Looking For Residential Villas - BPTP Visionnaire Villas 9891856789 Gurgaon
Olive Green Villas v. Cruz (Az Ct. of Appeals Memo Decision)
Transcript of Olive Green Villas v. Cruz (Az Ct. of Appeals Memo Decision)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE OLIVE GREEN VILLAS HOMES ASSOCIATION, an Arizona non-profit corporation, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. SANTOS CRUZ, a single man, Defendant/Appellee. ______________________________________
)))))))))))))
1 CA-CV 06-0651 DEPARTMENT E MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication - Rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure) Filed 10-02-07
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Cause No. CV 2004-000055 The Honorable Robert C. Houser, Judge AFFIRMED Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC Tempe
By James H. Hazlewood Javier B. Delgado Elise V. Saadi
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Law Offices of William R. Hobson Chandler
By William R. Hobson
and Counters & Koelbel, PC Chandler By Lisa J. Counters Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee N O R R I S, Judge
2
¶1 Plaintiff/Appellant Olive Green Villas Homes
Association (“Olive Green”) appeals from the superior court’s
August 15, 2006, order vacating the judgment and decree of
foreclosure and order of sale entered in its favor and against
Defendant/Appellee Santos Cruz on March 10, 2004. Olive Green’s
main argument on appeal is that the superior court abused its
discretion by declaring the default judgment void for lack of
jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and
affirm the order of the superior court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Cruz purchased a house in Glendale, Arizona in 1996.
He lived in the house with his wife, Estella Bastida,1 and their
children. Olive Green is a homeowner’s association which
provides services for Cruz. In return, Cruz was obligated to
pay assessments, fees, charges, costs, and expenses related to
these services pursuant to the Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions for Olive Green Villa Homes
Association (“Declaration”). Cruz evidently failed to pay
certain assessments, and, therefore, Olive Green recorded a lien
upon the house pursuant to Article IV of the Declaration and
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 33-1807 (2003).
1During a hearing, Cruz’s counsel noted Cruz and
Bastida were married by common law, and Arizona does not recognize common law marriage. Cruz and Bastida’s relationship is not at issue in this appeal.
3
¶3 On January 2, 2004, Olive Green filed a complaint (the
“foreclosure lawsuit”) in the superior court asserting Cruz owed
$2,274.14, with interest continuing to accrue. Olive Green
sought to judicially foreclose and sell the house to satisfy the
lien. Cruz did not answer or otherwise respond to the
complaint. On March 10, 2004, the superior court entered a
default judgment against Cruz and ordered the property sold at a
public auction after the statutory redemption period. The court
also awarded Olive Green’s court costs and attorneys’ fees.
¶4 In April 2004, Olive Green’s attorneys sent a post-
judgment letter to Cruz. The letter stated a foreclosure
judgment had been entered against Cruz, disclosed the current
balance due on Cruz’s account ($5,111.53), and stated that if
Cruz failed to make arrangements for payment by April 15, 2004,
Olive Green would proceed with a sheriff’s sale.
¶5 Thereafter, on October 7, 2004, the Maricopa County
Sheriff’s department conducted a public auction of the house,
and Olive Green purchased the house by credit bid. It
subsequently assigned the title to Excess Equities, L.L.C.2 In
June 2005, a Sheriff’s Deputy evicted Cruz and his family from
their home. Cruz subsequently asserted in an under oath
declaration that he was “not aware of the foreclosure
2Excess Equities, L.L.C. is not a party to this appeal.
4
proceeding, default judgment, Sheriff’s sale and Assignment of
Judgment” until he was personally served with a Glendale Justice
Court Summons and Forcible Detainer Complaint. He asserted he
first received the summons and complaint from the Sheriff’s
deputy when the deputy came to evict him. At that time, Cruz
was current on his mortgage payments, some eight months after
Olive Green purchased his house.3
¶6 On January 6, 2006, Cruz moved to set aside the
default judgment entered in the foreclosure lawsuit pursuant to
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1), (3), and (6), arguing
in pertinent part that he had never been notified of the lawsuit
or the Sheriff’s sale. In his supporting declarations, Cruz
asserted he had not received a copy of “any” summons or
complaint, notice of a pending default, notice that a default
had been entered or that he had a right redeem, or notice of the
Sheriff’s sale.
3We also note that on November 9, 2005, months after
the Sheriff’s deputy evicted Cruz and his family, Olive Green provided both a third and fourth notice, on the same day, that Cruz was violating Association rules by hanging a blanket over a window, and threatened to assess $300 in fees for the violation if not corrected within 10 days.
5
¶7 In response, Olive Green asserted Cruz’s motion was
untimely under Rule 60(c),4 and that Cruz had been served with a
Summons and Complaint on January 10, 2004, relying on the
process server’s affidavit, which stated the Summons and
Complaint had been issued “upon Estella Bastida, wife,
personally, being of suitable age and discretion and residing
therein, at their usual place of abode, . . . Glendale, . . .
Arizona, . . . at the hour of 1:00 p.m., January 10, 2004.”
The affidavit listed Bastida’s weight as 160 pounds.
¶8 On February 10, 2006, Cruz replied, supplementing the
record with a second declaration as well as a declaration from
Bastida. Cruz and Bastida both asserted Bastida had not been
served with the Summons and Complaint. They stated they were
not home at the time the process server claimed to have served
Bastida; that it was their practice to visit Bastida’s parents
or otherwise be out of the house on Saturdays, and they would,
therefore, not have been home at the time listed on the
affidavit of service. Cruz and Bastida also asserted the
physical description of Bastida listed in the affidavit of
4Olive Green also filed a “Notice to Court Re:
Defendant’s Non-Compliance with ARCP Rule 19.” In that notice, Olive Green asserted Excess Equities, as the current owner of the house, was an indispensable party to the litigation. Cruz did not reply, and the superior court merely acknowledged during the April 7, 2006, hearing that it had received the Rule 19 notice, but the court never again referenced the document.
6
service was incorrect. Both asserted that at the time of the
alleged service, Bastida weighed in excess of 200 pounds, while
the process server listed her weight as 160 pounds.
¶9 Cruz also requested an evidentiary hearing in his
reply, asserting it was necessary to fully develop relevant
evidence. At a subsequent hearing on April 7, 2006, Cruz’s
counsel informed the superior court that he wished to depose the
process server and the owner of Excess Equities. However, the
superior court questioned Cruz’s counsel as to what bearing
Excess Equities could have on whether process had been properly
served. Cruz’s counsel suggested Excess Equities may have been
“insiders,” and that the conveyance from Olive Green to Excess
Equities might have been fraudulent. The court later granted
Cruz leave to depose the process server and supplement the
motion.
¶10 Instead of deposing the process server, Cruz’s counsel
provided the court with a declaration from the process server.
In that declaration, the process server stated he had no
independent recollection of having served Bastida, that
reviewing the affidavit of service did not refresh his
recollection, and that he would not be able to add anything to
the affidavit of service if deposed. Cruz asserted in a
supplement to the motion that the process server must have
7
served someone else, since Bastida weighed over 40 pounds more
than the person the process server described, and because
Bastida was not home at the time the process server claimed to
have served process.
¶11 At a second hearing, Cruz’s counsel withdrew his
request for an evidentiary hearing. During the hearing, the
court specifically asked Cruz’s counsel whether he was taking
the position that the judgment was void, and Cruz’s counsel
stated in the absence of proper service the judgment was void.
Olive Green did not request an evidentiary hearing before the
court ruled on the motion to set aside the default judgment, and
did not present any evidence, by affidavit or otherwise,
challenging the statements made by Cruz and Bastida in their
declarations.5
¶12 After considering the declarations of both Cruz and
Bastida, which asserted they were not home at the time the
process server claimed to have served Bastida, the incorrect
physical description of Bastida on the affidavit of service, and
Olive Green’s failure to provide controverting evidence, the
superior court concluded Cruz had raised “plausible” evidence
demonstrating Olive Green had failed to provide proper notice of
the foreclosure lawsuit to warrant relief pursuant to Rule
5Olive Green first requested an evidentiary hearing in
its motion for reconsideration.
8
60(c)(4).6 That rule allows a court to relieve a party from a
final judgment if the judgment is void. By signed minute entry
entered on August 15, 2006, the court concluded:
On this record, the Court finds that service of process was not properly made on [Cruz], that the Court lacked jurisdiction over [Cruz] when the default judgment was entered and that the judgment was therefore void.
¶13 Olive Green moved for reconsideration on September 7,
2006. However, on September 14, 2006, before the court could
rule on this motion, Olive Green filed a notice of appeal from
the court’s August 15 ruling.
¶14 This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003) and 12-2101(C) (2003).
DISCUSSION
¶15 The question before this court is whether the superior
court correctly found Cruz had established through clear and
convincing evidence that he had not been properly served with
the summons and complaint in the foreclosure lawsuit, and thus
the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. We review a
decision to set aside a default judgment for an abuse of
discretion. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Osterkamp (“Gen. Elec.
I”), 172 Ariz. 191, 194, 836 P.2d 404, 407 (App. 1992). When
the superior court’s decision is based on disputed facts, “we
6The court determined Cruz had failed to show grounds
for relief pursuant to Rule 60(c)(1), (3), or (6).
9
will not . . . substitute our judgment for that of the
[superior] court.” Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Osterkamp
(“Gen. Elec. II”), 172 Ariz. 185, 188, 836 P.2d 398, 401 (App.
1992). We may find an abuse of discretion exists, however, if
the record fails to contain evidence to support the superior
court’s finding. Grant v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 133 Ariz. 434,
456, 652 P.2d 507, 529 (1982).
I. Service of Process
¶16 Although Cruz did not explicitly ask for relief under
Rule 60(c)(4) in his original motion or subsequent filings, he
and Bastida both asserted they had not been served with the
summons and complaint in the foreclosure lawsuit. Furthermore,
Cruz’s counsel argued at the August 8, 2006, hearing that the
judgment was void for failure to serve process on Cruz. Thus,
the court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding under Rule
60(c)(4).
¶17 A court does not acquire personal jurisdiction over a
person who is not properly served with the summons and
complaint, and the resulting default judgment is void. Sprang
v. Petersen Lumber, Inc., 165 Ariz. 257, 262, 789 P.2d 395, 400
(App. 1990); see also Martin v. Martin, 182 Ariz. 11, 15, 893
P.2d 11, 15 (App. 1994)(“judgment . . . is ‘void’ if the court .
. . lacked jurisdiction . . . over the person involved”)
10
(internal citation omitted). When a judgment is void, the
“court has no discretion but to vacate” the judgment. Martin,
182 Ariz. at 14, 893 P.2d at 14; see also Barlage v. Valentine,
210 Ariz. 270, 272, ¶ 4, 110 P.3d 371, 373 (App. 2005). “There
is no time limit in which a motion under Rule 60(c)(4) may be
brought; the court must vacate a void judgment or order ‘even if
the party seeking relief delayed unreasonably.’” Martin, 182 at
14, 893 P.2d at 14 (quoting Brooks v. Consolidated Freightways,
173 Ariz. 66, 71, 839 P.2d 1111, 1116 (App. 1992)).
¶18 The superior court considered the declarations of Cruz
and Bastida, which controverted the process server’s affidavit
of service.7 Cruz and Bastida asserted they were not home at the
time the process server claimed to have served Bastida, and that
the process server could not have served her because he failed
to accurately describe her in his affidavit of service. Olive
Green provided no controverting evidence, and the process server
had no independent recollection of the service and could not
provide any additional information. We must, therefore,
determine whether the evidence provided to the superior court
7Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1(d),
process may be served on a person “by leaving copies thereof at that individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein . . . .” Here, it is undisputed that Bastida lived with Cruz in his dwelling and was a person of both suitable age and discretion.
11
was “of a clear and convincing nature [sufficient] to overturn
the presumption of service.” Riggs v. Huachuca Inv. Co., 2
Ariz. App. 527, 529, 410 P.2d 149, 151 (App. 1966); see also
Gen. Elec. I, 172 Ariz. at 195, 835 P.2d at 407 (“Service of
process can be impeached only by clear and convincing
evidence.”).
¶19 Clear and convincing evidence – which requires
somewhat less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt8 - is “proof
that will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm
belief or conviction as to the issue sought to be proved.”
State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133, 156, 42 P.3d 564, 587 (2002)
(quoting State v. Turrentine, 152 Ariz. 61, 68, 730 P.2d 238,
245 (App. 1986)). Here, the superior court had declarations
from Bastida and Cruz, averring that Bastida was not at home
when the process server claimed to have served her, and that the
person the process server described in his affidavit of service
could not have been Bastida. The only contradicting evidence
8See State v. Leonardo, 161 Ariz. 111, 112, 776 P.2d
789, 790 (1989).
12
was the process server’s affidavit of service,9 which described a
person over 40 pounds lighter than Bastida according to both
Cruz and Bastida. Thus, not only was the evidence “plausible,”
as stated by the superior court, but it constituted clear and
convincing evidence that Bastida was not served with the summons
and complaint, and, therefore, that Cruz was not properly served
process in the foreclosure lawsuit.
II. Other Arguments
A. Subsequent Notice of Default Judgment
¶20 Although both parties brief and argue matters that
occurred after the initial default judgment, none of those
issues are relevant to this appeal. Whether Cruz knew of the
9Olive Green asserts the superior court should have
accorded more weight to the process server’s affidavit of service because he was an expert and an officer of the court. We disagree. Even if “private process servers qualify as experts,” as asserted by Olive Green, the process server did not participate in this case as an expert witness. Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Evidence 702, an expert’s testimony is used to “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .” Here, the process server’s affidavit was only relevant to show what he did in serving Bastida, and in no way assisted the superior court in understanding any evidence or determining a fact in issue. Furthermore, Olive Green provided no authority to support its assertion that an officer of the court’s testimony has more weight than that of any other person. Our established case law provides that a process server’s affidavit of service creates a presumption of service that can be rebutted through clear and convincing evidence. Huachuca Inv. Co., 2 Ariz. App. at 529, 410 P.2d at 151. Therefore, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in failing to accord more weight to the process server’s affidavit of service.
13
default judgment after the court entered it has no bearing on
whether process was properly served. As such, we need not
address those arguments.
B. Timeliness of Motion to Set Aside
¶21 Olive Green argues on appeal that Cruz failed to bring
the motion within a reasonable amount of time. Although Olive
Green acknowledges “some case law in Arizona hold[s] that there
is no ‘reasonable’ time limitation under the Rule when a motion
‘under paragraph (c)(4)’ is brought[,]” it asserts the rule
itself fails to explicitly state that claims under subsection
(c)(4) are not subject to a reasonable time limitation.
¶22 This court has authority to interpret rules of
procedure under the Arizona Constitution, Article VI, Section 5.
Barassi v. Matison, 130 Ariz. 418, 421, 636 P.2d 1200, 1203
(1981). This court succinctly stated “[a]s for appellant's
contention that appellee did not move within a reasonable time
to set aside the judgment, such contention is without merit
since the reasonable time requirement of Rule 60(c) does not
apply when a judgment is attacked as void.” National Inv. Co.,
Inc. v. Estate of Bronner, 146 Ariz. 138, 140, 704 P.2d 268,
270 (App. 1985)(citing Springfield Credit Union v. Johnson, 123
Ariz. 319, 599 P.2d 772 (1979)). As such, Cruz’s motion to set
aside the judgment as void was not subject to a reasonable time
14
limitation.
C. Evidentiary Hearing
¶23 Next, Olive Green asserted the superior court abused
its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
There is no requirement that the court conduct such a hearing
before ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment.
Furthermore, Olive Green failed to request an evidentiary
hearing before the court ruled on Cruz’s motion to vacate, and
only after it lost that motion did it request an evidentiary
hearing as part of its motion to reconsider. “[A] party must
timely present his legal theories to the trial court so as to
give the trial court an opportunity to rule properly.”
Airfreight Exp. Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Ctr., Inc., 215 Ariz. 103,
109, ¶ 17, 158 P.3d 232, 238 (App. 2007)(party waived issue when
they failed to raise it until after court dismissed the
action)(quoting Payne v. Payne, 12 Ariz. App. 434, 435, 471 P.2d
319, 320 (1970)). Because the superior court was never provided
with the opportunity to consider the merits of Olive Green’s
request for an evidentiary hearing, Olive Green has waived this
argument on appeal. See Schurgin v. AMFAC Elec. Distrib. Corp.,
182 Ariz. 187, 190, 894 P.2d 730, 733 (App. 1995)(issues raised
for first time on appeal are waived).
15
D. Rule 19 Motion
¶24 Olive Green also asserted the superior court committed
error by failing to require Cruz to join Excess Equities as an
indispensable party pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure
19. Olive Green argues that because Excess Equities owned the
property at the time Cruz filed his motion, it had a stake in
the matter and an interest in protecting its property. This
argument fundamentally misinterprets the purpose of Rule 19, and
is without merit.
¶25 When determining whether a party is indispensable, our
supreme court has held:
Indispensable parties are those who have such an interest in the subject matter that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting their interest or leaving the controversy in such condition that a final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. The test of indispensability therefore is whether the absent person's interest in the controversy is such that no final judgment or decree can be entered which will do justice between the parties actually before the court, without injuriously affecting the rights of others not brought into the action.
Bolin v. Superior Court, 85 Ariz. 131, 134-35, 333 P.2d 295, 297
(1958) (emphasis added). Following the 1966 amendment of the
rule, this approach was further approved by our supreme court in
King v. Uhlmann, 103 Ariz. 136, 437 P.2d 928 (1968). Thus, the
purpose of Rule 19 centers on ensuring that the entry of a final
16
judgment affords justice to the parties before the court along
with any parties not joined whose rights would be injuriously
affected if they were not joined.
¶26 A motion asserting a failure to join an indispensable
party normally includes a request that the court dismiss a
pending action to which indispensable parties have not been
joined. See F.D.I.C. v. Adams, 187 Ariz. 585, 589, 931 P.2d
1095, 1099 (App. 1996) (defendant moved to dismiss action
because plaintiff had failed to join shared loan holder, whom
defendant asserted was an indispensable party). Additionally, a
party may attack a final judgment by asserting the judgment is
void for failure to join an indispensable party. See, e.g., In
re Chase's Estate, 125 Ariz. 270, 274, 609 P.2d 85, 89 (App.
1980) (party may move to set aside judgment pursuant to Rule
60(c)(1) for failure to join an indispensable party). In each
situation, the indispensable party issue is raised to either
preclude or invalidate a final judgment.
¶27 Here, the default judgment was the final judgment.
The only “indispensable parties” to the foreclosure action
before the entry of the final judgment were Olive Green and
Cruz. Olive Green does not assert the entry of final judgment
deprived an indispensable party of equity or justice. Rather,
Olive Green asserts that failing to allow Excess Equities to
17
respond to Cruz’s motion to set aside the judgment somehow
deprived Excess Equities of the ability to protect its interest
in the property. When the final judgment was entered, Excess
Equities had no interest in the property. Olive Green cites no
precedent or authority for its assertion that, pursuant to Rule
19, a party who had no interest in the action, while it was
pending, must be allowed to respond to a post-judgment motion
that seeks to invalidate a default judgment for failure to
properly serve process. Although a superior court may have
discretion to allow a third party to intervene in a post-
judgment Rule 60(c) proceeding, Rule 19 is not applicable here.10
The superior court did not commit error by failing to join
Excess Equities as a party.
E. Motion for Reconsideration
¶28 Olive Green additionally asserts the superior court
abused its discretion by failing to rule on its motion for
reconsideration. Well established case law provides that the
superior court is divested of jurisdiction upon the filing of a
notice of appeal, and may not thereafter rule on a pending
motion for reconsideration. See City of Phoenix v. Leroy's
Liquors, Inc., 177 Ariz. 375, 381, 868 P.2d 958, 964 (App.
1993)(citing Castillo v. Indus. Comm'n, 21 Ariz. App. 465, 467,
10We express no opinion as to whether Excess Equities
should be considered an indispensable party.
18
520 P.2d 1142, 1144 (1974)).
¶29 Nevertheless, Olive Green asserts that, pursuant to
Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), before this court placed
the case on its docket, Olive Green could have asked the court
to dismiss the appeal, which would have allowed the superior
court to vacate its August 15 ruling and conduct an evidentiary
hearing. Olive Green is correct in arguing it could have sought
dismissal of its appeal before this court placed the case on its
docket. However, it failed to seek dismissal of the appeal, and
thus the superior court was never in a position to vacate its
judgment, a request Olive Green made in its motion for
reconsideration. Indeed, the case cited by Olive Green in
support of its contention specifically states that following the
filing of an appeal, a superior court may “proceed with issues
not directly involved in, or the subject matter of [,] the
appeal . . . .” State v. O'Connor, 171 Ariz. 19, 22, 827 P.2d
480, 483 (App. 1992). Vacating the ruling on which the appeal
is based directly involves the subject matter of the appeal.
Therefore, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
determining it was without jurisdiction to rule on Olive Green’s
motion for reconsideration.
19
CONCLUSION
¶30 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior
court’s order vacating the default judgment.
¶31 Both parties have requested an award of attorneys'
fees pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01 (2003) and 33-1807 (Supp.
2006) and the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions for Olive Green. Neither party is yet a prevailing
party, and we accordingly deny their requests for fees without
prejudice. When the superior court determines the prevailing
party, however, the court may consider the fees incurred by the
prevailing party on appeal in determining whether and how much
to award as reasonable attorneys' fees.
¶32 Cruz is, however, the successful party on appeal and
has requested an award of costs on appeal. We therefore grant
his costs upon his compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure 21.
_________________________ PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Judge CONCURRING: _____________________________________ PATRICK IRVINE, Presiding Judge ___________________________________ SHELDON H. WEISBERG, Judge
20