CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Democratic struggle is as old as the Nigerian State. The new democratic

experiment in Nigeria, after many years of military rule came into reality on the

29th May 1999, thus, setting the pace for the Fourth Republic. The term

democracy is capable of having many definitions and connotations to different

school of thoughts. However, the definition by Obasanjo and Mabogunje (1992)

which states that the concept of democracy should be examined from two points of

view, that is; as ideology and as politics captures it all. Democracy, as ideology is

the philosophy of governance which sets a high premium on the basic freedom or

fundamental human rights of the citizen, the rule of law, provision of basic

infrastructures, the flow of information and the right of choice between alternative

political positions democracy as politics is concerned with the institution and

processes of governance. These institutions and the procedures of governance that

they elicit tend to foster consensus whilst promoting and sustaining respect for the

ideology of democracy. When viewed as politics, various institutions tend to

collaborate to promote the act of governance, which is facilitated by the provisions

of the existing Constitution of a Country.

In an ideal democracy, there exist the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.

These various arms of government perform complimentary roles, all working

together to promote the rule of law and to ensure that the citizens of a nation enjoy

good governance. The constitution empowers the legislative arm of government to

make laws; it also gives it certain oversight functions over the activities of the

executive arm. Against this background, Godowoli (2001) classifies these

oversight functions as a model of intergovernmental relations, which can be

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described as a body of activities or interactions occurring between the executive

arm of government and the legislative arm. It is a form of systematic check and

balance on the activities of government, which is constitutionally backed up. The

complexity of the nature and patterns of oversight functions arises from the

number of programmes and activities which different levels of government are

engaged in within a specified period. These series of activities call for efficient and

orderly management. Accordingly, the efficient, orderly coordination and

management of activities and programmes brings to light the human dimension of

legislative oversight functions, which is very critical. (Janda et al 2002). The

dimension of legislative oversight function in the fourth Republic brings a lot of

question to mind especially with the amount of valuable resources, in terms of

human material and financial that was committed to this venture whose outcome

has never improved nor strengthened the country’s political process and service

rendered to the masses. This study shall examine the legislative institutions and

oversight functions in the National Assembly within the period of 2011 to 2015. It

evaluates the extent to which these oversight functions were performed and the

impact it has on the programmes of the executive arm of government as well as the

citizenry within the specified period.

1.2 Statement of Problem

The long reign of the military government in Nigeria and its subsequent

intervention in the political affairs of the nation has rubbed off on the political

class and the development of democratic institutions. The performance and

appropriate responsibility of the elected leaders as enshrined in the constitution has

always been hampered by lack of experience and greed on the part of the political

actors.

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The performance of oversight functions by the legislative arm of government in

Nigeria has over the years fallen below expectation. This is as a result of poor

commitment on the part of the leadership of this nation to the provisions of the

nation’s constitution. Corruption, greed and the deteriorating infrastructural

facilities have hampered the performance of government business.

Rather than provide qualitative service for the people, the elected representatives

had always contrived the democratic space, muzzled opposition, overturn electoral

choices and in the end engendered the rule of law and order within the democratic

space.

The executive on its part has always cash on the corruption tendencies on the part

of the legislative arm by attempting to bribe them anytime a crisis occurs or a

discovery is made in the execution of programmes that negates constitutional

provisions.

This study shall attempt to examine some of these problems with a view to

evaluating the performance of legislative oversight functions and how this has

affected the provision of social services to the citizenry during the said period.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad aim of this study is to examine the performance of legislative oversight

functions during the period between 2011 and 2015, with reference to the Nigeria’s

National Assembly and with particular focus on the Appropriation and Health

Committees etc.

The study also has the following objectives:

i. To examine the meaning, model and objectives of legislative oversight

functions in the National Assembly,

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ii. To examine the factors that determine the nature of legislative oversight

functions,

iii. To highlight the goals of legislative oversight functions,

iv. To evaluate the achievements of the legislative arm of government during

the fourth republic in the performance of oversight functions, and

v. To examine the challenges confronting the legislative arm of government

in the performance of legislative oversight functions.

1.4 Research Questions

The following questions will be addressed in the course of this study.

i. What is the nature of the legislative institutions in the Nigeria?

ii. What is the meaning of legislative oversight function and how is it been

carried out?

iii. What are the goals of the legislative oversight functions?

iv. How far has the legislative arm of government gone in the attainment of

these goals?

v. What are the challenges confronting the performance of legislative

oversight function in the Assembly?

vi. How can these challenges be addressed?

1.5 Research Hypothesis

Two hypotheses have been formulated in the course of this study.

Ho: The performance of legislative oversight functions has very significant

impact on the activities of the National assembly during the period within

2011 to 2015.

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Hi: The performance of legislative oversight functions has no significant impact

on the activities of the National assembly during the period within 2011 to

2015.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The belief by the people in a democratic system of government gave rise to the

uproar that ensures the emergence of the forth republic after many years of military

rule. One of the institutions that guarantees adequate participation of the people in

a democratic government is the legislative arm, charged with the responsibility of

making appropriate legislation for the nation and also acting as a watchdog on the

executive. Hence the legislative arm plays a pivotal role in any democratic

dispensation.

This study is significant in the sense that the performance of legislative oversight

functions of the legislative institutions is paramount and cannot be over

emphasized. The strengthening of the laws and legislations are very significant part

of the administration of democratic government, which must not be neglected.

The study is also said to be significant in the sense that it will serve as a useful

avenue for evaluating the legislature during the said period; their impacts,

challenges and prospects. It will also be useful in promoting greater understanding

of the importance of intergovernmental relations and interactions in Nigeria.

The study is also important in the sense that it will serve as a contribution to

knowledge as well as a reference point for future research endeavor with similar

disposition.

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1.7 Scope of the Study

This study will focus extensively on the performance of legislative oversight

functions of the National assembly within the period 2011 to 2015.

1.8 Research Methodology

The research design is intended to specify the methods and procedure of the study

and also state the nature of the study. In the presentation of this research study both

the exploratory and descriptive research designs were used. The justification for

this is that both method deals with determination, evaluation and explanation of

past events essentially for the purpose of gaining a better and clearer understanding

of the present and making a more reliable prediction of the future especially as it

relates to the topic under consideration.

The data used in this research study were mainly from two sources: the primary

source which involves the carrying out of a survey study through the

administration of a questionnaire to a group of selected respondents and the

secondary source which entails extracts from textbooks, literatures, journals and

publications internet. This source constitutes a larger portion of the literature

review. All relevant extractions have been duly acknowledged.

The primary data required for this study was collected through the administration

of a structured questionnaire to a selected group of respondents within and outside

the National Assembly. Specific attention was given to respondents who were

selected from the legislative arm to drive home the issues involved.

Because the population is very large, the researcher decided to select samples from

the population upon which the study was based. Since a good sample must as

nearly as possible reflect representative of the entire population, care was taken to

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ensure that the sample size is large enough to convey a measure of credibility to

the outcome of the study. Care was also taken to ensure that the choice of the

sample is left to chance, so as to reduce the possibility of bias in sampling.

In order to facilitate easy administration and collection of questionnaires, a total

number of 200 questionnaires were administered to respondents, of these 197 were

returned. The sample size for this work is therefore 197. The use of bias sampling

technique was adopted, where respondents who have little or deep knowledge of

the area under study were selectively chosen from the populace.

The responses to the questions raised in the questionnaire were analyzed by using

the chi-square (X2). The objective of the analysis was to establish the extent of

variation between the observed frequency (actual perception of the people on the

legislative institutions and the performance of oversight functions during the said

period) and the expected frequency (statistical expectation regarding respondent’s

perception on the topic). It therefore aims at testing the independence of perception

held by the respondents.

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CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.0 Introduction

This chapter review relevant literature on the same thematic areas in order to

identify areas of convergence and divergence views of renowned authors,

researchers and writers. This chapter also covers conceptual review, empirical

studies and theoretical framework of the topic under study.

The organization of any polity is the task of the government who is the custodian

of the sovereignty of the entire citizenry which collectively and willingly they have

submitted to it in return for peaceful and meaningful co-existence propelled by law

and good government. It is therefore trite to say that the extent to which the

activities or efforts of the components of the state especially human beings are

effectively and efficiently galvanized towards productive activities and in the best

interest of the state and the citizens determines the extent of the “goodness” or

otherwise of its government. It is again not dubitable that a critical instrument for

the organization of the state is law which government relies on day in, day out to

ensure societal equilibrium. Legislation which is a product of institutionalized law-

making process is by far the most important arsenal from which government

derives its laws. The foregoing, therefore, lends credence to the avowed roles and

responsibilities of legislation as a source of law in any society and by implication,

on the Legislature which is wholly and constitutionally responsible for making

these laws. The task of this section therefore is to critical x-ray and review

literatures that have been written in the area of legislative oversight function in

developing and developed countries of the world.

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2.1 The Legislature

Most African countries that re-democratized in the 1980s (Boadi, 1998) and those

that democratized thereafter have had to tackle some evident rots and conflicts left

behind by the military administrations. However, the post-military era challenges

facing the states have been partially blamed on colonial legacies (Osaghae, 1998).

While some of the challenges indeed are both the direct and indirect consequences

of colonialism, the greatest social, political and economic troubles facing most of

the African states today are in most cases self-inflicted. Mismanagement of

national resources, high official corruption, absence of institutional accountability,

authoritarianism, political instability, violence, and inter-tribal strife and wars have

at varying degrees undermined the ability of most of the African states to develop

and progress on the continents. Among the states that have been in this ways

seriously affected is Nigeria. Although Nigeria became independent in 1960, it has

failed to meet the high expectations reposed in it at independence. Indeed, the

Nigerian state appeared to have fallen from the position it once occupied in its

early years of political independence in the 1960s. Some of the countries that

became independent at the same time with Nigeria have today left her far behind in

terms of political maturity and economic advancement, societal cohesion and

national development (Osaghae, 1998, Nnamani, 2003).

Osaghae (1998) identified three major challenges that have been confronting

Nigeria since independence, namely political instability evidenced by high regime

overthrow often prompted by constant military coups; low level of national

cohesion manifesting in the form of incessant inter-ethnic struggles, religious

violence and adversarial politics, which are induced by the polarization and

division among the various ethnic and religious groups; and economic crisis

evidenced by huge debt burden lasting up till 2005, poor living condition of

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majority of the citizenry and lopsided and skewed distribution of national wealth

resulting in inequality and wide gap between the rich few and the wretched

masses.

Most writers on Nigerian politics have attributed the regressive economic

condition, absence of national unity and the political volatility in the country to

the prolonged military rule (Ajayi, 2011). The democratic rule, no doubt, died at

infancy in 1965, 1983 and 1993. In the three republics of Nigeria, democracy did

not last for over six years. Consequently, the restoration of democracy in 1999

was seen as a welcome development, although there were skeptics who did not

believe that the new democracy could survive due to the predatory instinct of the

Nigerian military class. Nevertheless, the return of representative democracy was

expected to mark a departure from the authoritarian-styled policy-making process

that characterized the earlier, successive military regimes – regimes that did not

only undermine institutional accountability but also robbed the political system of

the checks and balance as well as participatory politics fundamental to system

efficiency and good governance.

With the restoration of democracy and the attendant adoption of a presidential

arrangement in 1999, the executive and legislative organs were made separate and

functionally distinct, unlike during the military administrations. While the

executive organ continued to exist under successive military regimes and law and

policy-making role and policy implementation were solely borne by the executive,

the creation of a presidential arrangement under the fourth republic meant that the

legislature would have to take up some of the responsibilities that the executive

organ had exclusively performed previously.

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Being the representatives of the various constituents, the members of the National

Assembly, comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives, have the

mandate to debate and reflect the concerns, opinions and interests of the

constituents in government policy decisions. The legislature was expected to

reverse the decline in the economy, stabilize the polity and integrate the society,

generally. It was expected to take actions and initiate necessary reforms with a

view to transforming the state, and changing its poor national picture, as Osaghae

(1998) painted. Nigerians under the new democratic dispensation should be proud

of their beloved country.

Structure and Function of Legislative Institution

The roles the legislature performs in a democracy and the extent to which the roles

are performed vary with the system of government in place, as well as they differ

from one country to another. Essentially, the legislative institution provides for the

citizenry the platform for participatory political process. However, the

participation afforded by the legislative institution is the indirect type, as it will be

practically impossible for the electorate to gather in one place for policy decisions,

implementation and governance. Fashagba (2011) noted:

The presence of legislative institution in any

modern polity suggests the indirect participation of

the electorates in the making of decisions on issues

that affect their daily lives. Not only is the

presence of a legislature salient to the

acceptability of democratic regime, but also the

extent to which the legislature demonstrates

capability to freely express itself and asserts its

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power determine how democratic the government

is.

Government in a democratic system implies the rule of the majority. Apparently,

the legislature is one democratic institution that allows the various constituencies

to which a state is delineated elect their representatives. When elected, the

representatives are expected to represent the views, concerns and interests of their

constituents in the legislature. In fact, central to representative democracy is the

notion that elected representatives of the people constitute the legislative arm of

government (Kousoulos, 1982). Indeed, representation of citizens in parliament is

at the core of liberal democracy.

The legislature, hence, is saddled with enormous roles in any democratic system.

This is even especially so where the institution enjoy a huge measure of autonomy

in determining their internal operations, where there is constitutional provisions

for operational and institutional independence. According to Fish and Kroenig

(2009), the study of modern government and politics involving contemporary

nation-states is impossible without an appreciation of the role of the legislature.

Fashagba (2009) also affirmed that in modern democracies the roles of

representation, law-making and oversight of administration are often ascribed to

the legislature. In his view, Alabi (2010) established the power to make laws as

distinctively resided with modern parliaments. It is however important to point out

that while legislatures are often vested with the law-making role, some legislatures

contribute effectively in initiating bills and raising policy issues for the House to

deliberate upon but others simply debate whatever proposals the executive present

to it. Of course, the former in addition to initiating bills deliberate on policy

proposals and bills emanating from the executive.

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Oversight function is also a very important role of the modern legislature.

Oversight function particularly appears to preoccupy modern legislatures.

According to Verney (1969), the watchdog function is perhaps more important for

a legislative assembly than that of law-making (p. 167). The legislature provides

the institutional mechanism for ensuring accountability and good governance.

Stapenhurst also noted that ‘In most countries, the legislature is constitutionally

mandated as the institution through which governments are held accountable to

the electorate’. The role of oversight of executive administration thus specifically

entails: scrutinizing and authorizing revenues and expenditures of the government

and ensuring that the national budget is properly implemented. The constitutional

power to participate in budgetary appropriation gives the legislature needed

political influence to shape governance, and possibly carry out reforms that are

sustainable. In this regard, Saffell (1989) asserted that ‘no function of the congress

is more jealously guarded or more basic to administrative control than the power

of the purse’ (p. 69). In the same vein, Posner and Park (2007) affirmed

‘Legislatures in some countries have gained a role in approving macro fiscal

frameworks’. The Nigerian legislature belongs to the class of legislative

assemblies vested with preponderance of power over fiscal matters, perhaps.

The modern legislature equally performs representational function. Principally,

the people’s representatives for the singular fact that they are elected by the

people, especially under a democratic regime, hold the mandate of their

constituencies within the polity (Davies, 2004). Sodaro put it thus: ‘the essence of

representative democracy lies in the delegation of governmental power and

responsibility to a small number of people by the citizenry as a whole’ (2007, p.

179). Consequently, the elected members of the legislature are expected to pursue

good public policies for national development; this is most characteristic of

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electorates in the developed democracies of the world. In the emerging

democracies some variation may be seen, in terms of what the representational

roles of the legislators specifically are. Beyond public policy goals, patronage

opportunities for members of the constituencies are expected, by electorates in

emerging democracies, from their elected representatives in the legislature. This

other electorates are so predisposed as the result of their high level of

impoverishment and their neglect especially under the prolonged military rule.

It is noteworthy that the modern legislature serves as an agent of reform in the

state (Reed & Scheimer, 2003). In a state where some members of parliament are

ideologically inclined the desire to implement their reform agenda will greatly

influence their behaviors in the assembly. There is the instance of Japan in 2003

when some members of the ruling party switched parties to form a new party: the

party defectors sought to push for their reform agenda which they could not

achieve in their former part. Moreover, Nelson Polsby (cited in Ornstein, 1992)

observed that the legislature may be broadly categorized into area and

transformative legislatures (cited in Orstein, 1992). As area legislature, the

assembly serves as forum for discussion of ideas and policies and it provides a

formal platform for deliberation among significant political forces in the life of a

political system. Conversely, the transformative legislature actively translates

ideas into laws. The transformative legislature enjoys a huge measure of

institutional autonomy to act on bills or policy proposals emanating either within

the assembly itself or from the executive arm of the government. They mold and

transform bills and proposals into laws, irrespective of the source.

Nevertheless, a legislature can be transformative in function, a reformer in

character, but such behavior is cautiously exhibited. According to Saffell (1989, p.

66), a common strategy is for congressmen to be conservative, clinging to past

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positions, while cautiously reaching for new positions on a few issues. This

suggests that a legislature may sometimes find it very difficult to openly and

passionately champion the necessity for a drastic reform, unless the action will

improve the political fortune of the members pushing for the reform. Discarding

old ideas for new ones thus means that not only has the society bought into the

reform proposals but also the expected benefits of electoral rewards for the

proponents far outweigh the cost. When this is the case, very many legislators

willingly pursue reform agenda in the legislature. However, where the political

cost is seen to outweigh the benefit, personal interest of the legislators will dictate

that they tread with caution, as far as reform agenda are concerned. This perhaps

explains why reform agenda have been difficult to push through in the Nigerian

legislature in the current fourth republic. Notwithstanding, some legislators have

attempted to push for one reform or the other (Lewis, 2009).

Power of the Legislature under the 1999 Constitution

The extent to which the legislature of any state can shape governance and public

policy as well as initiate reforms and push them to successful end is a function of

the level of power given to it by the constitution on one hand and the extent to

which the executive defer to it, on the other hand. Unlike the executive arm which

most often wields a preponderant of discretionary power, in addition to its explicit

constitutional power (Fashagba 2009), the legislature is strictly guided by the

provisions of the constitution that established it. Indeed, for most part of the 1980s

and 90s, precisely a period spanning fifteen years and five months between

January 1984 and May 28, 1999, the Nigerian military was in power, ruling

through decrees and by administrative fiat (Akintayo, 1999). The military

however transferred power to a civilian government under a new constitution in

May, 1999. The 1999 Nigerian constitution which was amended in 2010 is

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currently undergoing another amendment process. The constitution was based on

the presidential system. This translates into the separation of governmental

powers, institutions and personnel under three distinct arms. In other words, the

executive, legislature and judiciary were created as separate institutions, with each

institution manned by distinct personnel. Consequently, each arm of the Nigerian

government draws its power from the 1999 constitution (amended in 2010). In this

study, the interest is particularly on the power vested in the legislature.

The Nigerian central legislature, known as the National Assembly, enjoys a broad

range of power under the 1999 constitution. This is perhaps so not only to rid the

state of its immediate authoritarian past, but also to enable it initiates, molds and

shapes policy on the democratic platform of the fourth republic. Section 4, sub-

section 1 vests the power to make law for the nation in the National Assembly

comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives. In sub-section 2 of

section 4, the constitution provides that:

The National Assembly shall have power to make

laws for the peace, order and good governance of

the federation or any part thereof with respect to

any matter included in the exclusive legislative list

spelt out in part 1 of the second schedule to this

constitution.

In addition to having the exclusive power to make laws on items in the exclusive

list, the National Assembly is equally vested with power to make laws with

respect to any matters in the concurrent list. This is provided for in the sub-section

4a of section 4. This means that the central legislature shares the power to make

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laws with the states (constituent units of the federation) on matters captured in the

concurrent list.

In a similar vein, the National Assembly is vested with a unique power that makes

it the only institution of the democratic government that can openly and legally

amend the constitution of Nigeria. This is captured in section 9 of the 1999

constitution. However, the amendment of any section of the constitution by the

National Assembly must be supported by the resolutions of not less than two-

thirds majority of all the members of the central legislature and approved by

resolution of the houses of assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the states.

There are thirty-six states in the Nigerian federation among which twenty are

required to support any proposed amendment to any part of the constitution before

such amendment can become valid.

Furthermore, in section 80 of the 1999 constitution, the legislature is vested with

the power to authorize expenditure from consolidated revenue fund of the

federation. The sub-section 3 of the section gives the power to authorize

withdrawal from public funds of the federation to the National Assembly. Also, it

is also part of the power of the legislature to prescribe the manner of withdrawal

of money from the public funds of the federation. The section of the constitution

gives the power to authorize spending and raising funds to the legislature. This

power of the purse importantly allows the legislature immense influence in

shaping government policies, certainly (Saffell, 1989; Verney, 1969). The power

to debate, deliberate, mold and/or amend the annual budgetary appropriation

proposal presented by the executive president is hence the opportunity to shape

the state policies and influence governance. In this manner, the central legislature

ultimately collaborates with the executive to meet the aspirations of the governed.

This legislature’s role in budgetary appropriation proposal, therefore, in a state

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where lack of institutional accountability and participatory policy-making under

successive military regimes bred mismanagement of national resources and

dysfunctional public policy, is of an uttermost imperative. With the legislature-

executive collaboration on budgetary appropriation under the democratic

Nigeria’s fourth republic the economic crisis and erosion of national cohesion

under the juntas should be reversed. There is yet the power to impose tax or duty

vested in the National Assembly, stipulated in section 163 of the 1999

constitution.

And the legislature is given power to intervene in the judicial administration. For

instance, the power to indicate cases in which appeals may be right, cases arising

from judgments in the court of appeal to be referred to the Supreme Court, is

vested in the National Assembly by the provisions of section 233 and sub-section

21. The legislature is also given the power to override executive veto on any bill.

Where the legislature decides to make a bill it has passed have the full force of

law, it can decide to use its two-thirds majority power to pass the bill into law.

Consequently, the bill so passed by the two-thirds members of the National

Assembly will no longer require presidential assent to become a law.

Considering the enormous constitutional powers vested in the central legislature,

in addition to the fact that it has absolute power to determine its internal

operations (stipulated in section 101 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution), as well as

constitute a distinct and independent body, the legislature of the fourth republic is

maximally equipped, politically and constitutionally, to shape and influence

government policies, and serve as springboard for new ideas and policy reforms.

The extent to which the legislature is able to use these powers, the level at which

it is able to come up with policy initiatives, and the degree to which it is

responsive to public opinions, society's developmental challenges and aspirations

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will determine its impact level on re-engineering the nation, socially,

economically and politically.

2.1.1 The Committee System

Each Branch of the National Assembly meets in plenary session or through one of

its committees. It would be unimaginable to conceive a situation where all the

legislative proposals, report form oversights etc. of the National Assembly are

considered in plenary session. The size of the Assembly of which a good

proportion would want to participate in any discussion before the House would

render this impracticable. As a result, the Assembly has been characterized by a

stable system of committees with fixed functions and jurisdiction. Michael (1979)

Each House may appoint a committee of its members for such special or general

purpose as in its opinion would be better regulated and managed by means of such

a committee, and may by resolution, regulation or otherwise, delegate any

functions exercisable by it to any such committee. However, neither House is

empowered to delegate to a committee, its power to decide whether a Bill shall be

passed into law or its power to pass a resolution on any matter. (Section 62 of the

1999 Constitution) The National Assembly has several different kinds of

committees, which can be grouped into four. These are the Committee of the whole

House, the Standing Committees, the Special Committees and the select

Committees. (By Virtue of the 1999 Constitution)

Committee of the whole House

The Committee of the whole House as its name suggests, is the whole Senate or

House of Representatives sitting as a committee. This usually happens after a Bill

has been read the second time when it shall stand committed to the whole House

unless the House decides to commit it to a standing or select Committee. In such a

situation, the President or Deputy President of the Senate or the Speaker or Deputy

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Speaker, as the case may be, vacates the chair. However, he continues as the

Chairman of the Committee of the whole House.

Standing Committees

These are sometimes called ‘General Purpose Committees’ and are appointed at

the beginning of the life of each legislature. Under the 1979 Constitution, there

were twenty-seven of these in the House of Representatives and twenty-two in the

Senate. Each Standing Committee in the House of Representatives and the Senate

at that time had twenty-five and eleven members respectively.

Special Committees

These are sometimes called “Special Purposes Committees” and are appointed at

the beginning of each legislative session, though any other special committee may

be appointed by either House and assigned such duties as the need may arise. The

most important of the Special Committees is the Committee of Selection,

appointed at the beginning of every session. Under the 1979 Constitution, in the

Senate, it consisted of the President, the Deputy President and four other senators

while in the House of Representatives, it was made up of the Speaker, Deputy

Speaker and nominees of political parties in accordance with their numerical

strength in the House. Its functions include nominating members to serve on ad

hoc special committees and on parliamentary delegations.

Select Committees and Examples of Committees

The Senate or the House of Representative may appoint a Select Committee of ten

or fifteen members respectively to consider any matter that may be referred to it.

The nomination in each case is by the Committee of Selection after a notice has

been given on a motion made and a question put.

2.1.3 The Oversight Functions

The oversight function of the legislature in Nigeria finds legislative importance in

Section 88, Sub-sections 1(a)- (b) and 2(a)-(b) of the 1999 Constitution of the

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Federal Republic of Nigeria which provides that “each House of the National

Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its journal or in the Official

Gazette of the Government of the Federation to direct or cause to be directed an

investigation into (a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to

make laws; and (b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or

government department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or

responsibility for (i) executing or administering laws enacted by the National

Assembly, and (ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be

appropriated by the National Assembly”. Sub-section 2(a)-(b) stipulates that “the

powers conferred on the National Assembly under the provisions of the section are

exercisable only for the purpose of enabling it to (a) make laws with respect to any

matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws;

and (b) expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration

of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration

of funds appropriated by it”. Besides, Section 89 of the 1999 Constitution

empowers the legislature to procure evidence, summon persons to give evidence

and require such evidence to be given on oath through examination of witnesses.

The National Assembly has the power to summon persons to procure additional

document or oral evidence and (where necessary) issue a warrant to compel

attendance by any person so required, on the pain of punishment if they fail to

attend. The legislature has the constitutional responsibility to supervise and

regulate the activities of the executive arm of government of the federation to

eschew waste and ensure fiscal discipline, observance of the rule of law and strict

compliance in implementing laws as passed by the legislature, and execution of

development programmes and policies. If the National Assembly loses faith in an

agency, the Congress can respond in a number of ways to put things in their proper

perspectives. For example, Congress can pass a law to overrule agency decisions,

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and/or to narrow the agency’s jurisdiction. It can use its appropriations power to

restrict the agency’s funding. It can also narrow the agency’s regulatory authority.

Ezeani (2010) noted that in spite of the importance of legislative oversight in

contemporary democratic governance, it has been controversial in all ramifications

in the political scene, and has remained the major source of executive and

legislative conflict in Nigeria. A former Attorney-General of the Federation and

Minister of Justice, Honourable Justice Oluwadare Aguda had once argued that

oversight functions as was carried out by the legislature was often unconstitutional

and violates the principle of separation of powers which is basic to democratic

government. He observed that “the legislature in Nigeria is systematically usurping

the functions of both the executive and the judiciary”, warning that “this could

hamper political stability and socio-economic development”

Therefore, the central thesis of the criticisms of legislative oversight is its integrity

which has been subjected to questions by critics who contend that oversight has

become a political tool for the harassment and blackmail of members of the

executive branch and perceived political enemies or rivals. It is argued that this

scenario gave credence to former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s stance on

different occasions on oversight functions, whereby it is alleged that he directed

some of his Ministers to ignore National Assembly summons because he

considered such political aberrations as undue interference, illegal acts and

ungodly avenues for corruption and extortions of resources from the Ministers.

Notwithstanding, the legislature with its robust legal instruments, is the symbolic

arm of government that determines the effectiveness or otherwise of democratic

governance. The power of legislative oversight is not without limitations as was

rightly captured by Chief Justice Warren as he succinctly observed that:

22

The power of congress to conduct investigation is

inherent in the legislative process. The power is

broad; it encompasses inquiries concerning the

administration of existing laws as well as proposed

or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of

defect in our social, economic or political system

for the purpose of enabling congress to remedy

them. It comprehends probes into department of

the Federal Government to expose corruption,

inefficiency and waste. But broad as this power of

inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general

authority to expose the private affairs of

individuals without justification in terms of the

functions of the congress nor is the congress a law

enforcement or trial agency. There are functions of

the executive and judicial departments of

government. No enquiry is an end in itself; it must

be related to, and in furtherance of the legislative

task of the congress. Investigation conducted

solely for the personal aggrandizement of the

investigators or to “punish” those investigated is

indefensible. Warren (2012)

It is expressly explicit from the above jurist’s assertion that the primary objective

of legislative power is, generally speaking, to lie down, be they decision rules or

conduct rules and to carry out oversight and investigative function. It must be

recognized that the legislative’s power to investigate is not absolute as it has some

23

legal impediments. This was made known by the court in Tony Momoh Vs. Senate

of the National Assembly (1982) NCLR 105. In that case, the Court of Appeal

clearly held that section 82 of the 1979 Constitution (akin to section 88 of the 1999

Constitution) is not designed to enable the legislature usurp the general

investigating functions of the executive nor the adjudicative functions of the

judiciary. Any invitations by the legislature to any person outside the purpose

defined in section 82(2) that is now 88(2) of the 1999 Constitution is invalid. The

prosecution of the persons guilty of corrupt practices or gross inadequacies or

misconduct in the discharge of the public office is left to the executive. This only

reinstates the doctrine of separation of power between the various arms of

government. Invariably, the oversight functions of the legislature end up with

identifying corruption, misconduct of public officers, resource waste or

inefficiency in service, review of government actions and activities for good

governance, etc. and findings thereof are referred to the appropriate arm of

government for further necessary actions in order to address the issues raised

therein inappropriate and acceptable procedures.

The Meaning Objective and Function of Legislative Oversight Function

According to Ndoma-Egba (2012), legislative oversight refers to the power of the

legislature to review, monitor and supervise government agencies, programmes,

activities and policy implementation strategies of the executive arm of government.

This is to ensure that the arm sustains the principles of good governance, remains

responsive, transparent and accountable to the electorates. The committee structure

of the National Assembly (House of Representatives and Senate) is being used to

execute oversight functions through supervision, watchfulness, or curtail excesses,

review of executive actions and activities. Oversight functions ensure that activities

of the executive arm of government and its agencies are kept under constant

surveillance and scrutiny by the legislature. A leading role for the legislature has

24

always been adjudged an essential defense against executive tyranny. The

legislature monitors, raises queries and (where necessary) censors executive

activities, activities of government agencies (such as ministries, departments,

parastatals, etc.) to ensure good governance and accountability (Onuoha, 2009).

John Locke (quoted in Johari, 1989) noted that it may be too great a temptation to

human frailty, apt to grasp at power for the same persons who have the power of

making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they

may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make. When the

legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body

of magistrates, there can be no liberty because apprehension may arise, lest the

same monarch or Senate should enact tyrannical laws, and execute them in a

tyrannical manner (Johari, 1989:280). Heywood (1997:318) observed that the

legislative and representative roles of assemblies have declined in significance;

greater emphasis has been placed on the ability of assemblies to constrain or check

executive power. Assemblies have increasingly become scrutinizing bodies, the

principal role of which is to deliver responsible or accountable government. He

noted that assemblies are not always effective in calling executives to account. For

example, in the National People’s Congress in China, control by a monopolistic

party, party loyalty has turned the assembly into a mere propaganda weapon, with

government policy nearly always being approved by unanimous votes. This means

that party discipline also constrains parliamentary scrutiny of the executive. In

essence, the principal function of the assembly in this context is to uphold and

support government actions and activities as majority of the members of

parliament belong to the governing party. The ruling political party ideology and

interest override national interest to retain, sustain and consolidate political power.

The legislative oversight, a critical aspect of the functions of the legislature other

than law making, have been severally compromised and often misused to serve

25

personal interest. These lapses have given rise to query why the legislative

oversight, a robust mechanism institutionalized to checkmate the excesses of the

executive arm of government and its agencies to curb waste in governance,

corruption, absolutism in the exercise of political power, has been compromised.

The end of absolute executive power is affirmed by giving to the legislature, and to

it alone, the right or power to make laws. In this context, arbitrary government is

replaced by a formal procedure for law making. Therefore, if the painstaking

process for passing bills into law is eloquent signal to demonstrate the degree of

importance attached to government by rules rather than individual arbitrariness,

why do law makers compromise the very ingredient for checks and balances in

governance? Thus the criticism as to the relevance of legislative oversight in

democracy, the primary objective of this article is to investigate the activities of the

legislature on its legislative oversight functions and the effectiveness of this organ

in ensuring accountability, responsiveness and sustainability of good governance in

Nigeria polity.

Challenges of Law-Making and Lawmakers Oversight Function in Nigeria

The foregoing analysis of the score card of the legislature in Nigeria shows that a

lot needs to be done by the legislature to ensure or promote good governance in

Nigeria and a considerable difference can be done through oversights. The law-

making process is beset with a legion of challenges that need to be addressed

squarely for the legislature to be truly independent of the executive in conducting

oversights and achieve the much-needed succor for Nigerians through legislation.

The challenges include the following:

Lack of Established Democratic Culture

The Nigeria’s fledgling democracy is at its infancy, Eine, O.I, (op.cit at 2008). The

debilitating effect of prolonged military rule in Nigeria has produced negative

consequences that continue to haunt individuals and institutions in Nigeria. The

26

legislature is not an exception. The legislature today is truly not independent of the

Executive and therefore, is often incapacitated from acting as the watchdog of

executive activities. Annan, K (2005) Thus, the inordinate ambition of members

and leadership of the legislative houses often sees them hob-nobbing with the

executive such that valuable time for law-making is lost in the process of lobbying

for juicy leadership positions and committees in the legislative houses.

Corruption And Nepotism

Corruption and nepotism have been the bane of public life in Nigeria. It is often

rumored that bills hardly sail through the legislature until members have had their

hands greased. Oyewo .O, (2007) The implication of this, therefore, is that debates

on such bills either at the plenary or committee levels cannot be subjected to

thorough scrutiny in the best interest of Nigerians who are the objects of such bills

eventually when they become laws. It is indeed not too gratifying that such

primordial and mundane issues have roles to play in passage of bills into law.

Personal Interests and Ambition of the Legislators

It is common knowledge that a good number of members of the legislative houses

at both federal and state levels pursue pure selfish interests that often inhibit them

from combating the challenges of law-making. Members pursue contracts from the

leadership of the houses and even from the executive such that they easily

compromise when it comes to contributing meaningfully to debates on the floor of

the house. At times, some members resort to absenteeism from the floor of the

house and do not participate at all in the proceedings. Again, many of the

legislators have ambitions to contest for leadership positions in the house or

membership and chairman of juicy committees. A lot of valuable legislative time is

wasted while pursuing these ambitions.

Interference With Legislative Oversight Functions By The Executive

27

The legislature is given a lot of powers in the constitution to perform oversight

functions and act as the watchdog of the executive. (See for example, Section 88 of

the Constitution) Again, the legislature must screen and approve certain appointees

of the executive. (See Sections 147, 154(1), 171(4), 231, 238 and 250 of the 1999

Constitution). The legislature is further empowered to even remove the President,

Vice President, Governor and the Deputy Governor through impeachment

procedure provided for in the constitution. (See Sections 148 and 188 of the

constitution). It is however disheartening to say that the exercise of the above

function to ensure good governance for the benefit of all and sundry is often

interfered with and hampered by the executive. This is done, first and foremost, by

the executive ensuring that their cronies are elected as the leaders of those houses

through excessive politicking orchestrated and funded by the executive. Again,

where the legislature musters enough courage and ventures to carry out any of the

oversight functions, the executive often resorts to the use of money to pursue a

“divide and rule” agenda to break the rank and file of the legislators. The effect of

the game is that good governance is denied to Nigerians who are entitled to have

same.

Benefit of Legislative Oversight to the Nigerian Democratic System

The principle of separation of power is the major ingredient of democracy

which guarantees that the executive arm of government does not control the

affairs of the legislature nor the judiciary. The doctrine of the separation of

powers implies that there should be three separate organs of government with

their separate sets of functions and powers. The presidential system of

government being practiced in Nigeria makes provision for separation of

powers, apportioning disparate powers and duties to the executive, legislative

and judicial arms of government. Essentially, the legislature as a symbol of true

democracy makes laws which the executive is under obligation to implement.

28

The judiciary is legally called upon in the determination of civil rights and

obligations to interpret the laws. This system of government understands from

the onset that powers may be abused and therefore introduced a system that

guarantees checks and balances amongst the three arms of government.

Therefore, through the power of interpretation, the courts can declare laws

made by the legislature unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect

whatsoever. On the other hand, the legislature has the power of oversight over

the execution and administration of laws by the executive. The executive holds

the powers of investigation, coercion and implementation of laws and can as

well use these powers to call the legislature and judiciary to order (Onyekpere,

2012).

In other words, it implies that the three organs of government should be kept

apart from each other in the interest of individual liberty and it is a perfect

system created for the overall benefit of the citizens. The functions of the

government should be differentiated and performed by different organs

consisting of different bodies of persons so that each department be limited to

its respective sphere of activity and not be able to encroach upon the

independence and jurisdiction of another (Johari, 1989:280). The principal

function of the executive is to execute laws, orders, rules, regulations, decrees,

prevention of the breaches of law, rendering a host of social welfare services

and meting punishment to the delinquents so as to maintain peace and good

government. On the other hand, in spite of its primary function of legislating

laws, amending or repealing existing laws, the legislature serves a number of

overlapping objectives and purposes to improve the efficiency, economy, and

effectiveness of governmental operations; evaluate programmes and

performance; detect and prevent poor administration, waste, abuse, arbitrary

and capricious behaviour, or illegal and unconstitutional conduct; protect civil

29

liberties and constitutional rights; inform the general public and ensure that

executive policies reflect the public interest; gather information to develop new

legislative proposals or to amend existing statutes; ensure administrative

compliance with legislative intent; and prevent executive encroachment on

legislative authority and prerogatives encapsulates in oversight functions

(http://en.wikipedia.org.wiki/Congressional_oversight). It also executes the

functions of oversight over the actions or inactions and other activities of the

executive and its agencies.

Legislative oversight encourages checks and balances; it enthrones fiscal

discipline, good governance, accountability and transparency in public offices.

It promotes accountability in government through enforcing efficiency and cost

effectiveness in course of generating people-centred policies and programmes

necessary to address the numerous challenges confronting governments at all

levels. Congressional oversight takes place when the National Assembly (the

Senate and the House of Representatives) continually review the effectiveness

of the executive arm in carrying out the congressional mandates through

supervision, watchfulness, or review of executive actions and activities. This

helps the National Assembly to establish issues and address problem areas in

order to make the necessary improvements or changes to create an effective

process. This legislative process brings to the knowledge of the public what the

executive branch is doing, and it affords the electorates the opportunity to see

what public office holders are actually doing, whether they are really serving

their collective interest or not. Most often, the public is not aware of what the

government is actually doing. This gives credence to Woodrow Wilson’s (1885)

classic study of the legislative branch as he observed that:

The informing function of Congress should be

preferred even to its legislative function. Unless

30

Congress have and use every means of acquainting

itself with the acts and dispositions of the

administrative agents of the government, the

country must be helpless to learn of how it is being

served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these

things and sift them by every form of discussion, the

country must remain in embarrassing, crippling

ignorance of the very affairs which it is most

important it should understand and direct. Wilson

(1885)

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Various theories abound that could be adopted as framework upon which the

literature could be built, these theories range from; Structural Functionalism,

Systems theory and theory of checks and balance. All three theories will be

discussed subsequently but for the purpose of this study we will adopt the theory of

checks and balance.

System Theory and Structural Functionalism Theory

Although structural functionalism finds its roots much earlier than systems theory,

as researchers use it today, it is based on systems theory. Structural functionalism

traces its beginnings back to the ancient Greeks and the writings of Aristotle

(Susser, 1992). Systems theory emerged much later. Although the discussion of

systems began with biologists in the l9th century systems theory was not fully

articulated until the 1920s. Ludwig von Bertalanry (1956, 1962), who developed

general systems theory was a principal in establishing it as a field of study.

Although systems theory originated later than functionalism, when researchers

study functions within their structures – such as is the case in committees in the

legislature functioning as organs in a system – they do it within the scope of

31

systems. The study of political systems came into its own with the adoption of a

structural-Functional approach.

The systems approach of David Easton (1965a, l965b) and Karl W. Deutsch (1963)

grew out of sociological and communication theory and a move toward the theory

and data of politics (Almond & Powell, 1966). Easton and Deutsch followed a

communication, or cybernetic, model to study politics. Gabriel A. Almond's study

of political systems grew out of a tradition of political theory and draws from

sociological and communications theories. While Easton and Deutsch adopted a

purely systems approach, Almond applied structural functionalism to systems

theory. Both have value in the study of political systems.

Systems Theory

A system, according to Anatol Rapoport (1966, 1968), is a set of interrelated

entities connected by behavior and history. Specifically, he stated that a system

must satisfy the following criteria:

1. One can specify a set of identifiable elements – committees.

2. Among at least some of the elements, one can specify identifiable relations –

committees and the body of legislature.

3. Certain relations imply others.

4. A certain complex of relations at a given time implies a certain complex (or one

of several possible complexes) at a later time. (Rapoport, 1966)

This definition is broad enough to include systems as different as the solar system

and language. Social systems, including economics and politics or in this case the

various committees and the body of legislature and their constituents, fit within the

definition. Social systems might be described as a class of entities (individuals,

families, institutions) with relations among them (communication channels,

influence, obligations). Systems are classified by the "nature of their relation to

their environments" and the search for laws governing the behavior of each class

32

(Rapoport, 1968). Systems appear to have "a will" of their own and a 'purpose" to

maintain a steady state. Living systems do this through homeostasis mechanisms

that restore equilibrium. Social systems have similar mechanisms (Rapopo 1968).

While systems in the physical sciences (like the solar system, chemical reactions,

and ecological systems) are extremely rigorous, social systems are less precise. In

social systems, the elements and relations are vague and hard to define. As the

basic unit of social systems, roles are commonly difficult to identify and classify.

For the "hard" sciences, this ambiguity would be regarded as problematic, but with

the social sciences, it would be commonplace (Rapopo 1966).

The Political System

A long-standing problem of political science has been to describe and account for

the internal structure of the political system. According to William Mitchell

(1968), structure is generally applied to patterns of power and authority that

characterize the relationships between the rulers and the ruled. These relationships

are enduring and thus predictable. In systems theory the unit of analysis for these

power relations is regarded as a concept developed in social psychology and

applied to sociology. Political roles deal with decision making on behalf of society

and with performing actions that implement the decisions and allocate scarce

resources. In analyzing the political system, the researcher typically describes these

roles and the people performing them. Traditionally, the main approach to

classification has been "the distribution of power" or more practically the

supervision of members of legislatures on resources already allocated – in the form

of oversight – (Mitchell, 1968) among the members of the system. Because the one

dimension of roles has inadequately described political systems, systems analysts

have developed more inclusive variables that lend themselves better to

measurement (Mitchell, 1968). Talcott Parsons (1951) put forth a set of variables

33

that he called pattern-variables. Gabriel Almond (1956; Almond & Coleman,

1960) suggested classifying structures based on;

(a) The degree of differentiation between structures,

(b) The extent to which the system is "manifest" or "visible,"

(c) The stability of the functions of the various roles, and

(d) The distribution of power. Mitchell (1968) added a fifth dimension, concerning

the "sustainability of roles."

Applying Systems Analysis

Easton (1966) proposed to define political systems more broadly than did

Rapoport. Easton defined a system as "any set of variables regardless of the

degree, of interrelationship among them". He preferred this definition because it

freed the researcher from the need to prove that a political system is really a

system. The only question of importance became whether the system was

interesting and thus worth studying. The analysis need only provide understanding

and an explanation of the human behavior that was of concern to the researcher.

Easton (1953, 1966) suggested that a political system was distinct from other

systems because it concerned itself with "the interactions through which values are

authoritatively allocated for a society" (1966). He divided the political

environment into two parts: the intra-societal and the extra-societal. The first

comprises those systems in the same society as the political system that are not

political systems because they do not have political interactions. Intra-societal

systems form the segments of society of which the political system is a component,

including the economy, culture, social structure, and personalities. These systems

create and shape the conditions in which the political system operates. A changing

economy culture or social structures all have impact on political life. The extra-

societal environment includes all the systems that are outside the given society.

They may form a supra-system of which the political system may be a part.

34

Structural Functionalism

The terms functional analyses and structural analyses have been applied to a great

variety of approaches (Cancian, 1968; Merton, 1968). With their broad use in the

social sciences has come discussion of the appropriateness of the use of structure

and function and the type of analysis associated with the concepts (Levy, 1968).

The functional approach is used more often than any other method in the study of

Western political science (Sussec 1992). Although structural functionalism

predated systems theory it still presupposes a "systems" view of the political world.

Similarities link functionalism to systems analysis. Susser (1992) writes that both

focuses on input—output analysis, both see political systems as striving for

homeostasis or equilibrium, and both consider feedback in their analysis. Yet

functionalism is significantly different.

Applying Functional Analysis to the Study of Politics

According to Michael G. Smith (1966), four approaches are useful in the

comparative study of political systems: process, content, function, and form.

Studies based on process and content face huge obstacles. In developed countries,

the processes of government are "elaborately differentiated, discrete and easy to

identify," but in simpler societies, the same processes are rarely differentiated and

discrete". They occur within the context of institutional activities that are difficult

to analyze for political processes. The more "differentiated and complex" the

government processes, the "greater the range and complexity" of content. Since

content and process are "interdependent and derivative," they require independent

criteria for studying government. The functional approach does not have the same

limitations as process and content, It defines government as all those activities that

influence "the way in which authoritative decisions are formulated and executed

for a society" (Easton, 1957). From this definition, various schemata were

developed to study the functions of government. Easton listed five modes of action

35

as elements of all political systems: legislation, administration, adjudication, the

development of demands, and the development of support and solidarity. These

were grouped as input and output requirements of political systems.

An Example of the Structural Functional Approach and systems Theory

Structural functionalism analysis consists of nothing more than stating empirical

questions in one of the following forms or some combination of them:

(a) What observable uniformities (or patterns) exist in the phenomenon under

study?

(b) What conditions result because of the phenomenon?

(c) What processes occur as a result of the conditions?

The first question asks: What structures are involved? The second:

What functions have resulted because of the structures? Asked in the opposite

direction, different results could occur: What functions exist? What structures

result from the functions? Another problem, according to Levy (1968), is that the

general concept of structure has many different referents, in both the biological and

the social sciences. Joseph Woodger (1948) in biology and Merton (t968) in the

social sciences have pointed to the abundance of referents given to the term

functionalism. This has led to a lot of confusion. Much of the literature is

preoccupied with function, whereas structure has been discussed less, Function

may be defined as any condition or state of affairs resulting from an operation of a

unit of the type under consideration in terms of structure. In the biological sense,

the unit is an organism or subsystem of an organism. In the social sciences, the

unit is usually a set of one or more persons (actors). Structure may be defined as

pattern of observable uniformity in terms of the action or operation taking place. In

the social sciences, the focus of analysis has been on the Criticisms of Structural

Functionalism.

36

Critics of structural functionalism view it as "a translation of Anglo-American

political norms in methodological terminology" (Susser, 1992). Structural

functionalism may be in decline as a methodological approach for the study of

politics; however, it leaves a set of terms that are still used in political jargon.

Some of those in the functionalist camp (Merton among them) rejected the notion

of this decline. Much of what was best in the political research of an entire

generation was couched in its terms (Susser, 1992). One of the main criticisms of

structural functionalism is that its categories were too undifferentiated to be of real

help in actual research (Susser 1992). Although Almond's functional taxonomy has

greater specificity and serviceability than the systems approach, it is seen as not

much more than a translation of familiar and known phenomena into blandly broad

categories. As such it promotes a terminological rather than an essential

transformation in the discipline (Susser, 1992). Another criticism is related to the

methodological approach used in functionalism. A list of functions is created

deductively and then appropriate structures are identified. In some cases, this

approach leads to "empirical contortions" to satisfy the framework. This criticism

applies to much academic research, leaving the researcher, rather than the

approach, responsible for assuring research validity. A final criticism, according to

Susser (1992), is that functionalism "harbors an ideological slant" that sustains

existing structures. It describes what exists rather than what ought to be, thus

maintaining the status quo. As if anticipating this criticism, Almond and Powell

(1966), responded to the criticism that functional-systems theories imply an

equilibrium or harmony of parts and 'that they have a static or conservative bias’.

Political systems are not necessarily harmonious or stable, they wrote, but

interdependent. The task of political science researchers is to ascertain how change

in any one of the part of a political system affects other parts and the whole. They

built political development into their approach to the study of systems. They look

37

at political systems as whole entities shaping and being shaped by their

environments. To understand the processes of political development, they examine

the interaction of the political system with its domestic and international

environments. These theories and the approach are still alive and well (Chamock,

2009; Fisher & Soemarsono, 2008; Fisk & Malamud, 2009; Mohamed, 2007;

Scheuerell, 2008). Understanding politics requires political syntax, much of which

continues to be based on structural functionalism and systems theory.

Weaknesses of the above theories

The weaknesses of functionalist and system theory is that they tend to lead to

exaggerated accounts of positive consequences of events and participation in such

events such as the performance of oversight by legislatures, however it mistakenly

assumes that there are no conflicts of interests between the different groups in

society such as the executive, legislature and judiciary and yet it doesn’t recognize

that politicking without certain checks on excesses can privilege or disadvantage

people more than others. The theory also ignores the powerful historical and

economic factors that have influenced social events and social relationships.

The long-standing problem of political science has been to describe and account

for the internal structure of the political system. According to William Mitchell

(1968), structure is generally applied to patterns of power and authority that

characterize the relationships between the rulers and the ruled. These relationships

are enduring and thus predictable. In systems theory the unit of analysis for these

power relations is regarded as a concept developed in social psychology and

applied to sociology, which is a major weakness in the application of system

theory not just to our discussion but to major arguments in the area of political

science. Functionalist theory on the other hand is centered on the idea that there is

38

a consensus in the values and norms of society and that social institutions found

within a society are integrated and function together.

• Assumptions: The conceptual assumptions underlying the approaches can be

divided into two basic areas:

The social system is the prior causal reality and the system parts are functionally

interrelated,

All social phenomena have functions for the larger social system. Concerning these

functions:

• they may be functional for the whole system or only part of it,

• there may be functional alternatives,

• there may be multiple consequences from particular phenomena, and finally,

• Dysfunctions account for tension and change in the system.

The approaches assume that systems can be identified and specified, that the

boundaries are measurable

• They are ideal model of society rather than an empirically derived one

Operational definitions are hard to come by

• At their outset they have a tendency to value stability, consensus

• They cannot explain the existence of societies in the first place

• They cannot easily explain rapid social change or breakdown of societies

Social change and social conflict became significant topics in the latter period

of functionalist dominance

39

• Rests on assumptions that are hard (perhaps impossible) to test

• Explanations can be tautological

Check and Balances Theory

The guarantee of liberty in any given government to the people is the practice of

the theory of separation of powers. This theory according to Gettel, implies that,

the three functions of the government ―should be performed by different bodies

of persons; each department (the legislature, the executive and judiciary) limited to

its own sphere of action, and within that sphere should be independent and

supreme (Chaturvedi; 2006:282). The theory of separation of powers is predicated

on the premise that, if a single group holds all the three powers of the government,

they are bound to have unlimited powers. They could prescribe any law arresting

say, criminals. Because, they exercise unlimited powers could pronounce the

criminals guilty without recourse to fair trial. It is through the separation of powers

that any given group cannot at the same time prescribe, execute and adjudicate in

any case. Otherwise, there will be no justice. That is why, it is only through the

combination of all these departments that a government can use force especially in

a military rule. The theory of separation of powers means that, a different body of

persons is to administer each of the three departments of government (The

legislative, executive and judiciary). And that, no one of them is to have a

controlling power over either of the others. Such separation is necessary for the

purpose of preserving the liberty of the individual and for avoiding tyranny. The

term ―Separation of powers originated with Baron de Montesquieu, a French

enlightenment writer. Nevertheless, the actual separation of powers amongst

different branches of government can be traced to ancient Greece. The framers of

the American constitution decided to base the governmental system on this theory

of separation of powers whereby the legislature, executive and judiciary branches

40

will be separate from each other. This gave rise to the idea of checks and balances

on each other. As a result, no one branch can gain absolute power or abuse the

power given to them like in despotic military regimes. The model of separation of

powers was first developed in ancient Greece and gained recognition by the

Roman Republic as part of the unmodified constitution of the Roman Republic. In

this model, the state is divided into branches, each with separate and independent

powers and areas of responsibility in such a way that no branch has more powers

than the other branches. This also, forms the concept of separation of church and

state as is the practice in many countries of the world depending on the applicable

legal structures and the prevailing views towards the exact roles of religion in the

given society. In respect to our discussion it will imply the roles assigned each of

the committees in oversight investigation, reporting its findings to the body of

legislature thereby strengthening in practical terms the notion of checks and

balances.

Meaning and origins of the concept

It must be noted that, the doctrine of separation of powers has been developed over

the centuries. The evolution of the concept of separation of powers can be traced to

the British Parliament‘s gradual assertion of power and resistance to the royal

decrees during the 14th century. James Harrington, an English scholar was one of

the first modern philosophers to analyze the doctrine of separation of powers.

Harrington in his essay, ―Common Wealth of Oceana (1656), built upon the

works of earlier philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli, described a

utopian political system that included a separation of powers. In his second

Treatise on Government (1690), John Locke an English Political theorist, gave the

concept of separation of powers more refined treatment. John Locke argued that

legislative and executive powers were conceptually different. But that it was

41

necessary to separate them in government institutions. However, in Locke‘s

conception, judicial power played no significant role.

The modern idea of the doctrine of separation of powers was vigorously explored

in the ―Spirit of Laws (1748) by Baron de Montesquieu a French Political writer

in his work. He based his exposition on the British constitution of the first part of

the 18th century the way he understood it. As a doctrine, it has been interpreted as,

―Where an individual occupies the position of both the executive and the

legislature, there is the danger of the legislature enacting oppressive laws which the

executive will administer to attain its own ends. Montesquieu in the process

outlined a three-way division of powers in England amongst the parliament, the

king and the courts, even though such divisions were not in existence at that time.

Montesquieu apparently believed that the stability of the English government was

due to this practice of separation of powers despite the fact that he did not use the

word ―separation. It must be realized that Plato, Aristotle, Harrington, Locke,

Montesquieu and other commentators saw the concept of separation of powers as a

way to eliminate the arbitrary powers to check dictatorial tendencies. One

condition of liberty is the separation of the legislature from the executive, and the

existence of an independent and impartial judiciary. It is also as a result of this that,

Montesquieu regarded ―the separation of powers as an essential safeguard of

liberty. According to him, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated

from the legislative and executive. That is why according to Gettel, this doctrine

implies that the three functions of the government ―should be performed by

different bodies of persons; each department limited to its own sphere of action,

and within that sphere should be independent and supreme (Chaturevedi,

2006:282).

Hence, separation of powers is presently understood to mean that, none of the

legislative, executive and judicial powers is able to interfere with the others. For

42

example, the Judges should be independent of the executive and legislature in

theory. Or that the same persons should not hold posts in more than one of the

three branches. For example, that one branch of government should not exercise

the functions of another. That is, the executive should not make laws which fall

within the purview of the legislature. That be as it may, closely related to this

theory is the ―doctrine of checks and balances. This doctrine states that,

governmental power should be controlled by overlapping authority within the

government and by giving citizens the right to criticize state actions and remove

officials from office. But the big question is, what happens in despotic military

regimes and, dictatorial civilian regimes or in parliamentary systems where the

cabinet minister must be a member of either houses of parliament as we have seen

in Mymmar (Burma), Nigeria, before 1966 Coup, Thailand, Chile, China, Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) before it crumbled in 1989 with the

introduction of glass-note and prestorica by Govbachev or how about where there

is one party dominance in a political system? The whole argument in favor of

separation of powers will be meaningless as well as hopeless in the above situation

or circumstances. Nevertheless, it must be stated that, like in Italy and in most

democracies, separation of governmental powers in their constitutions has a

separate constitutional courts to review cases that raise constitutional issues. Such

democratic countries create such mechanisms to ensure judicial independence from

legislative and executive officials. However, some scholars were of the opinion

that, creating an extreme separation of powers can make government less effective

because, it increases the possibility of ―governmental paralysis. Where the leaders

in different branches of the government disagree about fundamental objectives, the

country‘s official business will come to a standstill.

43

Is separation of powers feasible?

It must be noted that, separation of powers is almost impossible to carry out in

actual practice. ―However, in a modified form the theory has been adopted in

America, Nigeria France and other countries. The President and the legislature in

U.S.A. and Nigeria for example, are both elected by the people and are responsible

to them. While the judges once appointed hold office during good behavior. But in

both U.S.A. and Nigeria for example, the President has the legislative power of

vetoing to bills and the Senate has the executive duties of sanctioning

appointments and treaties, while, the Supreme Court has the power to determine

the constitutionality of the laws. In India and France for example, where there is

parliamentary form of government in place, the executive is responsible to the

legislature because, the cabinet members are members of the legislature and

therefore performs both executive and legislative functions. In England with

parliamentary system in place, there is no separation of powers because, the House

of Lords performs judicial functions and the judiciary has jurisdiction over the

executive officers. The cabinet performs legislative functions and its members are

also the members of the parliament (Sachdeva and Gupta; 1980:221).

Separation of powers in Nigeria in theory and practice

It is interesting to note that, the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of

Nigeria, separation of powers is a fundamental constitutional principle which spells

the roles and duties of the three arms of the government. These principles are

enunciated in the constitution as follows:

Part I Section 231(1), states that, ―the appointment of a person to the office of

Chief Justice of Nigeria shall be made by the president on the recommendation of

the National Judicial Council subject to the confirmation of such appointment by

the Senate.

44

Part I Section 231(2), states that, ―the appointment of a person to the office of a

Justice of the Supreme Court shall be made by the president on the

recommendation of the National Judicial Council subject to confirmation of the

appointment by the Senate.

Section 232 (2) states that, in addition to the Jurisdiction conferred upon it by sub-

section(1) of this section, the Supreme Court shall have such original jurisdiction

as may be conferred upon it by any Act of the National Assembly.

Part II Section 4(8) states that, save as otherwise provided by this constitution,

exercise of legislative powers by the National Assembly or by a House of

Assembly shall be subject to the jurisdiction of courts of law and of Judicial

tribunals established by law and accordingly, the National Assembly or a House of

Assembly shall not enact any law, that ousts or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a

court of law or of a judicial tribunal established by law.

Chapter V (The Legislature) Section 5 8(1) States that, ―The Power of the

National Assembly to make laws shall be exercised except as otherwise provided

by this section and sub-section (5) of this section, assented to by the President.

Section 58(3) says, ―Where a bill has been passed by the House in which it

originated, it shall be sent to the other House, and it shall be presented to the

President for assent when it has been passed by that other House and agreement

has been reached between the two Houses on any amendment made on it.

Section 5 8(4) states that, ―Where a bill is presented to the President for assent, he

shall within thirty days thereof signify that he assents or that he withholds assent.

Chapter V Part II (House of Assembly of A State) Section 100(1) states that,

―The Power of a House of Assembly to make laws shall be exercised by bills

passed by the House of Assembly and, except as otherwise provided by this

section, assented to in accordance with the provisions of this section.

45

Section 100(2) states that, ―a bill shall not become Law unless it has been duly

passed and, subject to sub-section (1) of this section, assented to in accordance

with the provision of this section.

Section 100(3) states that, ―Where a bill has been passed by the House of

Assembly; it shall be presented to the Governor for assent.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the essence of the doctrine of separation of

powers is to protect the arbitrariness of rules. It by bills passed by both the Senate

and House of Representative and, prevents the danger that is most likely to

emanate by the conferment of two much powers any single person or body and

check of one power by another (The Tide; 2010:23). The power of the executive to

convene the legislature and to veto its enactments affirms of defense while the

legislative power to impeach is necessary and sufficient to hold the executive

accountable to examination without holding him hostage. The people also look

forward to the judiciary for the dispensation of justice and that of judge must

carefully but firmly set out to administer according to law which is established by

the legislature or by the binding authority of president, which itself is substantially

founded on the laws passed by the legislature (The Tide: 20 10:23). Despite the

grammatical niceties with which the constitution is coated with in practice, any

rigid separation of the state departments as stated above is obviously going to

paralyze the governmental activities of the state. In theory separation of powers

seems to imply that, the powers of government consist mainly in making,

executing and applying laws to cases through the rule of law.

The theory of separation of power is most apt in this research because, here

separation of powers appears not to operate any legal restriction on power but, it

provides the basis for important principles which the law protects such as

independence of the judiciary and in this context the committees of the national

assembly in carrying out their various oversight functions as enshrined in their

46

constitutional rights as members of the legislative arm of government. It provides a

basis for the adoption of structure processes and control which protects liberty now

and in the future for the members of such committees to effectively and efficiently

discharge their responsibilities of checks on the executive. It guards against broad

spectrum of the ills like absurd judgment avaricious and ambitious self-serving

behavior and inefficient performances of functions, in other words checks the

excesses of all the legislatures who are to carry out the function of checks on the

executive and it’s MDA’s. In respect to our topic theory of check and balance

helps to identify some of the lope holes in the parastatals and ministries which are

under the auspices of the executive arm of government. The various committees set

up by the body of legislature will by virtue of their oversight responsibility check

the excesses of the executive through its MDA’s and by this strengthen

transparency and accountability which are essential pillars of democracy. And as it

is known our system of government evolves new conventions, political practices

and events at times which also require legal rules which will need to be devised to

protect the liberty of the people and our nascent democracy. The doctrine of

separation of powers therefore provides the justification for these measures and

helps to determine their nature and scope. Apparently, there is the need to monitor

our political system, be vigilant about our liberty and advocate new measures when

the liberty is threatened.

47

CHAPTER THREE

Legislative Oversight in Nigeria

3.1 Restoration of Democratic Dispensation in Nigeria

The name Nigeria was coined by Mrs. Flora Shaw who later became the wife of

the British Governor General Lord Lugard. The entity Nigeria was an amalgam of

the hitherto empires, kingdom and chiefdoms were made under a single

administrative system. In 1960, Nigeria got its independence through the combined

efforts of Nigerians in diaspora as well as the activities of nationalist such as Sir

Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo.

Three major political parties existed during this period thus Northern People’s

Congress (NPC), National Council of Nigerian and Cameroon (NCNC), and the

Action Group (AG) while the NPC has its stronghold in the north, the NCNC

dominating the south east and the A.G in the south west. NPC and NCNC formed

an alliance in the 1959 general election and subsequently won the election and

formed the government with Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as the Prime Minister and

Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe as President. As the Prime Minister of the newly independent

nation, Balewa made an unparallel effort in uniting and integrating all the regions.

However his government was ousted in a military coup led by major Kaduna

Chukwuma Nzeagu in January 1966. A counter coup was staged in May 1966

where General Yakubu Gawon became the president and soon a rancor became

inevitable within the ranks of the Nigerian Army. This discontents culminated in

the three year Nigerian civil war (1967 – 1970) with its attendant loss of significant

proportion.

General Yakubu Gowon was in turn ousted by General Muritala Ramat

Mohammed. Mohammed barely spent six months as the Nigerian President when

48

Colonel Buka Dinka assassinated him. General Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded

Mohammed and later in 1973, a general election was conducted and Alhaji Shehu

Shagari became the President of the second republic. His government was marred

by series of crisis and in 1978, General Mohamed Buhari topple his government in

a military coup. Buhari also barely spent one year when General Ibrahim Badamosi

Babangida overthrew him in 1978, IBB rule for eight years (1975 – 1983) after

which a general election was conducted. The 1983 election was adjudged to be the

freest and fairest election ever conducted in the history of Nigeria. Moshood

Abiola emerged the winner of the June 12 election but the military governments

choose to hand over power to an interim government led by Shonekan. General

Sani Abacha took over power from Shonekan in 1993 and he died in 1998 in a

controversial circumstance and General Abdulsalami Abubakar took over power

and conducted the 1999 General election that ushered the third republic.

Nigeria’s democratic journey in contemporary times began with the tacit

acceptance by the military hierarchy of the need to demilitarize the nation’s

political space. This gained actual fruition on May 29, 1999 when the then General

Abdulsalami Abubakar as Head of State handed over political power to an elected

President in the person of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. For over ten years of

democratic experimentation, the nation has conducted and witnessed four general

elections which took place in 1999, 2003, 2007 and the most recent 2011 elections

respectively. All of these election, especially the first three, have had their

outcomes vehemently contested in the court of law and election tribunals; and

heavily repudiated in the domains of the general public. This has been the case

because these elections have been conducted in a fashion in which they have been

easily characterized by myriad of irregularities. These irregularities have in turn,

left the electorate and the entire masses speechless and utterly disenfranchised

49

while at the same time draining mass of qualified voters into cesspits of mortal

political apathy. For example, Fidelis and Stephen cited Oddih (in Jega and Ibeanu

eds 2007:179) has cleverly noted that “the net effect” of an election that is

characterized by “fraud and manipulations” or irregularities is that it “… can lead

to apathy, leadership crisis, political violence, assassination galore, poor political

culture and insensitivity to the needs of the people”. Fidelis and Stephen (2014

p:131) further argued that the ignoble frauds that have dogged elections in the

country have only led to the ascendancy of leaders at all levels whose kettle of

legitimacy is dry, or whose political oasis has evaporated. And, it is an

uncontrovertibly conclusion that a leader without the people’s legitimacy in a

democratic formation is naturally exposed to the vagaries of unpopular,

unacceptable government. To this end, the leader becomes susceptible to self-

destruction, at least politically.

3.2 Overview of Oversight Functions in the Fourth Republic

The oversight functions of the legislature or its investigative power has attracted

some degree of criticisms against its apparent abuse of this parliamentary

mechanism since the inception of 1999 democratic dispensation. The National

Assembly’s perception of legislative oversight function as a short-cut to richness is

generally worrisome because it negates the principle of good governance. Any

legislative investigation means a sure way of enriching the legislators involved in

the exercise, and it earns them political relevance in the system as they seem to

assume quasi-judicial demigods to those public officers being investigated. As

soon as they secure the chairmanship of these committees, the next item on their

political agenda is oversight functions, which results in the preliminary

investigation trips to parastatals and government departments under their

supervision, and subsequent public sittings (a parliamentary simulation exercise for

50

public entertainment). Most often, the orchestrated committees abandon the

substance at issue to chase the shadow with a view to humiliating and intimidating

their prey to bow to pressure and accept to negotiate for unholy settlement.

Akomolede and Bosede (2012) espoused this observation thus:

The legislature is truly not independent of the

executive and therefore, is often incapacitated from

acting as the watchdog of executive activities. Thus,

the inordinate ambition of members and leadership

of the legislative houses often sees them hob-

nobbing with the executive such that valuable time

for law-making is lost in the process of lobbying for

juicy leadership positions and committees in the

legislative houses. It is common knowledge that a

good number of members of the legislative houses

pursue pure selfish interests that often inhibit them

from combating the challenges of lawmaking.

Members pursue contracts from the leadership of

the houses and even from the executive such that

they easily compromise when it comes to

contributing meaningfully to debates on the floor of

the house. At times, some members resort to

absenteeism from the floor of the house and do not

participate at all in the proceedings. Again, many of

the legislators have ambitions to contest for

leadership positions in the house or membership and

chairman of juicy committees. A lot of valuable

51

legislative time is wasted while pursuing these

ambitions.

To buttress the inordinate ambitions of some members of the legislature, an

inference may be drawn from this scenario where in a public hearing conducted by

a committee of the House of Representatives during which specific charges of

corruption were preferred by Ms Aruma Oteh, the Director- General of the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the Chairman of the House

Committee (Mr. Herman Hembe) which raised fundamental questions about

Nigeria’s system of government. The report revealed that “as part of its statutory

oversight functions, the House [of Representatives] Committee on Capital Market

and Institutions probed the manifest cause of the near collapse of the capital

market” for two years running. It was alleged that the House Committee Chairman

resorted to unguarded utterances on the accused thus: “you are not fit to regulate

the sector”. The Committee Chairman allegedly accused Ms Oteh of profligacy,

asserting that she had “been spending money as if it was going out of fashion since

assuming office one year ago. You stayed in a hotel for eight months and spent

over N30 million. In one day you spent N85,000 on food at the hotel. The other

day you spent N850,000 on food. These are the things we should look at to see

how you will regulate a market that is collapsing (The Nation Newspaper, March

21, 2012, p.2). The Director-General was completely taken aback as she could not

put up a defense immediately. Rather, she questioned the credibility of the

Chairman to preside over the probe, alleging that the Committee Chairman (Mr.

Hembe) collected a cheque to travel to the Dominican Republic to attend a

conference. He did not attend the conference nor did he return the money. She

accused him of undermining his capacity to carry out his duties as Chairman of

House Committee by asking the Securities and Exchange Commission to

contribute N39 million for the public hearing, and demanded N5 million for

52

himself to avert justice. The Director-General of the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) queried why the Chairman received information from the SEC

and passed judgment based on its face value without reference to the Commission

to verify the veracities of the issues raised therein. Aguda (2012) noted that while

bribery and corruption could seriously undermine any system of government, they

are not as fundamental in the damage they can do to a system of government as the

breach of the principle of separation of powers or as a disregard for fair hearing as

illustrated above. Hence, he made reference to the time-honoured procedure for the

conduct of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings which has long been well

established by the courts in all the common law countries, including Nigeria. The

procedure requires that any person against whom any allegation is made, or whose

interest may be adversely affected by such allegation, or by any statement made,

must be clearly and fully informed of such allegations or statements in advance of

any trial or investigation involving the accused. Therefore, the principles of legal

procedure demands thus:

Before any accused person is required to make his

or her defense or counter any statements adversely

affecting him or his interest, the following

requirements must be complied with. First, the

accused must be given the details of all allegations

or statements made against him; then he must be

afforded reasonable time and opportunity to prepare

his defense effectively to all the matters at issue; he

must be able to confront and challenge his accuser

or accusers at his trial or during any investigation.

These requirements apply in all situations and to all

proceedings involving any form of trial or

53

investigation no matter who conducts the trial or

carries out the investigation and for whatever

purpose (The Nation Newspaper, March 21, 2012,

p.2)

Aguda (2012) observed that in carrying out the statutory legislative oversight

function, had the Committee Chairman followed the requisite judicial requirement

to give the accused prior notice of the charges she was going to face at the trial, he

would have found out, as the accused subsequent defense might have indicated,

that she had plausible explanations for the allegations the House Committee

Chairman was making against her. However, the most important point at issue here

is not whether the House Committee Chairman’s allegations against the SEC

Director-General were true or whether the truth lies on the domain of the accused.

The fundamental issues are that the Legislative Committee breached the principle

of separation of powers by conducting judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and in

doing so, seriously violated the most fundamental rule of fair hearing (Aguda,

2012). The legislature has reduced this all important constitutional responsibility

to mere alarm mechanism being used to blackmail or witch-hunt political

opponents, extortion of money from the parastatals, departments and ministries

under its supervision for selfish or personal aggrandizement. For instance,

“Honourable” Farouk Lawan, Chairman, House of Representatives Ad Hoc

Committee on the Monitoring of Fuel Subsidy is alleged to have been enmeshed in

a US$620,000 bribery scandal. It was alleged that in course of executing the

statutory legislative oversight function on the N1.3 trillion fuel subsidy probe, the

“honourable” House Committee Chairman was alleged to have received

US$500,000 bribe from Zenon Oil and Gas Chairman, Mr Femi Otedola to

facilitate the removal of Zenon Oil and Gas company’s name from the list of oil

marketers who bought foreign exchange from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)

54

without importing petroleum products. Security operatives report is alleged to have

revealed that initially the accused denied collecting any bribe from the accuser,

later he claimed that he collected the bribe to use it as exhibit against Mr Femi

Otedola. The oil magnate alleged that the House Ad Hoc Committee Chairman

demanded US$3 million but collected $500,000 bribe as first installment for the

purpose disclosed above. Subsequently, the “honourable member” was suspended

from the House of Representatives while legislative probe into the matter is still on

course. The Clerk of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Monitoring of Fuel Subsidy,

Mr Boniface Emenalo who was also implicated in the bribery scandal had as well

been suspended from the House. “Honourable” Emenalo allegedly collected a

bribe sum of US$120,000 from Adetola, making the total bribery sum to $620,000

(http://thisday-staging.portal.dmflex.net/articles/icpcon- standby).These incidents

are incredibly terrible, shameful, disgraceful and egregious legislative oversight

outings of the 21st century in a developing country. The Speaker of the House of

Representatives, Honourable Aminu Waziri Tambuwal, in a swift and subtle

reaction to the unfortunate and quite embarrassing development, reprimanded his

fellow parliamentarians (a tactful caveat) thus:

When we elected to pursue the entrenchment of

probity, accountability and transparency in the

conduct of government business as a cardinal

legislative agenda, we advised ourselves never to

expect that it will be an easy task. Accordingly, I

have had cause to occasionally sound a note of

warning and reminder that our constitutional task is

inescapably hazardous requiring total commitment,

diligence, transparency, determination and sacrifice

… we shall not hesitate to sanction anyone who in

55

the course of these investigations overreached

himself or uses the process to intimidate anyone or

engages in corruption. Legislators must continue to

adhere to their legislative agenda and remain not

only sensitive to the yearnings and aspirations of

Nigerians but also proactive on all matters of urgent

national importance (http://thisday

staging.portal.dmflex.net/articles/icpc-onstandby).

The precarious situation in Nigeria polity has made most Nigerians to lose faith in

the supposedly good intentions of the government. Jaja (2012) noted that as

Nigerians seek an end to the scourge of corruption in public sector, the

expectations are that the legislators would be more proactive rather than

reactionary in the discharge of their oversight functions. They are expected to do

this by detecting and preventing waste, inefficiency and corruption before they

take place. Unfortunately, this has not been the case as series of public hearings

and probes of agencies have been conducted without official reports on some of

these investigations at all levels of government since the inception of the new

political dispensation. The legislature is a principal arm of government through

which governments are held accountable for their actions and inactions. The public

is hapless when legislators compromise the very ingredient that protects

democracy and good governance.

Instances of Incidents of Legislative Oversight Abuse and Ultra Vires

Legislative Oversight Functions

The defects in the legislative oversight functions in Nigeria’s present system of

government have emerged explicitly in the instant executive and legislative

conflicts of interests. Its manifestation raises the question whether the National

Assembly [the Senate or the House of Representatives] have the constitutional

56

power to conduct some kind of investigations. Assuming the House has such

constitutional competence in its schedule, did it adhere to the constitutional

procedure as laid down? The response is obviously not palatable. Ironically, the

legislature claims and exercises such unbridled powers. For example, in 2007 the

Senate President was alleged to have informed the upper house that “it is our

responsibility to review the circumstances of the recent list of indicted persons by

the EFCC to ensure that the power exercised by the Agency was not contrary to the

provisions of the EFCC Act. We need to inquire why some persons whom EFCC

had charged to court for corrupt practices were not disqualified from elective

offices while persons [members of the Senate] not yet charged are now faced with

disqualification” (The Nation, February 21, 2007, p.47). The Senate President,

with his genuine intention to correct what he perceived as anomaly, erred in his

function because, following the demarcation in the borders of separation of power,

it lies in the functions of the judiciary to determine whether or not the EFCC has

acted outside the law that created it, definitely not that of the Senate (Aguda,

2012). The legislature has enjoyed unbridled latitude in its oversight functions and

has continually extended its exercise of this constitutional power into all areas of

governance without regard to functions of other arms of government. For instance,

the House [of Representatives] Committee on Aviation, under the chairmanship of

the Deputy Speaker of the House, allegedly imposed fines on some foreign airlines

accused of charging Nigerian travelers discriminatory air fares. The Committee on

Aviation conducted a public hearing where British Airways, Virgin Atlantic, Air

France, Emirate and eight other foreign airlines were allegedly found culpable in

the payment demand by the House Committee on Aviation that investigated the

matter. Apart from the alleged tax evasion, the airlines were also accused of

arbitrary fixing of fares and colluding with dubious aviation officials to

shortchange Nigerian air travelers. The Investigative Committee was said to have

57

arbitrarily ordered the airlines to refund N230 billion to the Nigerian Civil

Aviation Authority (NCAA) and mandated the airlines to make the refund or risk

necessary sanction. Besides, the committee directed NCAA to review the British

Airways Service Agreement (BASA) with British Airways. It was insinuated that

the committee was very angry with the foreign airlines and might summon them

for another round of talks in the near future. The House of Representatives here

again usurped the function of the judiciary in its oversight function. The legislature

derives its power under the Constitution “to direct or cause to be directed” an

investigation by the Executive arm of government into the alleged mismanagement

of public funds or any such or other cases. Inasmuch as the oversight function is

apt in governance, on completion of its investigation, the Committee supposed to

have passed on the report with its findings and recommendations to the parent

body [House of Representatives], urging the House for a judicial panel to be

constituted by the executive arm of the government to conduct full-fledged

inquiries on the issues raised therein. It is the constitutional responsibility of the

executive arm of government [not the legislature] to set up a judicial panel of

inquiry into the matter. It is outside the legislative function and jurisdiction to

dispense justice and impose or threaten to impose penalties. The legislature would

have as well passed jail sentence on those indicted or found culpable of the

offences, or ordered that the air-crews be detained in prison custody for further

hearing of the case in a future date. This is not the proper function of a legislative

house in a democracy where obedience of the rule of law is being respected,

protected and observed (The Nation; 2011). Until the principle of separation of

power is respected and strictly adhered to, and the doctrine of fair hearing is

properly adopted in clear terms in all sorts of legislative investigations, this area

will remain for a long time the major source of executive and legislative conflict in

governance. Any departure from this legal and constitutional procedure in the act

58

of governance would be a perversion of justice. Most often, it is observed that such

perversion of justice in our system has been the outcome of the so-called

“oversight functions” being carried out unregulated by the legislative arm of

government (Aguda, 2012). In the presidential system of government, the principle

of separation of powers is the most fundamental element, particularly in a true

democratic government. In the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of

Nigeria, the legislature is not given the power to execute what the legislators now

brand “oversight functions” which most often involves the execution of the

judiciary and executive functions. Section 88 of the Constitution gives the National

Assembly only the power “to direct or cause to be directed” that such investigation

should be carried out into matters perceived to be anomalous in nature. The various

matters enumerated in subsection (1) of section 88 and that they “are exercisable

only for the purpose of enabling” the legislature (a) to make laws with respect to

certain specified matters; and (b) to expose corruption, inefficiency and waste. The

power is required to be exercised “by resolution published in its journal or in the

Official Gazette of the Government of the Federation. The legislature does not

seem to be observing the boundaries between it and other arms of government in

its oversight functions. There is need for committed coordination and streamlining

of government functions to harness the dividend of democracy and good

governance.

3.3 Oversight Activities of the Selected Committees from 2011 – 2015

Against the backdrop of our discussion so far, we will shed more light on the

legislative oversight outcomes or achievements of committees during the period

covered by the study. The oversight function of each committee are jurisdiction

specific, in the sense that they relate to clearly defined areas and government

59

offices, which each of them has been mandated to oversee, the oversight function

of the committee are intended to achieve the same objectives of ensuring that the

activities of the government are carried out legally, efficient and in a fashion

consistent with legislative intent. On this note, the committees will be assessed in

the context of the extent to which they have been effective in fulfilling their

respective oversight mandates.

3.3.1 Committees on Establishment and Public Service

Senates Committee on Establishment and Public Service

The committee consists of a Chairman, Vice Chairman and no member.

About the Committee:

Order XIII Rule 98. (24) of the Senate Standing Orders 2007 as amended states

that there shall be a committee to be known as Committee on Establishment and

Public Services appointed at the commencement of the life of the Senate.

The jurisdiction of the committee shall include:

(a) Federal public services matters generally including parastatals;

(b) Conditions of Service;

(c) Pension and gratuities;

(d) Training and manpower development;

(e) The office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation;

(f) Inter-governmental Affairs;

(g) Liaison between the National Assembly and the Presidency;

(h) Office of Head of Service;

(i) Consideration and Appropriation of Annual budget estimates of related

MDAs

60

House of Representative Committees on Public Service

The committee consists of a Chairman and Vice Chairman

About the Committee:

Order XVII Rule B.62.-(1) of the House Standing Orders 2007 states that there

shall be a Committee to be known

as Committee on Public Service and Federal Character consisting of not more

than 40 members appointed at

the commencement of the life of the House.

(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover:

(a) Federal Public Service Matters generally;

(b) Conditions of Service;

(c) Pensions and Gratuities (Records);

(d) Matters relating to Federal Commissions and Councils as contained in the

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, provided that such

Commissions and Councils are not covered by other Standing Committees;

 (e) Oversight over the office of the Head of Service of the Government of the

Federation;

 (f) All matters relating to the Federal Character Commission. (g) To receive

and treat complaints on non-compliance with Federal Character principles and

the law. (h) Annual budget estimates

3.3.2 Committee on Interior

Senate Committee on Interior

The committee consists of a Chairman, vice chairman and a member.

About the committee

61

There shall be a committee to be known as Committee on Internal Affairs

appointed at the commencement of the life of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the

committee shall include:

(a) Immigration and deportation;

(b) Naturalization and citizenship;

(c) Political asylum and Refugees;

(d) Prisons and other institutions for treatment of offenders;

(e) Public holidays;

(f) Aliens;

(g) Expatriates Quota;

(h) National day and other celebrations;

(i) Immigration and visas;

(j) Emigration;

(k) Passports and travel certificates;

(I) Seaman's identity;

(m) Medals and badges containing the National Flag and National Coat of Arms;

(n) Business permits;

(o) Registration of Marriages, births & deaths;

(p) Registration of Voluntary organisations;

(q) National Identity Card Project;

(r) National Civic Registration

(s) Registration of Voters, Voters Card;

(t) Elections generally;

(u) Funding of Political Parties;

(v) Independent National Electoral Commission;

(w) Demography, which includes birthrate, death rate, structure by age, sex, etc.;

62

(x) National population census;

(y) Annual budget estimates

House of Rep Committee on Interior

The committee consists of a Chairman, vice Chairman and 22 members

About the Committee:

Order XVII Rule B.37.- (1) of the House Standing Orders states that there shall

be a Committee to be known as

Committee on Internal Affairs consisting of not more than 40 members

appointed at the commencement of the life of the House.

(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover:

           (a) oversight the Ministry responsible for Interior;

           (b) Immigration and deportation;

           (c) Naturalization and citizenship;      

           (d) Prisons;

           (e) Issuance of Nigerian passports;

           (f)  Public holidays, national civic registration;

           (g) Aliens, emigration and business permits;

           (h) Civil Defence;

           (i)  Expartriate Quota;

           (j)  National Identity Data Management;

           (k) National Identity Card Scheme;

           (l) Consideration and Appropriation of Annual budget estimates of

related MDAs.

3.3.3 Committee on Police Affairs

63

Senate Committee on Police Affairs

The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and one member

About the Committee:

Order XIII Rule 98 (46) of the Senate Standing Orders 2007 as amended states

that there shall be a Committee to be known as Committee on Police Affairs

appointed at the commencement of the life of the Senate.

The jurisdiction of the Committee shall include:

(a) Police Affairs generally;

(b) Budget relating to the operation and maintenance of police departments;

(c) Issues relating to recruitment, promotion, benefits and privileges of

members of the police force;

(d) Maintenance of law and order and ensuring internal security of the nation;

(e) Fire-arms control;

(f) Consideration and appropriation of annual budget estimates of related

Institutions.

House committee on Police Affairs

The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and 26 members

About the Committee:

Order XVII Rule B.56.-(1)states that there shall be a Committee to be known as

Committee on Police Affairs

consisting of not more than 40 members appointed at the commencement of the

life of the House.

(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover :

              (a) Ministry of Police Affairs;

              (b) Nigeria Police Force;

64

              (c) Interpol;

              (d) Police Colleges;

              (e) Police Service Commission;

              (f)  Maintenance of internal security and public order;

              (g) Police Barracks, Police Housing and Police Post Housing Scheme;

              (i)  Annual budget estimates

3.3.4 Committee on Defence

Senate committee on Defence

The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and a member

About the Committee:

Order XIII Rule 98.(18) of the Senate Standing Orders 2007 as amended states

that there shall be a committee to be known as Committee on Defence and

Army appointed at the commencement of the life of the Senate.

The jurisdiction of the committee shall include:

(a) Payments, promotion, retirement and other benefits and privileges of

members of the Army;

(b) Size and composition of the Army;

(c) Defence headquarters;

(d) Ammunition depots, forts, arsenal reservations and establishments;

(e) Scientific research and development in support of the Army;

(f) Barrack projects;

(g) Military application of nuclear energy;

(h) Disarmament;

(i) Army cadets;

(j) Resettlement scheme for serving officers of the Army

65

(k) War graves, monuments and memorabilia;

(l) Peace keeping operations;

(m) Consideration and Appropriation of Annual budget estimates for the Army

House committee on Defence

The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and 23 members

About the Committee:

Order XVII Rule B.17.-(1) of the House Standing Orders 2007 states that there

shall be a Committee to be

known as Committee on Defence consisting of not more than 40 members

appointed during the life of the

House.

(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall include:

 (a) oversight the Ministry of  Defence and Office of the Chief of Defence Staff

 (b) Army, Navy and Air Force Departments in the Ministry of Defence;

 (c) Ammunition depots, forts and arsenal.

(d) Scientific research and development in support of the armed services;

 (e) Selective Service;

 (f) Size and composition of the Army, Navy and Air Force;

(g) Barracks;

(h) Strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defence;

(i) Military applications of nuclear energy;

(j) Special oversight function with respect to disarmament, and military

dependants' education;

(k) Military Cadets;

 (l) War Graves, Monuments and Memorabilia;

(m) Nigerian Defence Academy and Other Military Educational Institutions

66

(n) Defence Industry Corporation (DIC)

(o) Peace Keeping Operations;

(p) Veterans' measures generally;

 (q) Compensation, vocational rehabilitation, and education of veterans;

 (r) Re-adjustment of servicemen to civil life;

 (s)  Consideration and appropriation of annual budget estimates

3.3.5 Committee on Education

Senates Committee on Education

Chairman: Sen.Uche Chukwumerije, Vice Chairman: Sen. Olusola Adeyeye

About the Committee: Order XIII Rule 98.(21) of the Standing Orders of the

Senate 2007 as amended states that there shall be a committee to be known as

Committee on Education including Universal Basic Education (UBE) appointed at

the commencement of the life of the Senate.

The jurisdiction of the committee shall include: (a) Matters relating to education

generally; (b) Academic research; (c) External aid for education; (d) Educational

broadcasts; (e) Educational library services; (f) Educational statistics; (g) Federal

scholarships; (h) Institutions of higher education; (i) Vocational and non-formal

education; (j) National and international education agency; (k) Primary and

secondary education (special education); (l) Implementation of Universal Basic

Education Act; (m) Consideration and Appropriation of annual budget estimates

for related MDAs

Members: Sen. Ahmed Lawan

House of Representative Committees on Education

67

Chairman: Vice Chairman: Hon. ROSE OKOJI OKO

About the Committee: Order XVII Rule B.20.-(1) of the House Standing Orders

2007 states that there shall be a Committee to be known as Committee on

Education consisting of not more than 40 members appointed at the

commencement of the life of the House.

(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover: (a) Measures relating to education

generally; (b) Academic research; (c) External aid for education; (d) Educational

broadcasts; (e) Oversight over all Parastatals under the Federal Ministry of

Education; (f) Educational library services; (g) Educational statistics; (h) Federal

scholarship; (i) Unity schools; (j) Education tax fund; (k) Institutions of higher

learning; (l) Vocational and non-formal education; (m) Universal Basic Education

(UBE); (o) Annual Budget Estimates

Members: Hon. Shehu Garba

3.3.6 Committee on Petroleum Downstream

Senate committee on Petroleum Downstream

The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and a member

About the Committee:

Order XIII Rule 98. (20) of the Senate Standing Orders 2007 as amended states

that there shall be a Committee to be known as Committee on Downstream

Committee on Downstream Petroleum Sector appointed at the sectors’

commencement of the life of the Senate.

The jurisdiction of the Committee shall include:

(i) Oil refineries;

(ii) Pipeline and Petroleum Products Marketing;

68

(iii) NNPC;

(iv) Ministry of Petroleum Resources;

(v) Petroleum Products Price Regulation;

(vi) Oil subsidy;

(vii) Consideration and Appropriation of Annual budget estimates of related

MDAs.

House committee on Petroleum Downstream

The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and 22 members

About the Committee:

Order XVII Rule B.54.?(1) of the House Standing Orders states that there shall

be a Committee to be known as

Committee on Petroleum Resources (Downstream) consisting of not more than

25 Members constituted during

the life of the House.

(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover;

              (a) Petroleum Refineries;

              (b) Petroleum products marketing;

              (c) Petrochemicals;

              (d) Pipeline and Petroleum Marketing Company (PPMC);

              (e) matters relating to downstream Petroleum Sector and oversight the

Nigerian National Petroleum

                    Corporation (NNPC) Downstream activities generally;

              (f) Petroleum Equalization fund;

              (g) Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA);

              (h) in conference with relevant Committee(s) examine and scrutinize

69

the annual budget estimates of the NNPC and its subsidiaries and all oil related

companies and present same to the House for consideration and approval.

Table 1.1: Presentation of Committees and Members in the Senate

S/N Committee Name No of Members

1 Establishment & Public

Service

2

2 Interior 3

3 Police Affairs 3

4 Defence 3

5 Education 3

6 Petroleum Downstream 3

Source: National Assembly Official site

Table 1.2: Presentation of Committees and Members in the House of

Representatives

S/N Committee Name No of Members

1 Establishment & Public

Service

2

2 Interior 24

3 Police Affairs 28

4 Defence 25

5 Education 28

6 Petroleum Downstream 25

Source: National Assembly Official site

Overview of Oversight Mechanisms/Instruments used by the National

Assembly Committees

Briefs from MDAs

70

Visits to MDAs

Project inspection

Engagement with Appropriation Bill/Budgetary Function

Public/Investigative Hearing

Public petitions

Confirmation/Screening of Nominees

Interactive meetings/Sessions

Interviews

Bill Referrals

Resolutions

Committees of the National Assembly could deploy to enforce their Oversight

functions. There is a variety of instruments available for use by committees, which

are applied in varying degrees – as shall be discussed in subsequent chapter when

empirical data is recovered – some frequently, while others are used sparingly.

Direct oversight outcomes of the committees of the National Assembly

Intervention of the National Assembly led to the reform of the public

procurement Act, which effectively eliminates delays experienced by MDAs in

the access of funds for projects. The enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Act

was part of efforts by the National Assembly to address the high level of fiscal

indiscipline and mismanagement of public funds observed during oversight.

Oversight activities of committees led to drastic reduction in frequent

interruption of academic programmes in universities and other institutions in

the country. Ensured enhanced budgetary allocation to educational institutions

especially after the prolonged ASUU strike of 2013 and 2014. Instituted more

stringent measures aimed at curbing the menace of examination malpractices.

71

Instrumental to the implementation of the monetization policy with respect to

the federal ministry of education, parastatals, agencies and institutions. Through

intervention and interactions with the executive, the long confrontations

between polythnics, universities and the government were eliminated.

Enhanced funding of education programmes and projects, including assistance

to primary institutions in the area of renovation.

Their intervention led to the payment of debt owed to prison and gas

contractors. Introduced monthly imprest for all the Nigerian Prison Services in

Nigeria.

The investigation conducted on the immigration recruitment exercise which led

to the death of 16 people. The committee said insufficient funds were

responsible for the shoddy immigration recruitment exercise which led to the

death of the job seekers. At a Senate investigative hearing, members of the

committee on interior learnt that despite raising 710 million Naira from job

applicants, the recruitment consultant DRETEL Technologies Limited released

only 45 million Naira for the exercise. On March 15, the 16 job seekers died in

stampedes across Nigeria during the recruitment exercise, prompting

nationwide outrage and unearthing the huge level of unemployment in Nigeria.

Nigerians demanded to know those responsible for the exercise that caused

tears and agony for the families of those killed. From the testimonies of the

board members from the ministry of immigration and the comptroller general of

immigration, it appears the recruitment exercise was already fraught with

problems before it even began. All of this information was made possible for

public consumption due to the pro-activeness of committees of the legislature in

carrying out their oversight functions.

Raised the budget of the ministry of police affairs as recommended by the

executive. The committee on Police Affairs had on the 20th of December

72

summoned the IGP to appear before the committee and when he replied in

writing the committee members insisted that because of the seriousness

attached to the matter, he must appear before it on November 26th to explain and

answer questions as to why the police should shut out the lawmakers from

accessing the premises. It will be recalled that the Inspector-General of Police,

IGP Suleiman Abba, had declared that he would not recognize Hon. Aminu

Tambuwal as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, because doing so

would amount to subjudice since the case was still in court.

The probe of the controversy surrounding the award of contract and non-

delivery of multi-million Naira training ship for the Petroleum Training

Institute (PTI) in Effurun, Delta State. The contracts for the diving support

vessel, meant for the training of students at the institute, which was awarded to

Netsach Limited and partly paid for in 2009 during the late president Umaru

Yar’Adua's administration. It was learnt that since 2009 when the contractor

was paid the sum of N985 million, the National Assembly has been

appropriating funds for the vessel every year. According to the Chairman,

Senate Committee on Petroleum (Upstream), Senator Emmanuel Paulker, and

the discovery was made by the Joint National Assembly Committee on Gas and

Petroleum Resources (Upstream and Downstream) during the budget defence of

the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. According to him, the Committee had to

immediately set up the probe panel, comprising all the six committees on

petroleum and gas in the Senate and the House of Representatives, disclosing

that despite the yearly appropriation of funds for the vessel, it is yet to arrive the

shores of Nigeria, adding that it was the intention of the National Assembly to

find the vessel wherever it is.

CHAPTER FOUR

73

4.0 DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

The research methodology, which present the techniques and procedures used for

this study sets out by considering the design, population, sample size and sampling

methods, research questions as well as the analytical tools employed in the analysis

and interpretation of data obtained from this study.

4.2 Presentation of Data

Two hundred (200) questionnaires were administered to respondents in the both

chambers of the legislature and from among the populace. After administration and

recollection, 197 were returned and three (3) were not returned. The returned

questionnaires represented 98.38 percent, while the unreturned questionnaires

recounted for 1.19 percent of the total questionnaires. Therefore, the analysis is

based on one hundred and ninety seven completed questionnaires, which were at

the disposal of the researcher. The analysis is sub-divided into three sections.

These are; background characteristic of respondents, substantive issues of the

research and test of hypothesis.

4.2.2 Demographic Characteristics

Question No 1

Respondents were asked to identify their sex.

Table 4.1: percentage distribution of respondents by sex

74

Sex Frequency Percentage

Male 101 52.0

Female 96 48.0

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2015

Table 1 above indicates that males constituted 101respondents which represents

0.52% of the respondents. Female respondents were 96 representing 0.48%,

questionnaires were distributed on equal ratio to both sexes. This implies that more

males than females returned their questionnaires.

4.1.2 Question No 2

Respondents were asked to indicate their ages.

Table II: Percentage distribution of age

Age range Frequency Percentage

18 -29 90 50.7%

30 – 39 47 19%

40 – 49 60 30.3%

50 – 59 - -

60 and above - -

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2015

75

Table II above shows that out of 197 respondents the highest proportion of 90

(50.7%) falls within the age range of 18 – 29, followed by 40 – 49 years age range

which constitutes 60 (30.3%). Respondents within the age range 30 – 39, who were

47 (19%), took third place.

4.1.3 Question No 3

Respondents were asked to indicate their religion

Table III: Percentage distribution of respondents by religion.

Alternatives Frequency Percentage

Islam 98 49.7

Christianity 72 36.5

Atheism 27 13.7

Total 197 100

Source: Survey Research, 2015

Table III above shows that out of 197 respondents, the highest proportion of 98

(49.7%) respondents practice Islam, following the above category are Christians

who constitute 72 (36.5%) respondents. The third in frequency level are atheists

who represent 27 (13.7%) respondents.

4.1.4 Question No 4

Respondents were asked to indicate their marital status

Table IV: Percentage distribution of respondents by marital status

76

Marital status Frequency Percentage

Married 120 60.9

Single 53 28.9

Divorced 12 6.1

Separated 2 1.01

Widow 7 1.56

Widower 3 1.5

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2015

Table IV shows that the number of respondents that are single represent 120

(60.9%), the married respondents were 53 (28.9%), divorced amount for 12

(6.1%) the separated respondents were 2 (1.01%), the widow were 7 (1.56%) and

finally the respondents that were widowers were 3 (1.5%)

4.1.5 Question No 5

The interests here are the educational qualification of the respondents

Table V: Percentage distribution of respondents by educational qualification

Educational background Frequency Percentage

Primary education - -

WAEC/SSCE - -

ND/NCE 50 28%

Degree – above 147 72%

77

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2013

Table V above shows that respondents with primary education amount for none,

none had WAEC/SSCE, while those with ND/NCE accounted for 50 (28%), those

with degree and above are 147 (72%).

SECTION B: Substantive Issues

Table 4.2: Are you a member of the current parliament?

Responses Frequency Percentage

Yes 177 89.4

No 20 10.6

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2015

The above table shows that majority of the respondents making 177 (89.4%) are

members of parliament, while 20 (10.6%) of the respondents are not.

Table 4.2.1: Is the nature of legislative institution in Nigeria peculiar?

Responses Frequency Percentage

Yes 152 77

No 45 22.54

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2015

78

Table VI above shows that the number of respondent that select yes were 152

(77%), while those that select no account for 45 (22.54%).

Table 4.2.2: Have Legislative oversight functions been carried out proficiently to

meet set goals?

Responses Frequency Percentage

Agree 102 51.8

Disagree 95 48.2

Undecided - -

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2015

The above table reveals that 102 (51.8%) of respondents agree while 95 (48.2%) of

respondents selected disagree.

Table 4.2.3:How will you rate the performance of legislators in performing

oversight functions?

Responses Frequency Percentage

Intermediate 190 96.4

Low 7 3.6

High - -

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2015

79

The table above shows that 190 (96.4%) of the respondents which constitute the

majority selected intermediate while a handful of 7 (3.6%) voted low.

Table 4.2.4: In your opinion are there challenges confronting the performance of

legislative oversight functions?

Responses Frequency Percentage

Yes 100 52.0

No 97 48.0

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2015

The above table reveals that 100 (52.0%) of the respondents voted yes, while the

remaining 97 (48.0%) voted against.

Table 4.2.5:Can these challenges be addressed?

Responses Frequency Percentage

Agree 90 45.68

Disagree 100 50.76

Undecided 7 3.55

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2015

The above table reveals that 90 (45.68%) of the respondents agree, 100 (50.76%)

of the respondents disagree, while 7 (3.55%) remained undecided.

80

Table 4.2.6:The performance of legislative oversight functions has very

significant impact on the activities of the National assembly during the period

within 2011 to 2015.

Responses Frequency Percentage

Agree 100 50.76

Disagree 97 49.24

Undecided - -

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2015

The above table shows that the numbers of respondents that agree are 100

(50.76%) while those that disagree make up 95 (49.24%), this shows that those

who agree are more.

Section C: For Parliamentarians (For Senate)

Name of Committee Estab &

Pub

Service

Interior Police

Affairs

Defence Education Petroleum

Downstrea

m

No of Briefs from

MDAs

No of Visits to MDAs

No of Project inspection

81

No of Engagement with

Appropriation

Bill/Budgetary Function

No of

Public/Investigative

Hearing

No of Public petitions

No of

Confirmation/Screening

of Nominees

No of Interactive

meetings/Sessions

No of Interviews

No of Bill Referrals

No of Resolutions

Total

For House of Representatives

Name of Committee Estabs &

Pub

Service

Interior Police

Affairs

Defence Education Petroleum

Downstrea

m

No of Briefs from

MDAs

82

No of Visits to MDAs

No of Project inspection

No of Engagement with

Appropriation

Bill/Budgetary Function

No of

Public/Investigative

Hearing

No of Public petitions

No of

Confirmation/Screening

of Nominees

No of Interactive

meetings/Sessions

No of Interviews

No of Bill Referrals

No of Resolutions

Total

Source: Survey Research 2015

4.3 TEST OF HYPOTHESES

83

The statistical tool used to test this hypothesis is chi-square; it can be expressed as

follows;

X ²=∑( O−EE

) ²

Where X² = Chi-square

∑ = Summation

O = Observed Frequency

E = Expected Frequency

Observed frequency is the number of times the event has occurred, while the

expected frequency is the number of times an event is expected to occur.

Where the calculated value of chi-square (X²) at the degree of freedom (V) and

0.05 level of significance is less than the tabulated value of chi-square, then we

accept the null hypothesis (Ho) and reject the alternate hypothesis (H1). Also,

where the calculated value of chi-square at the appropriate degree of freedom (df)

and the same level of significance (0.05), is greater than the tabulated value of chi-

square, then we accept the alternate hypothesis (H1) and reject the null hypothesis

(Ho).

To test the hypotheses responses to the question that is relevant to the hypotheses

will be used.

84

Hypotheses 1: The performance of legislative oversight functions has very

significant impact on the activities of the National assembly during the

period within 2011 to 2015.

It is tested using questionnaire data question number IV on the Li-chart, table VIII

Table 4.2.6: The performance of legislative oversight functions has very

significant impact on the activities of the National assembly during the period

within 2011 to 2015.

Responses Frequency Percentage

Agree 100 50.76

Disagree 97 49.24

Undecided - -

Total 197 100%

Source: Survey Research, 2015

CONTINGENCY TABLE

RESPONDENTS

( O−E ²E

)

Agree 100 98.5

Disagree 97 98.5

197

85

O E O-E O-E² O-E²/E

Agree 100 98.5 1.5 2.25 0.02

Disagree 97 98.5 -1.5 2.25 0.02

0.04

Tab

Calculated

3.84

Calculated value

Degree of freedom (df)

df = (r-1) (c-1)

(2-1) (2x1)

1x1 = 1

5% df at1 = 3.84

INTERPRETATION

Hence, since X²calculated is 0.04 and is less than the 5% at 1 which is 3.84, we

then accept the null hypothesis, so the performance of legislative oversight

functions has very significant impact on the activities of the National assembly

during the period within 2011 to 2015.

4.4 Discussion of Findings

86

The findings from the discussion above reveals that there is a clear cut

relationship between oversight function of legislature and that the significance of

the various committees in oversight to the national assembly cannot be

overemphasized. It also reveals that a weak legislature and by extension its

committees is incapable of exerting any influence in the political process of the

state and cannot be effective in ensuring checks and balance. Conversely, given

constitutional powers (either written or unwritten), the strong legislature will be

well positioned to broaden the democratic space; it can shape governance through

various media open to it.

It is also recorded that no doubt, committees in the central legislature have made

some impressive efforts at re-engineering the social, economic and political

spheres of the nation. However, the political instability, absence of national

cohesion and economic challenges in Nigeria has only been tackled at disparate

degrees. Political instability in form of constant regime change has been properly

managed, evidenced by the intervention of the legislature to prevent a breakdown

of the constitution in March 2012, spearheaded by committees. Volatile political

environment anchored by the excesses of the executive and political violence,

notwithstanding, still constitute threats to democratic survival. Because of the

level of inter-ethnic suspicion and tension in the polity, national cohesion has

remained unattainable, moreover.

This has even become complicated by the activities of some elements in the

legislature whose sole aim in being in committees is to enrich themselves illicitly.

Thus, in the political and social spheres, the legislature has not been able to put

the nation in the path of stability and normalcy as would have been anticipated.

Economically, while the state is yet to reach the expected height, it appears some

of the legislations passed by the assembly have enabled the executive to

87

implement certain policies that gradually put the country back on the part to

gradual growth. Consequently, while the legislature has sought to reengineer the

state on different fronts, it has been unable to do that because of factors both

internal and external to the assembly. Yet, much depends on the extent to which

the assembly enjoys smooth working relationship with the executive for it to get

most of its policy initiatives implemented. The Nigerian central legislature, via its

committees needs to do better on their integrity in the service of the federation.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter covers the summary of the research topic, conclusion based on the

findings of the research and recommendations for further research.

5.1 Summary

88

In any democratic arrangement, the legislative arm of government occupies a

central position in the machinery of government. Indeed, it has been observed that

the legislature is the connecting thread of the democratic process and arguably it’s

most central inst i tut ion. At a 2005 UN Summit, the speakers of parliament

resolved that parliament is the central institution through which the will of the

people is expressed, laws are passed, and government is held to account (Abati,

2010: 62). In Nigeria, the legislature is the first among the three organs of

government to be so recognized in the Constitution. Traditionally, the legislature

is vested with formal law making powers, which give legislators the authority to

influence public policy. Incidental to lawmaking is the legislative oversight

function, which is as important as the law making function itself. This is because

by nature, oversight is a follow-up activity intended to ensure that legislative goals

are met. In order words, the passing of a piece of legislation does not mean that all

is well. Oversight assures that the laws work. It encompasses every attempt by the

legislature to review, monitor and supervise government activities,

programmes and policies to ensure that they are legal, effective and efficient. Now,

considering the relatively large size of government, the oversight function can best

be undertaken through the committee system in which the entire legislature is

divided into committees with assigned responsibilities. The committee system in

contemporary times has become the power house of the legislature in both

advanced and emerging democracies. The trend towards the use of committees is

often seen as one of the distinctive features of modern democracies. To ensure the

achievement of satisfactory legislative outcomes, legislation is referred to

committees for in-depth scrutiny. The committee system has worked in the more

advanced legislatures. Through committees-the legislature shapes Bills, authorizes

expenditure and scrutinizes the activities of the executive. In Nigeria, the

committee system is the medium with which the National Assembly oversees the

89

government. In recent years, particularly since the commencement of the Fourth

Assembly in 1999, this function appears to be growing in prominence.

This study has examined the oversight activities of the Committees of the

National Assembly for the period, 2011 - 2015. The overriding objective is to

assess how effective the Committees had been in the performance of the oversight

function. The study is relatively comprehensive as it covers both the theoretical

and empirical aspects of oversight. It commenced with an introduction into the

legislature, reviewing the nature and functions of legislatures and their

committees. In this introductory part, other pertinent issues were considered

covering statement of research problems, objective of the study its significance

among others. The review of related literatures to the study was carried out in

chapter two and also a theoretical framework upon which the study was built was

also adopted in this chapter. Chapter 3 looked at areas such as; restoration of

democracy in Nigeria, overview of oversight function in the fourth republic and

oversight activities of some selected committees. Chapter Four detailed the

presentation and analysis of data collated from questionnaires so administered.

Chapter Five offered the summary, conclusion and recommendations.

5.2 Conclusion

The growing trend in modern democracies is the use of the Committee system

with an obvious advantage that it permits parliament to deploy its resources

efficiently and effectively, both in terms of people and time, to examine complex

and wide ranging issues more thoroughly than when they are discussed on the

floor of the House. For one thing, the whole House does not have the luxury of

time to consider matters in all particular details; hence, committee systems are

inevitable in the legislative and oversight business of the legislature. For another,

against the backdrop of the complexity and variety of the issues that face modern

90

legislatures, the demand on the time of legislators calls for specialization and

division of labour. This purpose is often very well served by Committees. As in

other countries, legislative committees of various types have assumed much of the

work of legislatures.

In creating committees, the general practice across countries is to recognize the

existing bureaucratic institutions, such as Ministries, Departments and Agencies as

well as other areas where legislative oversight is required. In other words, all

aspects of the executive arm of government have corresponding legislative

committees through which parliamentary oversight is exercised. Indeed, it is a

constitutional requirement in most democracies of the world that committees are

fashioned this way to reflect the size and reach of government to ensure that no

part of it is left out. In some other countries, legislative Committees are categorized

into sectors and groups aside from being special, standing committees and joint

committees of the House, In effect, committees whose functions and jurisdictions

are related fall into the same category for complementarities of functions and

decisions on issues within that locale. It should be added that the workings of the

committee system are only different in largely insignificant areas.

Every aspect of oversight is backed by law. The powers may be expressed or

implied in the Constitution. Another source of powers is the Standing Orders/

Rules of the parliament. In addition, the instruments with which the functions arc

performed are many. As a matter of fact, most legislatures have developed

constitutional mechanisms and tools designed to facilitate the performance of their

oversight functions in relation to the executive branch. The performance of this

role is done through a wide range of channels, organizations and structures.

Notably, the appropriation process provides an important opportunity for the

legislature to exercise legislative oversight. Through the legislative power of the

91

purse, all the Committees, particularly the Appropriation Committee, play

prominent roles in oversight and can influence executive behaviour and

government policy direction in the process. But, the legislature must understand

the operations of the government, to be able to make informed decisions on the

laws which it passes and to conduct oversight effectively. Considering the size of

Committees relative to the total number of members in both Chambers of the

National Assembly over the period of this study, on the surface, it seems that the

Committees are rather large. But, on a second thought, the reason for this is not far-

fetched. The executive arm of government, which the National Assembly oversees,

is complex and large. As such, the Committees would grow correspondingly.

Otherwise, the National Assembly may not be able to perform its responsibilities

effectively and efficiently. Thus, the observed number of committees is intended to

match the relatively large size and often complex executive arm of government.

However, the large number of committees has its attendant implications:

members' absenteeism and limited participation or non-participation in committees'

work and general adverse impact on output. Indeed, the implication of the large size

of committees was reinforced in the analysis as there were generally cases of

absenteeism at meetings. It is important to mention, however, that membership

needs to be related to the scope of mandates. From the international comparative

assessment, there appears not to be a standard practice as to the appropriate

committee size, although between 13 and 25 members has been suggested. In

Nigeria's case, a trade-off may have to be tolerated between number of committees

and the size of committees in view of the problem of limited participation of

members in committee work because of multiple memberships of committees.

5.3 Recommendations

92

Legislative oversight function is the eyes of the people in government that watch and monitor the activities of the executive arm and its agencies in the implementation of laws, programmes and policies meant to serve the collective interest of the electorates. It dictates waste, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, corruption, mismanagement of public resources, etc. Its relevance in democratic governance need not be overemphasized. Oversight function is essentially valuable in ensuring that the intent of the legislature in legislating laws that will improve the living standard of the poor is reflected in the performance of the executive functions.

It is traditional in any research endeavor that when problems are identified,

solutions are proffered. Proffering solutions takes the shape of recommendations.

Recommendations are directed at providing the leeway to solving the research

problem. It is against this background that the following recommendations are

advanced;

As important as its role in government, it must endeavor to conduct its oversight functions within the confine of the law that established the National Assembly. It is important to respect and observe the principle of separation of power as provided in the 1999 Constitution of the Federation.

Usurpation of functions and unguided encroachment into the constitutional functions of the executive and the judiciary arms is unnecessary and should therefore be guarded against in the performance of its oversight functions. Good governance is seriously undermined by the legislature’s

93

usurpation of both executive and judicial functions. The damaging effect of the legislature’s totalitarian approach to governance is made worse by the very high level of corruption prevailing in the country, precisely located at the echelon of government hierarchy where state looting, ungodly manipulations and low budget implementations are taking place.

The legislature should live above the board in all its public and private functions. The interest and unity of the country should override personal and collective interests of the legislative members. Congressional assignments are not and will not serve as sources of exploitation to enrich oneself. Dignity, integrity, fair play, accountability and transparency in the act of governance must always be the watch word of the legislature.

The legislature should see their membership in the National Assembly as a call to national duty which demands sacrifice, commitment to duty, sincerity of purpose in all aspects of governance and a demonstration of the true representatives of the people. Fraudulent enrichment is abhorred because it is a total aberration from our social value, against ethics of good governance, a disservice to expectations and aspirations of those who mortgaged their political power into your hands to represent their interest in government. Remember, these same people you will definitely meet again

94

on your way to the village. Which face and eyes will you use to look at them?

Orderliness, patience, perseverance, diligence and patriotism provide the answer for “service to mankind”. For as long as the above fraudulent incidents persist and invariably contribute further in undermining the system of government in this country, attainment of political stability and socio-economic development is certainly elusive in the near future.

The functions of the legislative oversight should advance beyond mere investigation and recommendation. There is need for constitutional and/or legal teeth to be structured for effective and efficient legislative oversight, as a watchdog on the executive arm and its agencies, to bite culprits or cause the persons found culpable to be sanctioned to serve as deterrent. The legislature should have legal power to compel the executive arm of government to take appropriate action to institute judicial panel of inquiry on matters that have been completely investigated by the legislature and the reports on such cases have been duly passed on to the executive to take logical conclusive action.

The legislature should have legal power to ensure that the executive would actually be cause to take such conclusive action on the matters referred to it by the law-makers. The era where cases are buried for fear of exposing powerful elements in government ought to be a thing of the past.

95

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Appendix

QUESTIONNAIRE ON:

OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS OF SOME SELECTED COMMITTEES IN THE

NIGERIA’S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 2011-2015

Department of Political Science and International Relations

Faculty of Social Science,

University of Abuja.

P.M.B 117.

Dear Respondent,

I am an M.sc student of the department of Political Science and International Relations,

university of Abuja. I am carrying out a research work on; Oversight Functions of Some

Selected Committees in the Nigeria’s National Assembly, 2011-2015 as part of the

101

requirement for the award of a B.sc degree. You are requested to kindly respond to the

questions contained in the questionnaire.

All responses shall be treated with confidentiality.

In sincerity

(Name)

Reg No: (not necessary)

SECTION A

SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

1. SEX: Male [ ] Female [ ]

2. AGE: 30 – 39 [ ]

40 – 49 [ ]

50 – 59 [ ]

60 and Above [ ]

3. RELIGION: Islam [ ] Jews [ ] Christianity [ ]

4. MARITAL STATUS: Married [ ] Single [ ] Divorced [ ]

Widow [ ] Widower [ ]

102

5. EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION: primary [ ] O’level [ ]

A’level and above [ ]

SECTION B: SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

6. Are you a member of the current parliament?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

7. Is the nature of legislative institution in Nigeria peculiar?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

If Yes, Briefly Explain_________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

8. Have Legislative oversight functions been carried out proficiently to meet set goals?

Agree [ ] Disagree [ ] Undecided [ ]

9. How will you rate the performance of legislators in performing oversight functions?

High [ ] Low [ ] Intermediate [ ]

103

10. In your opinion are there challenges confronting the performance of legislative oversight

functions?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

If Yes, Briefly explain______________________________________________________

11. Can these challenges be addressed?

Agree [ ] Disagree [ ] Undecided [ ]

12. The performance of legislative oversight functions has very significant impact on the

activities of the National assembly during the period within 2011 to 2015.

Agree [ ] Disagree [ ] Undecided [ ]

SECTION C:

FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS: Please fill in number of occurrences of each in the empty

column

Name of Committee

No of Briefs from MDAs

No of Visits to MDAs

No of Project inspection

No of Engagement with Appropriation Bill/Budgetary

Function

No of Public/Investigative Hearing

No of Public petitions

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No of Confirmation/Screening of Nominees

No of Interactive meetings/Sessions

No of Interviews

No of Bill Referrals

No of Resolutions

105