Orval E. Faubus Interview – JFK#1, 6/29/1967

Administrative Information

Creator: Orval E. Faubus

Interviewer: Larry J. Hackman

Date of Interview: June 29, 1967

Place of Interview: Huntsville, Arkansas

Length: 36 pages, 2 addenda

Biographical Note

Orval E. Faubus was Governor of Arkansas from 1955 to 1967. This interview focuses on

his support for John F. Kennedy during the 1956 vice presidential campaign, the 1960

presidential campaign, Robert F. Kennedy’s visit to Osceola, and Faubus’ stance on the

civil rights actions, among other topics.

Access

Open

Usage Restrictions

According to the deed of gift signed October 19, 1976, copyright of these materials has

been assigned to the United States Government. Users of these materials are advised to

determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish.

Copyright

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making

of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions

specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other

reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is

not to be “used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” If a

user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in

excesses of “fair use,” that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution

reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the

order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection

to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your

questions concerning copyright to the reference staff.

Transcript of Oral History Interview

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room

of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character

recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts.

Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have

occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any

concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the

transcripts and the interview recordings.

Suggested Citation

Orval E. Faubus, recorded interview by Larry H. Hackman, June 29, 1967, (page

number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

ORVAL E. FAUBUS

Table of Content

Page Topic

1 1956 vice presidential campaign

10, 16 Support for 1960 Kennedy ticket

11, 34 John F. Kennedy’s visit to Texarkana

12, 33 Robert F. Kennedy’s speech at Osceola

17 Appointment of Lawrence Brooks Hays

18 Desegregation

26, 28 Personal views on civil rights

28 Greer’s Ferry dedication

31 Little Rock incident

33 Addenda “Bob Kennedy”

34 Addenda “An Occurrence Following John F. Kennedy’s Campaign

Appearance at Texarkana”

Oral History Interview1

with

ORVAL E. FAUBUS

June 29, 1967

Huntsville, Arkansas

By Larry J. Hackman

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: Governor Faubus [Orval E. Faubus], do you remember when you first

met John Kennedy [John F. Kennedy]?

FAUBUS: Yes, I’m sure the first time I met him was at the 1956 Democratic

Convention in Chicago. Adlai Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] was

nominated for president, and then decided to leave it to the convention

to pick his running mate. It had been traditional for the nominee for president to indicate his

choice for running mate, but in this instance Mr. Stevenson did not. So a wide open race

developed for the nomination for vice president. John F. Kennedy was one of the main

contenders. There were also Estes Kefauver [Carey Estes Kefauver], Hubert Humphrey

[Hubert H. Humphrey] and others. It happened that Arkansas was one of the states that led

the drive for Kennedy. We had two members of our delegation who were pretty strong for

Kefauver, but I don’t think the Kefauver supporters numbered over five or six in the entire

delegation and perhaps didn’t constitute more than two or three votes because many

delegates had a half vote. The convention had balloted the first time. Then Arkansas, which

was near the head of the roll call, started the parade for John F. Kennedy for the nomination

of vice president.

1 The interviewee later made revisions in the text.

At one point Kennedy was within thirty seconds or a minute of having the

nomination. Seated right in front of the Arkansas dele-

[-1-]

gation was the California delegation. The California delegation, I believe was for Kefauver. I

noticed Jim Farley [James A. Farley] come by and talk to some members of the delegation.

He had also visited us; we were very friendly with Jim Farley. When it looked like Kennedy

was going to get the nomination, state after state went for him, and his votes began to pile up

rapidly. At one point 50 percent, or perhaps 2/3 of the California delegates were on their feet

clamoring to go for Kennedy. I think the one man who kept John Kennedy from getting the

vice presidential nomination was James Roosevelt from California, who was with the

California delegation. He stood up and stopped the clamor for recognition within the

California delegation. He said, “Now, just hold on, don’t stampede, just stay quiet. Hold the

lines.” Roosevelt was holding the delegation for Kefauver. Then Tennessee voted and, of

course, went for Kefauver, although there’d been a split in the delegation as some of the

Tennessee delegates weren’t too happy with Kefauver.

HACKMAN: Right, I’ve heard that.

FAUBUS: We had information that even the Tennessee delegation might not go

for Kefauver. And if it didn’t, then, of course, the stampede would be

for Kennedy completely.

Governor Raymond Gary [Raymond Dancel Gary] of Oklahoma, head of that state’s

delegation, was a very good close personal friend of mine. I’d talked to him, tried to get him

to go with us for Kennedy. He had led the fight for Harriman [William Averell Harriman].

He had gotten discontented with the Stevenson people because they’d accepted a national

committeeman from his state that was contrary with him. The reason the Oklahoma

delegation didn’t go with us for Kennedy was because Gary felt that it’d be much easier to

carry Oklahoma for a man with a farm background, rather than Kennedy, because we’d

already nominated Stevenson, who, although from a farm state, had no farm background. He

was a professional and businessman from Chicago. So after considering it, Gary took his

delegation for Humphrey and Kefauver, I’ve forgotten which. When Tennessee went for

Kefauver and Oklahoma didn’t go with us for Kennedy, then Kefauver got the nomination by

a small margin.

HACKMAN: Right.

FAUBUS: But if James Roosevelt hadn’t held his delegation at that momentary

time when it looked like a majority were clamoring to go for

Kennedy—and not just his delegation, but others—then Kennedy

would have swept it. But when Roosevelt held the California delegation and then Tennessee

and Oklahoma went against Kennedy, it settled down to a tight race and Kefauver came out

with the victory.

[-2-]

Following this, when both nominees had been chosen, and Harriman and others came

on the stage with Stevenson—if you recall the pictures and the television coverage of the

Convention—they were all up there holding up their hands in a gesture of unity, and here

stood young Kennedy quietly in the aisle just back of the Arkansas delegation. So some of us

went out and said, “Go on up, you belong there, too. You’re entitled to the limelight.” We

urged him down the aisle toward the stage and he shortly appeared on the platform. He was

the last to join the group on the stage in the unity move when the battle was over.

That was my first association with John F. Kennedy. It was very pleasant, and, of

course, we were very friendly toward him. Arkansas, being from this particular section of the

country and being near the head of the roll call, contributed, I think, a great deal to John

Kennedy’s near victory in the contest for the vice presidential nomination in 1956.

HACKMAN: Well, I remember, I think Arkansas, in the first ballot had gone for

Gore [Albert Arnold Gore, Sr.].

FAUBUS: Yes.

HACKMAN: And Senator Fulbright [James W. Fulbright] at that time had

nominated, or had been asked to nominate Humphrey. I’m not sure if

he nominated.

FAUBUS: I believe he did.

HACKMAN: But, do you recall then how it came about that the Arkansas delegation

went for Kennedy on the second ballot? Had you talked with anyone

from the Kennedy people, or who had been influential in this decision?

FAUBUS: No, no one had talked to them. We just decided that’s the way we

wanted to go. Because Fulbright, without any disrespect to him, had no

influence with the Arkansas delegation. Peculiarly the Arkansas

Delegation was made up of a cross section of the state. We had some very liberal labor

leaders, Odell Smith of the Teamsters, Henry Woods who was one of their attorneys, who

was the executive secretary of McMath [Sidney Sanders McMath], in the administration in

which I had worked. We had Bob Young [Robert A. Young, III] who was head of one of the

biggest truck lines in Arkansas. We had people from eastern Arkansas, like Mayor Ben

Butler [Benjamin F. Butler] of Osceola; Harold Ohlendorf [Harold F. Ohlendorf], who is

now president of the Farm Bureau. We had people like Arthur Carter, county judge of Carroll

County; J. E. Dunlap, Jr., who is the

[-3-]

editor of a paper at Harrison; a complete cross section, and no one element dominated the

Arkansas delegation. In the beginning they were split between Harriman, Symington [W.

Stuart Symington, II], and Stevenson for the presidency with three delegates, I believe being

for Kefauver for the presidential nomination. No one, I’m sure, I know I didn’t, had talked to

any of the Kennedy People. We just decided that Kennedy was the best candidate for us and

the one with whom to win in the coming presidential race.

HACKMAN: I was wondering if Senator McClellan [John L. McClellan] or

Congressman Oren Harris had been at all for Kennedy or against

Kennedy, do you recall what their feelings were at that time? Or did

they have any more influence than Fulbright had really?

FAUBUS: Well, I’m sure that either one of them might have had more influence

with the delegation than Senator Fulbright. I don’t recall that we ever

consulted Senator McClellan on this particular matter, but he had been

very closely associated with the Kennedy family through his work on this Committee in

Washington where Bobby Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] had been Chief Counsel. I know

that when Senator McClellan’s son was killed in a plane accident in Arkansas that Bobby

Kennedy came with him to Arkansas to attend the funeral. We knew there was a close

relationship there. All this was very hectic. There was no time, we had no communications. It

was the biggest mass of confusion that I’ve ever seen, even worse than a campaign

headquarters. So just among ourselves in consultation we just decided Kennedy’s the man we

wanted to go for and we went.

HACKMAN: I was wondering, I think the Arkansas delegation was sitting close to

the Massachusetts delegation at that point, I wondered if any

friendships had developed during the convention.

FAUBUS: No, not particularly. We saw John McCormack [John William

McCormack]. I knew him pretty well. I’m not sure that he would have

known me at that time; he might have. I remember noticing

McCormack and one of the Kennedys—and I’ve forgotten now whether it was Bobby or the

president—in very close and animated conversation. We understood there was some

difficulty between McCormack and one of the Kennedys and Mr. Kennedy, whichever one it

was, stood quietly and spoke occasionally. But Mr. McCormack being for Mr. Kennedy for

the vice presidential

[-4-]

nomination. Now, this was just our haze understanding we knew nothing definite.

HACKMAN: As far as McCormack’s role, there’s always been some discussion

about the roll call when the Kennedy tide was on the way up and then

all of a sudden the Kefauver tide broke and turned in the opposite

direction; about the recognition of various states by Rayburn [Samuel Taliaferro Rayburn],

who was the chairman at that time. Do you recall anything at all about recognition of states

who were attempting to gain….

FAUBUS: No, I don’t, but it seems to me that the recognition of states happened

to be those that were more or less favorable to Kefauver. But we knew

nothing about whether this was deliberate or just by change in the

confusion. But I know that the California delegates, there must have been at least 2/3 of them

on their feet, were clamoring for recognition. They wanted to change their vote and go for

Kennedy before the end of the roll call. If California had ever gotten recognition, and had

changed its vote to Kennedy, it would have been a runaway. But James Roosevelt stopped

that. I was sitting just behind him to the right and was, in other words, a ringside spectator to

this interplay within the California delegation. When he stood and spoke, most of them

quieted and many sat down. There were a lot of labor people in the California delegation and

Roosevelt had a great deal of influence with them. He might have been the controlling factor

in the delegation, I don’t know, but he exercised some influence there that was quite decisive.

If he had been willing, and asked for recognitions, he might have gotten it, I don’t know. It is

my strong conviction that if California had gotten recognition they would have changed their

vote to Kennedy, and if they had polled the delegation they would have voted for Kennedy

unless Roosevelt had enough influence to stop them.

HACKMAN: Well, as far as the Arkansas delegation went, do you recall if its

reaction toward Kennedy was more a personality thing, in other words,

that he would run strong? Because I would think that he had been

identified as supporting Benson’s [Ezra Taft Benson] farm policies in some cases and also

the religious problem might have presented some problem for Arkansas people, or were these

issues really considered, do you recall?

FAUBUS: Well there was no time for calm deliberation at the moment. We

considered them; these things were in our minds, of course. Tom

Harper [Thomas Harper], who is now national committeeman from

Arkansas, was a member of the delegation, an

[-5-]

attorney from Forth Smith. I remember discussing this briefly with him. We didn’t think the

religious question would be any serious handicap as far as the vice presidency was

concerned. For the presidency it was a different thing, and we recognized that. We wanted

someone who had some appeal to the voters. Now, the Kennedys at that time were sort of

known to us as middle-of-the-road people, they were not extreme liberals, nor extreme

conservatives. Kefauver had quite a bit of disfavor in the state because he’s from the South

and many southerners felt that he had been too liberal on some of the issues which vitally

affected the region. So the delegation was not for Kefauver, We accepted him with good

grace once he was nominated, but we also felt he was a weak candidate. It turned out to be

the case Kefauver didn’t even carry his own state for the Democratic ticket whereas we

carried Arkansas for Stevenson and Kefauver, in spite of our feeling that they were two if the

weakest candidates that could be nominated so far as Arkansas was concerned. We felt that

Kennedy was the best candidate to get votes and that he was not an extremist.

HACKMAN: I see. Well, then moving on from the Convention, did you have any

other connection with Senator Kennedy or the people around him, let’s

say, from ’56 to ’59 or early ’60, before the campaign really got

going?

FAUBUS: Not that I recall.

HACKMAN: Do you recall if you followed his career at all closely and what your

attitude would have been in those periods?

FAUBUS: Well, I follow everyone’s career pretty closely in public life in

America, and we knew of the developments as they came about. And

when the ’60 convention came I was in the midst of a campaign and

didn’t attend. Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] from a neighboring state was a

candidate for the presidency. The Arkansas delegation went to the convention in California

officially uninstructed, but unofficially instructed by me, or asked by me, or requested by me,

to support Lyndon Johnson all the way, which they did. I was in the midst of a campaign and

what the Arkansas delegation did at the convention would have some effect on political

fortunes at home. Our primary was not over, and I was a candidate for renomination in the

primary. In ’56 the primaries were over and we could go to the convention and be more free

to decide on the candidates that we thought were the best candidates to win. In 1960 we had

to be mindful of the effect of the action of the Arkansas delegation on our own races here in

the state, mine and others.

[-6-]

HACKMAN: Well, in this period, let’s say, between ’56 and ’60, do you recall when

you attended the National Governors’ Conferences in those years, was

anybody particularly active at this level for Kennedy in relation to you,

do you remember?

FAUBUS: No, I don’t recall that they were, I saw Senator Kennedy only once, I

believe, during that period. The friendly relationship that developed

from the ’56 convention was carried over. Mr. Tom Harper and others

in the Arkansas Bar Association invited Senator Kennedy to speak to the Association annual

meeting at Hot Springs. At that time I was in St. Joseph’s Hospital in Hot Springs, which,

incidentally, was a Catholic facility, recovering from minor surgery. Senator Kennedy,

accompanied by Mr. Harper, came to my room to visit me after speaking at the Bar

Association meeting. This is the only time that I met him personally, that I recall, until after

he was nominated for president in 1960.

HACKMAN: What were your feelings toward Senator Johnson at that time, in ’60?

Was your, or was that support of the Arkansas delegations for him

strictly from the standpoint of the situation in the state? Or how serious

had his efforts been in the state, in contact with you?

FAUBUS: I had no more personal contact with President Johnson than I had with

Senator Kennedy at the time, very few personal contacts with either.

The support of Johnson in the convention of ’60, I’d say was based 75

to 90 percent on the political facts of life rather than any personal inclinations.

HACKMAN: Had any Kennedy people been working in the state before the

convention in ’60, or had they been in contact with you as far as trying

to get your support for him?

FAUBUS: They had been in contact with members of the delegations. I don’t

remember any contact with me. But, of course, there again, there

wasn’t much time. I was in the midst of a campaign for renomination

and any contacts I would have had with them would have been quietly through

intermediaries. There were none.

HACKMAN: Did you ever discuss the question of the nomination with McClellan,

Senators McClellan or Fulbright, or any of these people in the

delegation…

[-7-]

FAUBUS: I don’t recall that I did. I had discussed the presidential nomination for

1956 with both Senator Fulbright and Senator McClellan, each one

individually. But there was no discussion with either in 1960.

HACKMAN: I don’t know whether you’d want to talk about that. As far as not

going to the convention in ’60, was this completely dependent on your

involvement in the campaign in Arkansas? I know there were some

comments that the demonstrations of the Faubus for President group out at Los Angeles had

something to do with it.

FAUBUS: No, it really didn’t. I know there’s a lot of speculation on that, but I

think it’s safe to say that it did not. Sometimes maybe these things

influence you unconsciously to some degree, but I don’t recall that I

was conscious of any feeling about that particular matter. If I had been with the delegation it

would have assumed the same attitude which it did—to support Lyndon Johnson for the

presidency. The Faubus for President demonstration at the convention was as surprising to

me as to the others.

HACKMAN: Had other people in the South approached you to go to the convention

and sort of lead the South as an area at the convention in relation to the

platform and the candidate?

FAUBUS: Yes, I was approached a number of times, but any time it was

mentioned to me I told them that I had a race of my own and that I

would have to give my undivided attention to that and so, invariably, it

was pursued no farther. So, there was no lengthy discussion of the matter.

HACKMAN: What about the National State’s Rights party that nominated you for

the presidency at that point. What was your opinion of this group? And

what, if any, contacts if you have with them?

FAUBUS: I don’t recall that I ever met any of those people except one lady from

Arkansas who attended the convention. I disavowed the nomination as

soon as the work reached me. And the fact of the matter is, which

would come later on in

[-8-]

this, I talked to Bobby Kennedy personally about the situation in Florida where my name had

been placed on the ballot by petition. This was after I had already been nominated for

governor in Arkansas, which was tantamount in reelection. I told Bobby I would leave my

name on the ballot in Florida or take it off, whichever he said. I said, “You make the decision

and tell me what you want me to do.” He called back later and said maybe it would be better

for them if I took my name off the ballot in Florida. President Kennedy later told me in a

joking way that they were afraid that I would carry the state, but I think he was only

flattering me.

HACKMAN: Getting back to the convention when you were talking about Bobby

Kennedy, I had heard somewhere that at one point he had told the

Arkansas delegation, or virtually told them to stick with Johnson, in a

way saying that they didn’t really want the Arkansas vote. Do you think that was ever the

case?

FAUBUS: If so, I never did know of it.

HACKMAN: I know, I think…

FAUBUS: They contacted the delegation in California in an attitude of wanting

their support. But they were told by the leaders of the delegation,

which I believe, Tom Harper was chairman of the delegation, that their

decision had already been made and there just wasn’t anything they could do about it. They

had to stick with Johnson and they were going to stick with him all the way, which they did.

HACKMAN: And I know at one point, I think, maybe in a slip up Senator Kennedy

had said, well, he didn’t think he needed the South to win the

nomination and to carry the country. I think it sort of angered some of

the people at that point.

FAUBUS: Well, most people are a little sensitive about their influence or whether

they’re wanted or needed.

HACKMAN: After the convention then, as far as the presidential campaign, you

came out, I believe, in September, and said that you would support the

Democratic ticket. Do you recall how that decision came about, was

this basically dependent on the primaries being over, or…

FAUBUS: The primaries were over. I was the nominee of the

[-9-]

Party and had been the nominee of the party in the past, both here in

this county [Madison] and on the state level. So I announced that I

would support the Democratic ticket.

HACKMAN: Did the Kennedy people ever approach you in this period and discuss

what administration policies would possibly be if they were elected in

an effort to get your support during the campaign? Or were you ever

approached at all by them?

FAUBUS: Not personally. I was in close touch with their people in Arkansas. In

fact, they sent a man to Arkansas who stayed in the Democratic

headquarters in Little Rock all the time. I don’t recall his name. The

man who is now a federal judge, Judge Pat Mehaffy, was our main contact with the Kennedy

people. He made trips to Washington, to the headquarters to Arkansas contacted him.

Mehaffy kept me fully informed.

HACKMAN: Was there every any effort to set up a Kennedy organization outside

the regular Democratic organization in the state, or did they try to

work completely through…

FAUBUS: They worked through the Democratic organization. So far as I recall

there was no effort to set up anything outside of the Democratic

organization.

HACKMAN: Johnson, at that time the vice presidential nominee, called at one time,

I think, a unity conference to get people in the South together at

Nashville after the convention. Did you attend that, do you recall?

FAUBUS: No. I don’t recall if we had a representative, we might have, but I

don’t recall. We felt that the best way for us was to go ahead and do

what we could for the Democratic ticket in Arkansas, without being

aligned with groups which were constructed to be by some as trying to organize certain

groups in the South regardless of the feelings of other and people generally.

HACKMAN: Did the Kennedy people ever make any effort to organize the Negro

vote in Arkansas outside the Democratic organization, do you recall, to

work with any of the Negro leaders?

FAUBUS: Yes, they did, but not outside the Democratic organization. It was

using someone who was in our Democratic staff.

[-10-]

HACKMAN: Some of the Negro people who supported you, then they would

work…

FAUBUS: Yes, and many of the white leaders, political leaders, also.

HACKMAN: Do you have any recollection of Kennedy’s trip to Texarkana in

September of 1960? Can you remember discussing that?

FAUBUS: Yes, I went down and joined them. We met them at the airport. We

had a parade through the city. The district fair at Texarkana was under

way at the time and there was a tremendous crowd of people in the

city, one of the largest I’ve ever seen there. The streets were full. I remember there were

hundreds and hundreds of young people. They had come to the fair and not so much to the

political rally. But here was a national figure and they were all interested in seeing him and

he got a very fine reception. I appeared with him on the platform along with Senator

Fulbright, Senator McClellan, I believe, and some of the political leaders from Texas.

HACKMAN: I know usually when he came in to speak in the state he would always

identify more closely, it seemed, with the congressional delegation

than he would with you. Did you ever discuss that with him or…

FAUBUS: No. No. I never discussed that matter with him. But this is only

natural. A president is going to have to work with the congressional

delegation and they knew that I wasn’t doing anything to hurt them.

They knew also that the whole state Democratic organization, which was my organization,

no question about that, was working with them. So there was really no need for them to use

persuasion with me. Sometimes the influence of a political leader is greatly overestimated. I

think this is especially true in Arkansas. The people have never very much been told by any

political leader for whom to vote in a presidential race, or any other. I discussed this at some

length with Bobby Kennedy, when he was invited, with my knowledge and consent, to come

to Osceola.

HACKMAN: When was this?

FAUBUS: This was later in the campaign, after Senator Kennedy, the presidential

nominee, had appeared at Texarkana. I went to Osceola and appeared

on the platform with Bobby Kennedy and the political leaders of that

area. With my

[-11-]

knowledge the situation was discussed, and Bobby was told that if he stayed away from

certain subjects and stressed others, that would help a great deal. Following this advice, his

speech was built mainly around the work of the committees which were investigating the

corruption in government and the racketeers. He stressed those matters, which had

considerable favor in this state.

However, they didn’t carry that county, Mississippi County. It voted Republican in

that election in the race for president. I had always been strong in Mississippi County; I’d

carried it overwhelmingly. In this instance, the political strength of one man could not be

transferred to another. This has always been peculiarly true in Arkansas. There have never

been slates in this state. Our candidates, as governors, lieutenant governor, secretary of state,

attorney general, etc., each runs independently. Whereas, in Louisiana you have the Morrison

[James H. Morrison] slate, the Long [Russell B. Long] slate, McKeithen [John J. McKeithen]

slate, whoever the political leaders are. But in this state each person always runs

independently because our races have been in the primaries, as they have been in Louisiana,

or course, also.

I explained this to Bobby Kennedy, but he said to me, he didn’t infer it, he said it

directly, “Well, we know that whatever is done in the state, however it goes, is up to you.” I

replied, “I would certainly, in all sincerity and honestly, like to disabuse you of that idea. I’m

for you. I’ve endorsed you publicly. I appeared with the presidential nominee at Texarkana.

I’ve come up here to appear with you, in an area where the Kennedys are not popular. So I’m

doing all that I can, but don’t be under the misapprehension that I can carry the state for you

or take it away from you.” He didn’t seem to believe me.

I understand in some of the states in the Northeast a political leader has such strength

that he can take a state one way or the other, depending upon his choice. But that wasn’t true

in Arkansas at that time, and it isn’t true now. I think that my endorsement of the Democratic

ticket and my open support, without being too active, was as much as I could do. It would

have been dangerous for me to be too active. I wouldn’t have gotten any more votes for the

presidential nominee than were gotten anyhow and I would have jeopardized my own

fortunes severely. I was as much help to them as I could have been, because the people who

were my leaders, like Ben Butler [Benjamin F. Butler] and Ohlendorf [Harold F. Ohlendorf]

in eastern Arkansas, other political leaders, because I endorsed Kennedy and went along,

they also went. But this still doesn’t have a great deal of effect on the rank and file. That’s

the reason Bobby Kennedy was carefully instructed to avoid certain

[-12-]

subjects as much as possible and stress others that had favor in the state. I don’t know how

much effect Bobby’s appearance had in Arkansas but we did invite him to come; we were

courteous and helpful as we could be during his visit. From Osceola Bobby flew to Chicago

with Senator McClellan. At that time Senator McClellan had never endorsed the Kennedy

candidacy. The fact of the matter is we had some difficulty in getting Senator McClellan to

be at Osceola to introduce Bobby Kennedy. But after he had agreed to introduce Bobby and

appeared with us, and then had flown with Bobby from there to Chicago, this more or less,

well, had a tendency to cement relations with the Kennedys. Up to that time I was the leading

political figure in Arkansas who had endorsed the Democratic ticket. My endorsement was

not so much a personal thing or an espousal of the Kennedy philosophy of government, but

as the Democratic nominee for governor of the state, I announced I would support all of the

Democratic nominees, which included the candidates for president and vice president.

HACKMAN: What effect did the Johnson nominee as vice president have in

Arkansas? Did this help measurably?

FAUBUS: Not very much. The election was so close in Arkansas in that

particular race that any one of a number of things may have made the

difference. I don’t think there’s any question without my endorsement

at that time Kennedy would have lost the state. I think my endorsement,—this sounds self-

serving, but I’m trying to evaluate objectively and as honestly as I can,—perhaps had the

biggest influence on the way the state went. But still, that might not have been enough, it was

so close. The endorsement of Senator McClellan, or having Johnson on the ticket as vice

president, could have made the difference. Perhaps Bobby’s appearance at Osceola could

have made the difference stressing the subjects which he did, in his speech. Because of the

closeness of the election in Arkansas, Johnson as a running mate may have been decisive, but

that circumstance had minimal influence on the state as a whole.

HACKMAN: Was civil rights the overriding issue of importance in Arkansas in that

election? Or how much influence did other things, religion and

agriculture, maybe other things have?

FAUBUS: Religion had an appreciable effect. But not nearly as much as the civil

rights issue. Without the civil rights issue Kennedy would have swept

the state over-

[-13-]

whelmingly, in spite of, or regardless of, the religious angle. But all of this made a

difference. Yes, he lost many votes in some church groups, many of which carried on an

organized effort in opposition to his candidacy. Some people who had been life long

Democrats voted Republican in that particular race. The civil rights issue was the overriding

question.

HACKMAN: Were any of these religious groups in contact with you in an effort to

prevent you from endorsing the ticket at all?

FAUBUS: Yes, yes, some of them were quite unhappy with me. There was no

open organized effort directed towards me, but I was contacted by

leaders in various sections.

HACKMAN: In the campaign, in September, I believe, there was a Southern

Governors’ Conference here at Hot Springs that year. Price Daniel

[Marion Price Daniel] who was Governor of Texas was elected the

chairman, and some people interpreted that as an attempt to get the ticket behind Johnson and

Kennedy. Do you recall your role in this or if this was the purpose here?

FAUBUS: No, I’ve forgotten that the conference was in Arkansas that year, but I

guess that’s right. Price Daniel, who was the governor of Texas and

known—or thought—to be very close to the vice presidential nominee,

was nominated and elected as chairman. I had nothing whatsoever to do with it. I didn’t play

any role. Usually politicking for the chairmanship is held to a minimum in the southern

conference. Something was made of the fact that I was the senior governor at the time and

was passed over. However, I was elected vice chairman at the time. I never actively sought a

position of this kind, and it’s only seldom that anyone does in the conference. I think

Daniel’s election was overly emphasized as having a significance that wasn’t there. It had

some significance, perhaps, for the national publicity. I had no objection because I thought a

lot of Price Daniel. I think he’s one of the finest and one of the most able politicians and

public figures that I have known in the nation. The fact of the matter is we could have carried

the state for Daniel much easier than for the senator from Texas.

HACKMAN: Was this feeling demonstrated on the part of other governors from the

South, do you think, this feeling that Johnson was not helping the

ticket that much, or do you recall any expressions of that attitude?

FAUBUS: Well, many of the governors were talking about it as were many other

southerners.

[-14-]

HACKMAN: You mean, about why he got on the ticket in the first place?

FAUBUS: No. As to how much he was helping. I think, looking back, that

Kennedy’s selection of Johnson, perhaps, resulted in his election

where he would have lost. Because he had a difficult time in carrying

Texas, as you know, which is a big state, as well as some of the others. I think there would

have been a consensus among the governors that the nomination of Johnson certainly helped

in the South, but that it was not nearly as much help, that it had not nearly as much weight as

was given it in the national press and among national political figures.

HACKMAN: Do you recall, Ross Barnett [Ross R. Barnett] of Mississippi at that

time was making some effort to use unpledged electors in some of the

southern states. Do you recall him making any effort at the governors’

conference in relation to that? Or anything…

FAUBUS: No, for the most part these things were left out of the conference. This

has been especially true in the southern conference. We’ve regarded

the conference as working sessions, or where we could have some

fellowship and get acquainted, which was quite a pleasure to the political figures, their

families and members of their delegations. We felt the work that was done, which was

beneficial to all of us, was more important than the political angles. The states of the South

are quite independent. Arkansas is not going any certain way because Louisiana does, or

Mississippi, or Alabama, or Florida, and neither is any other state going to do this. Each is a

sort of political entity of its own, depending upon the regional tides, and local issues within

the state, as well as the personalities and influences of the political leaders.

If you will recall, unpledged electors were on the ballot in Arkansas. Those of us who

supported Kennedy figures that this was a help. Those who supported Nixon [Richard M.

Nixon], especially some of the religious groups, made a terrific effort. They started telephone

campaigns, urging, “Don’t vote for these unpledged electors. This is going to cause us to lose

the state to Kennedy and Johnson.” Very likely, if the unpledged electors hadn’t been on the

ballot, Nixon might have carried the state. He would have had a better opportunity because

he could have pulled a few more of what we call bandwagon votes. Nearly all those who

voted for the unpledged electors, preferred Nixon over Kennedy.

[-15-]

HACKMAN: At the time of the governors’ conference there was a telegram sent and

signed by ten of the southern governors, including yourself, I believe,

in support of the Kennedy ticket. Do you recall how this developed? I

think everybody, other than Ross Barnett, was a party to it.

FAUBUS: I think perhaps this originated with the governor of Texas [Marion

Price Daniel].

HACKMAN: I had heard or read that it might have had something to do with the

debate that was being held at that time. The people were influenced by

Kennedy’s debate against Nixon. Did that have any influence at all?

FAUBUS: It might have had some. I don’t recall trying to evaluate the matter. It

had no particular influence with me. I signed the telegram more or less

for the same reason that I had endorsed Kennedy to begin with.

HACKMAN: What areas of the state did Kennedy have the most trouble in, do you

recall, what were the reasons?

FAUBUS: The eastern part of the state, and some of the counties in the southern

section. There’s always some difficulty up here [northwest section]. I

think I lost two counties in the general election by my endorsement of

Kennedy, Washington and Benton Counties, two large counties here. But this area, in the

northwest corner, constitutes the major Republican strength in the state and has for years. I

lost some counties in this particular section, I feel sure, because of my endorsement of the

Democratic ticket. So his difficulty in this region was no more than any other Democratic

candidate. Well, I’d say it was a little more than other Democratic nominees has because this

constituted a basic Republican strength, coupled with the dissatisfaction with the issues

prevalent at the time. The religious issue had considerable bearing in northwest Arkansas.

HACKMAN: All right, moving on from the election then, did you have any meetings

with Kennedy or his people between the time of the election and the

inauguration as to possibly what policies would be in regard to

Arkansas, or any other thing?

FAUBUS: No. I never had a personal conference with President Kennedy after he

was elected.

[-16-]

HACKMAN: What did you anticipate as far as what the accents of the Kennedy

administration would be, do you recall having any preconceptions

about what they might do?

FAUBUS: Many of the people in the state felt that with the Kennedy

background—his father was a free enterprise businessman and a

member of the Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt] administration—he

would not be an extremist on any issue. He was highly regarded as an individual. Many

people admired his intelligence, and his ability to handle situations. Here and there someone

would express some concern at his youthfulness and inexperience, but this, in my judgment,

was only minor. I did confer with him on two or three occasions by telephone. And he told

me that he would consult with me on appointments from Arkansas. So when he decided to

name Brooks Hays [Lawrence Brooks Hays] to—what was the first position he named him

to?—was it a presidential advisor?

HACKMAN: That was the second, first he was over—let’s see, he’d been over with

TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority], or REA [Rural Electrification

Administration], one of the two, TVA, I think. And let’s see the…

FAUBUS: Anyhow, while he was in Florida, he called me and I very honestly

told him my opinion. I said, “Now, I’m a great believer in a man

having his own people and if this is the man you want it’s all right

with me. I’ll tell you quite frankly it won’t help you the least bit here. The people to whom

Hays appeals, you already have. So you won’t gain any votes whatsoever, except maybe one

here and there because of the state pride. What you need to do is branch out and pull in some

people who have influence with other groups. Certainly, you’ll have influence with other

groups. Certainly, you’ll have to name some people from these groups that are already for

you…”

HACKMAN: I’m going to reserve this thing so we can get …

[BEGIN SIDE II OF TAPE I]

FAUBUS: I told him I had no objection, Brooks Hays was a fine man and I hoped

would do him a good job, but that it wouldn’t help him.

Now a difficulty developed. I was informed by the Kennedy Administration that this

arrangement would be kept behind the scenes.

[-17-]

Then it leaked out and was in the press that Hays had been cleared with me, and that I

approved of the selection. Then in self-protection and in self-defense I had to issue a

statement in which I told the truth; that the president had called me; that I had told him that I

was a great believer in an official having his own people whoever he wanted in his

administration; that I had no objection to Mr. Hays’ appointment, but that it wouldn’t help

him the least bit in Arkansas; that Brooks Hays was known as a man of vacillation; that he

bent like a reed in the wind with every breeze that blew; and that it [the appointment] wasn’t

going to help the president any. Well, naturally, they didn’t consult with me anymore. But,

someone didn’t keep the faith on the national level by leaking the matter to the press, and

putting me on the spot. I had not asked to be consulted in the first place. I was glad to be

consulted if I could be of help, and told the president I appreciated it, and that I would give

him the benefit of any information I had and my completely truthful evaluation and

viewpoint on such matters for whatever benefit they would be to him.

HACKMAN: Were there ever any other later appointments that you objected to or

tried to make a recommendation on?

FAUBUS: No, he made some appointments later, which I highly approved, such

as Pat Mehaffy for federal judge, and I had no objection to the people

he named as attorneys for the Justice Department in the state. I believe

there are two, one in the eastern and one in the western district. Some people were named in

the national administration, who were good friends of mine and friendly to me, but they were

in minor positions.

HACKMAN: Had you felt, let’s say, at the beginning of the administration that a

great deal of change in the desegregation of schools and public

accommodations, et cetera, would be pushed in the Kennedy

administration? Or did you feel it was inevitable?

FAUBUS: We didn’t know. As I said before, there was a feeling among the

people in the state,—and the feeling of the people was more important

so far as Kennedy’s fortunes

[-18-]

were concerned, rather than mine as an individual or political leader, because I’ve already

stated, influence or strength is not transferred from one man to another in Arkansas, except to

the bare minimum. But there was a feeling among the people in the state that he wouldn’t be

an extremist and many people were very deeply disappointed when he went as strong as he

did on the civil rights thing.

HACKMAN: When something like this would take place in the state, for instance, a

push to desegregate a school by the Justice Department, for instance,

would you be consulted on this, or would they try to go directly to the

community first in a persuasive effort or how was this usually handled?

FAUBUS: I wasn’t consulted. It appeared that they worked mostly with the

people on the local level, and this, of course, had a tendency to keep

down any unified opposition to what they were trying to do. I think

they worked with a pretty well unified plan, but in a manner, also, to keep the opposition

from being equally unified.

HACKMAN: Did you ever take any specific problems to the White House level, any

of these actions that you objected to? Maybe not directly to the

president, but to anyone else there, do you recall? Or to Bobby

Kennedy?

FAUBUS: No, I don’t recall that I did.

HACKMAN: What about other Kennedy domestic programs in relation to the state,

do you recall what your opinion of them was? For instance, the Area

Redevelopment Administration, I think, made their first grant to some

community up in…

FAUBUS: Very good. I approved as an individual and as a political leader, and

the people in the state approved generally, of many of the programs,

such as the Area Redevelopment Administration, the Upstream

Watershed Control Program, the conservation program, generally, the building of the dams

on the Arkansas, the White and other rivers. The president had good support from the state in

all these programs and the relationship between my administration and the federal agencies

involved was very pleasant, very cordial. There was much cooperation which was very

beneficial to the state, and we think, oft times beneficial politically to the national

administration.

HACKMAN: There was never any problem then with civil rights problems being

held against the state as far as federal grants of any kind whatever?

[-19-]

FAUBUS: Apparently not. Not to my knowledge. Besides our help and support

was essential to the success of the other worthwhile programs. I told

the people of the state many times, many who disagreed with me and

some who agreed with me, even some who were my friends who didn’t like some things that

were happening, that I didn’t think we should be so inept or so stupid as to stop all progress

in every field simply because we didn’t agree with some of the things the national

administration was doing. This was my attitude all the time. There were many good programs

beneficial to the people. This made for wonderful cooperation between the state and almost

all the federal agencies of government in these particular areas.

HACKMAN: How effective did you feel the Arkansas congressional delegation was

in this period in relation to the state problems? Any problems in the

relationship there?

FAUBUS: On these same problems there was almost complete harmony between

the state administration, which was me and the people who worked

with me, the congressional delegation, and the federal agencies. There

was never any cross-purpose there. I never was at odds with any

member of the congressional delegation. In other words, a member of the congressional

delegation wasn’t wanting one thing, and me wanting another. This never did occur. There

was almost complete harmony there and unity in that respect. This, of course, made it easier

for the national administration.

HACKMAN: In relation to the governors’ conferences again, could you recall a little

bit how the feeling toward the Kennedy administration developed as it

was revealed through the attitude of some of these other southern

governors at the conferences of ’61, ’62, and ’63?

FAUBUS: No, some opposition developed to the national administration. It was

not possible for many of the southern governors to agree publicly with

the Kennedy administration on some issues. At the same time, I found

that cooperation with the national administration in other fields was very similar to that in my

state. Not as good, perhaps, as it was in Arkansas, because it couldn’t have been better. I

doubt if it was as good in some other states. I did observe among the southern governors,

most of whom could not succeed themselves, a tendency occasionally to join up and do some

leg work for somebody in the national administration in the hopes of benefitting by it. This

wasn’t pleasing to some other governors in the conference.

HACKMAN: Do you recall any of the specifics of that?

[-20-]

FAUBUS: I don’t know if this was true or not, but it was aired around one of the

conferences. Perhaps the next year after the meeting at Hot Springs,

that the Kennedy people had called and requested that I not be elected

chairman of the southern conference, that they must have someone else. I never did learn if

this was true but I suspect it was. I would resent this, not because I wanted to be chairman,

but because this was outside their field. I do know there were certain people in the

conference who would carry out such a request in order to incur favor. In other words, some

politicians would yield, the word “sell out” is too strong perhaps, to blandishment and to

certain things, not because they were in the public interest or in accord with prevailing

sentiment, but in an effort to ingratiate or endear themselves to the powers that be for

personal benefit. Governor Hodges [Luther B. Hodges] was one of those. I think, perhaps, he

had less respect among the southern governors than any one in the region because he had a

tendency to do these things. In other words, he sometimes became an errand boy for the

federal powers of the national administration while still publicly espousing certain issues

contrary to the administration.

HACKMAN: Hodges had been governor up—what, to ’60, and then went to the

Commerce Department. Would this have been in the Kennedy period?

FAUBUS: I believe it was.

HACKMAN: He wouldn’t have been governor in that period would he? It was in an

earlier period. It would have been Terry Stanford [James Terry

Sanford] of North Carolina, after he came in. Hodges served about

seven years,

Including part of the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] administration, and was

followed by Sanford for four years. I was thinking in ’60, or rather ’61, as soon as the

administration started he became secretary of commerce.

FAUBUS: Yes, this could have been at the conference preceding the one at Hot

Springs, but I was under the impression it was the one that followed. I

guess it was the one preceding.

HACKMAN: Or, maybe, it was at Hot Springs. Could that have been possible?

FAUBUS: No, this was at a conference at another place.

HACKMAN: Okay. In a couple of those conferences proposals were made to

censure the administration in a resolution on

[-21-]

their civil rights bill, and specifically, I think it was the time of the March on Washington in

’63. Do you recall what your role was in relation to that?

FAUBUS: I tried to keep the resolutions from being presented. In other words,

my attitude was, let’s not bring up these controversial things in the

conference, because we won’t accomplish anything. A resolution, or

an expressed viewpoint, would have little weight, if any whatsoever, and it’d just cause

disruption in the conference and difficulty for all of us. I felt we should keep those things out

and confine ourselves to the work of the conference that would benefit us individually and as

a region. This was my attitude always and I never did bring up anything in the conferences of

this nature.

HACKMAN: Do you recall who else was acting with you as a moderating influence

on this issue?

FAUBUS: Well, usually the governor of Texas, and I served with three. Usually

the governor of Louisianan, and I served with four of those; and oft

times the governors of border states like Maryland, Kentucky, West

Virginia. Some of the governors, say of a state like West Virginia, could have a very liberal

attitude. They could bring up issues and take stands which were helpful to them politically.

To take the same stand would be most harmful politically to me, or a governor in another

state. Likewise, someone in Mississippi or Alabama could bring up an issue which would be

beneficial for me to support, but with which the governor of West Virginia couldn’t agree.

Because of the divergencies in the region, geographic, political and otherwise, there were

many issues that had a tendency to divide. I tried always to keep such issues from coming

before the meetings in the southern and the national conference. I could see no good reason

to bring up a matter that would be embarrassing to the national administration or to a chief

executive in any region. Almost single handedly I prevented issues of this nature being

brought up in the southern conference in Greenbriar, West Virginia, when Wallace [George

C. Wallace] and Barnett were governors. I was chairman at the time.

HACKMAN: Do you recall any dealings with Vice President Johnson in this period

on civil rights? He headed that equal employment opportunity thing

[President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity] for the

president. They tried to come into local areas in some instances and give these plans for

progress.

FAUBUS: No. They usually left me alone in these matters. They

[-22-]

knew I wouldn’t attempt to cause them any difficulty and neither was I

in a position to give them any help. So if they left me out of these

matters it was better for me and them also. I think this was generally known or understood

and that’s, perhaps, the main reason that I was seldom bothered about these matters.

HACKMAN: Same question I had in relation to 1960, how seriously did you

consider running for Senate in ’62?

FAUBUS: Scarcely at all.

HACKMAN: This was the year you had said you weren’t going to run for the

governor and then came out again later. Do you recall what this was all

about and what your reasons were at that time?

FAUBUS: Well, I’d talked to many people across the state who would say,

“When you don’t run, I’m going to run.” Well, Alford [Thomas Dale

Alford] had been elected to Congress, defeating Brooks Hays with the

write-in campaign. Some of the Hays people always blame me for it, but I wasn’t to blame.

Hays was the one that cost himself the election. He was nominated at the same time I was in

the same primary, which showed that I didn’t bother his race because my strength was still

very great at the time.

It had always been my attitude and the general attitude of the people in the state that

they appreciate you pleading for their support and advocating your own candidacy, but they

don’t appreciate your trying to tell them how to vote in any other race. This is a very strong

tradition that’s grown up in the state and has prevailed for a long time. After the primaries

were over, Brooks Hays’ son [Marion Steele Hays], began taking a very active part in an

attempt to promote some of the civil rights programs. Then Brooks, feeling that he was pretty

strong, came back and made some very unwise statements in some public speeches in the

state. I saw this was getting him into difficulty. One of his strong friends and supporters was

a man by the name of Forrest Rozzell, who for many years has been the executive secretary

of the Arkansas Education Association. One day Mr. Rozzell called me. He said, “I’ve got a

group that would like to confer with you. We’ll come to your office but we’d like to wait

until you get through with all your work so we can talk for awhile without being interrupted.”

I replied, “Well, it might be better if I got away from here when I have finished my work. I’ll

just come by our office.” The AEA office is only a stone’s throw from the Capitol building.

So I went by, and the group happened to be only

[-23-]

Rozzell and Brooks Hays. Since I’d already been nominated, they attempted to prevail upon

me to come out and take the role of leadership in promoting some of the civil rights

programs, principally in the field of school integration. They cited what Brooks had been

doing. I waited until they go through with their pitch, if you want to call it that, and I said,

“Now, gentlemen, I respect each of you. I respect your views and I respect your right to do

what you choose to do. But I’m not fixing to attempt anything like you urge because all I

would do would be to cut my own throat.” I continued, “Brooks, you’re getting into serious

trouble, and you’re doing it yourself. I haven’t said a word to anyone, privately or otherwise,

that would reflect in any manner on you, or any of our friends.” And I told Rozzell, “You’re

going to be in difficulty also.” Then Brooks began to say, “Oh, I know my people. You know

I’ve been here visiting.” And I said, “Now Brooks, I know who you’ve been visiting with,

you’re visiting with only one group.” It happened that I visit with them too. “I’m not in as

high standing with that group as you are, but I do have friends in the group. I’m also visiting

and associating with people in other groups, and I know what I’m talking about. You’re

getting in serious trouble. You’d better attend to your congressional duties and let the federal

agencies that have outlined these programs bear the burden of promoting them. After all, they

weren’t our programs on the state level.” But I didn’t seem to prevail on them too strongly

for Brooks continued his speaking.

Sure enough, this tide began to rise, a tide of disfavor with Hays which he, himself,

with his son, had created. I hadn’t uttered a single public statement and hadn’t said a word to

anyone in private against Hays. All at once, Alford was running. Yes, Alford came to see me,

came to see me three times, and I discouraged him. I told him all the difficulties of a

campaign without his name on the ballot: getting the people to write-in his name, getting

known to the public in only eight days; all the Democratic nominees would feel an obligation

to vote against him because they were nominees and Brooks was a nominee; no organization;

the election officials chosen by the Democratic organization and the Republican

organization. I told him it was virtually impossible to win a race under those circumstances,

He came back a second time and I went over the same things. Then, at the last minute, he

came the third time to the mansion in the early morning to talk to me. I reiterated the same

things and added, “Now, Dale, I’m not going to tell you to get into this race. You’ve got all

the difficulties in the world. I’ll tell you only one thing. In my judgment, you’d have a bare

chance of winning. I can tell the sentiment. So you’re taking a long, long chance, and you’ve

got

[-24-]

to make that decision yourself. I wouldn’t encourage you the least bit to run.” I left him and

went to the office and went to work. About noon the news came on the radio that he had

announced and that was the first I knew of it. Now, a lot of people thought I put him in the

race, but I didn’t. Here again it is shown that if you contrary too much the tides of public

sentiment, you’ll be cut down and no organization, and no political leader can save you.

Rozzell almost got thrown out of his position in the AEA. In fact, if his organization could

have voted then on the election of board members, they would have voted him out. Having

enough board members committed to him at that time, with their replacements selected, one

by one, later on, he had a chance to mend his fences and retain his position. Brooks,

unfortunately, didn’t have that opportunity and lost his seat in Congress.

After Dale Alford won, many of Hays’ friends blamed me for the outcome, and

regardless of what the facts were, many other people accepted the premise that I was

responsible for Alford being in the Congress. We were then identified in the public mind as

political allies.

That is the background which leads to my answer to your question—why did I change

my mind and see the governor’s office again in 1962 after saying I would not. First, I didn’t

have any great desire to go to Washington. I could have run for Fulbright’s seat in the

Senate—the polls showed I could have won—or for Jim Trimble’s [James W. Trimble] seat

in the House. Instead, I decided to retire, temporarily at least, from active campaigning. So

many people had said they would run for governor when I quit that I felt sure there would be

one or more candidates my friends could support.

Many of these people did not run, and it appeared almost certain that either Dale

Alford or Sid McMath would wind up as the Democratic nominee. Alford, although widely

regarded as a political ally, broke faith, and, without determining my intentions, announced

as a candidate for governor. I learned later that he was encouraged and, to a great extent,

financed by the forces of Congressman Wilbur Mills [Wilbur D. Mills] and Senator

Fulbright, to keep him out of either of their races. That made him unacceptable to my friends.

McMath had opposed me for so long that most of my friends could in no way support him.

Under the circumstances as described, I decided to run again, entered the race and won. I lost

some support because some of my supporters had gotten obligated to other candidates when I

announced I would not run. I still had enough support to win over five opponents without a

runoff.

[-25-]

HACKMAN: How did this—the attitude in Arkansas toward the Kennedy

administration on civil rights develop on through then? It became more

serious a problem, I take it, even in ’62, right as some people were on

you even because you weren’t seen as strong enough on the issues.

FAUBUS: Yes. It grew more difficult. I was being attacked and criticized by

extremists on both side of the so-called civil rights issue. There’s a

question, which now, of course, will never be answered, as to whether

or not President Kenney could have carried the state for reelection. The people of the state

admired him in many ways; I admired him in many ways. He was a very able man, there’s

not a question about it. Still, he was the victim, much as was I and other political figures

across the South and across the nation, of the tides of an issue that might have cost him the

state if he had been permitted to seek reelection.

Things can change rapidly in politics. A serious international crisis can come up, such

as the Cuban situation. The people of Arkansas and the people of the South were, without

question, stronger for Kennedy on this issue than the rest of the nation. There is no doubt

about that. Just as right now, the South is stronger for President Johnson on international

relations and the Viet Nam situation that is the rest of the nation. So it’s a question of which

issue is uppermost in the minds of the people at the time of an election, which sometimes

determines the survival or the defeat of a political figure.

HACKMAN: What do you recall about Senator Kennedy’s visits into the state

during the period. I think he was in Fort Smith in ’61, October of ’61,

and then he came again down to the dedication of Greer’s Ferry Dam.

FAUBUS: Very pleasant. I met him at Fort Smith, appeared with him on the

program at the airport, Then he flew from there on to—what, Big

Sandy?—Well, anyhow, this place in Oklahoma, where Senator Kerr

[Robert S. Kerr] had invited him to dedicate a highway and some other project. He had a

great deal of favor at Fort Smith. The people there, from the little people up to the big

business people, were very interested in the continuation of Fort Chaffee. In his remarks at

the airport, Kennedy pledged unequivocally, without any reservations, that the camp would

remain active. This, of course, created strong favor for him in that region. Some of the civil

rights issues were not as important in that particular region as was the continued operation of

Fort Chaffee. The problem of civil rights was more serious in other sections of the state.

[-26-]

There was some question raised about my reluctance to meet President Kennedy at Fort

Smith. I’ve always felt that you just don’t run out to meet a political figure of this kind

without some indication that your presence is at least acceptable or tolerable, if not desired.

My attitude of opposition to the pushing of some of the civil rights programs was well

known. President Kennedy’s were well known. I simply hadn’t said anything. I hadn’t said

whether I was going to Fort Smith or whether I wasn’t. I was just keeping quiet. Because I

kept quiet I got some very strong criticism in the press in Little Rock. If they could find

where they could hurt me by using something, even a manufactured issue, a synthetic one,

shy, they would do it. So they began to make something out of this. But just as soon as I

received the word from the Kennedy organization that I would be welcome there, I issued a

statement saying I would go to Fort Smith to welcome the president. He was coming to our

state, and regardless of any disagreements we might have on issues, he was the president of

these United States. I was the governor of the state, and the president was entitled to this

courtesy. So I was there to meet him. Our relationships, as they always were when I met him

personally, were very pleasant indeed. In fact, I don’t think I’ve ever met but one man that I

would describe as more gracious than President Kennedy, and that was Harry Truman [Harry

S. Truman]. Harry Truman, without doubt, is the most gracious man that anyone ever met.

Our visit there was brief. His remarks were brief as well as the entire program from the

platform. Then he flew on to Oklahoma. Some of the press said something about my not

going on to the meeting, but it wouldn’t have been proper for me to horn in on the meeting

without some indication from Senator Kerr, or someone that they would, at least, be glad to

have me. And no indication was ever given. I was not invited. So naturally, I didn’t go on. I

might have declined if I had been asked because of business in the state. I don’t know what

the situation was at the time, how pressing the business matters were. President Kennedy and

his party spend the night with Senator Kerr at his ranch home after the dedication in

Oklahoma.

HACKMAN: What about the…. Go ahead.

FAUBUS: Well, that’s about all about the visit to Fort Smith.

HACKMAN: What about the one then at Greer’s Ferry? I know some people were

upset about the crowd or something, the critics were upset about the

speech you gave there. Do you recall that?

[-27-]

FAUBUS: Yes. Sometime before the Greer’s Ferry dedication. I joined the

congressional delegation in Washington. All of us went together to the

White House to extend an invitation to the president to come to

Greer’s Ferry and dedicate the dam and lake. The invitation was given without reservation. I

don’t mind telling you that some of the congressmen were afraid to go and extend the

invitation unless I went along. Tides were rather uncertain at the time in the state. So without

hesitation, I said, “Sure, I’ll be glad to extend an invitation. We’ve got a fine facility, built by

the federal government. This administration is largely the author of the project and

responsible for its construction. It has come to fruition, and certainly he should have an

opportunity to come and dedicate it if he wishes. I’ll be glad to go with the delegation.”

So all of us went together to the White House to extend the invitation. When the time

was set, we began to make arrangements. And I say this, without any disrespect to the

congressional delegation, when I was governor, my organization did practically 100 percent

of the work. We made all the arrangements with the local people. We cooperated with all the

federal agencies. The secret service people came to us when the affair was over and said they

had had the finest cooperation and it was the best arranged affair in which they had ever

participated. They said this without reservation and so far as I know, the personnel of all the

federal agencies felt the same. They came to my office, to my aides in the National Guard

and state police and said the same thing with apparently great sincerity. So we did make good

arrangements. The affair was very fine.

President Kennedy, as always, was very gracious. Previous to Kennedy’s arrival in

Little Rock, a greeting committee had been set up. We observed that about 80 percent of the

committee members had not supported President Kennedy. They were people who would

horn in on the glory, you know, without ever having done anything to earn it. So I called

Tom Harper and also talked to Bill Smith [William J. Smith] and Pat Mehaffy. Bill Smith

and Pat Mehaffy were perhaps closer to the Kennedy administration than any other

individuals in the state. Together we arranged to invite an additional group of people to meet

the president out at the airport [Strategic Air Command Air Force Base, Little Rock]. A

special place was reserved for them out there. We invited some of my worst enemies, but

they were good friends and supporters of the president. They were entitled to have an

opportunity to meet him, and him to meet them. Among these people were Heiskell [John N.

Heiskell] of the [Little Rock Arkansas] Gazette and Patterson [Hugh B. Patterson, Jr.] of the

Gazette, who wouldn’t give me credit for anything good. But we thought we owed this to the

president.

[-28-]

Now myself and two or three of my personal associates made these arrangements for the

benefit of these people who were his supporters who had been left off of the original

committee. On the official committee, a check revealed that 80 percent of them were people

who had voted against the president and would vote against him next time But Hugh

Patterson, Mr. Heiskell, the labor leaders and co-op leaders we invited there had supported

the president, were still supporting him and would have supported him the next time. We felt

they were entitled to a chance to meet the president and him to meet them. This was

something that happened, or was done aside from the official program, at my instigation, and

with help. Bill Smith first made the suggestion. Military ceremonies for the president were

held at the air base. I flew with him in his helicopter along with Congressman Mills and

others, I don’t remember, Senator McClellan, I believe, Senator Fulbright, from the air base

to Greer’s Ferry. Then I was permitted to ride with him in the car, I don’t recall who else,

from where the helicopter landed to the ceremony and then from the ceremony back to the

helicopter. Then we traveled by helicopter back to Little Rock to the Arkansas livestock

show grounds where, again at my instigation and with the help of his supporters,

arrangements had been made for the president to speak to the crowds at the livestock show.

Otherwise he would have appeared only before the crowd at Heber Springs, site of Greer’s

Ferry Dam, and would not have seen the additional thousand.

I presented him to the audience at Little Rock. It was my privilege and honor to

introduce him, but here again, some of my critics at the Gazette inferred, or stated, that I

could have said more. By introducing him as great American, I went a little farther than

protocol permits or advises, that you simply say, “Ladies and Gentlemen, the president of the

United States.” But I added some remarks to the effect that,—“It was a great honor and

privilege for us to have him in the state. It was gracious of him to come and to be with us,

and it was my privilege to present a great American, the president of the United States, the

Honorable John F. Kennedy.”

HACKMAN: The Gazette never got to that.

FAUBUS: Oh, they jumped on me for not saying more, yet, I had taken liberties

already to say that much. So you see, with these people, I could do no

right, no matter how I handled it. Yet, I was the one who arranged for

them to see him.

HACKMAN: You wanted to have them in there.

[-29-]

FAUBUS: I would have appreciated it if I had been in the president’s

circumstance, the same arrangement, because these people were very

strong supporters of his.

HACKAMAN: That’s about all the specific questions I have, unless you have some

conclusions you want to draw either on the Kennedy administration or

on the development of federal-state relationships in that period, maybe

some mistakes that the Kennedys made in regard to Arkansas and the South.

FAUBUS: Well, the relationships with the Kennedy administration on all levels,

the relationship was excellent, except for this controversial area of

civil rights. We believed in and supported practically all of his

domestic programs. We believe we made them work better in Arkansas than nearly any other

state. The administration costs were less, benefits were greater and this created favor for him.

This was especially true with the REA co-ops—of which there are eighteen in the state and,

perhaps, the single most influential political group in the state—the Farmers Union,

organized Labor and the Negro groups. Working with the national administration we made

these programs work for the benefit of these people, which helped the president to hold them

and to build favor with them. We even made many of these programs work well enough that

the disfavor was lessened with the chamber of commerce group and others, other groups that

don’t usually grow enthusiastic about these programs.

The president was very gracious to me at Heber Springs. In my remarks, I openly

criticized the civil rights promotion or pushing by his administration and others. But my

impression of John F. Kennedy was that he was a good politician; that he could understand

the issues which enabled a man to survive in one area which would be the political death of

him in another; he was gracious and understanding enough to work with another political

figure, or a man of his own party, or an ally, such as I had been, or an opponent to some of

his policies as I had become, and permit him enough flexibility to survive because there

wasn’t any possibility of electing and outright Kennedy man in Arkansas at that time. The

best the Kennedy administration could hope for was someone like me who would give his

administration 100 percent cooperation in all areas where it was possible. This is my personal

impression of President Kennedy as a public figure and as a politician.

HACKMAN: Let me ask you something. How did the relationship with the federal

government under President Kennedy differ from that that had existed

under President Eisenhower?

[-30-]

FAUBUS: The biggest difference was an improvement, because in the matter of

patronage there was no conflict—Kennedy appointed Democrats.

Kennedy gave greater support to some of the domestic programs, such

as the big dams, conservation, etc., which Eisenhower was not as friendly to the co-ops

[REA], who have been my political allies, as was President Kennedy. There would have been

no electric service in my original farm home had it not been provided by the Rural Electric

Administration. I strongly supported this program always. Eisenhower was not as mindful of

the problems of the poor as was Kennedy’s administration. How mindful he was personally, I

do not know, and had not the opportunity to learn. But there was an improvement in the

Kennedy administration in the field of cooperation, even though cooperation was good with

most agencies of President Eisenhower’s administration. In fact, we gave President

Eisenhower better cooperation than did some of the Republican governors on many of the

programs.

HACKMAN: Do you have anything at all you’d want to add about the Little Rock

situation while we’re recording this at all? I don’t have any specific

questions, I just thought maybe you’d want to put something on it for

people who are reading this thing in the future would be interested in.

FAUBUS: Well, I think there was considerable misunderstanding. There was

great distortion, and sometimes outright falsification, deliberately

promoted by certain segments of the press. I’m not sure about

President Kennedy, but I don’t think Bobby Kennedy understood enough about the

difficulties. I recall when he came to Little Rock with Senator McClellan when the senator

returned to attend the funeral of his son who has been killed in a plane accident that he

expressed an attitude of questioning about me.2 “Senator McClellan, how do you get along

with this fellow?” and so on. Yet, in many respects, I was more liberal than Senator

McClellan. So it showed that he didn’t understand the situation, he didn’t have a personal

knowledge of the local or state situation. One fallacy has been effectively laid to rest by

subsequent events since ’57. There was a great effort on the part of the press, the Arkansas

Gazette, aided by Time, Life; McGill [Ralph E. McGill], people of this bent, to create the

impression that the problem would not have existed had it not been for me,

[-31-]

that I personally created the situation in an effort to benefit from it politically. Subsequent

events have now shown that there is a problem, regardless of whether it had been me or

anyone else. The problem was there and is still with us. Regardless of whether Kennedy was

president or someone else, the problem was still there. That has been shown by the

difficulties in Watts, Cicero, Rochester, New York, Baltimore, Cambridge, Jacksonville;

well, all across the nation. Now, looking back, the situation was handled better in Little

Rock, whether as the result of my efforts or just plain luck, anyone’s entitled to his

viewpoint. But we had not a single death to this day in Arkansas attributed to a radical

incident, yet there have been any number of deaths in any number of states attributed to these

incidents. No stores were looted, we had no lying down in the streets, blocking traffic, or in

businesses. No windows have been broken. No businesses looted, not a single death. So

whether by luck or by design, or a combination of both, the situation was handled better in

Arkansas than it was anywhere else. And since subsequent events have proven that I didn’t

create the problem, that it is there regardless of who’s on the scene, I think it’s made me look

great deal better than I looked at the time.

HACKMAN: Anything else at all that you want to put on?

FAUBUS: There was a great deal more high regard for President Kennedy than

for his brother Bobby. One of the things that hurt him the worst in

Arkansas was when he made Bobby attorney general. I was not

2 This was after I had visited the senator in his hotel room to pay my respects, express my sympathy and offer

any assistance that I could give.

opposed to it at the time. I said it’s all right when I talked to Senator McClellan about it. He

asked me what I thought about it. I said, “Well, I think it’s all right, Senator. A man ought to

be able to trust his own brother, and certainly, you’ve got to have someone you can trust in

positions of responsibility.” But Bobby went too far. I know he’s an able man, but people got

the impression, that perhaps his ability was falsely portrayed, just as people had a false

impression of me in many respects. He was a bit imperious, bordering on arrogance in his

attitude in dealing with some of the problems. This hurt President Kennedy in Arkansas more

than any other one single thing. But, who know. Perhaps out of all the interviews you’ll get

across the nation, a central theme, or a consensus can be reached about what the situation was

generally and what the pertinent facts were in the whole situation. No one can know all the

facts from one particular spot, such as that which I occupied, or anyone else in any other

particular spot in the nation.

HACKMAN: Thank you very much.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

[-32-]

Addenda

BOB KENNEDY

At the time Robert Kennedy [Bob Kennedy] spoke at Osceola in behalf of his brother’s

candidacy for the presidency, there was another occurrence worthy of mention.

In the introduction of those on the platform, the applause for me was heavy, in fact

much stronger than for any other.

Kennedy was presented last as the main speaker. Those of us on the platform stood

and applauded in tribute to him. He stood, looked calmly out over the audience (the applause

for him was not as strong as it had been for me), then turned and looked directly at me. I

leaned toward him, across other, and took his outstretched hand in a handshake. The applause

came again, stronger. Then he turned back to the audience and began to speak as we on the

platform were seated. (The audience was standing in an open area in front and to the sides of

the platform).

The handshake was a gesture of alliance with me for the benefit of the audience.

He was saying to the people there and across the state, “I am friendly to Faubus so

you can safely vote for my brother,” and perhaps to me, “I have accepted you publicly now

deliver the state for candidacy.”

If a photograph of the occurrence has been caught, and the picture run statewide, it

would no doubt have benefited somewhat Senator John Kennedy’s candidacy at the time in

Arkansas. So far as I know, no photograph was made at the time, or at least one was never

published to my knowledge.

However, once the election was over, there was little evidence of acceptance by the

Kennedys of me or my administration.

[-33-]

AN OCCURANCE FOLLOWING JOHN F. KENNEDY’S

CAMPAIN APPERANCE AT TEXARKANA

I traveled from Little Rock to Texarkana to meet and appear with John F. Kennedy in

his campaign appearance speech there. Accompanying me were Pat Mehaffy, the behind-the-

scenes manager for Kennedy in Arkansas, and Attorney William J. Smith [Bill Smith], both

of Little Rock.

We met Kennedy’s plane at the Texarkana airport, greeted him, and all joined in the

parade from there to the speaking site in the heart of the city. Other Arkansas political figures

in the parade were Arkansas’s two U.S. senators, William Fulbright and John L. McClellan.

Also, Congressman Oren Harris, who was already there because that was a part of his

congressional districts.

After the political rally ended, each figure or group made its individual way back to

the airport. My group—myself, Smith and Mehaffy—arrived ahead of the Kennedy party. I

was ready to take off for the return to Little Rock. We were standing near the Kennedy plane

and Bill Smith said, “Let’s wait and say good-bye to the next president.”

Mehaffy concurred with Smith’s suggestion. Since our presence was known and

observed by many members of the press corps, who were likewise gathering, and since it

might be construed as a discourtesy to Kennedy if I left without waiting the brief period

required, I acquiesced in the suggestion.

Very shortly, candidate Kennedy appeared and shook hands with a number of people

a short distance away. He then accosted Congressman Harris. For a few moments they were

engaged in a close conversation, seemingly private and confidential, with Kennedy doing

most of the talking with Harris listening soberly and intently.

Then the two of them turned and walked toward the plane ignoring others nearby who were

interested in greeting the candidate. No one approached them for they were still seemingly

engrossed in a close confidential conversation as they strode along. They reached the tail of

the plane and then walked alongside the considerable distance to the entrance, climbed the

steps together and disappeared inside. I recall Kennedy’s long strides with the shorter Harris

beside him. As I recall Kennedy’s arm was, at least part of the time, around his companion’s

shoulders. I distinctly recall that the action seemed awkward for both. They passed very near

my group

[-34-]

and still nearer a number of other people, but distinctly refrained from glancing to either side

during the walk. I recall having the impression that they were going inside for some purpose,

perhaps connected with the subject matter of their close conversation, and that they would

shortly reappear, as we knew Congressman Harris was not going away on the plane. (The

next stop for the Kennedy entourage was somewhere in the Midwest, perhaps St. Louis or

Chicago as I recall.)

Very shortly, Harris left the plane alone, looking somewhat nonplused, and

approached my group. He said that Kennedy would not reappear, whereupon my group—

Smith, Mehaffy and myself—started for our car and Harris accompanied us.

When we were in private in the automobile, Harris explained the situation. I must say I never

saw anyone more embarrassed or ill at ease with his task. The color came and went in his

face, from white to red with mixtures of purple. We listened quietly.

Kennedy told him, he explained, that a reporter—I’ve forgotten the name—in the traveling

press group was seeking to get a picture of him—Kennedy—shaking hands with me, which

was to be run in a New York periodical to hurt Kennedy’s candidacy with some radical group

there. To prevent the possibility of the use of such a photograph, Kennedy, had engaged the

service of Congressman Harris to assist him in avoiding my group while boarding his plane. I

never inquired of Harris whether Kennedy had explained the reason to him before or after

boarding.

My group received the explanation quietly without comment. Congressman Harris,

after completing his embarrassing task, said goodbye, and Smith, Mehaffy and myself began

our return journey to Little Rock as Kennedy’s plane roared into the sky on its journey

northward.

Smith, no doubt, felt badly about his strong suggestion to wait to “say goodbye to the

next president” in view of what by many would be considered an insulting snub to the

governor of the state and his companions. It was apparent from Harris’ extreme discomfort

that he did not relish the occurrence or his, perhaps, unwilling role in it. Mehaffy, the strong

leader and organizer for Kennedy in the state, must have been concerned with the effect of

the incident on my attitude and activity in the campaign.

The incident didn’t bother me that much. My conscience was clear. I had not,

wittingly or unwittingly, been guilty of any act of discourtesy to my party’s candidate for

presidency,

[-35-]

nor had I been remiss in my duties as governor toward a visiting dignitary. I had displayed

the courage to meet, greet and appear with a political figure, who, up to that time, was the

most unpopular Democratic presidential nominee ever to appear in Arkansas.

I could understand the action, for I have seen much of this seeming lack of moral and

political courage on the part of many public figures. I had difficulty in understanding the

reasons or the judgment which prompted the action. After all, I had met Kennedy at the

airport and personally greeted him, joined in the parade and had been seated on the platform

during the entire rally including the candidate’s speech and appeal for votes. What difference

could one more personal contact have made after all that?

To me, and I’m sure to a varying degree on my companions, the incident had one

decided effect. In my mind it took Kennedy out of the ranks of the greatly courageous, and

placed him in the broad ranks of the less courageous and less admired political figures who

often purposely avoid a common courtesy to a fellow American or a fellow human being for

fear of losing a vote.

To me the Kennedy action that day was distinctly at variance with the theme of the

book Profiles of Courage, which was authored in his name.

As to the four Arkansas participants in the incident that day, Harris, Smith, Mehaffy

and myself, we kept the matter a closely guarded secret. In view of the closeness of the

election results in the state as revealed in the voting later on, if the incident had become

known the resulting publicity could well have cost Kennedy the electoral votes of Arkansas.

To this day in March 1976, perhaps less than a dozen people know of the incident.

[-36-]

Orval E. Faubus Oral History Transcript

Name List

A

Alford, Thomas Dale, 23, 24, 25

B

Barnett, Ross R., 15, 16, 22

Benson, Ezra Taft, 5

Butler, Benjamin F., 3

C

Carter, Arthur, 3

D

Daniel, Marion Price, 14, 16

Dunlap, J.E. Jr., 3

E

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 21, 30, 31

F

Farley, James A., 2

Faubus, Orval E., 1, 8, 33

Fulbright, James W., 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 25, 29, 34

G

Gary, Raymond Dancel, 2

Gore, Albert Arnold, Sr., 3

H

Harper, Thomas, 5, 7, 9, 28

Harriman, William Averell, 2, 3, 4

Harris, Oren, 4, 34, 35, 36

Hays, Lawrence Brooks, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25

Hays, Marion Steele, 23

Heiskell, John N., 28, 29

Hodges, Luther B., 21

Humphrey, Hubert H., 1, 2, 3

J

Johnson, Lyndon B., 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 22, 26

K

Kefauver, Carey Estes, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6

Kennedy, John F., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15,

16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,

34, 35, 36

Kennedy, Robert F., 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 19, 31, 32, 33

Kerr, Robert S., 26, 27

L

Long, Russell B., 12

M

McClellan, John L., 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 29, 31, 32, 34

McCormack, John William, 4, 5

McGill, Ralph E., 31

McKeithen, John J., 12

McMath, Sidney Sanders, 3, 25

Mehaffy, Pat, 10, 18, 28, 34, 35, 36

Mills, Wilbur D., 25, 29

Morrison, James H., 12

N

Nixon, Richard M., 15, 16

O

Ohlendorf, Harold F., 3, 12

P

Patterson, Hugh B. Jr., 28, 29

R

Rayburn, Samuel Taliaferro, 5

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 17

Roosevelt, James, 2, 5

Rozzell, Forrest, 23, 24, 25

S Smith, Odell, 3

Smith, William J., 28, 29, 34, 35, 36

Stanford, James Terry, 21

Stevenson, Adlai E., 1, 2, 3, 4, 6

Symington, W. Stuart, 4

T

Trimble, James W., 25

Truman, Harry S., 27

W

Wallace, George C., 22

Woods, Henry, 3

Y

Young, Robert A. III, 3