Ohio Supreme Court Brief on Teachers as Child Abuse Reporters
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Transcript of Ohio Supreme Court Brief on Teachers as Child Abuse Reporters
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No. 13-1352
In the Supreme ourt of the United States
______________________________
STATE OF OHIO,
Petitioner,
v.
DARIUS CLARK,
Respondent.
______________________________
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
______________________________
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
______________________________
MICHAEL DEWINE
Attorney General of Ohio
ERIC E. MURPHY
State Solicitor
SAMUEL PETERSON
Deputy Solicitor
30 East Broad Street
17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
614-466-8980
TIMOTHY J. MCGINTY
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
KATHERINE E. MULLIN*
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
*Counsel of Record
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
216-443-7800
kemullin@prosecutor.
cuyahogacounty.us
Counsel for Petitioner State of Ohio
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLEOFCONTENTS .............................................. i
TABLEOFAUTHORITIES ...................................... iii
I. CLARK MISTAKENLY EXPANDS THE PRIMARY-
PURPOSE TEST TO COVERALLACCUSATIONS......... 1
A. Clarks Argument That Accusations Are
Testimonial Conflicts With Crawford AndIts Progeny ....................................................... 1
1. Clarks test conflicts with the
Confrontation Clauses text........................ 2
2. Clarks test conflicts with the
Confrontation Clauses purpose................. 6
3.
Clarks test conflicts with theConfrontation Clauses history................... 9
B. Clarks Child-Hearsay Analysis Flips
History On Its Head And Advocates For A
Rule This Court Has Already Rejected ......... 11
II. CLARK IMPROPERLY TREATS TEACHERS AS
POLICE MERELY BECAUSE OF A REPORTING
DUTY..................................................................... 15
III.CLARK HAS NOT SHOWN THAT L.P.S
STATEMENTS WERE TESTIMONIAL UNDER THE
PRIMARY-PURPOSE TEST....................................... 18
IV.THE PROPER BALANCE IN CHILD-ABUSE CASES
SHOULD BE STRUCK THROUGH DEMOCRATIC
MEANS, NOT THROUGH AN ATEXTUAL,
AHISTORICAL READING OF THECONFRONTATION CLAUSE..................................... 21
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 24
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ii
APPENDIX
Ohio Rev. Code 2151.421(H) ............................ 1a
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iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page(s)
Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171 (1987) ...............................................8
Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) ...............................5,11,22
California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149 (1970) ...............................................7Commonwealth v. Hutchinson,
10 Mass. 225 (1813) .............................................12
Coy v. Iowa,
487 U.S. 1012 (1988) ...........................................22
Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004) ........................................passim
Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813 (2006) ......................................passim
Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965) ...................................2,3,4,5
Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74 (1970) .................................................5
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67 (2001) .........................................15,16
Giles v. California,
554 U.S. 353 (2008) ...............................................5
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.,
Humboldt Cnty.,
542 U.S. 177 (2004) .............................................19
Idaho v. Wright,
497 U.S. 805 (1990) .................................14,15,23
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iv
King v. Brasier,
168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779) ..............................12,13King v. Powell,
168 Eng. Rep. 157 (1775) ....................................13
Lee v. Illinois,
476 U.S. 530 (1986) ...............................................3
Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836 (1990) .............................................22
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305 (2009) .................................3,5,6,11
Michigan v. Bryant,
131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) ..................................passim
OToole v. Denihan,
889 N.E.2d 505 (Ohio 2008) ................................16
Ohio v. Roberts,448 U.S. 56 (1980) ...................................11,14,15
Rex v. Travers,
93 Eng. Rep. 793 (1726) ................................12,13
Solice v. State,
193 P. 19 (Ariz. 1920) ............................................9
State v. Frazier,574 N.E.2d 483 (Ohio 1991) ................................21
State v. Maxwell,
9 N.E.3d 930 (Ohio 2014) ....................................21
State v. Whittier,
21 Me. 341 (1842) ................................................12
Travellers Ins. Co. of Chicago v. Mosley,
75 U.S. 397 (1869) ...............................................10
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v
United States v. Boyce,
742 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2014) ...............................11United States v. DeLeon,
678 F.3d 317 (4th Cir. 2012), revd on
other grounds by133 S. Ct. 2850 (2013) .............22
Van Pelt v. Van Pelt,
1810 WL 773 (N.J. 1810) .....................................12
Wheeler v. United States,
159 U.S. 523 (1895) .............................................12
White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346 (1992) .....................................4,5,22
Williams v. Illinois,
132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) ...................................2,6,7
Yates v. Mansfield Bd. of Educ.,
808 N.E.2d 861 (Ohio 2004) ................................16Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions
Fed. R. Evid. 603 .......................................................22
Ohio R. Evid. 803(6) ..................................................17
Ohio R. Evid. 807 ......................................................23
Ohio R. Evid. 807(A)(1) .............................................21
Ohio Rev. Code 2151.421(F)(1) ..............................16
Ohio Rev. Code 2151.421(H) ..................................17
Ohio Rev. Code 2151.421(H)(1) .............................17
Other Authorities
Daniel J. Capra, Case Law Divergence From
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 197F.R.D. 531 (2000) .................................................22
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1 Edward H. East,A Treatise of the Pleas of
the Crown(Philadelphia 1806) ...........................13Francis Buller,An Introduction to the Law
Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius(4th ed.
London 1785) .......................................................21
1 James F. Stephen, History of the Criminal
Law of England (1883) ..........................................8
John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary
Criminal Trial(2003) ..........................................13
6 John H. Wigmore, Evidence 1756
(J. Chadbourn rev. 1974) .....................................10
John Henry Wigmore,A Supplement to A
Treatise on the System of Evidence in
Trials at Common Law 1761 (1908) ................14
3 John Henry Wigmore,A Treatise on theSystem of Evidence in Trials at Common
Law 1760 (1904) .........................................13,14
1 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on
Evidence 61 (6th ed. 2006) ................................14
Matthew Hale, The History and Analysis of
the Common Law of England(1713) ....................7
1 Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of
the Crown(E. Rider et al., 1800) .............12,13,21
ODJFS, Child Abuse and Neglect: A Reference
for Educators (2013), available at
http://www.odjfs.state.oh.us/forms/file.asp?id=
398&type=application/pdf ...................................16
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vii
Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Young
Maltreated Childrens Competence toTake the Oath, 3 Applied Dev. Sci. 16
(1999) ...................................................................15
Thomas D. Lyon and Raymond LaMagna,
The History of Childrens Hearsay: From
Old Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 Ind. L.J.
1029 (2007) ....................................................12,13
Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and theOath: Empirical Evidence, 73 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1017 (2000) ..................................................22
Victoria Talwar et al., Childrens
Conceptual Knowledge of Lying and Its
Relation to Their Actual Behaviors:
Implications for Court Competence
Examinations, 26 Law & Hum. Behav.395 (2002) ............................................................15
W. Williamson, The Trials at Large of the
Felons, in the Castle of York(York 1775) .....12,13
3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England(1768) ........................................7
9 William S. Holdsworth, A History of
English Law (1926)................................................7
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Ohios opening brief made three points. First, a
childs statements that are objectively meant solelyfor private parties without police involvement are
non-testimonial under Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004). Second, Ohios child-abuse reporting
statute does not turn reporters into police agents
and trigger the primary-purpose test governing po-
lice interrogations in the field. Third, even if the
primary-purpose test applies, L.P.s statements to his
teachers were non-testimonial.
Clarks response on each point lacks merit. He
argues for a contrary rule with no grounding in
Crawford or its progeny. And he justifies his rule
primarily with reliability and competency concerns
more appropriately directed to state legislatures
when drafting evidentiary rules than federal courts
when interpreting the Confrontation Clause.I.
CLARK MISTAKENLY EXPANDS THE PRIMARY-
PURPOSE TEST TO COVERALLACCUSATIONS
A. Clarks Argument That Accusations Are
Testimonial Conflicts With CrawfordAnd
Its Progeny
As Ohio noted, Petr. Br. 14-30, the Confrontation
Clauses text, purpose, and history show that, when
objectivelyassessed, statements meant solelyfor pri-
vate parties without anypolice involvement are non-
testimonial. This rule follows from the Confrontation
Clauses witness textwhich covers statements
meant for a criminal trial, not a private audience.
The rule follows from the clausespurposeto bar the
use of ex parte examinations by government officers.And it follows from the Nations history of regulating
private conversations under evidentiary, not consti-
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2
tutional, rules. Here, L.P.s statements to his teach-
ers fall within this narrow rule because they weremeant for daycare teachers, and the government had
no involvement in the conversation.
In response, Clark asserts that Ohio mistakenly
relies on a statements private audience, suggesting
instead that the focus should be on the statements
accusatorial content. Specifically, Clark argues that
the Confrontation Clause bars out-of-court state-
ments that . . . would function if introduced at trial
as the equivalent in the jurys mind of testimony.
Resp. Br. 25-26 (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415, 419 (1965)). Under this rule, he says,
statements accusing a targeted individual of engag-
ing in criminal conduct are generally testimonial.
Id. at 27 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.
2221, 2242 (2012) (plurality op.)). But the same text,purpose, and history that prove Ohios approach
equally disprove Clarks competing view.
1. Clarks test conflicts with the Con-
frontation Clauses text
The clauses witness text shows that Clark is
wrong both to focus on the jurys perspective and to
place dispositive weight on the statements content.
a. Clarks jury-focused test conflicts with the
Courts declarant-focused test. Whether a declarant
is a witness turns on the declarants perspective
because the declarants statements must pass the
Sixth Amendment test. Michigan v. Bryant, 131
S. Ct. 1143, 1162 (2011). While a questioners per-
spective helps assess the nature of the declarantspurpose, id. at 1160 n.11, 1162, no post-Crawford
case adds the jurysperspective to the mix. Indeed,
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3
even under the primary-purpose testwhich consid-
ers the totalityof the circumstances[t]he existenceof an ongoing emergency must be objectively as-
sessed from the perspective of the parties to the in-
terrogationat the time, not with the benefit of hind-
sight. Id.at 1157 n.8.
Douglas, the pre-Crawford case on which Clark
relies, does not help him. Resp. Br. 25-26. There,
the defendant and the declarant, Loyd, had been
charged with assault. 380 U.S. at 416. At the de-
fendants trial, the prosecutor handed Loyd his con-
fession and read from the document, pausing after
every few sentences to ask Loyd, in the presence of
the jury, Did you make that statement? Id. Loyd
invoked his right to remain silent each time. Id. The
prosecutor did this [u]nder the guise of cross-
examination to refresh Loyds recollection, never in-troducing the confession. Id. at 416-17. That the
prosecutors questionswere at issue led the Court to
say that his reading may wellhave been the equiva-
lent in the jurys mind of testimony that Loyd in fact
made the statement. Id.at 419. This language re-
sponded to the distinction between a prosecutors
questions and a witnesss answers. Lee v. Illinois,
476 U.S. 530, 542 (1986) (noting the confession wastechnically not evidence). It did not distinguish
testimonial from non-testimonial hearsay.
b. Clark incorrectly asserts that accusations are
generally testimonial. Resp. Br. 27. First, Clarks
accusation test conflicts with the witness text. A
witness speaks solemnly and for the purpose of es-
tablishing or proving some fact at trial. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009). An
accusation does not satisfy this definition simply be-
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4
cause it inculpates the defendant. Like any state-
ment, it must be made to creat[e] an out-of-courtsubstitute for trial testimony. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at
1155. And just as the purpose of custodial police in-
terrogation, objectively assessed, is evidentiary, the
purpose of an accusation meant solely for private
parties without police direction, objectively assessed,
is non-evidentiary. An accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers acts as a witness;
an accuser who makes a casual remark to an ac-quaintance does not. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
Clark responds with language from Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), that statements
are testimonial if the primary purpose of the inter-
rogation is to establish or prove past events poten-
tially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Id. at
822; Resp. Br. 26. But Davis was discussing state-ments to police who were perform[ing] investigative
and testimonial functions. Id. at 830 n.5. It dis-
claimed any notion that its test governed all con-
ceivable statements, leaving open the proper test for
private conversations. Id.at 822-23 & n.2.
Second, Clarks accusation test conflicts with cas-
es distinguishing between statements to governmentofficers and statements to private actors. Take
Crawfords treatment of the childs statements in
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). While Craw-
ford suggested the childs statements to police were
testimonial, Resp. Br. 32, it expressed no concern
about similar statements to the mother. 541 U.S. at
58 n.8; White, 502 U.S. at 349-50. The statements
audience, not its content, made the difference.
This is confirmed by comparing cases Clark cites
(Douglasand Hammon v. Indiana) with cases he ig-
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nores (Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), and
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)). Douglas andHammonfound statements testimonial because they
were topolice. Loyds confession after interrogation
represented exactly the type of formalized testimo-
nial evidence that lies at the core of the Confronta-
tion Clauses concern. White, 502 U.S. at 365
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Hammon
found statements testimonial because they were
made in response to police questioning about pastcrimes. Davis, 547 U.S. at 830.
Giles and Dutton, by contrast, show that private-
party accusations are non-testimonial. Gilesrejected
the dissents view that the Confrontation Clauses
forfeiture exception should be interpreted broadly to
help women in abusive relationships. 554 U.S. at
376. In the process, it noted that [s]tatements tofriends and neighbors about abuse are non-
testimonial. Id. The Dutton statement[i]f it
hadnt been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans,
we wouldnt be in this nowwas as accusatorial as
they come. 400 U.S. at 77 (plurality op.). Yet it was
clearly nontestimonial because directed to a prison-
er, not a cop. Davis, 547 U.S. at 825.
Third, Clarks accusation test conflicts with cases
finding a statements accusatorial nature irrelevant.
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717
(2011). When rejecting the argument that analysts
are not subject to confrontation because they are not
accusatory witnesses, the Court found no support
in the text of the Sixth Amendment for a distinction
between accusations and other statements. Melen-dez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313. If the Confrontation
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6
Clause does not exempt non-accusatorial testimony,
it should not encompass non-testimonialaccusations.Fourth, Clark incorrectly claims support for his
test in the Williams plurality and Melendez-Diazdis-
sent. Resp. Br. 26-27, 42-43. These opinions do view
the Confrontation Clause as limited to statements
having the primary purpose of accusing a targeted
individual of engaging in criminal conduct. Wil-
liams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 (plurality op.). But Clark
mistakes a necessary condition for a sufficient one.
The opinions require statements to be both accusato-
rialand testimonial. Id.; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at
330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2. Clarks test conflicts with the Con-
frontation Clauses purpose
Clark misreads the Confrontation Clauses pur-pose when he asserts that it was designed to pre-
vent trial by ex parte accusations, Resp. Br. 42, and
that it reaches accusations made to private parties
engaged in investigations, id.at 29-30.
a. The Confrontation Clause was not designed to
prohibit ex parte accusations; it was designed to pro-
hibit ex parte examinations. Crawford, 541 U.S. at
50. Those examinations were conducted by govern-
ment officials interviewing witnesses when investi-
gating crime. This [i]nvolvement of government of-
ficers in the production of testimony with an eye to-
ward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial
abuse. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. Ordinary
hearsay does not. Clark is thus wrong to accuse Ohio
of seeking to shield[] witnesses by procuring theirout-of-court assertions. Resp. Br. 24. A rule limited
to hearsay meant solely for private parties without
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7
police direction would not shield from confrontation
statements procured by the government. As Ohionoted, Petr. Br. 45-46, the Court can leave for anoth-
er day situations where a declarant uses private par-
ties as conduits for government actors or speaks
with private parties at the governments behest.
No better is Clarks reliance onthe reasonsfor the
confrontation rightallowing the jury to assess the
demeanor of witnesses and the defendant to cross-
examine them. Resp. Br. 23. If these benefits trig-
gered the right, the clause would cover all hearsay
because confrontation is missed anytime the prosecu-
tion admits an out-of-court statement. California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). Tellingly, moreover, the treatises that Clark
cites in support of these reasons show the confronta-
tion rights intended scope. They contrast testimonynot with garden-variety hearsay, but with ex parte
examinations. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries
on the Laws of England 373 (1768); Matthew Hale,
The History and Analysis of the Common Law of
England257-58 (1713). They thus confirm that the
right exists to bar the use of ex parte examinations
and their equivalents.
Clark also invokes Raleighs trial. Resp. Br. 24,
43. [T]he abuses there, however, went far beyond a
conviction based on hearsay. Green, 399 U.S. at 178
n.11 (Harlan, J., concurring). They included a classic
civil-law examination of Lord Cobham. Williams,
132 S. Ct. at 2249 (Breyer, J., concurring). Even the
Cobham letter referenced by this Court was written
for officials in the midst of trial. 9 William S.Holdsworth, A History of English Law 228 (1926). If
anything, the only arguable analogy between this
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case and that one appears in the history reports, not
the U.S. Reports. In addition to Cobhams evidence,a man named Dyer testified that an out-of-court de-
clarant accused Raleigh of planning to kill the king.
1 James F. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of
England 333 (1883). That the Court has never ex-
pressed any constitutional concern with this hearsay
shows that it falls outside the Confrontation Clause.
b. Clark mistakenly uses the Confrontation
Clauses purpose to conclude that it reaches state-
ments to listeners engaged in investigative func-
tions. Resp. Br. 29-30. His proposal misreads
Crawford and Davis. Those cases hold that the
clause regulates statements to police because their
interrogations bear a striking resemblance to exam-
inations by justices of the peace in England. Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. at 52. The involvement of govern-ment officers in the production of testimonial evi-
dence presents the same risk, whether the officers
are police or justices of the peace. Id. at 53. This
logicthat the government cannot evade the clause
by changing its employees job titlesdoes not ex-
tend to private conversations about past events.
Additionally, Clarks investigative-function pro-posal conflicts with the perspective that matters in
the end. Whether or not a questioner has a prosecu-
torial motive, the declarants purpose ultimately con-
trols whether the declarant is a witness. Bryant, 131
S. Ct. at 1160 n.11, 1162. Even when a questioner
cooperates with the government, a declarants
statements made unwittingly to [that] Government
informant do not become testimonial merely becauseof the listeners investigative functions. Davis, 547
U.S. at 825 (discussing Bourjaily v. United States,
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9
483 U.S. 171 (1987)). What sets yesterdays justices
of the peace and todays police apart from everyoneelse is that declarants speaking to them objectively
know their crime-fighting duties. The same cannot
be said when declarants speak to secret sleuths who
objectively have no criminal dutieswhether or not
theysubjectivelyact to obtain criminal evidence.
Finally, Clarks proposal is unworkable. A test
asking whether a questioner seeks to aid the official
search for truth creates uncertainty in every case.
Resp. Br. 30. Clark claims that [f]amily members
and friends almost never engage in conversations for
this purpose, id., but fails to explain why. In this
case, for example, L.P.s family might have had
Clarks investigative functions when speaking to
L.P. Tr. 431, 460. Under Clarks proposal, nobody
could predict the admissibility of any declarants an-swer to the question, what happened?
3. Clarks test conflicts with the Con-
frontation Clauses history
Clarks accusation test conflicts with the tradi-
tional way courts regulated accusations to private
partiesthrough rules of evidence. One can cite
cases almost without limit admitting a victims af-ter-the-fact accusation to private parties. Solice v.
State, 193 P. 19, 22 (Ariz. 1920). Clark responds that
these cases involve the excited-utterance exception
rather than the child-abuse exception, a distinction
that allegedly matters for historical and reliability
reasons. Resp. Br. 43-46. Clark mistakenly details
the history and reliability of child hearsay. See Part
I.B. But, even assuming his account, these distinc-
tions are without a difference.
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10
History. While Clark claims the excited-utterance
rule is old, Resp. Br. 44, it is questionable whethertestimonial statements would ever have been admis-
sible on that ground in 1791, Crawford, 541 U.S. at
58 n.8. Rooted in the res gesta concept, the rule
expanded to statements made after the described
events. Travellers Ins. Co. ofChicago v. Mosley, 75
U.S. 397, 408 (1869); 6 John H. Wigmore, Evidence
1756, at 231 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974). Clark cites
no case raising the slightest constitutional concernwith this expansion. That provides good evidence
that private-party hearsay falls within the Framers
design to afford the States flexibility in their devel-
opment of hearsay law. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
Clark retorts that it is the rules excitement ele-
ment (not its private audience) that removes these
cases from the Confrontation Clause. Resp. Br. 44.He thus seeks to constitutionalize the excited-
utterance rule. Courts would always have to ask
whether a private-party accusation met both the
evolving excitement element of state law and the
rigid excitement element of the Confrontation
Clause. Hammon shows what is in store for the
States under his view. The state court admitted
statements to police under Indianas excited-utterance rule, but this Court found the statements
testimonial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 821, 830-31. While
the clauses concern with statements to government
investigatorsnecessitated this approach, Clark seeks
to expand it to cover the usual situation where a de-
clarant utters to neighbors, not investigators. This
view that all excited-utterance rulings raise a fact-
intensive constitutional question conflicts with Craw-
fords effort to delink the intricacies of hearsay law
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11
from a constitutional mandate. Bullcoming, 131
S. Ct. at 2727 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).Reliability. Clark argues that, unlike excited ut-
terances, child hearsay is unreliable. Resp. Br. 43-
44. This distinction is little more than an invitation
to return to [the Courts] overruled decision in Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), which used reliability
as the touchstone for admissibility. Melendez-Diaz,
557 U.S. at 317-18. Indeed, the report in Melendez-
Diaz was likely more reliable than an excited utter-
ance. Cf. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799-
800 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring). Yet it
was still excluded. If alleged reliabilityis not enough
to veto the Confrontation Clause, then allegedunre-
liability should not be enough to triggerit.
Bryant, the case on which Clark relies, does not
help him. When making the primary purpose de-termination, the Court said, standard rules of
hearsay, designed to identify some statements as re-
liable, will be relevant. 131 S. Ct. at 1155. But it
left open the proper test for statements to private ac-
tors. Id. at 1155 n.3. Those statements are non-
testimonial without regard to reliability. Bullcom-
ing, 131 S. Ct. at 2720 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concur-ring) (The rules of evidence, not the Confrontation
Clause, are designed primarily to police reliability.).
B. Clarks Child-Hearsay Analysis Flips His-
tory On Its Head And Advocates For A
Rule This Court Has Already Rejected
As Ohio noted, Petr. Br. 31-35, at a minimum, an
incompetent childs statements to private parties arenon-testimonial. Logically, the incompetency finding
suggests that the child is incapable of making tes-
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12
timonial statements. Historically, courts introduced
hearsay from incompetent children. In response,Clark invokes history and logic to argue for the oppo-
site rulethat a childs incompetency means courts
must exclude the childs hearsay. He is twice wrong.
History. Clark agrees that child hearsay was
commonly introduced, Resp. Br. 47, but explains
this fact on the ground that children were historical-
ly allowed to testify, id.at 1-3, 47-49. Not so. It was
at one time considered, that an infant, under the age
of nine years could not be permitted to testify. State
v. Whittier, 21 Me. 341, 347 (1842); Commonwealth v.
Hutchinson, 10 Mass. 225, 225 (1813); Rex v. Trav-
ers, 93 Eng. Rep. 793, 794 (1726). This was the
sharply criticized rule. Resp. Br. 51. Hale, for ex-
ample, advocated for a case-by-caseapproach tied to
each childs understanding. 1 Matthew Hale, TheHistory of the Pleas of the Crown634 (E. Rider et al.,
1800). His view prevailed in King v. Brasier, 168
Eng. Rep. 202 (1779). And this case-by-case rule (the
one Clark says deviated from history, Resp. Br. 51)
was the law most everywhere until recently. Wheeler
v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524-25 (1895); Van
Pelt v. Van Pelt, 1810 WL 773, at *1 (N.J. 1810).
Clark relies on Blackstone for his contrary argu-
ment. Resp. Br. 1. But Blackstone cites only Hales
private opinion that children should testify un-
sworn. W. Williamson, The Trials at Large of the
Felons, in the Castle of York 19 (York 1775). That
view was always disputed. Hales treatise was first
published in 1736. Thomas D. Lyon and Raymond
LaMagna, The History of Childrens Hearsay: FromOld Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 Ind. L.J. 1029, 1034
(2007). Before then, a court rejected a childs testi-
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13
mony without suggesting the child could speak un-
sworn. Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. at 794. And Halesopinion was expressly repudiated forty years later.
King v. Powell, 168 Eng. Rep. 157, 157-58 (1775).
It wassettled, however, that private parties could
testify about what children told them. Indeed, Hale
opined that children should testify unswornprecisely
becausecourts admitted their hearsay. 1 Hale,Pleas
at 634. The trial judge inPowell, for example, stated
that, [w]ith regard to the admitting the declaration
of the child to the mother, lord Hale speaks of that as
a clear and settled thing. Williamson, Trials at
Large, at 19. Thus, when judges found a child in-
competent, they were disposed to compensate by al-
lowing the mother, a surgeon, or others to testify
about the childs statements. John H. Langbein, The
Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial 239-40 (2003);Br. of Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment & Ap-
peals Project, at 21-30.
Clark saysBrasier changed things. Resp. Br. 48.
But Brasier held only that the infant would have
been competent, and therefore that the extrajudicial
evidence could not be used; it said nothing about in-
competent children. 3 John Henry Wigmore,A Trea-tise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common
Law 1760, at 2271 (1904); Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. at
794 n.1; 1 Edward H. East, A Treatise of the Pleas of
the Crown444 (Philadelphia 1806). Ignoring all con-
trary authority, Clark cites Richard Burns 1783 edi-
tion of Blackstone articulating a broader view ofBra-
sier. Resp. Br. 48. But Burns source of information
for the case is unknown. Lyon, 82 Ind. L. J. at 1053.And Clark cites no authority suggesting that Burn
tied his idiosyncratic view to the confrontation right.
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Clarks more modern authorities (McCormick and
Wigmore) help Ohio. Resp. Br. 2, 48-49. The veryfootnote of McCormick that Clark cites for a rule ex-
cluding hearsay from incompetent parties adds:
However, in the past many jurisdictions have held
excited utterances admissible even when declarant
was a small child who would have been in competent
[sic] to testify at trial. 1 Kenneth S. Broun, McCor-
mick on Evidence 61 n.3 (6th ed. 2006). Likewise,
consistent with his view of Brasier, Wigmore recog-nized that [w]here the prosecutrix is a child too
young to be a witness, the statements should never-
theless be receivable. John Henry Wigmore, A Sup-
plement to A Treatise on the System of Evidence in
Trials at Common Law 1761, at 170 (1908).
Logic. Clark suggests that an incompetency find-
ing means the childs hearsay must be unreliable.Resp. Br. 6-7, 43-46. Yet at the height of the Roberts
regimewhen a statements admissibility turnedon
its reliabilitythe Court rebuffed this logic. In Ida-
ho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), it reject[ed] [the
defendants] contention that [a childs] out-of-court
statements . . . [were] per se unreliable, or at least
presumptively unreliable, on the ground that the tri-
al court found the [child] incompetent. Id. at 824.Wright did so partially because, while the finding
that a child could not communicate with the jury
might be relevant to whether the earlier hearsay
statement possessed particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness, a per serule of exclusion would not
only frustrate the truth-seeking purpose of the Con-
frontation Clause, but would also hinder States in
their own enlightened development in the law of ev-
idence. Id. at 825 (citation omitted). It would be
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15
ironic if the Court adopted a reliability rule under
Crawfordthat it rejected under Roberts.Wrighthad good reason to reject Clarks proposal.
Literature suggests that the competency inquiry at
trial is a poor proxy for assessing whether the childs
previous statements were reliable. SeeVictoria Tal-
war et al., Childrens Conceptual Knowledge of Lying
and Its Relation to Their Actual Behaviors: Implica-
tions for Court Competence Examinations, 26 Law &
Hum. Behav. 395, 396, 411-12 (2002); Thomas D.
Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Young Maltreated Chil-
drens Competence to Take the Oath, 3 Applied Dev.
Sci. 16, 16-17 (1999). Indeed, one of Clarks amici
rejects equating the two. Br. of Richard D. Friedman
& Stephen J. Ceci, at 15-19.
II.CLARK IMPROPERLY TREATS TEACHERS AS PO-
LICE MERELY BECAUSE OFAREPORTING DUTY
As Ohio showed (at 36-46), the teachers reporting
duty did not transform them into police agents or
trigger the primary-purpose test. The duty imposes
no requirement to investigate and does not make
mandatory reporters analogous to police. Further,
the duty would not transform private parties into
state actors for purposes of related constitutionalprovisions. Clarks contrary arguments lack merit.
First, Clark blurs the distinction between a re-
portingduty and an investigatingduty. He compares
Ohio law to the hospitals drug-testing policy for
pregnant women in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67 (2001). Resp. Br. 35. Yet the hospital
undertook that testing for the specific purpose of in-criminating those patients, not for a medical pur-
pose. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85. Fergusonitself dis-
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16
tinguished the hospitals investigations from a duty
to provide the police with evidence of criminal con-duct that [reporters] inadvertently acquire in the
course of routine treatment. Id.at 84-85 & n.24.
Second, Clark notes that a reporters allegations
may be given to police. Resp. Br. 35-36. He fails to
explain why that matters. If it did, anyone who
called 911 would be considered the police with re-
spect to anything said to them before the call. In ad-
dition, Clark nowhere disputes that everyonehistori-
cally had a duty to report crimes, Petr. Br. 38, and
everyone now has a duty to report child abuse in
many States, Pet. 24. Clark would turn all of these
people into state agents. This case, moreover, is even
further removed from police because reporters need
only call social-service agencies, OToole v. Denihan,
889 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Ohio 2008), and the statute im-poses an investigating duty on those agencies, not on
police, Ohio Rev. Code 2151.421(F)(1). That social-
service entities investigate rebuts Clarks claim that
prosecution is the primary means of protecting
children. Resp. Br. 35. Such prosecution is merely
an adjunct to the civil scheme. Yates v. Mansfield
Bd. of Educ., 808 N.E.2d 861, 866 (Ohio 2004).
Third, Clark suggests that administrative guide-
lines tell teachers to investigate abuse. Resp. Br. 37.
Yet the guidelines instruct that [i]t is not your re-
sponsibility to determine if abuse or neglect is in fact
occurring or if any of the circumstances surrounding
suspected incidents of abuse or neglect actually hap-
pened. ODJFS, Child Abuse and Neglect: A Refer-
ence for Educators, at 9 (2013), available athttp://www.odjfs.state.oh.us/forms/file.asp?id=398&t
ype=application/pdf. They instruct that, since it is
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the responsibility of the [social-service agency] to in-
vestigate alleged child abuse and neglect, school per-sonnel shall not pressure the child to divulge infor-
mation regarding specific circumstances or the iden-
tity of the alleged perpetrator. Id.at 32. And they
instruct that handbooks should be clear that your
school does not investigate abuse and neglect, but
the law enforcement and [social-service agency] do
these investigations and your personnel cooperate
whenever necessary. Id.at 46. Clark cites no evi-dence that the teachers here reviewed the guidelines,
let alone shared his misunderstanding of them.
Fourth, Clark argues that Ohio Rev. Code
2151.421(H) guaranteed that any accusatory
statements the teachers elicited would be admissible
in any [criminal] prosecution. Resp. Br. 20; id. at
10-11, 35. But subsection (H) is an irrelevant confi-dentialityprovision (as illustrated by this briefs ap-
pendix). It says a report made under this section is
confidential. Ohio Rev. Code 2151.421(H)(1). It
then lists exceptions to this confidentiality rule, in-
cluding criminal prosecutions. Id. Yet a report is
admissible in those prosecutions only in accord-
ance with the Rules of Evidence. Id. Clarks reli-
ance on 2151.421(H) is thus analogous to arguingthat all statements to private parties are really
statements to police because, like child-abuse re-
ports, allare also admissible in accordance with the
rules of evidence. But a business record does not
become a police report simply because it is admissi-
ble in accordance with Ohio Rule Evid. 803(6). The
same is true of the reports at issue here.
Fifth, Clark fails to distinguish the related consti-
tutional provisions that Ohio cited. He says the oth-
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18
er provisions are irrelevant because they regulate
police conduct, whereas the Confrontation Clausein no way governs police conduct. Resp. Br. 31
(quotingDavis, 547 U.S. at 832 n.6). YetDavismade
this statement not for Clarks proposition (that
statements to police are the same as statements to
private actors), but for a far different one (that the
clause does not prohibit police from procuring testi-
mony). Crawford notes the obvious difference be-
tween statements to government actors and state-ments to private parties, 541 U.S. at 51, and the
rules for distinguishing the two elsewhere are just as
informative here.
III.CLARK HAS NOT SHOWN THAT L.P.S STATE-
MENTSWERE TESTIMONIAL UNDER THE PRIMA-
RY-PURPOSE TEST
As Ohio showed (at 46-54), L.P.s statements tohis teachers were non-testimonial under the prima-
ry-purpose test. The teachers spoke with L.P. to pro-
tect him; L.P., given his young age, likely had no
purpose at all when responding to his teachers; and
the questioning was informal. Clarks contrary ar-
guments are mistaken.
Teachers Perspective. To claim that the teachersspoke with L.P. for prosecutorial purposes, Clark re-
lies on their reporting duty. Resp. Br. 34-38. Even if
the Court agrees that the primary-purpose test ap-
plies, the reasons discussed above, see Part II, show
that this duty does not establish that the teachers
spoke with L.P. for evidentiary reasons.
Clark also notes that L.P. did not simply have abump on his nose and had seemingly been struck
repeatedly by whips of some sort. Resp. Br. 34
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(quoting JA27). These egregious injuries, Clark says,
prove the teachers prosecutorial purpose becausethey immediately suspected child abuse. Id. at 34
(quoting Pet. App. 16a). Quite the opposite is true.
For starters, when asking questions like Whoa,
what happened, the teachers were kind of like in
shock. JA27. Most human beings, on encountering
a severely injured three-year-old, would spontaneous-
ly ask the same questions without attempting to
creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimo-ny. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.
In addition, the dramatic and serious nature of
L.P.s injuries, Resp. Br. 38, had the effect of focus-
ing [the teachers] attention on responding to the
emergency, Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157. When con-
fronted with an injured child, teachers need to know
whom they are dealing with in order to assess the . . .possible danger to the child. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial
Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177,
186 (2004); Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. After all, L.P.
himself was not old enough to dial 911 or to find his
way to the local police station. Resp. Br. 40.
L.P.s Perspective. Clark argues that [w]hile
young children lack a sophisticated understanding ofour criminal justice system, they perceive certain au-
thority figures much the same way adults perceive
the policeas official actors who have the power to
punish wrongdoers. Resp. Br. 32; id. at 40. But
Clark cites nothing for this bald conclusion. Here, no
evidence suggests L.P. viewed his daycare teachers
as people who would punish his abuser. More gen-
erally, studies suggest that, while children may viewpolice as those who punish wrongdoers, they do not
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20
view others in that light. Br. of Am. Profl Socy on
the Abuse of Children, at 7-9 & nn.6-10.Clark also claims that L.P. would have recognized
the gravity of the situation because the teachers
questioned him like police would. Resp. Br. 39-40.
But their conversation was brief, and the lead teach-
er did not want to embarrass L.P. or alarm the chil-
dren in the classroom. JA58. Further, when L.P.
implicated Dee, she did not repeat L.Ps words to
reinforce the gravity of the accusation. Resp. Br.
40. She did so because she didnt know what that
meant, JA59, and just wanted to understand [L.P.]
clearly, JA60. If anything, L.P.given his youth
and bewildered state, JA59had no purpose at all
in answering questions posed; the answers [were]
simply reflexive. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161.
Circumstances of Questioning. Clark claims thatthe same earmarks of formality are present here as
were present in Hammon. Resp. Br. 41. That is a
stretch. In Hammon, [i]t import[ed] sufficient for-
mality . . . that lies to [police] officers are criminal
offenses. Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 n.5. Here, no crim-
inal law punished L.P. for lying to teachers. In
Hammon, the victims interrogation was conductedin a separate room. Id.at 830. Here, L.P. was in
the classroom, and it was only later that a teacher
took him to a separate room. JA45, 58. In Hammon,
after [the victim] answered the officers questions,
he had her execute an affidavit. Davis, 547 U.S. at
832. The teachers did not later draft an affidavit for
L.P. to execute.
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21
IV.THE PROPER BALANCE IN CHILD-ABUSE CASES
SHOULD BE STRUCK THROUGH DEMOCRATICMEANS,NOT THROUGHANATEXTUAL,AHISTOR-
ICAL READING OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
For centuries, child-abuse cases have presented
difficult dilemmas. In Cases of foul Facts done in
Secret, where the Child is the Party injured, the re-
pelling their Evidence entirely is, in some Measure,
denying them the Protection of the Law. Francis
Buller,An Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials
at Nisi Prius 293 (4th ed. London 1785). [B]ut it
must be remembered that child abuse is an accusa-
tion . . . harder to be defended by the party accused,
[though] never so innocent. 1 Hale, Pleas at 634.
As the dueling amicus briefs show, the debate over
the proper procedure for resolving these tragic cases
is alive and well today.Clark, for his part, claims to have discovered the
solution to this centuries-old problem, and criticizes
Ohio for not having adopted it. Resp. Br. 1-7, 49-59.
Ohio (like many States) follows the case-by-case ap-
proach to determining a childs competency, State v.
Maxwell, 9 N.E.3d 930, 957-58 (Ohio 2014), but al-
lows courts to introduce child hearsay if it has par-ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness, Ohio R.
Evid. 807(A)(1). Far better, Clark argues, for Ohio to
eliminate competency requirements, Resp. Br. 3-5 &
n.1, and protect children with techniques like exami-
nations by therapists, id. at 4, 53-55. This pro-
posalone with little relevance to the Confrontation
Clauseis ironic.
For one, it is the defendant who typically chal-
lenges a childs competency. See, e.g., Maxwell, 9
N.E.3d at 957; State v. Frazier, 574 N.E.2d 483, 486-
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22
87 (Ohio 1991). Statistics suggest that prosecutors
rarely bring cases without the victims testimony.Br. of Am. Profl Socy on the Abuse of Children, at
24. Here, prosecutors sought to prove L.P.s compe-
tency. JA5-12. When they failed, Clark immediately
moved to exclude L.P.s remaining evidence. JA13.
For another, to justify his expansion of the con-
frontation right, Clark suggests the right could per-
mit unique forms of child testimony. Resp. Br. 53-55.
Yet, in other cases where States have opted for such
approaches, defendants have been less forgiving than
Clark about their validity. Compare Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), with Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012 (1988). Clark offers no basis to think that
defendants would stop challenging these methods.
For a third, even in jurisdictions with more re-
laxed competency rules, Resp. Br. 3-5 & n.1, courtsstill exclude witnesses for lack of competency (for ex-
ample, under the requirement that a witness have
oath-taking capacity). SeeFed. R. Evid. 603; Daniel
J. Capra, Case Law Divergence From the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 197 F.R.D. 531, 536 (2000); Thom-
as D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath: Empirical
Evidence, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1017, 1021-24 (2000).The relaxed rules also provide no solution when the
problem is the childs refusal to testify, White, 502
U.S. at 350, or the childs death, United States v.
DeLeon, 678 F.3d 317, 327 (4th Cir. 2012), revd on
other grounds by133 S. Ct. 2850 (2013).
In short, Clarks proposal is not the panacea he
claims. Worse still, by enshrining it in the Constitu-
tion, Clark foreclose[s] [the States] from contrib-
uting to the formulation and enactment of rules that
make trials fairer and more reliable. Bullcoming,
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131 S. Ct. at 2727 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It
speaks volumes on the need for such democratic evo-lution that many amicus briefs are filled with psy-
chological literature debating when childrens state-
ments are reliable. CompareBr. of Am. Profl Socy
on the Abuse of Children, at 23-29, withBr. of Fami-
ly Defense Ctr. et al., at 14-23. If ever there were an
area where the Court should afford the States flexi-
bility in their development of hearsay law, Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. at 68, this would be it.
One last word on Ohios approach. The same
brief that ridicules Ohio R. Evid. 807s reliability re-
quirement as an empty promise, Resp. Br. 46, criti-
cizes Ohio for seeking an advisory opinion on the
constitutional question because the intermediate
court said that L.P.s statements to his family should
have been excluded under the rule, id.at 17. Clarksown brief suggests the rule is far from empty. To
be sure, Ohio believes that L.P.s statements to his
teachers fall within Ohio R. Evid. 807. Unlike the
suggestive questioning in Wright, 497 U.S. at 826,
the teachers did not know Clark or even what [L.P.]
meant when he implicated Dee, JA59. And Clark
was the only suspect L.P. implicated to sixdifferent
people. JA46, 59, 128, 146, Tr. 431, 460. Yet this re-liability question is not for this Courtunder the Con-
frontation Clause. It is for the state courts under
Ohio R. Evid. 807.
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CONCLUSION
The Ohio Supreme Courts judgment should bereversed, and the case should be remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this Courts decision.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL DEWINEAttorney General of Ohio
ERIC E. MURPHY
State Solicitor
SAMUEL PETERSON
Deputy Solicitor
30 East Broad Street
17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215614-466-8980
TIMOTHY J. MCGINTYCuyahoga County Prosecutor
KATHERINE E. MULLIN*
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
*Counsel of Record
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
216-443-7800kemullin@prosecutor.
cuyahogacounty.us
Counsel for Petitioner State of Ohio
FEBRUARY 2015
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APPENDIX
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Ohio Revised Code 2151.421(H).
(H)
(1) Except as provided in divisions (H)(4) and (N)
of this section, a report made under this section is
confidential. The information provided in a report
made pursuant to this section and the name of the
person who made the report shall not be released for
use, and shall not be used, as evidence in any civil
action or proceeding brought against the person who
made the report. Nothing in this division shall pre-clude the use of reports of other incidents of known
or suspected abuse or neglect in a civil action or pro-
ceeding brought pursuant to division (M) of this sec-
tion against a person who is alleged to have violated
division (A)(1) of this section, provided that any in-
formation in a report that would identify the child
who is the subject of the report or the maker of the
report, if the maker of the report is not the defendantor an agent or employee of the defendant, has been
redacted. In a criminal proceeding, the report is ad-
missible in evidence in accordance with the Rules of
Evidence and is subject to discovery in accordance
with the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(2) No person shall permit or encourage the unau-
thorized dissemination of the contents of any report
made under this section.
(3) A person who knowingly makes or causes an-
other person to make a false report under division
(B) of this section that alleges that any person has
committed an act or omission that resulted in a child
being an abused child or a neglected child is guilty of
a violation of section 2921.14 of the Revised Code.
(4) If a report is made pursuant to division (A) or(B) of this section and the child who is the subject of
the report dies for any reason at any time after the
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2a
report is made, but before the child attains eighteen
years of age, the public children services agency ormunicipal or county peace officer to which the report
was made or referred, on the request of the child fa-
tality review board, shall submit a summary sheet of
information providing a summary of the report to the
review board of the county in which the deceased
child resided at the time of death. On the request of
the review board, the agency or peace officer may, at
its discretion, make the report available to the re-view board. If the county served by the public chil-
dren services agency is also served by a childrens
advocacy center and the report of alleged sexual
abuse of a child or another type of abuse of a child is
specified in the memorandum of understanding that
creates the center as being within the centers juris-
diction, the agency or center shall perform the duties
and functions specified in this division in accordance
with the interagency agreement entered into under
section 2151.428 of the Revised Code relative to that
advocacy center.
(5) A public children services agency shall advise
a person alleged to have inflicted abuse or neglect on
a child who is the subject of a report made pursuant
to this section, including a report alleging sexualabuse of a child or another type of abuse of a child
referred to a childrens advocacy center pursuant to
an interagency agreement entered into under section
2151.428 of the Revised Code, in writing of the dispo-
sition of the investigation. The agency shall not pro-
vide to the person any information that identifies the
person who made the report, statements of witness-
es, or police or other investigative reports.