal efforts in
order to reduce their vulnerability”. (Walt 1987)
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A hypothesis of alliance formation derived from Stephen Walt would be:
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
Threat (Aggregate power, Geographical
proximity, Offensive capabilities, and
Perceived intentions)
States counterbalance the biggest threat
Pakistan threat perception (India’s Aggregate
power, India’s Geographical proximity,
India’s Offensive capabilities, and Indian
leaders Perceived intentions
Pakistan seeks alliance to balance Indian threat
During 1955-1979 Stephen Walt studied several case studies, including the middle east countries,
supporting the hypothesis of "balancing." As previously stated, Walt defined the alliance as "a
formal or informal agreement between two or more sovereign states on security cooperation".
(Walt 1987) It includes both formal and informal treaties because countries are perhaps willing to
cooperate, but not prepared to sign a formal agreement. The presence or absence of a formal
agreement often does not say much about the actual level of commitment amongst the parties.
(Walt 1987, pp. 12, 13) Balance of Threat Theory Walt finds that states tend generally to 'balance,'
not bandwagon, against the threatening state or coalition. States are supposed to balance the most
powerful state or coalition. Indeed, they are balanced against the most dangerous state. The level
of threats posed by a State to others is a function of its power, its geography, its offensive military
capability, and its perceived aggressive nature. The total power of states is total power. (Walt 1987)
The greater the total resource of the state, such as population, industrial, military, and technological
capabilities, the greater can it pose a potential threat to others. With distance, the power capability
of projecting decreases; nearby states pose a higher threat than far away ones. In response to nearby
powers, states tend to choose their alliances more likely than to respond to distant ones. The ability
to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state constitutes an offensive power.
States with high offensive capacity are more likely to cause an alliance than those unable to attack.
(Walt 1987). Furthermore, Walt mentioned other factors that can motivate alignment, especially
when it is not clear which states pose the biggest risk. Ideology is a factor in the alignment of
many. In other respects, states prefer to ally themselves with governments whose political
perspective is similar to their own (Walt 1997, p. 168). The ideology of the alliance is a relatively
weak reason. Aid offers or acceptance is one ability to react to a common threat by States of various
skills. To Walt, the result more often than not of a large support relationship is alignment. (Walt
1987; Walt 1985b).
33
As a result, Walt proposed five hypotheses: States balance by allying against states that threaten
them. States team together with states that threaten them, or bandwagon. Allies with similar
ideologies are chosen by states. Allies are attracted to foreign help. Alliances are made easier by
political infiltration. Walt used the following determinants to test these hypotheses: States consider
aggregate power (more is more dangerous), geographical proximity (closer is more menacing),
offensive capability (more threatening), and offensive intents when choosing whether or not to
balance (states that have them are more threatening). Thus, from above, it shows that the issue
which drives Pakistan quest for international alliances isn't the domination of India (foreign
influence and political power as a result of population, industrial/military capabilities and
technological skills). Instead, India possesses this power and is linked to its geographical
proximity, aggressive power, and intentions.
The review above shows that there are different theories, each focused on or approaching a
particular aspect of alliances. While different alliance theories are available, this thesis focuses on
the theory of alliance by Stephen Walt. BoP can't explain why balancing often failed to form by
focusing only on capabilities. This gap is therefore narrowed by BoT. This shortcoming can be
corrected by recognizing that states form threat balance alliances and power is just one element of
their calculations. BoT's theory thus explains why developing countries usually look for allies in
response to local dangers and not to shifts in the global balance of power. Walt believes that
alliances are defensive and driven by fear. Walt is the first to look at Middle East alliance
behaviour, showing empirical evidence that states don't balance power per se, but balance the
threat. Nevertheless, this study uses BoT in the context of South Asia. Walt's theory is valuable
and can help his reader rethink the value of theory in international relations in contemporary times.
The theory of BoT explains why Pakistan seeks alliances with other countries such as China and
the United States.
1.7 Walt’s Concept of Why Alliances Endure or Collapse.
Although much has been written on the establishment of alliances, there had been very little
published about their breakdown, at least until Stephen Walt's landmark work, 'Why Alliances
Endure or Collapse.' Walt's theory divides the reasons for alliance breakup into two categories:
rational and irrational. He defines the former as termination ‘in the interest of one or more
members. (Walt, 1997: 156) In any alliance, 'interest,' according to Walt, is defined largely as
mutual support for threatening outside actors. As a result, his theory asserts that the major logical
34
reason of alliance degradation is a shift in the threat's perception (either by the threat or the ability
of the ally to materially confront the threat) Irrational variables such as domestic politics,
personality selection, and misunderstanding also play a part in his thesis. He frequently advises
that the political coalition should not be messed with 'in hindsight.'
1.7.1 Why Do Alliances End?
Existing alliances can deteriorate or collapse for a variety of reasons. This study presupposes that
entering an alliance comes with a cost – for example, joining an alliance decreases a state's
autonomy. As a result, nations will be hesitant to incur these expenses if the alliance is no longer
useful. What factors could cause governments to reconsider their alliance commitments?
1.7.2 Changing Perceptions of Threat
The most frequent perception of alliances is that they are formed in reaction to an external threat.
The degree of danger posed to others is determined by relative power, geographic proximity,
offensive capabilities, and perceived intents; all other circumstances being equal, an increase in
any of these elements will increase the level of threat posed to others. Nations generally form
alliances to counter the largest threat(s) they face, however revisionist states and particularly
weak states will occasionally 'bandwagon' by allying with a powerful or hostile force. (Walt
1997)
As a result, if there is a major change in the amount of threat that its members experience, such
partnerships will collapse. This type of change might happen for a variety of reasons. A shift in
power balance is the most evident process. If the governments that presented the original danger
become significantly weaker, an existing alliance is likely to collapse since the alliance's members
will have less need for external backing. (Walt 1997)
1.7.3 Summary
For a variety of causes, alliances weaken and break. The most apparent and significant reason
is a change in the identification or nature of the danger that originally prompted the connection.
If the danger diminishes or is replaced by a stronger one, the alliance established to combat the
initial threat will most likely alter. Alliances will also be likely to deteriorate if members acquire
other methods of self-defense or come to doubt their partners' ability or desire to fulfil their
responsibilities. If governments reframe their interests as a consequence of internal political
turmoil, or if ideological values are incompatible and the degree of danger is too low to
35
overcome these differences, an existing alliance will most likely perish. (Walt 1997)
The intensity of these diverse inclinations — and, as a result, the fragility of existing alliance
networks — will vary greatly from case to case. Alliances will be less stable in a multipolar
world because big countries will have more alternatives as their numbers grow, and adjustments
in the allocation of capabilities will be more frequent. It will also be more difficult for any state
to decide where the biggest danger is, and international alliances will likely be more flexible
and fluid as a result. (Walt 1997)
1.7.4 Why Alliances Persist.
1.7.5 Summary
Walt offers many reasons why governments will retain a military alliance even if the
circumstances under which it was created have significantly changed. First, if the danger
persists, the alliance will survive; second, alliances are more likely to survive when there is a
significant power imbalance within them, when the allies have similar political ideals, and when
the connection is highly institutionalized. Such coalitions will have an easier time adapting to
new circumstances and will be better prepared to deal with the inevitable conflicts of interest
that will develop. (Walt 1997)
1.8 Methodology
This is a qualitative, descriptive, and analytical research. Both primary and secondary sources are
used to achieve research objectives. We use the alliance history of Pakistan from 1947 to 2010 as
principal historical evidence to find answers to the research questions. The basis of the primary
sources is derived from: i) official documents available to the public like official publications,
annual reports and white papers from related ministries and expert groups; and ii) relevant
information in various published forms i.e., official statements and press releases, and media
reports/comments/debates through newspapers, magazines, and news monitoring services.
The media coverage of the CNN, Reuters, the New York Times, the Washington Post, The Dawn,
the News, the Nations, Jang, Chinese Newspapers, and the US are used to study Pakistan’s alliance
behavior. These sources will be derived primarily from the online archives of related newspapers.
Moreover, the office of the Historian and the US Foreign Relation online services and the US
National Security Archives, will be great primary and original sources to study the alliance. These
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are itself original contribution to the research. These sources will be a crucial empirical source to
study the contemporary nature of the study.
Meanwhile, secondary sources of related literature will provide background information, rival
theoretical approaches, substantive arguments, and critical perspectives that help deepen the
knowledge and understanding necessary to address the research problem. By putting these
alliances in a single package, we might discern pattern of Pakistan’s alliance behavior, which in
turn will help us better understand the Pakistan’s alliance evolution and further development.
Furthermore, we try to examine Pakistan’s alliance behavior from a Pakistani perspective; thus,
we can legitimately rely heavily on the Pakistani literature.
1.9 Organization of Thesis
This introductory chapter is followed by chapter on theoretical perspective of the thesis. It
discusses in detail theory of balance of threat and Stephen Walt theory on why alliance endured or
collapse. Chapter Two examines Pakistan’s alliance making with the US. Chapter three discusses
Pakistan-China alliance. Chapter four discusses Pakistan alliance with US and China the way they
endured or collapse. Finally, chapter five is a conclusion.
In the next chapter we discuss Pakistan-USA alliance making in the historical context.
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Chapter Five
Conclusion and Recommendations
5 Summary of the Research
This thesis uses Stephen Walt Balance of Threat (BoT) theory and Why Alliances Endure or
Collapse to elucidate Pakistan’s alliance pattern with two major nations of the world the United
States and China in order to address problems in the existing literature and better understand the
patterns in Pakistan's alliance behaviour. While the central objectives of the research are:
1. To investigate Pakistan’s need for an external alliance,
2. To examine the way Pakistan formed alliance with the US and China
3. Finally, to study the collapse and endurance of Pakistan’s alliances with China and US.
While the study attempts to answers following questions:
1. What are the security threats that urge Pakistan to form an international alliance?
2. How Pakistan formed alliance with the US and China,
3. And finally, what were the reasons which either collapsed and or endured Pakistan’s
alliance with the US and China.
Methodologically, to investigate the phenomenon, the study relied heavily on both primary and
secondary sources. The study secured some original sources from the US National Archives, the
Office of the Historian, and the Original Communique of the Pakistani Foreign Office and various
original documents signed between Pakistan and China and Pakistan and USA. In addition,
Autobiographies of Pakistani and international elites, such as Henry Kissinger, Ayub Khan,
Ambassador Sultan, and others, have been used to provide a better understanding of the
phenomenon. Furthermore, newspapers from around the world, such as Reuters, CNN, BBC, New
York Times, Washington Post, Xinhua, Peking Review, People's Daily, Dawn, and others, have
been used to provide a better understanding of Pakistani alliance formation.
Briefly this study has noticed that of all Pakistan alliances, Pakistan alliance with the US has been
volatile, oscillating between period of normalization and extreme hostility, while with China,
Pakistan relations has been as normal and enduring. The formation and continuation of
Islamabad’s alliances has mainly been dictated by the leadership’s constant perceptions of external
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threat. Traditionally, Pakistan has never relaxed its efforts to seek alliances in international politics,
first with the United States and then with the Peoples’ Republic of China. Since its independence
in 1947, while India has appeared as a major threat, Afghanistan has posed a secondary albeit
important threat. Significantly, Pakistan’s alliance behavior is driven by its perception of threat
and ideology played no role.
5.1 Research Findings Mentioned Succinctly
A careful examination of these two cases reveals the following. First and foremost, we find out
that Pakistan’s alliance behavior has been driven by Pakistan’s perception of threat rather than
other factors. Pakistan’s formed alliance both the US and China mainly to balance threat from
India and to a lesser extent Afghanistan. Second, we established that because alliance behavior
was driven by threat perception, ideology played only a supplementary role. Ideologically, neither
the US nor China shared Pakistan’s Islamic ideology. Furthermore, the alliance with the USA
failed not because the perceptions of the threats changed, but because the weakest partner,
Pakistan, in the alliance inevitably demanded greater autonomy than the strongest partner, the
United States, was willing to tolerate. While with China the alliance has remained intact despite
the changing dynamics in South Asia. Besides, this dissertation learns that the search for allies has
been a consistent policy of Pakistan’s leaders, regardless of who the leaders were or what they
believed.
5.2 Chapter-by-Chapter Summary of Findings
We observed that many Pakistan watchers believe that no simple model can explain Pakistani
foreign policy behaviors with such a comment in view; explaining Pakistan’s alliance behaviour
is also not any easy task. But with the development of alliance theories and the availability of some
important new research materials, this formidable obstacle is not insurmountable. The following
findings, which we generalize from the in-depth analyses of the two cases, which are discussed in
the following chapters, lay out some discoveries that can explain some complex historical
phenomena of Pakistan’s alliance making.
5.3 Chapter One and Two
In chapter one using mainly secondary literature we have established that Pakistan’s alliance
behavior was driven by its perception of threat more than anything else. Although some scholars
and politicians surprisingly found that Pakistani leadership was a great practitioner of realpolitik
and quite familiar with balance of power politics, Pakistani leadership’s decisions about who to
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ally with and who to oppose did not emanate from his desire to balance off the most powerful
nation but from his aspiration to redress the most dangerous threat. These findings essentially
approve the use of Balance of threat theory which also states that states balance threat not power.
To reiterates it, for examples, the most dangerous threat might or might not come from the most
powerful. As Walt argued, “the distribution of power is an extremely important factor; the level of
threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intensions.”
The threat might be perceived by Pakistani leaders as a danger to the very survival of the Pakistan
or the nature of the communist regime.
In the process and in every chapter, it came to our understanding that Pakistan’s Islamic Ideology
has played a supplementary role in Pakistan’s alliance practice even during the period the cold
war, post-cold war, and post 9/11, 2001 eras. Pakistan did not share ideology whether with the US
or China. Pakistan is an Islamic state, US is predominantly Christian while China is an atheist
state. So, in a way coincidently, Pakistan did not share the same ideology with all its allies.
Ideological similarity played a role that was secondary in importance. Hence the critical
determinant was their shared perception of principal threat.
The weaker partner's insistence on autonomy, in addition to the loss of shared perceptions of threat,
was the second most important factor in the alliances' eventual disintegration, primarily with the
US. In terms of the parties' relative military and economic capabilities, all of Pakistan's alliances
were also asymmetric. In this case, the weak partner, Pakistan, wanted to reap significant security
benefits at the expense of autonomy. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the US imposed a slew
of discriminatory restrictions and sanctions in order to sway Pakistan's behaviour in its favour, but
Pakistan had its own security concerns, such as balancing the Indian threat, which the US could
not address. It was also discovered that Pakistan's weaker partner's insistence on autonomy
deprives the major partner of one of the most important incentives for alliance survival. We
establish that Pakistan first alliance partner was the USA.
Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter 2, Pakistan and the United States formed numerous alliances,
at least three, when both countries' security was at risk, eventually collapsing once the objectives
were met; however, the alliances were primarily dissolved due to US initiatives, not Pakistan's.
Pakistan desperately wanted to keep its alliance with the US because of its rivalry with India, but
it was unable to do so. Furthermore, the US has never aided Pakistan in its conflict with India,
including the 1965 war, the 1971 war, and numerous other minor and major crises.
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Although Pakistan's alliances with the United States remained in place because their common
threat, first from the Soviet Union and then from the GWOT, the alliance was marred by suspicion,
allegations, counter-allegations, and deadlocks. Another important finding discussed in chapter
two was that when Pakistan and the US buried the hatchet, they sometimes aligned. For example,
after 9/11, 2001, the US promised Pakistan that this time it would not abandon the country, but
these promises were not kept.
Initially, Pakistan sought an alliance with the US in order to confront India's expansionist state, at
the expense of alienating two of its neighbours, China (India itself) and Russia, as well as
Afghanistan to a lesser extent. After joining US alliances, India turned against Pakistan. Despite
this, China has shown remarkable tolerance for the Pakistan-US alliance.
Pakistan formed alliance with the USA on three occasions and alliance dissolved on similar times.
In 1954 (SEATO 1954, CENTO 1955 and Mutual Defense Agreement, 1954) were signed which
establish first alliance. During the wars with India, US did not support Pakistan. First alliance
ended in early 1972 when Bhutto withdrew from agreements. While Carter Administration
imposed nuclear related sanctions on Pakistan.
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1980-1990) revied alliance again. US and Pakistan used
Mujahedeen to fight the Soviet in Afghanistan. During the decade, CIA and ISI, launched billions
of dollars’ worth of operations to prevent Soviet forces from further advancing into the region.
Alliance ended in 1990 when the US left Afghanistan unstable and imposed sanctions on
Islamabad again. After the 9/11 attacks and US’s invaded Afghanistan to eradicate militancy,
Pakistan became one of the most important strategic allies for United States.
We examine that Initially Pakistan tried to strike a negotiation deal with Taliban and al Qaeda
members to handover Osama bin Laden to American authorities. However, when negotiations
failed, Pakistan allowed American army to use Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC) and
military bases for launching attacks on Afghan soil. Musharraf confessed that the country had no
option but to support US as it had threatened Pakistan of “bombing it into stone age” if it did not
join the fight against al Qaeda. Again, the US is leaving Afghanistan scapegoating Pakistan for its
failure. So, on all three occasions the alliance with the US dissolved as convergence of interest
disappeared between the two nations.
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Pakistan's main area of interests/threat perception came from its regional environment (India),
while the US has global agenda. Finally, we realize this became one of the central reasons for the
dissolution of Pakistan-US alliance on all three occasions. US used Pakistan when it needed to
correct its global agenda, but once Pakistan utility has disappeared, US let Pakistan down and
changed its course of actions sometimes imposing sanctions. We established that originally touted
as a strategic alliance, Pakistan-USA alliance morphed into a transactional one over the years. We
also noted that US also complained Pakistan. i.e., in war against terrorism, US believed Islamabad
was supporting global war on terror, also providing sanctuaries to the Taliban.
5.4 Chapter Three
Pakistani leadership’s decisions about who to ally with and who to oppose did not come from their
desire to balance off the most powerful nation but from his aspiration to redress the most dangerous
threat (India and to certain extent Afghanistan). The most dangerous threat to the national security
of Pakistan come from the immediate neighbours India. The threat perceived by Pakistani leaders
from India has been real challenge to overcome and has been central reason to secure alliances
with China because India was a common enemy both to Pakistan and China. So, this finding is a
relevance and approves the use of Walt BoT theory that states balance external threats.
Nevertheless, Pakistan-China alliance did not happen initially. In the beginning Pakistan and China
had many issues but once these issues were removed an alliance which is time-tested, all-weather
and comprehensive was born in early 1960s.
Thesis establishes that India is a common enemy to Pakistan and China and prime reason for Sino-
Pakistan alliance. In the beginning India-China has close relations, Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai. Clash
over the status of Tibet led them to fight brief but bloody war in 1962. Also, U-2 incident made
Pakistan face Russia threat, US didn't help Pakistan. In the wake of Indo-China clash, US, UK
provided military & economic assistance to India, Pakistan got worried. This development led
rethinking both in China and Pakistan, therefore, an alliance has born which was long lasting and
reliable. In 1963 two nations signed three historic agreements: Border agreement, Trade
agreement, and Air agreement. Since then, it has been an important factor in the Sino-Pak alliance
formation besides endurance. China started supporting Pakistan on Kashmir.
Although the strength of India as an adversary has varied over time, Indian factor has been
constant. While during the Cold War, India appeared to be a strong factor in affecting Sino-
Pakistan, after the Cold-war, the changing dynamism like Indo-US strategic partnership, Pakistan
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Afghan policy and China neutrality on Kashmir has been new development, the alliance between
Pakistan and China remained intact at its core.
Nonetheless, Pakistan alliance with China was in response to the common threat, so relevance of
BoT theory. Thus, India had proximity, an offensive power, and had expressed aggressive
intentions towards both China and Pakistan, and so an alliance between Pakistan and China was
required to counter-balance India. Nonetheless, strategic transformation and structural changes in
the post-Cold War international relations made Pakistan-China relations fragile.
The sudden and unexpected rise of the Taliban, their support to the Uighurs separatists in Xinjiang
and several terrorist attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan have interrupted the delicate Pakistan-
China equation. Despite these hurdles and challenges Sino-Pakistan alliance did not collapse.
Pakistan cooperated with China on these issues. Since 9/11, 2001 economic content have further
cemented their ties. The Gwadar deep seaport and CPEC is manifestation of their close and strong
ties.
So common security threats and common future have kept Pakistan-China alliance intact, while
on the other hand, Pakistan USA alliance collapsed due to divergence of interests. This section has
found out that Sino-Pakistan alliance has persisted mainly because the rational on which originally
alliance was formed has continued to exist (Indian factor), so alliance has persisted. In more recent
times, Indo-US strategic partnership has reinvigorated Sino-Pakistan Alliance. Walt Argues:
Alliances will be especially durable when relations among the member-states have brought about
a strong sense of common identity (common threat).
5.5 Chapter Four
We discussed the causes for the collapse of the Pakistan-US alliance and the durability of the
Pakistan-China alliance in Chapter four. In that chapter, we learned that Pakistan and the United
States have a difficulty sustaining their mainly because they disagree in many areas. Even when
they formed coalitions, they pursued opposing interests and ambitions, which ultimately
jeopardized their partnerships' chances. In terms of Pakistan and China, we noticed that the two
countries have a lot in common when it comes to security, defense, and opposing regional
hegemons like India. As a result, their partnership was able to endure.
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5.6 Have we achieved Research Objectives?
It is reasonable to claim that Yes, we did. The objectives were 1) To investigate Pakistan’s need
for an external alliance, 2) To examine the way Pakistan formed alliance with the US and China,
and finally, to study the collapse and endurance of Pakistan’s alliances with China and US. Overall,
in chapter two, three and four these objectives have been achieved fairly.
5.7 Have we answered Research Questions?
Yet again, this thesis claims that yes, we did too. The research questions are 1) What are the
security threats that urge Pakistan to form an international alliance, 2) How Pakistan formed
alliance with the US and China, and what were the reasons which either collapsed and or endured
Pakistan’s alliance with the US and China. using Balance of threat theory enumerated by Stephen
Walt, in chapter two, three and four these questions have been realized reasonably.
5.8 Recommendations
The thesis takes is attempting to submit some recommendations that are made considering the
research findings. Nonetheless, these are merely the author's suggestions which may be helpful to
those who deal with the foreign relations of Pakistan. Recommendations are as follows:
1. Pakistan would have to strengthen its ability to combat the political, financial, and internal
pressure of India and the USA in order to maintain an equal relationship with the United States.
To do so, good national leadership and unreserved cooperation with China are necessary.
2. The new animosity of America to Pakistan is mostly attributable to its rising rivals in China,
where India was selected as a strategic partner in Washington, while the Chinese side of the power
equation lists Pakistan. The US strategy for South Asia recently reported is focused on India's
regional dominance.
3. Pakistan is well placed to withstand military pressure. Two points shown in the Pulwama Mini
crisis: firstly, Pakistan would protect itself by traditional means; secondly, nuclear dissuasion once
again served to mitigate military behavior. India, though, is in a big phase of weapons procurement
and modernization, which Pakistan would need to neutralize further if it does not balance. Pakistan
must above all disillusion India by the assumption that Pakistan's nuclear disorder might be
"checked" or a pre-emptive attack on Pakistan's strategic properties under the aegis of the United
States.
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4. This danger would be eliminated by a Pakistani "second strike" ability. The financial defenses
of Pakistan are vulnerable. The nation must join together in implementing the politically
challenging yet crucial tax and other reforms to ensure the country's fiscal and foreign account
balance lastingly. Pakistan should join China, Russia and other countries in their new attempts to
establish alternatives or complementary agreements to the US-dominated financial system in the
long run.
5. Similarly, Pakistan is not adequately prepared to combat India's and others' "hybrid" war in
Baluchistan, former Fata, media and political sectors in order to nationally destabilize the region.
Pakistan must develop sophisticated information defense, counterinsurgency and political
intervention using all the resources of modern technology.
6. Trade and investment are the most promising fields for developing a potential Pakistan-US
partnership. The United States is Pakistan's largest export market. Because of the lack of
competitiveness, Pakistani exports are being held back. The new push for Pakistan's
industrialization should focus export production to large markets in the US, China and Asia.
7. Similarly, even if official US aid to Pakistan is limited and contingent on this, Pakistan should
make a concerted effort to attract US private investment to explore the vast and untapped economic
opportunities that exist in almost every country. Pakistan will also benefit from innovative
management strategies and production technology as a result of these investments.
8. While Pakistan and the United States' strategic interests are not entirely aligned, there are
enormous opportunities for regional economic collaboration and integration. In the face of global
challenges such as climate change, hunger, and nuclear weapons, the US, China, Russia, and others
have proposed a future of cooperative and knowledge-based development and stability. In the end,
forces such as India will prefer a "win-win" confrontation over a "lost" confrontation.
9. Pakistan cannot afford to ignore the United States, which is the world's most powerful country.
Disappointments can be avoided if we work together on some common interests. Democracy,
people-to-people contact, education, and health are just a few examples. While we must work with
the US to bring peace to Afghanistan, it is not in our best interests for us to become involved in
any new US "game" in the region. The use of Pakistani soil for America's counter-insurgency
strategy after the withdrawal could drag the country into yet another conflict.
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10. We do need a broad-based relationship with the United States, but we should not be drawn into
any new ‘game' on America's behalf. It will be difficult to reestablish our relationship with
America. When it comes to negotiating the terms of the relationship, we need to be very clear
about our goals and priorities. Pakistan must remember that the United States will always prefer
India. The Sino-Pak relationship is based on realistic geostrategic calculations. The emerging
geopolitics are reflected in the growing strategic alliance between the United States and India, as
well as China-Pakistan relations. Pakistan must be cautious in its dealings with China as it seeks
to repair its ties with the United States.
11. However, this does not imply a deterioration in relations with China. With current energy and
efforts, it should continue to happen. Pakistan has nuclear weapons, but it requires Chinese
assistance. Although no problems are likely to arise in this relationship, Islamabad needs to invest
significantly more in understanding the Chinese mindset as well as the relationship's compulsions
and limitations. Terrorism, the security of Chinese personnel working on various projects in
Pakistan, and people-to-people contact are all important considerations for Pakistan. Finally,
Pakistan should never join the US-led anti-China alliance.
5.9 Need for Future Research
Those wishing to contribute to the field of Pakistan's alliance-making behaviour can conduct many
other areas or aspects of this research in the future. For example, a comparison can be made to see
which alliance partner, the United States or China, is better. Similarly, one aspect to consider is
which alliance partner is more reliable, China or the United States, and why. It would be a
significant contribution to the existing knowledge. Finally, we can compare the eras, for example,
a situation similar to 1960s is emerging in Sino-Pakistan relations when India brought the two
countries together, or is global politics, such as the Indo-US strategic partnership, pushing them
closer again than ever before? These findings would be interested.
5.10 Last Word
Pakistan's policy of alliance is based on the perception of a threat. Walt's threat balance theory has
been extremely useful in uncovering these findings. Pakistan's relationship with China was
transactional and focused on short-term objectives, whereas Pakistan's relationship with the US
was transactional and focused on short-term objectives. As a result, while Pakistan's alliance with
China has endured despite certain issues due to a shared cause, Pakistan's alliance with the US has
failed on numerous occasions, including GWOT, due to a divergence of interests.
