Olympic Beijing - Reflections on Urban Space and Global Connectivity

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Olympic Beijing: Reflections on Urban Space and Global ConnectivityXuefei Rena

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To cite this Article Ren, Xuefei(2009) 'Olympic Beijing: Reflections on Urban Space and Global Connectivity', InternationalJournal of the History of Sport, 26: 8, 1011 — 1039To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09523360902904751URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09523360902904751

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Olympic Beijing: Reflections on UrbanSpace and Global ConnectivityXuefei Ren

This essay examines the urban legacies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The impact of the

Olympics is not only confined to media coverage and city branding effects, but can also belocated in the intensified global connectivity reshaping urban spaces in Beijing. Focusing

on art space, heritage space, and new state space (i.e. state-sponsored mega-projects), thisarticle traces intertwining global and local connections forged in the arts, preservation

and infrastructure development that have integrated Beijing closely into the global citynetwork. Although these processes would have occurred without the games, the 2008

Olympics, as a socio-political ritual with important economic implications, hasintensified the magnitude of global connectivity of Beijing. The spatial production ofOlympic Beijing also reveals the conflicted urban legacies of the games, as seen in the

commercialization of art districts, gentrification of historic neighbourhoods, andsolidification of state power by use of new architectural monuments.

On 8 August 2008, the day of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, the

streets in Beijing were unusually quiet. The traffic in the most hectic section of thecentral business district was exceptionally smooth, due to the new regulation thatmagically reduced the city’s daily traffic by half (see Figure 1). Shops and department

stores were empty with few customers. Many college students and migrant workers, amajor population component of this metropolis of 17 million, had left the city since

the beginning of summer – some voluntarily and some not. Walking down the streetsof Beijing on this symbolic day, one could hardly feel the celebratory atmosphere of a

long-awaited mega-event. Instead, police vehicles, security guards and surveillancecameras were ubiquitously placed on every street corner, bridge and highway

overpass. The surveillance and patrol were especially visible in sensitive hotspots suchas Tiananmen Square, the Olympic venues and the embassy area with a large foreign

population. After the botched torch relay and Tibetan unrest earlier in the year, the

Xuefei Ren, Michigan State University. Correspondence to: [email protected]

The International Journal of the History of SportVol. 26, No. 8, July 2009, 1011–1039

ISSN 0952-3367 (print)/ISSN 1743-9035 (online) � 2009 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/09523360902904751

Downloaded By: [University of Warwick] At: 20:12 6 June 2010

Chinese authorities did not want to take any chances, and were determined to stage a‘safe’ Olympics at any cost. The various security measures taken to ensure a successful

opening ceremony significantly altered how this capital city looked and felt.The ‘fortressification’ of the city cast a sharp contrast to the hyper-production of

Olympic programmes in the media. The Olympic programmes filling the air aroundthe clock testified that the Beijing Olympics was a media event, and among all themedia extravaganzas, the most expected was the opening ceremony directed by

Zhang Yimou. The government summoned this accomplished Chinese director tostage a spectacular, never-seen-before opening ceremony for one billion domestic

viewers and a much larger global audience. With the high-tech-enabled coordinationof sounds, lights and well-rehearsed movements by human-pixel performers, the

short few seconds at the beginning of the opening ceremony assured spectators thatthis would be a definite showcase of the manpower, wealth and extravagance that

China now could afford to deploy to impress the world. The ceremony started withan innovative firework show titled ‘Historical Footprints’, directed by Cai Quoqiang,

a rising-star artist whose Guggenheim exhibition drew a record number of visitors inNew York in 2008. Fireworks in the shape of human footprints illuminated historicarchitecture along Beijing’s central axis – the Forbidden City, Tiananmen Square,

Qianmen – and arrived above the ‘Bird’s Nest’, the nickname for the National

Figure 1 Jianguomen Blvd, Central Business District, Beijing.

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Stadium, an iconic architectural masterpiece designed by Herzog and de Meuronfrom Switzerland. [1]

Zhang Yimou’s production of the Olympic pageantry unfolded around one centraltheme – emphasizing the splendour of Chinese culture and downplaying messy

politics. The performance began with a display of symbols of ancient Chinesecivilization – the four great inventions of gunpowder, the compass, the printing press

and paper – and then continued with other Chinese cultural icons. The modernreplaced the traditional as Lang Lang, the world-renowned young Chinese pianist,

took the central stage. Lang Lang is the symbol of the new China, a country that iseager to be portrayed not only as an economic powerhouse but also as a culturalgiant. As Lang Lang filled the stadium with his fluent, strong and confident play,

thousands of performers dressed in futuristic green costumes formed a human ‘bird’snest’ around him. The enormous scale of the performance, along with the

combination of blinking lights and Lang Lang’s piano play brought an ecstasy tothe stadium. With the directive work of Zhang Yimou, the opening ceremony showed

the extraordinary capacity of the Chinese state, which was determined to use thissocio-political ritual to demonstrate the rise of China as a geopolitical and cultural

power on the world stage.As the two-week-long spectacle has ended, it is time to reflect on the urban legacies

left by the 2008 Beijing games. During the seven-year build-up to the Olympics, thecity of Beijing went through dramatic transformations in all fields of development,ranging from business to infrastructure, real estate, art and architecture. The opening

ceremony is a symbolic ritual that unveiled the new Beijing in front of the world. Thetens of thousands of foreign journalists reporting from streets of Beijing offered the

global audience a rare opportunity to observe China’s capital city – its boulevards,state-of-the-art skyscrapers, museums, gated communities, new subways, art and

architectural marvels. What they saw, and also what the government wanted to show,was a modern and globalizing metropolis with clear reminiscences of other global

cities such as New York, London and Tokyo. The restless urban landscape signifiedthe fast transformation that Beijing had experienced in the years leading up to theOlympics.

This essay examines the urban legacies left by the games in this metropolis in fasttransition. Focusing on three types of urban spaces in particular – art space, heritage

space and new state space, this article traces the intertwining global and localconnections that have shaped these urban spaces in Olympic Beijing. I argue that the

urban legacy of the games should be understood in relation to ‘spaces of global flows’.By ‘spaces of global flows’, I emphasize the materiality and physicality of urban space

as shaped and reshaped by various ‘items’ flowing through it, such as information,people, goods and so on. [2] The transnational connections and linkages have closely

integrated Beijing into the global urban network. The urban legacy of the Olympicstherefore should not be confined to media coverage and city branding effects alone,but should also be located in the intensified connections, interactions and networks

forged, which constitute the institutional infrastructure for the global connectivity of

Olympic Beijing: Urban Space and Global Connectivity 1013


Beijing. These processes would have occurred without the Olympics, but it is theOlympics as a socio-political ritual with important economic implications that has

intensified the magnitude of interactions between the city and other places andactors. In the process, the city has become a mosaic of spaces of flows constituted by

the intense global traffic of information, ideas, people, goods and images. This essaytraces the global linkages forged that constitute the global connectivity of Beijing, and

examines the conflicted urban legacies of the Olympics in the making of art, heritageand new state spaces.

Spaces of Global Connectivity

By art space, I refer to the numerous art districts that have emerged in Beijing inrecent years, as represented by the 798 Dashanzi Art District. The Olympics brought

opportunities, together with overexposure, to the art community in Beijing. In 2005 afew works from Chinese artists were sold at record prices at overseas auctions, and

since then contemporary Chinese art has become a booming market for speculation.International galleries have rushed to art districts in Beijing to open branches and

curate exhibitions. The capital flowing into the field of Chinese contemporary art hashad significant impact on artists and their works, as well as on art spaces in the city.

As contemporary Chinese art becomes marketable, recognized and official, there arefewer and fewer political statements in artists’ works. Commercialization has quicklyeliminated possibilities of creative artistic production in the art districts and turned

these districts into marketplaces and showcases. Art districts in Beijing have gonethrough a short life-cycle, from grassroots art colonies into tourist destinations in just

two to three years. As the government discovered the economic potential of thecultural industries, it took control of art districts by setting up management offices,

and in doing so, has inserted its own regulatory logic in the spatial production of artspaces in Beijing. The section on art space will use the 798 Art District as an example

to trace the evolution of art spaces in Beijing and the role of the Olympics in thisprocess.

By heritage space, I refer to the official historical preservation zones as well as

individual historical landmarks across the city designated for preservation. Thesection on heritage space will examine the practices of and debates about historic

preservation and discuss how historic architecture was selectively recycled in thepreparations for a ‘Humanistic Olympics’. [3] A great number of Beijing’s hutongs

and courtyard houses [4] were demolished in the 1990s, when inner-city land becameextremely profitable for real estate speculation. Demolition of historical buildings

especially accelerated after Beijing won the Olympic bid in 2001. The city governmentcontinued massive urban renewal programmes with even more force and

determination, in order to create a ‘New Beijing’ for the ‘Great Olympics’. [5] Thegovernment encircled 33 preservation zones, but the official designation also impliedthat historical buildings outside these zones would have no protection and would be

vulnerable to wrecking balls. Even within the preservation zones, demolition of

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landmarked buildings was common, since some developers acquired land before thedesignation of preservation zones and were granted the right to tear down the old and

build the new. In addition to demolition, gentrification is another threat endangeringthe remaining hutongs and courtyard houses in Beijing. Hutong living, like loft living

in the West, has become chic for thrill-seeking foreign expatriates and affluentChinese urbanites. [6] As gentrifiers moved into their newly remodelled courtyard

mansions, they erased the dense neighbourhood-based social networks thatcharacterized hutong living in Beijing. [7] Although similar tensions also exist in

other Chinese cities, the Olympics has particularly escalated the clash betweenpreservation and development in Beijing. On the one hand, the governmentpropagated a ‘Humanistic Olympics’ and intended to symbolically preserve historical

buildings to showcase the local Beijing culture, [8] while on the other hand theOlympics raised expectations for property speculation and made preservation much

harder, if not impossible, to achieve.By new state space, I refer to the state-sponsored infrastructure and building

projects commissioned in the pre-Olympics years, such as the new subway lines andexpressways, the national stadium, museum and library, and the Beijing International

Airport. I would emphasize the word ‘new’ and differentiate these from the pre-existing structures accommodating state functions, many of them dating back to the

1950s. These are new spaces because they were designed and built at a breakneckspeed in the seven years leading up to 2008. But more importantly, these spacesembody a new kind of transnational flow – that of architectural and design expertise,

which was largely non-existent in the pre-reform socialist years. The centralgovernment and Beijing municipal government have repeatedly turned to prominent

international architects to design their grand projects. The highest-profile stateprojects in the capital include the National Theatre designed by French architect Paul

Andreu, the National Olympic Stadium (i.e. the Bird’s Nest) by Swiss architectsJacques Herzog and Pierre de Meuron, the CCTV headquarters by Dutch architect

Rem Koolhaas, and Terminal 3 of Beijing International Airport by the Britisharchitect Sir Norman Foster. [9] These flagship architectural projects have reorientedthe image of Beijing from that of a dusty socialist city into that of a sleek international

metropolis with a cutting-edge architectural scene. But can these new state spaces –articulated in the architectural language of modernity, transparency and openness –

entail possibilities for real political transformations? Or will these new ‘statecrafts’simply become another instrument for the party-state to use to legitimate and solidify

its power? The contrast between authoritarian state sponsorship and cutting-edgearchitectural design raises interesting questions about architecture, nation-building

and political change.There are numerous links and connections between art space, heritage space and

new state space. Transformations in urban forms, such as mass demolition, symbolicpreservation, as well as construction of state-sponsored mega-projects, are the mostfrequently appearing themes in contemporary Chinese art. Many artists in Beijing

choose to work with images of construction sites, half-demolished buildings, ruins



and debris to articulate the city’s metamorphoses. Urban construction anddestruction, including for example the making of heritage space and new state

space, has fed into artistic production and consequently shaped the formation ofart space in the city. New state space is often in a conflicting relationship with

heritage space, as the former often adopts modern, high-tech and futuristic urbanforms and therefore contrasts sharply with heritage spaces that try to appeal with

Chinese historic authenticity.In addition to connections and linkages, it is also important to point out what

these three types of spaces have in common. The emergence of art, heritage and newstate spaces changes the way the city looks (i.e. the image of the city) and feels (i.e. theexperience of the city). They are all examples of new forms of spaces of global flows.

The state and the transnational cultural elite – two major components of thetransnational capitalist class – are key players in the production of these spaces. [10]

Moreover, as the next sections will show, the production of art, heritage and newstate spaces is ultimately geared towards the maximization and accumulation of

capital in the global marketplace.

Art Space

The weekend before 8 August was the golden weekend for the art community inBeijing. Galleries had prepared for months to put on their best shows in time for theOlympic spotlight. On Sunday 3 August, the one square kilometre of the 798 Art

District was filled with gallery-goers, tourists, artists and reporters. Pace Wildenstein,a leading New York gallery, held its opening exhibition on that day. The gallery space

acquired by Pace Beijing was the last piece of large exhibition space available insidethis former factory compound. The opening exhibition – ‘Encounter’ – included

works from 23 established artists, ranging from Chinese auction stars such as FangLijun, Zhang Xiaogang and Yue Minjun, to Japanese artist Murakami Takashi, to Jeff

Koons, Andy Warhol, Richard Prince and Jean Michel Basquiat. [11] The selection ofartists is a statement of power from Pace, and it signifies how major Western gallerieshave quickly integrated Beijing into the global art market. Pace Wildenstein was the

first Manhattan gallery that opened in Beijing and it has thus completed the artprofile of 798, together with other established European galleries that moved in

earlier. [12] The acquisition of the last available gallery space by Pace Beijing alsosymbolizes the future development trajectory of 798 – as a showroom and

marketplace of contemporary Chinese art, instead of as the place for artists’ studiosand small exhibitions it was a few years ago.

The 798 Art District was originally part of a large-scale radio electroniccomponents factory built in the 1950s. With the help of East German architects

and engineers, the Chinese government poured 150 million RMB into theconstruction of dozens of Bauhaus-style factory workshops in an area of 500,000square metres. A railroad track was also built especially for the transportation of

construction materials and fuel shipments. All machinery and instruments were

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transported directly from East Germany. Factory 798 contributed enormously toChina’s industrial growth – for example, all the loudspeakers on Tiananmen Square

were produced by the factory during its booming years in the 1950s. [13]Similar to other state-owned enterprises, Factory 798 has been going through

painful restructuring since the late 1990s. Factory workshops were shut down andworkers were laid off with their salaries unpaid. The factory was eager to rent out

workshop space on short-term leases and use the rent to cover its economic loss. Afew artists moved into 798 in 2001, attracted by its Bauhaus style factory workshops

and cheap rent, including Cang Xin, Huang Rui, Chen Wenbo and Li Xiangqun,bookshop owner Robert Bernell and publisher Hong Huang. Word quickly spread inthe art community in Beijing, and more people and businesses followed suit. Old

factory workshops were renovated into art studios, galleries, book stores andoffices. [14]

In 2002, Beijing-Tokyo Art Project opened as the first gallery in 798 and stagedits inaugural exhibition, ‘Beijing Afloat’, attracting a large crowd. The

photography exhibition ‘Tui-transfiguration’ of artists Rong Rong and Inri,curated by University of Chicago art history professor Wu Hong, especially

emphasized the interaction between the photos displayed and the old factoryspace. The three series of photos – ‘Ruins’, ‘Transformation’ and ‘Rebirth’ – also

explicitly suggested the reuse of factory workshops as art space. [15] Many peoplefrom the art community who visited the exhibition were very much attracted tothe converted factory space. By 2004, Factory 798 had already become a dynamic

artistic quarter with a wide spectrum of institutions necessary for the developmentof contemporary art, such as galleries, exhibition spaces, artists’ studios,

bookstores, restaurants and coffee shops, all of which are located within theone-square-kilometre area of the factory compound.

This physical proximity helped to facilitate interactions among artists and build acommunity. In 2004, Huang Rui and Berenice Angremy at Thinking Hands

organized the first Dashanzi International Art Festival (DIAF), under the theme‘Radiance and Resonance/Signals of Time’. The festival incorporated 26 main events,including visual arts, music, theatre and performance art, all taking place within the

factory compound. The 20 open exhibitions organized by galleries and studios within798 attracted 80,000 people in one month. Thinking Hands continued the DIAF over

the next two years. In 2006, DIAF attracted a record 160,000 visitors, including manytravelling from other parts of the country and from abroad.

The development of contemporary Chinese art could not have been possiblewithout the emergence of the 798 Art District, which has opened up the space badly

needed for art exhibitions and festivals and made contemporary art accessible to thepublic. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the development of contemporary Chinese

art was severely constrained by the lack of exhibition space. [16] Artists held shows intheir private apartments and other temporary space to which the public did not haveany access. The emergence of 798 as a cluster of studios and galleries changed this

situation and provided an open platform for artists to be integrated into society and



to interact with the public. The chief organizer of DIAF, artist Huang Ruicommented that ‘what is interesting about 798 are the spaces, some big, some small,

housing all types of artists plying their trade and all types of people who come to seethe products of their labour’. [17] The availability of art space in 798 has thus become

a crucial bridge to connect the once underground contemporary Chinese art scene tothe larger society.

Transnational linkages can be clearly identified in the production of the art spaceat 798. Many of the artists who first moved in had lived and worked abroad, and they

were highly aware of the development of Soho, Chelsea and other art quarters in theWest. While working on the renovations of their lofts and studios, Soho/New Yorkwas a constant point of reference for these pioneers. International architects were also

involved in renovating several large factory workshops into modern art spaces withan industrial chic design. [18] The transnational links became even more evident as

prominent European galleries settled in 798 after 2005. They served as role models bysetting up higher curating standards, brought in international dealers and collectors

and at the same time also introduced Western artists’ work to Beijing. The success ofDIAF could not have been possible, either, without the sponsorship of foreign

embassies in Beijing, as well as enthusiastic coverage by the international media andhigh-prestige art publications that are eager to discover the new art in Beijing. As 798

continued to gain publicity, foreign government delegations, journalists, and touristsroutinely stopped at 798 to see contemporary Chinese art. Thus 798 became anunofficial icon of the art scene in Beijing (see Figure 2).

In spite of the instant success of 798, its transformation into an art quarter was byno means a smooth one. The landlord of 798 repeatedly tried to evict artists and tear

down factory workshops for redevelopment because of the heated real-estate marketin Beijing. The landlord that rented out spaces to artists was the Seven Stars Group, a

state-owned electronics factory that had planned to turn the area into part ofZhongguancun Electronics Park by 2005 and to redevelop the rest of the land into

high-rise apartments. In spite of protests from artists, in August 2004 Seven Starsdemolished a large area of Bauhaus buildings near the south-side entrance of 798 andrefused to renew rental leases with artists. The first clash between Seven Stars and

artists broke up around the organization of the DIAF in 2004. Seven Stars threatenedto close down the art festival and issued an open letter to artists, stating that

if individuals decide to hold the so-called DIAF without receiving governmentalpermission . . . Seven Stars reserves the right to shut down such activities. . . . Theright is also reserved to forbid entry to all personnel and vehicles that do not belongto the area during the holding of the festival. [19]

Artists led by Huang Rui responded immediately with another letter, which read;

This art district activity is well known to the international mainstream media,governmental and non-governmental organizations, artists, art aficionados andgeneral public [sic]. Shouldn’t Seven Stars take responsibility for the internationalimpact of their sudden measures? [20]

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Thus, by mobilizing the international media and soliciting support from foreignembassies in Beijing, artists succeeded in pushing through the inaugural international

art festival at 798.In spite of the media and public recognition, the fate of 798 was still precarious as

Seven Stars could have demolished the whole area after the short-term leases signedwith artists ended. In 2005, the artists decided to lobby the city government to turn798 into an official art district and, by doing so, to save it from demolition. Tsinghua

University art professor Li Xiangqun, also a member of the People’s Congress inBeijing, submitted a proposal to the congress calling for the preservation of 798. [21]

After a few visits by city and district officials in 2006, the city government announcedits decision to preserve the area and turn it into one of Beijing’s creative industry

clusters. A management office was set up, composed of members of the ChaoyangDistrict Office of Development and Reform, the Propaganda Department and the

Bureau of Tourism. The designation of 798 as an official art district has been adouble-edged sword: it saved the area from demolition, but it also meant that the

government would take control of the district from then on.The government decision to preserve 798 can be explained by its anticipation of

the upcoming Olympics. Because of the wide media recognition, the city government

intended to use 798 to demonstrate the official tolerance towards contemporary art.

Figure 2 A remodelled factory workshop in the 798 Art District. Source: Xuefei Ren,August 2008.



Indeed, during the Olympics, 798 was listed among the top ten official touristdestinations. The government designation brought about a rapid reshuffling of

tenants in 798. Several large international galleries and multinational corporations(such as Nike) moved in, and the original artists started to move out due to the sharp

increase in rents. By the time the Olympics begun in August 2008, the profile of 798had already completely changed into a combination of prominent international

galleries, second-tier local commercial galleries, art shops and restaurants catering tothe tourist traffic (see Figure 3). The evolution of 798 cannot therefore be separated

from the preparation for the Olympics. The Olympics prompted the government tomake 798 a permanent home for contemporary art, but meanwhile the promotion bythe city government of 798 as a tourist destination also paved the way for the art

district’s quick demise. Shi Xinning, one of the few artists still keeping a studio in798, commented about the change of the place:

There was a community feeling in 798 before. I had many friends in the yard andwe used to stop by each other’s studio, chat, drink and smoke. . . . Now the artmarket is too good, and suddenly everybody became busy. Artists have to producefor exhibitions, art fairs, biennials, one after another. Now you can’t just go intosomebody’s studio to chat, because time is money, if you waste others’ time, you’recosting their money. Also a lot of people have left 798. It became actually quieter

Figure 3 Shops catering to tourists, 798 Art District. Source: Xuefei Ren, August 2008.

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than before. I don’t care about tourists. I close my door and paint in my studioeveryday. [22]

The emergence of 798 as Beijing’s primary art quarter unleashed spatial constraints

facing contemporary Chinese art before. The 798 Art District is a space produced bytransnational linkages in the arts and media. The evolution of 798 shows how media

recognition and the government anticipation of the Olympics have helped to save thedistrict from demolition. However, the same forces led to the rapid commercializa-

tion of the art district and to the quick demise of 798 as a space for creative artisticproduction. As the 798 Art District becomes more integrated into the larger urbaneconomy, creativity has moved elsewhere, to other art quarters in north-east suburbs

of Beijing, such as Caochangdi, Liquor Factory and Songzhuang village. With cheaperrents and more available studio space, these new art districts are attracting artists

from all over the country. Art critic Philip Tinari commented on the changes of 798as such:

Art in China has become a full-fledged system, with its own hierarchies, rituals andcodes. 798 was somehow the hollow centre of this whole system, a monument tothe power of a creative China even if most of the real art-world action washappening elsewhere. [23]

Although as Tinari commented, creativity has moved elsewhere, 798 has played astrategic role in integrating Beijing into the global art market.

Heritage Space

On 7 August 2008, the newly renovated Qianmen Avenue opened to tourists. The

new avenue is for pedestrian use only, with traditional Chinese brand shops neatlyarranged on the carefully landscaped sidewalks (see Figure 4). A new cable-car track

runs in the middle of the pavement, reminding visitors of street scenes of Old Peking,i.e. the Republican period of the 1920s and 1930s. [24] Beijing is an ancient city witha history dating back to Liao dynasty (938–1122), and it has served as the capital of

five imperial dynasties and one modern regime. [25] Historical preservation is alwaysa tricky issue in the capital, as planners and preservationists can rarely agree on which

period of the city’s history to be preserved. The rehabilitation of Qianmen Avenuewas carried out to restore the streetscapes of late Qing and early Republican Peking –

a relatively recent phase in the city’s long history. But taking Republican Peking asreference is an obvious choice, because this period marked the city’s transition from

imperial to modern and Western. [26] The restoration of cityscapes of the OldPeking can thus project the city’s global future by making a link to its cosmopolitan

Republican era.The stakes in renovating Qianmen Avenue couldn’t be higher. Qianmen is in the

geographic centre of the city and is within walking distance from Tiananmen Square.

Historically, it is the front gate connecting the Outer City and Inner City of imperial



Peking. [27] During the Qing period (1644–1911), Qianmen was a boomingmarketplace, as new ruling Manchu elites ordered all Chinese residents and commercial

activities to be relocated to the Outer City. Imperial city walls imposed significantbarriers to traffic, and city gates such as Qianmen became major transportation arteries.

A downtown section appeared near the streets and markets in the densely populated areaoutside Qianmen. Here developed a great congestion of merchants, shopkeepers,peasants, workshops and labourers. Residents were concentrated in the highly

commercialized, densely settled lanes and alleys near Qianmen. [28]By the 1990s, Qianmen had already become a run-down city quarter with dilapidated

housing and densely populated hutongs, many of which lacked electricity, runningwater and sewerage. But it is a vibrant mixed-use neighbourhood and is known for the

famous Da Zha Lan, an open-air street market selling cheap clothing, watches, piratedDVDs and tourist souvenirs (see Figure 5). The historical importance of Qianmen,

the geographical proximity to Tiananmen Square as well as the high population density,all make the rehabilitation of the area a challenging task, so that Qianmen remained as

one of the last areas in Beijing relatively untouched by developers and demolitioncrews – but it was left relatively untouched only until the Olympics.

The Municipal Planning Bureau decided that the Qianmen area, with its crowded

housing and chaotic street markets, was not presentable for the Olympics since the

Figure 4 Reopened Qianmen pedestrian street. Source: Xuefei Ren, August 2008.

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area is on the Olympic marathon route. As part of the city’s pre-Olympicbeautification programme, master plans were drafted to widen the narrow streets in

the area, rebuild ‘authentic and historical’ shop fronts and displace street vendors andresidents to alleviate the density problem. Sensing potential criticisms regarding its

approach to preservation, the city government opened the ‘restored’ QianmenAvenue only one day before the Olympics. The ribbon-cutting ceremony, attended bya few government officials and developers, took place at 8.0 a.m. on 7 August, with

no announcements made to the media and heavily guarded by security. The newQianmen Avenue is a great disappointment to Beijing’s preservationists, as this is yet

another property redevelopment scheme in the guise of preservation. Nothing hasbeen preserved here – all the grey-brick ‘historical’ buildings are new constructions,

and some of the original hutongs and courtyards were demolished. What is even moreproblematic is that Qianmen Avenue is closed off to traffic permanently and has been

turned into a pedestrian shopping street. Qianmen Avenue is part of Beijing’s south-north central axis and a strategic traffic artery. The closing of Qianmen Avenue

meant that other streets nearby had to be widened to divert traffic. The nearby MeishiStreet, for instance, was widened from eight to 25 metres. Many original residentsand small business along the street were displaced, and the residents’ houses were

demolished (see Figure 6).

Figure 5 Da Zha Lan Market at Qianmen. Source: Xuefei Ren, August 2008.



Due to the large scale of the project, the city government had to seek private partnersfor financing. And this time, the city chose SOHO China Inc., a high-publicity private

development firm based in Beijing, which has dotted Beijing’s CBD area with itsSOHO projects in recent years. [29] SOHO China has become a star development firm

for its use of international architects and bold design. [30] For the Qianmen project,SOHO China invited Ben Wood, an American architect originally based in Boston,where he worked on the renovation of Faneuil Hall Market. Ben Wood is a well-known

name in architecture and real estate circles in China for his work on Xintiandi inShanghai. By renovating a dozen shikumen houses, Wood turned Xintindi from a run-

down inner-city neighbourhood into the priciest property in Shanghai. [31] Thecommercial success of Xintiandi also marked the transition from demolition to

preservation in urban development policies in Shanghai, raising awareness amonglocal developers of the economic value of historical buildings. The new Qianmen

Avenue followed the same formula as Xintiandi – have private developers invest inrenovating a ‘historical street’ to raise property value, and then demolish and

redevelop the larger area later to seek higher rents. [32] The Qianmen project thussymbolizes the series of failed attempts at historical preservation in Beijing.

The Olympics introduced complexities to historical preservation in a number of

ways. First, large-scale urban construction in the build-up years leading to 2008

Figure 6 Meishi Street. Source: Xuefei Ren, August 2008.

1024 X. Ren


swallowed many hutongs, courtyard houses and other historic buildings. Urbanconstruction would have taken place in Beijing anyway even without the Olympics,

but the scale of the pre-Olympic building rush is unprecedented, even in China, asboth private and public developers raced to complete construction before the official

2007 deadline. Second, the anticipation of a rise in property prices has spurred landand property speculation, which in turn has made preservation in Olympic Beijing

harder than before to achieve. Third, the city government was obliged to preservehistorical architecture to stage a ‘Humanistic Olympics,’ and this government-led

preservation campaign did lead to some positive results, such as the designation ofdozens of historical preservation zones. However, it has also led to a wave of ‘fakeantiques’ construction, i.e. replacing originals with new constructions to avoid high

rehabilitation costs. In many cases, authentic structures were torn down and replacedby fakes, due to the higher costs of rehabilitation. Lastly, the Olympics also intensified

the gentrification process already under way in areas with concentrated hutongs andcourtyard houses. Beijing in the pre-Olympic years attracted a large number of

foreign expatriates. Together with wealthy Chinese urbanites, they have investedheavily in remodelling courtyard houses into fashionable residences. In most cases,

although the physical structures of courtyard houses are preserved, the socialnetworks that make hutong living uniquely Beijing are erased as the gentrifiers move

in. The Olympics has had a significant impact on the production and consumption ofheritage space in Beijing. It helped to raise awareness of historical architecture, butalso overheated the property market and induced a commoditization of heritage.

Preservation in Beijing has taken a difficult path since the mid-twentieth century.In the 1950s, architect Liang Sicheng proposed to the government that a new capital

be built outside the old city of Beijing in order to avoid damaging the then well-preserved urban street networks, hutongs and courtyard houses. According to Liang

Sicheng, the spatial layout of ancient Beijing was an invaluable historical heritage andshould be protected at any cost. He also pointed out that Beijing was not planned and

built for modern economic and transportation functions, and pushing forwardindustrialization in this old city would not only destroy the old urban fabrics, but alsohinder the development itself. However, Liang’s proposal was not accepted by Mao

Zedong, who envisioned a modern socialist industrial city emerging out of ancientBeijing. Beijing rapidly industrialized in the 1950s, with more than 500 factories and

enterprises constructed in the city. The old city wall, which had survived numerousinvasions, rebellions and revolutions over hundreds of years, was demolished in 1958

by order from the central government.After the initiation of market reform in 1978, the urban real estate market began to

take shape, and high-rise buildings soon emerged on the skyline of this low-riseancient capital. The city government issued three legal documents in the 1980s

restricting building heights, while also identifying 33 historical protection zones inthe 1990s, which constituted 29 per cent of the old city. After 2000, the citygovernment passed new legislation guiding market transactions with regard to

courtyard houses, in an attempt to guarantee private property ownership and thus



give owner-occupiers incentives to rehabilitate their courtyard houses. However, inspite of these active policy measures, Beijing’s hutongs and courtyard houses have

been disappearing at a faster rate than ever. In 1949 there were about 6,074 hutongs inBeijing; the number had shrunk to 1,571 in 2005. [33] Among those remaining, 671

are within the designated protection zones, while about 900 are outside these zones.Demolition took place on a massive scale outside the protection zones. Even inside

the zones, private developers sometimes could tear down landmarked buildings ifthey obtained the land before the designation of preservation zones. For instance, in

2007, a hutong in the Dongsi area, sitting right within the preservation zone, wasdemolished by a private developer. The overheated real estate market andskyrocketing property prices in Beijing have made the enforcement of zoning laws

difficult and made preservation a low priority on the agenda of the city government(see Figure 7).

A large number of historical structures also became victims in this movementtowards ‘making fake antiques’. As the costs of rehabilitating old buildings are often

higher than new constructions, developers often replace original historical structureswith replicas. One of the first cases of ‘faking antiques’ is the rehabilitation of

Liulichang – a street of antique shops specializing in calligraphy scrolls, traditional

Figure 7 Hutongs and courtyard houses being demolished. Source: Xuefei Ren, August2008.

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paintings and art supplies. In this case, historical architecture was destroyed andreplaced by new constructions imitating the old ones. A more recent case is Nanchizi,

a designated preservation area with a large concentration of courtyard houses sittingright next to Tiananmen Square. In this case, the city government brought in private

developers for the ‘rehabilitation’ of the area. After the ‘rehabilitation,’ only 31 out ofthe original 240 courtyard houses were kept. Modern courtyard houses were built on

the site, some even equipped with car garages and indoor swimming pools. After theproject was completed in 2003, there was a large public outcry urging the government

to better supervise preservation – because if other preservation projects followed ofthe example of Nanchizi, then the whole old city of Beijing would be destroyed. Inspite of the criticisms, Nanchizi was not the last project of its kind. The

aforementioned Qianmen Avenue project, where new grey-brick constructionsreplaced old hutongs, is the most recent reminder of how little progress has been

made in Beijing in preservation.Why is historical preservation so difficult to achieve in Beijing? Is Beijing a special

case? Or do other Chinese cities share similar problems? A brief comparison withShanghai might be helpful here to illuminate the particularity of the preservation of

Beijing’s architectural heritage. In Shanghai, the urban renewal programme that beganin the 1990s is no less grand than that in Beijing, with millions of homes demolished

and residents displaced. Also, the enforcement of preservation laws in Shanghai isloose and ineffective, as developers often ‘break through’ zoning regulations, destroyhistorical structures and construct buildings in protection areas that violate zoning

codes. Shikumen houses, Shanghai’s equivalent vernacular architecture to courtyardhouses in Beijing, are mostly in poor physical condition and would require costly

rehabilitation. However, in general, Shanghai has been relatively more successfulthan Beijing in preserving its architectural heritage, as seen in the cluster of classical

and art-deco buildings along the Bund, the numerous well-attended garden villasacross the city and the new initiatives preserving the city’s industrial heritage.

A key to understanding the divergent paths of preservation in Beijing andShanghai, two cities facing similar constraints, is the different kinds of historicalbuildings available and the marketability associated with these old buildings.

Historical preservation in Shanghai has always been easier than that in Beijing, largelybecause Shanghai is a modern city with a much shorter history dating back to the

nineteenth century, and ‘historical’ buildings in Shanghai are mostly structures builtin the colonial period from 1860s to 1930s. These colonial buildings are mostly

Western architecture, which can thus be easily framed as symbols of Shanghai’scosmopolitan past. In contrast, hutongs and courtyard houses in Beijing have no

Western linkages at all and cannot be easily marketed in the same fashion as thecolonial architecture of Shanghai. Moreover, Beijing’s hutongs and courtyard houses

are vernacular residential structures and different from grand imperial architecturesuch as the cluster of palaces in the Forbidden City, which is relatively well protected.It is this in-between status, i.e., the fact that many of its structures are neither

Western enough nor imperial enough, that has confounded Beijing’s municipal



planners and officials, who for a long time could not find a way to market and profitfrom preserving hutongs and courtyard houses.

However, the Olympics unexpectedly eased the dilemma of preserving Beijing’svernacular architecture by bringing about a hutong chic. Just like the discovery of loft

living in the West, ‘hutong living’ has become a new fashion statement among anincreasing number of foreign expatriates and wealthy Chinese urbanites. Authentic

local culture, such as living in a hutong, has become a rare commodity sought after inrapidly globalizing Beijing. Some new residents rented hutong houses without

modern infrastructures to experience authentic hutong living, although many of themsoon moved back to more comfortable modern high rises after short experimenta-tion. [34] Others have invested handsome amounts in buying and remodelling

courtyard houses. Expat magazines in Beijing frequently feature articles on how torenovate courtyard houses, and publish photos of completely remodelled ultra-

modern courtyard mansions with their proud new owners – mostly foreign couplesworking in the media, design, law or other highly paid professions. Realizing the

increasing demand from foreigners for an authentic Beijing experience, a significantnumber of Chinese entrepreneurs have emerged to fill the need. They bought and

refurbished courtyard houses into boutique hotels or youth hostels catering toforeign tourists. A quick Internet search can instantly lead to dozens of links to

hutong hostels in Beijing, most of them having appeared just a few months before theOlympics. The city government has been also promoting the hutong as an integralpart of old Beijing culture. The hutong is used as a showcase of traditional Chinese

culture for the ‘Humanistic Olympics’. For instance, the top floor of the new CapitalMuseum has a huge replica of grey-brick courtyard houses for tourists to take photos

in front of, as the real ones are harder and harder to find outside the museum.This hutong chic emerged at a unique juncture of time and space – the period right

before the Olympics, as Beijing was going through a quick makeover, with massiveconstruction of modern buildings, an increasing foreign population and diminishing

traditional urban forms. As the high-rise gated communities quickly took over thecity, the rarity of low-rise hutong houses became attractive to thrill-seeking, fashion-conscious Chinese and foreign urbanites in Beijing. Although the fetish of the hutong

in a way raised the awareness of the cultural value of historical heritage, the fastgentrification of hutong neighbourhoods has also redefined the meaning of hutong

living, changing it from a common residential form in old Beijing to a symbol oftaste, sophistication and conspicuous consumption.

New State Spaces

On the morning of 8 August 2008, the lecture hall of the Ullens Center for

Contemporary Art at 798 was filled with an audience of architects, planners andjournalists, waiting for a panel discussion to be delivered by Sir Norman Foster andAi Wei Wei. Ai Wei Wei is an established contemporary Chinese artist; he worked

with Herzog and de Meuron on the design of the Bird’s Nest. Norman Foster was

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commissioned by the city government of Beijing in 2003 to design a new terminal forBeijing International Airport for the Olympics. To appeal to Chinese sensibility,

Foster’s design takes the iconic shape of a mythical Chinese dragon in red and yellow,waiting to take off into the sky. Compared to the repeatedly delayed Heathrow

expansion in London, also supervised by Foster & Partners, Terminal 3 of BeijingInternational Airport is a Chinese miracle – it only took four years from initial design

to completion. At the panel, Foster spoke highly of the ‘strategic vision’ of the Beijingcity government in commissioning such mega-projects to anticipate future urban

growth.Like the Bird’s Nest and the CCTV headquarters, Terminal 3 is among the many

state-sponsored, foreign-designed mega-projects in Beijing prepared for the

Olympics (see Figures 8 and 9). These ‘statecrafts’ indicate the emergence of a newkind of state space – space produced by global flows of architectural design to

accommodate state functions and articulate national ambitions. These new statespaces embody tensions between cutting-edge architectural designs and the

nationalistic ambitions of the Chinese government. In this section, I will first discussthe controversies generated by these high-profile state projects, and then situate

the emergence of these new state spaces within the context of the rescaling of statepower.

Figure 8 The ‘Bird’s Nest’ during the Olympics. Source: Xuefei Ren, August 2008.



In 1998, when the National Theatre was commissioned from French architect PaulAndreu, more than 200 members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences signed a

petition to protest against the decision. The architectural style of the National

Figure 9 The CCTV building near completion. Source: Xuefei Ren, August 2008.

1030 X. Ren


Theatre was a hotly debated issue in the local architectural community. Should it goback to a traditional Chinese architectural style, or should it be another Soviet-style

building in order to match the surroundings? Or should the new National Theatretotally break free from its urban context and adopt a completely different

architectural language? After months of debates and several rounds of designcompetitions, an ultra-modern high-tech design by Paul Andreu was selected as the

winning proposal. This decision immediately brought strong opposition from theolder generation of architects, planners and engineers. The older generation was

educated in the Soviet-style architectural schools. They drafted designs for manyhigh-profile buildings for the Communist regime in the 1950s. Many of them arenow established members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and are strong

opponents of commissioning state projects to international architects. However, thecentral leadership ignored the opposition, as the administration led by Jiang Zemin

saw the necessity for a brand-new architectural symbol in Beijing to demonstrateChina’s economic success, open-mindedness and (imagined) political transparency

(see Figure 10). [35]In spring 2005, Nanfang Zhoumo, a major newspaper based in Guangzhou,

published two polemical articles criticizing the practices of foreign architects inChina. The author is Wu Chen, the son of China’s renowned architect and senior

Figure 10 The National Theatre. Source: Xuefei Ren, August 2008.



member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wu Liang-Yong. The articles clearlypointed out that China has become a laboratory for foreign architects. The Chinese

state provided foreign architects the best conditions – both financial and politicalsupport – to fulfil their wildest design dreams. They use architecture to challenge

technology limits and use Chinese taxpayers’ money to solve the technical problemstheir plans have created. According to Wu Chen, foreign-designed mega-projects

tend to emphasize strong visual impact over actual function, and that quality has ledto great structural engineering difficulties and huge costs. Also, when they are not

informed by a thorough understanding of the local culture, the designs by foreignarchitects do not harmonize with the urban surroundings of Chinese cities. Wucriticized the way that the design of the National Theatre by Paul Andreu has

disrupted the sacred central north-south axis of Beijing, which had been kept intactfor centuries. As more and more mega-projects are commissioned to foreign

architects, Chinese cities are losing their authentic character and have become banalhomogenized cities that can be found everywhere in the world. He blamed those who

promote foreign architects in China, such as the media, some local architects andgovernment officials. In the end, Wu Chen identified the current domination by

foreign architects as a new form of cultural colonialism, which could endanger thedevelopment of contemporary Chinese architecture. As Wu Chen wrote:

They [foreign architects] come to China, full of enthusiasm to impose their valueson us. This is the same as the psychology of colonizers. In the process, what we arelosing is Chinese culture. . . . Years later, we will regret what has been done to ourcities. We will feel pain when we look at our cities. Here you can see architecturalinfluences of France, Switzerland, America, but not Beijing. Chinese people wholive in these cities are the ones who have to pay the price. [36]

In contrast, the younger generation of Chinese architects is more receptive towardsthe entry of foreign architects, and sees the notion of cultural colonialism as a new

form of nationalism and protectionism. In a panel discussion organized by NanfangZhoumo, architect Zhang Zai-Yuan (educated in Japan) commented that it might notbe a bad thing that China has become a laboratory for foreign architects. Foreign

architects have brought with them not only individual building projects but also newdesign concepts, technology and management methods for running professional

design firms, all of which are something Chinese architects can learn from. Ma Yan-Song, a young architect educated at Yale, expressed similar views. Ma thinks that

global competition is good, and it is quite normal for architects to practise beyondnational boundaries. Fang Zhen-Ning, an architecture critic, is more critical about

the cultural colonialism argument. Fang commented:

What is the Chinese tradition? Zaha Hadid once said, ‘if the surrounding is trash,should I also design trash?’ What Chinese architecture needs now is open and faircompetition. Herzog and de Meuron have designed more than 40 projects aroundthe world. How many has Wu Liang-Yong designed? . . . Our cities will look muchmore horrible if we only let Chinese architects do the work. . . . The argument of

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cultural colonialism is irrelevant. It is just another form of nationalism andprotectionism. [37]

Many of the supporters of foreign architects are themselves educated in Europe,

North America and Japan. They have worked overseas before returning to China.As they are familiar with both international practices and local conditions in

China, many of them have become active brokers introducing foreign architects tothe unfamiliar terrain of China. Ma Qing-Yun, a recently-returned, overseas-

educated Chinese architect, is widely regarded as the leader and role model for theyoung generation. He brought Rem Koolhaas to China and helped him win thedesign competition for the CCTV building, a 600-million-euro project. He also

opened his own design firm in Shanghai. His multinational team has beenworking on several large projects in satellite new towns of Shanghai. In the

architectural community in China, Ma Qing-Yun is nicknamed as ‘the ChineseRem Koolhaas’.

The debate in the Chinese architecture community about the ‘invasion’ offoreign architects is an intriguing case by which to examine the cultural clashes that

Chinese cities have been experiencing in the course of modernization andglobalization. Chinese architects have had mixed feelings about the takeover of

high-profile projects by foreign architects, and it was definitely a lost opportunity forChinese architects when high-profile projects such as the National Stadium and theNational Theatre were commissioned to foreign architects. However, many young

architects have also embraced the entry of foreign architects. They are thrilled byworking together with these international star architects, and have been catching up

quickly.In spite of the controversies and heated debates, the state-sponsored mega-projects

have been quickly constructed in Beijing. The fast implementation of theaforementioned state projects need to be understood in relation to the rescaling of

Chinese state power in the context of globalization and inter-urban competition. Theimpact of globalization on national state power has been one of the most heavilydebated issues in social sciences in recent years, and political theorists have typically

adopted one of two competing conceptualizations of state power. The first assertsthat the global scale has gained power at the expense of the nation state. [38] The

second argues that the nation has retained its power, given the institutionalization ofnational power and the questionable legitimacy of global governance. [39] In the late

1990s, however, urban geographers and sociologists presented a third conceptualiza-tion, pushing past the zero-sum perspective of power implied by the earlier two.

These theorists posited that rather than diminishing or maintaining the power of thenation state, globalization entails the territorial de-scaling and rescaling of state

power within the nation. [40] Examining the rescaling of state power in WesternEurope in response to globalization, Brenner asserts that urban regions have becomekey institutional sites of state power. [41] In response to broader structural changes

since the 1970s, such as de-industrialization, the retrenchment of the welfare state



and European integration, the economic contexts of cities have changed and majormetropolitan regions have been forced to adopt entrepreneurial policies to attract

capital investment. Although administrative boundaries remain fixed, changes instate practices and regulatory policies have reconstituted the meanings of territorial

divisions and intergovernmental relations. Instead of adopting a view of lineardecentralization, this theory emphasizes the reshuffling of state power and circulation

of resources between different geopolitical scales.State rescaling is path-dependent and has to be understood in local historical

and institutional contexts. Although certain rescaling processes and neoliberalstrategies observed in the Western city are present in Beijing, the historical andsocial contexts of post-socialist China have produced different assemblages of state

power. Consistent with rescaling theory, Beijing has employed an entrepreneurialapproach to urban governance in the development of its mega-projects and other

efforts to bolster its competitive position. Unlike in Western Europe and theUnited States, however, these strategies are not forced responses from the Beijing

city government to cope with post-industrial transitions. They are rather the resultof a centrally-directed programme devised by the national government to

concentrate state power at the most effective scale to spur economic growth. Byconcentrating authority and resources at the urban scale, the Chinese state has

given Beijing the autonomy it needs to carry out development schemes, such as theconstruction of various state mega-projects and the hosting of the Olympics.Therefore, the production of new state spaces, facilitated by the global flows of

architectural expertise, would not have been possible without the rescaling ofChinese state power at the urban scale.

Can these new state spaces – articulated in the architectural language of modernity,transparency and openness – embody possibilities for real political transformations?

The answer is likely to be negative, especially when we consider the inaccessibility ofthese new state spaces for the majority of urban citizens. Olympics tickets were highly

regulated, and only the privileged few – corporate sponsors and those who couldafford the high prices on the black market – could have first-hand experience of thespectacle. Similarly, the performances taking place in the National Theatre command

a prohibitive price that far exceeds the affordability of most residents. The CCTVbuilding will also probably be closed off to the public upon completion, as it

accommodates the core propaganda organ of the state – Chinese Central Television.In spite of the cutting-edge architectural designs, the emerging new state spaces in

Beijing will become yet another instrument for the party-state to legitimate andsolidify its power.

Conclusion

This essay has examined the urban legacies of the Olympics in Beijing through thelens of spatial production. By tracing the global networks and linkages in the arts,

architecture and preservation, I have argued that the Olympics intensified the global

1034 X. Ren


connectivity of Beijing and integrated the city into the global urban network. The artspace, heritage space and new state space in Beijing are examples of spaces of global

flows. The rise of contemporary Chinese art is inseparable from the development ofthe 798 Art District. Transnational connections of artists, galleries and media helped

to turn 798 into an unofficial icon of Chinese contemporary art, and thus saved thearea from demolition. In the field of historical preservation, international architects

educated local developers and policy-makers on how to profit from rehabilitating thehistorical built environment. Meanwhile, expats and wealthy Chinese urbanites

seeking new fashion statements have rediscovered the charm of hutong living, whichhas helped to raise awareness of historical heritage and but also led to fastgentrification of the remaining hutong neighbourhoods. The transnational linkages

are even more evident in the production of new state spaces, as the city governmenthas repeatedly turned to international architects to design mega-projects for the

Olympics. With financial and political support from the state, prominentinternational architects have found in Beijing a fertile ground for their wild

architectural experimentations. Iconic architecture such as the CCTV headquartersand the Bird’s Nest has radically changed the look and feel of this post-socialist city

by creating a bold visual image of the city in order to shock and impress.The Olympics, as a socio-political ritual with important economic implications,

acted as a catalyst in intensifying Beijing’s global connectivity, but also left behindconflicted urban legacies. In the field of contemporary art, the Olympics as a mediaevent helped to bring recognition to the 798 Art District in the pre-Olympic years,

and to connect Beijing to the art market in New York and London. Meanwhile, theoverexposure brought by the Olympics also led to the quick demise of certain

cherished elements of 798 – from a bohemian art quarter into a marketplacedominated by prominent international galleries. For preservation, the Beijing city

government is obliged to preserve the city’s remaining hutongs and courtyard housesto stage a ‘Humanistic Olympics’. But the pre-Olympic construction boom also

swallowed more hutongs at a faster pace than before, and led to widespread propertyspeculation and gentrification in the inner-city neighbourhoods characterized byhutong living. For state-sponsored projects, the Olympics marked a turning-point in

the state’s approach to architectural monuments and nation building. The Chinesestate needed a different architectural grammar to narrate the return of China to the

world stage, and it turned to global ‘starchitects’ for the work. The centralgovernment and Beijing city government pushed through their high-profile

architectural mega-projects in spite of the criticisms raised. These new architecturalmonuments, dressed in an architectural language of globality, high technology and

openness, are articulations of clearly nationalist ambitions. The two-week Olympicspectacle has now passed, but we can read the numerous traces left in the cultural

landscape of Beijing. The Olympics is strategic for deciphering the restless urbanlandscape of the new Beijing and the spatial production of Olympic Beijing revealsthe many contradictions embedded in the city’s transformation into a global

metropolis.



Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Alesia Montgomery at Michigan State University and RonenSteinberg at the University of Chicago for their insightful comments.

Notes

[1] Later the public was told to that Cai Quoqiang’s firework show as it was seen on television wascomputer-enhanced by Crystal Co., a leading animation design firm specializing inarchitectural design renderings – and also a participant in the production of promotionalvideos for Beijing’s and Chicago’s Olympic bids.

[2] This is different from Castells’s notion of ‘space of flows’, which refers to the globalinformation networks through which more and more of the world economy is coordinated inreal time across distances. See Castells, The Rise of the Network Society.

[3] The three themes for the 2008 Beijing Games were ‘Humanistic Olympics’, ‘High-TechOlympics’ and ‘Green Olympics’.

[4] Hutong refers to narrow streets and alleys formed by courtyard houses.[5] The English slogan for the 2008 Beijing Games was originally ‘New Beijing, New Olympics’.

This was later changed into ‘New Beijing, Great Olympics’ as people questioned what waswrong with the ‘old’ Olympics. But the Chinese version of the official slogan stayed the same –‘New Beijing, New Olympics’ – with a strong emphasis on ‘new’. The quest for ‘newness’ –i.e., anything newer is better – is a key logic underlying many urban renewal programmes,beautification campaigns and the demolition of hutongs in pre-Olympic Beijing.

[6] See Zukin, Loft Living.[7] Nanchizi near Tiananmen Square is one of the first preservation-based redevelopment

projects, where former multi-family courtyard houses were renovated into million-dollarluxury residences. Nanluoguxiang is another heavily gentrified area with many rehabilitatedcourtyard houses and a substantial foreign population.

[8] See Zhang, ‘Steering Toward Growth’, on symbolic preservation in Beijing.[9] The CCTV (Chinese Central Television) building was still under construction during the

Olympics in August 2008. However, the unfinished construction site did not stop the traffic ofarchitecture aficionados and tourists. The iconic building design and high construction cost ofthe CCTV building brought about heated debates. The CCTV building has already become anew icon. In February 2009, during the Chinese new year, part of the unfinished CCTVcomplex caught fire and was severely damaged.

[10] See Sklair, ‘The Transnational Capitalist Class’.[11] Other works included in ‘Encounter’ by Pace Beijing are from artists Georg Baselitz,

Chuck Close, George Condo, Marlene Dumas, Tim Eitel, Alex Katz, Yoshimoto Nara,Li Songsong, Liu Wei, Ma Liuming, Qi Zhilong, Cindy Sherman, Zhang Huan, WangGuangyi and Yang Shaobing. The curator of this inaugural exhibition is Leng Lin, a Chineseartist and critic who has organized numerous contemporary Chinese art exhibitions since the1990s.

[12] The major European galleries in 798 are UCCA (Belgium), China Contemporary (London),Gallery Continua (Italy), White Space (Germany) and Faurschou gallery (Denmark). All ofthese galleries moved into the 798 Art District after 2005.

[13] The larger factory project is called 718. To give a boost to industrial production, the nationalgovernment in the early 1950s identified 156 projects to be constructed with aid from theSoviet Union. Factory 718 was often regarded as the 157th project with technical aid from EastGermany. See Luo, ‘Recollections on the History of 718’.

1036 X. Ren


[14] See Tan, ‘Revolutionary Spaces in Globalization’, and Currier, ‘Art and Power in the NewChina’, for the transformation of the 798 into an art district.

[15] See Wu, ‘Tui-Transfiguration’.[16] See Angremy, ‘798, A Place of Artistic Possibilities’.[17] Huang, ‘1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 798’.[18] For example, the Ullens Center for Contemporary Art.[19] Quoted from Ye, ‘Weightlessness – 798 in the Present Continuous Tense’, 29–30.[20] Ibid., 30.[21] From personal interview with Li Xiangqun, 1 Aug. 2005.[22] Interview with artist Shi Xinning, 17 Aug 2008, in Caochangdi, Beijing.[23] Tinari, ‘798 Memoir’.[24] Beijing has been called by different names in Chinese. It was first called Ji as the small centre of

the Warring States Kingdom of Yan, and then Youzhou in the medieval period, Dadu duringthe Yuan Dynasty and Jingshi in the Ming and Qing periods. It was renamed Beijing in1912 by the Nationalist Party, changed to Beiping later in 1928, and back to Beijing again in1949 by the socialist regime. Although Beijing has been used as the official name since 1949,the name ‘Peking’ was widely used in the Western media until the 1980s. Beijing and Pekingare different Romanizations of the same Chinese word . See details on the name changesin Naquin, Peking.

[25] The five imperial dynasties are Liao (938–1122), Jin (1122–1215), Yuan (1267–1367), Ming(1368–1643) and Qing (1644–1911). From 1949 to the present, Beijing has been the capital ofthe People’s Republic of China.

[26] See Dong, Republican Beijing.[27] Imperial Peking was divided into two distinctive parts – the square-shaped Inner City in the

north and the rectangular Outer City in the south. The Outer City was smaller than the InnerCity and lacked the majestic imperial centre. Due to the presence of the imperial palaces, therewere more residences – mostly those of noble families and high-ranking bureaucrats – in theInner City, and more commerce took place in the Outer City. Qianmen is one of the gatesconnecting the two parts.

[28] See Naquin, Peking.[29] The projects from SOHO China are mostly located in the CBD area in Beijing; such projects

include SOHO Newtown, Jianwai SOHO, Chaowai SOHO, Guanghualu SOHO, ShangduSOHO and the most recent, Sanlitun SOHO, near the embassy area.

[30] Ren, ‘Architecture and China’s Urban Revolution’.[31] Originally designed by European architects, Shikumen blends European architectural

elements such as slate-grey bricks and French windows with Chinese features such ascourtyards and stone gates. See Ren, ‘Forward to the Past’, on the preservation-basedredevelopment at Xintiandi in Shanghai.

[32] Compared to the close partnership between the developer (Shui On Group) and Shanghai citygovernment for Xintiandi, the relationship between SOHO China and the Beijing citygovernment is more ambiguous. At the moment of writing, it is unclear if the government willgrant SOHO China the redevelopment rights for the larger area. The high stakes of Qianmenand pressure from the general public may push the city government to take full control of theproject, instead of letting a private developer profit from the project.

[33] The statistics are provided by Beijing Urban Planning Association.[34] From interviews with a few young European architects living in Beijing, 2 Aug. 2008. They

talked about living in a hutong house that burned coal in winter. The rent charged by theirChinese landlord is even higher than that of an average modern apartment, which indicatesthe high demand for hutong living.

[35] Ren, ‘La Chine et ses ‘‘Grands Projets’’ Urbains’; Ren, ‘Architecture and Nation Building’.



[36] Nanfang Zhoumo, 29 April 2005.[37] Nanfang Zhoumo, 29 May 2005.[38] Hay and Marsh, ‘Introduction: Demystifying Globalization’.[39] Mann, ‘Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State?’; Weiss, ‘Globalisation and the

Myth of the Powerless State’; and Hirst and Thompson, ‘Globalization and the Future of theNation State’.

[40] Swyngedouw, ‘Neither Global nor Local’; Brenner ‘Global Cities, Glocal States’; Brenner,New State Spaces; Jessop, ‘The Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix’; and MacLeod,‘New Regionalism Reconsidered’.

[41] Brenner, New State Spaces.

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Olympic Beijing - Reflections on Urban Space and Global Connectivity

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