ORIENTATION WORKSHOP ON TRANSITIONAL...

ORIENTATION WORKSHOP ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE July 25-26, 2017 at the Brentwood Suites, Quezon City This is an activity of the Alternative Law Groups (ALG) in partnership with the Transitional Justice-Asia Network (TJAN). TJAN is a loose network of organizations working on Transitional Justice, and is composed of members from 5 countries: the Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The activity was supported by the Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR) group in Indonesia, which is also the secretariat of the TJAN.

2017

2 Orientation Workshop on Transitional Justice / July 25-26, 2017 at Brentwood Suites, QC

Table of Contents

OPENING PROGRAM ............................................................................................................................... 3

PANEL DISCUSSION: CURRENT INITIATIVES AND PROSPECTS FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

IN THE PHILIPPINES ................................................................................................................................ 3

1. Martial Law and the Human Rights Victims Claims Board (HRVCB) ..................................... 3

2. Transitional Justice in the Bangsamoro ...................................................................................... 8

3. The Bangsamoro Land Issue and the WB-IOM Recommendations .................................... 11

4. The CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army) and DDR in the Peace Tables .............. 14

5. The Internal Purge in the CCP (Communist Party of the Philippines) and PATH .............. 16

OPEN FORUM ..................................................................................................................................... 17

FOUNDATIONS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: THEORETICAL/ LEGAL FRAMEWORK ........... 20

WORKSHOP 1: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES ........................................................................................ 33

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE .................................................. 35

Transitional Justice in Peru – by Atty. Edy Lynn Santiago ............................................................ 35

Transitional Justice in the Balkans: Focus on the ICTY – by Dr. Priya Pillai .............................. 37

Peace Process and Truth Commission: Experience from Aceh – by Mr. Faisal Hadi .............. 38

International Perspectives on Transitional Justice – by Atty. Trina Monsod ............................... 41

VALUES UNDERLYING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ............................................................................ 50

PROJECT HUSTISYA NATIN .................................................................................................................. 55

WORKSHOP 2: STRENGTHENING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE INITIATIVES IN THE

PHILIPPINES ............................................................................................................................................. 55

CLOSING PROGRAM ............................................................................................................................... 57


OPENING PROGRAM

After the Opening Invocation, the moderator, Rene (ALG Program Officer) led the personal introduction

of the participants. He introduced Atty. Marlon Manuel (ALG National Coordinator) for the Welcome

Remarks and Background of the Activity.

After welcoming the participants, Atty. Marlon gave a brief introduction about AJAR (Asia Justice and

Rights), ALG (Alternative Law Groups) and TJAN (Transitional Justice in Asia Network). He explained that

TJAN is a regional network of organizations working on TJ, composed of 5 partner organizations (from

the Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and

Thailand), including ALG. The network hopes to

strengthen the capacities of partner organizations that

are involved in TJ work.

He said that this is only the first in-country activity,

and hopes to gather ideas for future activities.

Atty. Cej Jimenez, the overall facilitator of the activity,

added that the Objectives of the Workshop is to

enhance the capacity of partner organizations to

integrate TJ perspectives into their organizational

policy and programs, and increase their ability to contribute to TJ ongoing and future advocacies in the

Philippines.

PANEL DISCUSSION: CURRENT INITIATIVES AND PROSPECTS FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE PHILIPPINES

1. Martial Law and the Human Rights Victims Claims Board (HRVCB)

Legal Basis

Republic Act 10368 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REPARATION AND RECOGNITION OF VICTIMS OF

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE MARCOS REGIME, DOCUMENTATION OF SAID

VIOLATIONS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Signed into law by Pres. Benigno Simeon Aquino Feb 23, 2013

Funding Source

Section 7. Source of Reparation. — The amount of Ten billion pesos (P10,000,000,000.00) plus

accrued interest which form part of the funds transferred to the government of the Republic of

the Philippines by virtue of the December 10, 1997 Order of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court,

adjudged by the Supreme Court of the Philippines as final and executory in Republic vs.

Sandiganbayan on July 15, 2003 (G.R. No. 152154) as Marcos ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in


favor of the Republic of the Philippines, shall be the principal source funds for the

implementation of this Act.

Composition

9 members, including the Chairperson

3 Divisions

+Secretariat, headed by Board Secretary

o Lawyers

o Paralegals / legal assistants

o Admin and support staff

Scope of HRCVB Mandate

REPARATION for victims

o Monetary compensation

o Non-monetary reparation

“Reparation” refers to the obligation of the State to restore the rights and

uphold the dignity of the victims, which is part of the right to an effective

remedy. Reparation shall be both monetary and non-monetary

RECOGNITION of victims

o Roll of Victims

o Human Rights Memorial / Museum

“Recognition” refers to the acknowledgment by the State of the violations

committed against persons who are victims of human rights violations as

described herein. This recognition shall be manifested by enshrining the name

of the said HRV (Human Rights Violation) victim in the “Roll of Human Rights

Violations Victims” prepared by the Board pursuant to its mandated powers and

functions

Human Rights Violations covered by the Reparation/Recognition under RA 10368

1. Committed by persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the state

Member of the Philippine Constabulary, former INP, AFP, and the CHDF as well as any civilian

agent attached thereto

Member of paramilitary group even if not organically part of the above

o So long as it is shown that the group was organized, funded, supplied with equipment,

facilities and/or resources, and/or indoctrinated, controlled and/or supervised by any

person acting in an official capacity and/or agent of the State as herein defined

Any member of the civil service, including persons who held elective or appointive public office

from Sept 21, 1972 to Feb 25, 1986

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, spouse Imelda R. Marcos, their immediate relatives by

consanguinity or affinity, as well as their close relatives, associates, cronies and subordinates,

and

Any person or group/s of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the

State during the Marcos regime


2. As to the Time the HRV was committed

To qualify, the HRV must have been committed during the period from September 21, 1972 to

February 25, 1986: Provided, however, That victims

of human rights violations that were committed one

month before Sept 21, 1972 and one month after

Feb 25, 1986 shall be entitled to reparation, under

this Act if they can establish that the violation was

committed:

o (1) By agents of the State and/or persons

acting in an official capacity as defined

hereunder

o (2) For the purpose of preserving,

maintaining, supporting or promoting the said regime, or

o (3) To conceal abuses during the Marcos regime and/or the effects of Martial Law

3. Acts Covered

Killing

Enforced/involuntary disappearance

Torture and/or cruel, inhumane, degrading treatment

Rape, sexual offenses against human rights victims detained or committed in the course of

military/police operations

Search/arrest/detention without a valid warrant; Arrest pursuant to Martial law, arrest on a

basis of an "Arrest, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO)," a "Presidential Commitment Order” (PCO)

or a "Preventive Detention Action” (PDA)

Torture, killing, violation of human rights of person exercising right to free speech, assembly or

organization (even if at that time assembly was illegal)

Involuntary exile

Unjust/illegal takeover of business

Kidnapping or exploiting children of those suspected of committing acts against the Marcos

regime

Other analogous violations, including those recognized by international law

Conclusive Presumption

Conclusively presumed victims:

o Claimants in the class suit and direct action plaintiffs in the Human Rights Litigation

Against the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos (MDL No. 840, CA No. 88-0390) in the US

Federal District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii

o Victims recognized by the “Bantayog Ng MgaBayani” Foundation

o But nothing herein shall be construed to deprive the Board of its original jurisdiction and

its inherent power to determine the extent of the human rights violations and the

corresponding reparation and/or recognition that may be granted.

To prove the HRV, the applicant shall submit one or more of the following

NSO-issued or local death certificate


Warrant of arrest, seizure orders (PDA, PCO, ASSO), mission order and other similar documents;

Certification by custodial government agencies on the fact of detention, carpeta, police blotter,

NBI files, release papers and other similar documents

Doctor’s affidavit, medico-legal, autopsy or pathology certificate or report, and other similar

documents

Declassified documents from the Department of National Defense and other government

agencies

Court records

Original or duly certified lawyer’s records

Photographs with affidavit of proper authentication

Sworn statement of two (2) co-detainees or two (2) persons who have personal knowledge of

the circumstances surrounding the HRV

Secondary sources of information from reliable sources may be presented such as church/non-

government organization report, books documenting HRVs, news clippings or other similar

documents

Other documents and evidence attesting the occurrence of the incident and violations or that

may be required for the award of any reparation

Determination of Award (under the Implementing Rules and Regulations)

Section 12. Determination of Award of Monetary Reparation. The Board, through the Divisions,

shall proceed to determine the award due each eligible claimant classified under Sections 16

and 17 of the Act. A point system shall guide the determination of the award in the following

manner:

o Victims who were killed or who were involuntarily disappeared and are still missing shall

be given ten (10) points

o Victims who were tortured and/or raped or sexually abused shall be given six (6) to nine

(9) points

o Victims who were detained shall be given three (3) to five (5) points

o Victims whose rights were violated under Section 3, paragraph (b), nos. (4), (5) and (6)

under RA 10368 shall be given one (1) to two (2) points

Other Salient Points

The Board may take judicial notice motuproprio of individual persons who suffered human rights

violations as defined herein and grant such persons recognition as HRVVs and included in the

Roll of Victims as provided for in Section 26 hereof

Substantial evidence required to establish claim

Summary proceeding

In instances where a victim is classified in more than one category of violation/s, s/he shall be

awarded the points in the higher category

Award under HRVCB without prejudice to any other award that may be given in the future for

HRVs


How much is 1 point worth?

1 point = Total amount available for disposition

Total number of points awarded

Non-Monetary Reparations

Section 5. Non-monetary Reparation. — The Department of Health (DOH), the Department of

Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Education (DepED), the

Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Technical Education and Skills Development

Authority (TESDA), and such other government agencies shall render the necessary services as

nonmonetary reparation for HRVVs and/or their families, as may be determined by the Board

pursuant to the provisions of this Act. The amount necessary for this purpose shall be sourced

from the budget of the agency concerned in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA)

MOA signed September 21, 2015

Appeal

10 calendar days from receipt of notice of resolution

Grounds:

o That the Resolution is not supported by substantial evidence

o That the claimant or opposing party has been deprived, through no fault attributable to

him/her, of presenting his/her evidence in support of his/her claim or opposition during

the Division proceedings

Opposition

15 calendar days from date of last publication

Grounds:

o The new claimant is not legitimate under section 8 of this Rule

o The human rights violation is not one of those enumerated under Rule II, Section1(d),

and Section 10 of this Rule

o The claim is fraudulent, fictitious or spurious

Board remands the case to the Division concerned

Recognition

Human Rights Memorial / Museum / Library / Compendium

o Roll of Victims

o Compendium of sacrifices (also on the Internet, government offices)

Database to be turned over to the Memorial Commission

Education and Curriculum Development

Publication only of stories of victims who gave their informed consent

Memorial Commission

o Establishment, restoration, preservation and conservation of the Memorial/ Museum/

Library/ Compendium


o It shall also coordinate and collaborate with the Department of Education (DepED) and

the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) to ensure that the lessons learned from

Martial Law are taught in schools

o Attached to the CHR solely for budgetary and administrative purposes

2. Transitional Justice in the Bangsamoro

Background

Transitional justice in the Bangsamoro is part of the peace agreement between the GPH and the

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

Previous agreements with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) did not specifically

address transitional justice issues, except to say that there shall be an autonomy arrangement

for the Bangsamoro in certain areas of Mindanao

GPH-MILF Peace Agreement

Signed agreements where Transitional Justice and Reconciliation is provided:

o Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), signed in October 2012

o Annex on Normalization, forged in January 2014

The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)

The Parties agree to work out a program for transitional justice to address the legitimate

grievances of the Bangsamoro people, correct

historical injustices, and address human rights

violations

Vested property rights shall be recognized and

respected

With respect to the legitimate grievances of the

Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust

dispossession of their territorial and proprietary

rights, customary land tenure or their

marginalization shall be acknowledged

Whenever restoration is no longer possible, the Central Government and the Government of the

Bangsamoro shall take effective measures for adequate reparation collectively beneficial to the

Bangsamoro people in such quality, quantity and status to be determined mutually

Annex on Normalization

H. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

o To work out a program for transitional justice to address the legitimate grievances of

the Bangsamoro people, correct historical injustices, and address human rights

violations, there shall be created a Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission to

undertake a study and recommend to the Panels the appropriate mechanisms for

transitional justice and reconciliation


o The organization, structure and other functions of the TJRC shall be specified in the

Terms of Reference agreed upon and signed by the panels

o The TJRC shall be headed by a chairperson, who is an international expert of recognized

independence, competence, probity, and integrity, jointly selected by the parties. In

addition, the GPH and the MILF shall nominate a representative ach to the TJRC

Mandate of the TJRC (Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission)

To undertake a study and make recommendations (based on consultations and experts' studies)

The TJRC report shall propose appropriate mechanisms to:

o Address legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people

o To correct historical injustices

o To address human rights violations and marginalization through land dispossession

It shall also recommend programs and measures that will bring about reconciliation of the

different communities that have been affected by the conflict

TJRC Conceptual Framework

The TJRC used the Swiss “Dealing with the Past” (DwP) framework inspired by the Joinet/

Orentlich Principles Against Impunity

It identifies four complementary key areas:

o The Right to Know

o The Right to Justice

o The Right to Reparation

o Guarantee of Non-Recurrence

These key areas form a holistic strategy for transitional justice

Process Employed by the TJRC

Consultation Process = Listening Process + Study Groups + Key Policy Interviews + DwP

Assessment

Analysis

For the TJRC, legitimate grievances, historical injustice, human rights violations, and

marginalization through land dispossession are the consequences of three mutually reinforcing

phenomena:

o Systemic violence by the State expressed in terms of political, socio-economic, and

cultural exclusion and in the disproportionate use of direct violence

o A pervasive culture of impunity that undermines the practice of the rule of law

o Deep neglect by the State combined with the lack of vision for the common good

These phenomena have their root cause in the imposition of a monolithic Filipino identity and

Philippine state by force on multiple ethnic groups in Mindanao and Sulu that saw themselves as

already pre-existing nations and nation-states

Recommendations

The TJRC perceives a ‘Bangsamoro opportunity’ rather than a ‘Bangsamoro problem’


The implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) is a unique

and extraordinary opportunity not only for Bangsamoro, but also for the whole Filipino nation

Solving the Bangsamoro situation in a durable manner offers a unique opportunity for a modern

State to manage the diversity inherent to any modern democracy in a constructive manner

The Bangsamoro aspires for a political framework which will enable them to practice good

governance, to develop their region and their people

The “dealing with the past” framework, combined with a conflict transformation perspective, is

key to addressing the grievances of the Bangsamoro people, historical injustices, human rights

violations, marginalization through land dispossession and to setting a solid basis for healing and

reconciliation in the Bangsamoro, as well as between the Bangsamoro and the Filipino society at

large

Implementation of Recommendations

The TJRC recommends to create the National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission

on the Bangsamoro (NTJRCB) that shall oversee the National Dealing With the Past strategy and

develop specific initiatives related to:

o Historical memory

o Impunity

o Promotion of accountability and rule of law

o Address land dispossession

o Promote healing and reconciliation in the

Bangsamoro

NTJRCB Mandate

To listen to the victims of the conflict, to investigate serious violations of international human

rights and international humanitarian law, and to inquire into specific events of the war

To contribute to the resolution of outstanding land disputes in conflict-affected in the

Bangsamoro and to address the legacy of land dispossession with concrete measures of provide

redress

To engage in the struggle against impunity, by promoting accountability and strengthening the

rule of law in relation to past and present wrongdoings, including crimes identified under the

Rome Statute and under international conventions to which the Philippines is a signatory

To promote healing and reconciliation among the different communities affected by the conflict

Second Set of Recommendations

The TJRC suggests 90 recommendations to be implemented through an incremental and flexible

approach that combines mutual reinforcing efforts carried on by:

o The GPH and MILF peace panels

o By existing governmental and state institutions at national, regional and local level

o CSOs and NGO bodies and organization in the field of education, history, reparation,

healing, justice, development, institutional reforms and reconciliation


3. The Bangsamoro Land Issue and the WB-IOM Recommendations

The title of the report was “Land: Territory, Domain, and Identity” and was submitted by the WB-IOM to

the TJRC. It was conducted in response to TJRC’s request, particularly its “Study Group on

Marginalization through Land Dispossession” to examine patterns of land dispossession among the

Moros and the IPs starting in 1898 to around 2000 and its impact. Please refer to Appendix A for the

presentation.

Prior to that, in 2013, WB-IOM conducted a scoping study of land conflict in selected conflict-affected

areas in Mindanao to better understand the causes, magnitude of the land conflict problem, and offer

initial recommendations of how to address the array of land conflicts in the region.

Data-driven which required digging archival materials particularly on settlement patterns and

population trends includes a spatial analysis of land dispossession wherein its impact differs from one

geographical site to another. It includes an analysis of informal and formal land dispute/conflict

mechanisms. It is forward-looking in that it provided recommendations/solutions to the land conflict in

the Bangsamoro region, benefitting from the experiences of other countries similarly suffering from

such contestation.

Outline of the Report

I. Introduction

II. Methodology

III. Historical Background on Land Dispossession (1898-2015)

IV. Land Dispossession and its Multiple Causes

V. Social, Political and Economic Impacts of Land Dispossession

VI. An Examination of Formal and Informal Land Conflict Settlement Mechanisms

VII. Prospective Challenges

VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations

The Study Areas

Minsupala

Proposed BCT

Due to spillover effects, contemporary study areas are Ranao (LDN/LDS), the old Cotabato

province (Maguinanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and to a lesser degree, South Cotabato

and Sarangani), and BASULTA (Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi).

Zamboanga peninsula not included due to lack of data

Key Findings

At the turn of the 20th century, Christian settlements in Mindanao were confined to a few places

with mostof the lands inhabited by the Moros, particularly the riverine and coastal areas,

andthe IPs occupying the inlands and the hilly and mountainous areas (slides 4-5)

Massive Christian resettlement of Mindanao, particularly those occupied by theMoros and then

IPs, started in the early 20th century and accelerated thereafter. They came in four waves that

reflected the predominant policy instrument used bythe central government in its state

formation and wealth accumulation process


o The first wave (1898 up to the Commonwealth period) laid the foundation for

thesystematic land dispossession of Moros and other original inhabitants of the

country(Mindanao in particular) through various laws and government programs (slide

6)

o The second wave (1946 up to the late 60s) saw the massive influx of northernmigrants

to Mindanao particularly areas occupied by Moros and IPs viagovernment-sponsored

resettlement programs (through its “land to the landlesstiller” policy) and spontaneous

migration (slide 7)

o The third wave (early 1970s up to mid-1980s) witnessed the peak of systematic land

dispossession of Moros and IPs, intensifying with the imposition of the Marcos Martial

Law regime and the predation of the Ilaga vigilante group (slide 8)

o Fourth wave – it’s complicated. Many factors were involved, including the proposed

coverage of the CAB (slide 9). Slide 10 shows the current composition of the population

from 1903 to 2010, showing the decline from 41% to 22% (from all over Mindanao), and

from 69.1% to 29.9% (in Moro Provinces)

Impacts of Land Dispossession

The four waves of dispossession gave rise to profound social, political, and economic impacts.

Drastic change in the ethnic composition of the population. The Moros and IPs to non-Moros

and IPs was 52% to 48% in 1903, by 1970 this had become 18% to 82%, resulting in the

“minoritization of the Moros” in their own land

Ethnic segregation – 75% of the Moros in Mindanao were concentrated in 5 provinces: Basilan,

Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi

Massive deforestation between 1950 and 1987, wherein the forests in Mindanao were denuded

by 2.2%, on annual average

Gerrymandering of old Cotabato, Lanao and Sulu Archipelago

Intensification of conflict and widespread poverty among Moros and IPs

o Accumulated years of land dispossession, displacement, and neglect have also had a

debilitating effect on well-being. These waves of resettlement not only “minoritized”

Moros and IPs in Mindanao but also intensified ethnic segregation

o As the demographic composition of Mindanao shifted, settler communities were

converted into barangays, municipalities and provinces to consolidate political power

o The four waves of dispossession gave rise to profound social, politicaland economic

impacts, leaving a legacy of violent conflict and poverty. Violentconflict has become a

common feature in communities that suffered from land dispossession and

displacement. Poverty estimates in 2012 show that 45% ofthe population in the

Bangsamoro Core Territory are below poverty threshold,compared to only 31% in other

areas of Mindanao, and around 23% in the entire country (slides 12-14)

Formal and Informal Land Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

An analysis of successful dispute resolution mechanisms in Mindanao identifies some common

elements:

o The need to painstakingly resolve competing claims plot-by-plot, claim-by-claim


o The importance of convening all relevant parties to a claim—competing claimants,

relevant national and local government agencies, the security sector, community and

religious leaders and civil society

o The need to ground dispute resolution in healing and reconciliation to encourage

acknowledgement of the historical injustices. Legal literacy can also play an important

role

Prospective Challenges (slides 16-17)

Projected Population Growth in Mindanao and ARMM

Land Administration and Management Implications of the CAB and BBL

The transfer of the land registration function (i.e., Register of Deeds under the LRA) to the

proposed Bangsamoro Government

Ancestral domain

Transitional justice and national dialogue

Spatial implications of socio-economic and normalization commitments of the CAB

Links between mining, displacement, and conflict.

Translating Pre-colonial Politico-cultural Formations to the Present Governance Context

Recommendations

General Recommendations:

o Global experience can usefully inform process, remedies, institutional structure, and

implementation

o Developing and implementing a policy to address land-related grievances and injustices

requires broad political consensus

o Restitution and compensation are the most common remedies. In Mindanao, a

combination of these would seem appropriate

o Policy and Agency for land reparation

o Introduce community land rights clarification processes as legitimate and legally

admissible

o Conduct national reconciliation dialogues

o Listen to narratives of dispossession

o Develop publicly accessible archives on land issues

o Assess the current and future impact of high-value natural resource exploitation on land

use and rights in Mindanao

o Ensure coordination between the land administration and the government agencies

leading the normalization process

Can be done immediately:

o Creating the Institutional and Legal Architecture

Ensure solid and sustained political commitment

Invest in good governance in the land administration and management sector

Develop and implement accessible and acceptable dispute resolution

mechanisms to address land conflicts at the community level

o Laying the Foundations: Filling Data Gaps and Building National Consensus

Address the land data gap


Conduct an “Intentions Survey”

Deeper examination of land and property conflict in the island provinces

Can be done upon establishment of the Bangsamoro:

o More responsive land policies to address landlessness, land conflicts and dispossessions

- compensation, restitution, reparation, redistribution, etc

o Opportunity to Re-engineer Land Administration Agencies - new institutional

arrangements and Cadastral Framework

o Enact a new legal framework for land administration. Clarify legal and operational

responsibilities

o Develop and implement an accessible and acceptable dispute resolution mechanism

that will address land conflicts

o Complete titling and registration of all untitled lands and record all tenure rights

including those outside of A and D areas in the new cadastral framework

4. The CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army) and DDR in the Peace Tables

The Cordillera has also a similar struggle with Mindanao, specifically on the armed struggle.

There is a conflict between the concept of land ownership as a tribe versus what the government says

that it is owned by the state. There is a conflict between national laws and what the tribes believe in.

But instead of the government listening to the issues and listening to what the people have to say, their

answer was militarization. Martial Law

All we wanted was having our own regional identity and regional government.The armed struggle is

rooted in land ownership. The tribes claim the land as their own, but land is taken away from

them.Communities and tribes organizing who are faced with militarization who are forced to take up

arms to defend themselves (1970s – 1980s)

Highlights of the demands of the CPLA: Withdraw all the military troops in Cordillera, demand that all

mining operations to cease immediately in the Cordilleras, and that there should be a regional

government established, which resulted to the CAR (Cordillera Autonomous Region)

EO 220 Sec 6. - Cordillera regional security force that should be an arm of the AFP in which the AFP

objected to and does not follow up to this day.

Now, with the concept of federalism hanging over our heads, we are afraid that once the Constitution is

opened up for amendments, the provision for an autonomous region in the Cordilleras will be deleted.

So we would like to establish that prior to federalism.

Lately, we submitted to Congress a draft bill about this, asking the President to certify it as urgent. The

BTC submitted the revised BBL to the President on July 17. On July 18, we also gave a copy of the

proposed Cordillera Organic Law to the President. In that meeting with the President in Malacaῇang, he

agreed, saying that it will be included in the certification (“Whatever treatment I will give to the BBL, I

will give the same to the Cordillera Organic Law”).


Yesterday, we were listening intently to the SONA of the President and waiting for this to come up. Well,

at least he mentioned the BBL, which he certified as urgent. So I don’t really know if it will really be

included in the President’s priority bills that he will endorse to Congress.

The movement views the Organic Act as the ultimate solution to all our problems in the Cordilleras. But

while working towards that, some members suggested that we might as well negotiate for other things

as well. In 2011, the CPLA and the government came up with an agreement (a MOA) for some specific

development projects and interventions in these areas which were ravaged during the war.

Our argument there is that this intervention is needed so that we can level up with the other

communities that were not ravaged by the war. While we lost developmental opportunities because we

were fighting throughout these many years, the other communities were already enjoying development

and progress. So we just wanted to level up. We worked on achieving an economic package to

concentrate on these areas.

We were also able to work out a package for former combatants who were integrated into the AFP, and

for some employment opportunities under the DENR programs. However, these agreements also caused

some rifts and division in our ranks. There were a lot of internal discussions and debates about it. In the

end, it was a purely voluntary decision – if others wanted to avail of these opportunities and enter into a

peace agreement with the government, then we would allow them. But we will not force those who do

not want to do that.

The arrangements we were entering with government (integration, employment and economic

packages, etc) should not be perceived as surrendering on our part. It does not mean we are already

surrendering our cause or movement, but rather, I view this as fleshing out the spirit of the Mount Data

Peace Agreement.

The essence of the Mount Data Agreement is that we agree to stop fighting, stop the war. We cannot

resolve any thing by keeping on the war. We can resolve things peacefully through open dialogues. So,

in that context, after all those years, I think there is no more place for an army. That was the main

argument there.

But as it caused a deep divide within our ranks, we just said that we will not force anyone to agree.

Besides, there was an advantage if the group maintains open lines with the government. In the event

that a new government administration will become as repressive as the Marcos regime, then the need

for an armed group will certainly arise. That was really the reason for keeping an armed component

before – because of a fascist, oppressive regime. But since, that is already a thing of the past, I told my

fellow members that I think there is no need for that. Hence, we can negotiate for other things.

Traditionally, our tribes are peaceful, and will not resort to war unless you push them. So, in the end, we

agreed that half of our organization will continue to be armed.

TJ is supposed to address pasthuman rights violations, and I am pretty sure that we will qualify there.

These violations happened during the early 1970’s up to the 1980’s. It was really a turbulent time.

Looking back, I think we were not able to address our initiatives or longing for a peace agreement. What

we were trying to address then was really more of a collective concern.

Actually, we are still ongoing with our implementation. By next month, we will meet once again to come

up with a 5-year economic strategy. But we really have to address the past violence that happened.


5. The Internal Purge in the CCP (Communist Party of the Philippines) and PATH

A video was first shown explaining the internal purge done by the CPP to “cleanse out” its membership

and take away the “deep penetration agents” or informers. It showed the exhumation of mass graves

and the suffering of the families of the victims, assisted by PATH. PATH (Peace Advocates for Truth and

Healing) was formally organized in 2002, pioneering in its focus on human rights violations by a non-

state armed group. Composed of torture survivors, families, relatives and friends of victims missing or

executed during the anti-infiltration campaigns within the Communist Party of the Philippines-New

People's Army (CPP-NPA) in the 1980s, PATH seeks truth and justice from the CPP-NPA and other Left

blocs involved in the anti-infiltration campaigns. PATH believes that all non-state armed groups,

including those not from the Left movement, should observe human rights in the conduct of their

resistance against the State. Ultimately, PATH holds the State accountable as well for the purges, and for

military atrocities during martial law and throughout successive administrations.

The invited panel discussant said that these human rights violations committed by the non-state actors

had been very difficult to deal with since it has not really been acknowledged, even with the ongoing

peace talks. Every time this issue was being brought up during the peace talks, the negotiators of the

CPP-NPA-NDF Panel would threaten to walk out of the negotiations if we insist on bringing the matter

up. They do not want to acknowledge that such a purge happened. They claim that those responsible for

the issue are no longer with them. But we would like to point out that some of their key leaders who

were responsible for the purge are still very much active in the movement, like the Tiamson couple, who

were the ones who approved the purge.

The CPP would like to think that this is already a closed case. But for the victims and their families, these

are not closed cases. Just 2 months ago, a family came to us. They were still thinking to inform their

missing brother that their mother had just died. But their brother died a long, long time ago as a victim

of the purge. We informed them and presented the information we got from the field, and it was only

then that they realized that their brother had indeed been dead for a long, long time already. For most

families of the victims, there is still no closure.

Our initial proposal is to form a Truth Commission. But the challenge is unlike the Truth Commissions

that we studied in other countries like South Africa, our non-state actors remain as non-state actors. So

how can you form a Truth Commission if they are not in power yet?

We would also like to bring this issue formally in the negotiating table of both the GRP and CPP-NPA-

NDF Panels. But the government is reluctant to bring it up officially as an agenda, and the CPP-NPA-NDF

Panel would maintain that this is a non-issue for them. In fact, before Ka Roger died, we were supposed

to gather some remains in Southern Tagalog, but what he told our emissary was “over my dead body!”

He would not allow it. Unfortunately, we do not know where Ka Roger’s body was buried, so we can

step right over his dead body.

But joking aside, we think that this issue is very important. If you think that the human rights violations

committed by non-state actors should be given due recognition, then the victims of those violations

should also deserve to be recognized as well. Never mind about reparation. Although the CPP-NPA

claims that in Mindanao, they gave P10,000 for each of the victim’s families. However, some families

never knew that the money was really indemnification for their lost loved one. They thought it was just

some money that was given to them as some form of support.


OPEN FORUM

Q: Why is rape only worth 9 points in the HRVCB chart?

Panel member: I know that the law is not perfect. There are many improvements that can still

be done. But how can you compare the experience of a 17-year old girl in prison, daily

threatened with rape, death or torture or summary killing, with the experience of other victims

who experienced the “water cure” torture, for instance? How does that compare with a man

kept in prison for 7-10 years? Yes, the law is not perfect, but what is more important is the

recognition of the state, and not about the money, or the amount of money. Of course, we also

know that it is very difficult to amend a law.

Q: What is the current status in terms of the recommendation for the full operationalization of

that commission (NTJRCB)? The BBL is not a requisite for the implementation of the Annex on

Normalization, where the commission is a part of. Was that discussed? Was this included in the

discussions with President Duterte? It may be worthwhile to look at. Maybe we can put some of

our efforts in pushing for the full implementation of that Annex, aside from pushing for the BBL,

because we have seen how it went before. And if the President’s SONA yesterday is any

indication, then it seems we can’t expect much to happen. Second, the panel discussants

mentioned a while ago the need to join forces in learning from the experiences of other groups,

especially with the issue of federalism, because as of now, nobody knows what model the

government will follow, what are its components, etc. Some Bangsamoro people are putting all

their eggs in the federalism basket, but I think

they do not really know it entails. You can

say, yes we support federalism, but I just

hope it is made clear what it is that we are

supporting. What are the details? What does

it mean specifically?

Panel member: In the several meetings of the

Panels that I attended, this was not

mentioned. It has been more than a year, and

all I heard is that there are plans on the part

of government, but this has not been placed

on the negotiating table yet. Our understanding is that implementation should be done together

– that both parties know what each one will implement. But that has not been placed on the

table yet.

Panel member: That is correct. It has not been discussed at the panel level where it should

properly be discussed. But my expectation is that the aspect of implementation will eventually

be elevated to a panel. Secondly, I can say that the OPAPP (Office of the Presidential Adviser on

the Peace Process) has plans to make a roadmap on implementation, as they have the desire to

really push this on a technical level. However, TJRC has recommended to do this at the national

level, since this is really a national issue. But all of these are still on a consultation level as of this

time. The problem is that nothing happened when the new administration came in. Before that,

there was already a draft EO for the setting up of the body. There were rumors that the only

thing needed was the signature of President Aquino. But when the new administration came in,


it was not a priority. So that is why they want to create a draft roadmap. But then again, this is

just a roadmap. What is interesting is that there are many separate initiatives, but we need to

put them all together. Secondly, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the ARMM regional development plan

includes transitional justice. RHRC is in-charge of that.

Panel member: When I asked about the TJ recommendations from the TJ people, at least for me

and my team, our realization is that nothing much will come out of this. The team calls it the

“peace process bottleneck.” We lobbied before the ARMM regional government, because so

many things need to be done, and so many incidents are happening, like the Zamboanga Siege,

about gaps in the HRVCB law (what happens with the violations committed before 1986?), etc.

The conclusion is that we can do the documentation, and the capacity building and trainings for

the ARMM partner agencies slowly, bit by bit. At least, we can start laying down the groundwork

for it. Update: Next month, we will have a meeting with the ARMM Development Academy and

we will be having a discussion to start the capacity building activities for the ARMM partner

agencies on documentation, human rights education and outreach. That is the first phase of the

draft roadmap with ARMM.

Q: A question on the HRVCB: What is the relationship between the HRVCB and CHR? Are they

separate institutions? Are their mandates separate and was that separation intentional and

why? Are they working together at all? Second, a comment for the Panelist on the CPP Purge

which links to accountability of non-state actors. Regarding your comment about Truth

Commissions and their inability to exact accountability of non-state actors with human rights

violations, South Africa was one of the first to do it. I think that the practice of Truth Commission

has already changed a lot since then. In Colombia, they have the FARC (Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia), which is a non-state actor. I think that now, non-state actors can actually

be included – it really depends on the mandate and how you want to set up the Truth

Commission.

Panel member: The HRVCB works closely with the CHR in terms of human resources. Some

employees are hired under the CHR, but are detailed to the HRVCB for the duration of the

board. The HRVCB has a very definite time period in which to complete its mandate, after which

it will be dissolved. So their work is very different from that of the CHR. The CHR is more on

investigations, documentation, fact finding, etc. What the two institutions are doing are

primarily very different, even if they do have a very close and intimate working relationship. The

effort to pass the reparation law itself was strongly supported by the CHR. In fact, during the

time when it was being discussed in Congress, former CHR Chair Etta Rosales, a victim of Martial

Law human rights violations herself, was at the forefront of engaging Congress and Senate, as

well as gathering support from the communities to support the reparation law. Also, the records

of the CHR were instrumental in settling the claims for some of the victims.

Panel member: We have an onging study on Truth Commission right now. We have a judge and

several lawyers helping us with that. But it’s not just the Truth Commission that we are

pursuing. Way back 10 years ago, we filed a trial case against 2 perpetrators. But the problem

was quite ironic – the provincial prosecutor threw our case out because he said that the victims

were conscious about the CPP-NPA and how violent these organizations are, so it was their

responsibility and lookout to steer clear from such people and groups. We filed a motion for

reconsideration, but unfortunately, our counsel passed away untimely, and we did not have a


lawyer. Are there any lawyers here who would like to volunteer? Please contact us if you are

interested.

Q: Has the TJRC gone back to the communities that they interviewed in the “Listening Process”

to give some feedback and updates? Although it was never promised that you would go back,

many of them are still hopeful that you would go back and tell them about your findings, your

analysis and recommendations, and what will happen next.

Panel Member: As far as I know, that is something that should have been done. But not in all

areas – I think it was only for selected communities. Although the TJRC, as a commission, is

legally existent until the signing of the Exit Agreement, whenever that will come, it has already

ceased operations. Once the Exit Agreement is signed by both parties, the TJRC will then be

officially dissolved. Meanwhile, it is no longer operational either. But I know that there were

some NGOs which were set up through the initiative of the former Chair of the TJRC.

Participant: For our NGO, we do go back to our partner communities tofacilitate validation and

provide some feedback on the Listening Process. In a way, it became a learning session on DWP

(dealing with the past).

Q: Does the roadmap include a feedback mechanism? Will you engage the communities once

again after the Listening Process? Although the TJRC is no longer functional, how can we sustain

it? I think you would be able to gather more insights if you validated the findings and

recommendations down to the community level. The question is somehow related to

sustainability.

Panel member: The last version of the 12-year roadmap is that the first 3 years will be for

documentation. One of the guiding principles in the roadmap is that the documentation and

human rights education campaign will be integrated, and that outreach will inform the

communities of what is happening.Ideally, validation should be done at the community level, so

the idea is to use the present mechanisms of the regional government (partnerships with the

DILG and DSWD, and incorporate some of the things that can be incorporated in their

agenciessince the RHRC cannot do everything). Just to give you an idea of the magnitude of the

work involved, just to disseminate the study results down to the community level, it would need

around 500 people. Also, the concept of TJ is strange to the communities and that is the reason

why we need to train people to bring the information down.

Panel member: During the Listening Process in the Bangsamoro areas, we had to ask the people

how they saw the concepts of TJ, that the facilitators who were trained would not impose their

concepts, so we were able to listen to the perspectives of the people. But one challenge is that

although the concepts were clear, they were not easily articulated by the people.

Panel member: The only activities I know that the TJRC is working on are those funded by UNDP.

They are working with the Independent Working Group, but also with their partners on the

ground to be able to disseminate this information. Yes, it is not on a large-scale, but it is

happening. They are also tapping national line agencies and partners. It’s a good start, even if it

is not enough.

Panel member: If the expectation is for us to go back to the more than 3,300 participants that

were involved in the Listening Process, I think we would not do be able to do that. Anyway, the

TJRC’s task when they did the Listening Process was really a scoping mission to check what the

people mean and what they understand about human rights violations – and that is where the

massacres, land-grabbing, forced disappearance, and other violations came out – then to put it


in the report, and not to focus on the 3,300. But the education, I think, should go wider, and not

just the communities that were engaged in the work of the TJRC. It’s challenging if you want to

popularize and validate the TJRC report at the level of the communities. Just translating the

report into Tagalog or the many different local languages, is already a gargantuan task. There

was an initial attempt, but it did not push through. There was also an attempt to record the

process in video, and some were posted online. But it does not exactly present what is in the

report. These are just small efforts to show the process. We just hope the other NGOs can pitch

in and help.

Q: Did you talk about the EO and the NTJRCB? Second, we have several big emerging issues right

now, like Martial Law in Mindanao and the crisis in Marawi. How can this be reflected, aside

from the TJRC? I know that a lot of the issues and events were covered by the TJRC up to MOA-

AD. But a lot has happened since 2013.

Panel member: On the NTCRCB, if that will hopefully be set up, will it be through an EO? We do

not really know. It really depends on the political will of the President, or on the political will of

both the Executive and Legislative branches. I think the President is not inclined to sign an EO,

since we have not heard anything from him. Originally, we suggested an EO in the report. But

that was within the context of the end of the previous administration. There was a big debate

about the merits and demerits of an EO. An EO is under the Office of the President, which

means many things. A legislative act will be more stable or lasting, and is not at the whims of the

Executive. But when it comes to the Legislative, the priority is still the BBL. So that is another

context we have to take into consideration. But I agree that the report should not stop at 2013

because the situations change, and incidents happen.

Moderator: OK. We have unfortunately run out of time. But fortunately, our invited Panel

Discussants will still be around for most of the day, so you can approach them for any more

questions that you may want to ask. Thank you.

FOUNDATIONS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: THEORETICAL/ LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The first presentor was Atty. Cej Jimenez. Her presentation appears as Appendix B.

What is Transitional Justice?

“Refers to the ways countries emerging from periods of conflict and repression address large

scale or systematic human rights violations."

There is no one way to practice transitional justice given the variety of contexts in which it can

be applied, but TJ "is rooted in accountability and redress for victims. It recognizes their dignity

as citizens and as human beings."

Its constant features include the "recognition of the dignity of individuals; the redress and

acknowledgment of violations; and the aim to prevent them from happening again."

"It is the application of a human rights policy in particular circumstances. It is the attempt to

provide the most meaningful justice possible in the political conditions at the time."


Set of Principles to Combat Impunity

Developed by UN Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet

Approved by the UN Commission on Human Rights 1997

Updated by the UN Independent Expert Diane Orentchiler 2005

FOCUS: On victims and perpetrators and their transformation into citizens with equal rights

Current UN mechanism: UN Special Rapporteur on “Transitional Justice”

A Conceptual Framework for “Dealing with the Past” (DwP)

Four main areas and mechanisms of a holistic “DwP” approach

o Right to Know

o Right to Justice

o Right to Reparation

o Guarantee of non-Recurrence

All areas mutually influence and depend on each other.

A long-term process that aims at establishing a culture of

Accountability, rule of law and reconciliation.

o Developed by SwissPeace and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA)

Victims/

Perpetrators

RIGHT TO REPARATION• Rehabilitation• Compensation• Restitution• Memorials, public apologies• Commemorations• Educational initiatives

RIGHT TO KNOW

• Truth commissions• Fact-finding bodies• Documentation• Archives• History books• Missing persons

RIGHT TO JUSTICE• Civil lawsuits, alternative

dispute mechanisms• International, domestic,

and ‘hybrid’ courts• Witness support and protection

• Trial Monitoring

CitizenshipCitizenship

GUARANTEE OF NON-RECURRENCE

• Decommissioning• Institutional reform• Democratic control of

the security sector• Vetting and lustration

Inspired by the ‘Joinet/Orentlicher’ principles against impunity

Swisspeace and FDFA 2009

A Conceptual Framework for Transitional Justice & Reconciliation

1 – Right to Know

An INDIVIDUAL RIGHT on the part of the victim and his/her family

A COLLECTIVE RIGHTS on the part of society

An OBLIGATION on the part of the State

Refers to the importance of individual and collective knowledge re the causes, experiences and

legacies of human rights violations


Right to Know: Mechanisms and Tools

Approaches to missing persons: search;

knowledge of life or death; exhumations

and forensic investigations

Truth Commissions

Commissions if Inquiry

Archives

Memorialization

2 – Right to Justice

Entails the duty of the State to hold

accountable those who are responsible

for HRVs

IHRL and IHL proscribe obstacles e.g. blanket amnesties for crimes against humanity, war crimes,

crimes of genocide, torture

Legal standards followed are those according to international human rights law, IHL and

international criminal law

Principle of fair and transparent trials as primary mechanism for ensuring:

LEGITIMATE ACCOUNTABILITY to challenge cultures of impunity

LEGAL RECOGNITION of the harm to the victims

Right to Justice: Mechanisms and Tools

International Mechanisms

Hybrid / mixed tribunals

National prosecutions

Universal jurisdiction

DECISIONS on type of trial: best suited to achieving a meaningful and legitimate form of

accountability in a given context

3 – Right to Restitution

Restitution, compensation or rehabilitation provided to victims of HRVs

Meant to acknowledge harm suffered, promote dignity and support ongoing capacity building

Right to Restitution: Mechanisms and Tools

Restitution of property and compensation

Individual and collective reparations

Symbolic reparations

4 – Guarantee of Non-Recurrence

NUNCA MAS! (Never Again!)

Presupposes the following:

o Democratic Societies


o Civilian Oversight of Security Forces

o Functioning Judicial System

o The Rule of Law

Guarantee of Non-Recurrence: Mechanisms and Tools

Demobilization and reintegration of combatants (DDR programs)

Elections and constitutional reforms

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Reform of the Legal System

Lustration/Vetting

Comparative Focus

Joinet /Orentlicher Principles against

Impunity UN Pillars Stephan Parmentier Alex Boraine Wendy Lembourne

Right to Know Truth Seeking Truth Truth Recovery Truth: Knowledge/ Acknowledgement

Right to Justice Prosecutions Accountability Accountability Accountability Right to Reparation Reparations Reparations Reparations Socio-Economic

Justice Guarantee of Non-Recurrence

Institutional Reform Institutional Reform Structural Transformation/ Political Justice

Popular Participation Local Ownership: Capacity-Building

Reconciliation Reconciliation Reconciliation Relationship Transformation

Holism in Practice

Importance of CONTEXT: DwP as a starting point

o CHALLENGE: to ensure that a DwP process is sensitive to conflict dynamics and informed

a nuanced understanding of the social, political, cultural and economic contexts

o OPPORTUNITY: to design a DwP process which is conflict sensitive and which is

meaningful for, owned by, those who have been most affected by HRVs

Who are the actors?

o CHALLENGE: to ensure that a DwP process is based on knowledge of, and participation

by, all relevant actors

o OPPORTUNITY: to design a DwP process which is inclusive, relevant and legitimate

How do Mechanisms connect to Broader Processes?

o CHALLENGE: to ensure that the mechanisms and measures in a DwP process can

contribute to conflict transformation, reconciliation and the rule of law

o OPPORTUNITY: to design a DwP process which is inclusive, relevant and legitimate

Challenges for TJ in the Philippines

The Focus on the Bangsamoro

o Who is the constituency? How organized is it?


o Who supports the constituency?

Coalescing with other Transitional Justice approaches

o Martial Law – victims and communities

o Displacement – durable solutions

o Non-State Armed Groups abuses and atrocities

Role of States and non-State Actor Groups (incl. NSAGs)

o Primary responsibility of the State

o Towards a National process for transitional justice and reconciliation?

o Who is involved? E.g. problem of elite capture

The second presentor was Atty. Marlon Manuel. His presentation appears as Appendix C.

Institutional Reform and Structural Changes (Guarantees of Non-Recurrence)

Why?

o Massive violations and systematic abuses also DESTROY institutions

o Institutions (political, legal, media, others) have been USED to commit (& justify) the

violations & abuses

o Institutions are WEAK, UNSTABLE & LACK CREDIBILITY

What needs to be done?

o Rebuild institutions

Establish accountable institutions and mechanisms

Institute needed structural changes

o Restore confidence in institutions

Enhance effectiveness, efficiency, integrity

Enhance peoples’ access to justice

Difference

Truth, Prosecution, Reparation Institutional Change

Who is the subject? Victims, survivors Society as a whole

Who is held primarily accountable?

Perpetrators, past government State

What is the focus? Individuals, groups, cases Institutions

Philippines:

Repressive regime Armed conflict

• Activists • political opposition • minorities • media • business

• Mindanao, Southern Philippines (Bangsamoro, MNLF-MILF)

• Cordillera, Northern Philippines (CPLA) • Everywhere (NPA)

Repression ended; Conflict continued


Some Reforms

o New Constitution was formulated

o Limitations on the powers of the President

o Independent Judiciary

o The military and police were reorganized

o Certain laws were repealed (eg., Anti-

Subversion Law); New laws were passed

o Electoral system was reformed

What happened?

o Martial Law in 1972

o Massive abuses and rights violations

o Congress was closed down

o Marcos became Executive and Legislative

o The justices / judges were under Marcos’ control

o Media establishments were closed down (subsequently, censorship was the rule)

o The military and police became instruments of the authoritarian rule

o The Constitution was changed (1973 Constitution)

EDSA People Power Revolution

1986 Freedom Constitution

o PROCLAMATION NO. 3

o 25 March 1986

o DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE

PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND

PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW

CONSTITUTION

o WHEREAS, the new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of

the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines;

o WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was done in defiance of the provisions of the

1973 Constitution, as amended;

o WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their extraordinary action

demands the complete reorganization of the government, restoration of democracy,

protection of basic rights, rebuilding of confidence in the entire government system,

eradication of graft and corruption, restoration of peace and order, maintenance of the

supremacy of civilian authority over the military, and the transition to government

under a New Constitution in the shortest time possible;

o WHEREAS, during the period of transition to a New Constitution it must be guaranteed

that the government will respect basic human rights and fundamental freedoms

1987 Constitution

o ARTICLE II – DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty

resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The

Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its


goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national

territory.

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.

The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the

fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by

law, to render personal, military or civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,

and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the

enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national

development.

Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees

full respect for human rights.

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall

ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

o ARTICLE X– LOCAL GOVERNMENT; AUTONOMOUS REGION

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and

in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical

areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic

and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of

this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of

the Republic of the Philippines.

o ARTICLE X – LOCAL GOVERNMENT; AUTONOMOUS REGION

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region

with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission

composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of

nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic

structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department

and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of

the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special

courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the

provisions of this Constitution and national laws. The creation of the

autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes

cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that

only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite

shall be included in the autonomous region.

o ARTICLE XI – ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall

continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be

provided by law.

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman,

composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy

and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate

Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.


Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall

act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials

or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality

thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in

appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result

thereof.

o ARTICLE XII – NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution

of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of

goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an

expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially

the under-privileged.

o ARTICLE XIII – SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures

that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce

social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by

equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and

disposition of property and its increments.

Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to

create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

o ARTICLE XIII – SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 17.

There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human

Rights.

The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must

be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be

members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities

of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.

Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on

Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers.

The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically

and regularly released.

o ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 5.

All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and

defend this Constitution.

The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of

the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty.

Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of

its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be

insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage, directly

or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote.



Section 5.

No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be

appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government,

including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their

subsidiaries.

Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service.

The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited

proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable.

The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three

years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the

Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty.


Section 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be

national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by

a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police

units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

o ARTICLE VIII – JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such

lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of

the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are

legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there

has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

o ARTICLE VIII – JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 8.

A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the

Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the

Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,

a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of

the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to

the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme

Court may assign to it.

Executive Order No. 1, 28 February 1986

o CREATING THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

Sec. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President

in regard to the following matters:

• (a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former

President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,

subordinates and close associates, whether located in the

Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all

business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,

during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking


undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers,

authority, influence, connections or relationship.

• (b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the

President may assign to the Commission from time to time.

• (c) The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above practices

shall not be repeated in any manner under the new government,

and the institution of adequate measures to prevent the occurrence

of corruption.

Executive Order No. 8, 18 March 1986

o CREATING THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 4. Functions of the Committee. – The Committee shall have the

following functions:

• a. Investigate complaints it may receive, cases known to it or to its

members, and such cases as the President may, from time to time,

assign to it, of unexplained or forced disappearances, extra-judicial

killings (salvaging), massacres, torture, hamletting, food blockades

and other violations of human rights, past or present, committed by

officers or agents of the national government or persons acting in

their place or stead or under their orders, express or implied.

• b. Report its findings to the President and make them public,

suggesting such action or actions by the new government to

compensate the victims and punish culprits as it may deem

appropriate.

• c. Propose procedures and safeguards to ensure that, under the

new government, human rights are not violated by officers or

agents of the government or by persons acting in their name and

stead or under their orders, express or implied.

• d. Performs such other functions as may be necessary for the

protection of human rights and the advancement of social justice in

the country.

Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987

o DECLARING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE CREATION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR

THE OPERATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Executive Order No. 1, 30 July 2010

o CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created

the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the

“COMMISSION”, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward

this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude

that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people,

committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices

and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous

administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure


to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served

without fear or favor.

The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who

will act as an independent collegial body.

o NOTE: DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY THE SUPREME COURT

Republic Act No. 6975, 13 December 1990

o AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the

State to promote peace and order, ensure public safety and further strengthen

local government capability aimed towards the effective delivery of the basic

services to the citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient and

competent police force that is national in scope and civilian in character.

Towards this end, the State shall bolster a system of coordination and

cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law

enforcement and public safety agencies created under this Act.

The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the

performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall

be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any

position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines.

Republic Act No. 8551, 25 February 1998

o AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REFORM AND REORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINE

NATIONAL POLICE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, ...

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy and principles. — It is hereby declared the policy of

the State to establish a highly efficient and competent police force which is

national in scope and civilian in character administered and controlled by a

national police commission. The Philippine National Police (PNP) shall be a

community and service oriented agency responsible for the maintenance of

peace and order and public safety. The PNP shall be so organized to ensure

accountability and uprightness in police exercise of discretion as well as to

achieve efficiency and effectiveness of its members and units in the

performance of their functions.

Republic Act No. 6975, 13 December 1990

o Sec. 3. Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 12. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense. —

The Department of the Interior and Local Government shall be relieved of the primary

responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious

threats to national security. The Philippine National Police shall, through information

gathering and performance of its ordinary police functions, support the Armed Forces of

the Philippines on matters involving suppression of insurgency, except in cases where

the President shall call on the PNP to support the AFP in combat operations.


Republic Act No. 10368, 25 February 2013

o AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REPARATION AND RECOGNITION OF VICTIMS OF HUMAN

RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE MARCOS REGIME, DOCUMENTATION OF SAID

VIOLATIONS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

o Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013

Other Laws

o REPUBLIC ACT N0. 9745 - Anti-Torture Act of 2009

o REPUBLIC ACT N0. 9851 - Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian

Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity (2009)

o REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10353 - Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012

Guarantees – not really guarantees

“guarantees” – reduce likelihood of repetition

Transforming institutions that made possible and helped perpetuate conflict or repressive rule

INTO institutions that sustain peace and protect human rights

Q & A:

• Q: I remember that the HRVCB covers incidents which happened in 1972 (date of reckoning),

and most of these incidents happened in the Bangsamoro areas. Is there any room for seeking

redress for these things? Second, we know that a case was already filed in the ICC, but are there

other things that we can expect? Can you explain it a bit more, especially for non-lawyers? As far

as we know, it is merely at the initial stage and is not yet a full blown case. Is that right?

Panel member: OK. The status. What was filed is a petition for investigation. Under the rules of

the ICC, there are 2 possibilities where they can officially investigate. Officially, the Chief

Prosecutor can do it on her own. In fact, she issued statements before, but those were unofficial

statements, so that will not feed into the process. Those were just her statements. But another

group also filed. So first there will be a determination if there is a basis to investigate. And if

they find that there is a basis, then that is the only time that the official process of investigating

for purposes of admissibility. That is the second level. If the process of fact-finding discovers that

there is indeed a basis to pursue an official investigation, then that is the only time when you

can say that the case has indeed been accepted by the ICC. So at this point, we are still only at

the very first step.

• Q: What can be done to hasten the process? That is the comment against the ICC, right? Their

processes take a long time. And our witnesses are already old and might die. So justice might

come, but it might be too late.

• Panel member: One of the things that the ICC will look into is if we have exhausted all possible

remedies in the country (national complementarity). So the process will really take a long time.

But there is one exemption – if the national processes cannot possibly take place (whether

brought about by the current political conditions, etc), thus you cannot really exhaust domestic

remedies. The burden of efforts right now this is to provide the ICC with the facts so that they

can proceed to investigate.

• Panel member: Also, another complication or peculiarity between our case and previous ICC

cases is that the other cases are all post-conflict, meaning they were running after the leaders

after they had been deposed or their term has ended. But in our case, it is a current sitting and


very popular President. Soevery time here is a discussion about the ICC, the prospects are not

too optimistic because of the unique situation. The ICC is very careful not to be perceived as

intruding or meddling in the country’s internal political affairs. So if you were the prosecutor,

you will really think twice before going after an incumbent President who enjoys a tremendous

amount of popular support, which can be perceived as interference. So that is a factor that the

ICC prosecutor will have to take into account.

• Q: What about the reckoning date? Can this still be modified?

• Panel member: The law is very clear on the time period – from September 21, 1972 up to

February 25, 1986. So unless the law is amended, it remains as it is. For cases outside the

prescribed period, it will have to fall under a different mechanism or a different law.

• Panel member: The concern you were mentioning was that the violations were rampant in the

Bangsamoro areas, so that has to be addressed by the BBL (Bangsamoro Basic Law). For

example, the Jabidah massacre occurred long before 1972. So if the violations did not happen

within the prescribed period, then this law will not apply. Look for other laws which can apply. If

the violations occurred in the Cordilleras, then it should be addressed by the Cordillera Organic

Act.

• Q: Is there a process in government right now where these concepts and principles are being

integrated into?

• Panel member: Actually, that’s one of the reason why we are here right now, because it’s not

something that we can hope that government will do on its own initiative. It has to start

somewhere, and it could start small. It is being implemented in the sense that it is in the law

(like the Constitution, HRVCB law, etc), but implementation is a big issue.

• Panel member: Going back to the issue of timeframe, you really have to acknowledge different

cultures, different contexts, experiences and incidents, so you cannot set a deadline or

September 21, 1972 nationwide. And as for the other incidents, then you must look for a law

which will apply.

• Panel member: When we had our regional workshop, we were discussing and trying to find out

what went wrong with the Philippines – what happened? Why did we miss out on certain

opportunities? One of our reflections was that we were elated and euphoric after we kicked out

Marcos. We embraced the military as partners in our struggle, so we did not pursue and hold

the perpetrators accountable. They were even celebrated as heroes of the People Power

Revolution. The theme then was reconciliation. Everyone was in a jubilant and celebratory

mood. Nobody said we should pursue the generals in the military. We did not prioritize truth

seeking and prosecution. It took us too long to realize that we should also have acted to hold

the perpetrators accountable. In fact, the family, associates, and friends of the Marcos family

are still very much here. The Marcos lawyers are still very much entrenched in the justice

system. It took us too long to realize that we should have acted. For example, we kicked Marcos

out in 1986, but we only had the Victims Reparations Act in 2012. In the elections, we even

elected members of the Marcos family and their cronies, and some of the perpetrators, so now

they are back in power. Had we started early in reparation, truth seeking and prosecutions, then

maybe we wouldn’t be in this situation. We were not even able to prosecute a single

perpetrator from the Marcos period. For now, it appears too late – how can we search for

justice when they are the ones in power?


WORKSHOP 1: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

The participants were grouped into the 4 Transitional Justice pillars: right to justice, right to know, right

to reparation, and guarantee of non-recurrence. The groups were asked to identify issues and

challenges under each pillar.

Guarantee of Non-Recurrence

Political interests –one of the biggest problems we have is existing political interests (refers to

our present political system).

Demonization of Human Rights – As a result of these political interests, human rights are being

demonized. How can we guarantee non-recurrence of human rights violations when people

perceive human rights as bad or as an obstruction to obtaining justice?

Weakening of institutions – We are referring to all branches of the government: executive,

legislative and judiciary. We have a police force that is prone to committing abuses, then we

have a weak judicial system (it takes a very long time before justice is served in court cases, we

have corrupt prosecutors, etc.), then we have a legislative body which merely serves as a rubber

stamp for the President’s crucial decisions

“Victimhood” syndrome – We have a tendency as a people to blame others for our misfortunes.

People tend to want a quick fix or a messianic figure who will fix all of our problems for us

Compounding mistakes instead of learning from them – Instead of admitting that we have

committed mistakes, there is a tendency to brag about being defiant and able to break the rules

instead of correcting the mistakes

Culture of impunity – People can’t get away with committing crimes and corrupt acts because of

the culture of impunity and not learning from mistakes (e.g. ex-President Erapis nowthe Mayor

of Manila)

Fragmented CSOs – The CSO community is not really united on rule of law or human rights. It

seems that some members of the civil society sector are being silent on issues such as human

rights.

o Comment: On the demonization of human rights, this is just a recent strategy/concept

invented by the Duterte administration. In the past it was a very welcome concept. I

believe that this will not stay beyond Duterte’s administration, hopefully.

o Comment: I beg to disagree that if you take away Duterte, then all our problms will be

solved. What is worrying right now is that it is no longer just Duterte who is the enemy.

Even some friends, family or close circles will defend the President.

Right to Justice

It is difficult and expensive to pursue justice in the Philippines.

Court cases are not decisive. It takes decades and there would be too many postponements,

some without any valid reasons

There are instances wherein both parties are not satisfied with the results, in turn, the issues

and especially the conflicts, are not resolved. One example is when indigenous people or the

marginalized sector’s rights were violated (like in cases of rape and murder), the defendants are

the ones burdened to prove the guilt of the perpetrators


Challenges and difficulties in evidence gathering and proof-finding. The investigating bodies of

the PNP and the AFP often have questionable methods and they sometimes rely on “intelligence

reports.” But in other cases, the investigation takes too long for fear of convicting the wrong

people.

The farmers are often denied justice because they lack the resources and the means to follow

up on their cases. In reality, those who are supposed to make sure that justice is served through

proper procedure are the ones denying the farmers their right to know.

In cases of non-state actors, how do we prosecute them? How do we acquire justice when there

is a lack of initiative and action from the government and there are no definitive procedure on

how to address the issue

There is lack of action from state-actors and institutions, including the LGU and the DOJ

There are different interpretations of the law, especially on enforced disappearances, and these

interpretations impede the implementationand the acquisition of justice

The purpose of the law is to protect the marginalized sectors (like farmers and the poverty-

stricken), but what happens in reality is that the drafting, interpretation and implementation of

the law are heavily influenced by those in power, and often, by the violators themselves

The perpetrators are in power

The people, the farmers, the poor, and the victims have no confidence in the justice system so

they would rather not file and pursue cases

In cases of ED, they fear for their lives. They would rather think that the victims were guilty

It is the state’s obligation to protect human rights, but only a few have a general idea of what

human rights are

Political influence on the judiciary

The people’s mindset about justice and human rights

Generation of dummies

Right to Know

Accessibility of information – It is difficult to access information from the government despite

having the Executive Order for “Freedom of Information.” This is especially important if you are

viewed as an “enemy of the state” (e.g. people who are on drug lists)

Absence of data/records – Sometimes, even if you reported to the police about your concern,

there would be no record of it in their system

Cultural attitude towards disclosing sensitive and personal narrative – On the part of the victim,

there is still stigma and shame (especially if you are a rape victim, victim of marital violence, etc)

Low level of trust in institutions (culture of silence) – Victims may think twice about going to

government institutions because they are wary that their concerns will not be addressed

properly

Historical “revisionism” – The public has the right to know about what happened in our past.

However, in the case of the Marcos regime, we can note that facts are not reported (how many

died or missing, how many were tortured, etc

Close-knit relationship amongst state security forces (“protect your own”) – Security sector

personnel often protects other uniformed personnel


Resources – Lastly, information on available resources are simply not accessible. We need to

empower, capacitate and train citizens.

Fake news – People nowadays spread unverified information or reports. This is especially true in

social media

Right to Reparation

Source of funds – where will the money come from?

Formula – Who will determine the formula?

Timeline/Period of Reckoning – what dates are covered by the period of reckoning?

“RIDO” or clan wars – Once money has been given, how do we ensure that clashes will not

recur? It may escalate into clan wars; a life for a life

Enforcement – how do we ensure that the perpetrators will provide the funds for reparation?

How do you measure and valuate the psycho-social damage experienced by the victims and

evacuees of the Zamboanga Siege? By the Marawi incident? How do you put a value to that for

reparation?

Right to reparation – on a personal victim level, and on a community level; historical injustices to

the Moro people and other IP communities

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Transitional Justice in Peru – by Atty. Edy Lynn Santiago

The affected region: Ayachuco

The site: La Hoyada, Huamanga, Ayachuco

The Conflict: Context

o Period = 1980 to 2000

o Affected region: Ayachuco

A mass grave in Hualla, Ayachuco

The human rights violations:

o Killings/Massacres, Enforced

Disappearances, Torture, and

Sexual Violence

The perpetrators:

o Sendero Luminoso (NSA),

MRTA (NSA), Military, Police,

Paramilitaries, Rondas, and

Communities (e.g. Comites

de Auto-Defensa)

The victims:

o Communities, University students, IPs, Press, Members of the Sendero Luminoso,

Military, Police


The CVR (Truth Commission)

o Convened in 2001

o Members—Initially 7; Increased to 12 (2 are women)

o Investigation period—2001 to 2003

o TOTAL—26 months

o Final Report—August 28, 2003

Mandate of the Truth Commission

o Truth-telling

o ‘Statement-Taking’

o Testimony Collection (14 months)

Included collection/data-gathering/sharing from Catholic and Evangelical

Organizations, CSOs

National Coordinator for Human Rights

Investigation proper:

o Number of Testimonies — 17,000

o 72 Full Documentation — Subject of cases filed by the Defensoria del Puebelo de Peru

(Ombudsman-CHRP Counterpart)

o 2 Forms:

Individual Statement-taking

Public Hearings

Logistics:

o 5 Regional Offices (Conflict-affected regions)

o 10 Regular Staff

o 500 ‘Statement-takers’

o Mobile Groups (with One Quechua/local language-speaking team member

o Targets for every week set

Training for Team Members:

o Familiarization with the ‘In-take’ Forms

o Interview skills (emphasis on building rapport; formal, respectful demeanor as a state

representative;

o Mental Health Support (for the victims; for the interviewers)

Public hearings: Forms

o Victims’ Public Hearings (12)

o Institutional Public Hearings (e.g. Universities, churches, political parties)

o Thematic Public Hearings (e.g. Gender/Women, Youth & Children)

Victim’s Public Hearings:

o Organized in regions (NB. Not an investigative tool; ‘story-telling’)

o Selected from the statement-taking

o Negotiated with the CSOs, churches (consent of victims and composition of cases

o Objective: To talk with the national audience

o Protocol: Non-adversarial

o Psycho-social support: Team of psychologists on stand-by (Minimum of 2 hours

debriefing after testimony


Archives

o CVR Files turned over to the Defensoria

CVR Recommendations

o Identification of possible fojas (Mass grave sites); restitution of remains in desaparecido

cases

o Prosecutions

o Reparations (Roll of victims—10,000 Soles per victim/heirs; Collective reparations—e.g

communal herds)

o Memorialization

Prosecutions

o Present objective in recovery of remains; May soon change when new administrative

law comes into effect (October 2017)

o Roles of CSOs and Victims’ Organizations

Transitional Justice in the Balkans: Focus on the ICTY – by Dr. Priya Pillai

Dr. Priya Pillai facilitated this session. Her presentation appears as Appendix E.

Context:

o Breakup of the Former Yugoslavia

o Declaration of independence, 1991

o Beginning of armed conflict

o Dayton peace accords, 1995

Setting up of the ICTY:

o UNSC resolution (808 & 827)

o First ad hoc courts (with ICTR) since Nuremberg & IMTFE

o Mandate: Individual criminal responsibility

o Temporal scope – 1 January 1991 onwards

Work of the Court:

o Jurisdiction (Arts. 2 – 5)

o Substantial docket

o Completion strategy 2003 & Mechanism of

the Intl Criminal Tribunals (MICT)

o Closing of ICTY – December 2017

Legacy:

o First sitting head of state indictment re

Milošević

o command responsibility and non-defense

of superior orders

o Finding of genocide in Srebrenica

o gender justice

o Input for the Int’l Criminal Court

Challenges:

o Resurgence of revisionist history


o Reconciliation?

o International accountability?

o Other transitional justice mechanisms (TRC/memorialization/reparations)?

Peace Process & Truth Commission: Experience from Aceh – by Mr. Faisal Hadi

Aceh:

o Population: 5.096 million (2016)

o Area: 56 770,81 km2

o Aceh is rich in natural resources, including oil, natural gas, timber, and minerals, and

provides 15–20 percent of Indonesia's oil and gas output

Armed Conflicts in Aceh’s History:

o In 1873,the Netherlands begins efforts to colonize Aceh, which had been an

independent sultanate for some 500 years. After a bloody 30-year struggle, the Dutch

gain control but never fully conquer Aceh

o 1942-1945, Aceh is occupied by the Japanese during the World War II.

o 1945-1946, Cumbok War, conflict between Uleebalang (the noblemen) and Ulama

(Islamic religious leaders)

o 1953-1958, DI/TII War, the first attempt to be independence from Indonesia by

declaring Aceh as part of The Islamic States of Indonesia

o 1976-2005, GAM (the Free Aceh Movement), the second attempt

The Rise of GAM:

o The conflict began on 4th December 1976,

when Hasan di Tiro formed GAM and

declared independence from Indonesia.

o The aspirations were based in part on a

historical claim that Aceh had never acceded

to Dutch colonial rule and was therefore

never part of the Indonesian nation state,

and the discriminative economic

exploitation by the regime.

The War Began:

o By1978 Suharto had sent thousands of troops to Aceh to quell the separatist movement,

resulting in a protracted conflict.

o In 1980 di Tiro and a few GAM leaders fled to Sweden, but the conflict continued.

o Suharto declared Aceh as a Military Operations Area (DOM) in 1989, and some of the

worst human rights abuses occurred during that period involving arbitrary executions,

kidnappings, rape, torture and disappearances, and village burnings, which lasted until

just after the fall of Suharto in 1998. But the war soon continued

Efforts to Forge Peace:

o Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh, 12 May 2000

Facilitated by the Swiss-based Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

Cease fire for 3 months

Delivering humanitarian aid for the people


Aceh CSOs prominent figures were involved in the humanitarian team to

monitor the implementation and giving advices

o Moratorium on Violence, 2001

o Peace Through Dialogue, 2001

o Cessation of Hostility Agreement (CoHA), 9 December 2002

Martial Law

o In May 2003 the CoHA process had collapsed, after GAM refused to hand over its

weapons and Indonesia’s armed forces refused to withdraw troops at a negotiation in

Japan

o On 19 May 2003, the newly installed President Megawati had put Aceh under martial

law

Blessing in Disguise

o In 2004, the reform-minded former army general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has been

elected as president, prospects for a peaceful resolution to the Aceh conflict improved

o Both Yudhoyono and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla had gained valuable negotiation and

conflict resolution experience while dealing with the problems in Poso and Maluku

(inter-religion conflict)

o Shortly after taking office, Kalla sent Deputy Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare,

Farid Husain, to quietly talk with GAM leaders both in Aceh and abroad

o Soon as the peace talks continued, the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26th December 2004

swept over much of Aceh. left more than 150,000 Acehnese dead or missing and

thousands more displaced

o The destruction has brought an international spotlight on Aceh and prompted a massive

humanitarian relief efforts

o The tsunami also dealt a considerable blow to combatants in both GAM and the

Indonesian army. Ultimately it was the catalyst that brought both parties back to the

negotiation table to broker a peace agreement and facilitate the recovery process

Helsinki Peace Agreement

o The Helsinki negotiations, held in between January and August 2005, resulted in the

signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between GAM and the Government

of Indonesia. The agreement consisted of six sections regarding the governance of Aceh,

human rights, amnesty and reintegration, security arrangements, the establishment of

the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and dispute settlement

o AMM comprises of 5 ASEAN countries (Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia,

Philippines and Thailand), plus EU among others Netherland, Swiss, Norway

o Justice and accountability issues were not a top priority during the Helsinki talks. But

despite of that fact, the MoU clearly provided for transitional justice approaches,

particularly a TRC and HRC

o The Helsinki MoU simply states that ‘A Human Rights Court will be established for Aceh’

(Article 2.2), and that ‘A Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be established for

Aceh by the Indonesian Commission of Truth and Reconciliation with the task of

formulating and determining reconciliation measures’ (Article 2.3)


Enactment of the Law on Governance of Aceh (LoGA)

o LoGA (Law Number 11/2006) has transferred most provisions of the Helsinki MoU into

national law

o However, the LoGA included an article preventing retroactive justice: ‘To investigate,

prosecute, rule on, and resolve cases of human rights violations that take place

subsequent to the enactment of this Law, a Human Rights Court shall be established in

Aceh’

Prosecution Using HRC

o Three cases of alleged HR violations in Aceh have been investigated by the Komnas

HAM:

Jambo Keupok Massacre

Simpang KKA Massacre

Rumoh Geudong Camp (arbitrary execution, rape, torture, etc)

o Stuck at the Office of the General Attorney

o Returned to the Komnas HAM because “the cases were not well prepared”

TRC for Aceh

o According to Article 2.3 of the Helsinki MoU, TRC for Aceh would ‘be established by the

Indonesian TRC with the task of formulating and determining reconciliation measures’

o At the time of the Helsinki negotiations, the national parliament had already passed a

National TRC Law (No. 27, 2004). But unfortunately By late 2006, when the Indonesian

constitutional court deemed the law unconstitutional, the law was revoked because of a

provision that required victims to accept amnesty for perpetrators before being eligible

for reparations

o The constitutional court’s decision meant that the establishment of a TRC for Aceh

would face long delays. Therefore, Aceh’s civil society has pushed, largely by way of an

NGO Koalisi Pengungkapan Kebenaran (Coalition for Truth Recovery, or KPK), for the

establishment of an Aceh TRC through provincial-level legislation (qanun)

o While some remain sceptical that this strategy will succeed, the KPK has produced a

draft qanun and submitted it to Aceh’s legislature. Aceh’s administration has

reservations about this approach because, without the backing of Jakarta or the stalled

national TRC, establishing a purely Acehnese commission could severely damage

relations between Aceh and Jakarta. Such a commission would also be unable to force

senior military officials to testify

o Qanun on Aceh TRC (No.17/2013) was enacted by Aceh Parliament on December 2013

o Mandate

Revealing the truth about human rights violations that occurred in the past

Recommends thorough reparations for victims of human rights violations, in

accordance with the universal standards relating to the rights of victims

Assisting in the achievement of reconciliation between perpetrators of human

rights violations both individuals and institutions with victims

o Yet, it took lots of effort by CSOs before it really working. Only in December 2015, the

recruitment of Commissioner has been started

o The 7 elected commissioners (2F, 5M) has been sworn by the Governor by the end of

October 2016


o Still lots to be secured: Office (third week now) and working facility, budget, and staffs.

o CSOs supports the gaps

Video Showing: The Case for Justice

A video (“The Case for Justice”) was shown, which highlights transitional justice initiatives from

different countries

International Perspectives on Transitional Justice – by Atty. Trina Monsod

South Africa

o Truth and Reconciliation v. Justice

o Highly publicized reports, interviews, progress and testimonies.

o Amnesty abut with public apology

Colombia

o ICC

o 8 million victims over 50 years

o FARC Peace agreement negotiated in stages (other groups ongoing)

2003-2006 Demobilization and reintegration under the Justice and Peace Law

involving 35,000 members. Involved confessions and reduced sentence, but

accompanied by other truth/

history initiatives.

2011: Victim’s Law

2012: agrarian reform, political

participation, illicit drugs,

victims, ending the conflict, and

implementation of the peace

accord.

o 2016: New Peace Agreement rejected

narrowly by those less affected by the

war

o Didn’t like the monetary assistance to reintegrated FARC

o Didn’t like the reduced sentences

o Want lustration

o Increased participation and constitutional amendment

o 2017: New TJ law

o Start disarming

o dilutes “command responsibility” and other means of prosecution

Guatemala

o 30 year fight against communist ended in 1996 with peace accords that had numerous

proposals on institutional changes

o Originally a peace treaty that did not allow prosecution, a Commission for Historical

Clarification continued with truth telling


o Anthropology foundation began exhuming bodies. Began a sense of the “duty to the

dead”

o Involvement of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ordering the investigation of

violations

o Slowly empowered victims to seek criminal justice

o Trials began in 2013 and declared Dictator Rios Montt guilty of genocide against the

Mayan indigenous people: 1st head of state to be tried in their own country for

genocide

o Elite prepared to discredit the trials and their use of media

Argentina

o Subsequent President provided amnesty

o Reversed by IAC

o Nunca Mas

Myanmar

o Conflict centered on desire for autonomy but conflict over natural resources

o 2011 end of 50 year military rule: 1.1 million internally displaced

o 2015 elections

o Fear of retribution by the elite and military threaten tensions

o Addressing corporate human rights violations - whether following South Africa’s refusal

to implement its own recommendations regarding cooperation responsibility, or

Liberian logging

o Call to begin with acknowledgment

Mali

o Civil war - with Tuareg attempts to secede, coup d’etat

o Reports of destruction of Muslim shrines, execution of detainees, looting and rape

o Mali refers case to the ICC in 2012. Investigates Al Mahdi case in January 2016

concentrating on war crimes, Charges confirmed in March, Decision in September 2016

Libya

o Violence against civilians were widespread and systematic, including repression of

peaceful demonstrations, and inciting violence by encouraging the annihilation of the

“cockroaches” opposing him

o Non-state party UN Security Council referred to the ICC

o No investigation into Rebel crimes

o Gaddafi died, but Al-Senussi is being investigated in Libya

o Shrouded in secrecy

o Assassination of lawyers and judges

o Other means of self-amnesty

o Crimes of rape and torture excluded

Uganda

o Self-referral to ICC Jan. 2004, Investigations in 2004

o Civil War (LRA): Extensive TJ measures promised but halted implementation

Criminal Trial of LRA Commander Kwoyelo in 2011 stalled when he was deemed

eligible for amnesty

Created a national policy on TJ, but was stalled at Cabinet - yet to be approved


Victims: mothers and children abducted were returned but subject to stigma

= Civil Society stepped in to provide smaller scale memorialization and truth

seeking

= Human Rights Commission concentrated on documentation

Kenya

o Post-Election violence 2007 to investigate corrupt officers and human rights violators.

o Special Tribunal to prosecute established but stalled in Parliament

o TJRC report submitted in 2013, then tabled in 2015.

o President announced in 2015 that there were almost 5,000 out of 6,000 cases open for

investigation, but will halt further action on all the cases for lack of evidence, etc

o But the President publicly apologized for violations against Kenyans and established a

98.7USD fund for reparations. Implementing Regulations still underway

DRC

o Insurgency by LRA: Self-referral to the ICC in 2004

o First Arrest Warrants against LRA leaders in 2005

o Surrender of Dominic Ongwen in 2015, Trial in Dec. 2016

o Joseph Kony et al at large

o Power - sharing agreement between state and non-state actors, proportionately among:

warring factions, unarmed opposition, and civil society

o International Penal Court to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,

and large-scale human rights. Slow to begin but strong civil society reports, particularly

with information gathering

o Includes Environmental Crimes, i.e., plundering to fund armed conflict

Familiar Circumstances

o Cold War backing of the US or Russia of leaders that crushed or encouraged communist

tendencies (Eastern Europe, Latin America, etc.)

o Issues about privatization / land reform (also Colombia)

o Colombia

A long-negotiated peace agreement of a 50-year conflict that was at the last

minute rejected by those least affected by the conflict

Rejecting a peace agreement for fear of changing the Constitution (although it

actually required it)

Desire for power sharing

Issues about reintegration and development as part of peace

Drugs as part of civil war

o Guatemala

Indigenous people repression (despite their majority)

Having to investigate and get stories after a long hiatus.

Elite hijacking the media to discredit the institutions Argentina

Amnesties

o Myanmar

Similar restrictions and self-amnesties (same in Libya)

o Mali

Civil wars with greater desire for secession or autonomy (also Spain, Scotland)


o Libya / Rwanda

Recognition that inciting to violence could be part of crimes against humanity

Different means of evading actual investigation or prosecution by excluding

crimes, especially against the victors/ self-preservation (Also Uganda that

halted/ stalled implementation, Kenya’s creation of Special Tribunal)

Familiar Issues

o Truth v. Justice/ Reconciliation v. Justice (S.A./ Kenya/ L.A.

o Power of the elite

o Prejudice of Media

o Trust in institutions, including the ICC.

o Entrenched beliefs about hierarchies, discrimination

o Confusion and dilution of meaning, i.e. “justice,” truth commission, power sharing,

reintegration, land reform, terrorism

o Inapplicability of mechanisms

o Inclusive mechanisms

Successes

o Building prosecutorial expertise (Guatemala, DRC)

o Media involvement (South Africa)

o New judicial forms

Hybrid Courts (Cambodia)

Concurrent jurisdiction

o Awareness of corporate responsibility and environmental crimes (DRC, Myanmar)

o Civil Society involvement and small victories (Uganda, Guatemala foundations and the

church)

o Easier means of recording

o Alternative means of recognition

Memorials

Media

LESSONS

o Generally:

Focusing on the Rule of Law and the integration of the 4 pillars (rather than

having to choose)

Imbalanced focus, i.e. Victor’s justice, persecution of the accused

Victim centered v. society generally

Empowered civil society that puts pressure on governments.

Willingness to begin with smaller victories rather than all-or-nothing approaches

Immediately integrating victim’s rights and providing participation and voice,

especially gender based violations

Specialized, but careful technical assistance, leaving room for context

o Prosecution:

International:

• Manner of Referral

• Ability to investigate

• Difficulty enforcing ICC arrest warrants


• Length of time

• Distance from victims. Relevance and Impact

Domestic:

• Need for expertise on prosecution of core crimes and large-scale crimes.

(Guatemala, DRC)

• Strengthening trust in weakened institutions - sometimes establishing

special or separate courts. (DRC, ICC, Regional, Khmer)

• Evidence: Beginning with the stories: civil society gathering of

information and cases, i.e., church, humanitarian organizations

• Choosing defendants, difficulty of show trials

• Curbing vengeance

o Truth

Credibility of sources - Media

Having more than one truth or perspective

Clarifying objectives, i.e. depending on the victims, systemic nature of large

scale violence - establishing cultural patterns rather than blame, etc.

Accompanied by other means of accountability with a view to prevention and

non-recurrence.

Publicity

Fact finding from the ground - civil society

Independent initiatives

Sensitizing the public to violations

Need to be careful about brandishing words and being careful about meaning.

Education of those least affected

o Non-Recurrence

Several countries continued to have the elite in positions of power = back to

truth

Rule of law based measures: Begin as you mean to go on

Empowering the victims and civil societies, ensuring victim-centered justice

Lustration difficulties - especially with long-term regimes

Reporting

o Reparation

Asset recovery based

Land Reform and rural development

Special laws allowing tracing of funds

Retraining - alternatives and opportunities

Questions addressing environmental and economic/ corporate crimes

Protection of witnesses, especially the vulnerable to shame for testifying

o What Else?

There are so many similarities here that we can count as great

accomplishments. Why does it not always seem so? Learned Helplessness?

Poverty consciousness?

History? Solidarity? Pride? Identity? Commiseration? Perspective? What are we

missing?


Are we missing anything?

Q & A

Q: In Peru and Aceh and Yugoslavia, were the transitional justice initiatives as divisive as the

Philippine experience? Especially when you talk about exacting accountability?

Moderator: To proceed faster, I will collect a few more questions before giving the mike to the

panellists. Are there other or similar or follow-up questions?

Q: With regards to divisiveness in the Philippines, it is not only in accordance to political

alliances, but also due to ideology or organizational affiliations. When memorialization was

brought up, what came to my mind was the big stone or boulder that was put in the UP Sunken

Garden to memorialize the victims of the purges, and it was a target for continued vandalism by

unknown people, so eventually it was removed. PATH had put the stone there to memorialize

the victims, but it was an initiative of a CSO. If I may ask, whose initiatives were there for the

memorialization? For us, right now, our memorialization of the victims have been mostly led by

CSOs. How much has the state been involved in your experience in other countries?

Q: In the Philippines, the military has been saying that 74% of the NPA (New People’s Army) are

recruited from Indigenous People communities, and 90% of their bases are located inside

Ancestral Domains of the IPs, so obviously, there should be a role for the IPs. The way that

Colombia had addressed it, as I heard from the Colombians who came here last year, was that

they had a separate chapter on IPs in their peace agreement. It was clear in Peru that IPs played

a key role in transitional justice, but I wonder how the IPs have played a role in the other

experiences, and what can the Philippines learn from them?

Moderator: Again, the questions were on divisiveness – how divisive were the factions in Peru

and in the other countries? You know, the false dichotomy between reconciliation and

accountability. Second, whose initiatives were involved in memorialization? Third, what role did

the government play or not play in memorialization? And fourth, the question on IPs.

Atty. Edy: In Peru, how hard was it to do the Truth Commission? And how hard was it to access

the communities after the violence? It was quite easy for them – because the violence ceased

totally. Of course there were isolated incidents after 2000, like assassinations of former

members of the Sendero Luminoso, but generally, there was peace. So everybody just wanted

to tell their stories. And the CSOs were proactively helping the Truth Commission, and also

projects like memorialization. On accountability, Peru would not be the perfect example for

prosecutions. Out of 70,000, they only have about 50 active cases right now. But their claim to

fame is the Barrios Altos case, that said that the state does not only have the duty to prosecute,

but also to punish the perpetrators. The decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

are not enforceable, but it can tell a state what their duty is. As a comparison of different human

rights bodies, compared to the European Court of Human Rights, and the African Court of

Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is considered as the number one in

terms of human rights activism, which also means they are good at enforcement. On the

question about memorials, the Museo de Memoria was state funded, as part of the

recommendations of the Truth Commission. Their Catholic university also had some efforts at

memorialization. On divisiveness and ideology, one of the findings of the Truth Commission was

that about 50% of the atrocities were committed by the non-state armed groups. But the


weakness at that time was that the case would depend on where the victims were found, or

where the atrocities took place.

Faisal Hadi: In the Aceh context, at the beginning of the initiative of helping the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission in Aceh, a time when the field negotiations had not yet been

established, that was the time when most of the Acehnese support the idea of having those

responsible for the atrocities to be brought to the law, and also considering that there are so

many cases that the courts cannot handle them, people started to think about the experience of

South Africa on a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, especially since for Muslims, we have a

belief that to forgive is an obligation. But first, it has to be acknowledged and recognized what

specific things have to be forgiven. It cannot be like what the Chief of the Military did in 1998

when they abolished the military operations right after the reign of Suharto. He made a public

appearance on national TV asking for forgiveness from the people of Aceh. In order to be

forgiven, he has to identify what cases he did that require forgiveness from the people of Aceh.

So his apology was not acceptable to the Acehnese community. But then, because the situation

got better from time to time after negotiations, recently, more and more people are opposed to

the idea of accountability and transitional justice mechanisms. They say that it is not good to

“open a can of worms.” This time, the push was coming from scholars, not from the grassroots.

So many young people today do not know about what happened during that time, and follow

the opinion and perception of the scholars, saying that what is done is already done, and it is

time to move on.

Dr. Priya Pillai: On the reaction of the population to the trials, I think that in the Balkans, one of

the issues was that the tribunal was an international tribunal which was sitting in the Hague. So

it was thousands of miles away from the location and the victims. Again, it was a balance – it

was created during the war, the war was raging, but the tribunal was set up. The conflicts began

in 1995, but the first trial and the first judgement came out in 1996 or 1997. So, basically while

the conflict was still happening, the victims and witnesses were talked to. That necessitated the

need for distance – for safety and a number of logistical reasons. You had to balance that on the

one hand, with the fact that it “wasn’t close enough” to the people. It was different compared

to the Cambodian experience – at least the tribunal was in Cambodia, so people can come there

and listen. It’s a little more real for the people in terms of what high justice means. In the former

Yugoslavia, the problem of what has been the perception, and this is clearly a perception based

on the wrong facts, which lead us to the important role of education – that it was against the

Serbs. That was the perception that a lot of the Serb politicians had, which they fed to a lot of

the people. If you look at the indictments, it was a lot of Serbs, but there was a lot of Croats as

well as Kosovans. So that was incorrect information but I think it comes down to public

perception and the role of education in making these high concepts a little more real and

tangible. At this point, a lot of cases have gone back to Bosnia. There has been good progress in

Croatia. Unfortunately, in Serbia there was very little progress. In fact, just a week ago, one of

the cases was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, saying that the prosecution had not done its

job. Unfortunately, there have been a lot of nationalist parties which have made the lines a little

more harder to cross. So that is in terms of the reaction to trial. On memorialization and

funding, in Bosnia, there is a large memorial, the Potichari Memorial, where a lot of the men

were executed. In terms of funding, a lot of it had been private funds, and a lot of it was given

by the US as well, but the point is that the memorial was mandated by the High Commissioner,


who did so while the region was still coming to peace. To an extent it was an imposition, but it is

a very powerful tool right now, and while they are still exhuming bodies and making DNA

matches, last July 24 was the anniversary of the memorial, and there were 700 bodies that were

newly identified and given a proper burial. So again, a memorial can be a very powerful tool. On

the role of indigenous peoples, I think there are some amazing examples from Latin America,

especially Guatemala, which established an international truth commission, with 3 international

commissioners. That was really powerful. The one distinction that I would make is with regards

to the timing of the establishment of the truth commissions. In Argentina, they were looking for

the truth to what happened to the victims of enforced disappearances. From their truth

commission report actually came an underground best seller named “Nunca Mas!” (“Never

Again!”). Although it focused on the role of the indigenous people, it also galvanized in the next

15-20 years the important place of prosecution. So again, it was a very powerful tool in terms of

how it might link. One point – we always talk about transitional justice in the context of conflict

and mass atrocities. The Canadian Truth Commission is focused exclusively on indigenous

children who were extracted from their communities over 75 years ago, and were put in

residential schools run by various churches and the state. They have now finished 4 years of

hearings across Canada, compounded with an apology by the Canadian government, and the

question now is on reparations. Again, it’s a proper tool that is not necessarily restricted only to

a context where you are emerging from a dictatorship or authoritarian rule. In this case,

reparations can be used for atrocities done to indigenous populations quite effectively as well.

Atty. Trina Monsod: Just a small note. Talking about autonomy and the negotiations here, what

we found is that there are just so many examples of different levels of different kinds of

different autonomies all around the world. The Philippines has more than 7,000 islands, each

with a different past – you would think by now that everyone knows we are diverse. Yet, here

we are, trying to put everyone under one national law. So I always felt that the advocacy, not

really for federalism, but for amending the Local Government Code – because that can do a

whole lot.

Atty. Marlon Manuel: On the memorialization, I have 2 questions. One: can we have some

updates on the Martial Law Museum, which is supposedly the mandate of the HRVCB? I believe

that was also supposedly funded, correct me if I am wrong. Second: I am not sure if it is a culture

for Filipinos not to have graphic images or memories of violent incidents. Certainly,

memorialization would include that. I remember in my first visit to Cambodia in 2005, the man I

was supposed to meet had an urgent meeting, so his officemates asked me if I already had the

chance to visit the Museum, which was quite near. So I went, and I had no idea about that

museum. It looked like a school – I heard that it was formerly a school building. And I was

shocked. You would see the pictures of the actual killings and executions. You could even see

the dead bodies right there in the room. You would see a narration of how the prisoners would

try to commit suicide using the barbed wires, and then in the room were the barbed wires. It

was very graphic. But I have not seen anything like that in the Philippines. We have the Bantayog

ng mga Bayani. We also have the Laur Detention Cell, but it was just a detention cell that was

turned into a memorial. You do not see the struggle and hardships. You do not know the story

behind it. Somebody mentioned the Holocaust Museum. But one very interesting memorial in

Germany is the German Resistance Memorial, which documented the resistance movement

against Hitler. It was actually in the place where a movie was shot – have you seen the movie,


“Valkyrie,” starring Tom Cruise? Anyway, the German Resistance Memorial was in that

particular place. You see, it is very different when you see just a monument or a statue, and it is

different if you go to a place where they give you the details and a picture about what

happened. You begin to have a new appreciation of the hardships and struggles behind it, and

thus, the move to recognize and memorialize that event. I am not really sure if we can do that.

Well, Fort Bonifacio, the past detention center, is no longer the place it used to be – it is now

known as “The Fort,” where you have all the tall buildings and the premier business district, so

maybe a memorial would be out of place there.

Panel member: It was in 2016 where there was a groundbreaking for the Martial Law Museum.

And the target location was in Agham Road, Quezon City, near the Office of the Ombudsman.

They had a groundbreaking, and former President Benigno Aquino III graced the occasion, and

he expressed support for the project. The HRVCB law provides for the funds for the museum. I

think that out of the PhP 10 Billion, the interest would go to the setting up of the Martial Law

Museum. That’s where the funding will come from.

Atty. Marlon: What is the status right now?

Panel member: When the new administration came in, it was basically put on hold. Before,

towards the end of the Aquino term, the Memorial Commission was already posting

advertisements for job vacancies – for archiving, librarians, researchers, operations, etc. So at

that time, you could already see the direction where it was going. Actually, some people from

the HRVCB staff even expressed interest in joining the Memorial Commission after their term

with the HRVCB. Unfortunately, with the new administration, nothing happened after that.

Atty. Marlon Manuel: But it was supposed to be led by the CHR, right?

Panel member: The Memorial Commission would be a separate entity, but would be under the

CHR only for certain administrative and budgetary purposes. So it’s really a separate entity.

Q: Follow-up question: was there any effort to identify the perpetrators, or putting it in writing

who were responsible for cases of human rights violations? I think that we are not comfortable

in putting down in writing who caused these abuses. Sort of like a “name-and-shame” campaign.

Can we still do that?

Panel member: Well, specifically for the work of the HRVCB, I don’t know if we can do that

because the HRVCB was not really strong on identifying the perpetrators. The focus wa son the

victims and giving reparations. For many of the eligible claimants, reparations were provided

even if the victims were unable to identify their assailants.

Atty. Marlon Manuel: That can be the basis for future memorialization – the stories.

Panel member: Perhaps, but right now we have to comply with the law – and the law focuses

right now on the victims, not the perpetrators.

Dr. Priya Pillai: Just an observation. I don’t know if I am opening a can of worms, but I went to

the Marcos Mausoleum in Batac, Ilocos Norte, and at that time, the former President’s body was

still there. It was quite a powerful narrative, going through the experience of walking through

the mausoleum. I didn’t know what to expect, but I find that it was quite well done, it was well

curated, and I wasn’t sure where or at what point in time the narrative would stop, or whether

the narrative would change. Coming out of the museum, I found myself thinking that if I didn’t

know much about Philippine history and the context, I would be led to believe that he was really

a very incredible man who did a lot for his country. I think that’s where the counter narrative

becomes really critical in terms of memorialization. The lack of something else – you can have a


counter narrative that explains what really happened. I also went to Corregidor, where you have

the Japanese Peace Garden, which is also quite iconic. But the comment is that it only talks

about the Japanese, and not about the other allied forces. I think that it becomes a point of

contention, and it becomes a critical focus for the narrative, especially in this day and age.

Panel member: In one of the discussion sessions of the Bangsamoro, one of the aspects of

transitional justice is, of course, the recognition of the Bangsamoro history, which is very valid. I

was quite bothered because the only thing that came out of the discussion on recognition of the

Bangsmoro history was memorialization of the home of Hashim Salamat, which I also think is

good, him being the founder of the MILF, so I believe we need to do it. When I raised the

question about memorialization of events, like massacres, etc, there was not much opinion

coming from the Bangsamoro people I spoke with. To be fair, Hashim Salamat is a very

prominent Bangsamoro, and he has to be recognized for his contributions, and turning his house

into a museum, with all his writings and documents – he was a really prolific writer, and some of

his writings were the basis for founding the MILF, for the resistance in the Bangsamoro, and I

was just wondering how much consciousness do we really have about the memorialization of

the victims of the conflict? You know, we need to talk about the victims as well, who suffered

most from the conflict.

Comment: Adding to what Dr. Priya mentioned, I remember when I was in Grade 6, we had

history lessons. The lessons focused on how much of the Marcos presidency contributed to the

good of the country. There was a list of the positive things he contributed. Seriously, there was

no mention of any massacres, victims of torture or enforced disappearance, or human rights

violations in the textbooks. I was already in college when I started reading about the thousands

of cases of human rights abuses and violations that happened during Martial Law, about his ill-

gotten wealth, and about their family’s extravagant lifestyle amid the general poverty. So I think

that it’s really a matter of grave importance to get the truth out there.

Moderator: Wonderful comments and insights. And on that note, we have to close the session

for now. We are running 45 minutes behind schedule, but I think it’s a good place to end.

VALUES UNDERLYING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

The session was facilitated by Atty. Al-Amin Julkipli.

Atty. Al: With the TJRC, TJ is sometimes connected with a letter R – making it Transitional Justice and

Reconciliation. For them, the reconciliation aspect is also important. It looks like from the name or

affiliation of the commission itself, whatever it’s supposed to do, and whatever the report is supposed

to achieve, it seems that there are 2 concepts that are involved: On one hand, you have Transitional

Justice, and on the other hand, you would have Reconciliation.

Just thinking about that, what message do the 2 parties want send out, for example, when they agreed

that there must be a system for achieving Transitional Justice, and at the same time, Reconciliation? Are

they necessarily different concepts? How are they related to one another? Try to go over the meeting

points between the concepts of TJ on one hand, and achieving R on the other hand.


I have 4 words here – I am sure you are familiar with these words. They are the following: justice, peace,

truth, mercy. So these are 4 words that are common English words and that you are already familiar

with. What I want you to do now is to think about these concepts, and consider everything you have

learned about Transitional Justice so far and what it’s supposed to achieve, and what its goals and

objectives are.

So this will be like a beauty contest, and I will ask you: If you were to choose just one value, where

would you be most leaning to? Which is most appealing to you? (The participants grouped themselves

into 4, depending on which value they are most leaning to).

Atty. Al: I did not give any definition for the values. Just base it on your common understanding, and in

your own interpretation of the words. Once you have chosen

your group or value, then your next task is to come up with a

common understanding of your value. How do you want to

define or understand that concept? The context is, of course,

Transitional Justice and Reconciliation.

So try to agree on a definition. How does your group

understand your particular value? Of course, within the

context of Transitional Justice and Reconciliation. In the next

few minutes, we will have a mini-contest, where we will ask

you beauty contest questions. Keep that in the back of your mind. So be prepared to defend your value,

and make sure that your value will be the one to rise to the top.

So you should also be thinking about this: against the 3 other values that you did not choose, which

would be the one where your value would have the most conflict, or least compatibility with, or could

bring the most trouble to your chosen value? For example, in the pursuit of justice, which value will you

have the most trouble with or is most detrimental to you?

At the same time, you can also choose which one goes best with your chosen value. I know that some of

you are already thinking about the linkages and connections one value has with each other.

Time is then given for the groups to discuss their values.

Plenary:

One representative per group is asked to stand in front. They were made to introduce their

value, and explain how their group understands their particular value.

Justice: I am justice, and we believe justice is the foundation to achieve peace and truth.

Truth: I am truth, and our definition of truth is that it is the most logical explanation of all the

verifiable past put together.

Peace: I am peace, and peace is the harmony of truth, justice and mercy.

Mercy: I am mercy, and mercy is the higher consciousness of humans. It allows people to think

things deeply and analyze things.

Atty. Al: So think about what you heard about the personification of each of these values. My

first question to each of you is, which of the other 3 values do you fear the most? Or which do

you think will give you the most trouble or most challenge? Based on your group discussions,


which value did you decide would be the most dangerous or is most incompatible with your

value, and why?

Mercy: Justice is the most incompatible with mercy. Why? Because if you show mercy to the

perpetrators, then you tend to be lenient and not give a decision which is just. Many Filipinos

will just say, “we will leave it all to God” – and many will no longer push for a more just decision.

We think this is the problem of Filipinos – they are too forgiving, and that is why we are in this

mess right now – we did not go after the perpetrators during the Martial Law years.

Peace: Our group thinks that in our quest for peace, we do not have any conflict with any of the

other values. As I said, peace comes with the harmony of the 3 other values.

Atty. Al: Because Peace is finding it hard to answer our “negative” question, then let me

rephrase the question “positively” – which value would go best, or work best with, or is the

most complementary, to Peace?

Peace: We actually made a hierarchy among the values. For us, the highest is Truth, because if

you know the truth, then that is the quickest way to your journey for peace. So I would say that

Truth would be most compatible with Peace.

Truth: Actually, we were not able to discuss that, but personally, I think truth would be most

compatible with Justice. Why? Because truth is very important in seeking justice. You cannot

arrive at justice without knowing the truth.

Atty. Al: But do you think that Truth will be in conflict with any of the other 3 values?

Truth: Mercy is most incompatible with truth.

Atty. Al: But Mercy was saying that they are most incompatible with Justice. That’s interesting.

How about Justice?

Justice: To attain peace and truth, you will require justice. But the group also said that mercy is

still compatible with justice, for as long as it is not the first or most important one. But it is still

important. How? For example, the group is not pro-Death Penalty, and mercy is a key ingredient

to have that kind of advocacy. But some people will say that people must be held accountable

for whatever they did, which could entail the Death Penalty. So we are not saying, take the life

of that man! Kill him! That is justice! Well, that is not the way we look at it.

Atty. Al: In other words, you did a ranking or hierarchy of the values, and you said that in your

quest for justice, mercy would come in last. So how does Mercy feel about that?

Mercy: I agree in a way. I think that among the 4 values, you really should have a priority,

otherwise, your decisions will be clouded. However, at the same time, I also believe that you

cannot attain justice if there is totally no mercy in you. You cannot be a heartless institutor of

grave penalties, such as the Death Penalty, because we are all human beings and we deserve

humane treatment and respect. So you cannot attain justice without mercy. If you were the

judge, you should have a balance of mercy to both the perpetrator and the victim. Justice is all

about maintaining the proper balance, and mercy is a core ingredient which should be

maintained to keep a proper balance. However, if you are heartless, ruthless, and you wish for

chaos and World War 3, in other words, justice without any consideration of any kind, then

mercy should not be among your priorities.

Atty. Al: OK. Interesting. Now I would like to invite your groupmates to speak up. This is now

your chance to support your spokesperson by trying to destroy the case of the other values.

What were the weaknesses or flaws in their reasoning? If you have some difficult questions that

I am sure you encountered in your group discussion, then you now have a chance to throw it to


them, or you can address it to everyone. It can be questions like: Is justice always fair? Does

justice always work? Things of that sort. I will give you 3 minutes to discuss the questions that

you will throw to the other groups.

Justice group: Is truth absolute? Is there a single definition of truth?

Atty. Al: Yes, that is right – in the context of an event, perspectives matter. Sometimes, what

may be true from what I witness may be completely different from the truth of another

eyewitness. So in some ways it can vary, right?

Justice group: There is no universal definition of truth. If there was, then we would have world

harmony and world peace.

Atty. Al: OK. How about peace – what are the difficulties or complications when we have to

prioritize peace, or we have to give more weight to achieving peace?

Truth group: Question: Peace at what cost? Will we aim for peace at all costs?

Atty. Al: OK. Artificial peace. Also, there is positive and negative peace. The peace that you find

in cemeteries is negative peace. We want peace in the sense that there is harmony among

communities, not peace at all costs. What we want is positive peace.

Mercy group: Can you have peace without justice?

Atty. Al: That is a very common question – peace versus justice. In other words, they can be very

complex and difficult questions.

Panel member: We have a case on the conflict between peace versus justice – the Mamasapano

massacre. In that massacre, the families of the victims were outraged and demanded justice for

the 44 fallen SAF (Special Action Forces) personnel – and why they had to sacrifice their lives for

peace. And the BBL (Bangsamoro Basic Law) was not filed partly due to that massacre. It

happened at a time which was supposedly the filing of the BBL, and there was a big hoopla over

the massacre. So this is an example of the conflict between justice and peace.

Panel member: I want to add another example. In the case of Colombia, they say that one

reason for the rejection by the public on the Colombia Peace Agreement was the absence of

accountability of the FARC rebel group (for some violations they caused during the conflict).

From the point of view of the negotiators, that was part of the peace agreement – that they will

not be pursued or prosecuted, but the public wanted to go after some of the rebel leaders.

Atty. Al: OK. Thinking about the same situation but in a different light, which is very personal to

many of us, is the struggle between having to move on or to pursue the perpetrators. How much

effort are you willing to put in, up to what lengths are you willing to put up with just to be able

to pursue the perpetrators? Or will you just say, OK, I leave it all up to God, and I now decide to

move on. Sometimes it can be very personal, or it can be a societal consciousness, but

sometimes you may actually want to forgo pursuing the truth, meaning uncovering many of the

hard truths because what you want to achieve is to be able to move on as a society. That is

actually a very common stand in the narrative of the Philippines. In the Marcos burial to the

Libingan ng mga Bayani (Graveyard of Heroes), for example, although the people were angry,

the prominent stand was to just move on.

Comment: In can be a little difficult to decide because sometimes people will say truth is justice

and peace, but what they actually mean is justice and quiet (not peace). If people complain, are

they not going to have any mercy? Or are they lacking in any of the other values? It’s like, what

would fail if one of the values is lacking?


Atty. Al: How about our group spokespersons here – would you like to add something? What are

your thoughts right now after hearing all this discussion? Do you still hold the same position as

you did a while ago? Is truth still your ally, and that you are least compatible with this value,

etc? Has your perspectives changed somehow due to our discussions? Not much? OK. Very well,

let’s give a round of applause to our spokespersons and to ourselves for this session. (applause)

Thank you.

SUMMARY: Actually, the exercise that you went through proved to each and everyone that

when you talk about pursuing transitional justice, or dealing with a legacy of abuse and mass

violence, one thing needed in order to achieve reconciliation is not having to choose between

the core values. These are the four core values, and to have to choose between one or two, that

is going to be just too difficult. You need all four values. If you were to put yourself in the shoes

of a peace negotiator, for example, then all of these four core values are required for

transitional justice and reconciliation to occur. The reason why these 4 values were highlighted

is because these are said to be the 4 core values that are required for transitional justice and

reconciliation to take place. What combinations or to what extent, and how the mixing and

balance would take place, there is no hard and fast rule for that. In fact, nobody has an answer

to how many percent of each value should ideally be present. These are values that relate to

people on a very personal and individual level, and yet, at the same time, if we bring it up to the

societal level, it might change somewhat. As an individual, for example, you may say that you

are more inclined to pursue truth more than justice, but if you consider now the context of

Mamasapano, then maybe, as a society, that’s no longer the case. So that is the difficulty now –

because if you consider these values which we all experience and adhere to on a very deep and

personal level, then as you multiply that to a larger societal scale, then the dynamics and the

rules suddenly change. That also puts into perspective why the pursuit of transitional justice and

reconciliation is very, very difficult.

Panel member: Just to add: for those of you who are following the Marawi crisis, there is clearly

a conflict between mercy, justice and peace. The government forces are saying that they just

want to finish what is happening in Marawi: they want the see the people go over the crisis to

be peaceful, and it doesn’t really matter whether the people are dying, and the buildings are

being destroyed. Achieving peace is the most important thing of all for them. And as to the

Communist Party of the Philippines, there seems to be a dichotomy between trying to see

justice, and instances and issues which clashes with their camaraderie, like the purge. I think this

is where negotiations are very important, no matter how difficult they may be. How do you now

blend these different values so that both parties get to move forward together?

Atty. Al: Just to wrap up the session, that exercise was really just an illustration of the almost

insurmountable challenges involved in transitional justice and reconciliation. Even from the

start, when you were asked to pick out just one value, you already found it difficult. So that’s

one of the lessons we should all consider. But going back, I mentioned that there are 2

important concepts behind – transitional justice and reconciliation, and the core values we’ve

chosen are said to be the core components of reconciliation. In other words, when all these 4

values meet, that is when the conditions are best for transitional justice and reconciliation to

take place. And for the curious, one of the sources of those values is actually the Bible. There is a

passage which says “reconciliation is achieved when truth and justice meet, and where peace

and mercy kiss.” So this is a perspective on how reconciliation can be pursued, and again, this


brings to the fore that you have transitional justice, where you look backwards at past atrocities,

and you also have reconciliation, which is really more forward looking (the reason why you want

reconciliation is because you want to be able to move forward). And that is really why

transitional justice should always go together with reconciliation. It’s not an either or. In fact,

the elements of transitional justice and the elements of reconciliation overlap. In so many

experiences in different countries, there has been relative success in one, but difficulty in

another value. For example, in Northern Ireland, they were heavy on reconciliation, but in South

Africa, it was more about moving forwards. We would also like to think of ourselves as a country

which is pursuing transitional justice and reconciliation. So it’s important for us, as a

transitioning society, to take a look at the experiences of other countries and how it went for

them, and learn from those experiences. Because at the end of the day, there will be a lot of

factors that will interplay and dictate how we will choose our path towards transitional justice

and reconciliation.

PROJECT HUSTISYA NATIN

A video on EU-funded Project “Hustisya Natin” was shown. Afterwards, Atty. Marlon discussed about

the project and its project components.

He mentioned that there will be some complementation between the Transitional Justice initiatives

project and project Hustisya Natin.

WORKSHOP 2: STRENGTHENING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE INITIATIVES IN THE PHILIPPINES

The participants were grouped randomly into two. They were to appoint a rapporteur, documenter and

presenter. The Guide Questions include:

How is TJ directly relevant to your organization, programs and clients?

How will you integrate TJ approaches into your policy and programs?

Through this, how can you contribute to TJ efforts/initiatives in the Philippines?

What is your evaluation of the activity? Any recommendations for improvement? For the next

activities?

Group 1

For Guide Questions 1-3:

o TJ is integrated in our programs and advocacies, we are looking into gender and Islamic

perspective. TJ is a way to address historical injustices and it can help establish and

institutionalize NTJRCB. TJ is more relevant in the context of the Zamboanga Siege and

Marawi Crisis.

o We are involved in peace building, involved in JPDF and CPP-NPA-NDF peace process.

Peace education involving military and police groups. The current programming is not TJ


conscious. There must be shifting of gears within different organizations for them to be

TJ oriented.

o There are plenty of pillars that we have talked about that needs to be integrated in the

programs. There should also be the retooling of the staff.

o We are currently fixing the funding, most of the employees and staff are not TJ

conscious but it is already included in the development plans. Marawi is their primary

jurisdiction (ARMM).

o Most of the law enforcers are IPs from different communities, we can integrate TJ in our

trainings, in addition to the environmental laws we teaching. Most common issue is

discrimination and land disposition when it comes to IP, TJ can be incorporated in the

seminars we conduct.

o We aim for empowerment through paralegal trainings. TJ is a new concept but what we

can do is to re-echo what we have learned here and integrate TJ in the programs,

trainings, proposals and activities. We can incorporate institutional reformation and

reconciliation through these concepts. As of now, we can aim for organization

awareness.

o We focus on land rights and on the rights of the farmers and in some cases, the fisher-

folks. We empower them to push for their rights. We can incorporate TJ through

trainings and through awareness raising, so they can assert their rights on their own. We

want them to acquire justice against the abuses of the landowners and the

corporations. We help them lobby for their rights.

o TJ is not new to us, we have our work in the CSOs, in issues of injustice, capacity

building, paralegal formation – all of these can be included in the concept of TJ. What

we need might be a new framework. TJ is not only relevant to current peace process

within the Bangsamoro, we are all affected by the activities of the government, so

wherever we are working, TJ can be integrated.

o We also monitor justice system, last year a toolkit was released that can help monitor

courts and proceedings. We will focus on the expansion.

o TJ is really new in the south, the Mindanao area. There are no memorials. We just need

to raise the awareness of the law students and of the people from the grass-root level.

o This activity would have been very helpful if we knew about it before we had

negotiations with the government. The concept of TJ is really relevant, it provides a

strong framework for different programs and for ongoing activities, especially with

things yet to be implemented – agreements, negotiations and such.

o The pillars of TJ, all 4, are helpful in dealing with conflicts involving non-state actors. We

can empower people and increase their awareness about their rights to know, to justice

and to reparations. Through a series of actions, dialogues and activities, we can aim for

a guarantee of non-occurrence.

o There are people who are easily swayed to occupy lands without the proper

qualifications, mostly because they are unaware and ignorant of the rights and laws that

govern the process, but through the use of TJ – the right to truth and justice –

conflicting parties can learn and can start to negotiate.


Evaluation

o We wish that the IPs and the Bangsamoros are given the chance to voice out and to

interact with other different organizations and groups, and to start building

relationships. There are some Bangsamoros who are against or do not agree with BBL. I

hope we give them all the chance to interact with others, especially those with differing

opinions.

o Recommendations for the next activity and for improvement.

o Can we run a TJ program for the Muslim rebellion and the CPP-NPA-NDF movement?

The TJ expert said “we don’t really know how to do that.”

Group 2

Relevance

o Migrant’s rights

o TJ as an advocacy

o Environmental justice (mining)

o Marawi crisis

o Governance issues

o Struggle of the Bangsamoro

Policy and programs

o Capacity-building

o Policy reforms

o IECs

TJ Efforts/Initiatives in the Philippines

o Strengthening the TJ advocacy

o Popularization of TJRC recommendations

o Building constituency on the ground

Evaluation

o Informative

o The process is good

Recommendations

o Inclusive (multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral, participation

o In-depth study of TJ

o Popularization of materials (ex. Primer)

CLOSING PROGRAM

Atty. Marlon Manuel (ALG): What is clear in the workplan that we submitted will be the conduct of 2

one-day discussion sessions. One is in Mindanao – so we will ask for the help of those based in

Mindanao here, just to plan how we can maximize that one day discussion session.

By October, we will meet again as a regional group and provide updates. I was looking for the AJAR

Team members and I asked Faisal where are the members of AJAR are, and he said that they are in

Europe looking for funds for the program.


Hopefully, when we meet again, we will have updates from AJAR which is leading the regional initiatives,

and managing the project, and hopefully, we will have available resources to have a longer workplan.

Right now, all we have is a very short term project.

To be very candid, we are very happy with how this workshop turned out to be. For many of us, even for

me, this is the first time that I heard the different perspectives coming from our groups on Transitional

Justice.

We give special thanks to Cej for her expertise and guidance to the team, even while we were in

Indonesia, and she has been our “guiding light” in this workshop, finalizing the conference design, and

even helping to contact the resource speakers.

Thanks also to our resource persons – we are happy that even if the invitation was on such short notice,

they still managed to come. Especially with our wide range of topics – the Bangsamoro, the WB-IOM

recommendations, the CPLA, and the CPP purge. We thank our speaker from the Cordilleras because

when we talk about Transitional Justice, people usually just think about the Bangsamoro, and they don’t

realize that there is actually another earlier attempt for autonomy from the Cordilleras.

We hope to be able to continue our

conversations with you, and hope you can all

help towards strengthening Transitional Justice

initiatives in the country.

In ending our activities, I always say that this is

just the start. This is just the beginning. I am

sure that we will hound all of you again for our

next activities. I know we are all working in

different activities together or bilaterally or

through networks – so that is another angle to

our partnership, and we are very happy to

continue working with all of you.

Thanks to Faisal for coming all the way to the Philippines. Thanks also to the members of the Philippine

team – Kix, Jing, Guiamel and Pong – for moderating the sessions, thanks to our admin staff, and thanks

to everyone for coming, and we hope to see you again in our future activities!

For those of you who are interested, we also invite you to a policy forum on the Environmental Defense

program tomorrow at the Microtel Technohub, where we will be discussing the environmental policy

agenda for the Duterte administration. It will be interesting, so we hope to see you there as well.

Maraming salamat po!

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