A University of Sussex PhD thesis 

Available online via Sussex Research Online: 

http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   

This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author   

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 

Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   

URBANGOVERNANCE,LANDCONFLICTSANDSEGREGATIONINHARGEISA,SOMALILAND:HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVESANDCONTEMPORARYDYNAMICS

ABDIFATAHITAHIR

ThisthesisissubmittedtotheDepartmentofGeography,SchoolofGlobalStudies,UniversityofSussex,inpartialfulfilmentoftherequirementsfor

thedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy(PhD)

OCTOBER1,2016

DEPARTMENTOFGEOGRAPHYSCHOOLOFGLOBALSTUDIES

UNIVERSITYOFSUSSEX

1|P a g e

ORIGINALITYSTATEMENT

Iherebydeclarethatthisthesishasnotbeenandwillnotbesubmittedinwholeorinpartto

anotherUniversityfortheawardofanyotherdegree.

Signature

2|P a g e

I. ABSTRACT

ThisthesisoffersanexplanationforwhyurbansettlementinSomaliland’scapitalcityofHargeisa

issegregatedalongclanlines.Thetopicofurbansegregationhasbeenneglectedinbothclassic

Somali studies, and recent studies of post-war state-building and governance in Somaliland.

Suchnegligenceofurbangovernanceindebatesoverstate-makingstemsfromapredominant

focusonnationalandregionallevels,whichoverlookstheinstitutionsgoverningcities.Yeturban

governancecanprovidekeyinsightsintothenatureandqualityofinteractionbetweenpeople

andthelocalstate,andtheprocessesofmakingandunmakingofSomaliurbanspaces.Given

therapidurbangrowthintheSomalipopulatedterritories,Iproposeashiftinfocustoexplore

city spaces, as a means of deepening understanding of Somali social, political and spatial

organisation. In advancing this proposed shift, the thesis scrutinises the nexus between

governanceandsegregation inHargeisa,drawingonurbanethnographicmethods, interview

and archival sources. I argue that segregation in the city can be understood as the spatial

manifestationofgovernancepracticesacrosscolonialandpostcolonialperiods,inintersection

withbottomupprocesses,particularlythequestforsecurityandpeacebuildinginwhatislargely

characterisedasahybridorder.Theconceptofhybridgovernance–whilecapturingimportant

aspectsofcontrolovercityspace-isofteninsufficientlyhistoricisedandpoliticisedtoconvey

the complex intersection of state institutions, clan and sub-clan allegiance and traditional

authorities.Myanalysisthussituatesrecenturbangovernanceandconflictsoverlandinalonger

history of municipal governance, urban land administration and conflict adjudication. This

historical perspective is important for the understanding of how segregation has been

reproduced over time, and adds a new dimension to the understandings of the drivers and

dynamicsofHargeisa’sspatialcharacter.

KEYWORDS:Urban,Segregation,State-building,Governance,Hybrid(ity),Customary,andClan

3|P a g e

II. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Firstandforemost,Iwouldliketothankmysupervisor,ProfJoAnnMcGregor,withoutwhose

tremendousandcontinuoussupportthisresearchwouldnothavebeenpossibletocomplete.

ProfMcGregor’sselflesstimeandattentionaswellasherhelpfulcommentsandconstructive

critiqueshavesharpenedmythoughtsandpushedmetocriticalboundariesthatallowedmeto

lookatissuesfromdiverseperspectives.ImustsaythatIcouldnothavepossiblyaskedfora

bettersupervisor.Iwouldalsoliketothankmysecondarysupervisor,DrCeriOeppen,forher

supportandvaluableadviceandcommentsinmeetingsandondrafts.

Similarly,mythanksgototheObservatoryofConflictandViolencePreventioninHargeisawhich

notonlyfundedthisstudypartiallybutalsoprovidedmewithconnectionsandlogisticalsupport.

I am particularly indebted to its Director, Abdullahi Odowa, the Head of the Research

Department,AhmedMuse,theHeadoftheLogisticsandHumanResourcesDepartment,Safia

Ali,andthedrivers,MohamedandSaad.IndispensablealsowassupportfromtheDepartment

forInternationalDevelopment(DFID),andIparticularlywishtothankMrIvanParkswhowas

inspirational and helpful at all times. Equally, I am indebted to thank the academic and

administrativecommunityoftheUniversityofSussexDoctoralSchoolforco-fundingthestudy

andSchoolofGlobalStudiesfortheirdistinctiveengagementandsupportindiscussions,deeds

anddealings.

Mythanksalsogotoallthepeoplewhoeitherfacilitatedaccesstoinformationorprovidedme

withdatainbothoralandwrittenforms.Becauseofthelimitationsinspace,Icannotmention

themallbutafew,includingMohamedAbdi,MohamedDiriye,AbdifatahIbrahim,Mohamed

Hussein,MohamedFarah,HusseinSamatar,IbrahimIdle,andJamalQawdan.Ialsowouldlike

tothankalltheotherindividualsorinstitutionsthathelpedmeinsomeformorshapeinthe

processofconductingthisresearch,whomIhavenotimplicitlyorexplicitlyacknowledged.Last

but not least, I wish to thankmy familymemberswhose names I cannot, for practical and

politicalreasons(entirelydomesticinnature),listhere.

4|P a g e

III. LISTOFFIGURES

Figure1:MapofHargeisa..........................................................................................................13

Figure2:SomalilandAdministrativeMap..................................................................................14

Figure3:TheannualDistributionofCaseshandledbytheLandCommissions,2009-13........141

Figure4:TheSpatialDistributionofLandDisputesHandledbytheLandCommissions,2009-13

..................................................................................................................................................142

Figure5:ActiveConflictonaPlotofLandinMasalaha,aneighbourhoodinSouthernHargeisa

..................................................................................................................................................157

Figure6:Weaponsusedintheattack,asclaimedbysecurityofficials...................................200

Figure7:Governmentofficialsspeakingtothemediaintheaftermathoftheincident.........201

IV. LISTOFTABLES

Table1:Urbanandruralpopulation,urbanproportionandaverageannualrateofchange....10

Table2:Therangeofkeyinformantandgeneralinterviews.....................................................53

Table3:Thelistoffocusgroups.................................................................................................54

Table4:NumberofflightsinHargeisaEgalInternationalAirport...........................................165

Table5:TheVolume(Kg)ofcargoHandledatHargeisaAirport..............................................166

Table6:TheNumberofPassengersHandledatHargeisaAirport...........................................166

5|P a g e

V. LISTOFABBREVIATIONS

APD AcademyforPeaceandDevelopmentCACAS CivilAviationCaretakerAuthorityforSomaliaDC DistrictCommissionerDRC DanishRefugeeCouncilDDF DistrictDevelopmentFrameworkDFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentICAO InternationalCivilAviationOrganisationIFC InternationalFinanceCorporationINGO InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisationsJPLG JointProgramforLocalGovernanceLUMI LandUrbanManagementInstituteMA MinistryofAgricultureMCAAT MinistryofCivilAviationandAirTransportMD MinistryofDefenceMFA MinistryofForeignAffairsMH MinistryofHealthMI MinistryofInformationMJ MinistryofJusticeML MinistryofLivestockMMR MinistryofMineralResourcesMNPD MinistryofNationalPlanningandDevelopmentMOI MinistryofInteriorMOP MinistryoftheOfficeofthePresidencyMPT MinistryofPostsandTelecommunicationsMPWHT MinistryofPublicWorks,HousingandTransportationMRDE MinistryofRuralDevelopmentandEnvironmentNUPI NationalUrbanPlanningBoardNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisationOCVP ObservatoryofConflictandViolencePreventionPC ProvincialCommissionerRDP ReconstructionandDevelopmentProgramRRA RahanweynResistanceArmySNL SomaliNationalLeagueSM SpokesmanMovementSNM SomaliNationalMovementSORADI SocialResearchandDevelopmentInstituteSPR StandardsandRecommendedPracticesSSP StateSafetyProgramsSYL SomaliYouthLeagueUCID UrurkaCadaaladaiyoDaryeelkaUDUB UrurkaDimuqraadigaUmmaddaBahawdayUN UnitedNationsUN-Habitat UnitedNationsHabitatProgramUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramWB WorldBank

6|P a g e

TABLEOFCONTENTS

CHAPTER1 INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................9

1.1 WhyHargeisa?................................................................................................................11

1.2 ResearchAimsandQuestions........................................................................................14

1.3 StructureoftheThesis...................................................................................................15

CHAPTER2 DEBATINGHYBRIDGOVERNANCEANDSEGREGATION.............................20

2.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................20

2.2 HybridGovernanceandSomaliState(Re–)Formation.................................................20

2.2.1 ConceptualisingHybridPoliticalOrders.................................................................22

2.2.2 RecentSomaliState-BuildingandHybridity...........................................................24

2.2.3 RoleofCustomaryInstitutionsinHybridity............................................................30

2.3 BeyondHybridity:Legitimacy,TrustandSegregation...................................................34

2.3.1 UnderstandingLegitimacyandTrust......................................................................35

2.3.2 ConceptualisingUrbanSegregation.......................................................................40

2.3.3 CausesandImpactofSegregation.........................................................................42

2.3.4 HargeisaasaSegregatedSpace.............................................................................45

2.4 Conclusion......................................................................................................................50

CHAPTER3 NEGOTIATINGDATACOLLECTIONINASEGREGATEDCITY........................51

3.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................51

3.2 BriefOverviewofDataSources......................................................................................51

3.3 InstitutionalAffiliationandAccessibilityofInformants.................................................57

3.4 NegotiatingResearchinStateandNon-StateSpheres..................................................59

3.5 The‛ConflictinSitting’Parlours?SomaliTeashops.......................................................64

3.6 ‛OverHere’:Ex-PublicOfficialsandArchivalMaterials..................................................65

3.7 EthicalConsiderationsandLimitationoftheResearch..................................................66

3.8 Conclusion......................................................................................................................68

CHAPTER4 HISTORICISINGURBANGOVERNANCEINHARGEISA.................................70

4.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................70

4.2 LocalGovernmentinaLateColonialContext:PolicyandResistance............................71

4.3 BoggedDownintheColony?CivilianRule.....................................................................79

4.4 BreakingwiththePast?MilitaryRule............................................................................83

7|P a g e

4.5 Re-establishingLocalGovernance:Post-Conflict...........................................................87

4.6 Conclusion......................................................................................................................96

CHAPTER5 HISTORIESOFTOPDOWNURBANLANDMANAGEMENT..........................97

5.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................97

5.2 EmergenceandContinuityofTopDownLandManagement........................................98

5.3 Development(s)ofPost-ConflictLandAdministrationandLandConflicts..................111

5.4 AccesstoLandandtheAlienationofthePoor............................................................119

5.5 Conclusion....................................................................................................................123

CHAPTER6 PLURALADJUDICATIONOFURBANLANDCONFLICTS.............................124

6.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................124

6.2 PluralJustice:HarmonisationandReforms..................................................................124

6.3 JudicialChallengesandtheirEffectonStateLegitimacy..............................................129

6.4 TowardsSpecialisedIntervention:LandCommission..................................................139

6.5 LandCommission:AdjudicationofaSelectedCase.....................................................145

6.6 WeakState?DynamicsandDilemmasofEnforcement...............................................153

6.7 Conclusion....................................................................................................................158

CHAPTER7 LEGITIMATIONFUNCTIONOFURBANLANDCONFLICTS.........................160

7.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................160

7.2 PushingtheBoundary:ThePastAirportExpansions...................................................161

7.3 TerritorialControlandSignificanceoftheAirport.......................................................164

7.4 AirportasaSiteforStateLegitimation........................................................................168

7.5 ExpropriationRationaleandResistance.......................................................................171

7.6 Mediation,ValuationandCompensation....................................................................179

7.7 Conclusion....................................................................................................................191

CHAPTER8 SECURITYIMPACTOFVIOLENTURBANLANDCONFLICTS.......................193

8.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................193

8.2 UrbanSecurityinaSomaliSetting:TheStatusQuo.....................................................193

8.3 UpsettingtheStatusquo:TheEarlyMorningWarCall................................................196

8.4 CourtMartialandPostViolenceCustomaryMediation...............................................199

8.5 Conclusion....................................................................................................................206

CHAPTER9 CONCLUSION.............................................................................................208

8|P a g e

BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................216

APPENDIXES.....................................................................................................................235

9|P a g e

CHAPTER1 INTRODUCTION

Somalilandhasattractedasignificantresearchinterestinthelasttwoandhalfdecades,focused

onpost-conflictpeace-buildingandthe‘hybridity’ofstateinstitutions.Thishasshedimportant

lightontheroleofclaneldersinnegotiatingaplacewithinthestate,andhasgivenbirthtoa

widerdebateabouthybridityinAfricanstateinstitutions.Itis,however,importanttopointout

thatthedebatesonpost-conflictstateformationinSomalilandoveremphasisehybridityasa

departure from the past, notwithstanding the fact that the trajectory of state building in

Somalilandshowsevidenceofcyclicalreproductionofstatutoryinstitutionsandtheirpractices

(Hoehne,2009).Inadditiontothisover-elaborationofthenoveltyofclanauthoritywithinthe

state,thecurrentdebatesoverhybrid-statebuildingarelimitedinseveralways.Firstly,these

studiesareaimedatthenationalorsemi-nationallevel,largelyoverlookingurbanauthorityand

citygovernance[exceptionsincludeGandrup(2014)andHagmann(2015)];secondly,theyfocus

on the intersection between the central state and peace-building, paying scant attention to

everydayinstitutionalpracticesinthemoremundanerolesofregulatinganddeliveringservices;

andthirdly,theyneglectthenexusbetweenclan-basedurbansegregationandgovernance.

Thisthesis,whichisfocusedonthegovernanceofSomaliland’scapitalcityofHargeisa,begins

toredresstheselimitations,byaddressingthedearthofknowledgeaboutpost-conflicturban

authority and spatial form. The shift in focus from the national to the urban level is

fundamentallyimportantbecausethelocalandmorespecificallytheurbanisthesitewherethe

vastmajority of people “come into contactwith ‘the state’ and this iswheremany of their

images of the state are forged”(Gupta, 1995, p. 376).Moreover, almost 40% of the Somali

populationnowliveincities,1withanestimatedannualgrowthof4.6%between2010-2015(The

WorldFactbook,2015b).The trend isexpected to rise further sharplyas currentprojections

predicturbanpopulationgrowthof270%by2050–Seetable1below(UN,2014).Relatedto

this, focussing on the city can enable us to examine the everyday practices and quality of

interactionbetweenthepeopleandthelocalstatemorecloselyandhencegaincomprehensive

analytical understanding of the politics and practices of governance in the post-conflict

Somalilandcontextwhereinstitutionsareinaformativeorreformativestate.

1UrbanpopulationsinSomaliahavealsorisenby125%between1990to2014withanannualrateofchangeof1.2.See(UN,2014).

10|P a g e

Table1:Urbanandruralpopulation,urbanproportionandaverageannualrateofchange

SOMALIA:URBANANDRURALPOPULATION,PERCENTILEPROPORTIONOFURBANPOPULATION,ANDAVERAGEANNUALRATEOFCHANGE

Urban RuralProportionofUrban

(percent)

Averageannualrateofchange

(percent)Year 1990 2014 2050 1990 2014 2050 1990 2014 2050

(inthousands) 1875 4223 15664 4447 6583 11412 30 39 58 1.2

Source:(UN,2014)

Inthisthesis,Itakeahistoricalapproachtoanalysethehithertounexploredlinkbetweenurban

governanceandsegregation,focusingspecificallyonmunicipalgovernance,landadministration,

andconflictadjudication.Thishistoricalapproachisimportantbecauseitcanshedlightonthe

rootsofcurrenturbansegregationandcanexplainhowgovernancepracticesnotonlyshaped

butalsoreinforcedpeople’son-goingsuspicionofthestate,whichinturncontributedtothe

perpetuationofsegregationofcitiesinSomaliland.

Thethesisprovidesthefirstin-depthanalysisofHargeisacityspace.Iexaminetherelationship

betweenurbansegregationandgovernance,arguingthaturbansegregationispartlyaspatial

manifestationoftherelationshipbetweenthestateinstitutionswithauthorityovercityspace

andthepublic.Equally, IarguethatthepresentsegregatedurbanforminHargeisahasbeen

cyclicallyconfiguredandreconfiguredovertime,throughgovernancepracticesmanyofwhich

createacontinuumbetweenepisodesofcolonialandpostcolonialcivilianandmilitaryrule.The

presentdiscussionsoverhybridgovernanceignorethesecontinuities,astheirmajorfocusisto

point out the relative difference in peace and stability between Somaliland and the rest of

Somalia. In theprocess, Somaliland’s state institutionsare representedasan idealmodelof

governanceforSomalis.Thiscelebratoryapproach(over)emphasisesthekeymediatingrolesof

‘traditional’authorities,suchastheclanelders,Akils,andSultans2,instate-buildingandservice

provision,andimplicitlyrepresentstheirinvolvementasanewphenomenon.Butthisisbyno

meansneworunique.Infact,customaryinstitutionshadoftenplayedakeyroleinbothcolonial

and postcolonial administrations. For this reason, it is also important to go beyond existing

2 Akils and Sultans are traditional authorities mainly found in Somaliland. The Sultans are higher inhierarchyasheistheleaderofalargerclanconglomerate.TheAkilsarechiefswhoareofteninvolvedinthedaytodaygovernanceandmediationofclanpolitics.

11|P a g e

debatesover 'hybridity' tounderstandurban institutionsand their role in theemergenceof

Hargeisa’s spatial character. The specific conflicts examined in this thesis do not point to

integrated/fusedlocalstateinstitutions,butrathertoplurality,coexistenceandcontradiction.

1.1 WhyHargeisa?

This study focuses on Hargeisa, Somaliland (See map of the city on page 13)3, which is a

particularlyinterestingsiteforastudyofurbanformandspatialdynamics,giventhepaucityof

existingscholarship,andthepotential forresearchontheneglectedmunicipalauthoritiesto

contribute tobroaderdebatesabout statehybridityand institutionalpluralism,aswellas to

debates overAfrican cities and segregation. The studywashosted and co-sponsoredby the

Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP), which is a non-profit institution in

Hargeisaestablishedin2009toconductresearchonpeacebuilding.Thisstudycomplementsand

extendstheOCVP’sexistingresearchonpost-conflictgovernance,conflict,security,andjustice.

AsaformerHargeisaresidentandemployeeofOCVP,theresearchhasbenefitedfromthefact

thatmyprofessional,socialandpersonalnetworksareconcentratedinthiscity.Animportant

elementofmydecisiontofocusonHargeisaalsorelatestothefactthatitisSomaliland’sbiggest

city inboth geographical andpopulation terms (though,due to theabsenceof censusdata,

populationsizeestimationsrelyongoodguessesbasedontriangulationsofsecondarydatafrom

varioussources).TheInternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisations(INGOs),UnitedNations’

agencies,localandcentralgovernmentsuseworkingfiguresrangingfrom400000to1200000

(TheWorldFactbook,2015a,HM,2010,Demographia,2016,WPR,2016).

Forthesereasons,themakingandun-makingofurbansegregationinHargeisaisofparticular

significance.Thecity’sdistinctivesegregatedclan-basedspatialformdatesbacktothecolonial

period, when the administrative functions of the state were not in Hargeisa, but were

concentratedinandlargelylimitedtothecoastaltownsofZeila,BulaharandBerberawiththe

latterservingastheseatofgovernmentandremainingtobesofornearly57outof85yearsin

whichSomalilandwaspartoftheBritishEmpire.ThecapitalwasmovedtoHargeisain1942and

itbecametheseatoftheprotectorate’sgovernment.Thecolonialperiodwascharacterisedby

an authoritarian governance of the city mediated by clan authorities. The importance of

Hargeisabothinadministrativeandeconomictermsdeclinedduringthepostcolonialciviland

military period, when it was significantly overshadowed by Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital.

3SeealsothemapofSomalilandonpage14.

12|P a g e

Administratively, the colonial-era authoritarian governance of the city mediated by clan

authoritiescontinuedtoshapethesegregationofurbanspaceinHargeisa.Ininstanceswhere

theauthoritariangovernmentwasabletocreateanenvironmentinwhichcosmopolitanspaces

emerged, these were then subsequently undone by the reintroduction of clan-based state

politics,whichbyimplicationmadeclan-protectionessential.Hargeisaregaineditsimportance

intheregionwhenSomalilandreinstateditsindependenceunilaterallyfromtherestofSomalia

in 1991, reclaiming its statehood on the basis of the colonial administrative boundaries

developedoveraperiodof85yearsunderBritishcolonialrule.Duringthisperiodsegregation

inthecitycontinuedalongthesameclan-basedlinesprimarilybecauseofthestate’sinabilityto

guarantee the security of urban citizens. All of this makes it ideal to extend or question

(celebratory) debates of hybrid peace-building by focusing on neglected city space and

authority,where subjects/citizens encounter the local state on a daily basis, andwhere the

manifestationoflackoftrusthasrepeatedlyfosteredatrendtowardsspatialsegregation.

Itisimportantheretonotethatclanidentityshapesnotonlytherelationshipbetweenthestate

and the public but it also plays a crucial role in the social and economic life of residents in

Hargeisa. For instance, employment opportunities are to a significant degree influenced by

kinship. Justifications for this include that there are social expectationswhich bind business

owners,shareholdersandorseniorofficialstotakepartintheirclan’seconomicempowerment

inorder tobenefit from itsprotection.Otherspointout thatbusinesses requireprospective

employeestohavesomesortofaguarantorwhocouldbeheldresponsibleincaseofatheft

andotherformsofmisappropriation.Thismakestheemploymentofpeoplefromone’skinship

networksmucheasiertotraceandsettlecases.Nonetheless,thefocusofthisresearchisthe

intersection between urban governance and the formation and perpetuation of clan based

segregationinthecity.

HargeisaisdividedintofiveadministrativedistrictsnamelyAhmedDhagax4,MohamoudHaybe,

Ga’an Libax, 26 June, and Ibrahim Koodbuur. Arab andAyub clans5 predominantly populate

4SomalispellingisusedinsomecasesassomeoftheplacenamesappearonmapsinSomali. Insuchcases,itisimportanttonotethatthelettersofXandChavedifferentpronunciationsinSomali.XcanbereadasHwhileCcanbereadasA.

5Irefertovarioussub-clansi.e.Isaaqasclansbecausetheyspeakofthemselvesmostlyasclansratherthan sub-clans. For this reason, I used the language commonly spokenandunderstood in the streetsratherthanthetextswhichreferIsaaqasoneclan.MyreferenceshouldnothoweverbetakenasthoughIamsuggestingIsaaqsub-clansareunrelatedandareindependentfromeachotherasclanunits.

13|P a g e

AhmedDhagah.Theformerstraddlesovervarioussub-districtssuchasMohamedAli,18thMay

and FarahNurwhile the latter ismainly found in aneighbourhoodpopularly knownas Isha

Borama as well as other sub-districts in the North andWestern parts of the city. Garhajis

(Eidagale and Habar Yonis) populates Mohamoud Haybe District, consisting of various sub-

districts such as Burco Durey, Sheikh Shukri, Qudhac-Dheer, JameecoWayn, andMohamed

MoogeaswellaspartsofGa’anLibahDistrictsuchastheNewHargeisasub-district.AwalClans

(Sa’adMuse,IsseMuseandAfgabMuse)predominantlypopulateIbrahimKoodbuurconsisting

ofGuul-Alle,Jig-JigaYar,HeroAwr,andLihle,aswellas26thJunedistrictconsistingofGol-Jano

Ayngal,Durya,Almis.Additionally,theyalsoresideinpartsofGacanLibaxsuchasSheikhMadar,

WaraabaSalaan,SheekhYusuf,SheikhNuur,andAwAdan.TheGaboyeclanisfoundintheDami

neighbourhoodofGa’anLibah.

Figure1:MapofHargeisa

Source:(UN-Habitat,2013)

The abovedescriptionof the clanbased settlementpattern inHargeisa ismeant toprovide

overall picture about how clans are predominantly distributed over space. It is however

importanttopointoutthatpopulationdistributionandspaceidentityinHargeisaiscontested

14|P a g e

andthereforetheaboveaccountmustnotbetakenforafirmrecognitionofspaceidentity.The

aimistoindicatethatsettlementinHargeisahasaclanundertonenotwithstandingthefactthat

manyresidentsdefytheclanlogicandarefoundinareaspredominantlyoccupiedbyclan(s)

other than their own. In other words, even in spaces where strong evidence of clan

predominanceexists,itisdifficulttodelineateresidentialpatternsbetweenthedifferentclans

astheboundariesarefluidandporous.

Figure2:SomalilandAdministrativeMap

Source:(OCHA,2012)

1.2 ResearchAimsandQuestions

Thisstudy’sfocusonHargeisa’sgovernanceandspatialformaimstohighlighttheimportance

ofunderstandingcitydynamics,andtocontributetoagreaterunderstandingofpeace-making,

institutions and governance in a post-conflict context. We can gain a more insightful

understandingofpost-conflictstate-buildingprocessesamidrapidurbanisationthroughgreater

knowledgeofurbangovernanceinstitutionsandtherelationsofpowerthataremanifestinthe

city’sspatialorganisation.ThestudycanalsocontributetobroaderdebatesoverAfricancities,

15|P a g e

governanceandsegregation.Governanceisnottheonlyexplanatoryfactorthatcanaccountfor

theemergenceandperpetuationofsegregationinHargeisa,butisoneofthekeyfactorsthat

shapesthemakingandunmakingofurbanspacesinSomaliland.Myargumentemphasisesthe

intersection between governance and popular responses to insecurity andmistrust of state

institutions to explain the reproductionof segregationover time. The studyhas a particular

focus on urban land administration and conflict adjudication and their interfacewith urban

developmentasameanstoshedlightonthespatialoutcomeofclan-basedpoliticsinthecity.

Thekeyoverarchingquestioninthisthesisis:whatarethekeyhistoricalprocessesandrecent

socio-political dynamics underpinning Hargeisa’s spatial character as clan-based segregated

urbanspace;howdopeoplenavigatetheterrainofurbaninstitutions;andhowdoesthisshape

themakingandremakingofurbanspaceinHargeisa?Asthethesisexaminesparticularaspects

of urban governance and institutions responsible for urban land administration and conflict

adjudication,themainresearchquestioncanbebrokendownintothefollowingsub-questions:

• Howdothehistoricallyrootedhybridmunicipalpoliticsandthetopdownurban

landadministrationexplaintheconfigurationandreconfigurationofHargeisa’s

spatialcharacter?

• Whatarethekeydriversanddynamicsofurbanlandaccessibility,conflictsand

adjudicationandhowdotheyrelatetotrust/mistrustofthestateandthecity’s

patternofsegregation?

• Howdo people navigate the terrain of urban institutions and howdoes this

shapethemakingandremakingofurbanspacesinHargeisa?

• Whatarethesecurityimplicationsofunresolvedurbanlandconflictsinthecity

and how do they influence state legitimacy and affect the city’s spatial

character?

1.3 StructureoftheThesis

Toanswerthesequestions,theremainingpartsofthethesisisorganisedintoninechapters:In

thenextchapter(two), Iexploredebates inthe literatureoverurbansegregationandhybrid

governanceintheAfricancontextandSomalilandspecifically.Idiscussthehistoricalandrecent

dynamicsunderpinningtheabsenceoftrustandthenegativeperceptionstowardsthestate,

situatingsuchdynamicsascrucialexplanatoryfactorsfortheemergenceandperpetuationof

urban segregation in both colonial and postcolonial times. I elaborate debates over hybrid

16|P a g e

governance,statelegitimacyandtrust,andtheirinterfacewiththeproductionandreproduction

ofurbansegregationtodevelopnewwaysofunderstandingthespatialcharacterofcities in

Somali/land. I argue that negative public perceptions of the state and lack of trust in its

institutionscantoasignificantdegreeexplaintheclan-basedurbansegregation.Theabsence

ofacceptablemeansofregulatingpublicservicesandconflictshaveerodedtrustinthestate.

Thespatialcharacterofthecitycanbeseenasaresponsetothesedynamics.Thechapteralso

revealstheshortcomingsofpredominantdebatesaboutSomalilandthatfocusonthenational

levelandneglecttheurbanlevel.Theproblemhereisthatsuchnegligenceoverlooksthefact

thatclansegregationcreatesbothurbangovernancechallengesandopportunities.Ontheone

hand,itcementsclancitizenshipandencouragesfragmentedurbangovernancepoliticswhich

makesitdifficultforthestatetoimplementdevelopmentpolicies.Ontheotherhand,itnotonly

enablesresidentsresistmoresuccessfullygovernmentpoliciesandpracticeswhichoverlooks

publicacceptancebutitalsomakesiteasierfornewcomerssuchasmigrantsnegotiatespace

inthecitythroughtheirexistingclannetworks.

IthereforearguethatthecurrentliteratureonSomalilandanditsfocusonthehybridpolitical

orderaremainlyaimedatexaminingstatelegitimacy,whichisimportantgiventhelongcolonial

andpostcolonialhistoryoflocalunacceptabilitybuttheyneglecttheurbanasacrucialsitefor

deepening understanding into the legitimacy crises the Somali state suffered for a long and

hence fail to informpublicpolicyandurbangovernancepractices thatareadequate toalter

publicchoicesofresidentialplaces,whicharecurrentlyperpetuatingsegregation.

In the third chapter, I discuss themethodological approach for this study, emphasising the

importance of urban ethnographic methods and historical sources to complement formal

interviewswith key informants and residents. After reviewing themain empirical sources, I

outlinethechallengesofcollectingdatafromstatedomains,anddiscusshowIusedteashopsin

Hargeisaasimportantsitesforgatheringinformationandlocatingkeyinformants,includingin

thediaspora.

Inthefourthchapter,IanalyseurbansegregationinHargeisainrelationtothetrajectoryoflocal

governance, drawing on oral narratives, archives and ethnographic field research, with the

purposeofmappingthecontinuitiesandchangesinurbangovernanceandtheirrelationshipto

themakingandremakingofsegregationinthecity.Thishistoricalapproachtourbaninstitutions

isimportantpartlybecauseparticularepisodesareoftenusedasapointofreferencepositively

ornegativelyforthelegitimationofpowerandauthority.Forinstance,memoriesofhowthings

17|P a g e

weredoneinthepastserveasexamplesofhowastateshouldbehaveinthepresentorthe

future. The chapter begins by exploring the introduction of local andmunicipal governance

duringthecolonialperiodandthepopularresistancethisprovoked.Itthenturnstotheearly

postcolonialgovernment’sfailuretoshiftawayfromthecolonialrulesandregulationsgoverning

urbanspaces,andthemilitary’ssubsequentattemptstobreakawaywiththepast.Inthefinal

section, I discuss the post-conflict state’s attempt to re-establish local and municipal

governance. I argue that spatial segregation has been a salient feature of the city from the

outset,andexplorethepowerrelationsandturbulenthistorythroughwhichsegregationalong

clanlinesandpopulardistrustofstateinstitutionshavebeenreproducedovertime.Myfocusis

ontheimportantmediatingroleofAkils(Chiefs)6,andtheeffectsofepisodesofinsecuritythat

reinforceurbanresidents’desiretoliveinspatialproximityoffellowclanmembers.

Thefifthchapterturnstourbanlandmanagementinstitutionsandpractices,whichalsohavea

history of operating from top-down, and I explore and how these shape public perception

towardsthestate.Thechapterbeginsbyexploringthecolonialsubversionandalterationofthe

indigenousapproachtolandmanagement.Ishowthatthecolonialadministration’sapproach

to landmanagement contravened local customson resourcemanagementbasedonmutual

understandinginformedbyasetofunwrittenrules.Itintroducedatop-downlandmanagement

with little or no consultation, which undermined the prior voluntary compliance with rules

governingnaturalresourcesincludingland.AsHargeisabecameacriticalsitewherenewurban

land regulations were enforced most visibly during the colonial period, I argue that the

expropriationoflandinHargeisaaffectedresidentsintwoimportantways.Firstly,thosewhose

landwasexpropriatedhadnoalternativebut tonegotiatespace inareaspopulatedby their

clan. Secondly, thosewhoqualified for compensationwere required tobring their elders as

guarantorsforthesepay-outs,forcingthemtobeclosetowheretheycouldgetaccesstothe

traditionalleaders.Ialsoarguethatthecolonialtopdownapproachtolandmanagement,which

wasunderstoodasalteringlandownershipfromthedomainofGodtothedomainofhumans

undermined theacceptabilityof thenewurban landmanagement regime.Thechapter then

discusses postcolonial attempts to bring about change in the land management regime,

primarily as a tool for boosting economicdevelopment. I argue that thepostcolonial state’s

attempt to bring about changewas unsuccessful, and that the continuation of the previous

6AkilsandSultansaretraditionalauthorities.InSomaliland,theSultanishigherinhierarchythantheAkilasheistheleaderofalargerclanconglomerate.TheAkilisequivalenttoachiefandheisofteninvolvedinthedaytodaygovernanceandmediationofclanpolitics.

18|P a g e

colonialrulesunderminedpublictrustinthestate.Furthermore,thecontinuedalienationofthe

poorfurtherentrenchedlackofpublictrust.Inthefinalpartofthechapter,Idiscussthepost-

conflictdynamicsofre-establishingurbanlandmanagementandconflictadjudicationregimes.

I argue that post-conflict attempts aimed at improving the legal framework for urban land

administration have not been successful, as the newly enacted laws are characterised by

ambiguity, further undermining public trust. This top-down land management was further

exacerbatedby thestate’s inability to regulate land,enforce itsdecisionsandguarantee the

securityofurbanresidents.Iarguethatthetopdownnatureofurbanlandregulatoryregimes

inthecitysignificantlycontributestotheperpetuationofsegregation.

Inthesixthchapter,Idiscussurbanlandconflictsandadjudicationmechanismsastheywere

operating at the time of the research, supposedly regulated initially through ad hoc local

government committees and the statutory judicial systembut later through theUrban Land

Commission(aspecialtribunalforurbanland).TheCommissionwassetupin2009tomediate

and adjudicate urban land conflicts, but which was shaped in practice by a plurality of

institutions.Thechapterbeginsbydiscussingkeyissuesinaccessibilitytourbanlandandthe

alienationof thepoor. I argue that the currentmechanismof access to land inurban areas

marginalisesthepoor,astheexistinglandmanagementregimeimposesrestrictionswithwhich

thelow-incomepeopleinthecitycannotcomply.Inthesecondsection,Ishowthatinstitutional

weaknesses,rapidurbanisation, increasing landprices,andgreatercompetitionforaccessto

landinurbanareascan,toa largedegree,accountfortherise inurbanlandconflicts.These

conflicts are exacerbated by the inability of the plural justice system to deal with them

adequately.Inthethirdandfourthsections,Idiscussurbanlandconflictadjudication,shaped

bythepluraljusticesystem.Iarguethatattemptstoimprovethedisputemediationmechanism

have shown institutional gaps in how the state deals with land issues. While the Land

Commissiondealswithconflictsamongcityresidents,itrarelyaddressesdisputesbetweenthe

people and the state.One of the key challenges emanating from this gap is the fact that it

reinforcesthepluralityofinstitutionsinvolvedbydrivingrecoursetoclan,andalsoundermines

trustinthestate.Iarguethaturbansegregationistheproductofsuchstrugglesandcompetition

betweencustomaryandstatutoryinstitutions.

In the seventh chapter, I discuss a high-profile land conflict between the government of

SomalilandandresidentsintheSouthofthecity.Thegovernmentdecidedtoexpandtheairport,

butthe landconcernedwasheldbyresidentswhowereunwillingtohanditover. Ibeginby

discussingthehistoryofairportexpansion,andscrutinisethesignificanceoftheairportforstate

19|P a g e

territorialcontrol.Iarguethatthestate’sexpansionattemptsarepremisedonanassumption

fortheneedforfullterritorialcontrolasameansofbothlocalandinternationallegitimation,

andthattheairportisseenasanimportantsiteforstatelegitimation.Thechapterthenmoves

ontodiscusstherationaleforthelandexpropriation,resistanceandthedynamicsofmediation,

valuation and compensation,muchofwhichpits the state evoking its rights todevelop and

managelandagainstresidents’claimsofbothformal legalentitlementsaswellastraditional

customaryrightstotheland.Suchstrugglesforlegitimacybetweenlandclaimants/ownersand

thestatemarginalisesthepoor,underminespublictrust,andformsthebasisonwhichviolent

resistancetothestateisjustified,andpublicchoiceofabodearemade.Iarguethatthenature

and means through which urban land conflicts are adjudicated play a key role in the

entrenchmentofthecity’ssegregatedspatialcharacter.

In the eighth chapter, I discuss the impact of urban land conflicts on security. The chapter

focusesonacasestudyinwhichthegovernmentwasinvolvedwithlandconflictatamilitary

base located in EasternHargeisa. Locals also claimed the land onwhich themilitary base is

located. The dispute flared up after the government decided to compensate a prominent

Ethiopianpolitician,fromwhomitconfiscatedland,bygivinghimrightstolandlocatedinthe

contestedarea.This led toviolent resistance inwhichsevenpeople lost their lives,and four

otherswereinjured.Thechapterconsistsofthreesections.Inthefirstsection,Iprovideabrief

overview of security in urban Somali settings. I show that the state is not the only actor in

securityprovisionsinthecountry.Iarguethatclanidentityisamajorfeatureofpublicsafety

andsecurity.Ialsoarguethatthemultiplicityofactorsinsecuritymayhavecontributedtothe

stabilityinSomalilandoverall,butitcanalsobeanobstacletoprogresstowardsaccountable

stateinstitutions.Myaccountofthisconflictseekstoshowthediresecurityimpactsthatcan

result fromthe lackofcrediblemediationandresolutionmechanisms forcases inwhich the

stateisoneofthedisputants. Iarguethattheabsenceofcrediblemechanismstoadjudicate

land conflicts in cases where the state is one of the disputing parties frequently produces

insecurityinurbancontexts,becauseofthewaythestatemanipulatesthejusticesystem.Iargue

that this erodes public trust, and hence plays a significant role in the production and

reproduction of clan-segregated spaces. The security implications of unresolved urban land

conflictsinthecitythusalsoplayasignificantinreinforcingthecity’sexistingspatialsegregation

alongclanlines.

Inthefinalchapter,conclusion,Iprovideoverviewofthechaptersandsummarisekeyfinding

andarguments.

20|P a g e

CHAPTER2 DEBATINGHYBRIDGOVERNANCEANDSEGREGATION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter elaborates debates in the literature over hybrid governance to show their

inadequacyforilluminatingurbanformandspatialcharacterofcitiesinSomali/land.Itseeksto

develop new perspectives on understanding the spatial character of cities in Somali/land

through alternative concepts such as state legitimacy and mistrust. These concepts are

appropriatebecausetheyaremoreconcernedwiththequalityoftheinteractionbetweenthe

rulerandtheruled.Thechapterconsistsoftwomainsections.Inthefirstsection,Ishowthat

recentstudiesonSomalilandfocusonthenationalorsubnationallevel.Iarguethatthecurrent

debatesneglecttheurbanlevelanditsrelevancetothestatebuilding,aswellastheinterface

betweengovernanceandurbanforminthebroaderSomalicontextandSomalilandinparticular.

In thesecondsection, Iarguethat therecentpost-conflicthybridstate-buildingprocesses in

Somaliland–whichwerebylargeaimedataddressinglegitimacyconcernsgiventherepeated

legitimacycrisesofSomalistate-buildingfromthecolonialperiodthroughtothepresenttime–

failedtodeliverasignificantshiftadequatetoalterpublicchoiceofresidence.Ithereforeargue

that it is important to go beyond existing debates over 'hybridity' to understand the social,

politicalandmorespecificallygovernancedynamicsunderpinningthespatialcharacterofcities

inSomaliland.Ithenmoveontodiscussurbansegregationandarguethatnegativeattitudes

towardsthestateandlowlevelsoftrustinitsinstitutionscantoasignificantdegreeexplainthe

perpetuationofurbansegregationonthebasisofclanidentity.Ialsoarguethattheabsenceof

crediblemechanismstomanageservicedeliveryleftpeoplewithnoalternativetousingidentity-

basedsocialarrangementstoregulatetheirrelationswiththestateandamongthemselves.This

preventedtheemergenceofcosmopolitanspacesandreinforcedtheresilienceofsegregation

by(sub)clans.

2.2 HybridGovernanceandSomaliState(Re–)Formation

Beforeembarkingonthediscussionaboutthepost-conflicthybridgovernanceandstate(re–)

formationinSomaliland,itisimportanttolookbrieflyatthehistoryoftheconflict.In1981,an

insurgentpolitical organisation, the SomaliNationalMovement (SNM),wasestablishedby a

groupofmainlyIsaaqpoliticians.TheirstatedobjectivewastoliberateSomaliafromthegripof

21|P a g e

Mohamed Siad Barre’s dictatorship. Soon after its launch7, SNM established itself along the

borderwithEthiopiaparticularlyNorthWesternandTogdheerregionsamidhostilitiesbetween

Ethiopia and Somalia. It startedwaging sporadic guerrilla attackson the Somali government

forcesbasedalongthebordersandfurtherinside.TheresponseoftheSomalistatewasheavy

handedasitoftenvisitedwrathonthecivilpopulation(mainlytheIsaaqclans)intheNorthwho

wereaccusedofproviding support for the insurgency.ThisgaveSNMthe tools itneeded to

enlistwidespreadsupportandrecruitmorepeopleinitsranks.Realisingthedangerapparentin

thepopulargrowthofSNM,Barreembarkedonadiplomaticeffortaimedatcuttingoffsupport

andsuppliesfromSNMbymendingrelationswithhisarchrival,DictatorMengistuHaileMariam,

thethenPresidentofEthiopiawhowasprovidingSomaliinsurgencies8withmilitaryandfinancial

support.

InApril1988,BarreandHaileMariamsignedadealmediatedbyDjibouti’sPresidentHassan

GouledAptidon.Keyamongtheagreedpointsweretherestorationofdiplomatictiesandending

ofhostilitiesparticularlytheprovisionofsupportforeachother’sinsurgencies.Thiswasamajor

blowtoSNM.Onthe27thofMay,merelytwomonthsaftertheagreementwassigned,SNM

forceswagedasurpriseattackontheSomaliArmy,whichwasatthetimeoneofthestrongest

intheregion.TheepicentreoftheattackswerethemajorcitiesofHargeisaandBurao.Both

citieswerealmostlevelledtothegroundbygovernmentforcesandnearly50000peoplelost

theirlives.Thewarlastedforthreeyearsandintheend,itnotonlydrainedthestateresources

butitalsoweakeneditsmilitarycapability.Italsousheredinthedeathofthemilitaryregimein

Somaliaastwomoreguerrillamovements,UnitedSomaliCongress(USC)andSomaliPatriotic

Movement (SPM) sprung up in the Southern regions of Somalia. Barrewas finally ousted in

January1991andthemajorcitiesintheNorthwerecapturedbySNMforces.However,SNM

wasunabletogovernpeacefullyasriftsbetweenitsleadershipemerged.Insomeinstances,this

ledtoafreshformofconflictswithintheSNMelitesandtheirclans.Clanauthoritiessuchas

elders,AkilsandSultanswhichwerevitalintheSNMstruggleagainsttheBarreregimebecame

essentialonceagainforfindingapoliticalsolutioninthepostBarreconflictoverresourcecontrol

andpowersharingbetweentheSNMelites.

7Someaccountssuggestthatsomeof theforcesthat laidthefoundationforthearmedwingofSNMdefectedfromtheSomaliArmedForcesasfarbackasin1978.

8PrimarilySomaliNationalMovement(SNM)andSomaliSalvationDemocraticFront(SSDF)whichwas2yearspriortoSNM

22|P a g e

The important role traditional authorities played in the post-conflict political dispensation

occurredatatimewhenthepoliticalsituationintheSouthwasdeteriorating.Forthisreason,

discussionsonhybriditydominatethepost-conflictpoliticalwritingaboutSomaliland.Explicitly

orimplicitly,thisbodyofliteraturepointstothefactthatthehybridpoliticalorderinthepost-

conflictcontextwaslargelyanattemptinwhichtheelitesweretryingtoaddressthedeficitin

statelegitimacyandpublictrust.Butthishasnotbroughtaboutsignificantchangesinthelevel

oftrustforthestateinanyqualitativelymeaningfulway.Forinstance,forthefirstthreeyears

(1991-1993)ofthepost-conflicthybridorderinSomaliland,tensionwasrunninghighbetween

the different factions in major cities as armed confrontations occurred in Berbera when

AbdirahmanAhmedAliwasincharge9(Drysdale,2001).Hissuccessor,MohamedIbrahimEgal,

alsoencounteredresistancefromsectionsofthemajorclansin1994-1997,asarmedconflict

brokeoutinboththecapital,Hargeisa,andsecondcapital,Burao.ForBalthasar(2013),these

wars formed as part of the state-building processes. More importantly, these wars can be

understoodasalegitimationstruggleinwhicheachsideoftheconflictwastryingtoaddressthe

legitimacycrisiswhichledtothedisintegrationoftheSomalistatebetween1988-1991.Before

arguingwhy it isnecessarytogobeyondhybridity forunderstandingthespatialcharacterof

citiesinSomaliland,itisimportanttodefinehybridityasaconcept.

2.2.1 ConceptualisingHybridPoliticalOrders

Hybridpoliticalorderscanbedefinedas“contradictoryanddialecticco-existenceofformsof

socio-politicalorganisationsthathavetheirrootsinbothnon-stateindigenoussocialstructures

and introduced state and societal structures” (Boege et al., 2009b, p. 17). More

comprehensively, Hagmann and Hoehne define hybrid political orders as the “sum of

institutionalised,yetdynamicpowerrelationsthatonecanempiricallygraspatagiventimeand

place, [involving] international legal arrangements aswell as everyday practices of ordinary

peopleandprocessesatthe local level,oftenacrossbutrarelywithoutreferencetonational

boundaries” (Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009, p. 44). The use of the words contradiction and

coexistence are important here, as they show that traditional institutions may act in

contradiction of state authority in some instances, but may also be complementary and

enmeshedinotherinstances.Examplescanreadilybefoundinincaseswherethestateisweak

9TheseincludetheperiodinwhichAliwasacaretakerSNMleader(JanuarytoMay1991)fortheNorthernRegions, and after he was elected as President of Somaliland on 18th May 1991-1993 when he wasreplacedbyMohamedIbrahimEgal.

23|P a g e

andseeksthesupportofnon-stateactorsto,forexample,upholdpeaceandstability.Butthere

may also be contradictions when the existence of traditional institutions works against the

desiresofthestatetodischargeitslocalandinternationalobligations.Thedynamicnatureof

hybrid political orderspartly reflects the fact that theboundariesbetween ‘traditional’ and

‘state’arenotdefinedabsolutely,ascustomaryleaders,businessmenandreligiousleadersmay

becomepoliticiansandtakeonstateroles,andviceversa(Boegeetal.,2009a).

AccordingtoBoegeetal.(2009a),hybridpoliticalordersdifferfromWesternconceptualitiesof

thestateinanumberofways.Firstly,inhybridorders,securityisundertakenbyvariousactors

unliketheWesternmodel,whichmakessecuritytheexclusivedomainofthestate.Secondly,

politicalleadershipisnotthesoleprerogativeofthestateastherearedifferentkindsofpolitical

leadershipsexistingalongthestate.Thirdly,thewelfareofthepeopleisnotinthehandsofthe

statemostlyaspeoplerelyonsocialsafetynetssuchaskinship,andinSomaliland,clan-based

socialnetworks.Richards(2015)arguesthathybriditygoesbeyondthetraditionalandformal

governancecombinationdiscussedintheliterature.Shearguesitisalsoaboutstrikingabalance

between “domestic needs and external demands”, supported and sustained locally but also

aimedatreachingsovereignty.AttheendoftheColdWarinearly1990s,manyAfricanstates

disintegratedandWesternpowers saw itnecessary to intervene inwhat theyconsideredas

failedstates,soastoenhancethenewinternationalorderofpeaceandsecurity.Somalialayat

theheartof thesetheoreticaldebatesoverhybrid-state-makingandbecamethefirst testing

groundforstaterevivalattemptsconceptualisedinrelationtothestatefailurethesis.

Proponentsofhybridpoliticalorderssuggestthatthecentralproblemwithinterventionsthat

stemmedfromtheassumptionofstatefailurerelatedtoconceptualisationofthelatteritself.

(Boegeetal.,2009a).Bycastingstateorderas‘hybrid’,scholarsrejectedtherepresentationof

Africanstatesasbeing“pathologicallyweak’inneedofsavingthroughinterventions(Hagmann

andPéclard,2010).According toHagmannandHoehne (2009), thestate failure thesishasa

number of weaknesses. Firstly, it fails to recognise the differences between African states.

Secondly, thestate failurethesishasatendencytoassumethatthedisintegrationofcentral

institutionsmeansanarchy.Thirdly,thestatefailurethesisusestheWesternstateasthemodel

againstwhichotherstatesshouldbemeasured,oftenassumingthatWesternstatesarestrong

and others are weak. Fourthly, the abovementioned assumption inherently leads to the

conceptualisation of intervention mechanisms relying on set of indicators developed under

theseassumptionsinordertoanalyseandarriveatasolutionforthe“failingstates”.

24|P a g e

Giventherealitiesofstate-building,whicharecharacterisedbymultipleprocesses,therewere

manyemergingpoliticalordersthatdeviatedfromthemaintenetsofthestatefailurethesis

(Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009). For instance, Somali territories represent an example of an

emergenttrendofgovernancearrangementsnegotiatedatthelocallevel(Menkhaus,2006b,

Menkhaus, 2006a). The manner in which such orders develop differs from one context to

another, indeed, suchnegotiation“refers tothedynamicand,at leastpartly,undetermined

processesofstate(de-construction”(HagmannandPéclard,2010,p.544)whichtakesplaceat

both the localandnational levels (RendersandTerlinden,2010). Instateswherecentralised

formalinstitutionsarenon-existent,unableorunwillingtoreachallpartsoftheirterritory,such

inexistence or gaps in governance are filled through non state actors such as customary

institutionsandsubnationalorlocalpoliticalorganisations,negatingtheideathatthoseareas

arechaoticandanarchicBoegeetal.(2008).Forinstance,Bakonyi(2013)arguestheRahanweyn

ResistanceArmy(RRA)intheSouthernpartofSomaliawasapoliticalorganisationthatmanaged

to bring about three elements which are essential for governance; security managements,

judicialservicesandlocaltaxcollectionforthefirsttimesincethedisintegrationoftheSomali

centralstate.

2.2.2 RecentSomaliState-BuildingandHybridity

AsthecentralSomalistatewasnearingdisintegrationinthelate1980s,scholarlydebatesabout

whatwentwrongandhowanalternativeoption couldbemapped for Somali state-building

raged among academics. These debates often focussed on the national level. The object of

argumentwastheanalyticaluseoftheconceptofclan,which, in itsmostbasicdefinition, is

termedasa“dynamicsocialconstructthatcanbesubjecttodifferentinterpretationsandare

usedtodescribeandvalidatechangingsocialandpoliticalrelations”Bradbury(2008,p.13).Two

majorperspectivesemergedfromthesedebates.Thefirstsoughttotaketheclanasabasicunit

ofanalysisforthesocialandpoliticalorganisationoftheSomalis,whilethesecondpositedthat

clanisoneofmanywaysinwhichtheSomalisocietycouldbeanalysed.Bothdebatesplacethe

focus on political and cultural dimensions of the concept,while overlooking its socio-spatial

utilityand the factorsunderpinning suchutilities. Theuseof clanasanalytical framecanbe

traced to Lewis’s seminal works in the late 1950s on Somaliland (1958, 1961). For Lewis,

clannismwasandremainstobepervasiveamongtheSomalis,asclan identity isacquiredat

25|P a g e

birthandisusedtoformsocialandpoliticalalliances.10Hisbasiccontentionisthatifyouwant

tounderstandtheSomalis,youneedtounderstandthemechanicsofkinshipandclan.Thisview

remainedunchangedforLewisfromhisearlyworksthroughtohisrecentwritinginthe1990s

and2000s.Hemaintainedthatclanlineageisintrinsically‘inherentintheSomaliculture’,saying

thatthe“global levelmodernmasssocietyseems,by itsscaleandanonymity,toexpandthe

boundsofpatriotismbeyondacceptable,viablelimits.Thisappearstoevokealienationatthe

locallevel,soremotefromthecentreofrealpower,andpromotingrenaissancesofthelittle

traditionaloffamiliarcommunalidentity”(Lewis2010,p.141).

Luling(2006,p.473)observesthatgenealogy,whichisessentiallythearchitectureonwhichclan

mechanicsarebuilt,isa“webwhichholds[Somali]societytogetherandunderpinspoliticallife”.

She further points out that clan is a complex system, characterisedby shifting alliances and

allegiances,theunderstandingofwhichoftenslipthroughthefingersofobservers.Lewis(2004)

referstothis“intricacy”asinvisibility,whichpresumablymasksthedifferencesamongSomalis,

leadingtoover-elaborationoftheirhomogeneity.ForLewis,thekinshipconceptprovidedthe

tool for understanding thepolitical and social dynamics underpinning conflict.His argument

posited that clan lay at the heart of state-building and it is the clan through which its

disintegrationcouldbecomprehendedandresolved(LewisandMayall,1995,Lewis,1993).In

thisperspective,clanbecomesthemostimportantmeansthroughwhichtheSomalistatecould

berevived.Thisapproachcriticisestheanti-clansentimentsofficiallyadoptedbytheprevious

Somali administrations during both the democratic andmilitary rules as being far from the

Somali reality (Lewis, 2008a).Here, kinship is presented as anorganisingprinciplepervasive

enoughthateventheIslamists,whosewaronclanwasthusfarthetoughest,wereunableto

subdue as clan divisions between them come to the surface endangering the very anti-clan

ideologiestheypromotedorbreached.

Lewis(1998)pointsoutthatpoliticalviolenceshouldnotbeasurpriseamongtheSomalis.He

assertsthatanyobserverwhostudiedtheSomalisknowsthatviolenceisinherentinitsculture

and symmetric clan system. The Somali culture according to the author distinguished only

warranleh(warrior)andwadaad(religiousman).Thisviolentandsegmentaryclansystem,he

argues,gavethedictatorshipanopportunitywhichitcouldexploittoprolongitstimeinpower.

Hepointsoutthat“anyrealisticassessmentofpossiblefuturetrendshastoacknowledgethat

10Hefurtherarguesthatclancanbeunderstoodwithinthesameframeworkoftribeasablood-based“social,territorial,political,andtosomeextentreligiousunit”(Lewis,1955,p.585)

26|P a g e

Somalinationalismevidently retains its segmentarycharacterandhasnotbeen transformed

intoamodernorganicmode” (Lewis,1989,p.578).Heargues further that this is sodespite

rejection by “urbanised andWesternised Somalis [who]maintain that discrimination is 'old-

fashioned', that it is contrary to the injunctions of the Prophet” (Lewis, 1955, p. 584). Even

thoughtheconceptofclanliesinthecentreofLewis’view,heneglectsthespatialdimensions

ofclanasakeyfeatureofurbansettlementsinSomaliland.Equallyheoverlooksthefluidityof

theclanconceptandalignmentsinspiteofthefactthatheemphasisesitsimportanceasatool

ofunderstandingtheSomalis.Forinstance,criticspointoutthatclanidentityismorepoliticised

inthecurrentclimateinSomalilandandSomaliathanittraditionallywas(Bradbury,2008).

Theabovecritiquespointtothechangingfaceofclanasaconceptboth in itsdynamicsand

functionamongtheSomalis.AccordingtoLittle(2003),clanhasinthepastservedasameans

throughwhichcommunitiesseektosurviveinahostileecologicalandeconomicenvironment.

Thishoweverwas/isneitheruniformacrossgeographicalspacesnorstaticinsocialdomainsover

time.ForinstanceBjork(2007)observesthattherearedifferencesinthewaythatclanisused

inthedifferentgeographicalspacesinthecountry.Forinstance,inurbancontexts,clanidentity

isnotasstrongasintheruralcontexts.Theauthornotesthatmanypeopleinurbancentresdid

notknowtheirclanmembershipuntilthecivilwarbrokeout.Itwasalsocommonforurbanites

toliveincosmopolitanneighbourhoodswherepeoplehailedfromdifferentclanbackgrounds.

InspiteofthefactthatclanisusedassocialandeconomicnetworkamongtheSomalis,many

peoplestilldespiseclanidentity(Bjork,2007).Furthermore,Luling(2006)claimsthatclannism

wasideologicallyrejectedbySomalinationalistsduringtherunuptotheparliamentaryelections

of1960s.Buttheseattempts,sheargues,didnotlastlongasclannismplayedanimportantrole

inpost-independenceSomalipolitics.Shearguesthatclannismdidnotandprobablywillnot

disappearasadivideramongSomalisuntilsomethingelsereplacesitastotalunityisdifficultto

achieveinanysociety.Sheacknowledges,however,thepossibilityofurbanplacesassites in

which the influenceof clannismcould reduce, as these sitesproduced younggenerations in

whichclannismmeantnothing.

ThesecondmainperspectiveinthedebateaboutthemannerinwhichthecentralSomalistate

couldberevivedwasopposedtotheuseofclanasanoverarchinganalyticalconceptforthe

social, economic and political organisation of the Somalis (Samatar, 1989, Kapteijns, 2004,

Besteman,1998).Theseauthors likewise focussedonnationalpolitics,oftenoverlookingthe

urbanlevel.ThisperspectiveproposesthatclanisoneofmanyelementsthatunderpinSomali

culturalandpoliticalreality,butitisfarfrombeingtheanswerforcentralstaterevival.Theycite

27|P a g e

theexistenceofa commonculture, language, religionandappearanceas someof theother

morelegitimatetoolsofanalysisthatcouldbeusedtounderstandSomalisociety.Inopposing

thosewhopresent clanasameans to resolve thepolitical crisis inSomalia, thisperspective

placestheblameonbadleadershipandexclusionarypolitics(Samatar,1997).Thissuggeststhat

political conflict in the Somali territories cannot be understood as being the result of an

intrinsically violent culture but rather as the absence of a civil way to address political and

economicconcerns.Samatar(2006b)arguesthatthemobilisationofpeopleandresourcesfor

political or military action is often necessitated by the “absence of a viable civic political

associations”.Samatar(2009)submitsthatcommoncivicbelongingispossibleandtherehave

beenmanycasesdemonstratedinSomalipolitics.AcaseinpointisSomaliYouthLeague(SYL)

wheredespitebeingtheleastfavouritepoliticalmovementforcolonialists,itemergedasavictor

intheMogadishu’smunicipalelectionin1955.

Samatar(2006b)alsoarguesthatclanidentityisnottheonlymaindeterminantofsocialand

politicalorganisationamongtheSomalis.HepointsoutthattheSomalitraditionalandmoderate

practicesofIslamprovideanimportantplatformofcommoncitizenshipwheredifferentclans

canseethattheybelongtoacommunityaboveclansegmentation(Samatar,2006b).Equally,

clan identity is contextboundand canbeoverriddenby social andpolitical occurrences.He

furtherpointsoutthatrecenteventsinwhichtheIslamiccourtswereabletomobilisecrossclan

supportfortheireffortsshowsthatclanisnotthebigelephantinSomalipoliticsanditcanbe

overcome in many instances through nationalist or religious means. In other words, both

external and internal factors can bring about a situation in which Somalis can act

nationalistically.AnimportantexampleisthewaythattheIslamicCourtscametoprominence

inMogadishu,whichcanbeexplainedbyaconjunctionofseveralfactors.Firstly,oppressionby

warlords;secondly,thewayinwhichKenyaintervenedandmanipulatedthepeaceprocessin

Embagathi;thirdly,theendorsementoftheIslamicCourtsbytheinternationalcommunityand

fourthlythepopularperceptionthattheWestisagainstIslamicvalues(Samatar,2006b).The

suggestion inherent in this view is that clan ideals and identity are contextual and can be

configuredandreconfiguredbypolitical,economicandsocialeventsandoccurrences.

Similarly,Kapteijns (2004)criticises theabsenceof the ‘impactofcolonial rule’ inclan-based

analysesofSomalisociety,whichignorethechangesthatmayhaveoccurredtotheconceptof

clanduringthisperiod.Sheprovidesthreeexamplesofhowtheimpactofcolonialruleonclan-

basedSomalisocialandpoliticalorganisationcouldbeteasedout.Firstly,thedivisionofSomali

land is put forward as being a drastic measure cutting communities from each other and

28|P a g e

therefore altering their clan-based interdependence. Secondly, the role of the colonial

administration in using and abusing the clan-based political structures through a process of

formalisationinwhichthestateimposeditselfonitssubjectsisoverlooked.Shearguesthatthis

reinventionof traditional institutionsby thecolonialadministrationaltered the fundamental

tenetsofSomalipoliticalorganisationanddenteditsimage.Equally,Besteman(1998,p.110)

argues that even though the kinship skeleton remains, its content has changed due to the

pressuresimposedonitbyglobalprocessessuchas“colonialism,statebuildingandColdWar”,

andthesechangesneedtobeaccountedforwhenanalysingSomalisociety.Thisperspective

advancesSomalisasbeingoneethnicgroup,organisedthroughmembershipofakinshipsystem

of association, but warns of the danger apparent in the ‘deployment of this genealogical

difference’asthebasisforpolitics(Samatar,2006a).

ThisperspectivealsounderlineshowSomalipoliticalcriseshavebeenrootedinthepoliticisation

ofgenealogicaldifferencesamongtheSomalisandifthis isreinventeditwill leadtoanother

disaster as Somali cultural values and the political exploitation of clan identitieswill collide.

WhilethisperspectivehassuccessfullyprovidedalternativeunderstandingsofSomalisocialand

politicalorganisation,likethepreviousperspective,italsofailstoelaboratetheutilitiesofclan

in the spatial character of cities in the Somali territories and its role in urban governance.

Moreover,criticsofthisperspectivepointtotheusefulnessofclanasanorganisationalasset

andreadilypointtotheclan-basedsegregationapparent inalmostall aspectsoftheSomali

society (Luling, 2006). This accords well with the assumption inherent in the early Somali

scholarshipwhichcharacterisestheSomalisasculturallyfractiousandpronetoviolencebecause

ofthepowerofclan.Inriposte,advocatesoftheSamatarianperspectivepostulatethatafar

betterexplanationforthedestructionandanarchyinSomalipoliticscanbefoundintheobvious

hegemonicstrugglebetweenpowerfulpoliticalforceswhoseekrefugeinidentitypoliticsand

useitinstrumentallyasameanstorealisetheiraims(Samatar,1992,Samatar,1988,Samatar,

2009).

This argument against an essentialist view of clan is further reinforced when the practices

committedinthenameofclanareseparatedfromtheclanasamodeofsocialorganisation.For

instance Samatar (2006a, p. 57) distinguishes clanism “as the political mechanism for

manipulating community sentiment along sectarian lines” from clan as the “genealogical

differences[that]havebeenoneoftheelementsofSomalitradition,but…never inducedthe

kindofmayhemthatmar[theSomali]society”now.Samatar(1997)seekstovalidatethispoint

inhiscomparativestudyofBotswanaandSomaliawhereheargues that these twosocieties

29|P a g e

havetakentwodifferentpathsdespitehavingsimilarecologicalandculturalelements.Whereas

onecreatedasectarianandexclusivenorm,theotherenjoysacivilandinclusivesystem.Inthis

view,whenthecivicstateprevails,legitimacyisenforcedandnationalidentityisstrengthened

leadingtotheentrenchmentofademocraticcultureandenhancementofpeacefulcoexistence.

While the author does not focus on the urban level, the samepoint could bemade for the

formation of spatially segregated cities in Somaliland, which are, as will be argued in the

empiricalchapters,toa largeextenttheoutcomeof lowlevelsof legitimacyandtrust inthe

state.

Atthesubnationallevel,scholarlydebatesaboutrecentstate-buildinginSomalilandfocuson

thehybridpoliticalorderwhosehistorycanpartlybetracedtoSNM’smanifestoof1982.The

manifesto advocated a decentralised system of governance for the post Barre political

dispensation,aimedatincorporatingclan-basedpoliticsaswellasregionalidentities(Prunier,

1998,Gilkes,1999).Likethepreviousstrandsofargument,thesedebatesneglecttheurbanlevel

intheirdiscussionofthehybridstatebuildinginSomaliland.Theytooaccreditsuccesstothe

significantroleoftraditionalinstitutionsinmediatingpost-warclanandpoliticalconflicts.The

firstoftheseconflictstookplaceinBuraoinSeptember1991wherelocalclanmilitiascollided.

Thisunderminedtheoptimismthatfollowedthedeclarationofindependence,aspro-SNMclans

werethoughttobenefit fromthenewstatedisproportionatelyandattheexpenseofothers

(FarahandLewis,1997).ThesecondconflicttookplaceinBerberainMarch1992whentheSNM

administrationtriedtoimposecontrolovertheportofBerberaandthelocalclansrefusedto

abidebythatorder.Notlongthereafter,thethirdmajorpoliticalconflicttookplaceinHargeisa

andBuraoin1994(Bradbury,2008)assomeoftheclansfeltthattheywerenotgiventheirdue

shareingovernmentstructures.Theseconflictsoccurredagainstthebackdropofexcitement

aboutSomaliland’sstatehoodandmostpeoplefeltthatclanswhosupportedtheSNMtofight

Barrewouldnot fightamong themselves (FarahandLewis,1997).Amajordimensionof the

political conflicts in Somaliland which was not captured in the literature relates to an

observationmadebyMenkhaus(2003)inrelationtoSouthernSomalia.Hearguesthatwhen

conflicts devolve in a lower level of the genealogical chain, the scale and the impact of the

conflict reduces. This observationmay alsowell explain an important factor that expedited

peace in Somaliland, as clans had becomewar weary during the final years of the political

conflictandcouldnolongeraffordtosustainthewar.Thepoliticalclassinbothcampshadalso

realised that their days were numbered before the public turned their back on them. This

30|P a g e

createdfrictionbetweenpoliticianswithinthesamefactionsastheystartedaccusingeachother

ofbeingbeneficiariesofthewar(Balthasar,2013).

ThepeacebuildingprocessesinSomalilandbeganwithclan-basedmeetingslargelysanctioned

bytheSNMandweremotivatedbyadesiretoreconciletheclans inSomalilandratherthan

inflame theirdifferences. These clan-basedpeace initiativespaved theway forbiggerpeace

conferencestosettlepoliticaldifferencesbetweentheclans.Thefirstmajorpeaceconference

inSomalilandtookplaceinBuraoin1991(Bradbury,2008).Theconventionofthisconference

wasaimedatreconcilingtheclanssoastoenhancethelegitimacyoftheSNMadministrationin

theregion.TheconferenceaddressedthedifferencebetweentheclansintheNorthandlaid

thefoundationforthepresentdaySomalilandadministration.Itwasthisconferencethatsaw

the reinstatementof Somaliland’s statehoodagainst thewishof SNM top leadership (Walls,

2011).Inspiteofinitialpublicapproval,politicalconflictseruptedbetweentheclansmainlyover

hegemonyandresource-sharinginthenewlyfoundedstate.Thesecondmajorconferencein

SomalilandwasaresponsetotheseconflictsanditoccurredinSheikhinOctober1992.Several

keyissueswereagreedinthisconference,includingthedesignationofmajorportsandairports

asanationalasset.Bradbury(2008)suggeststhatthisconferencewasadefiningmomentfor

theGuurti(astate-widecouncilofelders)asitpavedthewayforitsformalisation.Walls(2009)

observesthatthereweretwooutcomesfromtheconference;aceasefireagreementbetween

thewarringclansandthefoundationforanotherpeaceconferencetobeheldinBorama.The

Boramaconferencewasfromthebeginning‘intendedtobeabigger’conferenceandaimedto

have a fundamental impact on the country’s political landscape. Even though the Borama

conference was more to do with state-building than peace-building, the existence of the

differentmilitiasloyaltotheirrespectiveclansandotherfreelancerswhowerebentonmaking

money for themselves caused concern for the participants, such that peace-related issues

remainedattheheartoftheconference.

2.2.3 RoleofCustomaryInstitutionsinHybridity

TheoveralldrivetowardshybridpoliticalorderinSomalilandcanbestbecharacterisedasan

attemptaimedatconstitutingor reconstitutingpublic trustandstate legitimacy in thepost-

conflictcontext.Keytothisattemptistheenmeshmentoftraditionalinstitutionsinthemodern

statebuildingprocesses.IntheSomalicontext,thisisnotanewphenomenon.Inboththerecent

anddistantpastofstateformationintheSomalipeninsula,‘modern’and‘traditional’formsof

governanceinmanycasescontradicted,coexistedandcomplementedeachother.Forinstance,

31|P a g e

colonialadministratorsoftencollaboratedwithclanelders.FarahandLewis(1997)describethe

processofdelegating responsibility to theeldersduring thecolonialerawhenAkils (Chiefs),

were paid to perform some state functions. In post-colonial times, traditional systemswere

againusedbythestateinordertobringaboutlawandorderamongthepopulace,particularly

inruralareas.WhatisuniqueaboutthecurrenthybridpoliticalorderinSomalilandis,perhaps,

the scale rather than the substance of the mixture. In other words, the extent to which

traditionalsystemsareformalisedandconstitutionallysanctionedisnew.Inthepast,however,

Akilsandpro-governmentelderswerealsokeyinstrumentsthroughwhichthestatemaintained

lawandorder in a politically chargedenvironmentwheremost of the ‘people regarded the

government as an enemy and declined to cooperate. Akilswere important for these efforts

becauseoftheirknowledgeaboutthemembersoftheirclansandthefactthattheycouldeasily

facilitatethecaptureofsuspectsandimpoundmentoflivestock.Forinstance,Rayne(1921,p.

21)wrotethat“awantedman’sAkilmaybeorderedtoproduce”asuspect“insteadofsending

a[messenger]tocall”him.Formanypeople,Akilswerepartoftheproblemsincetheywere

voluntarilyorinvoluntarilyworkingwithanillegitimatestatesecurityapparatus.

Butitisimportanttorememberthatthepoliticsofchieftaincywascharacterisedbydiversityas

it was underpinned by individual agency. Indeed, this diversitywas characteristic of African

contextsmore broadly, as some chiefswillingly supported the colonial powerswhile others

opposed.AccordingtovonTrotha(1996,p.80)“thisdiversitywastransformedandsubsumed

into a unifying administrative structure....organised on the basis of institutional innovations

followingthreeprinciples:thoseofdevolution,hierarchyandtheadministrative”(vonTrotha,

1996, p. 80). Firstly, the principal of devolved powers upheld the colonial state’s right of

‘appointmentand removalof chiefsas its soleprerogative (vonTrotha,1996); secondly, the

principal of hierarchy meant that the colonial government could invent and/or modify the

institution of chieftaincy to serve as auxiliary communicativemeans between itself and the

population;andthirdlytheprincipalofadministrationunderpinnedthecolonialgovernment’s

introductionof territorialityand jurisdictionaldistrictboundaries for localgovernance. Inthe

caseofSomaliland,theinstitutionofchieftaincyprecededtheBritishcolonialadministration.It

wasinheritedfromtheEgyptianswhoconstitutedchiefsamongtheSomalisduringtheirbrief

rulepriortothearrivaloftheBritish,tofacilitatebasicadministrativefunctionssuchasrecord

32|P a g e

keepingandpopulationcountsfortheirofficialsinthecoastaltowns.EachAkilwasresponsible

foradia-payinggroup11andwouldreportbacktohisEgyptiansuperiorsinBerberaandZeila.

Even though the customary institutions were not limited to only Akils, they became the

preferredcolonialmeansofgovernanceintheProtectorateduringBritishrule.Thehome-grown

Sultanatesystemofpublicauthority,whichhadbettersocialstandingandlegitimacyintheeyes

of the public,wasmarginalised to a significant degree. UnlikeAkils, the public authority of

Sultanswasnotacolonialinvention.ThisisnottosaythattheSultansweretotallyoutsidethe

statebutratherthelevelofAkils’engagementwaspronounced.OneofthereasonswhyAkils

were preferred as an administrative instrument was the fact that they could cover wider

geographical areas by their sheer far greater number than the Sultans who were few and

represented bigger clan groupings. According to Lewis (1955, p. 585), the institution of

chieftaincy (i.e. Akil) was highly revered or feared. He observes that “chief's glance [was]

referredtoas(ilkulul)'theburningeye'…hispersonissostronglyendowedwithpowerthat

amongsomecloselyrelatedtribesitisusualforavisitingchieftoavoidafacetofaceencounter

with his equivalent and to be greeted indirectly by a representative”. Consequent upon his

specialrelationwithGod,achiefcancalldownblessingormisfortuneuponhispeopleandtheir

stock”.Asevidenthere,thechiefsarerepresentedastheagentofGod,whichdeviatesfromthe

generalperceptionofchiefdomasapoliticalposition,whichwasandstillissubjecttochallenge

bythemainlyegalitariansociety inwhich itoperates.Theauthorhimselfpointsoutthatthe

chiefs’decisionsweremainlyvoluntaryastherewasnospecialpolicetoenforcetheirdecisions.

Functionally,theAkilsystemwasconstitutedintwoways.Thefirstwasbasedonpeoples’choice

and clans were given the opportunity to nominate an Akil and present their choice to the

government, while the second was based on government selection where the District

Commissioner(DC)appointedtheAkilwithoutnecessarilyconsultingtheclan.DeceasedAkils

wereinheritedinmanycasesbytheirnextofkin.Thecolonialadministratorsdidnotconsider

the Akil system they introduced as wholly traditional but they were hopeful that it would

transformintoanindigenousformofgovernancehavingfeaturesandpropertiesoftraditional

leadership.Theprimaryadministrativefunctionofthisinstitutionwasbasicallydeterminedby

the colonial administrators and most importantly the District Commissioner whose orders

11Dia isabloodmoneyandadiagroup iscomprisedofmembersofaclanwhocollectivelypaybloodmoney in cases where one of their members causes death within or outside the clan accidently ordeliberately.

33|P a g e

outlined the duties and responsibilities of the Akils. In otherwords, Akilswere government

agentsaswellastraditionalauthorities.EventhoughAkilswereseenascolonialstoogesthey

wereneverthelessneededby their subjects,as theywere themosteffectivemeans through

whichthepopulationcouldmakecontactwiththestate.TheneedforAkils’mediationwaseven

madegreaterinsituationswhereacollectivepunishmentinvolvingtheconfiscationofproperty

andseizureoflivestockwascarriedoutagainstclans(Millman,2013).Understandably,forthis

reason, among others, Akils’ intervention often necessitated that people of the same clan

backgroundconcentrate inareaswhere they couldeasily get access to theirAkils andother

supportsysteminherent intheclanstructure.DespitethesehistoricrolesofAkilsascolonial

stateagents,thereisnonethelessaconsensusintheliteratureaboutthekeyroleoftraditional

authoritiesinthemorerecenthybridstate-buildingprocesses.

Thereis,however,anemergenttrendintheliteratureonstate-makingthatprovidesacrucial

case for going beyond hybridity (Hoehne, 2013, Hoehne, 2011). Furthermore, the role of

customary institutions in thehybridordercanbecritiqued inanumberofways.The ideaof

hybridityevokesanimageinwhichstateinstitutionsaremadeoftwoformsofgovernancethat

arenicelyfittingandmerged–itiscastasamagicmedicinethatcouldrevivetheSomalistate

orotherAfricanstates.Put itdifferently, theroleof thecustomary institutions in thehybrid

order isover-emphasisedandrepresentedasthemissing linkthatcanexplainthedifference

betweensuccessfulgovernanceand failedattemptsof topdown international interventions.

This representation seems exaggerated andmight inmany cases jarwith the reality on the

ground. For instance, one could question the extent towhich institutions in Somaliland are

hybrid.ApartfromtheGuurti,thehouseofelders,thereisnonotablenationallevelinstitution

which could be characterised as being hybrid in Somaliland. This is in sharp contrast to the

assumptioninherentintheliteraturethatseeshybridityasagoldenthreadthatgoesthrough

thestatestructuresinSomaliland.

Additionally,somescholarsaccusethehybridordersofbeinginstrumentalised.Attheheartof

theseaccusationsisthefactthatthecustomaryinstitutionsareincreasinglybecomingco-opted

by the political elites in the executive branch of the government. For instance, traditional

authorities in Somaliland were accused of transforming into institutions that undermine

democraticprogressandhencefurtherexacerbatethealreadybleakimageofstatelegitimacy

(Hashi,2005).Otherscepticsofthe longtermapplicabilityofthehybridpoliticalorderargue

that hybrid state-building processes have outlived their usefulness and what remains now

“underminesdemocraticprogress…andlegitimateauthorityofthestateinstitutionsaswellas

34|P a g e

theleadingtraditionalauthoritiesintheregion”(Hoehne,2013,p.199).Theauthoralsooutlines

anumberofweaknessesinherentinthetraditionalsystems,whichgetstransferredtothestate

when the tradition and themodern are combined to formonepolitical order. For instance,

traditionalsystemsmaybeeffectiveat the local levelbut theymightbe lesseffectiveat the

nationallevelandleadtodivisionsbetweenclans,astheirauthorityislimitedtotheirparticular

clanofbelonging.Traditionalsystemsalsohaveatendencyofbeingbiasingagainstwomenand

youngpeople. If theycontinuetobeasignificantpartof thestatestructures, theycouldall

present a threat to the possibility of democratic and equitable participation in the political

processeswherewomenhave thesamerights in stateaffairsas theirmalecounterparts.As

evident here, the interaction between traditional and modern ways of governance are

“characterisedbycomplementarityandincompatibility”(Renders,2007,p.441)incontrastto

representationsthatcasttheirrelationshipasblendedandfunctioningwelltogether.

Amajorweaknessinthehybridstate-buildingargumentiswhatHoehne(2013)callsimbalanced

state-building, in which the modern structures of the state dominate the incorporated

traditionalstructure,suchasinthecaseoftheGuurti.Inspiteofitsformalinclusioninthestate

structure, the current political dispensation in Somaliland makes the Guurti functionally

marginal. This undermines the quest for state legitimacy, which was the main reason why

traditional institutionswere incorporated in the firstplace.TheGuurti’s standingamong the

public is vulnerable. They are not elected and they have onmany occasions prevented the

democraticprocessbyeitherextendingtheirterm,orthatoftheexecutive.Moreover,Guurtiis

traditionally a dynamic institution in which any male capable of commanding respect can

representtheclanandperformthefunctionsknownforGuurtii.e.mediationofdisputesand

conflict. This, coupledwith their institutionalisation aspartof the state,has cost them their

legitimacyamongthepopulace,andbyimplicationworsenedthatofthestate(Renders,2007).

2.3 BeyondHybridity:Legitimacy,TrustandSegregation

Fortheabove-mentionedreasonsaswellasthefactthathybridityfailstoilluminatethequality

of interaction between the state and the people and the spatial manifestation of such

interaction, it is crucial to go beyond existing debates over 'hybridity' to understand urban

spatialformandtheunbaninstitutionsthatshapesettlementpatterns.Theargumenthereis

thattheliteraturesonurbansegregation,statelegitimacyandtrustaremoreabletoprovide

newunderstandingsof thedynamics that shape the spatial character ofHargeisa andother

Somalicities.Whilehybriditygenerallyfocusesonthenatureofstate institutionsandcanbe

35|P a g e

descriptiveof the character of state-building, the concepts of legitimacy and trust aremore

concernedwiththequalityofinteractionbetweenthestateandthepeople.Assuch,theycan

provideabetterunderstandingofurbangovernanceandsegregationinHargeisa.

2.3.1 UnderstandingLegitimacyandTrust

Tyler(2006,p.1),defineslegitimacyasa“psychologicalpropertyofanauthority,institution,or

socialarrangementthatleadsthoseconnectedtoittobelievethatitisappropriate,proper,and

just”.ThisisreinforcedbytheOECD(2010,p.15)’spostulationthata“politicalorder,institution

or actor is legitimate to the extent that people regard it as satisfactory and believe that no

availablealternativewouldbevastly superior”. TheOECD (2010),differentiatesat least four

forms of state legitimacy. First is ‘process legitimacy’, which is about setting the rules of

engagementbetweencitizensandthestate.Secondis‘performancelegitimacy’,whichisabout

thestate’sperformanceagainstasetofmeasuresbelievedtoindicatelevelofperformancei.e.

service delivery. Third is legitimacy that emerges from shared beliefs and social practices

informed by values, ideology or religion. And finally, there is a legitimacy that derives from

recognitionofthestatebyexternalactorsascertainingitssovereignty,whichinturnimpactson

itsinternallegitimacy.

Discussionsover legitimacyareimportantforunderstandingstate-buildingprocesses.Lemay-

Hébert (2009) divides state-building debates into twomain camps. The first of these is the

‘institutionalapproach’,whichbuildsontheWeberianconceptualisationoftheterritorialand

organisationalcontrolofthestate,throughthemonopolyofviolence,whichiscaseasacrucial

elementforunderstandinglegitimacy.Inthisapproach,statelegitimacyisalsomeasuredbythe

state’sabilitytodeviseplansorpoliciesanditsabilitytoenforceregulationsandlawsthrough

accountable and transparent processes and instruments of power (Fukuyama, 2004a). The

second approach draws heavily on Durkheimian state-building perspectives and it places

emphasisnotonthephysicalstructuresandinstitutionsofthestate,butratherthepoliticaland

socialaspectsofthestatei.e.thepeoplewhoconstitutethepowersininstitutionalstructures

(Buzan, 2008). As evident here, these conceptions of the state also vary in their

conceptualisationoflegitimacy,andtheextenttowhichtheyemphasiseit.AccordingtoLemay-

Hébert(2009),theinstitutionalapproachplacesemphasisontherelationshipbetweenservice

deliveryandlegitimacyasafulfilmentofthesocialcontractbetweenrulerandruled(Rotberg,

2004 ),while in the legitimacy approach, the strength of the state and the extent towhich

democracyexistsareseenasfactorsenhancinglegitimacy(Fukuyama,2004b).

36|P a g e

The literature alsomakesotherdistinctions in how tounderstand the concept. For instance

Gilley (2006)makesadistinctionbetweenobjectiveand subjective legitimacy. The former is

basedonimpartialobservationofstatebehaviour,howpeopleviewthestateaswellastheir

levelof trust,whereasthe latter isbasedonsubjectiveexperienceand interpretationbythe

opiniongivers.Thepolicyimplicationsofthesedifferentanalyticalperspectivesonlegitimacy

taketwoforms,descriptiveandprescriptive,asmappedbyHoffmanandKirk(2013).Theformer

places the emphasis on understanding legitimacy by looking at the specifics of beliefs and

perceptionsandhowthisshapesthewaypeoplerelatetoandassessthestate(Andersen,2011).

Thelatterplacesemphasisonnormativeindicatorsbasedonuniversalguidelines(Bellinaetal.,

2009). This is mainly concerned with improving political legitimacy, and it is particularly

importantforcountriesgoingthroughdelicatedemocratictransitions,assumingthatthelevel

ofstatelegitimacyislikelytoincreasevoluntarycompliancewithrulesandregulations(Moehler,

2005).

Furtherdifferentiationoflegitimacyincludeinput,outputandthroughputlegitimacy(Schmidt,

2013).Theinputlegitimacyisconcernedwiththecitizen’sparticipationinthedecisionmaking

processeswhereasoutputisconcernedwiththeperformanceofthestateinstitutionsentrusted

withdischargingpublicservice.Thethroughputisconcernedmorewiththeprocessesthrough

which both the input and output as well as the practices and cultures which shape their

interactionareconstituted(Lieberherr).

State legitimacy is associatedwith effective institutional development. Positive attributes of

highstate legitimacy include increasedvoluntaryengagement ingovernance,aswellasnon-

coercive compliance with rules and regulations. In other words, legitimacy is believed to

enhance state capacity as it spares theneed to devote resources to coercion (OECD, 2010).

Consequently,statesareoftenkeentoincreasepositiveregardfromthepublic.Inacontinent

marredbyauthoritarianism,oneofthemostpopularmeansthroughwhichpoliticallegitimacy

ispursuediselections,whethergenuineornominal(Moehler,2005).Butthepitfallofpursuing

legitimacy through elections is that people’s perception is to a significant degree shapedby

whichpoliticalpartytheyidentifywith.TheauthorobservesthatinmanyAfricancountries,itis

likely that losers of elections may display negative perceptions towards state institutions

whereasthosewhovotedforthewinningpartyarelikelytoexhibitmoretrustinthestate.This

may be particularly pronounced in cases where state and party institutions aremerged, or

wherepartieshaveaconstituencythatisdefinedbyregional,ethnic(orintheSomalicase),clan

loyalties. Similarly, winners are less likely to defend civic rights than losers if such action is

37|P a g e

perceivedtobeagainstthegovernment(Moehler,2005).Animportantspatialmanifestationof

theweaknessesintheprimacyofelectionsasalegitimationprocessisthefactthatsuchefforts

produceasymmetricaldistributionsoflegitimacyacrossterritories,aspeoplelivingindifferent

partiesofacityorcountrymayhavesignificantlyvaryingperceptiontowardsthestateforsocial,

economicandpoliticalreasons.Eventhoughthisisoverlookedintheliterature,itisimportant

topointoutthatidentitypoliticsinsuchelectionscanoftenperpetuateurbansegregationalong

ethnicandclanlines.

According Etzioni (2011), legitimacy is, more often than not, underpinned or informed by

normativevaluesandsocialpractices,“subjecttomoraldialogues”butnotnecessarilyproduced

bythem.Inmanycases,suchmoraldialoguesinformtheunderstandingofwhatisconsidered

and what is not considered just. But Buckley (2013) problematises this, underscoring the

importance of distinguishing the related acts of justice and legitimacy. While just can be

understoodasmorallyinformedprinciplesthroughwhichdecisionsareappropriatedasbeing

correct, legitimacy denotes rules to which conformance is attained voluntarily without

necessarilybelievingthatsuchactsarejust.Hepointsoutthat“theconceptoflegitimacydiffers

from the concept of justice insofar as citizens accept “just” principles as both morally

appropriateandmorallycorrect,whereascitizensaccept“legitimate”usesofpublicpoweras

morally appropriate but not fully correct” [ibid, p 329]. Arguing along these lines, Samatar

(2009)invokestheconceptoffaith(bywhichhemeansdevotiontoparticularvaluesfoundin

boththeIslamicreligionandnomadicSomaliculture,i.e.egalitarian“beliefinself-relianceand

developmentofconfidenceinthecommunity’scommitmenttojustice”)asameansofrestoring

statelegitimacythatsufferedfromlongtermnegativeattitudes.

NegativepublicattitudestowardstheSomalistatedatebacktothecolonialtimeswhenmost

oftheSomalipopulationfeltthatthestateinstitutionsthroughwhichtheyweregoverneddid

notrepresenttheirvaluesandbeliefs.Thiswasmanifestedbythestiffresistancetothecolonial

powers from their arrival in 1884 to their departure in the 1960 (Irons, 2013, Hess, 1964,

Mohamed,2002a).Keytothisresistancewasawidespreadrejectionoftheexclusionarynature

ofcolonialrule,whichnotonlyimposedanalienstate(s)butalsosubdividedSomaliterritories

intovariousentities(Samatar,1982,Mohamed,1996).Beingawareofsuchdiscontent,colonial

authorities embarked on politicalmanoeuvres prior to independence such that some loyal

Somalis were incorporated into the formal governing system primarily to bring about state

legitimacy (Samatar, 2009, Mohamed, 2002b). These attempts did not, however, yield

significantimprovementsintherelationshipbetweenthecolonialstateandSomalis.Asaresult,

38|P a g e

politicalresistancegainedmomentum,leadingtoindependenceinthe1960(Mohamed,2004).

To thedismayofmanywhoexpecteda turnaround inhowgovernancewasconstitutedand

executed,thepostcolonialstatebecameasiteforfreshformsofstruggleforresourcesmainly

betweenelites.Similarly,thepostcolonialstateinheritedallinstrumentsofrepression,asthose

whoassumedthepowerdidnothaveimmediateintentionsofdismantlingthem.

Consequently, public perceptionof state legitimacymade little if anyprogress. This became

clear soon after independencewhen poets whowere strong supporters of the struggle for

independencefoundthemselvesatwaragainwithanewAfricanstatereplicatingoldcolonial

behaviours.Amongthefirsttocriticisethewayinwhichpower-sharingtookplaceandtheway

in which resources weremisappropriated by the ruling elites was Ali Sugule (Sugule, 1962,

Sugule,1966).Growingpopulardiscontentwiththeimmediatepostcolonialstatefacilitatedthe

coupin1969.Themilitaryofficerswhooverthrewtheciviliangovernmentwereawareofthe

legitimacydeficit fromwhichthecivilianSomalistatewassuffering.Asaresult, thefirst few

yearsofmilitaryrulewerecharacterisedbynation-buildinganddevelopmentnarrativesaimed

atrestoringpublicconfidenceinthestate.This,however,didnotlastlongasthemilitaryregime

becamemorerepressivethanthecivilianregimeitreplaced.AccordingtoBradbury(2003),in

the aftermath of Somalia's war with Ethiopia in 1997, public institutions were dilapidated

through scarcity of financial resources and dwindling aid and state legitimacy declined

significantlyasclansbecamean importantsourceof“patronageandprotection”.Thosewho

wereexcludedfrompowerandthebenefitsofthestatealsofurtherentrenchedgroupidentity

bymobilisingresourcesthroughclanstructures.Bytheearly1980s,increasedcompetitionfor

illicitandformaltradeledtoincreasingsegregationofthemilitaryandpoliticalelitesandthe

eventual collapse of the state in Somalia [ibid]. This insecurity and breakdown of state rule

underpinned people’s tendency for concentrating in particular geographical locations. The

manner inwhich the statewas governed had significantly undermined trust in formal state

institutions in the country. Trust in the state is particularly important in understanding the

perpetuationofurbansegregation.Thisisbecausetrustplaysanimportantroleinformingsocial

relationshipsbasedonchoiceandreciprocity.Inotherwords,thestate’smodeandpracticesof

governance shapes the levelof credibilityand legitimacy it can reciprocally receive fromthe

public.

Dunn(1992,p.74)definestrustasthe“confidentexpectationofbenignintentionsinanother

free agent”. But Luhmann (1992) makes a distinction between confidence and trust.While

confidencecanbeunderstoodasacertainlevelofexpectationsofapersonorinstitutions,trust

39|P a g e

can be understood as being based on previous encounters and confidential information

presupposing scenarios of risk. Similarly, Dasgupta (1992, p. 51) places emphasis on

expectationsbydefining trustasa“senseofcorrectexpectationsabout theactionsofother

people thathaveabearingonone’sownchoiceofaction”.Although this doesnotaddress

Luhmann(1992)’sconcernregardingassessmentsofriskasakeycomponentoftrust,Gambetta

(1992,p.217)’sproposaloftrustdoesseemtoaddressthisconcern,ashesuggeststhattrust

“or,symmetrically,distrust[canbeunderstoodas]aparticularlevelofthesubjectiveprobability

withwhichanagentassessesthatanotheragentorgroupofagentswillperformaparticular

action,bothbeforehecanmonitorsuchaction(orindependentlyofhiscapacityevertobeable

tomonitorit)andinacontextinwhichitaffectshisownaction”.

AccordingtoDasgupta(1992), trustcanbeunderstoodasacommoditygovernedbyspecific

marketrules.Forinstance,whentherearedeviationsfromnormalpractices,punishmentssuch

as social stigma or other forms of enforcement are applied. If trust in the enforcement

mechanism is low, the possibility of entering into agreements also becomes low. In the

Somalilandcase,trusttowardsthestateisunderminedbythelackofequitableaccesstojustice

andenforcementmechanismsfreefromcorruptionandnepotismandhencepeoplenolonger

seeitfittohonourasocialcontractwiththestateastheirexperiencewiththestateismainly

negative.Trustisthereforeinfluencedordeterminedthroughaprocessinwhichanagentacts

in a relationship on the basis of prior knowledge [ibid]. In other words, trust here can be

understoodasa commodityheldby thepublic and traded foraparticularoutcomeof state

governance. The price is determined by the extent to which reasonable arrangements

acceptabletobothsidesarenegotiated.InthecaseofSomaliland,thecurrentarrangements

arenotacceptabletothepublicandthiscanhelpexplainthespatialconcentrationofpeoplein

particulargeographicallocationspartlytoresistthestate.Thisconceptualisationoftrustseems

tobebasedonfamiliarity,whichmakesthelatterakeyattributeoftrust.ButLuhmann(1992,

p.95)pointsouttheneedfordistinguishingtrustandfamiliarity,suggestingthat“familiarityis

anunavoidablefactoflife;whereastrustisasolutionforspecificproblemsofrisk”.Herethe

“specificproblemsofrisk”arethegovernment’sactionswhicheitherenhanceorerodetrust.

Historically, colonial legacies and the manipulation of state instruments for the control of

subjects canbeconsideredasamajorexplanatory factor for the lossofpublic trust in state

institutions (Mamdani, 1996). Equally, postcolonial continuity of governance malpractices

further undermined public expectations of independent African states, as they failed to

constitute ruling arrangements different from those experienced during the colonial period

40|P a g e

(Samatar,1985).Theabsenceofsignificanttrustinstateinstitutionshasbeenworsenedinmany

African contexts by the emergence of military dictatorships that overthrew the colonially

inducedfragileAfricandemocraciespartlybecauseofpublicdiscontentoverhowthoseinpower

behavedorgoverned.Mostofthesemilitaryregimesdidnot,however,performanybetterthan

thosetheyreplaced.AccordingtoMenkhaus(2006b),distrusttowardstheSomalistateisrooted

intherepressivemannerthroughwhichpublicorderwasconstitutedandimplemented.This

had left a lasting scar in public confidence in state institutions, and many people remain

reluctanttoseethestateresumingoldpowers.Byimplicationthishasfacilitatedorentrenched

urbansegregation.

2.3.2 ConceptualisingUrbanSegregation

Thetermsofurbanfragmentationandsegregationareinterchangeablyusedintheliteratureto

describetheurbanformandrelatedsocialrealitiesthatresultfromtheresidentialseparation

ofsocialgroupsonthebasisofidentityi.e.tribe,ethnicity,race,religion,ideology,economicor

othersocialstatuses.While,Imostlysticktousingsegregation,Ioccasionallyalsousetheterm

fragmentation,bywhich Imeanthesameassegregation.Myaimbelow is first toprovidea

conceptual understanding of segregation. I then move onto discussing the causes and

consequencesof segregation. In the final subsection, Iprovideanoverviewof thehistoryof

urbansegregationinHargeisa.GiventhelackofliteratureonsegregationinSomalistudies,this

sectionreliesmainlyonwidergeographicalandsociologicalstudiesontheconcept,itscauses

anditsconsequenceinurbanplaces.

Urban segregation can be understood as a phenomenon where specifically defined groups

occupyparticularspacesinthecity,voluntarilyorinvoluntarilymaintainingadistancefromone

another for social,economicandpolitical reasons (KaplanandWoodhouse,2005,Battersby,

2004,Muhammadetal.,2015). It isaconceptwhich, fromasocialandpoliticalperspective,

reflectschangingurbansocio-spatialrealitiesaswellasthedynamicsofpowerrelationswithin

andbetweenpeopleandthestateandnon-stateactors.Fromaphysicalperspective,itseeksto

accountforthechanginggeographicalandterritorialstructuresofplacesandtheimpactthis

couldhaveonurbanliveability(Navez-Bouchanine,2002citedinDeffnerandHoerning,2011,

Dauskardt, 1993). According to Massey and Denton (1988), urban segregation can be

understoodastheoutcomeofsocialandeconomicprocesses,anditcanbemeasuredwithina

basic frameworkconsistingofat least fivemaincomponents.Thesearetheextenttowhich:

groupsaredispersedacrossspatialunits;groupmembersareexposedtoeachotherinurban

41|P a g e

spaces;groupmembersareoriented towardsaparticular central residence;particular social

groups are concentrated in a physical space; andminority groups are clustered in adjacent

places.

Asalientfeatureofthedebatesoversegregation isthebinaryforminwhichdistinctionsare

madebetweenthewealthyandpoorneighbourhoodsofthecity,oftenrootedinthehistorical

developmenttrajectoriesofoldandnew,or‘traditional’andmoderncities(Muhammadetal.,

2015).Furthermore,segregationcanbejudgedtobe‘good’or‘bad’.Theformerisassociated

withpeople’sabilitytoincreasetheirchanceofnegotiatingabetterlifeinurbanplacesthrough

socialnetworkswithneighbours. The latter isassociatedwithnegativefeaturessuchasthe

exclusionofthepoorfromopportunitiesavailableinthecity(Peach,1996).VanKempen(1994)

points to someof themainweaknesses in thesedualistic framings, chiefamong thembeing

whether segregation should be considered at the city or conurbation level, and whether it

shouldbeconsideredasstaticordynamic.Equally,segregationstudiesarecharacterisedbyan

epistemologicalbias,asthefocustendstobeplacedonareaspopulatedbythepoor,whichby

defaultmakeswealthyareasescapescrutinyofacademicandpolicydebatesoverhowspaces

shouldbeorganisedandinhabited.KaplanandWoodhouse(2005)criticisestheliteraturefor

overlookingsegregationwithinthesamegroupsalongclasslines.Visser(2013)arguesthatthis

can influence the outcome of efforts aimed at bringing about integrated spaces, as lack of

understandingoftherelativelywealthyareascan leadtomisdiagnosisand ineffectivenessof

city-widepolicyefforts.

Several distinct strands of academic writing can be distinguished on segregation. The first

investigatessegregationasaspatialphenomenonwherethecityconsistsofdifferentsegments

occupied by various sections of the urban population (Balbo and Navez-Bouchanine, 1995,

Navez-Bouchanine, 2003,Navez-Bouchanine, 2002 cited inMichelutti, undated). The second

looks at urban segregation from a social perspective where service provision is analysed in

relationtoinfrastructuraldevelopmentanditsimpactondisintegrationorintegration(Coutard,

2008,GrahamandMarvin,2001).Thethirdconsiderssegregationfromaneconomicperspective

lookingatthepolarisationofurbaneconomicspacesandthedifferentialaccesstoopportunities

and services (Sassen, 2002, Van Kempen, 1994), while the fourth strand looks at political

segregation where exclusion and inclusion are perpetuated through power relations and

administrativeinstrumentsusedtodoorundopolicybasedornon-policybasedinstitutional

practices(Navez-Bouchanine,2002,Pieterse,2006,Watson,2009,Parnell,1991).Thisbringsus

to the final thread of the debate, looking at urban segregation from social and cultural

42|P a g e

perspectiveswhereconflictingidentitiescoexistandinteractwithinthesameterritoryshaping

urbanresidentialpatternsaccordingtoculturalandethnicidentities(Harrisonetal.,2003).Itis

importanttopointoutthattheabove-mentionedthemesaresituatedwithinbroaderattempts

toidentifysegregationdynamics,itscausesasaphenomenonanditsimpactonurbanliveability

as well as the possible means through which its negative consequences can be mitigated

(Michelutti,undated).

2.3.3 CausesandImpactofSegregation

Segregation is generally cast as the result of two main processes: “social prejudice” and

economicmalfunctioning’ (K’AkumuandOlima, 2007). Social segregation inAfrican cities is

largelyattributedtothecolonialmanipulationofspace(Macoloo,1998).Mbembe(2004,p.384)

arguesthaturbansegregationwasa“biologicalprotectionoftheso-calledwhiterace…[where]

variouspoliciesandregulatoryframeworksaimedatprotectingthewhite[s]fromtherestofthe

population[wereintroduced,making]the…artsofcitybuildingandofinhabiting…synonymous

withthecreationofanillusoryharmonyandpuritybasedonthefictionofracialdistance”.In

addition tosuchrationalisationsofprotection, segregation inmanycitiesduring thecolonial

period was justified on the basis of health risks such as malaria (Muhammad et al., 2015,

Murunga,2012).Indigenouspeopleinthecontinentweredisplacedfromtheirhomesonthe

basisofthispoliticallymotivatedviewonhygiene12(Parnell,1991).Policyinstrumentssuchas

urbanplanninganddesignpracticeswereusedtobringaboutdomiciliaryseparationbetween

socialgroupsforthebenefitofonegroupoveranother(Spinks,2001,Myers,2003).

An example of this is South Africa (Dauskardt (1993), where residential segregation was

implementedthroughlegislationincludingtheGroupAreasAct,whichresultedintheremoval

ofmanyinnercitycommunitiestourbanfringes.Similarly,inNairobi,localcommunitieswere

alsoremovedfromstrategicpartsofthecitytoremoteperipheriesinthe1910s(Turton,1972).

Postcolonialcitiesoftenretainedthissegregatedurbanformastheyfailedtobreakawayfrom

colonialmechanismsofmakingurbanpoliciesandplaces(Myers,2010).Asaresult,“segregation

and segmentation in colonial” urban form translated into a high level of inequality among

12Regardlessofhowsegregation is justified, insomecases,suchcolonially inducedsegregationfoundcurrencyinthelocalcultures.Forinstance,insomeMuslimcities,theindigenouscommunitiesdidnotmind segregation primarily because they wanted to protect their values from colonial influence(Muhammad,etal,2015).

43|P a g e

Africanpopulationsaselitesinheritedtheexclusivewhiteareaswhilethepoorwereleftout.As

thegapbetweentherichandpoorincreased,classbecameinimportantfactorinfluencingurban

segregationinAfrica,andalsoledtoprocessesofself-segregation.

Lewinson (2007) provides an example in which segregation came about as a result of class

differenceinanEastAfricancontext,whereofficeworkerssociallysegregatedthemselvesfrom

those inthecommunitytheyconsideredasbackward.Asidefromclass,community interests

can influence the emergence of voluntarily segregated residential patterns on the basis of

‟strong taste for sharing a church or temple, preserving customs, trading with each other,

borrowing from or lending to each other, speaking their language and teaching it to their

children,orenjoyingeachother’scompanyinday-to-dayaffairs”(Anas,2006,p.542).Spatial

segregationmay also occur, either deliberately or inadvertently, on thebasis of landuseor

following infrastructural developments. An example of this is cities where primary and

secondary use of land exhibits differentiation in the location of residential and commercial

spaces(K’AkumuandOlima,2007).

Elaborating the concept of ‘splintered urbanism’, Graham and Marvin (2001) posit that

investment in infrastructural networks underpinned by differentiation in land use leads to

segregation inurbanspaces,andcannegativelyaffect theprovisionofservicesacrosscities.

Their argument rests on four key points. Firstly, urban development tends to be advanced

through the provision ofmodern infrastructural networks across national economic spaces.

Secondly the emergence of new information technologies has challenged the assumed

inevitabilityofconnectionsthroughphysicalinfrastructure,asthesenewtechnologieshaveto

some extent ‛unbundled’ infrastructural development, leading networks to be segmented.

Thirdly, infrastructuraldevelopment strategies led to theemergenceofpremiumnetworked

spaceswherewealthypeople live inclosedoff sectionsof thecitymostoftenreferredtoas

gatedcommunities.Fourthly,thisproducesresistanceintheformofsocialmovementsopposed

totheinequalitiesofpremiumspacesandcommoditisednetworks.

However, the idea of splintered urbanism was heavily criticised for beingWest-centric and

ignoringexperiencesfromNon-Westernsettingswhichinmostcasesdeviatefromtheaforesaid

theorisationofurbansegregation(Coutard,2008).Splinteredurbanismwasalsocriticisedfor

theimplicationthatsegregationisanewphenomenon,whichresultedfromrecentchangesin

global economic interaction and governance practices. Kooy and Bakker (2008) refute this

44|P a g e

suggestionandpointoutthatcitiesinmanydevelopingcountrieshavelongbeendividedalong

ethnicandsocio-economiclinespriortotherapidglobalisationofeconomicandculturalflows.

One of themost fundamental questions underpinning segregation discussions is thatwhich

relatestoitsimpact.Thisisimportantbecausesegregationisnotonlyproducedbyparticular

social, economic and political realities but it also produces particular social, economic and

politicalimpactswhichshapeexperiencesofurbanliveability.Theseincludebothnegativeand

perhapstoalesserextentpositiveimpacts.Amongthenegativeimpactsofsegregationinclude

the political marginalisation of certain groups that can flow from their concentration in

particularareas.Segregationcaninthesecasesleadtocollectiveviolencewhen‟discrimination,

spatialmismatch,anddemographicchangecombine”(KaplanandDouzet,2011).Similarly,Abu-

LugholdandRace(2007)arguethatracialandethnicconflictcanarisefromrivalryoverspace

andaccesstoresources.Theauthorobservesthatconflictarisinginsuchsituationsoftenleads

totwotendencies;eitherindividualsmovetoareasperceivedtobesaferforthemortheyget

trappedwithinaclosecircleoftheirfamiliesorcommunities,oftencuttingthemselvesofffrom

thesocialfabric,aconditionofself-isolationwherechildrenandadultsinthefamiliesspendless

time in the streets. As we shall see, the former has particularly relevance for the case of

Hargeisa.

Moreover,segregationcanalsoentrenchundesirableeconomicconditions,aspoorpeoplewho

liveinlowincomeareasarelikelytohavelesssocialandeconomicmobilitythanpoorpeople

living in non-poor locations. This is due to the fact that the “particular form of the spatial

configurationthatarisesinacityshapesthehorizonsofpossibility.Ifthehorizonisextremely

limited,spatialconfigurationcontinuestoproducesegregationandexclusion.Alternatively,if

thehorizonsaremoreopen,wearemoreinclinedtousetherichmultiplicityofspatialpractices

to unleash new ways of interaction and engagement” (Pieterse, 2005, p. 3). In urban

managementterms,segregationplacesaburdenonlocalauthorities’questforequitableservice

delivery,wheresucheffortexists.Forexample,servicesprovidedinlowincomelocationsmight

belowerthanotherareasasmunicipalauthoritiespaylessattentiontoareaswithlowerlevels

ofrevenuegeneration.

Segregationmayalsohavepositiveimpacts.KaplanandDouzet(2011)observethatsegregation

may have contributed to political empowerment in some instances, as spatial separation

formedthebasisonwhichparticulargroupsfightingforgreaterrightsareincubatedinareas

predominantlyoccupiedbytheirownsocialgroups.Whilesomepositive impactsmayfollow

45|P a g e

fromvoluntarysegregation,Anas(2006,p.13)pointsoutthatitscrucialtoidentifythelevelat

which this occurs. The author distinguishes between optimal and non-optimal level of

segregation.Theformercanbeunderstoodastheconditioninwhich‟addingonemoreperson

toa[segregatedarea]createssocialmarginalbenefitsandcoststhatareequal”.Thelatteris

whentheadditionofoneormorememberstothesegregatedareadonotadd“socialmarginal

benefits”.Althoughsuchoptimalseparationmaymitigatesomeofthenegativeexternalitiesof

segregation,itisimportanttopointoutthatsocialintegrationbasedonstronggroupidentity

such as clan or regional affiliations can play an important role in possible instability. This is

becauseitcreatesanenvironmentwheredistancingothersistheprinciple/goalthroughwhich

advancementofsocial,economicandpoliticalinterestsrotate,hencelayingthefoundationor

exacerbatingexistingdivisions.InthecaseofHargeisa,thespatialconcertationofpeoplealong

clan linesenabledpeopletoresist thestatebothpoliticallyandviolentlywhentheir interest

are/perceivedtobeendangered.

2.3.4 HargeisaasaSegregatedSpace

InanattempttohistoricisehowsegregationdevelopedovertimeinHargeisa,Ibrieflydiscuss

theemergenceofurbansegregationduringthecolonialperiod.Iarguethaturbansegregation

was not necessarily inevitable as some of the Somali settlements prior to the arrival of the

colonialadministrationhadsignsoftraversingclanandlineageboundaries.Ialsoarguethatthe

postcolonial, including the post-conflict, development trajectory reinforced the existing

segregatednatureofurbansettlementinHargeisa.Forthemostpartduringthecolonialera,

Hargeisawasnotasadministrativelyandeconomicallyimportantforthecolonialadministration

asweretheEasternandcoastaltown.Asaresult,theseatofgovernmentforthreeandhalf

decadeswasinBerberaandoccasionallySheikh.Thisinitialconcentrationofstatestructuresin

Berberawasattributabletoarangeoffactors.FirstlyBerberawastheonlyall-weatherharbour

inSomaliland(WarOfficeGeneralStaff,1907)andsecondly,itwasthebiggesturbancentrein

thecountryandthirdly,littlewasknownatthetimeaboutthesettlementsintheinteriorparts

ofthecountry(SeeSwayne,1996).Moreimportantly,thecoastaltownswereperceivedtobe

morecivilisedandcosmopolitanthantheinteriorpartsofthecountry,asaresultofIndianand

Islamicinfluences.13

13Capt.MalcolmMcNeilofSomalilandFieldForcewrotein1902aboutcoastaltownsthat“Indianwaysandcustoms(andwiththemAdenprices)cameintovogueintheSomalicountrywhere….thecoinageis

46|P a g e

Thecolonialgovernment’sviewsoncosmopolitanismwerecharacterisedbybinaryoppositions

whereontheonehanditconsideredcosmopolitanspacesaslesssusceptibletoharbouringlocal

resistance,14 but on the other it encouraged clan segregation due to the ease with which

administrationfunctionswereoperablethroughprecolonialinstitutions,particularlytheAkils.

Priortothearrivalofcolonialpowers,Hargeisawasaruralsettlementpopulatedbynomadic

clanswhoseasonallymigratedinandoutofthearea.PermanentsettlementinHargeisabegan

withthearrivalofIslamicclericsinthemid-19thcentury,whoseauthoritywascastastakinga

cosmopolitan non clannish form (War Office General Staff, 1907, p. 51). Hargeisa’s urban

nucleusisattributabletoIslamicclericswhooftenhailedfromdifferentclansandcommanded

highlevelsofrespectamongthenomadsallowingthemto“settledownandformpermanent

villages”inanyspaceoftheirchoosingregardlessoftheirclanbackgrounds(Irons,2013,p.20).

InadditiontotherespectforthereligionembodiedbytheseagentsofGod,tolerancetowards

Islamicclericswasfosteredbytheirprovisionofeducationalandhealthservices,inmanycases

freeofcharge(Briggs,2012).Suchservicesattractedpeopleofdifferentbackgroundsseeking

Islamic knowledge and treatment, making cleric-dominated urban places cosmopolitan.

ThroughouttheearlyyearsofBritishrule,urbandevelopmentinHargeisaremainedmodestand

segregatedalongracial,ethnicandclanlines.GovernmentquarterswerelocatedintheWest

andservedastheareawherethewhitesandtheirIndiansubordinatesresided,whiletheSomali

populationwasmainlyconfinedtotheEastandtheNorthofthetown.MajRayne,whovisited

Hargeisa,describeditasa“townofsticks/andnativemats[and]afewsun-driedbrickhouses”

andagovernmentquarters(1921).Thegovernmentquartersconsistedof“districtheadquarters

[with]Europeanaccommodationforofficialsandgovernmentofficesandotherinstallations”.15

TheestimatedpopulationofHargeisawas1000in1907(Swayne,1996)butinlittlemorethan

adecadethisnumbergrewto2000makingthesettlementthebiggestofahalfadozencleric

dominatedvillagesintheinteriorpartsofthecountry16(FOHS,1919).

in rupees,andHindustanibeenspokenbyverymanySomalis ispractically theofficial languageof thecountry”(Fergusson,2013).

14ThisissobecausethefirstresistancetocolonialrulewasinstigatedinBerberabythemanlaterlabelledasthe‘madmullah’,buthefailedtowintheheartsandthemindsofthetown’seliteswhoconsistedofpeoplefromdifferentethnicandracialgroups.

15TNACO535/141/7Theseatofgovernment.

16Theestimatedpopulationoftheprotectorateatthetimewasabout300,000.

47|P a g e

The urban significance of Hargeisa was boosted in 1942/3 when it became the seat of the

protectorate’sadministration following thedestructionof thegovernmentoffices inBerbera

duringthewarwiththeItalians(Millman,2013).Themovementofthecapitalwasattributable

toanumberoffactorsthatinclude:firstlythefactthatHargeisawasincloseproximitytomajor

traderoutessuchasEthiopiaandDjibouti; secondly,militaryattentionshifted fromtheeast

followingthedefeatoftheMullahbecauseoftheItalianpresenceinEthiopia;thirdlyHargeisa’s

weatherconditionswerefriendlierthanBerberawhichgetsextremelyhotduringthesummer;

fourthly,theWesternpartofthecountryhadahigherpopulationdensitythantheEast;and

lastlyHargeisawasbynowthelargestinteriorsettlementinthecountry.17Beingthenewseat

of government, Hargeisa received greater infrastructural development in the run up to

independence(BritishSomalilandProtectorate,1945).Thesenewprojectsfurtherentrenched

the spatial character of the town as they followed the previous settlement patterns.

Governmentoffices,stores,camps,andhousingforexpatriates(manyofwhomcamefromthe

otherBritishdependenciesinAsia),werebuiltintheWesternsideofthecity(BritishSomaliland

Protectorate,1954,BritishSomalilandProtectorate,1958)whiletheSomalisectionsremained

underdevelopedandneglected.

The spatial segregation of the city was manifest not only in physical but also social terms.

AccordingtoLaurenceandThomas(2010)therewasaclearsocialdemarcationbetweenthe

EuropeanquartersofthecityandtheSomalisection.Forinstance,itwasatabooforaEuropean

womantovisittheSomalipopulatedpartofthetownunaccompaniedoronfoot.Moreover,the

European population of the town was itself also divided along ethnic lines socially and

economically.WhileEuropeansofBritishdescentmainlyoccupiedprestigiousgovernmentjobs,

Italians(manyofwhomwerefromItalianSomalia)wereoftenengagedinnon-officebasedjobs

such as mechanics and low-profile engineering occupations. The internal segregation of

Europeanswas not limited to economic differences but also social disparities. Little cultural

interactionexistedbetweentheItaliansandtheBritish.Equally,theSomalipopulationinthe

citywasdividedalongclanlines.TheGarhajis.Arab,Awal,andAyubbelongtotheIsaaqbranch

oftheSomaliclanswhereasGaboyebelongstotheminorityclansoftheSomalia.

PostcolonialHargeisaretainedthesamespatialcharacterdevelopedundercolonialrule.Itwas

dividedintoquarters;thegovernmentquarterandthecivilianquarters.Theformerhousedthe

17TNACO535/141/7Theseatofgovernment.

48|P a g e

civilservantsandothergovernmentofficialsandunliketherestofthetown,thissectionwas

wellbuiltbythestandardsofthetimeandithadsteadywatersuppliesandelectricityaswellas

somepavedroads.TheEasterncivilianquarterconsistedoftwomajorneighbourhoodsdivided

bytheriverbed,withtheNorthbeingalittlemorebuiltupthantheSouth.Thedeteriorating

economicsituation inSomalilandafter independencehasalso furtherentrenchedthespatial

segregationofthecity.Fourdaysafterindependence,SomalilandunitedwithSomaliaandthis

dawnedaneweraforHargeisaasmeagrestateresourceswerechannelledtodevelopingthe

capital, Mogadishu, making it the prime city and central focus of action for all sorts of

opportunities.Asaresult,thehandfulofBritish-trainedskilledmenandtolesserextentwomen

fromSomaliland left for thenewseatofgovernment.Equally,businessmenfromSomaliland

increasinglyshiftedtheirfocustotheSouth,leavingHargeisaforthoseunableorunwillingto

relocate forwhatever reason.Soonafter independence, theurbanelites fromtheNorth felt

side-lined notwithstanding the fact that they believed that they weremore qualified than

Southerners(Gulaid,undated).

ThisdiscontentresonatedwiththebroaderpopulationintheNorthwhowerealsoincreasingly

realisingthattheunionwaslessfruitfulthananticipated.ThemarginalisationoftheNortherners

wasmorevisibleinHargeisathaninanyothertownsinthecountryduetothefactthatHargeisa

in the latter years of the British colonial powerwas progressively becoming a capital in the

making for a future Somaliland state. In the two decades after independence, however,

unprecedented numbers of development projectswere implemented in the South. The first

major resistance to thismarginalisation came in1962whenmilitaryofficers from theNorth

staged a coup in Hargeisa.18 Although this failed, therewas a backlash in the form of state

repression of theNorthern population. In otherwords, the after effect of this coup further

entrenchedthemarginalisationofHargeisa.CivilservantsfromtheNorthwerereplacedwith

Southerners.Thisfuelledtensioninthecityaspeoplecouldnolongeridentifywiththestate,

andfeltswampedbyalargerandmorepopulousSouthernbrother.Itisimportanttonotethat

the social support system that the clan structure provides became an effective response

mechanism for theharsheconomic reality inwhichNortherners found themselves after the

Union.AslimitedurbanemploymentopportunitiesmadeitdifficultformanySomalistosurvive

18Capitalisingonthediscontentamongthepeopleinthenorth,ColHassonKeydAbdilleWalanwalwhoreturned from SandhurstMilitary College in theUK led 25 junior officers to take overmajormilitarybarracksandtheradioinHargeisa.

49|P a g e

inHargeisa,socialnetworkingandclancontactsbecamethebasisonwhichnewcomerssurvived

theharsheconomic realityof the town. Inotherwords, itwasmore likely for somebody to

surviveinaneighbourhoodpopulatedbyhisorherkinsmen/womenthanareaswherethatis

notthecase.

Inthe1980s,acivilwarbrokeoutintheNorthernregionsofSomalia(asstatedelsewherein

Chapter2).Thewarbeganasaresultofa long-termmarginalisationofnotonlythepolitical

classbutalsotheordinarypeoplefromtheNorth.Employmentopportunitiesbecamerelatively

scarce in the northern cities and the meagre service delivery inherited from the colonial

authoritiesdeterioratedsignificantly.TheNortherndiscomforthoweversubsidedintheearly

yearsofthemilitarycoupwhichinthebeginninggainedasignificantpublicsupportacrossthe

country.Asthebrutalityofthemilitaryregimeincreased,thepublicsupportstartedtodwindle

inthemid1970sandNortherndiscomfortresurfacedagain.Theregime’swarwithEthiopiain

1977alsoprecipitatedtheemergenceofmajorcrackswithinthemilitaryrankspartlybecause

of clanpoliticsanddivision in the system.SNM,whichcapitalised significantlyondefections

fromtheregime,strengtheneditsmilitarycapabilityasaguerrillamovementbetween1981and

1988when it launchedasurpriseattackongovernmentbases inmajorurbancentres in the

North.

Hargeisa became the epicentre of the war Hargeisa and it was heavily bombarded by the

government forces using both heavy artillery and air power (Gilkes, 1989). Almost all the

residents in thecity fledtotheneighbouringcountries,aswellas toAsia,EuropeandNorth

America(Bradbury,2008,Hammond,2014).WhenMohamedSayyadBarrewasremovedfrom

powerin1991,thedisplacedresidentsreturned,reconstructingwhatwasleftoftheirhomes.

The precarious security situation in the aftermath of Barre’s removal from power made it

difficultforpeopleofdifferentclanbackgroundstoresideinthesameneighbourhoodasmany

fearedfallingvictimtorevengeattacksagainst theirclan forearlieroffences.Thisreinforced

clan-baseddivisionofthecityontheonehandbutontheotherhanditcontributedsignificantly

totheresilienceofthecityatatimewhenitwasemergingfromaconflict.For instance,the

clan-basedspatialcharacterofthecityfirstlymadeiteasierforpeopletoliveinareaswhere

theycouldaccessstateservicesthroughavailablesocialnetworks.Secondly,itenabledthecity

tocopewiththehighlevelof inter-urbanmigrationaswellasrural-urbanmigrationbecause

newcomers negotiated space and survival in areas populated by their clan. And thirdly, it

contributed to theconstructionof thecityby thediasporawhoremit substantialamountof

50|P a g e

moneyandtendtotargetneighbourhoodspopulatedbytheirownclanprimarilybecauseof

perceivedlowerrisks.

2.4 Conclusion

Inthischapter,Ihavereviewedtheliteratureonhybridstatebuilding,statelegitimacy,public

trust,andurbansegregation, inanattempt tounderstandhow identity-basedoccupationof

particularurbanspacescantosomedegreebeexplainedbygovernancepractices.Ihaveargued

that there is aneed togobeyondhybridity ifweare tounderstand the spatial characterof

Hargeisa and the drivers and dynamics underpinning its segregation along clan lines.While

state-practicesare important in thedevelopmentof segregation, I alsoargued thatnegative

perceptionsofstatelegitimacyandtheerosionofpublictrustinformalinstitutionscanbecome

acatalystwhichdrivespeopletoresideinareaspredominantlyoccupiedbypeoplewithwhom

theyshare identityandrelationsbasedonkinship. Inmuchofthe literatureonAfricancities

(outsideSouthAfrica),andparticularlyinunderstandingofSomalicities,authorshavepaidlittle

attention to identity-based segregation. This gap in scholarship is replicated in policy and

practice. In contexts where efforts have beenmade to dismantle geographical segregation,

bridgingthegapinspatialinequalityoftenbecameamonumentaltaskwithfewtangibleresults.

The problem partly lies in misplaced priorities, as there has been a blatant failure of the

interveningauthoritiestotransformtheconditionsthat initiallyerodedpublictrust informal

institutions. I have argued that policy efforts in the Somali context aimed at bringing about

greater social cohesion above the clan identity, during both postcolonial and post-conflict

periods, failed because of the manner in which the state behaved. For instance, the state

breached water but drank wine during the postcolonial period, as it failed to live by the

principlesitrhetoricallyadvocatedi.e.equitableaccesstoresourcesandservicesregardlessof

one’sidentity.Similarly,thepost-conflicthybridorderhasbecomeboggeddowningovernance

malpractices (nepotism, corruption and cronyism) that undermined trust. The spatial

manifestationof this isa segregatedsettlementpatternbasedonclan identity. Toseehow

thesetheoreticalargumentsexplainingthedevelopmentofurbansegregation,ariseoutof/are

rootedinempiricaldynamicsofurbangovernanceinHargeisainrecentyears,itisfirstnecessary

tospellouttheresearchmethodsofthethesis.

51|P a g e

CHAPTER3 NEGOTIATINGDATACOLLECTIONINASEGREGATEDCITY

3.1 Introduction

Thischapteroutlinestheurbanethnographicmethodsthroughwhichthedataforthisthesis

wascollected.UrbanethnographytracesitsroottotheChicagoSchool(CobbandHoang,2015),

anditsfoundationislargelycreditedtoRobertParkandErnestBurgesswhomadesignificant

contributiontothestudiesofurbanpovertyinthelate1920s,19atatimewhensocialscience

scholarship was shifting its focus to the dynamics of the rapid urban transformation and

populationgrowthincities,particularlyintheUSA(Gubrium,2007).Initsmostbasicdefinition,

urbanethnographycanbeunderstoodasaqualitativeresearchtechniqueaimedatcapturing

the“waysinwhichcitydwellersexperiencetheurbanenvironment—howtheyperceive,cope,

act,orfailtoact”(AuyeroandJensen,2015,p.361).Inthisstudy,however,myfocuswasnot

solely on urban dwellers’ experience, but also to explore urban institutional dynamics and

investigate the history of city governance, which is important in shaping urban residents’

perceptionsandactions.Thedataforthisstudywasgatheredoveraperiodofninemonths.

The duration of the fieldwork was influenced by the accessibility and availability of data,

institutionalarrangementsandmyownfamiliaritywiththefield.Thechapterisorganisedinto

fivesections.Inthefirstsection,Iprovideabriefoverviewofthedatasources–ethnographic,

oralhistoricalandarchival.Inthesecondsection,Idiscussmyexperienceofgatheringdatafrom

state and non-state actors inHargeisa. In the third and fourth sections, I discussmy use of

teashopsinthecityaskeysitesofdatagathering,aswellasmyendeavoursoftracingformer

public officials in the diaspora. In the final section, I explore the limitations and ethical

considerationsoftheresearch.

3.2 BriefOverviewofDataSources

Primarily, this study relieson threemain setsofdata.The first set consistsoforalhistories,

observations, interviews, informal conversations, and focus group discussions, which are

conventionaltourbanethnographicstudies.Thesecondsetconsistsofnewspapers,blogs,and

websites.Thefinalsetconsistsoflocalgovernmentrecords,courtrecords,NGOreports,colonial

archives and other documentary materials. Using snowball sampling from initial contacts, I

conductedatotalof91interviews(notallofwhichareciteddirectly),namelykeyinformantand

19See(Parketal,1925).

52|P a g e

personalinterviews.Thekeyinformantinterviewswereconductedwithpeopledeemedtohave

specialist knowledge and insight into urban land and conflictmanagement as well as other

relevanturbangovernanceelementssuchasdevelopmentplanningandmanagement.

Iselectedtheintervieweesfromthepredominantclansinthecity,namelyHabarAwal(which

includesSa’adMuseandIsseMuse),Garhajis(whichincludesHabarYonisandEidagale),Arab,

AyubandGaboye20.Clanrepresentationforthisstudywasparticularlyimportantinanumber

ofways.Firstly,identityplaysacrucialroleinhowpeoplenavigatethroughserviceprovisionin

thecity, largelybecauseofgovernancemalpractices,whichreinforcesclan identityaswillbe

seenintheempiricalchapters.Secondly,clanbalanceiscrucialforrepresentingdivergentviews

andtoconstructanoverallnarrativeofcitydynamics.Thirdlyandmoreimportantly,Ifeltthat

myattemptsforclanbalancecouldshieldmefrombeingaccusedofbiastowardsaparticular

clan,moreso since Ihail froma local clan,HabarYonis.However, Idonot seeclanoreven

Somali-ness, for thatmatter,asa significant shaperofmy identity;norwould Iwant tocast

myselfasessentiallyWesternisedorurbanite(incontrasttoLewis’s(1961)characterisationof

thosewhodonot identifywithclannismasWesternisedorLulling’s (2006)depictionofsuch

groupsasurbanites).

WhileIcanneitherclaimnorrefusetobeurbaniteorrural,WesternisedorNon-Westernised,

whatIcanassertandinsististhatmylifeexperiencemorethananythingelseconstitutesmy

identity.However,theproblemwithmylifeexperienceisthatitkeepsonchangingandbreaking

all the rulesof fixed identity, takingmeacrossmanyboundaries i.e.my trajectoryhasbeen

transurban,transrural,transnational,andtranscivilisation.Inanutshell,mylifeexperienceand

senseofbelongingtraversesthedominantformsofbelongingsuchasclan,tribe,nation,and

nationality. Likemanyothers on themove, I alternately acquire and shedoff aspects ofmy

identityasmylifechanges–young-old,rural-urban,citizen,refugee-citizen–orasisrequired

byaparticularcontextataparticularpointintime.Keytriggersofthesechangesincludeboth

socialandeconomicinfluences.Forinstance,livingindifferentcountriesequippedmewiththe

ability of acquiring a set of social and economic skills as well as experiences that were not

essential for negotiating space in the host societies but which were also important for

broadeningmyscopeofworldviews.

20ClangroupingsinSomalilandaremainlyDir,DaaroodandGabooye.DirincludesIsaaq,Gedabuursi,Issa,andAkishawhereasDaaroodincludesDhulbahanteandWarsengeli.

53|P a g e

MypositiononclanisimportanthereatatimewhentheSomaliidentityrecentlytookthecentre

stageinaheateddebateaboutknowledgeproductioninSomalistudies:controversyhingedon

whetherornotitwaspossibleforSomaliresearcherstoriseabovetheirownclan,objectively

analysepoliticalrealitiesintheirowncountry(s)andproduceunbiasedknowledge(Aidid,2015,

Hoehne,2015,Mirre,2015,Mohamud,2015,Serunkuma,2015).

Besidesclanbackground, Ialsoselected interviewees fromparticularly relevantoccupational

categories.TheyincludedMinisters,Parliamentarians,civilservants,judges,traditionalleaders,

religiousleaders,NGOworkers,andformerpublicofficials,includingsomebasedinthediaspora

(Seetable2).Theagegroupsoftheparticipantsrangedfrom18sto70s(theseagesarebased

onmyownestimations).Thepersonalinterviewswereconductedwithpeoplewhohaddirect

experienceof issues related tourban landmanagementandurban landconflicts.This setof

interviewees include landowners or claimants aswell as relatives of those affectedby land

conflictsorrelatedviolence.WhileIgenerallytriedtointerviewasdiversearangeofpeopleas

possible to gain different perspectives on urban matters, the voice of women is not well

representedinthisresearchduetoinaccessibilitychallenges.Onlythreekeyinformantsanda

focus group discussion consisting of five women were interviewed for this research. To

compensate for this underrepresentation, most court cases I selected for analysis involved

women.

The interviews and other research material were used variedly in the research. Some case

studiesexploredingreaterdepthreliedonanarrowerselectionofinterviewswhileothershad

a larger rangeof interviews andother secondarymaterials. For instance, the case study of

conflict around the airport relied on a less diverse range of informants because it pitted

membersofpredominantlyoneclan(theEidgaleclan)andagainstthestate.Asaresult,most

ofmyinformantsinthisregardwerefromthisclan.

Table2:Therangeofkeyinformantandgeneralinterviews

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

KEY INFORMANTS PERSONAL INFORMANTS

Politician (2) Land Owner - Taxi driver

Policeman Land Owner - Farmer (2)

Police Station Commander Land Owner – Agro-pastoralist (2)

Hargeisa Local Government Councillor Hargeisa Resident - involved in land dispute (2)

Opposition Member of Parliament Relatives of one of the attackers (3)

Member of Parliament Relatives of one of the attackers (2)

54|P a g e

Official - Ministry of Public Works Relatives of one of the attackers

Official - Ministry of Aviation and Air Transport Land Broker (2)

Ministry of Public Works Official (2) Farmer

Ministry of Aviation – Official Famous Playwright

Military Official Unemployed

District Officer Student

District Court Judge (2) SNM Fighter

Director of Civil Unit - Legal Aid Clinic Lawyer - Farmer's Son (2)

Director General of the Ministry of Public Works Lawyer - Farmer's Son

Director General - Ministry of Aviation and Air

Transport

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

Director UNDP – JPLG Somali Official

Civil Servant UNHABITAT – International Staff

Chairman of Land Commission NGO Worker

Former Minister of Interior. Activist for displaced people (2)

Former Mayor of Hargeisa (2) Activist and Social Researcher.

Solicitor General of Somaliland IT Specialist in an NGO

Prosecutor Religious Leader

Criminal Lawyer TRADITIONAL LEADERS

Legal Advisor for Electoral Commission Sultan (2)

Lawyer (2) Elder (2)

Oral Historian, Artist and Radio Presenter. Clan Elder

Local Resident Involved in Land Dispute Son of a Chief Akil and Lecturer at the University of Hargeisa

Academic INFORMANTS IN THE DIASPORA

Retired Agricultural Economist Former Governor of North Western Province.

Former District Commissioner of Hargeisa

Former Chairman of Somaliland Atrocities Commission.

Seaman21 from Hargeisa

The above-mentioned interviewswere complementedby four focus groupdiscussions. Each

focusgroupconsistedofatleastof6individualsfromadiverserangeofbackgrounds,selected

fortheirsharedexperienceandinterestinaparticulartheme(TraceyandBurgess,2001).Like

the interviews, I selected the focus group

participants fromvarying social and interest

groups such as the youth, business people,

women’s groups, members of the religious

community, and predominant clans in the

city,namelyHabarAwal,Garhajis,Araband

Ayub.Mostofmyinterviewsandfocusgroups

21Therewereonly

LIST OF FOCUS GROUPS

Traditional Leaders Focus Group (8 Participants)

Religious Leaders Focus Group (5 Participants)

Women’s Focus Group Discussion (5 Participants)

Preliminary Focus Group on Land Conflict (7 Participants)

Table3:Thelistoffocusgroups

55|P a g e

discussionsweredrawnfromtheIsaaqclansnotwithstandingthefactthat Ialso interviewed

fewpeoplefromotherclans.ThisissobecauseHargeisaispredominantlypopulatedbyIsaaq.

Moreover,Hargeisa’sidentityisincreasinglybecomingexclusionarypartlybecauseofthefact

thatthecity’spre-conflicthistoryisunderemphasised.Forinstance,therearefewmonuments

inthecitysuchasthejetfighterinfrontoftheformerCommercialBankofSomalia,atankona

roundabout in from of Bar Hargeisa and a hand holding themap of Somaliland in Kaalinta

Sideedaad:allofwhichsignifyconflictandorimmediatepost-conflictIsaaqcentredhistorical

references. Thismakes the city identity Isaaq centred and it has to some extent influenced

availabilityandaccesstoinformation.

Among the social groups included in the studywere also returnees from the diaspora. The

intention was to be inclusive. As focus groups tend to either become consensual where

participantsmostlyagreeonthediscussedissuesordissentientwheretheydisagreesignificantly

(TraceyandBurgess,2001), Iemployedcarefulmoderation soas toensure that issueswere

debatedbytheirmerit.Thefirstfocusgrouptookplaceintheearlystageofmyfieldwork,with

theaimofgettingageneralpictureofkeyissuesandthecurrentandhistoricaltrendsofurban

governance in the city. The second and third focus groups examined the interface between

urbaninstitutionaldynamicsandurbanland,asitemergedthatcontrolsoverurbanlandwere

verysignificantsourceofconflict.Theselatterfocusgroupswereparticularlydedicatedtothe

rolesoftraditionalandIslamicinstitutionsinrelationtolandaccessibility,landadministration,

andconflictmanagement.The last focusgroupsexaminedhowwomenareaffectedby land

conflictandtheirresolutionmechanisms.Inputfromthefocusgroupsarecitedasgroupsrather

thanindividuals.

OneofthemajorchallengesIfacedwiththeinterviewsandfocusgroupsrelatedtotheprocess

of interviewingwomen.On the onehand, I feared thatwhen interviewingwomenwith the

consentof theirhousehold leaders, itmightdiminish thequalityof the informationbecause

femaleparticipantsmaygivemeversionsof thestorywithwhichtheythinktheirhousehold

leaderswouldbehappy.Ontheotherhand,ifwomenwereinterviewedintheabsenceoftheir

householdleadersthatmayposeagreaterriskofadisputewheretherelationshipofthefamily

mightbeatarisk.Thisconcernwasaddressedthroughpriorconsiderationandassessmentof

particularinterviewees’circumstancesandbyaskingviewsoftheirfamilyabouttheinterviews.

Given the unequal power relations between men and women in Somali settings, careful

selectionofvenueswascrucialforwomeninterviewees.Itriednottomakeassumptionsand

sought tomitigate thesepower relationsby attempting tohold interviews in awoman-only

56|P a g e

sessioninthelocationoftheirchoice.IaskedthemtosuggestavenuebuttheyinsistedIshould

alsoproposesomelocationsforthemtochoosefrom.AmongthesitesIrecommendedincluded

theUniversityofHargeisa’sLawDepartment,theOCVPoffice,restaurantswithprivatemeeting

rooms, and a notary firm in the city centre. They unanimously chose the latter for its

convenience for public transport and proximity to shops where many of them wanted to

proceed,andthefirm’smeetingroomswithwhichatleastoneoftheparticipantswasfamiliar.

Whileconductingthediscussions,Iobservedthatwomenfounditdifficulttotalkabouttheir

experienceinfrontofotherwomenforfearofpeerlabellingandpressure.Socialstatussuchas

employment, age and household positions also influenced the interviewswithwomen. For

instance,IfoundthatdiscussionsweremoreopenandfrankwhereIconductedinterviewswith

high-rankingfemaleofficialsinNGOandGovernment,aswellaswiththeolderwomen.Another

challengeIfacedwithinterviewsandfocusgroupsrelatedtofinance.Inanenvironmentwhere

NGOs conduct assessment exercises regularly, itwas often difficult to get intervieweeswho

werewillingtoshareinformationwithoutbeingpaid.Insomecases,Iwasabletoovercomethis

byinformingtheparticipantsaboutmystatusasastudent,emphasisingthatIwastheretolearn

andshareknowledgeabout“ourpeople”inacademicfora.Butinmanyinstances,Ihadtopay

transportationandrefreshmentexpensesforintervieweesandfocusgroupdiscussants,using

theOCVP financial infrastructure to issue receipts toensure transparencyandaccountability

(andIthenreimbursedtheOCVP).

In addition to the focus groups and interviews,media sources also proved to be important

platforms for gathering information about the city. I monitored issues relating to land

administrationandconflictinthepopularSomaliwebsitesandblogs,aswellasrelatedYouTube

channels,whichare increasinglybecomingapopularmethodofdisseminating informationin

theSomalicontext.Thismadememoreawareofawidearrayofsocialandpoliticalissuesnot

necessarily directly connected but relevant to my study. Among the websites I monitored

included salaanmedia.com, qarrannews.com, hadhwnaagnews.com, somaliland.org,

somalilandpress.com, and others. I often stored videos and articles from these sources in a

thematicallyorganisedplaylisttobeabletoaccesslater.Thedataobtainedfromthesesources

wasparticularlyimportantforgaininginsightintothedynamicsofthelandconflictattheairport

andthemilitarybaseintheeastofthecity.

In addition, I monitored the social, political and economic climate in the city through

participating in discussions in teashops, which are important public places where people

57|P a g e

socialiseanddiscussvariousissuesrangingfrompoliticstosports.Thepoliticalaspectsofsuch

discussionareoften termed, in theSomali language, fadhikudirir.This loosely translates to

engaging in conflict while sitting. In other words, it is a form of public discourse in which

participantsintimately(orseeminglyso)debateabouttopicsrangingfromsocialandreligious

issues to economic and political issues. Such debates provided particularly a significant

opportunityforgainingurbanethnographicdata.

Theabove-mentionedinterviews,focusgroups,teashopdiscussions,andmediasourceswere

supplementedwith reportsandother recentpost-conflictarchivalmaterials collected locally

from NGOs and independent consultants. I also draw on important historical materials,

collectedfromtheNationalArchivesandtheBritishLibrary.Thesecolonialreportsandarchives

wereimportantforhistoricisingurbangovernanceinHargeisa.Historicaldocumentsarehardto

comeby,asthecitywasalmostentirelylevelledtothegroundinthelate1980swhenwarbroke

outbetweenSNMandthemilitaryregimeofMohamedSiyadBarre.Ofcourse,thesecolonial

documentsandarchiveswerewrittenfromparticularpoliticalandadministrativeorientations

thatrequirecarefulscrutiny.OneofthewaysinwhichItriedtoovercometheselimitationswas

touseoralhistoricalnarrativesasacounter-balancetocolonialsources.Inthenextsection,I

will outline the key dynamics and contours of assembling data from the above-mentioned

sources.

3.3 InstitutionalAffiliationandAccessibilityofInformants

Myfieldworkbeganin lateFebruary2014,whenIarrivedinHargeisafromLondon. Itwasa

familiarenvironmentbothatthepersonalandprofessionallevel.Atthepersonallevel,Igrew

upinthiscity,havingasaresultbothfamilyandfriendnetworks,whileattheprofessionallevel,

I worked with the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP). The PhDwas a

collaborativedoctoral studyco-sponsoredby theOCVPand theUniversityofSussex.On the

OCVP side, the funding was a small part of £1.8 million grant from the United Kingdom’s

Department of International Development (DFID) for research into conflict, governance and

justiceinSomalia.MyaffiliationwiththeObservatoryservedasanasset.Itprovidedmewith

statusandavisibleandknownbase,astheorganisationhasahistoryofresearchinthecity.It

alsopermittedmetohaveaccesstovariousnetworksingovernmentalandnon-governmental

agenciesaswellasresearchfacilitiesandlogisticalsupport.

InthefirstweekofmystayinHargeisa,IarrangedameetingwiththeDirector,AbdullahiOdowa,

oftheOCVPtoupdatehimaboutmystudyanddiscusstheroleIcouldplayintheorganisation’s

58|P a g e

researchactivities,whilenotlosingfocusonthedatacollectionforthePhD,aswellashowthe

organisation could supportme inmy study.My secondmeetingwaswith the Logistical and

HumanResourcesmanager,SafiaAhmed.WediscussedwaysinwhichIcouldshareaccessto

theorganisational facilitiesandnetworks.Thecentral focusof themeetingwasofficespace,

meetingvenuesandtransportation.Atthetimeofmyarrival,theOCVPhadseveralvacantdesk

spacesandtwomeetingrooms.Inlightofthis,accesstomeetingvenuesandallocationofdesk

spacewererelativelystraightforward,butthesamewasnotthecasefortransportationasthere

wereonlytwovehicles,aminibusandafour-wheel-drive,sharedbyallmembersofthestafffor

theirday-to-dayduties.Asaresult,themanagerrightlyaskedmetoprovideherwithadvance

noticeofmyresearchactivities,soastoprioritiseaccesstotransportation.

One problem I encountered in fulfilling this requirement was the fact that in many cases

appointmentsweremadeonadhocbasisoftenrequiringmetobeflexibleandmeetinformants

atatimeandplaceoftheirchoice,mostlywithveryshortnotice.Thiswasmadeallthemore

difficult by the fact thatmeetings were constantly cancelled or delayed by the informants,

particularly key informantsworking for thegovernment. Furthermore, theabsenceofpublic

transportthatcouldcomplementmyaccesstotheOCVPtransportationwasalsoahindrance.

Inordertoovercometheseproblems,thereweretwochoices.Rentorbuyacar.Ioptedforthe

latter and bought a second hand car at the cost of $2100, payable in instalments. Thiswas

moderately cheaper than renting car at a cost of $600 per month. Being from the local

community, it is important to mention that my experience with logistical issues and their

interface with safety and security was relatively cheaper than that of foreign researchers

negotiating data collection in Somaliland. The latter are required to hire armed escort from

special police units established to protect foreigners with two 4x4 vehicles outside the

immediatebordersofthecity22(Gandrup,2014).

Inthesecondweekofmystayinthefield,Iturnedmyattentiontomappingouttheinstitutions,

placesandpeoplethatcouldshedlightonurbangovernancedynamicsandtheirinterfacewith

segregation.TheinstitutionsandpeopleIidentifiedincludedbothstateandnon-stateactors.

Chief among the state actors were officials in local government, the statutory courts, the

Ministries of Public Works, Interior, Aviation, and Planning. The non-state actors included

traditionalleaders,suchasAkilsandSultans,aswellasreligiousleaders,suchastheclericsand

22Thislimitsforeignresearchers’abilitytomeetrelevantinformantsinthenearbyvillagessurroundingthecity.

59|P a g e

informal Islamiccourts.Theyalso includednon-governmentalorganisationsbothat the local

and international level. At the international level, I was interested in the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP), particularly the Joint Program on Local Government (JPLG),

whichsupportsinitiativesaimedatimprovinglocalgovernance;andtheUnitedNationsHabitat

Program,whichsupportedsomedevelopmentplanningexercisesinHargeisa.Atthelocallevel,

Iwas interestedingettingconnectionswiththeAcademyforPeaceandDevelopment(APD),

whichhas in thepastdone significant researchon land conflicts; and the Social Research&

DevelopmentInstitute(SORADI),whichalsohasahistoryinresearchonlocalgovernanceand

advocacy forhuman rights; and the LegalAidClinic,whichprovides legal assistance topoor

peoplewhocannotaffordlegalrepresentation.

3.4 NegotiatingResearchinStateandNon-StateSpheres

IbeganmyinquirywithselectedpublicofficialsinlocalgovernmentandtheMinistryofPlanning.

Iassumedthatelitemembersofsocietywouldbedifficulttoaccess(HertzandImber,1993),

asresearchersinAfricancontextshavepointedtothedifficultyinobtaininginformationfrom

publicofficialsbecausetheyareeitherunusedorunwillingtogivedata(Gokah,2006).Inthe

secondweekofmyfieldwork,IformallyapproachedthelocalgovernmentExecutiveSecretary,

whoisthesecondmostpowerfulfigureintheMunicipality.Afterbriefinghimaboutmyresearch

overthephone,hegavemeanappointmenttomeethimat10o'clockonthe4thofMarch2014.

However,whenIreportedtohisoffices,hewasnotavailable.Itriedtocallandinformhimabout

mypresencebuthedidnotpickupthephone.Ispentthedayinandaroundtheofficesoflocal

governmentinHargeisa,hopingtocheckhimagaininhisoffice.Theproblemoflocatingpublic

officialsduringtheformalhoursismadeallthemoredifficultbythefactthattheworkinghours

inSomalilandareonly08:00amuntil12pm.Astherewasnosignofhimcomingtotheoffice,I

wentbacktomystationat1:00pm.Thefollowingday,IcalledtheExecutiveOfficerandpolitely

toldhimaboutthefactthatIhadwaitedinhisoffice.Hetoldmethathewouldbeabletomeet

methefollowingday.ButthesamehappenedonthenextdayandIhadtoreturntotheOCVP

empty-handed.

Thefollowingweek, IwenttotheMinistryofPlanningandspoketothereceptionaboutmy

research.Aftercarefullylookingatthelistoftheofficebearersonthenoticeboard,Iaskedfor

thenamesandcontactdetailsof those I thought tobepotentialkey informants.However, I

wentthroughthesameexperience,asIwasunabletolocatethem,excepttheMinisterwhomI

foundtobenotonlypunctualbutalsoengaging.ThesehiccupsconvincedmethatIneededto

60|P a g e

change tactics. I imagined that social networking andmore informal ethnographicmethods

wouldbemoreeffectiveinlocatingkeypublicofficialsthanformallyapproachingthemintheir

offices. In the thirdweek ofmy research, I reorientedmy strategies and contacted the key

peoplethatIneededthroughinformalsocialnetworks.Thechangeinstrategyworkedforme

inaverysignificantway.WhenIlocatedindividualsinformallythroughsocialnetworks,Iwas

abletosavetimeandresourcesasmyappointmentswereveryrarelycancelled.Thisapproach

alsoenabledmetobypasstheredtapebureaucracyofformalappointments.SoIconcentrated

myeffortsongettingkeypublicofficialsinlocalgovernmentinthismanner.Localgovernment

in itself was important to understand in order to gain insight to how recent urban politics,

governanceandplanninginHargeisaworks,anditsimpactonurban-dwellers’lives.Inaddition,

local government offices were important as they housed the Land Tribunal – or Land

Commission as it is popularly known -which dealswith land issues in the city, andwhich I

regardedasakeysourceofinformation.

Throughinformalsocialnetworks,Imanagedtogetholdofthreecouncillors,oneofwhomwas

responsibleforurbanlandmanagementandconflicts.Asidefromprovidingmewithinformation

and grantingme an interview, hewas also crucial in facilitating further contactswithin the

municipal council. Having secured key contacts and interviews from themunicipal council, I

turnedmyattentiontotheLandCommission.Iapproachedalegalpractitionerinmycontacts

tohelpmelocatesomeofthekeyjudgesandCommissionersintheLandCommission.Hewas

abletoputmeincontactwiththechairmanoftheCommissionwhowastrainedasalawyerat

theUniversityofHargeisaandwhoalsoworkedwith theMinistryofPublicWorks.Our first

meeting occurred in a city centre restaurant, Hadhwanaag, where we had informal

conversations aboutmy research aswell as the general political climate in the country.My

familiaritywithlocalpoliticsallowedmetoengagewithhiminformally,whichinturnfacilitated

mylaterrelationshipwiththeCommission.Hesetmeanappointmentwithinacoupleofdays

attheLandCommissionofficesinthelocalgovernmentpremises.Ihadaformalinterviewwith

himandwithanothertwojudgesofthesameCommissioninthenextweek.Ialsoaskedthe

chairmanwhetherhecouldallowmetositinsomeofthehearingstowhichheagreed.Ishowed

upthedayofthehearing.

Unfortunately,however,thisdidnotgoaccordingtoplan,asoneofthejudgesthrewmeoutof

thecourtalongwithsomejournalistswhowantedtocoverthecase.Iwaitedforthehearingto

endandthenapproachedthechairmanoftheCommissiontointroducemetotherestofthe

judgesincludingtheonewhothrewmeout.AfterformalintroductiontothoseIhadnotyetmet

61|P a g e

before,Iwasgrantedpermissiontolistentoanothercaseinthesameweek.Asaresult,Iwas

abletoattendthesubsequenttrialandobservehowtheCommissionoperatesanddischarges

itsdutieswhendecidingcases.Thejudgesalsograntedmeaccesstosomeofthecourtrecords.

Theyinstructedthesecretarytogivemeelectroniccopiesofsomecasesandalsophotocopied

theregisterforme.WhileIwasthusabletogetformalwrittenjudgementsofabout100cases,

thesecretarywastoobusytocopythefullregister,butsheallowedmetodosomyself.This

registerofcasesfrom2009to2013wasaparticularlyimportantsourceforme,asitenabledme

toseethegeographicaldistributionoflandconflictsinthecity.Italsoenabledmetohavean

ideaaboutthelandconflicttrendssolvedthroughtheformalcourtsinthe5yearsfrom2009.

Followingthesuccessfulattainmentofkeycontactsinstatedomains,Iturnedmyattentionto

non-stateactors.IbeganthisendeavourwithinternationalandlocalNGOs.Whilemypersonal

networksandOCVPlinkswereuseful inaccessinglocalNGOs,thesamewasnotthecasefor

internationalNGOs.Thiswasbecausekeyofficialsintheseorganisationswereinternationalstaff

whocouldnotbeaccessedthroughmyexistingpoolofsocialnetworks,whichmainlyconsisted

ofSomalis.Whereaccesswaspossible, the internationalorganisationswere less informative

andweremuchstricteroninformationsharing.Forinstance,Irequestedaccesstoshapefiles

heldbytheUnitedNationsHabitatPrograminordertomakesomemapsofurbansegregation

inHargeisabutwasunabletoobtainthemastheUNHabitatProgramkeepsatightlidonsuch

data.Thismightbepartlyattributabletothefactthattheywereunwillingtosharesensitive(or

evennon-sensitive)datawhichcouldaffect their relationshipwith thegovernment.Another

reasonwhyaccesstointernationalNGOsmighthavebeendifficultisthefactthattherewasa

senseof competitionbetween researchers coming fromoutsideand the internationalNGOs

who conduct their own research tailored to obtaining funding from donors, which can be

contradictedbyfundingfrombynon-NGOcirclessuchasacademia.

AccesstoIslamicinstitutionswasalsodifficult,primarilybecauseofwidespreadfeelingamong

thereligiouscommunitythattheWest(andbyextensionthoseeducatedintheWest)isoften

biasedagainstthem.Forinstance,myvisittotheIslamiccourtandinteractionswithkeypeople

therewasmoreuptightandformalthantheotherjudicialactorsImet.Thiswassodespitethe

fact that I was introduced to the scholars operating the Islamic court by individuals they

respected and knew. I tried to compensate for this up-tightness through contacts who had

insightintohowIslamiccourtsoperateandinteractwithpeopleinvolvedinlandconflicts.As

evidenthere, individualswhocome fromWesterncountries, regardlessofwhether theyare

Somalisornot,areoftenviewedwithsuspiciouseyes.Moreseriousworries includedthatof

62|P a g e

espionage.InspiteofthefactthatIwasnotdirectlyconfrontedwithaccusationsofthisnature,

I was made aware that social science research in Somali settings is negatively affected by

conspiracytheoriesusedbydifferentsocialforcestodiscreditresearchers.Thefoundationof

such suspicions is not only related to recent world politics but is also rooted historically in

footprints left behind by explorers who disguised themselves as Muslims in order to gain

information about Somali territories. For instance, Richard Burton, a British explorer, who

arrived in the Somali shores in 1854 at a timewhen Somali nomads in the interior parts of

SomalilandhadlittleifanyinteractionwithpeopleofEuropeandecentdisguisedhimselfasan

ArabmerchantwellversedwiththeIslamicknowledgeinordertogaintrustamongthelocals.

SomalisrealisedhewasneitherArabnoramanofreligiousbackground,asclaimed,whenhe

hadalreadyleftthecountry.

Ontheotherhand,accesstotraditionalleaderswasrelativelyeasy.Thiswaspartlybecausethe

OCVPhadavastpoolofcontactsinthecustomarydomain.However,oneproblemIfacedwas

thatmostofthesecontactswereextensivelyexposedtoresearchactivitiesattheOCVP.(The

OCVPconductscontinuousassessmentofsecurity,justiceandgovernanceanditoftencontacts

traditional leaders to provide information). In order to avoid bias primarily inducedby their

familiaritywith the lineofwork theOCVP is involved in, I soughtaccess toother traditional

leaders who had no previous contact with the OCVP in the recent past through my own

independentsocialnetworks.

Havingobtainedcrucialdataonurbanlandmanagementandconflict,Iturnedmyattentionto

thosewhoareinvolvedinoraffectedbyurbanlandmanagementandconflictatthecommunity

andneighbourhoodlevel.Inthebeginning,locatingpeopleinvolvedinurbanlandconflictswas

difficultduetothefactthattheLandCommissiondidnotkeepcontactsofthepeoplewhose

cases it handles. Key to my endeavours for accessing particular communities was the

establishment of trust (Tonkin, 1984). ForHyndman (2001) creating trust could involve the

ethnographerimmersinghim/herselfintherealitys/heisstudying.Theresearcherinthissense

becomespartoftherealityandhencegetsmoreinsight,helpandcooperationintheprocessof

conducting the research. This immersion however still requires overcoming people’s

unwillingnesstocooperateorshareinformation.Lindley(2009)underscorestheimportanceof

existingpersonalandsocialnetworksasameanstostartbuildingtrust.

Theuseofsocialnetworksandvolunteeringtobuildtrustwereparticularlyappropriateforthis

studygiventhatIwasalreadyfamiliarwiththepolitical,socialandeconomiclifeofthepeople

63|P a g e

inthecity.23IapproachedtheInstituteofPeaceandConflictStudiesattheUniversityofHargeisa

aboutthepossibilityofvolunteeringtohelpteachoneoftheircourses.ThethenDirectorofthe

Institute,whowasrecentlyappointedforChief Justice, informedmeaboutanopening fora

part-timepositionforteachingresearchmethodstopostgraduatestudents.Itaughtthiscourse

alongwithanothercolleaguefromUniversityofAddisAbaba,spendingabout6hoursaweek

over a period of one month. Most of those enrolled in the course were working with the

government, non-governmental organisations and themedia. The coursewas taught in two

classes,withatotalnumberof120studentsfromvariouspartsofthecity,whocamewitha

significantdegreeofprofessionalexpertiseandtheirownsocialnetworks. Iwasalsoable to

volunteerforanotheracademicinstitution,theUniversityofBederinHargeisa,inordertowiden

my ability to gather data from different geographical areas. The process of making new

colleagues and everyday working relations paved the way for insightful chatting, informal

probingandlistening,whichaccumulatesalotmoreusefulinformationthanformalinterviews.

Hyndman(2001)providesanexampleinwhichshevolunteeredforanorganisationandwasable

toestablishfriendshipaspeoplegotusedtoher.Inthisway,shewasabletogaininformation

thatwouldhavebeenimpossibleforhertogethadshenotvolunteeredandtriedtowinpeople

overbyshowingherimpartialitytotheofficeandorganisationalpolitics. Impartialityiseven

more important inpost-conflictcontextswherethedegreetowhichone isseenas impartial

playsasignificantroleintheprocessofestablishingtrust(vanderHaaretal.,2013).

Myassociationwiththeaboveuniversitiesandtheirstudentsenabledmetoaccessapoolof

peopleanddataonurban landadministrationandconflictmanagement, indeed,thevarious

issues that surfacedbecame toowide formy focusonunderstanding the interfacebetween

urban governance and segregation. As a result, I concentrated my attention on particular

landmarkcaseswherethestatewasengagedinconflictswithcivilians.Isingledouttwomajor

cases.Thefirstcasewasanactiveon-goingconflictintheairportarealocatedintheSouthern

partofthecitywherethegovernmentwantedtoexpandtheairportboundarybutthelandear-

markedforsuchexpansionwascontestedandclaimedbylocallandowners.Thisledtoaconflict

inwhichthestateandlandownersnearlyclashedonseveraloccasions.Amemberofthestaff

attheOCVP,whoisadriverandrecentgraduateoflawattheUniversityofHargeisaandwhose

23 Nonetheless, the author notes that familiaritywith context is not a guarantee for easier access toinformation.Evenifoneisfamiliarwiththeresearchsite,thereisaneedtore-establishcontactsassomepeoplemayhavechangedtheircontactdetailssorlefttheregion/county.See(Gokah,2006).

64|P a g e

familywasinvolvedintheconflict,MohamedSaeed,wasusefulinmyinitialcontactwiththe

landowners.

ThesecondcasewasaconflictbetweenthemilitaryandciviliansintheEasternpartofHargeisa.

Thegovernmentgave the land inquestion toa localbusinessmanas compensation for land

confiscatedbythemilitaryneartheirheadquartersinHargeisa.Butthecivilianswhooccupied

andclaimedownershipofthelandclaimedithadbeenconfiscatedfromthemforpublicuse

duringthemilitaryregimeandthuscouldnotbegiventothebusinessman,whowasacivilian

justlikethem.Astheconflictdeteriorated,sevenpeoplelosttheirlivesandanotherfivewere

injuredfollowingclashesbetweenthetwosides.AmemberofthestaffintheOCVPputmeinto

contactwithpeoplewhowereinsidersinthisconflict.KeyamongthesewastheSultanofthe

areawhowascrucialinmediatingtheconflictbetweenthestateandcivilians.AlthoughIwas

unabletogetholdofthosewhowereinjuredinthefightbetweenthetwosides,Imanagedto

locatetheir relatives.Thesetwo landmarkcaseswere important formystudytounderstand

howgovernancepracticesfosterurbansegregationinthecity.

3.5 The‛ConflictinSitting’Parlours?SomaliTeashops

Teashopdiscussionswereparticularlyimportantinmyethnographicapproachtounderstanding

popular attitudes and identifying emerging trends and issues related to urban land

administration,landmarketsandconflict.AlthoughIwasalreadyawareoftheimportanceof

teashopdiscussions,theirimportanceassitesofresearchenquirywasbroughttomyattention

byMohamedSeid,aclosefriendwhoisasocialresearcherandatrainedlawyer.Bearingthisin

mind, I experimentedwith these sites, andmy first teashopdiscussionwaswith a groupof

friendsand theirassociateswhom Ihad interviewed in thepast. I agreewithSeid that such

discussionsweremoreopenandengagingthantheformalinterviews.Thisisnottosuggestthat

teashopdiscussionsshouldreplaceformalinterviewsbutrathertoshowthatdiscrepanciesexist

betweenthelevelofengagementandopennessinthetwotechniques.

Theteashopdiscussionsoftentakeplacebetween4to6o'clock,butcanalsolastlonger.This

temporalframeisprimarily influencedbythehightemperatureinthecitywhichkeepsmost

peoplehomeandmostbusinessesclosedbetween1to3:30pm.Oneofmyfavouritespotswas

apopularteashopinthecitycentre.Thisteashopattractedsignificantcrowdsforthreemain

reasons.Firstly,itwaslocatedinastrategicpositionintheheartofthecity,withalmostequal

distance to the various neighbourhoods. Secondly, itwas cheaper thanmost of the formal

teashops–itwaslocatedinpublicopenspaceinfrontofaformercommercialbankandsothe

65|P a g e

ownersdonotorpaylittlerent.Andthirdly,thechanceofonefindingsomeonetheyknowin

this teashop without necessarily having a prior appointment was higher, indeed it has the

reputationofattractingpeoplefromallwalksoflife.OtherteashopsIfrequentedwerelocated

inCalaamadahaneighbourhoodintheSouth,inthecourts’areaintheShacabkaneighbourhood

intheWest,andinnewHargeisaintheEast.Mostoftheseteashopswereoperatedinformally

by small-scale tradersanddidnothavenames. I alsoheldappointmentsanddiscussions in

hotelsandrestaurantssuchastheShiraaqle,Star,MaansoorandAmbassador.

More often than not, people who knew my contacts also joined us and provided crucial

informationand insight into theproblemofurban landmarkets,managementandconflicts.

Discussionsofthisnaturetookmoretimethannormalinterviews.ButthelongerIsatinatea

shopwithpeopleIknew,themorelikelythatotherpeopleIdonotknowjoinedusandprovided

key insights intothetopicunderdiscussion.Forexample, inone instancewewere joinedby

someonewhotookoffenceatourdiscussionsonlandgrabbing,takingissuewithcriticismofa

particularpoliticianwhohadcriticisedapublicofficialwhohailsfromtheirclan.Asaresult,the

visitorjoiningusfeltobligedtoshedlightonanumberoflandallocationstheyknewinvolving

officialsfromotherclans.Amajordrawbackofthistechnique,however,wasthefactthatsome

people steered the discussion into a direction which was not of interest to the research.

However,Iwasflexibleandtolerantinsuchscenarios,soastogaintrustandfriendshipwithmy

contacts.Anotherdownsideoftheteashopdiscussionswasthefactthatasignificantnumberof

thepointsslippedawayfrommemorywhenneithernotesnorrecordingsweremade.24Ioften

wrotedownwhatIcouldsalvagefrommemorywhenIgothome,oftenafter8:00pm.

3.6 ‛OverHere’:Ex-PublicOfficialsandArchivalMaterials

Some of the key individuals who were useful for shedding light on the history of urban

governance in the city were based at the time of the data collection in England and the

Netherlands.Itwasadauntingtasktotrytolocatethemastheyleadalowprofilelife.Istarted

thejourneyof locatingthembyvisitingWoolwichArsenalwherethereisasignificantSomali

community.Imetacloserelative25ofBilleRafle,theformergovernorofHargeisaintheearly

andmid-1970s.Iaskedhimtocallhisuncleandenquireaboutthepossibilityofaninterview.A

24 Research in Somali setting ismoreproductivewhen tape recording is not involved. See (Balthasar,2012).

25Whohimselfwasaformerpoliceofficialinthefinalyearsofthemilitaryregime.

66|P a g e

fewdayslater,closerelativesinformedmethathewaswillingtospeaktome.Asafollowupto

thispermission,Icalledthepublicofficialtoconfirmhisconsentaswellasaskinghimwhether

hewouldprefertomeetinpersonorhaveatelephoneinterview.Heoptedforthelatter.The

otherpublicofficial,OmarBoss,whowasaDistrictCommissionerinHargeisain1967,wasalso

basedinWoolwich.Iapproachedhimwhilesittinginacafeteriaandaskedhimwhetherhecould

talktomeabouthistimeinHargeisatowhichheagreed.Wehadalengthychatinacoffeeshop

wherewe discussed urban governance during his time, particularly urban land and security

management.

Aside fromspeakingto formerpost independencepublicofficials, theBritishLibraryandthe

NationalArchivesalsoheldhistoricaldocumentsonurbangovernanceinHargeisa.Ifirstbecame

familiarwiththeBritishLibraryduringtheearlystageofmystudyandhavesincenichedmyself

aspaceinthisreveredinstitutionforaccessibilityandconvenience(sinceIlivedinLondon)and

becauseithasthesecondlargestcollectionofresearchmaterialsintheworld.WhiletheBritish

Library wasmy primary base for reading andwriting, I also spent twoweeks in the British

National Archives, selecting and scanning relevant materials. The acquaintance with these

institutionswasparticularly importantbecausehistoricalmaterialsonurbangovernanceare

hardtocomebyinSomalilandowingtothefactthatthecountrywentthroughacivilwarwhich

destroyedmuchofthearchivalrecord.

ExceptforthreeinterviewswithinternationalstaffinSomaliland,alltheinterviewsandfocus

group discussionswere conducted in the Somali language. In both the interviews and focus

groupdiscussions,I informedtheparticipantsabouttheirrighttowithdrawatanypoint.The

datawastranscribedinthesourcelanguageandthentranslatedintoEnglish.

3.7 EthicalConsiderationsandLimitationoftheResearch

Ethical consideration for this research was drawn from the six principles stipulated in the

economicandsocialscienceresearchcouncil (ESRC,2010).Theseprinciplesare integrityand

quality,informingresearchparticipants,confidentialityandanonymity,voluntaryparticipation

freefromcoercion,avoidanceofharm,andindependenceandimpartialityoftheresearcher.In

this study, the integrity and quality of the research were safeguarded throughout the data

collectionandanalyticalprocesses.Imadeanexpliciteffortincollectingandanalysingdatato

capturedifferentperspectives.

67|P a g e

Onewayinwhichintegrityissueswarrantedspecialattentioninthisresearchrelatestowhat

Hyndman(2001)callstribalismintheresearchprocess.26Thisreferstotheuseofsocialnetworks

andnational andethnic affiliation as away toobtain information,which couldhaveproved

difficult toobtainotherwise.As I havealreadyelaborated, social networkswereparticularly

important in this study and I exhausted bothmy professional and other social networks to

identifyandlocateinterviewees.

Theresearchparticipantswerefullyinformedabouttheresearch.Eachparticipantwasgivenan

opportunitytoaskquestions,andIansweredthesetothebestofmyability.Whileformalsigned

informedconsenthasbeendeemedobtainableinSomaliland,MohamedandLoewenthal(2009)

pointtotheneedforconsideringhistoricalbackgroundwhenconductingresearchonSomalis.

TheypointoutthatSomalisarenotusedtobeinginterviewedwithasignedconsent.However,

it is important to note that this has changed significantly over the last few decades where

Somaliland was relatively stable and free from widespread repression. Nonetheless, I used

verbalconsentinmystudyprimarilybecauseitmadeinformantstalkmoreopenly.Iwasalsoat

mosttimesinpossessionofaninformationsheetdevelopedforsharingwithpublicofficialsif

requested.Whenusingdiscussionsatteashops,ItriedtoensurethateveryoneknewthatIwas

aresearcher,andknewwhatIwasresearching.Isubjectedthematerialcollectedinthiswayto

closeethicalscrutinybeforeusingit,oftenapproachingindividualsagaintoasktheirpermission

toattributeviews,ormorecommonly,makingsurethatinformationwasanonymised.

Participationinthisresearchwasvoluntaryandfreefromcoercion.Ipaidparticularattention

tohowIwasusingmysocialnetworks.Wherepossible,Iusedhighlyinfluentialpeopleaskey

informantsbutItriedtoavoidusingthemasameansofaccesstoothergeneralinterviewees.I

wantedtoavoidpeoplefeelingobligedtogivemeinterviewsbecauseofthepowerrelations

involved.Wheretheserviceofsuchpeoplebecametheonlywaythroughwhichaccesstothe

soughtindividualswaspossible,Imadeeveryefforttoremovetheimpressionofinfluenceby

theintermediaryperson.

Confidentialityandanonymitywereupheld inthestrictestmannerpossible.Balthasar(2012)

notesthatanonymityisimportantaswhatisbeingsaidmayhaveasignificantimpactonnot

26Hyndman2001showshowidentitybecomesimportantwhenconductingresearch.Shenarratesthatinher fieldwork, the colleagues at theUNofficewhere shewas volunteering suggested introduction toCanadiancolleaguesattheUN.Sheseesthereasonforwhichthisintroductionwasmadewasessentiallyto enable her get access to better facilitation and help for her research through her nationalitybackground.

68|P a g e

onlythepresentbutalsofuturecareersofpeople.Irecordedthenoteswithanelectronicpen

anduploadedthemontoencryptedcloudstoragesoastoavoidtheriskofthenotesgettinglost

with traces of participants. Thiswas particularly important because the study encompassed

interviews fromgovernment employeeswho could lose their jobs for having the courageof

speakingcandidlyabouttheissuesIinvestigated.

Inapost-conflictcitywherediscussiononland-relatedissuesmayevokememoriesofatrocities

committedduringacivilwarthatdisplacedmostoftheresidentsinthecity(Walls,2011),itis

importanttounderstandthatsomepeoplewereunableorunwillingtoshareinformation.Asa

researcher, Iwas fullyawareof thisandrespectedpeople’schoice,assilencecanserveasa

copingstrategyinpost-conflictcontext(Goodhand,2000).

Asindependenceandimpartialityarecrucialforanycrediblestudy,Imadeanuttermosteffort

to remain impartial.Nonetheless, it is important topointout that regardlessofmyeffort in

ensuringimpartiality,IamawarethatImaybeaccusedofpartiality.ThisisbecauseHargeisais

acontestedurbanspacewhereclanpoliticsprevail.Hassan(2015)pointsoutthatonerarely

conducts research insettingswhere the informant isalso insiderwithoutmakingabalanced

compromisebetweenresponsibilityand trust. In suchasettingonemightbeseenasbiased

towardshisclanandhencethismaynegativelyaffectone’simageincertainquarters.Having

this risk in mind, I maintained my independence from local political dynamics, assuring

participantsthatIwasimpartialthroughouttheresearchprocess.

Someofthelimitationsoftheresearchrelatedtothelackofshapefileswhichcouldhavehelped

memapandvisualisethesettlementpatternofthecity. Iwastoldthatsomeshapefilesare

availabletoUNHabitatbutIcouldnotobtainthemfromtheirofficesinHargeisa,asIwastold

that these are unavailable for public consumption. As other researchers in Hargeisa have

experienced (SeeOmar andOsman, 2016), further problemson visualisation also related to

photos. Inotherwords, takingphotos inHargeisa isnotwelcome,asmanypeopleprefer to

remainanonymousbothintextandimage.

3.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, Iprovidedanoverviewofdata sourcesand institutionalaffiliationaswellas

accessibilityofInformants.Ihaveshownthatthedatawascollectedthroughurbanethnography

involvingbothkeyinformantparticipantsandthegeneralpublicwhohadpersonalexperience

oftheissuesrelatedtourbanlandadminstrationandconflictmanagement.Ihavealsooutlined

69|P a g e

theusefulnessoftheteashopsaskeysitesfordatacollectionandrecountedmyendeavoursto

trace key public officials in the diaspora. Finally, the chapter discussed ethical issues and

considerations for the study.Having familiarised the readerwith themethodology, thenext

chaptersdeploymyempiricaldatatoshowhowurbangovernanceshapesHargeisaspatialform.

Thefollowingchapterbeginsbydiscussingfindingsongovernanceatthemunicipal leveland

subsequent chapters zoom into narrower aspects such as land administration, conflict and

adjudication.

70|P a g e

CHAPTER4 HISTORICISINGURBANGOVERNANCEINHARGEISA

4.1 Introduction

Inthischapter,IanalysethetrajectoryofurbangovernanceinHargeisa,situatingitinalonger

history of urban institutions, drawing on oral narratives, archives and ethnographic field

research. This historical approach is important because history in Somaliland is a lived

experience where particular episodes are often used as a point of reference positively or

negativelyforthelegitimationofpowerandauthority.Forinstance,memoriesofhowthings

weredone inthepastserve inmanycasesasexamplesofhowastateshouldbehave inthe

present or the future. This chapter will explore continuities and changes in the interaction

between the state and the intermediary customary institutions through which

centralised urban governance – often under Governor, District Commissioner or a Military

Commander–wasmediated.Iarguethatthecentralisedauthoritarianhistoryofgovernance

andthemediatingroleofcustomaryinstitutionshaveshapedandreinforcedHargeisa’sspatial

characterasasegregatedcity,oftenalongclanlines. Asthe‘hybridity’focusedliteratureon

Somalilanddoesnotilluminatethecomplexdynamicsofurbangovernanceanditsintersection

withsegregation,Iarguethatitisimportanttogobeyondthisconcepttounderstandthespatial

character of cities in Somaliland. Specifically, I argue that a deeper historical perspective is

necessaryonthecontradictoryandcomplementaryrelationshipbetweenstateandnon-state

actorsthanisusualindiscussionsofhybridity,andIalsoexploreempiricallyhowlegitimacyand

trustcanprovidefruitfulinsighttothenexusbetweengovernanceandspatialform.

Thechapterbeginsbydiscussingthelatecolonialcontextandtheintroductionofurbancouncils,

whichunderminedthepowersofAkils. I showthatpopularresistancetothe introductionof

local governance contributed to the growing sense of nationalism and therefore had the

potential to reduce segregation. The chapter then turns to thepostcolonial context and the

civiliangovernment’scontinuedmisuseofpowerandrecoursetoAkils.Itisimportanttonote

thatduringthemilitaryperiod,asignificantbreakoccurred.Thisbreakwasrootedinthestate’s

denunciationofclanism.Butthiseffortwasunderminedinpracticebythestate’severyday’s

interactionwiththepublic.Forinstance,nepotismthrivedinpublicservicedeliveryandaccess

to employment and other economic opportunities did not emasculate the resort to clan in

practice. Furthermore, I argue that state led developments and re-planning of cities – i.e.

through self-help campaigns and evictions – re-segregated the city,while also resulting in a

cosmopolitan moment of cross-clan opposition to the government. I also discuss the post-

71|P a g e

conflictcontextofdemocraticlocalgovernmentandtheon-goingroleofAkilsandclaneldersin

municipalelections.Despitethebriefhistoricalrupture,itisthereforethecontinuitiesinurban

governance–shapedbyAkilsandclanmediation-thatareparticularlystrikingtoday.

4.2 LocalGovernmentinaLateColonialContext:PolicyandResistance

Inthissection,Idiscussthepoliticalandadministrativedynamicsoflocalgovernmentinalate

colonialcontext.Ishowthatthroughoutthecolonialperiod,customaryinstitutionssuchasAkils

werekeyintermediaryinstitutionsofpower.IncontrasttoMillman’s(2013)argumentthatthe

Protectorate’s survival on meagre resources was largely attributable to colonial officers’

effectiveness,IarguealargepartofsuchsurvivalcanbeattributedtotheroleAkilsplayedin

the administration of the population. But, as independence approached, the colonial

governmentmadeconcertedeffortsaimedatreorganisingpowerasitspoliciesshiftedtowards

the creation of what can essentially be understood as responsible governance as part of

preparationforindependence.Intheory,thesepoliciesweremeanttoformalisepowerofthe

Akilsbysettingupurbancouncils,designedtofosterconditionsconduciveforatransitionto

civic rule based on citizenship rather than subjecthood. I argue that opposition to local

governancecanbeinterpretedasanattemptbyHargeisaresidentstorejectthereorganisation

ofpoweroverspace,providingthemwithcommoncausetraversingclaninterestsaroundwhich

they could unite and temporarily reducing segregation.While colonial authorities were not

intentonpromotingnationalcitizenshipinplaceofsubjecthoodbeforeindependence,theyalso

wantedtobeginaprocessoftransitionawayfromAkils’priorpowers.Inshort,theintroduction

and resistance to local governance impactedonhowpeople related toeachother,with the

effectofmitigatingpriorurbanpoliticalsegregation.

Municipal governance in Somaliland dates back to the latter decades of colonial rule in the

protectorate.In1948,thecolonialgovernmenttookadecisionthatitwantedtointroducelocal

governanceinSomaliland,bringingnearlytenyearsofpreandpost-WorldWarTwomilitaryrule

toanend.Thisintroductionoflocalgovernancewascharacterisedbyuncertainty,mainlyabout

the shape of the new structures and the role of customary institutions. This marked the

beginningofeffortsaimedatdevolvingpowerinalimitedsensetolocalgovernmentstructures

aspartofalargerpolicyofSomalisingtheadministrationforeventualindependence.Thekey

questionswere; could the Somali people practice aWesternmodel of democracy and elect

councilsonthebasisofuniversalsuffrageorwoulditbemorepracticalandcheapertousethe

existing political institutions to introduce municipal governance? Locally based colonial

72|P a g e

administratorswereinfavourofthelatterwhichallowedthemtocreateinstitutionsthathad

the shapeofWestern structuresand substanceofnativeorders. Furtherquestionshowever

arosefromissuesoflegitimacyastheAkilsystemonwhichtheadministrationhadsofarrelied

waspopularlyconsideredtobeacolonialinventionanddidnotenjoylegitimatesupportlocally.

Post-warcolonialrecordsshowtherewereattemptstofindapragmaticandamicableapproach

tosolvingthisdilemma,createdbypopulargrievancesagainsttheAkilswhowereincreasingly

becomingcorrupt(Rayne,1921).27Proposalswerethusmadeintheearly1950storeducethe

power of the Akils by drawing on other existing traditional public authorities for local

governance,suchasthejilibshir.Thejilibshirisaclanmeetingofupto200menwhogatherto

discussmattersconcerningtheclansuchasconflictandsocialwelfareaswellasfinanciallyand

politicallybindingdecisionsonmembersoftheclan.Whilethisdidnotby-passAkilscompletely,

astheyattendandevenpresidedinthemeetings insomecases,theydidnothaveexclusive

controloverwhatwastobediscussedandcouldonlyadvanceviewsthatwereagreedupon.

Vertically,above this levelofpublicauthoritywas theequally importantsubclanshirwhere

elders of the different groups congregate and deliberate on collectively binding decisions.

CorrespondencebetweenLondonandthecolonialadministratorsinHargeisashowthatthere

wasaconsensusabouttheabsenceofeffectivepublicauthoritiessuitableforlocalgovernance

introduction above this level of Somali traditional decision-making platforms, except when

greaterclangroupingswereneededforwarfareordefencepurposes.28

PriortotheSomaliparticipationinformalurbangovernanceintheformoftowncouncilsand

district committees, an Advisory Council was constituted in 1946 to give the Governor a

consultationforuminwhichhecouldseektheadviceofelitemembersoftheclansonmatters

affectingtheirlives(suchelitememberswereoftenpopularlyconsideredstooges).29Inspiteof

thisinstrumentalisationofcustomaryinstitutionsinlocalgovernance,until1950,therewasno

officialwrittengovernmentpolicyregardingtheassociationofSomaliswithurbangovernance.

Inotherwords,decisionsontheinvolvementofSomalisinurbangovernanceweremadeonad

hocbasisbythedifferentcolonialofficialsindifferentcapacities.Thiswas,however,changed

27TNACAA/23/6/01FutureorganisationoftowncouncilsinSomaliland.

28 This suggests that the Somali traditionalpublic authority andpolitical institutionsweregetting lesseffectiveasthehierarchygoesup;aweaknesspartlyattributabletothedisruptioncausedtothesystembythesuccessivecolonialpowers;firstly,theEgyptiansandlatertheBritish.Ibid.

29TNACO535/141/11Reorganisationofadministration:advisorycouncillegislation.

73|P a g e

whenthegovernmentdeclaredthatitaims“toevolveasimpleandeffectiveorganisationwhich

willbecapableofremainingagovernmentoperatedbythepeoplethat issufficientfortheir

needs.”30Theplanshowsthatthe‘localauthorities[wereproposed]tobeconstitutedbygroups

having affinities along geographical’ lines. In otherwords, the constituted authoritieswould

consist of tribal leaders paid by the government and assisted by councillors who would

voluntarilyworkforthelocalgovernment.

Thenextstepwasthe“settingupofdistrictcouncilscomposedofrepresentativesofallclasses,

including the local authorities, [and] theywould be advised at first butmight become local

government bodies later”.31 Though the planwas seen as progress by locally based colonial

administrators, London was concerned about the viability and sustainability of such local

governance structures in the long run. It worried about the introduction of complex and

unfamiliarsystemsofurbangovernance,whichriskedupsettingthestatusquoandundermining

existingsystemsofdecision-makingandpublicauthority.ForLondon,itwaspreferabletofind

traditionalleadersandtoincreasetheirpowersonconditionthattheyagreedtorepresenttheir

peopleinlocalgovernancestructures.OfficialsalsosuggestedthatAkilsshouldbegivengreater

financialautonomyandallowancesfortheirlocalexpensesastheywouldotherwiseinevitably

bereluctanttoserveaslocalgovernmentstructures.32Whilepessimismcharacterisedtheviews

ofLondon, localcolonialadministratorsweremoreoptimisticaboutthe introductionof local

governance in Somaliland. Their optimism drew inspiration from ‘the existence of tribal

conferences’andthe‘increasingdesireforprogressandadvancement’aswellasstereotypical

characterisationsofSomalisaspeoplewitha‘highlevelofintelligence’.33

Thelocalgovernmentordinancewasfinallyenactedin1950andtheGovernorwasempowered

toselectthosewhowouldbecomemembersofthenewcouncil.TheaimwasthattheGovernor

shouldretaintheabilityofappointingindividualsseenasfriendlytocolonialauthoritiesfrom

boththetraditionalleaderssuchasAkilsandeldersandothernotablesinthetownsuchasloyal

businessmenandclerics.TheprimaryfunctionofthenewTownCouncilwasmainlytomaintain

30TNACO535/152/3Thereorganisationofnativeadministration:Somalirepresentationandintroductionoflocalgovernment.(Theexactdateofthisstatementisnotstated,butitrelatestothe1940s).

31Ibid.

32Ibid.

33TNACAA/23/6/01FutureorganisationoftowncouncilsinSomaliland.

74|P a g e

peace and the rule of law as most of the provisions in the Town Council Ordinance were

inherentlyconcernedwithurbansecurity.Forinstance,section5statesthat“thedutyofevery

localauthoritywastomaintainorder inthetribeoramongtheSomalisresiding inthearea”

(BritishSomalilandProtectorate,1951).Thecolonialgovernmentwasunsureaboutthesocial

and political consequences that could emerge from the constitution of local councils and

thereforeitproposedthattheintroductionoflocalgovernanceshouldbepilotedinmajorurban

settingsbeforerollingitouttotherestofthecountry.Thiswasbecauseitwasassumedthat

townshadsomecosmopolitanareas,andthat‘tribalpolitics’wouldbelesspronouncedthanin

ruralareas.34

Being the biggest towns in the protectorate, Hargeisa and Berbera hosted the first Town

Councils,establishedin1953.35InthecaseofHargeisa,thenominatedmembersoftheCouncil

formedthemajorityoftheassemblyandtheyhadlimited‘legalandfinancialautonomy’.36The

District Commissioner was the ultimate authority in the council and was empowered to

manipulate rules leaving no room for deviation from the established norm of colonial

administrationintheProtectorate.Anotheropportunityforavoidinganysignificantdevolution

of power was presented by the scarcity of skilled staff, whichmade the staffing of council

dependent on the central state.37 In other words, civil servants working for the central

governmentweretransferredtolocalgovernmentsoastohelptheseexperimentalstructures

performtheirduties.

While the colonial government saw the introduction of local governance as a positive step

towardstheSomalisationof theadministration, the localpopulationwasscepticalaboutthe

aims and objectives of the exercise. The locally-based colonial administrators related this

scepticismtotemporalandaptitudefactorsnotingthat:

thispromptstheenquirywhethertheSomalisaresufficientlydevelopedto

assume the greater responsibilities proposed at so early date as 1953 [or

34Thiswassoduetothefactthatitwasassumedthat‘tribalpoliticsaffectedlessadverselytheTownCounciladministration’inthemorecosmopolitanareasIbid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.

35Ibid.

36TownCouncilswereencouragedtocomeupwithhalfofthemoneyneededfordevelopmentprojectstobeundertaken.

37TNACAA/23/6/01FutureorganisationoftowncouncilsinSomaliland.

75|P a g e

whether] it may well be that given definitive powers with something

concrete,reluctancetoacceptresponsibilitywillgraduallydisappear.38

The introduction of local government in Somaliland took place at a time when nationalism

amongSomaliswasreachingitspeakandthishadanunexpectedeffectonurbanclan-based

segregationinthetown.Thiswasbecausetheexistingpoliticalcleavagesbetweenthedifferent

clanssignificantlydecreasedasaresultofthesharedoppositiontolocalgovernment,making

theprojectlesssuccessfulthanenvisionedbythecolonialgovernment.Eventually,TownCouncil

committeeswerefilledmainlywithilliteratecolonial-friendlyfiguressuchasformeragentsof

the native security apparatus, messengers, translators or small scale businessmen who

benefited from colonial rule, and it failed to bring about any tangible changes in urban

governance.Rather,itbecameajustificationfortheDistrictCommissionertocontinuehaving

completecontrolovertheaffairsofurbancentres,makingtheprocessnomorethananexercise

offormalisingandlegitimisingthestatusquo(BritishSomalilandProtectorate,1951)

Fortheprotagonistsoflocalgovernment,clannismand“nomadisminhibiteddistrictcouncils,

whiletribalincoherenceneuteredtribalcouncilsbeforetheyhadbeenformed”(Millman,2013,

p.207).Butforantagonists,askingpeopletopayallegiancetoaprocessinitiatedbyapolitythey

didnottrustwasnaïveat itsbest.Seenthisway,theTownCouncilwasneithersuccessful in

developmentplanningnormaintaininglawandorder,aspeopledidnotseelocalgovernment

councils as legitimatepublic authorities. For instance, inOctober 1953, attemptsmadeby a

memberofthecouncilcalledGulaidSamatartodisperseacrowdwhichwasformingatthetown

centrewasmetwithseverebeatingbyhisclansmen.Thecolonialgovernmenttookthisincident

seriouslyandarrestedsevenmenfortheassaultofthecouncillor.Twoofthesemenreceived

18-monthsentenceswhilefivereceived12months.Thesentencesweremainlyaimedatmaking

anexampleofthosewhoresistthegovernmentanddisrespect itsagents (BritishSomaliland

Protectorate,1951).

Thisincidentdidnot,however,deterorreduceoppositiontolocalgovernment.Accordingtoa

letterfromtheGovernorofSomalilandtotheSecretaryoftheStateforColonies,therewere

three categories of opposition to the government plan: nationalists who claimed to be the

legitimate voice of the people, individuals who lost government jobs because of the re-

38TNACO535/152/3Thereorganisationofnativeadministration:Somalirepresentationandintroductionoflocalgovernment.

76|P a g e

organisationoftheadministration,andIslamicclericswhohabituallyopposedeverythingthat

thegovernmentproposed.39Ofthethreegroups,oppositionfromthenationalistmovements

represented the most forceful threat because of the fact that their influence was growing

exponentially.Non-violentnationalistmovementsintheProtectorateweredrawinginspiration

from Farah Omar who had shown a remarkable peaceful resistance against colonial rule a

decadebeforetheintroductionoflocalgovernment.Thenationalistmovementclaimedtobe

the legitimaterepresentativeof thepeopleandrequestedthatanycommunicationbetween

thestateandthepopulationshouldcomethroughthem.Butthedistrictadministrationhadlong

refused todealdirectlywith their representatives: in a letterdated18 September1938, for

example,thedistrictofficerinHargeisawrotethathe

willnotrecogniseanypersonasaspokesmanforanyparticulargroup,party,

districtortribe[andthat]inallsuchmatters[he]willonlydealthroughthe

district officers, Akils, Jawabdars [interpreters] and recognised religious

leaders.40

Drawinginspirationfrominstancesofcivildisobedience,supportersofnationalistmovements

such as the Somali National League (SNL) and Somali Youth League (SYL)41 showed strong

resistancetotheintroductionoflocalgovernment.42Thetorchbearersofthisoppositionwere

mainlyurbaniteswhowereconsideredbythecolonialgovernmentas“detribalisedandsemi-

detribalised progressives [with] a disruptive influence” in Hargeisa.43 For these nationalist

leaders, the idea of national self-determination stemmed from cities, envisaged as

cosmopolitansettlementsnotbasedonclandivisionsandresultanturbansegregation.Intheir

thinking,theideaofthestatewasembodiedinurbanityandurbanisationaswellasarelated

39Ibid.

40Ibid.

41SYLwasinitiallysetuptocreatebrotherhoodamongtheSomalisandreducetheviolenceamongthembut later expanded into a nationalist organisation that sought self-rule for Somalis and eventuallyindependence.

42TNACO535/152/3Thereorganisationofnativeadministration:Somalirepresentationandintroductionoflocalgovernment.

43Ibid.

77|P a g e

shiftawayfromtheintermediarysystems.AccordingtoJama,anationalistactivistinthe1950s

whoispresentlyasocialresearcher,theanticolonialviewpointsoftheseyoungmenandwomen

wasthat:

ifyou'renotincities,itisdifficulttotalkabouttheformationofastate.This

isadesirewithoutafoundation.Itiseasytodresslikeanurbanisedperson

but it is difficult to become a son of the city. If you pose a question to

somebody pretending like an urbanised person and ask them about their

deeperfeelingonthestate,theywillprobablytellyouthatattheendofthe

dayitisnecessarytobecomebiasedtowardsyourclan.44

Thepointmadehereisthaturbanisationandurbanismwillshiftpeopleawayfromthecolonially

supportedparochialrelationshipsbasedonkinshiptowardsmorecosmopolitanrelations,and

tonationalcitizenshipasaformofbelonging.Itisallegedthatthenomadiclifestyleandmind

setinevitablyhinderstheformationofanyrelationshipsbasedonelementsotherthankinship.

AccordingtoJamaagain,clanaffiliation:

undermines the emergence of a united political vision based on

farsightednesswherepeoplehaveidentityotherthantheclan.Forinstance,

in urban contexts it was usual to hear that somebody is from Hargeisa,

Berbera or Mogadishu. The interaction between the two groups also

significantlydiffer.45

Inabidtocountertheoppositiontolocalgovernanceandcustomaryinstitutions,thecolonial

administrationsaw itnecessary tocreateamoreBritish friendlyenvironment inHargeisaby

reinvigoratingbroadcastingfacilities.46Colonialrecordsshowthatpartoftheintentionofthis

strategywas to ‘demystify’ the local governmentpolicies towhich the residentsofHargeisa

44Interviewee1November6,2014.ActivistandSocialResearcher.

45Ibid.

46Radiobroadcastwas firstaired inHargeisa in1941.Thebroadcastswereusedasanadministrativeinstrument, toannouncekeygovernmentdecisionsaffectingnomadsetc.Thiswasnot so far-fetchedfromthetraditionalmeansofdisseminatinginformation,asinformationaboutsecurity,lossofpropertyandevenforeignaffairswastraditionallybroadcastinthevillagesthroughgatheringsinthecentreofthevillage.WhenradiobroadcastswereestablishedinHargeisa,peopleusuallygatheredaroundabigradiopositionedinoneofthepopularareasofthecitycentre(WarOffice,1946).

78|P a g e

showedsignificantresistance.Theobjectiveoftheinformationdisseminationexercisewasto

inform people about the intention behind the introduction of local government as

‘developmentmachinerywherebythepeoplecancombinetoimprovetheirownconditionsby

theirowneffortswithgovernmentguidanceoneducationandhealthservicesaswellaswater

supplies’.47Assuch informationalonemayhavebeen insufficient toconvinceSomalisof the

purposeofthelocalgovernment,theadministratorssuggestedthat‘leadingSomalisshouldbe

takentosomesuitablepartsoftheSudantoseeforthemselveswhathasbeenachievedthere’.48

The radio broadcast was, however, a double-edged knife. On the one hand, it enabled the

colonialadministratorstoadvancesupportfortheintroductionoflocalgovernanceandsocial

development agendas, particularly education, to which the population was hostile in the

beginning.Butontheotherhand,thoseentrustedwithadvancingthese initiativeswerealso

furthering nationalist ideas through songs and poetrywhichwere full of idioms and riddles

makingamockeryof the system.49The colonial administrationwasnotnaiveabout thisbut

facedasituationwhereotherregionalpowerssuchasEgyptwereencouraginglocalnationalism

inSomaliland,byprovidingnationalistswithmeansthroughwhichtheycouldpropagatetheir

ideas.Thus,theytoleratednationalistfiguresandgroupsusingcolonialpropagandamachines

inalimitedway,providedthattheysupportedeffortstocreateaBritishfriendlyandeducated

rulingclass.

Frederiksen(2014,p.1287)arguesthat“colonialgovernmentalitywasfundamentallyaproject

ofmanagingcontradictionanddifferenceandthosetechniquesofpowerthatbestmanaged

and worked with this produced the greatest stability of rule”. As evident here, to borrow

Frederiksen’s framing, the colonial administration was caught between a need to maintain

politicalorderanddesiretobringaboutBritish-friendlysocialtransformation.Inotherwords,

local government was used as a way of bringing about reorganising power over space –

particularly in the cities - while advancement of education was used as way of facilitating

acceptanceforcolonialparadigms.Butoppositiontothisnewformofsubjectivityinthespatial

reorganisationofpowerhadgivenpeopleacommonreasontounitearoundandresistthestate.

47TNACO535/126/16FutureAdministrationofSomaliland.

48Ibid.

49In1954,MohamedAhmedpopularlyknownasKulucmadealivebroadcastofasongthatwascriticalofthegovernment.ThisresultedinthestationoperatorfleeingthecitytoevadearrestandthesingerwhowasongovernmentpayrollbeingsuspendedandexiledtohishomevillageofKhatumo.

79|P a g e

Inshort,theintroductionandresistancetolocalgovernanceimpactedonhowpeoplerelated

toeachother:althoughevidenceissketchy,Isuggestthatthislatecolonialcontextofnationalist

resistancehadtheeffectofmitigatingpriorurbansegregationalongclanlines.

4.3 BoggedDownintheColony?CivilianRule

Inthissection,IarguethatthepostcolonialSomalistatewasunableorunwillingtoshiftaway

fromthecolonialpracticesofurbangovernance,henceunderminingstatelegitimacyandpublic

trust in thestate. I showthatpower remainedcentralisedandconcentrated in thehandsof

publicofficialssuchasDCsandPCswhoactedandbehavedlikethecolonialmasters.Inother

words, thepoliticalauthorities failed tocreateagovernanceenvironmentbasedonnational

citizenshiprathertheclan-basedandhighlymediatedstatehoodwherecustomaryinstitutions

actedandwereusedasgatekeepersforaccesstoservices.

Postcolonialurbangovernance in theSomali republicwas characterisedby continuity rather

thanchangeofcolonialadministrativepractices.Notwithstandingthefactthatthemantraof

resistance to the colonial power had revolved around liberation and transformation, little

changedregardinghowthestaterelatedtoitspeople.Therewerealsocontinuitiesinthesocial

andspatialorganisationofthecity.Pesek(2011)attributesthistowhathecallsthe‘dilemmas’

ofthepostcolonialAfricanstate,whichinheritedthestructuresaswellasgovernancetacticsof

colonialpowersbutdidnothavetheeconomicmeansandpoliticalpowerthroughwhichitcould

behavelikethecolonialpowerswithoutbeingsignificantlyandmilitarilychallenged.

Furthermore,thepostcolonialstate’slackofcommitmenttodecentralisingpowerreducedlocal

governancetonomorethananominalstructure.Municipalgovernment’srolewasdrastically

limited to themanagementof theZaribas (a localurbanmarket),maintenanceof roadsand

garbagecollection.Assuch,itfailedtoattracteithercapablepoliticiansorskilledlabourforce

asmost of those qualified enough for running a city had taken up vacancies at the central

government level. The District Commissioners and Regional Governors in collaborationwith

intermediaryinstitutionsrantheshow.AccordingtoRay(1996)oneofthereasonsthatchiefs

were formidable intermediary institutionswas the fact that they constitutedparallel power,

perceivedmainlyasillegitimate,becausetheyhadbeenusedbycolonialauthorities,butthey

werealsoaccessibletothepostcolonialstateastheyderivedtheirauthorityfromprecolonial

sourcesoflegitimacy.Thiscreatedasituationofinstitutionalpluralism,inwhichbothstateand

traditional authorities coexist in the postcolonial context. This coexistence was however

characterisedby tensions. In the caseof theSomaliRepublic, these tensionsweremanaged

80|P a g e

differently by the civilian and military postcolonial regimes. During the civilian government

(1960 to 1969), Akils50 assumed greater role in the mediation of the state and the people

particularlyduringtheelectiontime. It is importanttonotethatAkilsplayedacrucialrole in

electoralprocessesastheymobilisedpeopleforcompetingpoliticalpartiesandcandidates.Akils

organisedpeoplenotonlybecausetheywereagentsofpoliticalpartiesbuttheyalsohadvested

interestsinmaintainingtheirinfluenceandpoweraswellensuringaccesstostateresourcesand

servicesforthemselvesandfortheirclanmembers.

Thespatialmanifestationof theroleofAkils inpolitics is important forunderstandingurban

segregation in a number ofways. Their role becomes particularly clearwhen one examines

Somalielections.51Firstly,politicalelitesmayseeitaselectorallystrategicandbeneficialifthey

concentratetheirsupportinaparticularurbanspace,soastoincreasetheirchanceinpolitical

participation.Secondly,itiseasiertomobilisefinancialresourceswhentheclanisconcentrated

inaparticulararea.Thirdly, it is logisticallymoreefficienttoreachsupporterswithmessages

andupdateclanmembersaboutthepoliticaldynamicsforone’sadvantage.

ThestatewasoftentolerantwiththeinstitutionsofAkils,asitneitherhadthecapacitynorthe

politicalwilltoreplacethem.Whiletheywereattimesseenasactorswithdisruptiveinfluence

for bureaucratic development, they were on the other hand seen as an effective way of

controlling thevastunmanned territoriesof thisyoungnation.As sovereigntyand territorial

controlthatcomeswithitdependontheavailabilityofcertainlevelsofresources(Pesek,2011),

the postcolonial Somali state lacked the capacity necessary for maintaining territorial and

politicalcontroloveritsnomadicandpovertystrickenruralandurbanpopulations.Thestate’s

inabilitytomonopolisetheinstrumentsofviolencehadamajorimpactonthespatialcharacter

ofHargeisa.Forinstance,thefrequentoccurrenceofviolenceinthehinterlandsofHargeisahad

oftencausedmanypeopletofearfortheirlivesbecauseofthepossibilityofrevengeattacksby

relativesofthevictims.Mediationaimedatbringingclanskirmishestoanendhadoftendrained

amajorpartofthegovernment’seffortsinthemaintenanceoflawandorder.Hargeisa’s1967

50 Akils’ relationship with the state was determined initially through their roles in the struggle forindependence.Thoseindividualswhowereonthesideofthecolonialrulerswereside-linedbythenewstate while those who were involved in the struggles enjoyed better status and access to the stateresources and power. This, however, was not sustained for a long as criticism against the stateovershadowedcriticismagainstthosewhoworkedwiththecolonialofficials. Interviewee7August20,2014OralHistorian,ArtistandRadioPresenter..

51Thesearebasedonmyownobservationinthe2012elections

81|P a g e

DistrictCommissionerrecallsseveralincidentsofconflictwithinashortspanoftimeandstates

thatthesecurityproblemswereoneofthemajorchallengesthegovernmentfacedatthetime.

The DC says that when he was transferred to Hargeisa, there were 51 cases of unresolved

murder in thecourtsandanother50cases forwhichsentenceswere issuedbut judgements

wereyettobeenforced.52

Themurdersresultedfromaconflict,whichlastedfornearly7years,betweenSa’adMuseand

ArabclansofHargeisa.TheDCclaimsthatthereasonswhythisconflictwasprolongedrelated

torevengeattackswhichallbeganwiththekillingofareputablereligiousmanintheoutskirts

ofthecity.Thisledtoachainofretaliatoryrevengeattackswhere46peoplefromthetwoclans

losttheirlives.Inordertoresolvethisconflict,theDCappointedamediationteamofsevenmen

fromeachside.TheAkilsfrombothsidesagreedtothisarrangement.Thesupportofagroupof

religiousmenwhowereactivelyengagedinresolvingcivilaffairsandissuestodowithpeace

werealsoenlistedtohelpresolvetheissue.Thelastdisputeinvolvedthedisappearanceof5

menwhosefatewasnotknown.Bothsidesdeniedknowledgeofwhathappenedtothesemen.

TheDCinformedthemeetingthat:

unlessthetruthistoldaboutwhathappenedtothesemen,noonewillleave

themeeting.Thenarespectableoldmanstoodupcryingandconfessedthat

his clanwas responsible for the death of the fivemen in retaliation for a

religiousmankilledbytheotherclan.Anotheryoungmanfromtheotherclan

alsostoodupandsaidthatthereligiousmanwaskilledbyhisclanandthat

they will give compensation for him and 20 additional camels for wrong

doing.53

Whilethemediationwascontinuing,theDCissuedaconfiscationordertoparamilitarytroops

fortheroundingupoflivestockfrombothclans.AccordingtotheDC,thousandsofsheep,goats,

cattle,andcamelwereroundedup,andanumberofbirkas(smallmobilereservoirsconstructed

withcement)wereseized.Theprimaryaimoftheconfiscationwastoforceclanstoreachan

amicablesolutiontothesecurityprobleminthecity.Moreover,theconfiscatedlivestockwould

alsoformpartofthecompensationfortheoffenceseachsidehadcommittedagainsttheother.

52Interviewee3Nomember05,2014.FormerDistrictCommissionerofHargeisa.

53Ibid.

82|P a g e

Followingtheagreement,thecamelsthathadalreadybeenconfiscatedweredesignatedtoform

partofthecompensation.Althoughtheamountneededforcompensationexceededthatwhich

was in government hands, the DC proposed that the livestock in his possession should be

subdividedascompensation.54Thispropositionwassaidtohavebeenreadilyacceptedbymost

eldersasitsparedthemfromatediousprocessofcompensationcollectionanditalsorelieved

thestateofworryingaboutfurtherrevengeemanatingfromimpatiencewiththelongevityof

collectiontime.

AsimilarcasealsooccurredintheSouthofthecitywheretwosub-clans,ReerGuuleedandReer

GobdoonoftheEidagalesub-clans,clashedin1968.Fivepeoplewerekilledintheclash,two

fromeachsideplusawadad(cleric),whowastryingtomediate.TheDCrequestedaunitof

paramilitarytroopsandavehicletoconfiscatethelivestockofthewarringclans,aswellasthe

birka.Theconfiscationincludedsheep,cattleandcamel.AccordingtotheDC:

thereasonwhytheconfiscationwasnotlimitedonlytocamelwasthefact

thattheconsequencesoftheconfiscationwillnotbefeltatthehousehold

levelifsheepandgoatsarenotincluded.Butiftheyareconfiscatedthenthe

painwillbefeltattheverylocallevelaschildrenwillhavenoaccesstomilk.55

Asinthepreviouscase,thesupportofareligiousgroupwasagainenlistedandinformationon

thebackgroundandclandynamicsoftheconflictwereobtained.Claneldersweretakentoa

remotevillageintheSouthofthecityneartheborder.TheDistrictCommissioneridentified7

menfromeachgrouptomediatethisproblem.Themediatinggroupweretoldthattheyarenot

goinganywhereuntiltheissueswereresolved.Thereligiousgroupbroughtsomeinformation

totheDCwithregardstothenumberofpeoplekilledandonwhatsideseachcamefrom.The

compensationforthedeadmenwasagreedinthelimitedtimethattheDChadgiven:24hours.

Theabovecasesdemonstratethatthememoriesofpastcolonialwaysofgovernanceshaped

the manner and mechanism through which urban governance and particularly conflict-

resolutionwaspracticedinthepostcolonialcontext.Contrarytothegeneralrhetoricagainstthe

stateduringthecolonialtimesandearlynationalistagendas,thepostcolonialstatewasunable

54 The clans agreed to this arrangement except for one sub clan which refused to accept thecompensation,allegingthattheirmanwaskilledwithoutreason.TheAkilsofthatclanthentoldtheDCtokeepthecamelsforthempendingsidetalkswithhisclan.

55Interviewee3Nomember05,2014.FormerDistrictCommissionerofHargeisa.

83|P a g e

tobreakawayfromtheuseofcustomaryinstitutionsasintermediariesbetweenthestateand

thepeople.Bycontrast,thestatecontinuedtousetheintermediarysystemofAkilsforalmost

thesamereasonsandinthesamewaysthattheywereusedduringcolonialtimes.

The clan conflicts and insecurity seem likely to have undone some of the prior impetus to

cosmopolitanchoiceof residence inurbancontexts,promotinga recourse tosegregation. In

otherwords,securityconcernsandfearofrevengeattacksbyotherclansaswellasthefactthat

the state was unable to guarantee safety in Hargeisa made it difficult for people to trust

neighbourhoodsunpopulatedbytheirclans,perpetuatingsegregationalongclanlines.

4.4 BreakingwiththePast?MilitaryRule

The civilian era thus did not usher in change regarding the importance of clan and the first

notablebreakwiththepastcamein1969whenthemilitarytookover.Ofparticularimportance

intermsofbreakingwiththepastwasasetofpoliciesaimedatpromotingnationalcitizenship

and intended as a departure from the highly clanised belonging prevalent under the civil

leadership. Intheseexercises, themilitaryregimeembarkedonpoliciesofclandenunciation

andmilitariseddevelopmentcampaigns.

Whenthemilitarytookovertheadministrationofthecountry,municipalgovernanceinHargeisa

was further weakened. Councillors were dismissed and the role of municipality in city

management remained limited. Urban governance was militarised and most of the civilian

DistrictCommissionerswere replacedbyMilitaryOfficers.Neighbourhoodmanagementwas

alsocloselytiedtorulingpartystructures.Each50houseswereputunderthemanagementof

aloyalsocialistsupportercalledtabeele(signholder).56Orientationcentreswerealsoerected

in most of the neighbourhoods where people were called in on weekly basis to hear long

sermons about how the state was different from that which existed before it and how

nationalismcanbenurturedthroughcollaborationwiththestate.Subjugationandsuppression

ofopinionbecameamarkerforthenewgovernmentanddissentingvoiceswerepunishedin

themostseveremannerpossible.

Therewasaspecificrhetoricandpolicyofdenouncingclan,asthegovernmentissueddirectives

criminalising clan identity. In 1971, the statedeclared clannism, “whichwas associatedwith

nepotism and corruption, officially banned and ritually buried” (Lewis, 1989, p. 573) in

56Interviewee7August20,2014OralHistorian,ArtistandRadioPresenter.

84|P a g e

cemeteries across the country. People remember in particular, the government’s symbolic

‘burial’oftribalisminanorchestratedpublicgatheringinHargeisa,whichwassupposedtobea

signofaparadigmshiftfromclannism.Thisrhetoricwashowevernotaccompaniedbyconcrete

actionasthestaterevivedclanismandnepotisminitseverydaygovernancepractices.57

Loyalty to the socialist party was maintained through a guulwade (guulwadeyaal in plural)

system.GuulwadeinSomaliisawordwhichlooselytranslatesasvictorious.AccordingtoGulaid

(undated,p.134)guulwadeweredesignatedasrevolutionaryguardiansandwere“giventhe

powertojudgeanyindividualtheyencountered,onadailybasis,whiletheywereadministering

theirrolesasguardiansoftheRevolution….nootherauthorityhadthepowertoreversetheir

judgmentoncetheyhadformulatedtheirperceptionof thosewhocrossedtheir roads”.The

practicesof theguulwadehasgiven rise to theemergenceofaconcept,guulwadeyn,which

capturesthecultureofobediencecreatedunderrepressiveconditionswherepeopleplaytothe

tuneoftheoppressorforpersonalandpoliticalsurvival.

Beingthesecondbiggesttownintherepublic,Hargeisawasanimportantcentreofactivitiesfor

therevolution.Itwasalsoherewhereresistancetothestatewasmostactive.Forthisreason,

Hargeisa was given unparalleled attention by the security forces and most importantly by

guulwadeyaal.As repression and forced compliancewith governmentdirectivesbecame the

normratherthanexception inHargeisa,everyonestartedfearingfortheir lives includingthe

‘hardheadednomads’incolonialterms.Thisunprecedentedleveloffearledtoareductionin

violent conflict among the clans as they feared the dire repercussion that could result from

gettinginvolvedinconflict.58Forthefirsttimeinmanyyears,violenceinthehinterlandsand

subsequentrevengeattackscarriedoutinmajorcitieswentdown.Thisreducedlevelofviolent

conflictledtotheemergenceofcosmopolitanspacesaspeoplecouldtrustresidinginspaces

dominatedbyclansotherthantheirown.Thesecosmopolitanmixedclanneighbourhoodswere

comprisedofrelativelywelltodofamilies–residentswereoftenmiddle-classpeoplemainly

consisting of senior government officials, businessmen andwealthy people from the Somali

Diaspora–suchastheRedSeaneighbourhoodformedintheWestofthetown.59Asevident

here, the urban desegregation seen under military rule did not result from intentional anti

57ParticipantinAgipTeashopDiscussionApril11,2014.HargeisaResident.

58ParticipantMay13,2014.HargeisaResident.FocusGroupDiscussion.

59ParticipantinStarAreaTeashopDiscussionMay17,2014.HargeisaResident.

85|P a g e

segregationpolicybutratherasareductionofinsecurityunderrepressiveconditions.Moreover,

thereisnoevidencethatthisdesegregationoccurredinlessaffluentpartsofthetown.

Despitethedenunciationandcriminalisationofclanismintheearlyyearsofthemilitaryrule

andthecreationofhighlystructuredpartypowers,themilitarygovernmentdidnotbreakaway

fromtheuseoftheintermediarycustomaryinstitutionsbutitchangedtheparameterswithin

which this system worked. Bank and Southall (1996) see the manipulation of chieftaincy

institutionsasattemptsmadeatchangingthelegitimacyandautonomyofchiefs.Inthecase

thatconcernsushere,structuralandsemioticchangesalteringthemechanicsandlanguageof

powerweremadetotheinstitutionofAkils.Thiswasdonebyrelabellingtheirtitlestoreflect

thefunctionsthatthestate identifiedforthemtoperform.For instance,thetitleofAkiland

ChiefAkil(ParamountChief)wererespectivelyrenamedNabadoonandSamadoon.Theformer

translatesastheSeekerofPeacewhereasthesecondtranslatesastheSeekerofGood.Inthe

urbancontextofHargeisa,thesenewrolesforAkilsweredelinkedfromclanandinsteadtiedto

a specific geographical area – a town neighbourhood for example (or a village in rural

contexts).60 The new arrangements thus spatialised and territorialised the operation of the

institutioninsuchawaythattheauthorityoftheAkilwasnolongernecessarilyconfinedtothe

clanhecomesfrom.

Iargue that thismovecanbeseenessentiallyasawayofunderminingAkils’ legitimacyand

jurisdiction,asthestatewasfarfromditchingtheinstitutionasitoftenhadacauseforwhichit

couldbeused.Forinstance,inadditiontotheirroleinthemaintenanceofpeaceandsecurity,

the Akils in urban areaswere at the centre ofmilitary campaigns. One of these campaigns

focusedonbuildingamajordamforHargeisa.Theresourcesandmanpowerfortheconstruction

ofthiswaterfacilitywereraisedthroughacombinationofgovernmentfundsandpublicsupport

intheformofequipmentandmanpower,muchofwhichmobilisedbyrebrandedcustomary

institutionssuchasNabadoonandSamadoon(AkilsandChiefAkils).Essentially,thiscampaign

canbeseenasanattemptaimedat legitimisingandmobilisingtotalsupportforthesocialist

regime’s self-help approach to development particularly the improvement of education,

agricultureand infrastructure.Pesek(2011,p.54)conceptualisescampaignsasa“temporary

and concentratedattempt to changewithina short spanof timeparticular aspectsof social

configurations of a given society”. As in other newly independent African states, Barre’s

60ParticipantinCommercialBankTeashopDiscussionJune13,2014.HargeisaResident.

86|P a g e

campaignssupposedlyaimedtobreakwiththepastthroughself-sufficiencyrhetoricthrough

whichthepopulationwasmobilisedforundertakinggranddevelopmentprojectswithresources

locallyavailable.

Akilswerealsoinstrumentalinthecampaignforgrandiosestateleddevelopmentandnation-

buildingprojectsmentionedabove.InHargeisa,theseprojectsincludedtheconstructionofthe

majorsocialistpartybuildingandorientationcentres,schools,nationalmuseumandlibrary–all

ofwhichdatedfromthisperiod.Asidefromthemeagreresourcesavailabletothestate,the

manpowerandequipmentnecessaryforconstructingtheseprojectswerenotinthehandsof

thegovernment.Akilshelpedthegovernmentpullupalltheregionallyavailableresourcesfrom

privateindividualsvoluntarilyorinvoluntarily:theywerethusonceagainintheir(colonial)role

of state agents, as tax collectors and mobilisers of labour for the state. According to the

Governor, the reason for which the revolutionary government was interested in the urban

development inHargeisawastoupliftthestatusofHargeisasoastobring itatparwiththe

imageexpectedofa2ndcapitalcity.TheGovernorrecalled:

thegovernmenthadlong-termprogrammeforthecityandallmyprograms

are interconnected;wells, library,museumandtheairportaswell.WhenI

cametoHargeisa.Theairportdidnothaveaplacewherepassengerscould

sit,theyusedtostand-upbutIaddedaVIPssection.Theideawasthatwhen

dignitariesarrive,theywillbewelcomedtherethantheyshouldbetakento

themuseum,thelibrarythenfinallyentertainedattheNationalTheatre.61

Thisurbandevelopmentnarrativeis,however,challengedbymanypeople62inHargeisawho

claim that far from promoting Hargeisa to a second capital city, the government had an

unwrittenruleofblockingdevelopment,asevidencedbythebanninginvestmentofbuildingsof

morethanthreestoriesinthecity.Theyallegethatthegovernmentwaslessinterestedinthe

urbandevelopmentofHargeisaforpoliticalreasons.

Ontheotherurban landtenuresecurityhad improvedundermilitary rule.Peopleno longer

fearedowninglandinareaspopulatedbyotherclans.Whilethisfacilitatedtheintegrationof

theclanswhotraditionallyhailedfromHargeisa,italsoincreasedtheriftbetweenthosewho

61Interviewee10October29,2014.FormerGovernorofNorthWesternProvince.

62ParticipantinCommercialBankTeashopDiscussionJuly01,2014.HargeisaResident.

87|P a g e

wereassociatedwiththegovernmentandthosewhowereopposedtoit.Inotherwords,non-

Isaaq clans such as Daaroodwere viewedwith suspicion due to their support, or perceived

support,fortheregime.Thisledtonewconcentrationofpeopleofparticularclanorientation

i.e.Southernersinaparticularspace.Ontheotherhand,thiswasoftenusedbyantagoniststo

showthattheircityisatriskforbeingovertakenbyforeignersduetotheformationofnewclan

spaces.

Thissectionhasshownthatthefocusofurbangovernanceduringtheperiodsofcivilianand

military rule was on security and development. Urban segregation during civilian rule was

exacerbatedby increasingmarginalisationofHargeisaand lackofemploymentopportunities

whichforcedmanypeopletostayareasclosertowheretheycouldgetaccesstokinshipbased

communalsupport.Similarly,insecurityemanatingfromclanskirmishescausedmanypeopleto

watchtheirbackforpossiblerevengeattacks.Customaryinstitutionsmitigatedtheseproblems

byhelpingthestatemaintainlawandorderandfacilitateaccesstoservicefortheirsubjects.It

is important tonotethatwhilesignsofdiversityemerged in thespatialcharacterof thecity

duringthemilitaryregimemainlyduetotheimprovedsecurity,thestatewasunabletobreak

awaywith thepastdespite repeatedeffortsorat least rhetoric to thisend.Thecontoursof

governanceinthecountryandthefactthatcitiesweremanagedinamilitarisedwayforagood

partofthepostcolonialperiodledtogreatcontinuitiesinthespatialcharacterofthecity.

Thisepisodeofurbandevelopmentendedabruptlywiththenearcompletephysicaldestruction

andemptyingofthecityduringthewarwithmasspopulationflight.Theconflictdestroyedits

physical and institutional structures, claimed the lives of more than 50 000 residents and

displacednearlyitsentirepopulationinthelate1980s(Bradbury,2008).Thenextsectionturns

tothenextphaseinthecity’shistoryandthetrajectoryofpostconflictrecovery.

4.5 Re-establishingLocalGovernance:Post-Conflict

Below,IarguethatinsecurityintheimmediateaftermathoftheBarre’sousterinmostcities

reinforced theutilityof clanasan importantelement inchoosingwhere tostayandwho to

relateto.Furthermore,Iarguetheroletheclancontinuestoplayinthedemocratisationprocess

andthewaypoliticalpartiesuseitorabuseitreinforcestheutilityofclanasaunitofidentity.

This, combined with the key roles the customary institutions continue to play inmediating

access to services in the post-conflict context, strengthens clannism and hence perpetuates

segregation.

88|P a g e

Forthreeyearsfollowingthewarin1988,thecityremainedalmostvacantasitwasflattenedto

thegroundandresidentsfledtotheneighbouringcountryofEthiopiaandelsewhere.Whenthe

militaryregimewasoustedfinallyin1991,peoplestartedcomingbackfromtherefugeecamps.

Duetothefragilityofthestateintheearlyyearsofthepost-conflictcontext,clanbecamemore

important than ever before for security purposes in urban areas, causingmany peoplewho

ownedlandinareaspopulatedbyotherclanstomovetostrongholdsoftheirclans(APD,2010).

In other words, the conflict seems to have removed whatever solidarity may have existed

betweentheclansinHargeisaandreconstitutedsegregation.

RefugeesandotherruralmigrantsaimingtotakeadvantageofthepostBarrefreedomhave

graduallyrefilledtheemptyandruinedspacesofthecity.Reconstructionbeganmostlythrough

remittancesfromthediasporaandemanatedmainlyfromtheMiddleEast,WesternEuropeand

NorthAmerica.Thisusheredanewwaveofurbandevelopmentorredevelopmentandrapid

growth,whichmadeHargeisamorethantwiceasbigasbefore,bothintermsofitsgeographical

areasandpopulationsize.Thisrapidpost-wargrowth63gaverisetovariousurbangovernance

challengesatatimewhenSomalilandwasstrugglingwithpost-conflictinstitutionalweaknesses

andlackofcapacitytodeliverservices.

From1991to1993,theweaknessofthestateanditsinabilitytomonopolisepowerinthepost-

conflictcontexthadamajor impactonthereestablishmentof localgovernment institutions.

Attemptsatestablishinglocaladministrativestructureswereovershadowedbyeffortsaimed

at ensuring safety and security in the city as lawandorderbrokedown in theaftermathof

Barre’sremovalfrompowerin1991.64Thiswasattributabletopoliticalandpersonaldifferences

amongtheSNMleadersfuelledbythefactthattheclanswerearmedandmilitarycommand

hadlittleornoinfluenceovertheaffairsoftheclanmilitias.65

Politiciansinthepost-conflictcontextarticulatedtwomajorviewsontheroleofclanandAkils

instatestructures,whichhadimplicationsforHargeisalocalgovernment;institutionalismand

63Thisrapidgrowthcanberelatedtothreemainreasons.Firstly,Hargeisahadbeenandcontinuestobeamajoradministrativecentre.SecondlyHargeisaistheepicentreoftheinter-urbanmigrationaswellasrural-urbanmigrationwhere thosemoving fromotherurbanor ruralareas in thecountry stretch theboundariesofthecity.AndthirdlyHargeisahadinthepastfourdecadesproducedasignificantdiasporawhocontributesignificantlytoitsrapideconomicandspatialgrowth.

64Interviewee2November8,2014FormerChairmanofSomalilandAtrocitiesCommission.

65Ibid.

89|P a g e

deferralism66. Thesepositionshad theirhistory in thecontextof theSNMsmilitary struggle

againsttheregime.Thoseintheformercampwereconcernedabouttheincreasinginfluence

andauthorityoftheclaneldersintheorganisationandtheyproposedtoprofessionaliseand

detribalisethearmedwingoftheorganisation.Theideaherewasinsteadoftheclansproviding

rationsandlogisticstothesoldiers,theyshouldsupportacentralisedauthoritysoastomake

sure that the forces fighting for theorganisation are accountable to its command. If people

wanted to provide supplies for the cause SNMwas fighting for, then they shouldmake all

contributions through a central fund managed by the central command. The other group

believedthatthepriorityofSNMwastoremovethemilitaryregimefrompoweratanycostand

throughanyavailablemeans;theassumptionwasthattheremovalofBarrewouldleadtoan

environmentinwhichtheorganisationwouldbeabletoreorganiseitselfandputaneffective

administration inplace.ThedifferencesbetweentheSNMleadershipwasmainlysuppressed

duringthestruggle.AccordingtoaformerSNMofficialduringthewarwithBarre:

tosaythingsshouldbedoneinapropermannerwasakintotreason.The

confidentialdiscussionswehadinthecentralcommitteemeetingwereoften

leakedtothecivilians.Propagandawouldspreadagainstanyonecomingup

withadifferentnarrative.Peoplewouldsaytodayisnotthedaytotalkabout

these issues and those who voice their concern would be branded as

traitors.67

These pre-incursion differences between the SNM officials created a hostile political

environmentinthepostBarreadministrativeandpoliticaldispensations.Inotherwords,Post

SiyadBarrelocalgovernancewasmarredbyinternalpowerstrugglesandinsecurityproblems.

Thisparticularlynegativelyimpactedthereestablishmentofaneffectivelocalgovernanceinthe

immediateaftermathofBarre’sfall.Thespatialconsequencesofthiswasthatmembersofclans

whoresidedinanareawheretheirclanisnotpredominantmovedtootherareaswheretheir

clanhadsignificantpresenceasthatwouldreducetheriskofbeingvictimisedbymarauding

militiasofotherclans.Forinstance,manyfamilieswhowerefromtheAwalclansmovedoutof

66Ibid.

67Ibid.

90|P a g e

areapopulatedbytheGarhajisandviceversa.68Thesecurityutilityoftheclanseemshereto

haveunderminednationalbelongingandcitizenship.Ray(1996),andSkalník(1996)arguethat

thereisatensionbetweentheconceptofcitizenship,whichgrantsthebearerindividualised

rightssuchthatonecouldtheoreticallyliveinanyplaceofhis/herchoosingwithinthepolity;

and the subjectivity inherent in the traditional public authorities where the individual is

expectedtopledgetheirallegiancetothecustomaryinstitutionofchieftaincy.

Such division in allegiance became a recipe for the widespread post Barre deterioration in

securityinHargeisa.Asurbansafetydeclinedbetween1991to1993,nonSNMpoliticiansused

thisasanopportunity topresent themselvesasanalternative to the failedSNM leadership,

culminatingintheelectionofMohamedIbrahimEgal,aformerPrimeMinisterofSomalia.The

newPresidentcametopoweratatimeofinsecurity.Hespentasignificantpartofhispolitical

energyonunderminingtribalinfluenceonthearmedforcesasheembarkedonademobilisation

process, which was largely successful (though at times there were problems, e.g. the

governmentoverlookedthefactthatthearmedyoungmenhadlongmadealivingoutofthe

checkpointsandanyhandoverneededtofurnishthemwithanewsourceofincome).69Thenew

PresidentappointedMohamedHashiElmifromAwalclaninNorthernandWesternHargeisaas

aMayorin1993.HashiwasatrainedengineerandakeyfigureintheSNMpoliticalstructure.

ThePresidentmadetheappointmentatatimewhenarmedoppositionagainsthimwasactive

inthecity.Thiswasthefirstmajorattemptatre-establishinglocalgovernmentinHargeisa.The

new[PostSNMappointed]mayorprioritisedlawandorderandestablished22policestations

andsubstationsinacorrespondingnumberofnewlyrestructureddistrictsandsubdistricts.70

Theincreaseinsecurityinstallationswereseenasimportant71bythePostSNMgovernmentfor

notonlymaintenanceoflawandorderbutalsoasapreludefortheestablishmentofarevenue

base in a hostile political environment where people were armed and could challenge tax

68Interviewee62May12,2014.LandBroker.

69Interviewee2November8,2014FormerChairmanofSomalilandAtrocitiesCommission.

70Interviewee9August16,2014.FormerMayorofHargeisa.

71ParticipantinKaahRestaurant/TeaDiscussionAugust07,2014.HargeisaResident.

91|P a g e

collection attempts.72 The new mayor’s rearrangement of administrative structures was,

however, heavily criticised as this came at a timewhen the governmentwas facing armed

resistancefromdisgruntledGarhajisclansintheEastandSouthofthecity.Hewasaccusedof

takingadvantageofthisanddestroyingpropertieslocatedinthecitycentrebelongingtothe

clanswhofoughtwiththegovernmentbetween1994and1997withoutdueprocess.73

As detailed in chapter two, traditional authorities played a significant role in the re-

establishmentof lawandorder in Somalilandafter thewar, helping the state todisarm the

militiaandfacilitatingdialoguebetweenwarringclans.Asaresult,theyareoftenrepresented

asanimportantinstitution,andinvokedasanexplanationtoaccountforthedifferencesinstate

building processes between Somalia and Somaliland(Walls, 2009). Advancing this

representation are state officialswho for political reasons seek to legitimate their cause for

independenceonthebasisofidentitypoliticswherereferenceismadetohowSomalilandisa

culturednationwithtraditionalauthoritiesthatsaveditfrompoliticalcatastropheasopposed

totheSouthwhichlacksthis.74

Despite this romanticised representation, I argue that tensions characterise the relationship

betweenthestateandtraditionalauthoritiesinSomaliland,andspecificallyinHargeisa.These

tensionsareattributedtotheinabilityofthestateandthecustomaryinstitutionstomanagethe

complex post-conflict political, cultural and social dynamics. While the statutory system is

accusedofbeing ineffective in resourceandconflictmanagement, the traditional system(as

representedbyAkils)isaccusedoflackofinnovationtokeeppacewiththechangingrealityof

modernlivesandbeinganobstacletotheformationofstatebureaucracies.Forinstance,the

FormerMinisterofInteriorbelievesthatAkilshaveoutlivedtheirusefulnessas.

the harm they cause is more than the good they do for governance and

maintenanceof lawandorder.Theproblemnowisthefactthatthereare

72Revenue collection startedwithamodest levies small shopsandhawking standsbut this graduallyincreasedandthelocalgovernmentfinallymanagedtohaveasourceoffundingindependentfromthepresidency.

73ParticipantinStarAreaTeashopDiscussionMay17,2014.HargeisaResident.

74Interviewee28August12,2014.Politician.

92|P a g e

toomanyofthemandwhenconflictsariseeachsidewhetherrightorwrong

willhaveanAkilontheirside.75

In2001,areferendumwasheldforanewconstitution.WhiletheconstitutionofSomaliland

(RepublicofSomaliland,2001)incorporatestraditionalauthorityatthepoliticallevel,thiswas

notthecaseattheadministrativeurbanlevel.Forinstance,apartfrombeingregisteredwiththe

MinistryofInterior,theAkils’roleinlocalgovernanceisnotclear.Thisisdespitethefactthat

they are considered crucial actors in peace-making and a formidable force in electioneering

wheretheymobilisesupportforthedifferentpoliticalparties.

Inadditiontotheelections,servicesprovidedthroughclientalismandpatronagenecessitates

clanstostrivetoputoneoftheirowningovernmentpositions.Inotherwords,oncetheclan’s

candidateisinpositioninaservicedepartmentforalocalauthority,membersoftheclanexpect

thattheywillhaveprivilegeinaccessingserviceslegallyorillegally.76MediatedoftenbyAkils,

this kind of political environment increases the need for clan solidarity towards political

participationandrepresentationandthisinturnreinforcesurbansegregation.

Thenewconstitutionalprovisionforlocalgovernmentelectionsin2001markedanimportant

breakwiththepast,astherewasfromthen,asystemof localgovernmentthatpromisedto

quitedramaticallyalterlocalgovernanceinstitutionswithahistoryofauthoritarianpracticeand

lackofaccountability.WhileAkilsretainedtheirroleinthecentralgovernment,theywerenot

formallyincorporatedintothelocalgovernancestructures.AccordingtotheformerMinisterof

interior,1200Akilsarenowonthegovernmentpayrollacrossthecountrywhile400moreare

onawaitinglistforapproval.77Themajorfunctionoftheirpayistoensurethatthestatecan

enrol their services on issues related to peace and security. The process throughwhich the

appointment or recognition of Akils’ statehood is achieved is not well defined. The Interior

MinistryofficialspointoutthatAkilcandidatescomewithahandfulofmembersfromtheirclan

whodemandrecognitionofthecandidateoftheirchoice.Thestateseesthispracticeasbeing

informalandforthepurposeofcontrollingthemitisbetterforthegovernmenttoreducethe

75Interviewee8August19,2014.FormerMinisterofInterior.

76ParticipantinStarAreaTeashopDiscussionMay17,2014.HargeisaResident.

77Interviewee8August19,2014.FormerMinisterofInterior.

93|P a g e

number of Akils.78 While officials thus tried to control and reduce Akils’ power, politicians

nonethelessdependedheavilyonthem.Inthelocalcouncilelectionsof2002,politiciansactively

engagedAkilstobroadentheirpoliticalbaseandlegitimacy.

MayorJi’ir,cametopowerthroughthisfirstsetofmunicipalelectionsin2002,bringinganend

tomorethanadecadeofexecutiveappointmentofmayors.Morethanadozenpoliticalparties

contestedforseatsinthemunicipalelectionsbutonly3politicalpartiesemergedasnational

parties; UDUB, Kulmiye and UCID.79 Eleven councillors were elected on UDUB tickets and

another6councillorsjoinedthemfromthepartieswhichdidnotmakeittothefinal3national

parties.Thismadethenumberoftherulingpartycouncillors17,trailedbyKulmiyewhichhad4

andUCIDwith3. TheMayor and thedeputymayor served as executive and the rest of the

councillorsweredividedinto4committeeswithchairs,deputiesandsecretaries.Thecitywas

divided into5districtsandonecouncillorwasput inchargeofeachdistrict. Inotherwords,

everycouncilloralsohadanotherexecutiveor ‘semiexecutive’position.Thekeycommittees

were the finance and the land committees but equally important were the social welfare

committee which was responsible for the sanitation and social affairs and the security

committeeresponsibleforissuestodowithsecurityattheneighbourhoodlevel.

Forthefirstfewyears,themayoralseatofHargeisawaspoliticallyunstableascouncillorsoften

madeattemptstoremovethesittingmayorforpersonalorpoliticaldifferences.Removalwas

often attempted through a vote of no confidence, which required the support of only 8

councillors.Interestingly,thispoliticsdidnotmapstraightforwardlyontoclanpolitics.According

toaformermayor,impeachmentwasoftenattemptedforpoliticalgainsas:

everybodywanted tobecomeamayor.Mayorsmayhave tobedislodged

constantlyfortheopportunitytocomeup.Atthetimetheissuewaslessto

dowithclanpoliticsassomecouncillorsfrommyownclanusedtooppose

me. Itwasmoretodowithotherassociations likefriendshipandpersonal

interests.80

78Ibid.

79UrurkaCadaaladaiyoDaryeelka(WelfareandJusticeParty).

80Interviewee9August16,2014.FormerMayorofHargeisa.

94|P a g e

Thefocusofthenewelectedcouncilfrom2002wasonstrengtheningthetaxregimes.Previously

local government tax collectionhadbeendone through informalpracticesheavily relianton

individualcollector’saptitudeinusingtheirsocialnetworkasapotentialsourceofidentifying

keytaxpayersinahighlysegregatedcity.Urbansegregationservedthenewtowncouncilwell

astheywereabletoidentifypotentialtaxpayersthroughtheclanandkinshipbasednetworks.

Inotherwords,sincetherewere/arenoaddressesandpersonaldocumentsforidentification,

clanmembershipwhichassignseveryonewithalineagebasedidentitylabelbecameauseful

toolthroughwhichtaxcollectorslocatepotentialtaxpayers.81Theaimwastoincreasethetax

baseoflocalgovernmentbutbyimplicationitreinforcedserviceprovisionalongclanlines.Local

government staff were often sent to neighbourhoods populated by their clan not only for

securityreasonsbutalsoforeaseofaccessandidentificationpurposes.BorsdorfandHidalgo

(2009)arguethatsegregationofurbanspaceissometimesbridgedbytheexistenceofsocial

networksbetweenactorswhotrytomitigatethenegativeconsequencesofsegregation.Inthe

case of Hargeisa, even after the local elections, tax collectors used kinship based social

networkingtoidentifypotentialtaxpayers.Onemajorflipsideofthismechanismwashowever

thefactthatitrecordedaverylowrateoftaxcollectionunderstandablebecauseofnepotism

andcorruption.

Astaxpaymentisakeycomponentforaccountablegovernance,itisalsoanimportantelement

throughwhichstatelegitimacycanbemeasured.InsituationslikeHargeisa,wherethestateis

believedtomisappropriaterevenuesgeneratedfromtaxpayers,suchtaxationisusedasmeans

todiscreditthestate,andtoreinforcearationaleofelectingsomeonefromone’sownclan.In

the2012localgovernmentelections,aninformerinateashoppointedoutthat:

Thereweretwocandidatesfromhisclanwhereasonewasamanofintegrity

andtheotherwasnot.Weelectedthecandidatewith less integrityastax

collectedfromuswas/isanywaymisappropriated…solethim(withtheguy

withlessintegrity)eatwiththem.Hadweelectedtheotherguyhewoulddo

thatandhenceourmoneywouldallbeeatenbypeopleotherclans.82

81ItisimportanttopointoutherethatAkilsarenotusedtocollectrevenuesfrommembersoftheirclan.

82ParticipantinCommercialBankTeashopDiscussionJuly01,2014.HargeisaResident.

95|P a g e

Theconcernhereisthatifaclanelectsamanofintegritybuthiscolleaguesfromotherclans

are not, he/she will not be involved in irregular or corrupt practices or sharing of

misappropriatedtaxesorresourceslootedfromthestatewithhisclansmen/womenwhereas

othersaredoingwhatherefrainedfromtothedisadvantageofhisclan.

Thenewsystemoftaxcollectionintroducedbytheelectednewmayor,Ji’ir,tooktheformofan

incentive,throughwhichtaxcollectorswhorecordedthelargestnumberofpayerswouldbe

rewarded.However,thisonceagainhadanegativeeffectonthetaxcollectionregimeinthe

town. The tax collectors placed their focus on the individuals that paymost taxes so as to

maximise their tax collection strategy. As the previous incentive-based strategy for tax base

expansionfailedtobringaboutanytangibleincreaseinthenumberoftaxpayersinthecity,the

newmayorapproachedtheUnitedNationsHabitatprogrammetohelpwiththecreationofa

GIS which would enable the local government to record the cadastral boundaries of the

propertiesandthebuiltenvironmentingeneralforrevenuecollectionandplanningpurposes.

UNhabitatacceptedtheproposalandimplementedtheGISprojectin3phases.Thefirstpart

wascompletedin2005andthe2ndin2008when25,000propertieswererecorded.Thedata

wasusedforthreereasons;taxcollection,landmanagementandtownplanning.Attheendof

theproject,90%ofthebusinessesinthecitywererecorded.Therecordingofthepropertiesin

the town has increased the revenue of the local authority by a significant margin, 300%.83

Thoughimportantintermsoflocalgovernmentcapacity,thisdidnothelpmuchwiththeland

conflictproblemsinthecity(asweshallseeinchapter6).

This section has shown that the focus of urban governance in the post-war periodwas the

reestablishmentofurbangovernancestructuresandtransition todemocracy,andredefining

theroleofthecustomaryinstitutionssuchastheAkilsinthepoliticalandsecuritydynamicsof

the city. I have shown that the existing rifts between the SNM factions complicated the

reestablishmentof local governance in the immediateaftermathofBarre’souster asefforts

aimedatendingthearmedconflictovershadowedtheneedforestablishinglocalgovernance

structures.Iarguedthatpost-conflicturbangovernancedidnotshiftfromtheuseofcustomary

institutionsasameansofdeliveringservices.Ihaveshownthattheyplayedakeyroleinthe

political and security stabilisation of the town. They also continue to play a key role in the

municipalpoliticsparticularlytheelectionandre-electionofcandidates.

83Interviewee9August16,2014.FormerMayorofHargeisa.

96|P a g e

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided a historical narrative of segregation and its interface with local

governanceinHargeisa.IarguedthatsegregationinHargeisacouldbeunderstoodasaresponse

topolitical,economicandsecurityissuesthatpersistedduetothestate’sinabilitytobringabout

changeandshiftawayfromthepast.Forinstance,Hargeisa’ssegregatedspatialcharacterwas

entrenchedduringthepostcolonialperiodbythestate’sinabilitytodealwiththedireeconomic

andsecurityproblemsinthecity,whichmadeitnecessaryforpeoplerelyontheclanasarisk

mitigationmechanism.Themostsignificantsignofchangeinurbansegregationcameduringthe

socialist regimewhenmilitarised and repressive approaches to urban governance improved

securityintheearlyyearsoftherevolutionandcosmopolitanspacesemergedincertainareas

ofthecity.Butthisdidnotlastlongasthestatemetamorphosedagaintoitsfamiliarpatrimonial

andclientalistformfurtherexacerbatedbypredatoryanddictatorialgovernancepracticesthat

underminedwhatwasleftofthepublictrust inthestate.UrbansegregationinHargeisawas

finallytakentoanewheightbythediresecuritysituationintheimmediateaftermathofBarre’s

removalfrompowerandthesuccessivefragiletransitiontodemocracy.Thishistoricaltrajectory

ofurbangovernancecanelucidatethefactorsthathaveentrenchedthespatialsegregationof

Hargeisaamidrapidurbangrowth.Whilethischapterfocusedonmunicipalpolitics/governance,

thenext chapter further zooms inon landadministration to revealhowspecific governance

practicesshapeHargeisaspatialcharacter.

97|P a g e

CHAPTER5 HISTORIESOFTOPDOWNURBANLANDMANAGEMENT

5.1 Introduction

This chapter focusesonurban land administration, past andpresent. It provides ahistorical

overview of the colonial land management practices and their impact on shaping people’s

attitude towards the state aswell as the dynamics of post-conflict urban landmanagement

practices.Iarguethattheweakstatecapacityandlackofresourcesandskillstoputinplacean

effectiveregulatoryframeworkcanexplainthecontinuedlargenumberoflandconflictsinthe

city.Ialsoarguethatthe“modern”landadministration,whichischaracterisedbyaweakstate

andpluraljusticesystem,hasunderminedpublictrustinthestate.Thechapterbuildsonthe

previouschapter’saccountofhistoriesoflocalgovernmentthatdetailedtheroleofAkilsand

urban councils to focus on urban land administration. I provide a further layer of empirical

evidencetosupportmyargumentforhowurbanlocalgovernanceinstitutionshaveshapedthe

cityinspatialtermsandparticularlyhowtheyhavereinforcedthespatialsegregationofthecity

alongclanlines.Throughoutthenarrative,IattempttoshowthaturbansegregationinHargeisa

alongclan linescanbeviewedasageographicalmanifestationofpeople’sresponsetostate

policiesandpractices.AsIhaveargued,thepresenthybridityfocusedliteratureonSomaliland

failstoprovideadequateexplanationoftherelationshipbetweengovernanceandspatialform

at the urban level. I argue that it is important to go beyond the brief references of urban

governanceashybridtoexplorethespecificmodesoflandadministrationovertime.Ialsoseek

toexploretheideaofsegregationasaconcept,whichismoreusefulintermsofexplainingthe

spatialcharacterofcitiesinSomaliland.

Thechapterisorganisedintothreesections.Inthefirstsection,Ilookattheearlyhistoryofland

administrationand its legacies, particularly theassociationbetween landadministrationand

appropriation,andthelate-colonialattempttoregisterindividualurbanlandholdingforelites

and itseffects. Inthesecondsection, Ipresentevidenceforpostcolonial legalcontinuities in

landadministration.Inthispostcolonialperiod,Iarguethaturbanlandwasnotapriority,partly

duetoalackofcapacity,buttheresultwasaproliferationoflandconflicts,whichreinforced

the importanceofclanandsegregatedurbanspaces.Finally, Idiscuss the importanceof the

2001legalandpolicyframeworksforurbanlandinterventionandaseriesofstate/NGOefforts

toregulateurbanland.

98|P a g e

5.2 EmergenceandContinuityofTopDownLandManagement

Understandingthedynamicsofthecurrentstateofurbanlandmanagementinthepost-conflict

contextbegsforarevisitingofthepast.Thiswillenableustoseehowurbanlandgovernance

approaches during the colonial and postcolonial periods shape the present day urban land

managementpractices.Asshowninthepreviouschapterandisalsorelevanthere,historyisa

livedexperienceinthecontextofSomalilandasitisusedorabusedtojustifycurrentthinking,

processesandpractices.Inmyexaminationofthepast,Iarguethaturbanlandmanagement

duringthecolonialperiodwashighlycentralised:authoritiesdidnotconsulttheSomalisabout

waystomanagetheircities,presumablybecauseofanassumptionthattheSomaliswerenot

educatedorknowledgeableenoughtopassjudgementonideasaboutlandmanagement.Ialso

arguethatthisauthoritarianformofgovernancelaidthefoundationforthemistrustbetween

thestateandthepublichenceunderminingstatelegitimacy.Ialsoarguethatthepostcolonial

statedidnotshiftawayfromthispractice,furtherentrenchingthelackoftrustinthestateand

byimplicationthelowlevelofstatelegitimacy.Theresponsetothelackoftrustandlegitimacy

ismanifest in the formof spatial segregationasmembersof thesameclanconglomerate in

specificchunksofthecitytoincreasetheirchanceofsurvivalinthecity.

IbeginthisexaminationwithcoloniallandmanagementinSomaliland,whichcanbetracedback

to the early years of the protectorate’s formation when the government introduced the

registration of documents ordinance in 1912. This legislation provided the colonial

administrationwithatoolthroughwhichtheycouldrecordandmanageindividualownership

oflandandimmovableproperties.TheregisterwaslostduringthewarwiththeItalians.This

ledtopost-WorldWarTwolandconflictsaspeoplemadeclaimstovacantgovernmentlands.

Landclaimswereatthetimemostlysubmittedbyeliteswhowantedtooccupyimportantparts

ofthecityorfurthercommercialgains.84Controlswereinitiallylimitedtothecoastaltownsbut

asurbancentresgrewinlandthe landadministrationframeworkwasalsoexpanded intothe

interiorpartsofthecountry.Colonialofficialsintroducedthetownship’sordinancein1924ata

timewhen theProtectoratewas emerging fromaprotracted conflict following theMullah’s

uprising.Thisactwasminimalist initsfirstversionmainlyfocusingonpoliticalcontrol,butin

1927thegovernmentamendedtheordinancetoprovidecolonialofficialswithsweepingpowers

of reorderingsettlementpatterns in townships. It isparticularly relevant to the focusof this

84TNACO535/149/4LandTenure.

99|P a g e

chapteronlandadministrationbecauseitpermittedtheGovernortoconfiscatelandrequired

for‘publicpurpose’.85Thepublicpurposeforwhichtheamendmentwasjustifiedincludedthe

constructionofnewroadsandbridgesaswellas therealignmentofexistingstreetsandthe

constructionofpublicoffices,buildingsandanyotherpurposedeemedfitbytheGovernor.

Compensation,whereitexisted,wasoftendeterminedthroughgovernmentledassessments.

Landownerswhodidnothavetitledeedsqualifiedonlyforthepaymentofpresentvalueof

their buildingswithout regard to the value of the sitewhereas thosewhoheld government

issued freeor leaseholdqualified forpaymentof the landvaluetogetherwithanybuildings,

trees,cultivationetceteraonit.86Theintroductionanduseoversubsequentdecadesofthese

expropriationruleswereunfathomabletothevastmajorityofpeopleintheProtectorate,and

have a place in popular historical memory. This apprehension and memories of land

expropriationthatcontinuetoberetoldcanbeexemplifiedbyaclanelders’storyinwhicha:

seniorSomaliofficialnamedInaIgare,workingforthecolonialgovernment

issuedanorderfortheexpropriationofland.Anoldladywhowasamongthe

evicteeswastoldthefactthatMuseIgareactingontheinstructionsissued

bytheGovernorwantshertovacatethelandtowhichshereplied‘hewho

speaksnonsenseisInaIgare.87

Myargumenthereisthatthissimpleutterancebecameanidiomofresistanceusedtodismiss

stateactionslackingcrediblerationalisation.Theenduranceofthissimpleutteranceacrosstime

andspaceshedslightonhowunsophisticatedmundanelanguagewasusedtodefythestate.It

also shows that Somalis at the time could not imagine andmake sense ofwhy the colonial

governmentwouldwanttomovepeoplearoundwhenthereisaplentyofvacantspacewith

which it could do whatever it wanted. It highlights the importance of land administrative

regulationsbothtocolonialpowerandtopopularresistanceandperceptionsofitsillegitimacy.

Thisincomprehensiondoesnotsuggestthatlandusemanagementwasaforeignconcepttothe

Somalipeople in the interiorpartsof thecountry.Venemaetal. (2009)observe thatSomali

peoplehadahistoryoflandusemanagement,thoughthiswasupheldorally,variedoverspace

85Ibid.

86Failuretocomplywiththisstipulationoftenwarrantedafineof500shillings.

87Interviewee24August15,2014.ClanElder.

100|P a g e

andwasnotformallycodified.Forinstance,pastoralistsoftenplannedwhichareaofthecountry

might be suitable for migration during the dry seasons basing their assessment on the

environmentalfootprintsoftheprecedingseason(i.e.rainfall)whilefarmersusedtoenclose

certainpartsoftheirlandforuseinthedryseasonswhensuppliesmightbelessabundant.An

intellectual represented traditional land management in the following positive terms,

emphasisingmutualconsentandnegotiation,disruptedbycolonialinterventions:

whenpeoplecomewateringplacessuchaswells,theyusedtoenquireabout

whoseturnisitorwhoseclanissupposedtowatertheiranimalinaparticular

dayoftheweek.Theotherclansusedtostepbackandletthatparticularclan

quench their animals. So, it was a system based on mutual respect and

agreementbetweentheclans.Theproblem is that thetraditionalsystems

was disrupted by foreign influences which increased the competition for

resources.88

The point here is that local people’s approach to land use management was based on

consultation and voluntary adherence as opposed to colonial actions. Colonial interventions

wereoftenconstitutedthroughatopdownprocessrequiringinvoluntaryenforcementmainly

shaped by disregard for local knowledge that cast doubt on people’s ability to govern their

relationshipwiththeenvironmentinamutuallybeneficialway.Inrelationtourbanspace,the

techniques through which colonial urban land use management operated differed

fundamentallyfromthatwhichwasunderstandabletotheSomaliswhoselandusemanagement

wasbasedonseasonalcalendarswherecertaingrazingactivitieswerenotallowedincertain

timesbutevictionandexpropriationoflandwasunnecessary.

Hargeisa,likeothermajortownships,wassignificantlyaffectedbytheintroductionofthenew

landmanagementordinance.Accordingtocorrespondencebetweenthesecretaryofthestate

LieutenantColAmeryand theGovernorof SomalilandKittermaster,expropriationof land in

Hargeisabecamenecessarybecauseofthecity’sexpansioninonedirection.Primelandalong

theonlymainstreetinthetownshipwasidentifiedforoneofthemajorexpropriationexercises

inlinewiththenewrules.Thelandinquestionwasgrantedtotheownersin1922andtemporary

traditionalstructureswerethereaftererected.Theviewoftheadministrationwashoweverthat

88Interviewee14September03,2014.Academic.

101|P a g e

thelandwasgrantedonatemporarybasisandthisallocationdidnotentailguaranteeoftenure

security.Moreover, theyargued that theoccupationof this land felloutside thecategoryof

privateownershipasstructureswerenotpermanentandownersheldneithertitledeedsnor

paid taxeshenceproviding governmentwith sufficient grounds to removeandpay theman

amountofmoneyequivalenttothesimplestructuresonthelandandnotthelandvalue.89

However, the colonial office in London believed that private ownership of land should be

respectedandthosewhocurrentlyoccupythelandshouldbeconsideredasprivatelandowners

astheiroccupationalrightshouldremainduringthelifetimeoftheguarantee.90Intheend,the

localadministratorsproposedtocompensateownersinamannerthatdidnottakeintoaccount

thesitevalue.91Theproposedcompensationthereforeentailedonlythelabourandthematerial

cost of temporary structures. In a letter dated on the 23 ofDecember 1937, theGovernor

announced that land along themain streetwould be expropriated to pave theway for the

constructionofnewblocksofpermanentbuildings.Noticestothiseffecthadbeenservedwith

the occupiers, giving them seven days to make the necessary arrangements for the

expropriation. Sixteen dwellings were affected by this expropriation and a committee from

variousagenciesincludingtheTreasurer,andChiefofCustoms,DirectorofPublicWorksanda

‘leadingSomaliresident’wereputtogethertoevaluatethecostofthedwellings.Theevaluators

came back with an estimated compensation of Rs.2350. Occupiers were notified that the

compensationwillbepaidtothemnextyear.92

Theexpropriationoflandaffectedthespatialcharacterofthecityintwoimportantways.Firstly,

thosewhowereevictedfromthelandhadnochannelthroughwhichtheycouldcomplainabout

thegovernment’spositionotherthanthetraditionalinstitutionssuchastheAkils.AsIarguedin

thepreviouschapter,thislackofotherleverageagainstthestateinherentlymadepeoplestick

to the parts of the town in proximity to particular Akils, where they could easily get social

supportandsolidarityparticularlyiftheyexperiencednegativeencounterswiththestate.

89TNACO535/80/1Townshipamendmentordinance.Expropriationoflandordinance.

90Ibid.

91Ibid.

92TNACO535/126/20CompensationfortheremovalofwattleanddaubstructuresinHargeisatown.

102|P a g e

Thisrenewedeffortinstatelandmanagementpracticesofficiallyintroducedanewparadigm

for conceptualising land ownership. Conceptually, land management mechanisms in Somali

culturewererenderedwithinaresourcesharingframeworkrestingownershipof land inthe

domainofGod.Inthisapproach,peoplewereseenasmerecaretakerswithusufructrightsto

land.Twoformsofownershipwererecognisedbythissystemnamely1)communalownership

ofpastorallandwhereclansareidentifiedwithaparticularturfbutdonotmonopoliseitsuse

exclusively and2) privateownershipwhere individualsmay carveout a pieceof land in the

villageorurbanareaforcultivationorpermanentsettlement.Thisbottom-uptraditionalland

managementapproachwasalteredincrementallyoveraperiodof85yearsinwhichSomaliland

was part of the British Empire mainly through a top-down process. The most significant

alteration came in the late1930swhen local colonialofficialsembarkedonefforts aimedat

relievingLondonfromthefinancialburdenoftheProtectorate93byexploringthepossibilityof

discoveringmineraldepositsthatcouldsupporttheadministrationinthelongrun.Asaresult,

in1939thegovernmentintroducedanewlandtenureordinancedesignedtorespondtothese

possibilities.Whilethecolonialgovernmentconsultedthetraditionalleadersonlocalpolitical

issuessuchaspeaceandsecurity,thesamecouldnotbesaidforlandmanagement.Thislackof

consultationmighthavebeen justifiedon thebasis that therewas lackof knowledgeabout

urban land issues in Somaliland as therewere very limited number of towns in the country

notwithstanding the typical colonial mentality of underestimating local knowledge and the

intellectual capacity of natives. In the late 1930s, London becamemuch more reluctant to

providesufficientfundsfordevelopmentatatimewhenanumberofsignificanttownshipswere

emergingintheprotectorate(Millman,2013)

Accordingtocolonialrecords,theapproachtolandownershipbythestatewasinitiallyjustified

on the basis of treaties signed with the clans in Somaliland. But the legal officer in the

Protectorateraisedhisconcernaboutthis,sayingtheymakenomentiontoanyacceptanceof

thestate’sownershiprightsoverland.Onthecontrary,anarticleinthetreatystatesthatthe

tribeswill“nevercede,sell,mortgageorotherwise[disposeof]…anyportionoftheterritory

presentlyinhabitedbythemorbeingundertheircontrol”.Accordingtothelegalofficer,thisdid

notprovidethegovernmentwithalegalframeworkthroughwhichtransferthestateownership

oflandcouldbejustified.94Thelegalofficer,however,advisedhissuperiorsinLondonthatan

93Theprotectoratewasheavilyreliantonfundingfromthecolonialoffice

94TNACO535/149/4LandTenure.

103|P a g e

articleinthePrincipalOrderinCouncilof1929(whichreplacedtheOrderof1889)95contains

provisionsthatcouldallowthestatetotakeownershipofland.Accordingtoalettersignedby

MalcolmMacdonaldonthe19thofAugust1939,landownershipinthisorderwasdivisibleinto

threecategoriesnamelycrownland,publiclandandtriballand.

Crownlandwasdefinedas“allpubliclandsintheProtectoratewhicharesubjecttothecontrol

of his Majesty by virtue of any treaty, convention or agreement, or of his Majesty’s

Protectorate”; public land was defined as “all lands which shall have been required by his

Majestyforthepurposeofpublicserviceorotherwisehowsoever”,andprivatelandwasdefined

asalandthesurfaceofwhichisvestedinanindividualorcorporationwhetherbyvirtueofgrant

fromtheCrownorotherwise”butbeneathofwhich,i.e.mineralreserves,rightsarevestedin

the Crown.96 He argued that “the only crown land is that which has been acquired for the

purposeofpublicserviceor ‘otherwisehowsoever”.Hecontendedthat the“meaningof the

words‘otherwisehowsoever’[wasnotclearbutcouldbetakenasreferencetothe]acquisition

byaformaltransferfromthetribestotheGovernororbyalegislativeacteitherdeclaringland

tobecrownland,[or]tobeconvertedintocrown…givingtheGovernorpowerstodisposeof

orexercisecontroloverit’”.97

Thelegislation,introducingdifferentformsofstate,privateandcommunaltenurechallenged

howlandownershipwasconceptualisedamongSomalisandthetransferofownershipfromthe

domainofGodtothedomainofgovernmentdelegitimisedthelandmanagementprocessin

the eyes of the public, who continued to perceive it as a colonial project designed for the

subjugation and confiscation of their property without equitable compensation.98 The

unpopularityofhistoriesof landadministration inbothurbanandruralcontexts,particularly

through their role in expropriations, thus contributed directly to nationalist resistance. The

relevanceofthishistorytothenarrativethatfollows,isthatasweshallsee,therearedirect

continuitieswithmodesoflandmanagementinHargeisaovertimeandintothepresent.

95Wheretribessignedanagreementwiththegovernment.

96TNACO535/149/4LandTenure.

97Ibid.

98ParticipantMay13,2014.HargeisaResident.FocusGroupDiscussion.

104|P a g e

As evident above, colonial administration was a top-down process characterised by lack of

consultation with the public and local authorities. This authoritarian state culture had a

significantimpactonthefutureofurbanlandmanagementinthecountryasmostofthecolonial

land policies and lawswere retained in the postcolonial period. The continuities aremore

striking than the changes. Attempts aimed at change often failed. For instance, in 1960 the

governmentappointedaParliamentaryCommissiontodealwithlandreform,butaftersixyears

ofworktheycameupwithadraftwhichfailedtopassinparliament(Besteman,1990).From

the beginning this reform initiative had the hallmark of a failure as it was laden with elite

interestsandalsowasgeographicallyskewedinfavourofthefertilecommercialfarmlandsin

theSouthastheideabehindtheinitiativewastoredressthecolonialacquisitionofsignificant

cultivablelandalongtheriversinJubaandShebelle.Detailsofthehowtheywantedtodothis

(i.e.nationalisationsorrestitution)couldnotbeobtained.ADistrictCommissionerinHargeisa

duringthistimeattributesthefailureofthisattempttotheabsenceofnationalcoverageand

consultationwithlocalofficialsatdistrictlevel.99HestatedthattheCommissionneithervisited

norconsultedwithhimorthepeopleinHargeisa:

ThelegislationwascookedupinMogadishuandatnotime,whileIwasin

thedistrict,wasIconsultedoraskedtoorganisepeoplewhocouldcontribute

noteworthy ideas to the proposed legislation on land. At the time, we in

Hargeisaalsohadsignificant landmanagementproblemsasconflictoften

usedtoarisefromlandownershipdisputesinthecity…wecouldhaveadded

asubstantialcontributionfromthispartofthecountry.100

ThecontinuationofmanyofthelawsinheritedfromthecolonialadministrationandtheSomali

government’s failure to formulate new land management regulations permitted District

Commissioners to exercise colonial style powers in Hargeisa, which alienated people and

fosteredhostilityandmistrusttowardsthestate.AccordingtoalegalpractitionerinHargeisa,

landdecisionswerebasedonthewishesandwhimsofofficersratherthanlawsandpolicies.101

99Letalonethepublic.

100Interviewee3Nomember05,2014.FormerDistrictCommissionerofHargeisa.

101Interviewee34August30,2015.Lawyer.

105|P a g e

ThisviewofarbitrarydecisionstoresolveconflictsissupportedbytheformerDCofHargeisa’s

memoryoflanddisputesinthisperiod.In1967,herecalledfindingitdifficulttomanageland

and as a result took sternmeasures including banning issuing land titles to applicants who

wantedtoeitherlegalisetheirexistinglandownershiporapplyforregistrationofanewplotfor

twoyears.102Thisdidnotincreaseconfidenceinstateauthority.Iarguethatthewayinwhich

thestatemanagedurbanlandinHargeisaledmanypeopletolosefaithinthesystemandrely

onothermeansofdealingwiththeirproblems.Thislackoffaithinstateinstitutionsshapedthe

wayinwhichpeoplethinkaboutandchooseresidentialandbusinesssettlementsinthecity.In

otherwords,theylocatedthemselvesinareaspredominantlypopulatedbytheirclans,tobuild

propertyandworryaboutlegalisationlater.Whenthemilitaryregimecametopowerin1969,

thelackofconsultationonlandmanagementpoliciesandlegislationhadnotchanged.

Themostsignificantlandusechangeundermilitaryrulecamein1972whenBilleRafle,former

Governor of North Western Region of which Hargeisa was the capital, removed informal

settlementsnearthecitycentreinordertoimprovethecity’simage.Evicteeswereresettledin

peri urbanareas Southof the citywith limitedaccess towater andother essential services,

leading to a mixed reaction, discussed below. It is important to understand how particular

episodesof landmanagementpractices such as this shapedpublic perceptionsof the state.

Whilethismovepleasedsome,suchasthosewhomthegovernmentprovidedwithurbanland

andwhogainedadegreeoftenuresecurity,103manyothersweredisgruntledbecausetheywere

movedawayfromareasinwhichopportunitiesandaccesstoserviceswerehigher.Indeed,many

oftheresidentsIspoketowerenotissuedwithpapersatthetime,whichalsocontributedto

laterlandconflictsintheperiodofrebuildingafterstatecollapse.

The most prominent such scheme of eviction and resettlement was the movement of the

Dunbuluq neighbourhood to the outskirts of the city. Dunbuluq at the time was a

neighbourhoodconsistingmainlyofGarhajisandArabclans.Criticspointoutthattheremoval

of people and expropriation of land was done in a manner not dissimilar to the urban

governance practices of the past where people were often left with no choice other than

acceptingthegovernmentproposals,conveyedasorders.104Theycomplainthatpeoplewere

102Interviewee3Nomember05,2014.FormerDistrictCommissionerofHargeisa.

103ParticipantApril07,2014.HargeisaResident.FocusGroupDiscussion.

104ParticipantinAgipTeashopDiscussionApril11,2014.HargeisaResident.

106|P a g e

settledinareasfarremovedfromthecitycentreandmostoftheemploymentopportunities.105

The government version, however, brushed such criticism aside. According to the former

Governor, under military rule, eviction was necessitated by the fact that the area was

inaccessibletotheauthorities,asthestructureswerebuiltveryclosetoeachotherandposed

adangertoitsinhabitantsduetothepossibilitiesofdiseasetransmission,aswellascreatinga

publichealthhazardfortherestofthecity.106Thegovernmentplanningforthere-locationof

peoplefromthecitycentretotheoutskirtsdidnot,however,reconfiguretheclan-basedspatial

characterofthecity.Thisisbecausetheareaofthecitythattheevicteesweremovedtoabutted

theneighbourhoodof thecity inwhich ruralpopulationsof thesameclanbackgroundwere

living.Stateddifferently,theseevictionshavefurtherreinforcedHargeisa’sclan-basedspatial

character.

AccordingtoDauskardt(1993)evictionscanhaveprofoundsocio-economicandculturalimpacts

oncommunities.ButTröger(2009)pointsoutthateviction isnotonlyaboutexclusionbut it

couldaswellbeamodeofachievinginclusion.Inotherwords,peopleareinitiallyexcludedfrom

a particular space but included in another. He seeks to problematise the representation of

exclusionandinclusionastwoseparateandirreconcilableprocessesandpointsouttheinherent

interwoven-nessbetweenthetwo.Theauthorshowsthatconditionsofevicteesfromtheinner

cityofAddisAbabaimprovedinanewperipherallocation,whichhadbetteraccesstowaterand

road networks. In opposition to representations of peripheral neighbourhoods as entirely

excludedfromthesocialfabricofthecity,thestudyfoundthatvariousformsofcommunication

andnetworkshaveenabledevicteesgetaccesstoopportunitiesandservicesforthoselivingin

peripheral areas. In relation to theHargeisaevictions fromDunbuluq, theGovernor insisted

(contratopopularopinionandmemoriesoftheshiftasforceddisplacement)that:

therewerealotofpraisesfortheprojectandpeopleintheendwerequite

happywithwhatwehavedone.Eachfamilywaslocatedaplotofabout20

m²,bearinginmindthatfamiliesusedtoleavein3or4mintheirprevious

locations.Oncethenecessaryplanningwasundertaken,representativesof

thepeopleweretakentothenewsitesoastoseetheplaceforthemselves

beforetheyaremoved.Webroughtthepeoplevehiclestomovethem.Each

105Ibid.

106Interviewee10October29,2014.FormerGovernorofNorthWesternProvince.

107|P a g e

plotandfamilyweregivenanumber.Oncewemovedthemwithourvehicle,

Iinstructedthegovernmentofficerstohelpthemwiththeunloadingoftheir

stufffromthetrucks.Oncewehavecompletedtheprocess,peoplewerequite

happywithitandtheystartedcelebratingthemoment.107

TheresettlementofevicteesintheSouthofthecityreinforcedtheclanbasedspatialcharacter

of the city given the shift toareaspredominantlypopulatedby their respective clans.Many

peoplebelievethatthegovernmenthadanopportunitytoalterthecity’ssettlementpatternas

these exercises could have been used to promote spatial integration and to break up

concentrationsofparticularclans.108Itisimportanttomentionthattheseevictionstookplace

at a time when the government announced a new state policy on eradicating and burying

clanism in public life. Yet the land management practices of the state were in practice in

contravention with this policy, as the state failed to promote its rhetoric through existing

governmentinterventionssuchasthemovementofpeopletoareaspopulatedbyotherclans.

Equally,thestatealsofailedtobringaboutmeaningfullandreformsdespiteseveralhalf-hearted

attempts.

Itisimportanttopointoutthatlandmanagementpoliciesandlawshadaruralfocusthroughout

thepostcolonialperiod.ButsuchpoliciesarenonethelessrelevantfortheHargeisacontextas

theboundarybetweenruralandurbanisblurredinHargeisa(Moolla,2009).Asidefromthefact

thatasignificantnumberof‘urban’peopleleadasemi-rurallifewheretheykeepanimalssuch

aschickensandgoatsformilking,amajorseasonalriverflankedbyfarmsrunsthroughthecity.

Inotherwords,thelandreformpoliciesdesignedforruralbasedsectorssuchasagricultureand

livestockalsohadasignificantbearingonurbanlife.LandtenurereformsinSomaliadateback

totheimmediatepostcolonialperiodwhenthecivilianSomaligovernmentmadeanattemptin

whichitsoughttocodifyaspectsofthecustomarylawonlandaspartofagreaterattemptto

consolidatethedifferentlawsinthecountry(Contini,1967).Subsequentattemptsfollowedin

1975whenthemilitaryregimeissuedadecreeputtinglandownershipinthehandsofthestate

inabidtoincreaseagriculturalproduction(Bruyas,2006).Thiswaspremisedontheclassical

postcolonial assumption that sees land rights as key economic drivers able to reverse the

economicandsocialproblemsinAfrica(DFID,2007).Liketherestofitspostcolonialbrethren,

107Ibid.

108ParticipantinStarAreaTeashopDiscussionMay17,2014.HargeisaResident.

108|P a g e

theSomalistate’sattempttoreformlandownershipwaslargelyunsuccessfulandthestate’s

intentionofunlockinglandasaneconomicresourcewasnotrealised.

Eventhoughtheepicentreofpostcolonial landreforms inSomaliaushered inbythemilitary

administrationwasthefertileregionsintheSouth,thearidlandsoftheNorthwerenotspared.

Thereformsweremainlyundertakenintwodistricts,ErigavointheEastandGabileyintheWest.

InGabiley,thegovernmentestablishedalargescalestate-ownedfarmasanexperimentaimed

at increasingtheagriculturalproductioncapacityoftheregion,butthis miserablyfailedand

pastoralistsonceagaininformallyregainedcontroloftheirlostland(NortonandFlyktningeråd,

2008). Similarly, in Erigavo, grazing reserveswere established by the livestock development

agency for the formation of cooperative societies aimed at empowering pastoralists. The

cooperativesweredesignedtoconsistof45householdseachcontributing10sheepand1cow.

However,theprogrammewascounterproductiveasitwasexploitedbyeliteswhoboughtoff

the shares of those unable to contribute the 10 sheep and 1 cow required for cooperative

membership(NortonandFlyktningeråd,2008).Inbothcases,thelandtenurereformswereseen

asgovernmentencroachmentonpastoralists’traditionalrightsofpastureandwatering.

It is important to point out that urban landmanagementwas neglected during themilitary

regimeinSomalia,asidefromtheevictionsdiscussedabove.RoblehandHussen(1977)citedin

Besteman and Roth (1988), observe that the government passed 22 pieces of legislation

governingtheagriculturalsector,yetonlyonelaw(theUrbanLandDistributionLawof1973)

dealingwithurbanlandmanagement,whichwasnotwidelypromulgated,andwasamended

later in1980 (DemocraticRepublicofSomalia,1980,DemocraticRepublicofSomalia,1973).

This lackofurban focuswasattributable to the fact that thestatewas trying tobringabout

changeinoverdependenceonpastorallivelihoods,perceivedtobehighlyvulnerabletoseasonal

variations.Agriculturewasseenasamorestablemodeoflivelihoodeventhoughthecountry

hadonlylimitedfertilelandalongtheriversintheSouth.Amongthekeylegislationandpolicies

introducedweretheagriculturallandlawof1975,whichaccordingtoBesteman(1990)wasby

far themostextensivepieceof legislationdealingwith landmanagement inthepostcolonial

period.109Oneofthecornerstonesofthenewlegislation,whichalsohadimplicationsforurban

contexts,was the fact that it notonlyenhanced theauthoritarian colonial approach to land

109Thislegislationpavedthewayfortheestablishmentofdevelopmentcooperativesandalsoenhancedthe existing agricultural crash programmes through which land was allocated land to governmentemployeesandgraduatesofagriculturalcolleges.

109|P a g e

managementbut italsofurtheredthenotionofstateownershipover land.Besteman(1990)

pointsoutthatthe1975lawnullifiedtherecognitionoftraditionalauthorityoflandownership

asitvestedalllandinthehandsofthestate,reducingcommunalandprivateownershiptomere

tenancy.Therenewedstateinterestinvigorouslandmanagementcanbeseenasanattemptat

strengtheningitsgriponpowerandimplementingitssocialistideologies.Thislandmanagement

focuscouldalsobeseenasaprimeopportunityfordemonstratingtheshiftfromacapitalistfree

markettoasocialisteconomywherecooperativesratherthancompaniesplayacentralrolein

theeconomy(Roth,1989).

Another key corner stone of this law was the imposition of compulsory registration for

landownership.Again,therewereramificationsofthispolicyinurbanaswellasinruralcontexts.

Whilethislawwasjustifiedthroughthelenseofpovertyalleviation,italienatedthepoorand

empoweredtheelitesinthecountryatleastintwoways.Firstly, itenabledthemtogettitle

deeds for unclaimed land110 at a timewhen the countrywas going through steep economic

declineworsenedbyinsurgenciesintheNorth.Secondly,itenabledthemtosalvagesomeof

theirsavingsatatimewhenthecountrywasfacinghighrateofinflation.Roth(1989)notesthat

“high price inflation discourages investors from holding financial assets, and increases the

incentiveforholdinglandorcommodities(e.g.,goldorlivestock).Pricelevels,asmeasuredby

theGDPdeflator,roseatanaverageannualrateof10percentovertheperiod1965-80,andin

excessof45percentannuallybetween1980-5.Basedona14percentnominalrateofinterest

onbankdeposits in 1985, 10 financial assets in real termswouldhave yieldeda31percent

negativeannualreturn”(Besteman,1990).

Overall,theintroductionofcompulsoryregistrationwascounter-productive.Forinstance,the

prohibitionofsalesortransferof landnegativelyaffectedinvestmentasownerswerelegally

unabletosellortransfertheirproprietorshiptoothers.Moreover,itincreasedcompetitionover

landownershipandspeculationaswellascommercialisationofruralfarmlandsattheexpense

of the poor. It also led to the breakdown of existing traditional ways of managing and

adjudicatinglandconflictswithoutcreatingcrediblealternatives.AccordingtoBesteman(1990),

amoreappropriatelandmanagementschemecouldhavebeenfoundintheenhancementof

communalownershipoflandinsteadoftheindividualisedownershipapproachpromotedinthe

1975 legislation.Thiswouldhaveenabledmembersof thecommunity tocontinueusing the

110InmostcasestheeliteswhoacquiredregistrationforunclaimedlandinSomaliahavehadnoimmediateintentionorabilitytoinvestintheland.

110|P a g e

traditional systems while also getting access to government documentation guaranteeing

security of tenure (Besteman, 1990). Besteman (1990) defines tenure security in the Somali

context“asthe[landowners]perceptionthats/hewillbeabletosustainrightstousetheland

and obtain continuing benefits from investment in the land”. The introduction of land

registration in Somalia posed a challenge to this perception as it changed land rights from

communaltoindividual.Theideaherewastoalterthewaylandownersseetheirownershipto

thelandandhenceincreasetenuresecurity.

Whileinsomecontextslegaltitlingmayincreasetenuresecurity,thiswasnotthecaseinSomalia

followingthemilitaryregimesregistrationpolicy.AccordingtoBesteman,in“situationsofhigh

population pressure, rising land values, land speculation, unequal access to land under

customarytenure,orencroachingcontroloverlandbyadominantgroup,legaltitleconferred

bythestatemayincreasetenuresecurity”(Besteman,1990).But,underthemilitaryreforms,

thiswas not the case and themeasures contained in the agricultural land lawweremainly

counter-productive.Oneofthereasonswhycustomarytenurecontinuedtobeseenasmore

able to confer security was the fact that rural populations were dispersed and the level of

urbanisationwassignificantlylow.Butmoreimportantly,ownershipwasgovernedbyasetof

principlesthatareknowntovillagersandthegovernmentalike(BestemanandRoth,1988).For

instance,customarytenurerecognisedlandownershiponthebasisofinvestmentinvacantland

through either labour or other ventures such as capital, inheritance or gift(Norton and

Flyktningeråd,2008).Eventhoughtheintroductionofthe1975agricultural lawrenderedthe

existingcustomarytenurenullandvoidinlegalterms,inpracticeitprevailedinmostpartsof

thecountry,includinginsomeurbanareas.Thechallengetotheintroductionoftheregistration

processwasthereforethefactthatthepublicdidnotuniversallyacceptit.BestemanandRoth

(1988)arguethata“highlevelsoftenuresecuritycanexistwithoutstaterecognisedtitle.For

example, customary land tenure can, under certain circumstances, provide individuals with

tenure security having grazing and cultivation rights, without any state recognition of title”

(Besteman,1991).Theformalisationoflandregistrationinthecountrydidlittletoprovethat

customarytenurewasanimpedimenttoeconomicdevelopment.

InHargeisa,therewasrushtoregisterurbanlandbyelitesasaresultofthesemeasures.The

impositionofcompulsoryregistrationforlandinthecountrywasinterpretedintheNorthasa

measure through which the government wants to impose further punishment for their

111|P a g e

resistancetothestate.111Asaresult,manyeliteswhoownedagriculturalland,particularlyurban

farmsalongtheriverrunningthroughthecentreofHargeisa,rushedtoregistertheirlandsoas

to deny the government the chance of making this process a pretext for accusing them of

disobedience.112Anotherimportantfactorwhichcompelledlandownerstoregistertheirland

duringthisperiodwasthefactthatHargeisaattractedsignificantinvestmentintheconstruction

industryasmembersofitsdiasporacommunitiesincreaseddemandforlandsoastoconstruct

residentialhousesmainlyasaresultofincreasedoutflowofmigrationtotheMiddleEastwhere

employment opportunities were higher. However, the heightened opportunities for land

transactions in the city led to a rise in land conflicts complicated by the absence of proper

measurementofthefarmlandboundaries.Aspeoplehadnofaithwhatsoever inthemilitary

regime,traditionalinstitutionsoftendealtwiththeproblemthroughthebackdoorofthestate.

Theseprocesseswerebroughttoahaltthroughthewaranddestructionofthecity.Theydid,

however,haveimportantlegaciesfortheperiodofpost-conflictreconstruction,asweshallsee

inthenextsection.

5.3 Development(s)ofPost-ConflictLandAdministrationandLandConflicts

Inthissection,Idiscussthedevelopmentofpost-conflictlandadministrationanditsrelationship

tolandconflicts.Idosobyexaminingurbanlandmanagementlaw,whichhasbeencriticised

forbeingcomplexandambiguous(Bruyas,2006)andIshowthatthislawfailedtostrengthen

theurbanregulatoryframeworkwhichwasandcontinuestobeweak.Ialsoshowthattheurban

landregulatorysysteminplacecreatesmoreconfusionthanitsolvesandplaysakeyroleinthe

rampantlandconflictsinHargeisa.Asaresult,Iarguethatthisunderminespublictrustinthe

regulatory system and hence fosters the continued reliance on the clan network and hence

segregation.

Priorto2004,eachdistrict inHargeisahad itsownlandcommitteedealingwith landrelated

issues.Procedureswereweakleadingtomultipleissuanceoftitlesforthesamepieceofland.

Bruyas(2006,p.19)notesthattheregistrationprocedureswere inheritedfromtheprevious

regimeandthelegalregulatoryframeworkwithinwhichtheyoperatedwereeither“inefficient

ordisconnectedfromtherealityontheground”.Theconflictitselfreconfiguredandreinforced

111Interviewee7August20,2014OralHistorian,ArtistandRadioPresenter.

112Ibid.

112|P a g e

thecity’sclan-basedsettlement,butthepost-conflictlandmanagementexacerbatedinsecurity

anddistrustofthestate,andhencereproducedtheimportanceofaclan-basedsettlementlogic.

In1999,thegovernmentintroducedanagriculturallandlawwhichwasequallyimportantfor

urbanlandinHargeisaasthecitywas(andstillis)increasinglyexpandingintoagriculturaland

pastorallandwithinitsimmediatevicinity.Thelandmanagementregimeinplacecouldseldom

copewith the demand and pressure placed on it by such rapid growth. Attempts aimed at

bringing about reforms were mainly unsuccessful. This was partly attributable to the non-

existence of previous land records andmunicipal bylaws. Land reforms in Somalilandwere,

therefore,startedfromscratchasaparliamentary-led legislativeprocessaimedatproducing

comprehensive laws governing landboth at the central and the local governments’ level. In

2001,thepopulationofSomalilandvotedforareferendumonaconstitutionwhichplacedland

managementinthehandsofthestatebutguaranteedrespectforprivateownership(Republic

ofSomaliland,2001).

In2002, thegovernment introducedthe first landmanagement law(RepublicofSomaliland,

2002a)exclusivelydealingwithurbanlandwhichwaslateramendedin2008asthelawattracted

substantialcriticismforitssuperficiality(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008).Such

criticismwascarriedovertotheamendedversion,whichwasequallyaccusedofbeingoverly

concernedwithplanmanagement rather than creation.Nonetheless, itwasby far themost

significantattemptatdelineatingtheinstitutionalboundariesbetweenthelocalandthecentral

statewithregardtolandmanagement.Whileregulatoryandpolicy-makingresponsibilitywere

giventocentralauthorities,themicromanagementoflandwasentrustedtolocalauthorities.

Accordingtothis law,themunicipaldepartmentsdirectly involved in local landmanagement

arethedepartmentsofland,physicalassets,andlandrecordstransfer(Bruyas,2006).Atthe

central state level, the ministries of agriculture, pastoral development and environment,

interior,health,communication,mineralresourcesandwater,theMinistryofpublicworks,and

the parliamentary subcommittee on natural resources and environment are all institutions

concernedwithurbanlandmanagement(Farah,undated).

Asidefromthelargenumberofministriesanddepartmentsinvolved,theprovisionsofthenew

wide-rangingurbanlandlawarenumerousanddetailed. This in itselfdidnotmakeforeasy

implementation.Norwasthelawwidelyunderstood.Inaddition,McAuslan(2006)criticises

thisurban landmanagement lawfor its tendencytopresumetheexistenceofamasterplan

[whichatthetimeofdatacollectiondidnotexist]anditscentralconcernwithrevisingplans

rather thanputting inplaceguidelinesonwhich plans couldbemadeand land registration

113|P a g e

problemscouldbeaddressed. In2004, themunicipalityofHargeisa incollaborationwithUN

Habitatstartedaregistrationofpropertiesexercisewhereinformationwasgatheredthrough

GISusingsatellitedigitalimagesandGPSdevices(Turkstra,2008).Theideawastostrengthen

the local state’sability tomanageurban landbydevelopinga reliablecadastral system.113A

majorproblemwiththesystem,however,wasthatitdidnotrecordthedimensionsoftheplots

asthiswasperceivedasinformationthatwouldincreaseboundaryconflicts.Thislimitedtheuse

of the system to a mere revenue collection mechanism (as shown in previous chapter).114

Moreover,thetechnicalexpertisenecessaryforthemaintenanceofsuchasystemisnotwidely

availableinthecityandthosewhoaretrainedtomanagethesystemtakeupmorelucrative

jobsinthenon-governmentalorganisationssector(APD,2010).Atpresent,only3000properties

outof60,000eligibleforregistrationinHargeisaareactuallylisted.Thisatteststothemagnitude

ofthelandregistrationprobleminHargeisa.(BarryandBruyas,2009)suggesttheintroduction

ofacomprehensivecadastralsystemasawayofreformingthelandregistrationprocessesin

thecountry.Theydefinecadastralsysteminthiscontextas“asystemincorporatingevidentiary

documents, unrecorded community knowledge, land registration, boundary definition and

cadastral survey”. They advance this cadastral system not only as a way of enhancing land

registrationprocessesbutalsoasawayofimprovingaccesstoland.

ThelandtitlingsystemisoneofthemajorcontributorstolandconflictsinHargeisa.Owingto

the lack of transparent, accountable and stringent land registration mechanisms, irregular

issuance of titles is not uncommon.While in general this negatively affects landowners by

creating a condition in which they have to bribe public officials to obtain the necessary

documentation,marginalisedsocialgroupsarebyallaccountsmorevulnerable.115Thelackofa

functioningregulatorysystemthatisaccessibletoallaswellasthelackofcapacitytoregister

continuallyandre-registerlandownershipcreatesmassiveinequalities.Theproblemisfurther

complicatedbythelackofunifiedcoherentsystem.Littleifanycoordinationexistsbetweenthe

localandcentralstateinstitutionsonurbanlandmanagement(FarahandAli,undated).

113Cadastralsystemhererefersto“asystemincorporatingevidentiarydocuments,unrecordedcommunityknowledge, land registration,boundarydefinitionsandcadastral survey. See (Barry,M.andBruyas,F.2009).

114Usingthecadastralsystem,taxesareleviedfromtheoccupantsofthebuildingratherthantheownersofthebuilding.

115Interviewee36August20,2014.DirectorofCivilUnit-LegalAidClinic.

114|P a g e

Themost important institution for urban landmanagement at the central state level is the

MinistryofPublicWorks,whichhoststheLandandUrbanManagementInstitute(LUMI).LUMI

wassetupinaccordancewithurbanlandlawtoworkcloselywiththeNationalUrbanPlanning

Boardtoformthebasisonwhichcentralgovernmentpoliciesaretranslatedintotechnicalsets

ofrulesandregulationsconcernedwithurbanlandmanagement(RepublicofSomaliland,2002

amended in 2008). The Institute was proposed to have various sections, including a land

administrationdivisionresponsiblefortheprovisionoftechnicalexpertiseonlandpolicyand

regulationaswellasaphysicaldesignsection,whichdealswiththepreparationofmasterplans

andmapping.Themasterplansoughttocoveraradiusofnomorethan5kmbeyondthefringes

ofthecityandtheyareusedforzoningpurposes–i.e.residential,industrial,commercialand

public–aswellasthemappingofutilityservicessuchaselectricity,waterandcommunication

linesinthecity(RepublicofSomaliland,undated).ThisInstitute,however,existsonlyinname

asithasneitherthetechnicalcapacitynorfinancialabilitytodischargeitsduties.

Atthelocallevel,thenewurbanlandmanagementlawof2002(particularlyarticle2)madethe

administration and the allocation of urban land (including land within the immediate

surrounding of the city) the prerogative of local government particularly the executive

committeeofthecouncils.Landlocatedonthefringesofthecity,accordingtothislaw,remains

in the hands of those who hold titles, but if the owner decides to convert it into a built

environment such residential or business buildings, 30% of the land will be taken by the

municipality.Themountainousareassurroundingthecitywherecultivationisimpossiblecannot

be recognizedas farmlandand theiroccupation is illegalandsubject toconfiscationwithout

compensation. This creates friction between the adjacent local authorities of Hargeisa and

Salaxleyaseachclaimstohavelegaljurisdictionoverthelandonthefringesofthecity(Republic

ofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008).Sometimesthesejurisdictionaldisputesresultinviolent

deathsashappenedin2013whenfirewasopenedbyrespectivearmedguardsaccompanying

theofficialsfromthetwosides,leadingtothedeathofonesecurityofficer.Localgovernments

arerequiredunderthislawtoregisterpropertieswithinthecitybasedonexistingownership

papersandinconjunctionwiththerecordsheldattheMinistryofPublicWorksaswellasthe

municipality(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008),butthisleadstomultipleissuance

ofownershippapersbytherespectivemunicipalities.

While theurban land lawmakesa significantattemptatdelineating thevertical relationship

betweeninstitutionsdealingwithurbanlandadministration,i.e.centralandlocalauthorities,it

fails to cater for the horizontal relationship and interface between the local authorities

115|P a g e

themselves.116Thefailuretoseparatepoliticalfromadministrative issuesfurthercomplicates

the fragile regulatory system in the country. This is because the lower structures of the

governmentdonotfunctionwellanddonotprovidethebadlyneededservicesdueconstant

meddlingandinterferencefromthecentre.Inmanyinstances,thisblurstheboundarybetween

thepoliticalandadministrativefunctionsofthestate,asspeltoutbytheSolicitorGeneral:

if the localgovernment isnothappywith thedirectivesof theMinisterof

InteriorandMinistryofpublicworks,thelegalavenuethroughwhichthisis

supposedtobesolvedistotakethemattertotheHighCourt.Whathowever

happensisthattheselegaljurisdictionalissuesareoftensolvedinapolitical

way bymobilising various actors that include the traditional leaders and

other influential bodies. But what we do not realise is that this kind of

arrangementaretemporaryanddon’tlastlongandthisleadstorecurrence

oftheproblemmorefrequentlythancouldbethecaseiftheproblemwas

solvedthroughlegalmeans.117

Thispoorregulatoryframeworkandlackofharmonisationoflandlawsarepartlyresponsible

fortheinstitutionalweaknessesinthecountry(FarahandAli,undated).Attemptstoconsolidate

andstrengthentheinstitutionalcapacityoftheagenciesdealingwithurbanlandinthecountry

remainproblematic.AccordingtoadevelopmentworkerforalocalNGO,lackofpoliticalwill,

onthepartofthegovernmentandpoliticalparties,hamperseffortsaimedatstrengtheningthe

regulatory framework forurban landmanagement.Thisproducesboth lackofaccountability

amongofficialsandlackoftrustfromthepublic.

Thislackofpoliticalwillisrootedinthewaypeoplecometopowerinthefirst

place. People are not voted in becauseof their political agenda. Theyare

voted in because of their affiliation with clans. So instead of politicians

developingprogramsforthepublictobeabletodecide,votesaresolicited

on the basis of clan membership. This led to lack of accountability. For

instance,iftodayweareworkinghereandthereisnooneaskingmeabout

116Despitethis,clashesoverthe jurisdictionsof landmanagementbetweenthevariousgovernmentalagenciesarealsocommon. i.e.MinistryofAgricultureversusMinistryofPublicWorks,andMunicipalCouncilversusMinistryofPublicWorks.

117Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.

116|P a g e

myworkandthereisnoonetowhomIamaccountable,itismostlikelythat

Iwillearnmysalarywithoutdoinganything.Thesameisthesittingmembers

ofthecouncilandparliamentwhoknowthattheyarenotaccountabletothe

publicand therefore theydon't care.The senior civil servantsalsoare the

same….they do things as they wish…..because after all they will be

nominated to their positions due to clanmembership or affiliation in the

nameofrepresentation.118

Twomajorthemesoftenrecurredinmydiscussionswithintervieweesastowhytheregulatory

systemforlandmanagementissoineffective.Firstly,governmentagenciesaresusceptibleto

clanpressures,makingtheapplicationofrulesandregulationsdifficult.Forinstance:

if government officials attempt to implement policies, their effort is

underminedbypeoplegoingtotheirseniorsandsayingofficialXandofficial

Yareuptonogoodandtheywanttomakethepublicgoagainstyou.119

Secondly, the weak regulatory system is attributed to government’s susceptibility to

international pressure as officials do not like to appear to be against the international

community,hencetheydeveloppoliciesthatarenotbasedonlocaldesiresandcircumstances.

InapoliticalenvironmentwhereinternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisations(INGOs)havea

significantfinancial,developmentandplanningcloutoverthestate,externallyfundedpolicies

donotinmanycasesarisefromlocalneedsastheyareconceivedandproducedthroughoutside

interests,puttingaquestionmarkontheirapplicabilityandacceptabilityinthelocalcontext.As

apoliticianexplainedtome:

Donorshaveideologicalandeconomicinterestsandtheyoftenwantthese

intereststobereflectedinthemakingoftheregulations.Insomecases,they

maybecomeanobstacletothemakingofregulationsasparticularclauses

maynotbeservingtheirparticularideologicalinterests.Theywantthefinal

producttobeinlinewithparticularvisionstheyhaveinmind.Thismakesit

118Interviewee29August16,2014.NGOWorker.

119Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.

117|P a g e

difficult for the Somaliland state to bring about regulations that are

acceptabletothepeople.120

Fortheirpart,thelaw-makingbodiesclaimthattheydonothavethenecessaryfinancialand

technicalexpertisetodraftorscrutinisebillssubmittedbythegovernmentministriestoensure

thatlawsarenotbasedonnarrowagendas.TheMPsandmembersofthelocalcouncilclaim

that:

they can’t serve their constituencies because of lack of resources as they

don'tgettravelallowanceforgoingbacktotheirconstituenciesandasthey

alsodon’thaveofficesintheirconstituencies.121

InHargeisa,lackoflegalcertaintyemanatingfromthepoorregulatorysystemhascontributed

tolowcompliancelevelswithlandmanagementrulesamongpropertyowners.Unnecessaryred

tapebureaucracyhampersthestrengtheningofthelandregulatorysysteminthecountryand

thisnegativelyimpactsonthecity’seconomicdevelopment.

According toa reporton thebusinesssector inHargeisa jointlypreparedby theWorldBank

(WB)andtheInternationalFinanceCorporation(2012),Hargeisaisrankedas86of183whenit

comestothebureaucraticdifficultiesofsettingupabusiness.Theprocedureforsettingupa

businessinHargeisagoesthrough15stepsoveraperiodof56days.ThismeansHargeisaismore

bureaucraticthanmanyAfricancitieswhenitcomestotheestablishmentofbusinesses.Italso

makesitmoreexpensive.Forinstance,the“costofdealingwithconstructionpermitsinHargeisa

is1,038.8%ofincomepercapita.ThisplacesHargeisaamongthetop20mostcostlyeconomies

globally. Only 16 economies are more expensive i.e. Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad, Djibouti,

TanzaniaandZimbabwe”(WBandIBRD,2012).Itisimportanttomentionthat90%ofthecost

incurredduringtheprocessofgettingtheconstructionstartedisspentonutilityconnections

andonly10%ofthecostisleviedbythegovernment.Inotherwords,thelocalauthoritiesdo

not significantly benefit from the red tape bureaucracy in place. According to the Solicitor

General,oneofthemainissueswiththeredtapebureaucracyisthat:

120Interviewee28August12,2014.Politician.

121Interviewee79August12,2014.MemberofParliament.

118|P a g e

itfacilitatescorruption.Theinfluenceoftheclanandinterferenceofthedue

processispartofthecorruption.Corruptionisnotonlyaboutgivingmoney

tosomeoneinordertoachieveaparticularaim.Corruptioncouldaswellbe

interference with due process. There are two kinds of corruptions; active

corruption and passive corruption. The passive corruption is if somebody

turnsawayfromanactionhewassupposedtocarryoutinordertobenefita

particulargroupofpeopleorperson.Theactivecorruptionontheotherhand

isthatwhichtheindividualactivelyparticipatesinacorruptionprocess.122

In addition to these obstructive rules and corruption, the regulatory system faces serious

challengesfromthelongtraditionoftopdownprocesses,whichunderminesitslegitimacyand

makesenforcementofgovernmentaldecisionsmostlyinvoluntary.Verylittleattempthasbeen

madetochangethistopdowncultureexceptforafewinstanceswhendonoragencieshelpto

formulate plans incorporating some level of consultation. Thus far the only plan involving

participatory planning is the recent constitution of District Development Framework (DDF)

documents aimed at identifying the social and economic as well as physical development

deficienciesinthecityandprioritiesforintervention.TheDDFidentifiedseveralpriorityareas

for immediate attention such as theneed for improvement in physical infrastructure,water

suppliesanddilapidatedpipelinesandaccesstohealthcare(HM,2010).

While suchparticipatoryplanningcan facilitatechange in the topdownmentalityofmaking

regulations,itisimportanttopointouttheanomaliesinsuchexercises.Onemajorchallengeis

thefactthatpeoplerarelycometoconsultationsessionsunlesstheyarepaidadailysubsistence

allowance.123 This demand for money developed from a culture in which the INGOs pay

participants forconsultationsoastomaketheirprograms lookconsultative. Inreality, those

who report for such forumsare a groupofpeoplewhomakeahabit of earning from these

practices,underminingthevalueofconsultation.

In short, weaknesses in the regulatory system have undermined public trust in the

administrativeframeworkofurbanlandinthecityandthisnegativelyaffectsserviceprovision.

Thestate’sinabilitytomobilisethenecessaryresourcesforimprovingaccesstoservicescoupled

122Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.

123Interviewee4August16,2014.Lawyer.

119|P a g e

with lackofpoliticalwilltobringaboutchangearebelievedtoexacerbatethesituation.This

discreditsthestatefurtherandundermineswhatisleftofitsreputationtomanagepubliclife.

Inotherwords,publicconfidenceinthesystemisheavilyeroded,inherentlypromotingpeople’s

relianceonothermeansofresolvinglanddisputesandstickingtoareasinthecitywherethey

canaccessclansupportnetworknecessaryforaccesstoservices.Whilethiserosionofpublic

confidencecutsacrossthesocialandeconomicspectrumofthepeopleinthecity,thepoorand

underprivilegedsuchasminoritiesandwomenareaffectedmostseverelyasthecurrentland

governance practices inhibits access to landwhich is one of threemajor obstacles to urban

developmentinSomaliland,accordingtopaneldiscussionfacilitatedbytheWorldBank(WB,

2014). While, on the one hand, clan-based segregation may give an impression of social

integration transcending class, it is important to point out that this can also be viewed as

inconvenientcohabitationwheretherichoftenexploitthepoorfinanciallyandpolitically.

5.4 AccesstoLandandtheAlienationofthePoor

AccesstolandinSomalilandischaracterisedbysevereinequalitybetweenpoorandtherich.In

thissection,Iarguethatsuchinequalityisnotonlyduetoadisparityofwealthbutalsostructural

exclusionary state land management practices. For instance, the legal framework leads to

differential treatment of the poor and the rich. This is because the law imposes greater

restrictionsonthepoorthantheirwealthiercounterparts.Anexampleofthiscanbefoundin

article15oftheurbanlandlawwhichstipulatesthatplotsshouldbeallocatedinajustmanner

onthebasisofcitizenship(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008).Whilethiswould

appearegalitarian,fameandprivilegecreepinbecauseofthedifficultyformanytoprovetheir

citizenship.Inotherwords,whilethosewhoarewellknownarenotusuallyrequiredtoprove

their citizenship, poor people and women have to enlist the help of an Akil or prominent

memberoftheirclantovouchfortheircitizenship.Moreover,whilethelawpermitstheabsence

ofaplanningprocessfortheconstructionofnon-permanentstructures,124thisimpermanence

alsoformsthebasisonwhichsuchbuildingsareoftenremoved.

Thepooralsofacefurtherchallengeswhengivenlandinaprimearea,becausesecurityoftenure

islinkedtobuildingandinvestmentintheland.Thelawstipulatesthatifsomebodyisgivenland

124Plotscanbecategorisedintopermanentresidencyplotsconsistingofmaterialssuchasbricks,cementet ceteraand temporary residencies consistingof Somali traditionalmatsandhousesmadeof ceilingboards.Temporarystructureswillnotrequiretohaveplanswhereasthepermanentstructuresshouldhavebuildingplans(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008).

120|P a g e

in prime area facing amajor road and he/she is unable to build on it, themunicipality can

reinstate theallocationof such landand theoccupantwill begiven land inanother locality.

Wealthierpeopledonotfacethesechallengesastheycanoftenconformtotheconditionsof

thelawregardingnewlandallocations.Article19stipulatesthatanybodywhoisgivenapiece

oflandbythestateandwhoinvestedinthatpieceoflandandbuiltastructureofapermanent

naturewillberecognisedforowningthatlandforever.125Similarlytransferandsaleoflandis

subjecttotheabilityofthepersonacquiringlandforpermanentresidencyasstipulatedinarticle

25whichstatesthatanybodywhois/wasgivenlandforpermanentresidencycansell,transfer,

givethelandasagiftordispensethelandinanyformhe/shefindsitfitinaccordancewiththe

law.126

Further challenges face the poor living in peri-urban locations by the agricultural land law

introduced in1999.Article6of this law–whichalsoapplies tourbancontextsas thecity is

increasinglyexpandingtoagriculturalandpastorallandinperi-urbanareas–limitsallocation

of land to one plot of eight hectares which cannot be sold for three years (Republic of

Somaliland,1999).Formanypoorpeoplewaitingforthreeyearstoselltheirlandisaluxury

theycannotafford.Whilewealthierpeople in thecityaccessperi-urban land in thenameof

investmentanddevelopment,poorpeopledonothave theability toorganise the resources

necessary for acquiring land in the name of development. According to article 12 of the

SomalilandInvestmentpolicy,landgivenfordevelopmentshouldbebuiltupwithinoneyear.127

Butbusinessmenrarelyconformtothisrequirementyetarenotsubjectedtoevictionwhereas

the poor often face the risk of expropriation. On the other hand, land given for temporary

residencemusthavethenecessarystructureserectedwithinthreemonthsfromthetimeitis

granted(MTI,2014).Inmanycases,poorpeoplemaynothavethefinancialabilitytofulfilthis

requirement.Thelawstatesthatiflandisgrantedfordevelopmentsuchasindustryorother

businesses,itcannotbeusedforresidentialpurposes,128(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amended

125AccordingtotheconstitutionofSomalilandforeignerswhoaregivenlandinthecountryhavethesameprivilegeasthelocalswhenitcomestolandownershipandtransfer.Landownershiptitlecanbegiventotheowneroncethebuildingisabovetheventilation.

126Theaboverightsdonotextendtothepeoplewhomakehabitoftradingland.

127Ifthepersonfailstobuildthelandwithinthistime,ayearlytaxisleviedfromhimorher.

128 Allocation of plots for residential reasons will have to be advertised in noticeboards and the

newspaperssoastoallowthosewhowantadisputetheownershiptimetoraisetheirconcerns.

121|P a g e

in2008)butwealthypeople inthecitydefythisas landallocatedforbusiness is turned into

grandresidentialhouses.

Asevidentfromtheabove,thelandregulatorysysteminthecountrycreatesdifferentialaccess

tolandandoftenexcludesunderprivilegedpeople.Thesepracticeswidenthegapbetweenthe

havesandthehavenots inacountrywherepoverty istheorderofthedayforthemajority.

Somalilandranks4thintheleagueoflowestGDPpercapitaincomecountries.129Thereisalso

inequalityinhowmenandwomenaccessjobopportunitiesinthecountry,withanemployment

to population ratio of 28% for males and 17% for females. Urban poverty in Somaliland is

estimatedtobeintheregionof29%.Thefuturedoesnotlookbright,asonly50%ofthe6-13

agegroupgotoschool.ThisisinsharpcontrasttotheneighbouringcountryofEthiopiawhere

87%ofthesameagegroupsareschoolgoers(WB,2015).Moreover,oneinfourhouseholdsare

unable to meet their daily basic needs (WB, 2014). According to King et al. (2003), poor

households inHargeisasurviveon roughly2$aday.A recent reportby theWorldBankalso

indicatesthatpovertyinSomalilandiswidespread,aconditionwhichiscompoundedbylackof

recognitionandabsenceofeconomicopportunities.Accesstoservicesisalsounequalforthe

poorandthewealthyinthecountry(WB,2014).

Due to the fact that the legal mechanisms through which land in the country is managed

presentsafargreatchallengeforaccessinglandtothepoorthantherich,thepooroftenresist

theencroachingstatethroughclanmobilisation.Insomecases,thismobilisationenablesthem

toaccessandretainlandillegally.

AccordingtotheWorldBank(2014),accesstolandisoneofthemostimportantobstaclesto

business in Somaliland. Poor and weak regulatory and enforcement systems are partly

responsibleforthischallenge.AccordingtotheAcademyforPeaceandDevelopment(2010),

the state in many cases is unable to evict people from government buildings despite the

existenceofalegalmechanismallowingthestatetoevictandconfiscatepropertyfromthese

people130(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008).Thestate’sinabilitytoenforceits

129Surprisingly,withaGDPpercapitaestimatedat$347,SomalilandisaheadofdiplomaticallyrecognizedcountriessuchasMalawi,theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoandBurundi.

130Forexample,theurbanlandlawstatesthatthemunicipalityhastherighttoremoveillegalsettlementsinaccordancewiththemasterplan(article21).Suchevictioncouldbesubjectedtobothpermanentortemporarystructures.Buttheevicteeshavetoberesettledinappropriateplacesandthecostofremovingthemwillhavetobeshoulderedbythemunicipality.Equally,theMayorofthecityinconsultationwiththeNational Urban Planning Board has the right to issue orders of confiscating properties for public

122|P a g e

landregulations is inmanycasesattributabletocorruption.Thesemalpracticesarenowhere

moreevidentthaninthemultipleallocationandissuanceoftitledeedsforthesamepiecesof

lands.Thisleadstolackoffaithinthelandmanagementsystemwhichinturnleadmanypeople

tobuildonlandandworryabouttheconsequenceslater(APD,2007).Astudyconductedjointly

bytheWorldBankandtheInternationalFinanceCorporation(2012)pointsoutthatthehigh

cost of acquiring a construction permit forces many small companies and people to build

withoutapermitandthenseektolegalisetheirownershipafterwards.Asaccesstolandinthe

post-conflictcontext is increasinglybecomingdifficult for individualsfrompoorbackgrounds,

evasionofauthoritieshasbecomeinevitableformanypoorpeopletoputaroofovertheirhead.

Thestateisparticularlysusceptibletobeingunderminedinareaswhereindividualscanhave

access to greater support frommembers of their clan. This cements further the clan-based

characterofthecityasdemonstratedbyakeyinformantintervieweewhosaidthat:

Oneofthereasonswhythisirregularaccesstolandhappensincludesthefact

thatpeoplethemselvesfindaspacetosettleinareaspopulatedbytheirclan

beforelegalisingit.Ifthegovernmenthadthepowerofgivingthelandtothe

applicants first before it legalises, this would have probably altered the

spatial distribution of clans in the city. This is so due to the fact that the

governmentwouldthenhavetheopportunitytointegratedifferentclansinto

particularspaces.131

Beingwithincloseproximitytoareasdominatedbyone’sclanisimportantpartlybecauseofthe

factthatthestateisunabletoregulatelandinaneffectivewaythatsafeguardslandownership

andprovidestenuresecurityforthepoor. Inothertimes,rulesareimplementedinanillegal

way alienating the vast majority of urban residents through corruption. Affiliation to and

membership of particular clans and remaining within vicinity dominated by one’s clan is

thereforeanessentialmechanismtoresistunfavourablegovernmentpoliciesanddecisions.In

short,abjectpovertycoupledwiththefailureofthestatetoregulateaccesstolandandconflict

in amanner that is favourable to thepoor and theunderprivilegedhas reproduced clanned

spacesasameansofdodgingtheoddsagainstpovertyandstateaction.Amidtheconcentration

interest.LandconfiscatedbecauseofpublicinterestwillonlybeusedforpublicpurposeandnotanyotheruseIllegalsettlementswillhavenocompensationinthisregard.

131Interviewee28August12,2014.Politician.

123|P a g e

ofbusinesses,governmentservicesandaidprogramsinthecapital,spontaneouslanddisputes

occurfrequentlyandattimesspiralintomajorconflictsinvolvingnotonlythedisputingparties

butalsotheirrespectiveclansoftenoccurinHargeisa.

5.5 Conclusion

Inthischapter,IarguedthaturbanlandmanagementpracticesinHargeisa–fromearlyonwhen

Somalilandwasformedasaprotectoratetillthepresenttime–haveconsistentlybeenbased

on top down processes. For instance, during the colonial period, the introduction of land

managementlawsinvolvednoconsultationwitheitherthepublicorthetraditionalleaders.132

Thistopdownculturewascarriedforwardthroughindependenceasthestateoftenreliedon

lawsmadeduringthecolonialperiod.Neitherthelandreformsattemptedduringtheimmediate

postcolonial civilian government nor the subsequent socialist land management regime

introducedduringthemilitaryadministrationinvolvedpublicconsultation.Similarly,duringthe

post-conflictperiod, landmanagementpracticesremainedtopdowninsharpcontrasttothe

bottom up peacebuilding process.133 Very little has changed in the post-conflict context as

institutionsremainedcentralisedwithpolicies“hangingupinthecloudswithnosignsofcoming

down”;134apracticewhichledtothedevelopmentoflandmanagementinstrumentswhichare

divorcedfromtherealityontheground.Thishascontributedtothedevelopmentofincreasingly

negative public attitudes towards the state, reproducing the endearment of people to

customaryinstitutionsandlineageidentityandbyimplicationsettlementspatternsalongclan

lines.

Having discussed urban land administration in Somaliland, the next chapter discusses the

dynamicsofadjudicationmechanismsforurbanlandconflicttodemonstratehowresourceand

conflict management as well as service delivery shape the spatial character of cities in

Somaliland.

132Note,asmentionedelsewhere,colonialauthoritiesconsultedAkilsandfriendlyelderson issuesonissuestodowithlawandorder.

133ThroughthebottomupapproachforwhichSomalilandisnotablypraised.

134Interviewee34August30,2015.Lawyer.

124|P a g e

CHAPTER6 PLURALADJUDICATIONOFURBANLANDCONFLICTS

6.1 Introduction

LandconflictsaresomeofthemajorproblemsfacingurbanplacesinSomaliland.Thecapital

city,Hargeisa isparticularlyreelingwithsuchproblemsbecause it is increasinglybecominga

magnet for rural-urbanmigrations, relocationsand investment from thediaspora,aswell as

returnmovementsfromrefugeecampsaroundthecountry.Thecityalsohostsrefugeesfrom

theSouthandinternallydisplacedpeople.Theproblemisexacerbatedbythelackofcoherent

means throughwhich such conflicts canbe speedily and justly resolved. This is because the

justice landscape in Somaliland is characterised by the coexistence of plural (at times)

competing,contradictoryandoccasionallycomplementarysetsoflawsi.e.statutory,Islamicand

customary laws. In this chapter, I argue that themanner inwhich conflicts are adjudicated

reinforcesthecity’sclan-basedspatialcharacter.Thisistosaythatthefailureofthestatutory

system to manage conflict or enforce judicial decisions has eroded and undermined public

confidenceinthestate.Ialsoshowthatthisineffectivejusticelandscapemarginalisedthepoor.

Consequently, thepoorandotherswho lost trust inthesystemrelyonadjudicationbynon-

state institutions, increasingtheattachmentofurbanresidentsto localspacesdominatedby

theirclanwhereservicesandsupportaremoreaccessible.Onceagain,theconceptof‘hybridity’

asithasbeenelaboratedintherecentstate-buildingliteratureisablunttool,asIhaveargued

inchapter2,andmyfocushereisonapluralityofdiscrete,yetoverlappinginstitutions.

Thechapterisorganisedintothreesections.Inthefirstsection,Idiscussthepluraljusticesystem

in the country. In the second section, I turn to the challenges facing the judicial system, its

developmenttrajectory,thefailuretoaddressurbanlandconflictsaswellastheimpactsuch

failurehasonstatelegitimacy.Inthefinaltwosections,Idiscusstheestablishmentoftheurban

LandCommissionandthemannerinwhichitoperates,arguingthatredtapebureaucracy,low

levelofcapacityandinterferencefromthestatemakesitunabletobringaboutanysignificant

changesinthequestforresolvingproliferatinglanddisputes.

6.2 PluralJustice:HarmonisationandReforms

LandconflictadjudicationinSomalilandisunderpinnedbyaplurallegalsystemthatconsistsof

customary law, Islamicshariaandstatutory laws.AccordingtoUN(2006,p.35),“traditional,

religious,andsecular(modern)systems,functioninginparallel,regulateawiderangeofaffairs,

125|P a g e

from the resolution of constitutional disputes in regional political administrations to the

enforcementofbusinesscontractsandthesettlementoffamilydisputes”.Thispluralitydates

backtotheprecolonialSomalijudicialpracticeswhenIslamicshariainfluencedcustomarylaw

andinmanycasesinformedtherulings.Theintroductionofcoloniallawscreatedfurthernew

institutionsandenhancedthepluralityofthejusticesystemsasbothshariaandcustomarylaws

wereallowedformallytocoexistandservedifferentcolonialagendas,andwereincorporated

variously intostate legislativeframeworks(aswehaveseenwiththeAkils inchapter4). It is

importanttonotethatpriortothearrivalofthecolonialpowers,Somalisusedcustomarylaws

knownas(Xeer)whichreedsinEnglishasheer.Heerareagreementsbetweenclansabouttheir

interactionwitheachother:theyarenotlimitedonlytoconflictandjusticebutincludesocial

interactions,marriage,economicandculturalcooperation.

Abdile(2012,p.87)examineshowheerworksandidentifiesthreelayersinwhichthesystem

operatesnamelynegotiation,mediationandarbitration.Hearguesthatheerisan“alternative

disputeresolutionsystemthatfacilitatesreconciliationandpromotesrestorativejustice”.The

useofthetermalternativesuggeststhatheerisasubstituteforsomethingmoreimportantthan

itself.Itreinforcesthepositioningofstatutorylawastheprimarysystemoflawsinthecountry

towhichallotherformsoflawshouldconform.Abdille’spropositionofheerasanalternative

restorativejusticesystemisopposedbySchlee(2013)whoarguesthatnegotiationsinheertake

place between often unequal opponents and this compromises justice. He criticises the

idealisationoftheSomalistatelessness.Hearguesthatthestrengthofheerliesinitsabilityto

maintainpeace,butitdoesnothelpintheachievementofjustice.AccordingtoSchlee(2013,p.

261)“mediationandcompensationdonotre-establishamoralorderorenforce‘law’,andthey

arenotmeanttopleasehigherauthorities likeGod,theStateortoconformtolofty ideasof

Justice”.However,thisstatementoverlooksthefactthatcustomarylawsareinformedbysharia

andcouldpartlybeaimedatpleasingGod.ThisisevidentintheSomalisaying,“illahoweexna

hanagagategin,garashanahanagucadaabin.Looselytranslated,thismeans“ohgoddonot

forgiveusifwesidewitheitheroftheprotagonists,butforgiveusifourjudgementsarebased

ontheextentofourintellect”.

Owing to its popular familiarity, heer remains strong, and has outlasted the collapse of the

country,playinganimportantroleintherestorationofpeaceandstabilityinthenation.Thorne

(2011)pointsout that the informal justicemechanism inSomaliahas taken theplaceof the

statutory system or complements it where both exist. The author rightly criticises the

assumptioninherentinmanystudiesofajusticevacuumcreatedbythecollapseofthestate,

126|P a g e

butfallsintothesametrapofseeingheerasaninformalfall-backandinferioralternative,by

saying“peoplewillalwaysneedwaysofsettlingtheirdisputes,andifthereisnomoreformal

wayofdoingso,theyresorttoothermeans”(Thorne,2011,p.3).Thissuppositionisfurther

reinforcedbyNottenandMacCallum(2005)whoalsoarguethatSomalishavereturnedtotheir

customary law to fill the gap left by the statutory state laws. This problematic assumption

inflatesthevalueoftheso-calledformalbyassumingthatpeopleweremoreinclinedtousethe

statutory justice system than the customary one and that the absence of the statutory led

peopletofillthegapbyapplyingcustomarylaws.Iarguethattheoppositeaccordsbetterwith

Somalihistory,asacriticalmassofpeoplehaveatnotimepreferredthestatutorylawsoverthe

customary.

LeSage(2011) questionstheextenttowhichheercouldbeharmonisedamongtheSomalis

sinceit isoftenbasedonclanarrangementswhichmaydifferfromoneclantoanother.This

concernis,however,underminedbythefactthatinmanycasesthegeneralprinciplesofthe

heerarethesameregardlessoftheclansbetweenwhichagreementstakeplace.Theresilience

ofheerdespiteacenturylonginfluencebyboththecolonialandpostcolonialstatesisnotable

andcanbepartlyattributabletotheuniversalnatureofheeramongSomalis.ButAbdile(2012)

argues that universality alonemay fall short of explaining the survival of heer amidst state

collapse.HeemphasisesrathertheconservativenessofSomalisocietyandresistancetoforeign

influence;thesuspicionandmistrusttheydirectatthestatutorylaws;andtherespecttheyhave

for their own customary laws, which they regard as superior to the codified statutory laws

introduced by the colonial powers. Thorne observes that the limitations of customary laws

includetheirfailuretokeeppacewithchangingurbancontextswhere“defininglinesbetween

clansbecomeblurred”(2011).Thisis,however,contradictedbytheevidenceemergingfromthe

settlement patterns in Hargeisa that I present here. Yet there are drawbacks, because

enforcement of rulings is voluntary and there is no ‘central authority’ to resort to, while

customarylawalsoplacesgreatemphasisoncommunityrelationsattheexpenseofindividual

rights.Forinstancerapedwomenmightbeforcedtomarrytheirtormentorsinabid“toprotect

thewoman’shonour[andensure]fullpaymentofherdowrybytheattacker’sclantothevictim’s

clan”(Wojkowsk,2006,p.21).

There have, however, been attempts aimed at bringing heer into international standards.

AccordingtoNamibiaandUbink(2011),eldersinBuraoapproachedtheDanishRefugeeCouncil

(DRC) in 2003 with an idea of reforming customary law so as to bring it in line with the

international standards. The conference in Burao agreed on the elimination of communal

127|P a g e

responsibility,andenshrinedprotectionsforvulnerablegroups,andtheprotectionoftherights

ofwidowsinparticular.Anassessmentoftheimpactofthesechangesestimatedthattheresult

wasa90percentreductioninmurdercases.However,suchassessmentisproblematicandcould

have been related to other social changes given the fact that “awareness of the National

Declarationsamongthegeneralpopulationwasfoundtobeminimal”(NamibiaandUbink,2011,

p.15).Inotherwords,ifawarenessofthedeclarationwassolow,itisdifficulttoassumethat

these declarations had made changes in the public mind-set towards these issues. Unlike

customary law, the introduction of the statutory laws is a relatively new phenomenon in

Somaliland,datingfromthecolonialcontexts.Yetthestatutorylawsareofcourseimportant,

andaswehaveseenalreadyinrelationtochiefsandland,thepresentandimmediatepost-

colonialjudicialorganisationintheSomalilandsweremodelledonthecolonialsystem(Hersi,

2009).

The adoption of colonial justice structures and their post-independence application were

complicatedbytheinheritanceoftwocolonialsystems;ItalianintheSouthandBritishinthe

North.Inthetenyearsfollowingtheindependence,thejudicialsysteminthecountrycontinued

tofollowthesetwodifferentsystems,whichattimeswasineffective,andmeantthatcaseswere

dropped–famouslyinthecaseofanattemptedcoupbyBritish-trainedmilitaryofficers,who

couldnotbeconvictedduetoloopholescreatedbyadualsystem.135Seriousattemptshavenot

beenmade to rectify the limitsof theprevious judicial system in termsofbothcontentand

structureinthepost-conflictSomaliland.ThecurrentjudicialstructureinSomalilandconsistsof

mainlyurban-basedSupreme,Appellate,Regional,andDistrictCourts.TheRegionalCourthears

caseswith3years’punishmentwhileDistrictCourtsdealwithasentenceunderthreeyears.

TheAppellateCourtdealswithallcivilandcriminalappealsfromtheregionalcourts.136Itcould

bearguedthatthelimitationsofthestatutorylawscontinuetoexistpartlybecausetheydonot

enjoy the trust nor the resources required for its highly bureaucratic nature. Thisweakness

allows both the customary and the sharia laws to compete and at times outperform the

statutory laws. As evident here the existing plural forms of the judicial system have their

respectiveweaknessesandstrengthsandfuturejudicialreformsneedtostrikeacarefulbalance

135Interviewee2November8,2014FormerChairmanofSomalilandAtrocitiesCommission.

136Interviewee34August30,2015.Lawyer.

128|P a g e

betweenthemsoastobringoutthebestfeaturesofeach,ratherthanprioritisingonesetover

another.

Effortsaimedatreformingthejusticesystemarenotnew.Thepost-colonialSomaligovernment

hadtocontendwiththechallengesofintegratingpluraljusticesystemsconsistingofstatutory

lawsleftbehindbythecolonialpowersandtheshariaandcustomarylawswidelypracticednot

only in the rural areas but also in towns. The civilian Somali government established a

Consultative Committee for the Integration of the Legal System who put forward a set of

confusingrecommendationssuggestingtheuseoftheItalianpenalcodeforcivilcases,Indian

‘penalcodeforcriminalprocedures’,shariaforfamilyandminorcases,andheerfortheconflict

resolutionamongtheclans(LeSage,2011).Thismadethedispensationofjusticedifficultand

in practice Northern judges used their previous laws while Southerners continued with the

Italiansystem.Equallythemilitaryregimemadeanattempttoreformthesystemandin1973

changes placing responsibility for crimes on the perpetrator as opposed to the clan were

enacted,butthisfailedtotakeeffectasclansresistedimplementation.Thegovernmenthadto

retractin1974andallowthesimultaneoususeofbothheerandshariaforfamilymattersand

maintenanceofpeaceandsecurity(ibid).

As shown above, successive Somali governments failed to bring about meaningful judicial

reformsandintegrationbetweentheoverlappingandcompetingformsofIslamiclaw,statutory

andcustomarylaws.Ganzglass(1996)arguesthatthefailuretoestablishanintegratedjudicial

systeminSomaliawasnotjustafailureoftheSomalistate,butthattheUNalsodeservessome

oftheblame.HeoutlineshowtheUNfailedtolaythegroundworkforreformsasit‘missedthe

opportunity’ofputtinginplacepropermechanismstorevivetheSomalijudicialsystem.Atthe

heightoftheUNinterventionin1993,plansweredrawntoundertaketransitionaljustice,but

suchplanswere‘ambitious’anddiscussedjudicialstructuresalongthelineof“the1962Somali

three-tieredjudicialsystemconsistingof21DistrictCourts,RegionalCourtsinsevenregionsand

twoCourtsofAppeal,oneinHargeisaandtheotherinMogadishu”(Ganzglass,1996,p.125).

ThejudicialsystemenvisionedbytheUNwasnotcreativeenoughtotakeaccountofthedangers

of recycling thestateof justice thatexistedbefore thecollapseof thestate. Inotherwords,

theseefforts failedtodevisea formof legalempowermentdifferent fromthoseofthepast.

Namibia and Ubink (2011) point to the importance of legal empowerment in post-conflict

contexts,andtheneedtoaddresscharacteristicallyoverlappingandsometimescontradicting

plurallegalsystems.

129|P a g e

Reformingthepluraljudicialsystemhasbeencastaskeytomaintainingstability.Adam(1991)

arguesthatsharialawshouldbeintegratedformallyintoanyfutureSomalijusticesystem,and

thesameholdsforcustomarylaw.Suchamovewouldremovetheconcernsofmanywhohave

ahigherleveloftrustinthatwhichtheyknow,customaryandsharia,thanthatwhichtheydo

notknow,statutorylaw.PoliticalmovementsinSomalilandhavelongrecognisedthis,asalmost

all the major movements have a clause in their charters indicating that the customary or

statutorylawshouldbeusedonlywhennotincontradictionwiththesharialaw.Accordingto

LeSage(2011)historicalfootprintsabouttheapplicationofsharia,statutoryandcustomarylaws

intheSomalicontextprovideabasisonwhichharmonisationcouldbeimplemented.

6.3 JudicialChallengesandtheirEffectonStateLegitimacy

Copp(1999,pp.4-5)writesthat“whenweevaluateastateforitslegitimacy,ourconcernisto

assessitsmoralauthoritytogovern.Thelawsofastaterequireorprohibitustoactincertain

ways,andthestatetypicallyenforcesitslawbyattachingpunishmentsorpenaltiestofailures

to comply…The problem of legitimacy is, then, to explain how a state can have the moral

authority to do the kinds of thing involved in governing”. Like other key services, justice is

generallyregardedasacrucialcomponentofstate’smoralauthoritytogovern,moresoinpost-

conflictcontextswherethesocietyisintheprocessofhealingfromdevastatingconflictmuch

ofwhichwascausedbysubjectivelyperceivedorobjectivelyproveninjustice.Inthissection,I

arguethatthemannerinwhichthestatemanagestheplurallandscapeofthejusticesystem

underminesitslegitimacyandpeople’sconsentforitsmoralauthoritytohaveamonopolyover

violence.

ThechallengesofthejusticesysteminSomalilandaremany.Forinstance,thestatutorysystem

standsaccusedofincompetency,widespreadcorruption,andsubjecttothemeddlingofjustice

bypowerfulpoliticiansandclans,whiletheshariaandtheheerarecriticisedforbeingoutof

touch with the international conventions on equality and rights. Collective responsibility,

unequal representation,and immunitypresentproblems to the future integrationof judicial

systems in Somaliland. Thus far, attempts at improving justice have concentrated on

strengtheningthestatutorylawsinspiteofthefactthatveryfewpeopleeithertrustorhave

accesstothisformoflaw.Whiletheimportanceofthestatutorylawscannotbeoverlooked,it

isalsoimportanttoplacethecentralemphasisonwhatworksbestontheground.Customary

lawisparticularlycrucialbecauseitenjoysrelativelegitimacyandtrustamongthepopulaceas

itisbasedonsocial,culturalandpowerdynamicswithwhichlocalsarefamiliar.Forinstance,

130|P a g e

land in customary law is considered a symbol of power and communal property to which

everyoneisentitledtohaveashare,asopposedtoacommoditytowhichcertainindividuals

ownandreapthebenefit.Bruyas(2006)observesthatcustomarylawismoreadaptabletothe

contextinSomalilandthantheothertwoforms,especiallywhenitcomestotheadministration

ofcommonpropertiessuchasgrazing,waterandpasture.Theadvantagesofcustomarylaws

include that they are cheaper and less time demanding as customary decisions are reached

withinareasonabletimeframe(APD,2008).

The mediation process of customary laws focusses mainly on bringing about a solution to

problemsratherthandecidingonwhoisrightorwronginadispute.Critics,however,arguethat

mediation teamsarenotneutralas theyaredrawn fromthedisputingparties.137Moreover,

furthercriticismisdirectedatthefactthatcustomarylawscanbereactiveratherthanproactive.

Even though customary laws are highly effective when it comes to conflict resolution and

particularlylandconflicts,theyhavesomewell-documentedweaknesses(Hashi,2005,Hoehne,

2011).Forinstance,theprocesslacksuniformityinthesensethatdifferentterritoriesmayhave

differentprecedents.Thislackofuniformitymakesinterclanconflictslikely.Anotherweakness

isthefactthatthetraditionalmechanismprioritisesthewellbeingoftheclanovertherightof

theindividual.Despitetheseweaknesses,customarylawsremainthefavouritechoiceforland

conflictresolution(OCVP,2014)mainlyfortheirsimplicityandfamiliarity.Inaconflictmediated

bycustomarylaw,closefamilymembersoftheconflictingpartiesareinvolvedinthemediation

process,guaranteeingthevoluntaryimplementationofdecisions.Theprocessisalsorelatively

straightforward (Bruyas, 2006). Firstly, a committee comprising both sides is put together.

Secondly,thedefendantandtheplaintiffsaresummonedtoacceptdecisions,asaprerequisite

forthecasetocommence.Thirdly,thecommitteemembersswearthattheywillbeimpartial.

Fourthly,theplaintiffisrequestedtoproducewitnessesforhis/herclaim.Fifthly,thedefendant

is given an opportunity to accept or contest the legitimacy of the claims submitted by the

plaintiffandisaskedtopresentevidenceforhis/herobjection.Sixthly,thedefendantisasked

to swear in the name of God that the property belongs to him/her and that the plaintiff’s

submissionsareuntrue.Seventhly,thecommitteedecidesonownershipoftheparticularpiece

ofland.Thelastpartoftheprocessinvolvesaharmonisationprocesswherecertainstepsare

takentonormaliserelationshipi.e.gifts(APD,2008).

137Interviewee4August16,2014.Lawyer.

131|P a g e

Islamic law in relation to landdoesnot just sit alongside statutory and customary laws as a

separate corpus of rules, but138 is also a significant source for the twoother formsof laws

governingurbanlandmanagement(Bruyas,2006).Indeed,theconstitutionacknowledgesthe

roleofIslamintheformulationofstatutorylaw.Butwhenitcomestoapplication,Islamiclawis

oftenlimited,inrelationtoland,tothemediationofinheritancerelatedcases.Nonetheless,the

shariacourtsenjoyhigherlegitimacythantheotherformsofmediationpartlyduetothefact

thatIslamishighlyregardedasareligionamongSomalis.Accordingtoareligiousleader:

The Islamic lawenjoysoverwhelming support from thepublic. The reason

whytheyenjoythissupportisbecausepeoplerespectreligion.Somalisdonot

showthesamelevelofresistancetotheIslamiclawsastheformalstatutory

laws.Thosewhoareagainsttheimpositionofsevereshariapunishmentsdo

notnormallystatetheir intentionstraightforward.Theyoftensayshariais

applied without sufficient evidence. The reason for which this diplomatic

framingofthesituationisnecessaryisbecauseofthefactthatitisgenerally

unacceptable among the public to oppose Islamic sharia for religious

reasons.139

Like the customary institutions, the Islamic court places emphasis on harmonising the

relationshipbetweentheplaintiffandthedefendantandtheydosobyfirstlyremindingboth

sidesofthesanctityofthesharialaws.Adefiningfeatureoftheshariacourtisthefactthatthe

conflicting parties come to the court willingly and in most cases decisions are abided by

voluntarily.Unlikethecustomaryinstitutions,theshariacourtsfollowaprocedurewherethe

representativesoftheconflictingpartiesarenotpartofthepanelthatdecidesonthecases.The

processinsharialawisthatbothpartiesarelistenedtobyapanelofexpertclericswhoreview

thefactsandconsulttherelevantshariasourcestomakeajudgment.Ifthedefendantcontests

thevalidityofthefactspresentedbytheplaintiff,thecourtasksthedefendanttoproducea

138Thesharialawcategorizeslandintosevendiscreteareas:clearingavacantland,receivinglandasagrant, leasinga land fromthestate, charitable land, reserved land foradefinedpurpose,“unviolatedzonesoflandandtheofficeofpublicinspection”(APD,2008).

139Interviewee21August15,2014.ReligiousLeader.

132|P a g e

witness140orswearinthenameofGodthatthepropertybelongstohimorher.Theconflicting

parties in sharia courts are not often represented by lawyers. Religious leaders “who

participatedinFGDsexplainedthattheSulxi141mediationprocess[requires]eachpartyinthe

dispute[tobring]twomalewitnessesoriftwomalesareunavailableonemaleandtwofemale

witnesses”(OCVP,2014).Thelowerstatuswomenholdaswitnessessuggeststhe”possibilityof

biasagainstfemalesinthismediationprocess”(DS,2008).ThestudynotesthattheIslamicsharia

alsohasanumberofissueswhichdonotconformtointernationallysanctionedhumanrights

lawsparticularlyconcerningwomenasIslamicshariaisperceivedtohavedifferentialtreatments

formenandwomennotonlyintestimoniesbutmoreimportantlyinheritance.

Thestatutorylaws,ontheotherhand,arelessflexibleandmainlyrelyonpre-conflictlawsdating

frombeforethecivilwar(DS,2008).Inthestatutorysystem,thefocusisplacedonreachinga

decisionon thebasis of the legalmechanismavailable to the judges. In the context of land

disputes,moreoftenthannotdecisionsbecomeunsatisfactoryforoneofthepartiesandthis

jeopardises the process, leading in many cases to violence among the competing parties.

Moreover,thestatutorylawsaremainlyweakbecauseofthefactthattheinstitutionsthatwere

supposedtoproducelawsareeithermalfunctioningordonothavethecapacitytodoso(DS,

2008).Theyalsosufferfromalackoflegitimacyamongthepublicandtheyarealsoinaccessible.

In addition, the legal codes and complex terminology used in the statutory system are not

commonlyunderstoodbythepublic, resulting inapprehensionand lackofconfidence in the

judiciarysystem.Moreover,thestatutorycourtsareaccusedofbeingverycorruptinaddition

to being time-consuming, a luxury which the poor cannot afford as pointed out by a key

informantinterview:

Poorpeoplecan’taffordtocommuteandcomebacksomanytimestothe

courts.Theycan’teitheraffordtopayforthecaseadjudicationfeeletalone

lawyers.Thesituationisevenworseforinternallydisplacedpeoplewhoare

140 One of the distinctive features of the sharia law is the fact that testimonies ofmale and femalewitnessesdonotweighthesame.Whileonemalewitnessescantestifyforacase,thisisnotthecaseforfemalesastwofemalewitnessesweightthesameasonemaletestimony.

141Thisisareconciliatorymediationwherethefocusisplacedatbridgingthegapbetweenthesidesbyseekingvoluntarycompromises.

133|P a g e

forcedtoseekhelpfromthestatutorysystemasthecustomary lawmight

notbeveryusefultothem.142

In thecustomarysystem,conflictingpartiesare representedbypeople fromtheir respective

clans and the process has some degree of security built into it where mediators consider

repercussionsthatcouldresultfromneglectingtheinterestofoneoftheparties.Sinceinternally

displaced people do not belong to dominant clans with political clout in the city, they are

marginalisedbythecustomaryinstitutions.Thesameisthecasefortheminoritygroups.

Generally, judicial proceedings rely heavily on testimonies (aswill be seen in the court case

discussedindetail)anditisdifficultforthepoortobringwitnessestocourtaswitnessesusually

donotcometothecourtsunlesstheyarepaid.Similarly,itisdifficultforthepoortogatherthe

documentaryevidence required for filing casesas theyareunable tomobilise the resources

necessaryforundertakingthisexercise.Asmostpeopleinthecountryarenotfamiliarwithlaws

aswellasthecomplexcodesandterminologiesusedincourts,legalrepresentationisessential

forwinningcasesbutthisisbeyondthereachofthepoorinthecity.Thereisalsoverylittlehelp

availablefromNGOs.TheLegalAidClinic,whichisaprojectbasedintheFacultyofLawatthe

UniversityofHargeisaandfundedbytheUNDP, isoneofthefeworganisationsthatprovide

helpinaccesstoservicesforthepoor.Ithelpsthosewhocannotaffordlawyerswithbasiclegal

representation,butduetothelimitedresourcesavailable,thestringencyoftheirvettingmay

discouragemanypeoplefromseekingtheirhelp.143Theclinicliaiseswiththecourtsandinsome

instancesmayobtainawaiverforcourtfees.Oneofthe lawyersworkingwiththeclinicsaid

that:

in some cases, we ask the court to consider cases from these people

differentlyastheymaynotbeabletoaffordthefinancialrequirementsfor

142Interviewee21August15,2014.ReligiousLeader.

143Theneedofthepersontogetaccesstotheirservicesisthattheyaskthemtobringpeoplewhoknowthemandwhocanvouchforthem.Thecentreonlytakesthecaseofonesideandasktheothersidetoseek a different avenue for their representation. the legal aid clinic takes a small amount of casesdeterminedonassessmentfortheirneed.

134|P a g e

filingacase. Insomecasesthecourt'sacceptourpleaandallowthepoor

peoplefilecases.144

Difficultyinaccesstojusticeisalsogenderedasthewaymenandwomenaccesslegalservices

aredifferentinanumberofways.Forinstance,intervieweeswhoisaprosecutorpointedout

that:

menareoftenprepared topay corruptofficialsorat least seem toknow

exactlyhowtogoaboutitwhereaswomansufferbecausetheremightbea

perception among the officials that women either pay little or not at all

thereforetheymightbesubjectedtomorebureaucraciesthanthemen.145

Women’s ability to access justice services is also inhibited by the fact that the judicial

environmentisalsogenderedasmostofthestaffworkinginthejusticesystemaremenwho:

show very little empathy forwomen in courts.We are the first cohort of

womenpublicprosecutorsinthejusticesystem.So,theproblemiswoman

aremarginalisedinthejusticesystemandthisaffectsthewayinwhichjustice

isdelivered.Nowweareonlysixwomenprosecutorsandthereisnosingle

femalejudgeinthecity.146

Thesedifficultiesinaccesstojusticereinforcethehabitofbypassingthedueprocessaspeople

pursueothermeansofaccessingservicesi.e.socialnetworkingwhereonemayseekthehelpof

amemberofhis/herclan.Asidefromclanrelations,accesstoservices,arealsodeterminedby

whoyouknow.Forinstance,

144Interviewee36August20,2014.DirectorofCivilUnit-LegalAidClinic.

145Interviewee19September04,2014.Prosecutor.

146Ibid.

135|P a g e

ineveryMinistry,therearesomejuniorofficerswhoarepowerfulandhave

directaccesstothehigher-rankingofficials.Thispeoplecanmakeyoubypass

anyformalrequirementsandhaveyousortedout.147

The challenges in the judicial system can be situated in the dynamics of the state building

processesanditsinterfacewithlegitimacy.Somesuggestthatthejusticesystemgotweakeras

thestatebecamemorestable,gainingincreasingpowerandeconomicclout.148Inthebeginning

thestatewasunabletoinfluencethejusticesystembecauseitdidnothavefullfinancialcontrol

overtheaffairsofthejudiciaryasjudgesoperatedvoluntarilywithoutgettingpaidbythestate.

Evidencefortheindependenceofjudgesfromthestateissometimesarguedtoreflectthefact

that during the immediate post-war period, judicial decisionswere at timesmade amid the

presenceofarmedgroupsinthedoorstopofthejusticechambers.149Insomecases,judgeshad

tomakedecisionswhilemilitiassupportingtheplaintiffanddefendantsrespectivelythreatened

totakeactionifsentenceswereissuedagainsttheirperson.Yetthisdidnotmeanthatjudges

were independentof clans.Quite theopposite, as judgesmayhavebeendependenton the

politicalcloutoftheirrespectiveclanswhichimplicitlyorexplicitlyprovidedthemwithadegree

ofprotectionfortheirpersonalsafetyandsecurity.150

The anomalies in the justice system attract a substantial level of criticism from the public.

Variousstateledattemptstorespondtothiscriticismhavenotbornfruit.Insomeinstances,

internationalNGOshaveprovidedfundingforreforms,buttheyareseldomseenasapositive

influence,asspeltoutbyanintervieweeinHargeisa,sayingthat:

what's this NGOs are doing is sneaking Western influence and blocking

justice.Anexampleoftheseisthegovernment'sinabilitytocarryoutcapital

punishmentsentencesbecauseofinterferencefromtheinternationalNGOs.

Thisnegativelyaffectsthesecurityofthecity.Therewasacaseinwhicha

mankilledanothermanfromhisclanandacourtissuedadeathsentencefor

the perpetrator. However, the sentence has not been carried out due to

147Interviewee29August16,2014.NGOWorker.

148Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.

149Ibid.

150Ibid.

136|P a g e

interferencefromtheinternationalNGOs.Thisledtoagreaterinstabilityfor

whichthegovernmentwasunabletocontrolasclansnearlyclashedoverthe

inabilityofthegovernmenttocarryoutthedeathsentence.151

Formostcritics,neitherinterventionfromNGOsnorthegovernmentdrivenattemptshaveso

farbroughtaboutasignificantchange in justicedelivery.This lackofchange isattributed to

either inabilityor lackofcommitment todealwith theproblemeffectively.One interviewee

sumsupthesituationsayingthatthe

lack of seriousness about the judicial reforms in the country can be

exemplifiedbythefactthatthegovernmentdidnotbuildasinglecourtroom

whilealmosteveryMinistryinthecountryhasnewbuildings.TheHighCourt

ishousedinadilapidatedcolonialbuilding.Thisshowsthelackofapolitical

commitment to improve the judiciary infrastructure and system in the

country. TheMinistry of Justice which is just an administrative executive

branchofthegovernmentishousedinadecentbuildingthatwasconstructed

recentlywhilethejudgesintheHighCourtandtheSupremeCourtdon'thave

properchamberstowork.ThereisonlyonevehiclefortheHighCourtinthe

country. The judge’smobility is limitedandmostof the courtsdon't have

transportoftheirown.152

Moreover, the judicial system is politicised and subject to interference from the executive.

Sensitivecasesareallocatedtojudgeswhomaysteerthecaseinthedirectionthestatewants.

Suchinterferencehappensinasystemicwaywherethechairmanofthejudgesiscalledbysenior

judges who order him to allocate certain cases to certain judges, often justifying their

interferenceonapretextthatthecaseistoocomplexforjudgeAorB’sabilityforadjudication.

Thisisalexiconforremovingcasesfromthedocketofreluctantjudges.Insuchinstances,what

happensisthatthe:

chairmanwillcallyouandaskyoutodosomethingaboutaparticularcase

ashereceivedacallfromtheuppercorridorofthejusticesystemhierarchy

151Interviewee33May30,2015.DivisionalManagerofaCoorporateCompany.

152Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.

137|P a g e

requestingthatarulingshouldbemadeinaparticularway.Thiscausesfears

amongthesitting judgesandtheyhavetoabidebysuchrequestmadeto

themthroughtheirbosses.153

Accordingtokeyinformant interviewsandgroupdiscussions, inthecasewheresomejudges

refusetoabidebytheordersfromabove,theyareeithersubjecttoharassmentorremoved

fromoffice.Itisimportanttomentionthatthejudgesdonothaveentitlementsaftertheyleave

oraresuspendedfromtheirjob.Forthisreason,thejudgesmostlyconcentratetheirenergyand

effort in enriching themselves and protecting their jobs by not going against thewill of the

executive.Judgesalsoavoidbecomingjoblessinthestreetsforsecurityreasons,astheymay

have passed judgments with which many people may have not been happy, making them

vulnerabletoarevengeattackparticularlywhentheirprotectionisnolongerguaranteedbythe

state.Promotionsarealsomadeaccordingtothelevelofobediencedisplayedbysittingjudges.

Furthermore,judgesarenotappointedonthebasisoftheircompetenceforthejobbutthey

areratherselectedonthebasisofwhotheyknowandtoalesserdegreeclanrepresentation.

Whilehighcourt judgesaredirectlyappointedbythePresidentandtheprerogativeof firing

themremainswithhim,regionalanddistrictjudgesarehiredorfiredbythechiefjusticewhois

alsoapresidentialnomineeapprovedbyparliament.Thechiefjusticeheadsthedysfunctional

JusticeCommissionusedmainlyfordiscipliningdissentingjudges.TheCommissionconsistsof

10peoplemostofwhomholdkeynationalpositionsi.e.theChiefJustice,AttorneyGeneral,two

senior judges, Director General of the Ministry of Justice and the Director-General of the

Ministry of Labour. The other four are appointed by the upper and lower chambers of

Parliament. The role of the Justice Commission includes improving the justice system and

removing and transferring judges154 but a number of people from the legal community in

HargeisatoldmethattheCommissionisusedtomanipulatethejusticesystemas:

allthosewhoarerepresentedintheCommissionhavesomehowpowerover

the delivery of the justice services. For instance, if you clash with the

prosecutors, what happens is that you are summoned by the Justice

Commissionandyouwillbesuspendedfromthejob.Thisissoduetothefact

153Interviewee38August08,2014.DistrictCourtJudge.

154 The quorum is usually five and agenda is proposed by the chief justice. The chief justice is notindependentforhisjobasheisindirectlycontrolledbytheexecutivethroughtheParliament.

138|P a g e

thattheprosecutionisrepresentedintheJusticeCommissionandtheyhave

aninfluenceinwhogetshiredorsuspended.Thisinterfereswiththedelivery

ofjusticeinthecourtsanditmakesthejobofthejudgesdifficulttoperform.

Inadditiontothese,thereisnomechanismtocomplainagainsttheJustice

Commission and the head of the Justice Commission himself is subject to

politicalinterference.155

Theotherformofinterferenceisthatwhichcomesfromclans.Clanpressurecanbeinterpreted

asaresponsetothepoorperformanceof the judiciarysystem inthecountry. Insuchcases,

peopleexploretherelationalweboftheclanandtrytofindsomebodywhoisrelatedtothe

judge.Thepracticeisusuallythat:

youwould be visited privately and told about some sort of injustice been

committedagainstthepersonseekingthehelp.Inthatcasemembersofthe

clanwouldexpectyoutointerveneanddosomethingaboutitbelievingthat

thecaseoftheirmemberisjustone.Corruptjudgeshelptheirkinsmeninany

available way but those who resist the clan pressure face some sort of

labellingintheircommunity.156

Interference in the formal judicial systemcontributes to thenegativepopular conceptionof

stateinstitutionsnotleastbecausesuchinterferencedoesnotexistinthetraditionalmechanism

ofsolvinglandconflicts.Customaryinstitutionshaveproventobemoreeffectiveinresolving

issuesofthiskindbecausetheyarehighlyaccessibletothevastmajorityofthepublicandare

also cheaper.While customary institutions have provided peoplewith an alternativemeans

throughwhich they couldmanage land issues, it hason theotherhand significantly eroded

publicconfidenceinthestatutorylaws.Thisisnottosuggestthatclanmechanismsofresolving

landconflictsareafall-backduetotheabsenceofproperlyfunctioningstateinstitutionstodeal

withtheproblemsofland,butrathertoacknowledgetheoutperformanceofonesystemover

155Interviewee32August03,2014.MinistryofPublicWorksOfficial.

156Interviewee38August08,2014.DistrictCourtJudge.

139|P a g e

another in a customary legal environment characterised by multiplicity of institutions,

competitionandcoexistence.

Theabove challenges in the judicial systememasculates state legitimacy,whichwasalready

sufferingfromalonghistoryofstrainedrelations,mistrustandnegativeperceptionamongthe

populace.WhilethepluralnatureofthejusticesysteminSomalilandhelpsthestatedispense

servicesitdoesnotorcannotprovideformally,theflipsideofthisisthechallengepresentedby

thecoexistenceofthevariousjusticedispensations.Themannerinwhichthecomplementarity,

contradiction,competition,andcoexistenceof thisplural justice ismanagedtosomedegree

underminesthe legitimacyof thestate.Accordingto (Lund,1997,p.100), the“legitimacyof

stateinstitutionsimpliesarecognitionandthusanappreciationofthem,andthisisintimately

linkedtotheconceptsofjusticeandpropriety”.Neitherappreciationnorrecognitionofasense

ofjusticeexistsamongthepublicinHargeisa.157Suchoverrelianceonthecustomaryinstitutions

hasarguablyalsofurthersegmentedtheurbanpopulation,encouragingthemtoresideinareas

dominatedbytheclansfromwhichtheyhail.

6.4 TowardsSpecialisedIntervention:LandCommission

Priorto2005,landconflictsinthecityweredealtwithbyacommitteewithinthemunicipality

structureandappealswerehandledbytheformalcourtsinlinewiththeDistrictAdministration

Lawwhich empowered local authorities tomediate land conflicts as amatter of peace and

conciliation (Republic of Somaliland, 2002b). In 2005, however, this was changed and land

dispute adjudication was transferred to the formal courts (APD, 2008). In 2002, an

administrativeLandCommissionwasestablishedinaccordancewiththeurbanlandlaw,which

wasamendedin2008.TheCommissionconsistsofsevenmembersfromtheministriesofpublic

works, interior, agriculture, religion, pastoral development and environment, and the

municipalityofHargeisa.158Themembersarenominatedbytheirrespectiveinstitutionsandare

thenofficiallyappointedbytheMinisterofInterior.ThecommitteesitsinHargeisamunicipality

157ParticipantinHadhwanaagTeashopDiscussionSeptember19,2014.HargeisaResident,ParticipantinKaahRestaurant/TeaDiscussionAugust07,2014.HargeisaResident,ParticipantinMaansoorHotel/TeaDiscussionOctober21,2014.HargeisaResident.

158MembersoftheCommissionarelegallyfreefromtheministriesthatnominatedthemandcannotbeassignedwithotherdutiesotherthanthelandadjudicationworktheyareengaged.Equally,theministriescannot change a member and replace him with someone less the he is legally discharged from theCommission.

140|P a g e

premisesandtherepresentativeoftheMinistryofPublicWorkschairstheCommissionbecause

hisMinistryisthelineMinistryforurbanlandmanagementinthecountry.

WhiletheCommissionisempoweredtomediatelandconflictsinurbanplacesinavarietyof

contexts, there are limitations on their jurisdiction. For instance, the commission cannot

adjudicate land conflicts in which a court’s decision has already beenmade, where land is

locatedinanareabeyondtheurbanmasterplan,pastorallandinruralareas,publicland,and

landdisputeswhereacriminaloffence iscommittedand isundertrial inacourtof law. It is

importanttopointout,however,thatthedatacollectedfromtheCommissionforthisthesis,

showsthat inpracticetheCommissionadjudicatedlandoutsidetheir jurisdiction:nearlytwo

percentofthelandadjudicatedbytheCommissionfallsoutsidethecitywheretheCommission

isnotlegallyallowedtomediateandishometominoritygroupswhomighthavebeensubjected

tomorelanddisputesthananyotherareainthecity(Seefigure2).

Insomecases,theCommissionadjudicatesconflictswherethelocalgovernmentispartytothe

dispute–i.e.ifpeoplewhoownlandinperi-urbanareasrefusetogivethe30%oftheirland

requiredforpublicservicetothelocalgovernment.TheCommissionalsoadjudicatescasesin

whichlocalgovernmentsubmitsanapplicationforthereacquisitionoflandwhoseownersfailed

tobuildorpaytaxes.Insuchcases,ifconvicted,theCommissionorderslandownerstogivepart

oftheirlandequivalenttothetaxowedtothelocalcouncil.Moreover,whereverthereisacase

where both parties lay claim to vacant land where the Commission is not convinced that

ownership of the land is for neither parties, the Commission recognises such land as public

land159(RepublicofSomaliland,2013).Thiskindofrulingisrare,butwhenithappens,itoften

leadstogreatersecurityproblemsassuchdecisionsareviolentlycontested.

WhileitisdifficulttogaugetheeffectivenessoftheformationoftheCommissioninreducing

occurrenceoflandconflictsinthecountry,securityandadministrativeofficialsinHargeisaclaim

that land conflicts have been reduced over the last five years.160 Should this be the case, a

numberoffactorsmighthaveledtothisdecreasebesidestheestablishmentoftheCommission.

Oneofthesefactorsisthatlandtransactionsinvolvegreaterriskmitigationprocessessuchas

theverificationofownershipandassessmentofpotentialriskofdisputesarisingafterthesale.

159TheCommissiongivesacopyofthedecisiontotheexecutiveofficerofthelocalauthorityandtheywillalsogiveacopytotheMinisterofPublicWorksinordertoregisterthelandforgovernmentownership.

160Interviewee66August10,2014.PoliceStationCommander.

141|P a g e

Similarly, public land available in the urban periphery has decreased as the city is currently

expanding to farms previously owned by people who hold formal title deeds. Yet the

government proudly relates the decrease of land conflicts to the establishment of the Land

Commission.Whilethisclaimcannotberuledoutaltogether,itisimportanttopointoutthat

thelandconflictrecordsinthelandregistry(wherealllandrelatedcasesarerecorded)suggest

thatthecasesoflandconflictsubmittedtotheLandCommissionhavebeensteadilyontherise

forthelastfiveyears(SeeFigure1).

Figure3:TheannualDistributionofCaseshandledbytheLandCommissions,2009-13

Source:dataforthisfigureareobtainedfromthelandconflcitsregistryattheLandCommission’sofficesinHargeisa.

Between 2009 and 2013, the Commission handled 323 cases. Only 20 of these cases were

handledinthefirstyear,2009.Thisnumberalmostdoubledinthefollowingyear.Similarly,2011

and 2012 have also seen a sharp increase as the Commission handled 74 and 86 cases

respectively.In2013,thenumberofcaseshandledbytheCommissionreachedarecordof104.

Asapparentfromthisdata,thecasessubmittedtotheCommissionwererisingexponentially.

Thereasonwhytherewassubstantial increaseyearbyyearmightrelatetothefactthatthe

Commissionwasnotinthebeginningfamiliarorpopularamongthepublicbutaspeoplebecame

awareof itsexistence,morecasesweresubmittedforadjudication.Thecounterargumentto

thispositionis,however,thatcaseswerereferredfromthecourtstotheCommissionfromthe

142|P a g e

beginning and therefore awareness existed among those interested in getting their dispute

resolvedthroughatleastthestatutorysystem.161

Figure4:TheSpatialDistributionofLandDisputesHandledbytheLandCommissions,2009-13

Source:dataforthisfigureareobtainedfromthelandconflcitsregistryattheLandCommission’sofficesinHargeisa.

Thelandregistryalsoshowssomediscrepanciesinthespatialdistributionof landconflicts in

thecity(seefigure2).Accordingtothisdata,IbrahimKoodbuurandGa’anLibaaxhadthehighest

numberof landconflictsasthetwoneighbourhoodsaccountedfor29and27percentofthe

totalnumberofcasessubmittedtotheCommission.Anumberoffactorscouldhelpexplainwhy

thesetwoneighbourhoodshaveagreaternumberoflanddisputesthanotherareasinthecity.

Notwithstandingtheirpeculiarities,onecommonelementbetweenthesetwoneighbourhoods

isthatbothareasareperceivedtoberelativelymorestrategicandhavehigherlandvaluesthan

mostotherpartsofthecity.Forinstance,IbrahimKoodbuurhadtraditionallybetteraccessto

161ParticipantinCommercialBankTeashopDiscussionJuly01,2014.HargeisaResident.

143|P a g e

water162 and as a result land in this area remains expensive. Equally, it had significant state

properties and the elites of the previous government were mainly housed in this

neighbourhood. At present, a number of international NGOs have their bases in this

neighbourhood.Ontheotherhand,Ga’anLibaaxiswithinverycloseproximityofthecitycentre

and it is also increasingly expanding into peri-urban areas, which in the past were mainly

mountainouspubliclandinahighlystrategicdirectionofthecityi.e.theroadtotheimportant

nationalportofBerberawhichrunsthroughthisneighbourhood,makinglandinthisareamore

valuablethanmanyotherpartsofthecity.

Land disputes are some of the most pressing urban issues that the post-conflict state in

Somalilandfaces.Urbanauthoritiesacrossthecountryareconfrontedwithseriouslandissues

ranging from the inadequate land registry to encroachment of public space and illegal

appropriation of peri-urban land (King et al., 2003). The vastmajority of these conflicts are

resolved through customary laws as indicated by a survey conductedby theObservatory of

ConflictandViolencePrevention,whichfoundthat44%ofrespondentspreferresolvingtheir

landdisputesthroughcustomaryinstitutions(OCVP,2014).Butasignificantproportionofthe

conflictsarealsoadjudicatedbytheLandCommissionwhichemploysformalprocessesdetailed

ingovernmentpublishedguidelines.

TheCommissiondecideshowtohandlecasesbasedona judgementof theirmagnitudeand

complexity.Non-complexcasesarehandledinadifferentwayinvolvingfewproceduralsteps.

Inthesecases,theCommissionmakesquickrulingsmainlybasedonexpertopinion.Equally,

LandCommissionersrequestevidenceofownershipfromthemunicipalityinordertospeedup

rulings. Provision of evidence is governed by Islamic law and the other administrative laws

regarding land management. Acceptable evidence includes documentations issued by the

relevantauthorities,163testimoniesoflong-timeresidents,164oath,andvisibleinvestmentsuch

162Accesstowaterisoneofthekeyfactorsthatpeopleconsiderwhenbuyingland.

163Previousgovernmentissueddocumentshavesignificantweightiftheycannotbeproventohavebeengainedthroughcorruption.Equallydocumentswillhavesignificantweightifaprovableownershipdidnotprecedetheissuanceofsuchdocuments,orifthedocumentisnotissuedduringthetimeoftheconflict,thatthedocumentwasnot issuedillegally,andthattherehasnotbeenvisible investmentbyanotherpartyonthedisputedpieceoflandpriortotheconflict.

164 Testimonies are considered as crucial evidence in line with the Islamic law when proving on ordisprovingownershipofland.

144|P a g e

as building and erection of foundation or fences.165 The Commission makes the decisions

throughsimplemajorityvoteandalsogivestherulinginawrittenform.Thechairmanofthe

Commissioncommunicatesthedecisiontotheregionalcourt,whichhastheresponsibilityof

enforcingtheCommission’sdecisions,withinamonth.

Inmorecomplexcases,thechairmanappointsanadjudicationcommitteeconsistingofthree,

fiveorsevenmembers foreachcasesubmittedtotheCommission.166 Inthefirstsitting, the

committee sorts out procedural issues, i.e. both sides are represented in the hearing and

ensuring that lawyers of both sides have had the opportunity of speaking to the sides they

represent.This is followedbytheformationofacommitteeandavisit ispaidtothe land in

questionsoastoenablethecommitteetoassessthesituationontheground.Thecommitteeis

empoweredtoenlistexpertopinion.Intheinitialstages,thecommitteeoftenenquiresabout

thepossibilityofoutofcourtsettlementdrawingonanumberofoptionssuchasthatparties

resolve their issues by 1) agreeing within themselves through negotiation, 2) nominating a

mediation team consisting of their representatives and overseen by a member of the

Commission,and3)seekingthemediationofelders.

Shouldthepartiesagreetothisoutofcourtsettlementoption,theLandCommissionauthorises

thecommencementoftheproceduresandissuesadecisionsupportingtheresolutionofthe

case.Ifthemediationfails,anormalhearingofthecasecommences.Whilethetrialsgoon,itis

verycommonthattheCommissionissuesrestrictionsonongoingconstructionorregistrationof

property.Theimpositionofsuchrestrictionsisappliedforbyoneofthesides.IftheCommission

isconvincedtoapplytherestriction, itasks forthepersonwhosubmittedtheapplicationto

provideaguaranteeforthereimbursementofthecostincurredasaresultoftherestriction,in

casehe/shelosesthecase.167

Tounderstandnotonlytheproceduralbutalsothepracticaladjudicationofcases,itisimportant

toreviewoneofthecaseshandledbytheCommissionindetail.Thecasediscussedbelowhas

165Existenceofstructuressuchasfenceorfoundationcanbeconsideredasanevidenceifitcanbeprovedthattheywerenotconstitutedbyforce,grabbingorothercorruptedmeans.

166 The number of the Commissioners for mediation is determined by the nature of the case to bemediated.

167 There are two forms of restrictions, one imposed on one-party or another imposed on all partiesinvolvedinthedispute.TheCommissioncanimposerestrictiononanongoingconstruction,processingofownershippapers.

145|P a g e

beenchosenbecauseitshowsthedynamicsofthelegal,institutionalandskillgapsinresolving

landdisputesthroughthestatutorysystem.

6.5 LandCommission:AdjudicationofaSelectedCase

Thecasediscussed in this sectionpittedMahamed168 (hereafter referredasplaintiff) against

Marwo169(defendant).ThecasewasopenedforadjudicationonDecember12,2010intheLand

Commission.170 The hearing panel consisted of five out of the seven members of the

Commission.

Inhisopeningremarks,thedefendant’slawyercontendedthathisclientwassoldaplotofland

bythedefendantonDecember19,2003,asshowninanotarisedsaleagreement.Thelawyer

arguedthattwoweekspriortothedatethecasewasbroughttocourt,thedefendantdestroyed

concrete blocks, commonly erected as a sign of land ownership, on property owned by the

plaintiff.Whentheplaintiffaskedthedefendantswhytheydidso,thedefendantsaidthatthe

landwaspurchasedfromthembelowthemarketprice.Thelawyerarguedthatthedefendant

sold the land to theplaintiff,andher sonwasawitness in thenotary.The lawyer therefore

requestedthecourttorulethelandbelongedtohisclientandorderthedefendanttopaylegal

expenses.

Inhis counterargument, thedefendant’s lawyerdenied theseallegations.The lawyerargued

thathisclientdidnotsellthelandtotheplaintiffbuttherewasaverbalagreementbetweenhis

client and the plaintiff. The agreement was that the plaintiff should help the defendant’s

daughtermigratetoanoverseascountry.Theplaintiffwasalsosupposedtoregistertheland

for the defendant, and contribute financially to the upbringing of the defendant’s orphan

children.Inreturn,thedefendanttoldhimthatshewouldgivehimland,withoutspecifyingany

particularsizeofthisland.Theplaintiffdidnotfulfilthetermsoftheverbalagreement.Hedid

notalsoofferheranyfinancialhelpotherthan$100dollarsandanother$500sentthrougha

remittancecompany.Thelawyerarguedthatwhenhisclientwascollectingthemoney,shewas

168Pseudoname.

169Pseudoname.

170Thisispartofthetribunaldata,whichIhaveanonymised.

146|P a g e

madetosignapaperpresumablyasareceiptfortheremittance.Thesamepaperwaspresented

inthecourtasasaleagreement.Hearguedthatitisimpossibletosuggestthat200x150ofland

couldbesoldfor$600in2003.Healsodismissedthenotary,astheareawasnotevenatthe

timeplannedforresidentialpurposes.

TheHearing

Thecourtconvenedfoursittingsonthiscase.ThefirstwasheldonDecember25,2010.The

plaintiff’s lawyerarguedthatthereasonwhythelandwassoldcheaplytohisclientwasthat

therewasnohighdemandforlandatthetime.Healsoarguedthatthedefendantapproached

hisclient,whoisfromthesameclanashim,andbeggedhimtobuythelandfromherasshe

needed the money. Considering the kinship-based relations between the two families, the

plaintiffbought the land fromherunderonecondition: that shewillbringaguarantor.Asa

result,shebroughtherchildren’sgrandfatherwhohassincepassedaway.

Inanattempttopre-emptpossiblequestionsaboutwhythedefendantallowedtheconstruction

oftheconcreteblocksinthepropertyasademarcationforownership,thedefendant’slawyer

focusedhiscounterargumentonjustifyingthereasonwhyhisclientacceptedthedemarcation

inthefirstplace.Hearguedthatasanoldperson,hisclientwasfeebleandunabletoverifythe

factsof thematter. The lawyeralsopointedout that thedefendant’s son signed thenotary

thinkingthathismotherwassentmoneybysomeoneoverseas.Healsostatedthathersonat

thetimeofsigningtheletterwasunderageanddidnotknowwhatwasgoingon.Healsoargued

thatthesonwasilliterateandcouldnotknowthecontentofthelatter,ashesignedtheletter

withhisthumb.

ThesecondsittingwasconvenedonDecember26,2010. In thishearing, theCommissioners

weretakentothe land inquestion, located inG/Libah,WarabeSalan,AwAdan.The lawyers

showedtheCommissionersaroundtheproperty.TheCommissionersgaveinstructionforthe

land to be measured, which was recorded as 250x150m. They also identified the private

properties and public spaces surrounding the land. The plaintiff’s lawyer also showed the

Commissionersconcreteblockswithsomescribblingonthem,andanearthworkwhichhassince

been levelled. He argued that these concrete blocks belong to the plaintiff, and they are

damagedby the defendant and her family.While on the site, the Commissioners asked the

defendantsomequestionsinthepresenceofherlawyer.Theseincluded

Q:Wereyoutherewhentheconcreteblockswereerected?

A:Noitwasbuiltinthemiddleofthenight.

147|P a g e

Q:Didyoursonsworkintheconstructionandearthwork?

A:No.

Q:Whatisyourrelationshipwiththeplaintiff?

A:Nothing.

Q:Whoerectedtheconcreteblocks?

A:Theyaretheoneswhoconstructedandcamewithsoldierschasingourchildrenfromtheareas.

Q:Whoare‛they’?

A:Theplaintiffandhisfamily.

Q:Whobulldozedtheareaonthesecondtime?

A:Mychildrendidsowhenwedidnotseeanyonecomingforsixyears?

The last two sittingswerededicated tohearing thewitnesses.However, theydemonstrated

seriouslegalincompetencebyboththelawyersandthejudges.Thisisbecause,aswillbeseen

below,thewitnesseswereaskedverymildquestionwhichdidnotchallengethemenoughto

revealthetruth.Veryfewbackgroundchecks,ifany,werealsodonebythelawyerstoscrutinize

theintegrityandcredibilityofthewitnesses,aswouldbethecaseinanycrediblelegalprocedure

ofthisnature.ThethirdsittingoccurredonJanuary4,2011.Theplaintiff’slawyerproducedfour

witnessestosupporthiscase.Thefirstwitnesswasa34-year-oldconstructionworkerwhoisa

residentofHargeisa.He said thatheworkedon theconstruction siteon thedatewhen the

concreteblockswereerected,andtherewasnolanddisputeatthetime.Theplaintifflawyer

askedhim:

Q:Thereweresoldiersatthetime?

A:No.

Q:Didthechildrenworkintheconstruction?

A:Ihaveseenoneofherchildrenattheconstructionsite.

Thedefendant'slawyerdidnotcross-examinethewitness,buttheCommissionersaskedhim

onequestion:

Q:Whowassupervisingthematthetimeoftheconstruction?

A:Aforeman.

148|P a g e

The second witness was a 50-year-old builder. He said they were taken to the site by a

constructioncompanyunderthesupervisionofanengineerwhohasshownthemthesite.He

said,atthetimetherewasnoanysignoflanddispute.Theplaintifflawyeraskedhim:

Q:Thereweresoldiersinthesiteatthetimeoftheconstruction?

A:No.

Q:Werethedefendant’sfamilyworkingonthesite?

A:Someofthemwereworkinginthere,oneisincourtnow.

Thedefendant’slawyerdidnotcross-examinethewitnessagain.ACommissioneraskedhim:

Q:Howmanydaystherewereworkinginthere

A:Oneday.

Thethirdwitnesswasa60-year-oldresident inthearea.Shesaidshewasamakeshift food

seller,andwhileshewassellingherfoodontheconstructionsite,shedidnotseeanyproblem.

Theplaintiff’slawyeraskedherwhetherthe:

Q:familywhosoldthelandtotheplaintiffwerepresentatthetimeoftheconstruction?

A:Yes

Q:Doyouseeanyonewhowasthereinthisroom?

A:Yes,pointingatthedefendant’sson,hewasthinneratthetime.

TheCommissionalsoaskedthewitnesssomequestions:

Q:Wherewerethefamilywhosoldthelandatthetimeoftheconstruction?

A:Theywereresidentinanearbyplace.

Q:Didyouseethedefendantinthere?

A:Iwastheretwice,andIhaveseenher.

The fourthwitnesswas36-year-olddriverwhosaidtheywentthereat6 in themorning.He

testifiedthattherewasnolanddeputewhenhewentthereinthemorningoftheconstruction.

Theplaintiff’slawyeraskedhimwhether:

Q:Thereweresoldiersinthesiteonthedayoftheconstruction?

A:No.

TheCommissionersaskedhim

Q:Whatwereyoudoingonthesiteonthatday?

149|P a g e

A:Iwasdrivingtheplaintiffsisterstotheconstructionsite.

Q:Doyourecogniseanyonewhowasthereonthatday?

A:Hepointedtothedefendant’sson.

The fourth sitting was held on December 18, 2011. The defendant’s lawyer produced two

witnesses.Thefirstwitnesswasa55years-oldneighbourwhotestifiedthattheplaintiffandthe

defendantcametoherinateashop.Shesaidtohimthatshewantedtogivelandtothisman

whowasfromLondon.Theywenttothefarmtogether,andshepointedattheWesternpartof

thefarm,sayingshegaveittohim.Thelandgiventohimwasnotdemarcatedatthetime.The

plaintiffgaveher$200andsentheranother$400later.Thegrandfatherofherchildrenwasthe

guarantorwhosaidtheywouldberesponsibleforanyproblems.Thenotarywasthensigned.

Theplaintifferectedconcreteblocksonthesitetodemarcateownership.Awhile later,they

cametoknowthattheconcreteblocksweredestroyed.Theplaintiff’sfamilywenttothewitness

andgavehimsomemoneytohireabulldozer.Theytookthebulldozertheretodemarcatethe

landagain,but thedefendant’s sonsprevented them fromdoing so. They thenwent to the

guarantorandaskedhimtointervene,andhetoldthemtogowithpoliceofficers.Whenthey

wenttothesitewiththepolice,therewasnoonethere,andtheycontinuedtheirwork.Despite

allthis,thewitnesstestifiedthathedoesnotbelievethatthelandwassoldtotheplaintiff.He

insistedthatitwasagift.Theplaintiff’slawyercross-examinedthewitnessbriefly.Heasked

Q:Wasthecontentofthenotaryofwhichyouwereasignatoryreadtoyou?

A:IthoughttheywereGodfearingpeople.

Q:Whoaskedyoutobringthebulldozer?

A:Therelativesoftheplaintiff.

Thedefendantslawyercross-examinedthewitness.Heasked

Q:Wereyoutakingpartintheconstructionactivity?

A:Yes

Q:Didyouseethechildrenofthedefendant?

A:Myeyesdidnotcatchthem.

Q:Tellushowmuchlandwasdemarcatedfortheplaintiff?

A:Thelowerwesternpartsofthefarm.

Q:Whenyouusedthebulldozer,whatwasguidingyou?

A:Ifollowedpreviousdemarcations.

150|P a g e

Q:Didtheplaintiffbuylandfromyou?

A:Yes.

Q:Whatwasthesizeoftheland?

A:100x150.

Q:Howmuchdidhegiveyou?

A:$2500.

Q:Doyouhaveaproof?

A:Yes.

Q:Areyouoneofthesignatoriesinthenotary?

A:Yes,Iam,butitwasagift,notasale.

Q:Ifitwasnotsalewhydidtheguarantorsignit?

A:Ididnotknow,Isignedthenotarylater.

The second witness was a 35 years-old builder. He told the court that they started the

construction of the concrete blocks in the morning. At the time, there was no sign of the

presence of the defendant’s family. But two guys came to the site when the construction

workerswereleaving.Hesaidthatheoverheardthemsayingthattheywilldestroytheconcrete

blocksiftheirduesarenotgiven.TheCommissionersaskedhimfurtherquestions.

Q:Wereyouoneoftheconstructionworkers?

A:Yes.Didyouseethedefendant’sfamilyinthere?

Q:No.

Theplaintifflawyercross-examinedthewitness.Heaskedhim

Q:Whenyouweretakingpartinconstruction,didyouseesoldiers?

A:No.

Q:Wasthereadisputeinthesite?

A:No.

Q:Whowerethedefendant’stwochildren?

A:MohamedandAbdi.

TheCommissionersaskedthewitness:

Q:Whenyouwereconstructingtheconcreteblockswhichwassupervisingyou?

A:Anengineer.

Q:Wastheotherside,defendant,representedinthedemarcationprocess?

151|P a g e

A:No

TheCommissionaskedthetwosidestopresenttheirconcludingremarksonDecember23,2011.

Theplaintiff’slawyerpresentedhisconcludingremarks,butthedefendant’slawyerdidnot.

TheRuling

Followingthehearingofthewitnesses,theCommissionersdeliberatedtheirrulingonDecember

15,2012.Theystipulatedthattheybasedtheirrulingonarangeofstatutoryandsharialaws.

Theypointedout that, in linewithArticle79and80ofXHM,theCommissioncomparedthe

evidencepresentedbythetwosidesintheformofwitnessesanddocuments.Thisissodespite

the fact theonlywrittendocument submitted to thecourtwas thenotary sale’sagreement

disputedbythedefendants. Thismakesthewitnessestheonlysignificantevidenceforboth

sides of the land dispute. In the ruling, the Commissioners also claim that upon a close

examinationofthetestimonials,theyweresatisfiedwiththeaccountsprovidedbytheplaintiffs’

fourwitnesses.

In summary, theCommissionerspointedout in their ruling that the firstwitnesswhowas a

constructionworkertestifiedthatwhentheconstructionstartedtherewasnolanddisputeor

presenceofpolice.Thesecondwitnesstestifiedthatoneofthedefendant’ssonwasworkingin

theconstructionandthattherewasnodisputebetweenthesides.Similarly,thethirdwitness

whowasacookfortheconstructionworkersreinforcedthattherewerenodisputesbetween

the sides and the defendant’s children were on site at the time of the construction. The

Commissionwassatisfiedwiththesetestimonies.

The defendant’s witnesses were two. The first witness testified that he accompanied the

defendantandtheplaintifftothefarmatthetimeoftheexchange.Hetestifiedthathewasalso

awareofthepayment,andhewasasignatoryinthenotary.Theonlydifferencehepointedout

was that the land was a gift and not sale. His testimony therefore does not support the

defendant’s case in anyway. The secondwitnesswhowas constructionworkerdidnot also

testify inawaythatsupportsthedefendant.Heaffirmedthattherewerenodisputesatthe

timeoftheconstruction.TheCommissionwasthereforesatisfiedwiththetestimonygivenby

thewitnesses,whichdidnot inanycasesupportthedefendant.Takingthis intoaccountthe

Commissionacceptedthetestimoniesandthenotaryasevidencebytheplaintiff.

TheCommission’sbriefrulingonthiscasewasthusbasedonlaws,bothIslamicandstatutory,

whoserelevancetothecasewasnotexplainedatallintheruling.Inessence,therulingwasfour

152|P a g e

lineslongandwasladenwithreferencestoarticlesandsectionsoftherelevantlaws.Theruling

wasissuedintheSomalilanguage,anditstransliteratesasfollows:

TheCommission–inconsiderationoftheabovetestimoniesandinaccordancewitharticles82,

80,117,119oftheXHM;aswellasarticles92,193,and272section1ofXHM;readtogether

with723ofXMandarticle25section1ofLawNo:17/2001;andinconformancewiththeIslamic

ShariaLaw,particularly theQur’an,Chapter,1 (Baqara), verse275,282and283– issued the

followingruling:

1. TheCommissionruledthecaseagainsttheplaintiff.

2. Thesizeofthelandruledfortheplaintiffis200x150.

3. TheCommissionorderedthedefendanttopaythelegalexpenses

4. TherulingwasmadeonDecember15,2012.

5. ThechairpersonchairedthesittingsandattendedbyfourCommissioners

I have detailed this case at length because it shows the absence of proper documentation,

adequate legal training, sufficient financial resources, and investigative capacity. Taken

together,thisleadstoover-relianceonwitnesses.Italsopointstothegraveweaknessesinthe

landregistrationsystemofthecity.Furthermore,itexplainsthereasonwhytheadjudication

systemreliesonothermeansofprovingownershipsuchasthroughwitnesses.Bothsidesofthe

disputemobilisedwitnessestodefendtheircase.Neitherhadevidentialdocumentsotherthan

anotarysignedagreement,whichonesidepresentedasevidenceandtheotherdisputed.One

major problem with the reliance on witness accounts relates to their authenticity. Sources

knowledgeableaboutthelanddisputesinthecityinformedmeoftheexistenceofagroupof

peoplewhoarecommonlyknownasdheerbeenaalayaal,whichcanbe looselytranslatedas

false oath takers. The group benefits from the over-reliance on witness accounts as a key

mechanismofprovingordisprovinglandownership.TheytakeIslamicoathsonbehalfoftheir

clientswhoenlisttheirservice.

Moreover,thestatefailstocheckclaimsthroughalternativeformalmeans.For instance,the

Commissioners have overlooked the possibility of verifying disputant claims from the police

records. In otherwords, the police could have been requested to checkwhether they sent

officers to theconstructionsiteasclaimedbyoneof thedisputants.Suchpoorcoordination

betweenthevariousagenciesinvolvedinlandconflictsmakesadjudicationprocessesweakbut

alsocompromisesrevelationofthetruth.

153|P a g e

Themannerinwhichjudgmentsarepassedindicatesalackofsophisticationandshallowness

notonlyonthepartoftheLandCommissionbutalsootherstatutorycourts.Thejudgmentsare

justifiedonthebasisofarangeofstatutorylegalinstrumentsandsharialaw,butscantdetails

aregivenaboutthemeaningofthesearticlesandsectionoflawsandversesoftheQur’an,or

how they relate to the case. This ambiguity in the application of the law discouragesmany

peoplefromusingthestatutorysystemastheyareconfusedbythecomplexlegalorganisation

whosedetailsareburieddeepinbooksthatarebarelyaccessibleoravailabletothevastmajority

ofpeople in thecity.Theway thiscasewashandledechoes issues raised in focusgroups,171

which support my interpretation of the lack of trust in the Commission’s process and

judgements. Taken together, the above-mentioned weaknesses undermine the state’s

credibilityandlegitimacytogovern,encouragingpeopletorelyonothermeansandnetworks

tomediatetheirconflictanddefendthemagainstthestate.Thespatialmanifestationofsuch

mistrust,Iargueonceagain,issegregation,aspectsofwhichenablepeopletoresistthestate’s

attempttoenforcerulingsandotherregulatorydecisions.

6.6 WeakState?DynamicsandDilemmasofEnforcement

Theabovecasedemonstratesthatweakstatecapacityindeliveringjusticemayexacerbateland

disputesthatcanhaveserioussecurityimplicationsforthecity,asclaimantsmaycomearmed

to the teeth fighting on the disputed site. Inmost cases, armed violence happens after the

adjudication.172Thissuggeststhattheproblemarisesfromtheweaknessofthestatetoenforce

courtrulingsandothergovernmentdecisions.Thereasonwhythegovernmentcannotenforce

sentencesvariesdependingonthecaseandcontextbutonecommonelementthatrecursin

thediscussiononthejustificationforthepoorenforcementisthatitjeopardisesthesecurityof

thecityasclansmaymobilisethemselvesonalargescale.Thisunderminesthejudiciaryandthe

executivearmofgovernment,whichisentrustedwithenforcingjudicialdecisions.Oneformer

securityofficialtoldmewhathappenswhencourtsissuethemwithdecisionsforenforcement:

when a warrant reaches the station commander, he communicates the

divisionalcommanderandthenthedivisionalcommandercommunicatesthe

policeCommissionerand then thepoliceCommissioner communicates the

171FocusGroupDiscussionAugust31,2014.VariousParticipants.HargeisaResidents.

172ParticipantinKaahRestaurant/TeaDiscussionAugust07,2014.HargeisaResident.

154|P a g e

Minister and then the decision comes from the Minister saying that

enforcementofcourtsentencecouldcausegreaterpoliticalrepercussionand

thereforethereisnoneedtoenforceit.173

As evident here, the key challenge facing the Land Commission is a lack of enforcement.

Similarly, clan mobilisation makes it difficult politically for the state to take action against

individuals.Someofthereasonsthatmakeclansrendersupporttheirkinsmenisthatmanyof

thejudgmentsareperceivedtohavebeenissuedthroughcorruptionornepotism.Butitisalso

important that sometimes the clans side with people from their own ranks without any

justification.Aretiredagriculturaleconomistpointedout:

Whatpeoplewantisthattheygettheirrightsbutdenytherightofthestate.

Peoplegotogovernmentofficialsandiftheydon'tfindwhattheywantfrom

themtheybypassthesystemandgotosomeoneandabovethemthrough

socialnetworksandtrytoimposetheirordersfromabove.Thiskindofbypass

weakenstheruleoflawasofficialswillhaveatendencyofnotkeepingthe

lawastheirorderswillbecancelledbyhigherauthorities.174

Theotherproblemislackofcapacityonthepartofthestate.Thosewhoare

workingforthestatecanbecorruptedbecauseofthefactthattheydon'tget

enough benefits to take care of their families. There are also lack of

administrativeskillsforcivilservantstodischargetheirduties.Thistherefore

causesaproblemtotheenforcementprocess.Inmanycasesyouwillseea

smallplotoflandcausinghavocinaneighbourhoodaspeopledisputeand

sometimesuseviolencemainlybecauseoflackofenforcementondecisions

madethroughcourts.175

Aside from the fears of the destabilising repercussions resulting from

enforcement,securityforcesexerciseextremecautioninenforcementsdue

to the fact that if they harm somebody in the line of duty, they are held

173Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.

174Interviewee35August16,2014.RetiredAgriculturalEconomist.

175Interviewee27August12,2014.Politician.

155|P a g e

responsiblepersonallyfortheseactsbytheclanfromwhichthevictimshail.

Recently,thegovernmentadoptedanewpolicyinwhichitpaysbloodmoney

totheclansonbehalfofitssecurityofficersbuttheamountofcompensation

is lesser than the standard clan-based arrangements and this leads to

unacceptabilityofgovernmentcompensation.176

Enforcement is also weakened by the mutual exploitation of government and traditional

institutions/Akils. Inotherwords, thegovernmentexploits the traditional system inorder to

enforce its rules and regulations and the traditional authorities exploit the government

structures by exerting political clan-based pressure on the government in order to achieve

particulargoalsandinterests.Anexampleofthiscouldbefoundinaninstancewhereasitting

judge’sauthoritywasdefiedincourtbyanAkilrepresentingamemberofhisclan.Thejudge

recalls:

Iinstructedthepoliceinthecourttotakehimoutofmychambersbutwhile

theyweretryingtodoso,hepulledapistolandfiredoneshotintheairand

thenfled.Iissuedanarrestwarrantforhimandpolicesiegedhishousebut

theleadofficerreceivedacallfromtheProvincialCommissioner(PC)saying

thatheshouldwithdrawhisforcesfromthearea.Theofficer informedhis

bossthathe isundercourt instructiontoarrest themanandbringhimto

courtbutwaschallengedthathewillberesponsibleforanyinsecuritythat

results fromthisattempt.The followingday,agroupofAkils cametome

requesting a mediation between me and the man who challenged my

authority.ItoldthemthisisnotanissueofAkils.Iinstructedthejudgesand

otherstaffinthecourttotakeleavesincethegovernmentisunabletoensure

theirsafety.

Followingthis,theprovincialprosecutorandthepolicedivisionalcommander

cametome,askingthatIshouldrecallthecourtstaffandjudgesoncondition

thattheywillbringtheAkilwhocausedtheproblemincourt.Itoldthemif

youcan'tbringthoseItellyoutobringtocourtthenIcannottakethoseyou

bringtocourtonyourown.Themanwasinhidingforfewdaysthenhecame

176Interviewee28August12,2014.Politician.

156|P a g e

outofthehidingafteraweekandheaccidentallymetthepolicedivisional

commanderinthelocalgovernmentoffices.Oneofthesoldiersrecognised

himandhewasarrestedonthespot.ClanelderstriedtointervenebutItold

themthatthemanchallengedtheruleoflawandauthorityofthestateand

forthisreasonheisunderarrestforthestate.Mypointwastoensurethat

thedueprocessisfollowed.Ofcourse,thatwaswhenthejudiciarywasmore

independentforatleastpettycasesbackinthelate1990s.177

Whileelitesandpublicofficialsrhetoricallydismissclanism,itisraretoseedirectconfrontation

overinstanceswhereclanshaveunderminedjudicialauthority,particularlyinissueswherethe

politicalstakesarenothigh.Thereasonswhyelitesandpublicofficialsavoidclasheswithclan

elders is not only about security, but also relates to social and political interests. Since the

introductionofmulti-partypoliticsinSomaliland,it iscommontoseeclansgatheringintheir

strongholdsandmakingpoliticaldeliberationsinsupportoroppositiontopolitical leaders. In

someinstances,clanshavebeeninstrumentalinthemakingofpower.Thecurrentgovernment

forinstance,cametoofficethroughfiercemobilisationofHabarJeloandsignificantproportion

ofAwalclans.Itcanbearguedthatthismobilisationofclansupportweakensthedevelopment

ofpoliticalparties’abilitytocompeteonthebasisof ideologicaldifferences.Thiscanleadto

security concerns as the different clan based political forums and gatherings can issue

inflammatorystatementsthatcanfuelconflictbetweentheclansandthestateorwithinthe

clansthemselves.

177Interviewee37March30,2014.DistrictCourtJudge.

157|P a g e

Figure5:ActiveConflictonaPlotofLandinMasalaha,aneighbourhoodinSouthernHargeisa178

Source:Phototakenbyauthor

WhiletheestablishmentoftheCommissionontheonehandmayhavehadasignificantimpact

ontheway landconflictsareresolvedthroughthestatutorysystembyspeedingupcases, it

facesseriouschallengesthatunderminepublicconfidenceinitsabilitytoresolvelandconflicts

inthecity.Manypeopleaccusethesystemofbeingascorruptasthecourtswhilealsosignificant

interferenceexistsfromdifferentsourcessuchasthegovernmentagenciesaswellastheclan

pressures.Butbyfarthemostimportantissuethatmakespeopledoubtthefunctionalityofthe

Commissionisthefactthatthereisaseriouslackofenforcementofdecisionsitmakes.179This

makespublicconfidenceswinginfavourofcustomaryandIslamicinstitutions,whichhavesome

sortofvoluntaryenforcementmechanismbuiltintothemasfamilymembersofbothsidestake

partinthemediationprocessandprovideguaranteesthattheverdictisacceptedbyall.

178IhavetakenthisphotoinMaywhenIcameacrossagroupofpeoplefightingoverapieceofland.Oneofthesidescametoconstructademarcationfoundationinacontestedplotofland.Thiswasstoppedbyanothergroupofmenwhoalsoclaimedtheownershipoftheplot.Thepoliceintervenedtheconflictandpreventedthetwogroupsfrombecomingviolenttowardseachother.

179ParticipantinHadhwanaagTeashopDiscussionSeptember19,2014.HargeisaResident.

158|P a g e

Ascanbeseenintheabovenarrative,theimportanceofclanmembershipthatisperpetuated

throughthepluralandoverlappingjudicialstructures,hasdevelopedasaproductofthestruggle

betweencustomaryandstatutoryinstitutions.Suchstrugglerestsonantagonisticpracticesof

legitimationanddelegitimationofauthority(aswillbedemonstratedinthenextchapter)where

landconflictmanagementisthefieldinwhichaspectsofthestruggletakeplace.Isuggestinthis

thesis, that theway the Land Commission and other legal institutions operates is thus also

implicated in theperpetuationof territorial segregation. This isbecause thewayurban land

conflictsaremanagedtoasignificantdegreecanchangeorreinforcethespatialcharacterofthe

city.Forinstance,iftheconstitutionofaspecialisedCommissionforlandconflictssucceededin

bringing about tenure security, such that land owners did not live in continual fear of

unnecessarydisputes,thiscouldhavecontributedtotheemergenceofnon-clanbasedattitudes

tochoiceofsettlement.Theopposite,however,seemstobethecase,asthestate’sfailureto

enforcejudicialdecisionsarguablyreinforcesthecurrentclanbasedspatialpatternofthecity

aspeopleseenoalternativetostayinginanareawheretheycanaccessothermeansofresolving

theirlandissues.

6.7 Conclusion

Given the fact that the statutory system has at no timemonopolised the local governance

landscapeinurbanplaces,customaryinstitutionshavesuccessfullypositionedthemselvesasa

betteralternativetoresolvelandconflicts.Thishappenedagainstabackdropofarelationship

characterisedby inconvenientcoexistenceandconstantstruggle forgoverningspaces.While

thestatutoryinstitutionshavetheupperhandinsuchstruggle,inthesensethatthestateoften

sanctionedthem,thecustomaryinstitutionsenjoyedmuchhigherlegitimacyandpopularity.In

mynarrativeabove,whichcutsacrosshistoricalandrecentlandmanagementpractices,Iargue

thattheclanbasedspatialsegregationofHargeisaispartlyageographicalmanifestationofthe

strugglebetweenthestatutoryandcustomaryinstitutions.Inotherwords,thegreaterthelevel

oflegitimacyandaccesstocustomaryinstitutions,themorelikelythatpeoplewillmaketheir

choicesofabodeinareaswheretheycouldgetaccesstosuchinformaljusticearrangements.

Itisimportanttonotethattheadjudicationmechanismdiscussedinthechapterneglectsland

conflictsinwhichthestateisparty.Whilethestatutorysystemisreelingwithproblemsresulting

frombothformalandinformalinterferencefromtheexecutive,thetraditionalinstitutionsare

alsosubjectedtoasignificantlevelofmanipulation.Suchmanipulationsaremultidimensional.

Someareformalsuchasthefactthatasignificantproportionofthetraditionalstructuresare

159|P a g e

onthegovernmentpayrollandhenceareseldomtrustedasindependentmediators.Othersare

informalinthesensethatthestateusesvariousmechanismstounderminetraditionalleaders

whodonotplaytotheirtune.Thisincludesthecreationofparalleltraditionalfigureswhohail

fromthesameclanasthatofthedissentingeldertobreakuptheirsupportbase.Thiscreates

mistrustnotonlybetweenthestateandcustomaryinstitutionsbutalsothestateandthepublic.

Inthelongrun,suchmistrustunderminesstatelegitimacy.Inthenextchapter,Iexaminefurther

howthisstruggleforlegitimacycontributestourbansegregationinHargeisa.

160|P a g e

CHAPTER7 LEGITIMATIONFUNCTIONOFURBANLANDCONFLICTS

7.1 Introduction

In 2012, the government of Somaliland embarked on efforts aimed at expanding Egal

International Airport in Hargeisa, following an infrastructural development grant from the

KingdomofKuwait.Theproposedexpansionincludedtheconstructionofarunwayaswellas

the demarcation of a boundary and security fence around the airport.180 One of themajor

challengesfacingthisprojectwashoweverthefactthatthelandsurroundingtheairportwasin

thehandsoflocallandowners/claimantswhoweremainlylow-incomepeoplefromtheEidagale

whichisoneofthemajorclansinthecity.Thisledtoalandconflict,pittingthestateagainst

landowners. Inseveral instances,thisconflictalmosttranslatedintoviolentconfrontationas

the state threatened land owners with eviction and land owners warned the state of dire

consequences.Evidently,thetwosideswereengagedinalegitimacystruggleinwhicheachside

soughttolegitimiseitsactionsanddelegitimisethoseoftheother.Inthischapter,Iarguethat

this legitimacy struggle marginalises the poor due to unequal power relations, undermines

publictrustinthestate,andformsthebasisonwhichviolentresistanceisjustified.Insecurity

and lack of trust contributes to the perpetuation of clan-based settlement patterns where

resistingindividualsorgroupsfavourtolocatethemselvesinareasdominatedbytheirclansso

astomobilisesupportandresourcesforchallengingauthorities.Thedisputedocumentedinthis

chapterthatpittedthelandowners,intheairportwhoallbutfewbelongedtotheEidagaleclan,

againstthestateworkedtoreinforcetheirclanidentityasaprimesourceofprotection,while

thecoverageofthisdisputeinthemediaalsoencouragedothersnottoneglecttheirinvestment

inclannetworksasasourceofsecurity.Thedisputealsoworkedtoincreasepopularsentiment

thatthestatecouldeasilybecometheenemy.

This chapter relies on key informal interviews, archivalmaterials, andmedia sources.While

discussionsontheconceptofhybriditymakereferencestothedynamicsofstatelegitimacyand

theessentialsinglenatureoflegitimationthroughthefusionofstateandcustomaryinstitutions,

the spatial manifestation is neglected. Simply casting institutions that shape the spatial

characterof the cities in Somaliland ashybrid, thusworks toobscure rather than illuminate

importantsocialandpoliticalprocesses.Thechapterisorganisedintofivesections.Inthefirst

180 Thenortherndirection is exempted from the expansiondue to the existenceof substantial urbandevelopmentconsistingofbothcommercialandresidentialareas.

161|P a g e

section,Idiscussthehistoryofairportexpansion.Inthesecondandthirdsections,Idiscussthe

significanceoftheairportandterritorialcontrolaswellastheimportanceoftheairportforstate

legitimationamidalonghistoryofnegativeperceptionstowardsSomalistatebuilding.Inthe

fourth and fifth sections, I discuss how the state rationalises and seeks to implement land

expropriationaswellashow landowners rationaliseandorganise their resistance.Equally, I

examinetheprocessesandpracticesofconflictmediationaswellthevaluationofproperties

andcompensation.

7.2 PushingtheBoundary:ThePastAirportExpansions

Legitimacyliesattheheartofmodernstate-buildingdiscussions.Despitethis,thelegitimacyof

publicauthoritiesattractsinadequateattentionintheliteratureonSomalistate-building.The

limited available literature on legitimacy places the focus on the national and regional

subnationallevelsoverlookingthelocalandmorespecificallytheurban(PeggandKolstø,2015,

Richards, 2015, Wiuff Moe, 2011). Hoffman and Kirk (2013) underline the importance of

localisinglegitimacydebatesastheyareshapedbytheeverydayinteractionbetweenpeople,

influenced by cultures and beliefs. Moreover, legitimacy discussions at the local level are

importantforunderstandingtherationalesthroughwhichpeoplemayassesslegitimacy,which

islargelyshapedbythemeaningcitizensattachtostatebehaviour(GuptaandSharma,2006).

According to Nora and Réginas (2014) differentials in how people may rate legitimacy and

ascribedifferent levelstovarious institutionswithinastate,181canbeaccountedforthrough

examinationof the local.Thus,examiningthe localisedconflictover theairportexpansion in

Hargeisa,willenableustounderstandmorecloselythepolitical,economicandsocialfactors

underpinningthevariouswaysinwhichperceptionstowardsthestatelegitimacyareformed.182

As legitimacy is characterised as a continuous process of social and political construction

conditionedbyconstantinteractionandcontestationbetweenvarioussocialandinstitutional

actors(Lund,2006),theairportexpansioninHargeisacanbestbeunderstoodasanattemptby

thestatetoincreaseitspoliticallegitimacyandstateviabilitybothlocallyandinternationally,

facingintheprocessastiffresistancefromothersocialactorsi.e.localresidentswhooppose

theairportexpansion forvariousreasons.Theproposedexpansionmainlyseeks topushthe

181i.e.localandnationalorexecutiveandlegislativeinstitutions.

182Forinstance,theremaybedifferenceinhowtheelitesandmasses,interestorsocialgroups,orpeoplefromdifferentregionsmayevaluatelegitimacy.

162|P a g e

airport boundary towards Uubaale settlement whose formation preceded the airport

establishment,datingbacktothemid1940s.Accordingtoanoldladyinher70swhospentmost

ofher life inthearea,thespaceonwhichtheairportstandsusedtobeaplaygroundwhere

youngpeopleperformSomalitraditionaldancesduringspring.183Thegrowthofthesettlement

gainedmomentumintheearly1950swhenSultanAbdullahiDirieoftheEidagaleclanregistered

33 farmswith the colonial government on grounds that hewanted to diversify his clan’s184

nomadiclifestylesoastomakethemresilienttoenvironmentalhardshipsbysettlingsomeas

farmersincloseproximitytothecitywheregreateropportunitiesexisted.185

Pioneersofthesettlementincludedthefamilyofafamousplaywright,AhmedSuleimanBidde,

andotherssuchasAwTahir,AwFarah,AliBarre,Bodle,LehTur,SalanJirde,AdanIman,and

Saqafale.Thesettlementgrew incrementallyasothernomadic families joinedthepreviously

smallbandofsettlers.186Infrastructuraldevelopmentintheareabegunintheearly1950sata

timewhenthecolonialgovernmentwaspreparingthecountryforpossibleattainmentofself-

rule or full independence subject to the then ongoing local, regional and global political

dynamics. Among the most significant of these developments was the construction of the

airportin1952.Priortothis,thecolonialgovernmentconstructedasemi-tarmacroadonthe

Southernsideoftheairportin1951.187Forthefirstfewyears,airportactivitiesremainedlimited

due to the fact that scant facilities andequipmentwere available for airlineoperations. For

instance,therewerenofirefightingmachinesandaccommodationtohouseambulancesatthe

airport.Thesituationwas,however,improvedintherun-uptotheindependencein1960when

theProtectorate’streasuryincludedtheprovisionoffirefightingmachinesfortheairportinits

1956/7 budget. Despite conflicting advice on the issue between the various departments

concerned (Treasury, 1958), the treasury approved a grant of 14,180 to finance 95% of the

construction cost for a new airport terminal in 1956/7 fiscal year. By the end of 1958, the

183Interviewee45April22,2014.LandOwner.

184Itishoweverimportanttonotethatindividualsfromotherclansarealsofoundinthearea.ButitisnotclearwhethertheytookadvantageoftheSultan’sproposalorsettledintheareaontheirown.

185Interviewee39June05,2014.Playright.

186Ibid.

187Interviewee51March30,2014.LandOwner.

163|P a g e

terminal, main building, garage and access roads for the airport were completed (British

SomalilandProtectorate,1958).

Theairportwasthereafterexpandedseveraltimes.Thefirstexpansionoccurredin1965when

aunitoftheSomaliArmedForcesestablishedabaseneartheairport.Theyconstructedfew

housesontheWesternsideandinstalledradarsontherightsideoftheairport.Themilitary

basewasfurtherexpandedundertheleadershipofMohammedMidahwhoservedinthearmy

atdifferentcapacitiesandlaterbecameaseniorofficial intheDefenceMinistry.Afewmore

military facilities were added. These included stores for light arsenals and fuel tanks.188

Accordingtolocalresidents,theinitialexpansionoftheairportdidnotencounterstiffresistance

fromlandownersintheareapartlybecauseofanunderstandingthatthemilitarywillnotfurther

theirpositiontowardsthefarmers.Thelandowners,fortheirpart,alsowereexpectednotto

encroachonthegovernmentpropertiesinthearea.Theexpansiononlyaffectedafewfarms,

so this probably compromised any greater resistance to the expansion at that time.

Furthermore, theGovernorof the thenNorth-WesternProvince forwhichHargeisawas the

capitalrefurbishedtheairportfacilitiesandaddedrestingroomsintheearly1970s.189

Asidefromthefactthattheairportwas,andstillis,avaluabletransporthubinthecountry,it

wasalso,andremainsastrategically important focalpoint forstate legitimacy.For instance,

duringtheconflictbetweenEthiopiaandSomaliainthelate1970sandearly1980s,thecityof

HargeisawasvulnerabletoEthiopianairpowerduetoitscloseproximitytotheborder.Asthe

airport is locatedonhighergroundthanmostpartsof thecity, it servedasoneof themost

importantstrategicplaceswhereairdefencesystemsaimedatpreventingEthiopianjetfighters

from bombarding the city could be installed. As a result, the Somali government placed a

significantarsenal inandaround theairport. Theairportalsobecamea strategicground for

politicalcontrolandpower.Thisstrategicrolebecamemoreapparentduringthecivilwar in

1988whentheairportbecameamajorhub for themilitaryactivitiesof the formerdictator,

MohamedSiyadBarre,whousedtheairportasakeybaseforhostinghisairpowerandartillery

aimedatshellingthecityinabidtobringtheSNMrebelliontoanend.

UponthedisintegrationoftheSomalistate,theairportbecameasignificantbaseforsomeof

theclanmilitia in thecity foralmost threeyearsbeforeMohamed IbrahimEgal, the second

188Interviewee39June05,2014.Playright.

189Interviewee10October29,2014.FormerGovernorofNorthWesternProvince.

164|P a g e

PresidentofSomaliland,cametopowerin1993.Oneofthemostdaringepisodesofresistance

the President faced during his time in office came from militias based in the airport. This

resistance finally resulted ina stalemateemanating from thePresident’s attempt to forcibly

demobilise themilitias andgaining control over the airport notonlybecauseof its strategic

transportationvitalitybutalsoforits importanceinstrengtheningstatecontroloverthecity.

MilitiasintheairportwhowereunconvincedaboutthelegitimacyofthePresident’sascentto

powerandthemeans throughwhichhewantedtogaincontrolover theairport resistedhis

attempt,leadingtoaninterclancivilwarthatlastedforalmostthreeyears.190Eventhoughthe

conflictinitiallybeganasalowlevelskirmishinvolvingclanmilitiafightingoverthedistribution

ofstateresources,itlaterdegeneratedintoabiggerpoliticalstruggleinvolvingpoliticianswith

varyingviewsandagendas.Theconflictwasexacerbatedbythefactthatasignificantnumber

ofthesecuritypersonneldefectedtotheirrespectiveclansandtheirmilitia.Theclashdisplaced

more than 150,000 people, and most of those fleeing the war sought refuge in areas

predominantlypopulatedbytheirclans(Bryden,1994a).Thiswarcametoanendin1997when

thePresidentagreedtomeetsomeofthedemandsputforwardbyresistingclans,Garhajisof

whichEidagaleispart,andtheirmilitias,andsackedsomeofhiskeypoliticalallieswhowere

consideredasspoilers inthepeaceprocess.Theculminationofthewarenabledthenascent

statetoimposeeffectivecontrolonalmostallthemajorgovernmentfacilitiessuchastheports

andairportsinthecountry.

7.3 TerritorialControlandSignificanceoftheAirport

Territorial and state-owned property control was an essential element of state building in

Somaliland throughout its post-conflict history. Itwas particularly a priority for Abdirahman

AhmedAli(Tuur)191andMohamedIbrahimEgal,thefirstandsecondPresidentsofSomaliland

whosecentralthemesforre-establishingthestaterevolvedarounddemobilisationofmilitias

andcontrolofessentialrevenuegeneratingproperties.InaninterviewwithMattBryden,along

time humanitarian worker and researcher in the region, Egal said “we are very much

handicappedbylackofresources,butmygovernmenthastoestablishitselfasbeingcompletely

incontrolofthecountrybeforewecanembarkuponaninternationalcampaignforrecognition”

190Thisconflictdeniedthestatetheabilitytoexercisecontrolovermostpartsofthecountry.

191AbdirahmanAhmedAli(Tuur)attemptedtotakecontrolofBerberaportasarevenuegeneratingstatepropertybutencounteredstiffresistancefromsomeofthelocalmilitia.

165|P a g e

(Bryden,1994b,p.4).Asevidenthere,fullterritorialcontrolwasanecessarypreconditionfor

thequestofstatelegitimacyintheeyesoftheinternationalcommunity,butitwasalsousedfor

bringingaboutlocallegitimacyasthestatesoughttoshowitseffectivenesstotheHargeisaand

broaderSomalilandpublic.ThesubsequentadministrationsinSomalilandbuiltonthisfocusof

controllingrevenue-generatingpropertiesandtreatedportsandairportsasimportantsitesfor

nationaldevelopment.For instance,theNationalDevelopmentPlanbandstheairportwitha

rangeofotherkeytransportinfrastructuresasvitaldriversforeconomicgrowth(MNPD,2011).

Hargeisa airport in particular continues to receive significant attention from authorities in

Somaliland partly because of the fact that traffic in the airport has seen significant growth,

generatingagreater levelof revenues for the state.192 For instance, flights from/toHargeisa

haveincreasedfrom1422to2581between2006to2007,asharpriseof82%193(Seetable1).

Correspondingly,boththecargoandpassengersintheairporthaveincreased.Forexample,in

2006, thenumberof incomingpassengersstoodat34566while thenumberof theoutgoing

passengers stood at 10519. In 2007, this number has increased by 125% for the incoming

passengersand542%fortheoutgoingpassengers.Thisincreasehoweverslightlydecreasedin

thefollowingyearforboththeincomingandoutgoingpassengersby19%and17%respectively.

Asforthefreight,theincomingandoutgoingcargoin2006roseby4%and46%respectively.

Whileingeneralthesefiguresshowfluctuations(wheretheydecreaseinsomeyearsbysmall

margins),theoverallpicturesuggeststhattrafficintheairportincreasedsignificantly.

Table4:NumberofflightsinHargeisaEgalInternationalAirport

Year Flights PercentageIncrease

2006 1422 0%

2007 2581 82%

2008 2783 8%

2009 2131 -23%

Source:(MNPD,2012)

192GraphsarereconstructedfromatableintheNationalDevelopmentPlan(seeMNPD,2012).

193Thisincreasecontinuedinthefollowingyearbutatamuchsmallermarginof8%.In2008,thenumberofflightshavedecreasedby23%possiblyduetotheglobalfinancialcrisis.

166|P a g e

Table5:TheVolume(Kg)ofcargoHandledatHargeisaAirport

Source:(MNPD,2012)

Table6:TheNumberofPassengersHandledatHargeisaAirport

Source:(MNPD,2012)

0

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

2500000

3000000

3500000

2006 2007 2008 2009

VOLUME(KG)OFCARGOHANDLEDATHGABETWEEN2006-2009

CGOin(Kg) CGOout(Kg)

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000

90000

2006 2007 2008 2009

NUMBEROFPASSENGERSUSINGHGABETWEEN2006-2009

Passengersin PassengersOut

167|P a g e

AuthoritiesinSomalilandenvisagethattheincreaseddemandforairportserviceswillhaveto

beaccompaniedbyacorrespondingincreaseininvestmentintherangeof9-11percentperyear

(Hassan,2012).TheMinisterofAviationobservesthat iftheairport’sroleasakeyeconomic

driverintheregionwastobeenhanced,suchinvestmentneedstobeintheregionof25million

dollars,194whichcanbemobilisedthroughacombinationoflocalresourcesandinternational

aid(MCAAT,2016).Nonetheless,Akweietal.(2012)arguesthattheenhancementofairports

performanceaskeyaspectsofnationalinfrastructuresshouldnotbefocusedonfinancialgains

alone, but attention has to be also directed at quality of services where airports take

environmentalaspectsofdevelopment195andperformanceintoaccount.Equally,community

relations with the airport is also vital. In other words, while conforming to international

standardsandpassengerratingarecrucialforappraisalofairportperformanceandimage,what

isequallyimportantishowcommunitiesseeandfeelaboutairportswithintheirvicinities.This

is because community life is affected and shaped by airport operations. In addition to the

economicdimensionsoftheairport(MCAAT,2012)citedin(Gandrup,2014),thecurrentfocus

of airport development in Somaliland is primarily targeted at the legitimisation of de facto

statehood inanenvironmentwhere de jure status isdenied.Similarly, theairport,asakey

revenuegeneratingfacility,alsoservesasasiteof interactionforstateviability,visibilityand

legitimacy.

According toGoodstein andVelamuri (2009), statesmay legitimise their power by attaining

exclusivepropertyrightssoastoincorporatesuchrightsinthestatebureaucracy.Theymayalso

legitimisetheirpowerthroughcollaborationwith"othercentresofpower"suchascorporations

andcustomaryinstitutions.Similarly,theyalso"engageinvariousstrategiesofinstitutionalwork

todisruptormaintainexistingstructuresandpracticesofinstitutionalcontrol"(ibidp.506).For

instance, post-conflict leaders use land as a way of legitimising their rule by promising to

implementcomprehensive reformsaimedat redressingpast injustice.This isparticularly the

caseinsituationswheretheinstitutionsoftheoustedregimesufferedfromacrisisoflegitimacy

brought about by administrative malpractices such as corruption, nepotism and unequal

exploitationofresourcesresultinginawidespreadpovertyandrampanteconomicinequality.

194Sayingthatheishopingtosecurefundingthroughgovernmentinitiativesandinternationalaid.

195Attemptsaimedatrespondingtotheneedforfocusingtheenvironmentalaspectsofimprovingairportservicesqualityhavebeenlargelydrivenbydonors.ThroughfundsprovidedbyUSAID,theairporthasforshort period operated on power provided through renewable energy project but the facilities wereparalyzedbylackofmaintenance(Somalilandgov,2013).

168|P a g e

Insuchcases,post-conflictadministrationsseekto improvetheirpolitical legitimacythrough

narrativesofgreatertransparencyandaccountability.

PoliticallegitimacyinSomalilandwasweakintheimmediateaftermathofBarre’souster,mainly

becauseoftheinter-factionalskirmishesbetweenmilitiasloyaltovariousclansinthecountry.

The state’s inability to deal effectively with these problems, for almost six years following

Somaliland’sunilateraldeclarationofindependencefromtherestofSomaliain1991,ledtoloss

of trust in theneworder.The terminationof thewar in1997howeverenabled thestate to

initiate efforts aimed at improving its image and control over state territories. This exercise

beganwithinstallationofthefirstpost-conflictbasicfencearoundtheairport,alongthelines

inheritedfromthemilitaryregime.Thiswasfollowedbyseveralrenovationsaimedatenhancing

the airport’s capacity for handling increased numbers of travellers at a timewhen diaspora

communitiesfromtheregionweresignificantlyincreasingconnectionswiththeirhomelanddue

to sustained peace and stability.Most of the airlines using the airport were Somali owned

companieswhomaderegularflightstotheMiddleEastwheretravellerscouldtransitmostlyto

international connections to North America and Western Europe. More recently, the

commercial viability of these movements has attracted the attention of giant international

carrierssuchasEthiopianAirlines.

7.4 AirportasaSiteforStateLegitimation

Theincreasedcommercialviabilityoftheairportservedthequestforstatelegitimacyonthree

fronts.Firstly,itboostedtheimageofSomalilandasatrustworthyeconomicpartnerwithwhich

internationalcompaniescoulddeal.Secondly,itenabledtheadministration,whichwas,andstill

is strugglingwith theburdenofnon-recognition, tohaveaccess to internationalconnections

without having to go throughDubaiwhen travelling for diplomatic, commercial or personal

reasons.Andthirdly,itprovidedthestatewiththetoolsnecessaryforarguingthatitisdoinga

goodjobintakingthecountry’sdevelopmentforward.Theincreasedcommercialviabilityofthe

airport,however,camewithgreaterresponsibilitiesforauthorities inSomaliland. Inorderto

ensure that carriers operate in a safe and acceptable operational environment, aviation

authoritieshavetocomplywithinternationalregulationsscatteredovermorethan19annexes

169|P a g e

(ICAO, 1974), various manuals (ICAO, 2013b, ICAO, 2013c, ICAO, 2003, ICAO, 2014) and

treaties196(ICAO,1944).

Thesetreaties,annexesandmanualsproviderecommendationsrangingfromrunwayspecific

guidelines (ICAO, 2005) to principles and policy-making strategies for general airport safety

standards(ACI,2009).Theaimistostandardiserulesandregulationsgoverningairportsafety.

Standardisationherereferstothe“uniformandconsistentimplementationof[Standardsand

RecommendedPractices]SARPs”(ICAO,2013a,p.6).Forinstance,intheGlobalAviationSafety

Plan of 2014–2016, states are required to achieve “implementation of an effective safety

oversightsystem”by2017;fullimplementationoftheICAOStateSafetyProgramframeworkby

2022; and advanced safetyoversight system includingpredictive riskmanagement”by 2027

(ICAO,2013a,p.4).Thesetargetsaresetandinformedbyanarrowlydefinedconceptofsafety

asa“stateinwhichthepossibilityofharmtopersonsorofpropertydamageisreducedto,and

maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard

identificationandsafetyriskmanagement”(ICAO,2013c,pp.2-1).

In order to implement this narrowly defined view of safety, states are required to develop

processes and train skilled personnel for their implementation. At the heart of this are the

development of country specific safety guidelines,197 which include the formulation and

maintenance of State Safety Programs (SSP) (ICAO, 2013c). This entails the preparation and

enactmentofrulesandregulationsaimedatensuringefficientandeffectivedeliveryofaviation

serviceswhichincludethedevelopmentofVisualandInstrumentofFlightProcedures(VIFP)for

the navigation of aircraft aswell as the provision of other equipment deemed essential for

aircraft operations (ICAO, 2006). Additionally, states are required to provide aeronautical

informationservicetoaircraftsusingtheirairportsorairspaces(ICAO,2003)andalsoconform

tocertainchargingstandards(ICAO,2013b).Thepressureemanatingfromtheneedtoconform

tosuchstandardsisexperiencedvariedlybythememberstates.Countriesemergingfrompost-

conflict contexts go through a great deal of pressure not only because of their lack of the

necessaryresourcestoimplementthesestandardsbutalsoresistancefromtheirmainlypoor

196ThestateofSomalilandwasnotasignatorytothesetreatiesduetothefactthatitisnotrecognisedbytheunitednationsofwhichICAOisaspecialisedagency.

197informedbythetreatiesandannexesenactedsuccessivelysincethefirstChicagoconventionin1944.

170|P a g e

populations affected by the conformance related exercises.198 In the case of Somaliland, a

significant proportion of this conformance is managed by the ICAO office in Nairobi, Civil

AviationCaretakerAuthority for Somalia (CACAS),partlybecauseof the lackof capacityand

partly because of disagreement between Somaliland and Somalia regarding the control of

airspace(ICAO,2013b).

Informed by the aforementioned requirements,most international airlines tend to evaluate

airportsbeforetheystartoperations.Variousteamsaredispatchedtoassessthesituationon

theground.Someofthekeyaspectsthey lookat includethe levelofdemand,natureofthe

airportoperations,securityoftheterminals,existenceofexteriorfencesandboundaries,and

capacityforrespondingtoemergenciesi.e.theavailabilityoffirefightingmachines,existence

ofsufficientwatertanksaswellasskilledemergencypersonnel.199Sinceitsestablishmentinthe

late1950s,EgalInternationalAirportenjoysarelativelygoodsafetyrecord.Theonlyincident

reportedinwhichtheairportnamewasmentionedisanaccidentwhichoccurredin1989when

aSomaliAirlinesflightwhichflewfromHargeisacrashed10minutesaftertakingofffromthe

airport,killingallaboard(Ranter,2016).

Whiletheairportalreadymetsomeofthesespecificationsi.e.theavailabilityofterminalsand

provisionofadequateemergencyequipmentICAO(2014),compliancewithotheraspectsofthe

recommended standards such as the creation of a secure fence and boundaries are still

underway.Ofparticularsafetyconcernforauthoritiesare“freelyroaminganimals”,whichpose

a danger to the operation of aircrafts in the airport. According to theMinistry of National

Planning and Development, lack of “navigational aids and proper airfield lighting facilities”

hampertheabilityoftheairporttohandleairlinesduringlowvisibilityconditionssuchasrainy

andnon-daylighttimes(MNPD,2012,pp.123-4).Inadditiontotheseinfrastructuraldeficits,the

priorities identified by the Ministry of Aviation in the National Development Plan include

“introductionandimplementationofflightsafetyrulesandstandards,reviewofallexistingrules

andregulationstomeetFAAandICAOstandards,formulationandimplementationofanational

airtransportpolicy,andimprovementoftheoverallregulatoryframework”ofaviation(MNPD,

2012,pp.124-5).

198Giventhefragilesecuritysituationintheregion,themostpressingconformanceinthisregardwhichSomalilandseekstoimplementinthatwhichrelatestosafety.

199Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.

171|P a g e

As can be seen here, these priorities are designed to enable the state to conform to the

international standards forairnavigation.As such, theycanbeunderstoodasanattempt in

whichthestateistryingtolegitimiseitspresenceininternationalarenas.Theairportauthorities

arguethattheywouldberegionallycompetitiveiftheytakethelevelofcompliancetograde9

withinfourmonths.200

7.5 ExpropriationRationaleandResistance

Inthelightoftheabove,theauthoritiesarepursuingtoimplementtwoformsofboundaries,

thefirstofwhichistheimmediateairportsecurityfenceatadistanceofapproximately400m

awayfromtherunway.Thesecondistheairportboundaryrequiringanadditional1200m.While

unoccupiedlandformeetingtheserequirements isnotavailableontheNorthernsideofthe

airport due to the heavily built up nature of the area, vacant land for possible expansion is

availableinalltheotherthreedirectionsbutthisismostlyprivatelyownedland,exceptforfew

areas–suchastheEidagaleclansettlementarea-inwhichthegovernmentcontestslegitimacy

ofownership.201Theclaimstothelandwerebothformallegalentitlementsaswellastraditional

customaryrights.Claimants/ownerscanbecategorisedinto1)peoplewhoboughtthelandand

holdpapersfromboththegovernmentandthesellers,2)peoplewhoinheritedthelandfrom

theirparentsandclaimthattheyhavebeenstayinginthelandasfarbackasduringthecolonial

timebutwhodonotholdpaperstoascertaintheirclaims,and3)peoplewhoholdlegalpapers

from the previous governments but the grounds on which the land was given remains

dubious.202Asstatedabove,mostofthesepeoplewereunemployedmembersoftheEidagale

clan(plussomeprominentEidagalefiguresandafewnon-Eidagale).

In2012,thegovernmentorderedthedemarcationoftheairportboundaryandconstructionof

asecurityfence.Sevenseniorgovernmentofficialswereappointedasaselectcommitteefor

this task (Somaliland Post, 2015). These included theMinisters of Aviation, Defence, Public

Works, Interior, Presidency, and Health as well as the Director General of the Ministry of

Aviation’sand theMayor.Soonafter its formation, thecommitteecalled forameetingwith

landownersaroundtheairport.Theyputforwardtwopointsfordiscussion:1)thereroutingof

200Ibid.

201Ibid.

202Papersobtainedduetocorruptionorotheradministrativemalpracticessuchnepotism.

172|P a g e

thewhiteroad,whichisagravelledroughroadconnectingSomalilandwiththeEthiopianSomali

region and 2) the demarcation of the airport boundaries. Initially, the landowners’

representativeswereadamanttoengageinthediscussionabouttheexpansionoftheairport,

astheysensedthattheywerelosinglandgraduallytotheever-shiftingboundaryoftheairport.

Accordingtooneoftheland-ownerswhoattendedthemeeting,theytoldtheofficialsthat:

decisionsregardingthewhiteroadinvolvemuchmorethanthecommunities

inandaroundtheairportastheroutegoesasfarasEthiopia.Ontheother

issue of demarcation, we told them that the airport boundary has been

demarcated three times before by various administrations including the

colonial,post-colonial Somaliadministrationandpost-conflictgovernment

undertheleadershipofEgal.Wecannotcontinuelosingourlandallthetime

because of policies introduced by every new regime in the name of

development.203

AccordingtoMunene(2012),developmentprojectsserveasameansthroughwhichstateimage

is improved and deficit in political legitimacy is mitigated. For instance, the central state

toleranceforpoliticalelites’mobilisationoflocalresourcesforuniversitiesinKenyaviaethnic

communitieswasseenasameansoftryingtofillthelegitimacygapinthestate.204Theairport

developmentprojectcanbeviewedthroughasimilarlensasitwasadvancedonthebasisof

nationalinterestwhiletherealmotivemayhavebeentoachieveagreaterpoliticallegitimacy.

Evidenceforthiscanbefoundinthemannerinwhichthestatesoughttoconvinceland-owners

toaccepttheneedforexpansion.Theland-ownersdemandwastoretaintheirlandrightsorget

full compensation in linewith urban landmarket values. In a bid to loosen the community

representatives’standontheissue,thestateoveremphasisedthegreaterdevelopmentgood

thatcanresultfromtheairportexpansioninameeting[whoseexactdateintervieweesdidnot

recallbutapproximatedatFeb2012]betweengovernmentofficialsandlandowners.However,

asland-owners’representativeswereincreasinglyunconvincedaboutthegenericdiscussionon

thegreatergoodandeconomicgrowthadvancedinthemeeting,governmentrepresentatives

203Interviewee53March30,2014.Farmer.

204Thestatesufferedfromlackofpoliticallegitimacysinceitsestablishmentin1963.See(Munene,2012).

173|P a g e

felt compelled to divulge some of the specifics of such benefits. According to one of the

attendeesinthemeeting,thestateofficialspointedoutthatsomeofthelandinquestion:

would be used for the construction of major hotels and other executive

housing schemes which will boost the image of the city and provide

dignitariesandother importantguestsasecureenvironmentwithinwhich

theycouldundertaketheirdealingsinSomaliland.205

Nonetheless, most of those in themeeting remained unconvinced about the government’s

claims.Thegovernmentattemptedfromthebeginningtoinvolvetraditionalleaders.According

to Bennett et al. (2010), in circumstances where the state is emerging from a post-conflict

context,traditionalauthorities’powerandlegitimacyisreduced,resultingindefianceoftheir

orders.206Thisdoesnot,however,meanthatlegitimacyshiftstoelectedbodies,partlybecause

traditionalauthorities’poweremanatesprimarilyfromtheir lineageandthereforecannotbe

replacedbyelectedrepresentation.Whileontheonehandsomestrandsoftheliteraturepoint

toincreasingconcernaboutthereducedpublicimageoftraditionalinstitutionsinpost-conflict

contexts(Gundel,2006),theirvitalityisontheotherhandemphasisedsignificantly(Jeng,2014).

Itisalsoimportanttoacknowledgethatthislargelydependsonthecontext,asinsomecases

traditionalauthoritiesemergewith increased legitimacy.Regardlessofwhether legitimacyof

customaryinstitutionsisreducedornot,non-stateactors’cooperationwiththestateisvitalfor

voluntarycompliancewithrulesandregulationsinacontextoffragility.Inthecaseoftheairport

expansion, such cooperation is however unlikely to produce voluntary compliance as the

relationship between land-owners and the state is characterised bymutualmistrust. This is

becauseofthehistoryofexpansion,ineachthreephasesofwhich,land-ownersintheareawere

negativelyaffected.

Oneoftheland-ownerswhospokeinapressconference,onthe16thofDecember2013,pointed

outthattheyarefedupwiththeexpansionsastheykeeponloosinglandtothestate,allinthe

nameofdevelopment.Anotheroldman,TahirAliBarreaddedthat thecolonialgovernment

asked for a land in which it could build an airport and they provided space. The post-

independenceSomaligovernmentalsoaskedforfurtherspacetostoremilitaryhardwareand

205Interviewee44April18,2014.LandOwner.

206Forexample,somepeoplemayremovefencesorrefusetohonourordersbanningthemforentryinaparticularpieceofpublicland.

174|P a g e

theyalsograntedtheirrequest.Andbecauseofthistheycannotacceptanyfurtherlossofland

andwilldefendagainstanybodywhotriestoforcethemout(Hussein,2013).Muchoftheland-

owners’resistanceisinformedbygrowingsuspicionsaboutthelegitimacyofstateclaims-not

onlythenatureoftheexpansionitself,buttheextenttowhichthegovernment’srationalefor

landexpropriationisgenuine.Inotherwords,thissuspicionprovidesland-ownersgroundson

which they can resist the government’s intention to expropriate their land. They allege that

prominentpoliticianswanttotakeadvantageofthesituationandexpropriatelandgreaterthan

whatisneeded,soastomisappropriatethemlater.207Anotherintervieweewhoisalsoaland-

owneradded:

they'retellingusthegovernmentmayneedthislandinthefuturesoithasto

remainvacantbutwedon'tknowhowlongthatfutureisgoingtobe…isit

100years,10years,oreternal.Thisisunacceptable.Itdoesn'tmakesense.

Worstofall,considerationforforeignguests isnotsomethingthatcanbe

justifiedfortheexpropriationoflandfromthepublic.208

Poor strategies and coordination coupled with inconsistent land administrative practices

providedtheland-ownerswiththenecessaryjustificationforentrenchingtheirdoubtoverthe

legitimacyofstateactions.Thisisbecauseplanningpermissionforurbanresidencywasgranted

forsomeofthelandinquestion(particularlythatwhichwaspreviouslyclassifiedasagricultural

land). It involveddesignating30percentoftheplannedlandforpublicpurposes, in linewith

urbandevelopmentguidelines.Despiteconformingtotheserulesandobtainingthenecessary

papersforturningthislandintoresidentialsettlements,someoftheland-ownersarefurious

with the prospect of facing eviction. Moreover, multiple institutions are involved in the

proposedlandexpropriation,confusingthemainlyilliteratelandowners.Ontheonehandthe

military is putting pressure on the land owners by extending their bases beyond the main

securityfencewhileontheothertheMinistryofAviationintandemwiththeMinistryofPublic

Worksarepushingtheairportboundaries.Dealingwiththeseinstitutionsseparatelyputsthe

residentsintheareaunderagreatdealofpressure,aseachoneofthemrequiresthefulfilment

ofcertainregulationsandbureaucracy.Oneoftheland-ownerspointedoutthat:

207Interviewee44April18,2014.LandOwner.

208Interviewee53March30,2014.Farmer.

175|P a g e

toregisterland,legaliserightfulownershipandthenthreatentoevictpeople

arethingsthatcannotlogicallygotogether.Thereare20differentlawsand

institutions fromwhichwe had to seek legalisation, bearing inmind that

wheneverweneedsomethingfromthem,theyallrequiredrevenuesforthe

servicesprovided,yetcompliancewiththeserulesdonotgiveanyprotection.

Howarewethenexpectedtotrustthestate?.209

Asthemistrustbetweenthestateandlandownersgrew,publicofficialsadoptedadualstrategy

inwhichon theonehand theyengaged inadialoguewith landowners,acknowledged local

people’s land ownership and sought a negotiated settlement. On the other hand, they also

threatened land owners with forceful eviction and threw doubt on the legitimacy of local

people’slandownershipbysayingthatthegovernmenthastherighttousepubliclandforpublic

use, insinuating that the land is not owned.210 Furthermore, they also made inflammatory

remarksthroughthemedia,increasingtheriftbetweenthetwosides.Forinstance,theMinister

forCivilAviationwasallegedlyquotedinanarticlepublishedinalocalnewspaper,assayingthat

thelocalpeoplewanttoloottheairportland.Suchremarkshadallegedlydireconsequenceson

therelationshipbetweenthestateandthelocalpeoplewhosecooperationisdeemedvitalfor

airportsafetyatatimewhenthestatesecurityapparatusareillequippedtodealwiththerecent

threats in the region, due to lack of necessary training and equipment resulting from the

country’s lackof internationalrecognition.211From1997to2012beforetheconflicterupted,

thepeopleintheareahadacooperativerelationshipwithauthoritiesastheyofteninformed

themaboutanysecurityproblemsinthearea.Anotherland-ownerassertsthat:

people [land owners] have always been a protection for the airport from

1997. They guaranteed the security of the airport and therefore security

cannot be used as a justification for the removal of the very peoplewho

protectedtheairport.212

209Ibid.

210Ibid.

211Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.

212Interviewee51March30,2014.LandOwner.

176|P a g e

While land-owners complain about the government’s lack of sensitivity to the role the local

communities play in the security of the airport, the government on its part insists that it is

makingcompromisespreciselyinordertosafeguardtrustandcooperationwiththelocals.For

instance,thegovernmentofficialsclaimthatthereisasignificantdelaytotheimplementation

oftheairportexpansionprojectpartlyasaresultofavoidingactionsthatcouldjeopardisetheir

relationshipwiththelocalpeople.Oneoftheofficialssaid:

compromisesaremadeonthegroundsthatweneedthepeopleforsecurity

purposes.We also give jobs to the local people…all the people doing the

menialjobscomefromthelocalarea.Nobodycompeteswiththemasfaras

themenialjobsareconcerned.That'sbasicallytocreatearelationshipbased

ontrustbetweentheministryandthepeople.213

Contrarytothegovernment’sclaimofcautionandcare,theconstructionoftheairporthascut

offpeopleintheareafromaccessingnotonlyjobopportunities,butalsoessentialservicessuch

aszaribas(localgrocerymarkets),schoolsandhealthfacilities.Thisisbecausetheroutesthey

used to use for accessing the city are now closed and alternative routes have not been

provided.214 Speaking to the media, residents in the area claim that they have raised their

concernswiththeauthoritiesbutnothingwasthusfardone.Oneoftheresidentspleadedwith

authoritiestogrant“passagefortheirchildren,sickpeople,andthosewhowanttogotothe

cityforbasicserviceswhicharenotavailableinthearea"(TogahererNews,2016).Civilaviation

officialshoweverclaimthattheyareworkingontheseissuesandtheyhavealreadywrittento

relevantauthoritiestomakeessentialservicesavailableinthearea.Forinstance,theyclaimthat

theyrequestedthelocalgovernment,MinistryofHealthandanIslamicNGO215to,respectively,

constructazariba,MotherandChildHealthCenters(MCH)andmosqueforthepeopleinthe

area. Discussions were also underway, according to airport officials at the time of data

collection, for hiring a bus that takes children in the area to their respective schools while

awaitingprovisionoftheseamenities.216

213Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.

214Interviewee51March30,2014.LandOwner.

215LedbyShMohamedAliGeddi,aprominentlocalfigureinthenon-profitsector.

216Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.

177|P a g e

Thesepromises aremostly disregardedby thepredominantly Eidagale residents inUubaale,

whoseethestateasuncaringandunsympathetic,whichonlytakesfromthecitizensbutdoesn’t

giveback.Thisviewispartlycreatedbythegovernment’straditionalpoorservicedeliveryinthe

areabutwasmore recently activatedby theanticipated landexpropriationprocess that fell

short of people’s expectation from the post-Barre administrations. According to Nora and

Réginas(2014,p.23),perceptionof“statelegitimacydependsonthedegreetowhichspecific

societalexpectationsareperceivedasbeingmetbyaspecificstateinstitutionintheeyesofa

specific group of people in the context of a specific process in comparison with specific

alternatives”.Suchparticularitiesofexperiencesandhowtheseshapepeople’sperceptionof

the state resonate well with the situation in Somaliland where experiences with past

administrationsareusedaskeysignifiersforhowgovernmentsshouldorshouldnotbehave.

Thisisbecausesomeoftheland-ownerspointoutthatthisisthefirsttimetheyfacedalarge-

scaleevictionoveraperiodofthreedifferentgovernments.Oneofthefarmerswasquickto

pointoutthatthecurrentsituationcomparesunfavourablywiththecolonialeraas:

thecolonialgovernmentneverusedtobotherus….andtheyneverpressured

ustoregisterland.217

Anotheragedresidentintheareareinforcedthisclaim,sayingthatawhitemanvisitedthem

duringthecolonialtimeandaskedthem:

whoownsthecamelinthere?andwerepliedthatitbelongstoadisabled

man. Then he asked further how is it possible that a disabledman herds

camel,towhichwerepliedheisassistedbyhiswifeandbrothers-in-law.He

thenwenttothedisabledmanandrequestedhimtomoveoutoftheairport

vicinitybecauseofthefactthathiscamelswonderabouttherunways.But

thedisabledmantoldhimthathecannotmoveoutoftheareabecauseof

thefactthatthisishislandandallhisancestorsareburiedinthearea.Then

thewhitemanlefthimaloneandsaidtohim,pleasekeepyouranimalsout

oftherunway.218

217Interviewee45April22,2014.LandOwner.

218Interviewee43April22,2014.LandOwner.

178|P a g e

Struggles against the military regime and associated memories which resonate with many

peopleinthecityarealsousedasawayoflegitimisingpeople’srightforopposingexpropriation

andretaininglandownership.Thestateinthisregardispaintedasbeingguiltyofcommitting

thesamegovernancemalpracticesthatunderminedthepreviousregime.Oneofthefarmers

pointedoutthat:

ThereasonwhywefoughtagainstBarrewasinjustice….wefinallymanaged

toliberateourlandandpropertiesfromthosewhooccupiedorexpropriated

themillegally.Wewerenotexpectingthesamefromthisgovernment.Let

themknowthatwecannotgiveupourlandwhichourbrothers,cousins,and

uncleshavediedforliberating.Eachmeterofthislandcostsusblood.219

SimilarsentimentsareechoedbythefamousplaywrightAhmedSuleimanBiddewhotoldthe

mediathatmanyoftheforefathersof thecurrentresidentsdied"tryingto liberatethis land

fromthemilitaryregime.Heassertsthathecannotfathomhowcouldanybodydaretotellthem

tomoveawayfromtheirland".HeconcludedthatifthePresidentwasmadetosignadecree

orderingtheremovalofpeoplefromtheir landbysomeMinisterswithulteriormotives,“we

haveGodontheirsidewhosignedthelandforus”(Hussein,2013).Moreover,therolethelocal

clansplayed in the constructionof theairport is alsoevokedas reminder that theairport is

rootedinthehistoryofthecommunity.220Oneoftheland-ownerssaidthat:

peoplefromherecontributedtotheconstructionoftheairportasthecolonial

governmentenlistedworkersfromthisclan.Thewholeairportyouseetoday

wasonlyconsistingofthetowerandun-tarmackedrunway.Itissurprising

thatthisgovernmentwantstoremovethesettlementthatcontributedtothe

airportdevelopmentandwantstoevictuswithoutcompensation.221

219Interviewee45April22,2014.LandOwner.

220Ibid.

221Interviewee39June05,2014.Playright.

179|P a g e

7.6 Mediation,ValuationandCompensation

AstheconflictsbetweenthestateandlocalEidagalelandownersdeteriorated,thegovernment

embarkedonaneffortaimedatdefusing the tension through intermediary institutions.This

divergencefromitspreviouscourseindicatesthatthegovernmentrealisedthelowleveloftrust

itenjoysamongthepeople(mainlyGarhajisclansingeneralandEidgaleinparticular)inthearea

anddecidedtolegitimisetheprocessbybringinginotheractorswhomighthelpinthisregard.

JohnsonandHutchison (2012)argue thathybridpoliticalorderswhere statutory institutions

workintandemwithnon-stateactorssuchasthecustomaryinstitutionscanresultingreater

legitimacyastheyincreasepeople'strustinthestate.Inthesamemove,thestateinSomaliland

alsoenlistedthehelpofvariouscommunity-basedcommitteestoimprovethelegitimacyofthe

process.TheseincludedNeighbourhoodDevelopmentCommittees,ClanElders’Committeeand

Akils’andSultans’Committee.AmongtheAkilsandtheSultaninvolvedincluded,RashidJambiir,

AbdirizaqMohamedAskar,AkilAbdiWeli,andAkilHersi.TheDirectorGeneraloftheMinistry

ofAviationpointedoutthat:

thereasonweinvolvedallthesecommitteeswastoensurethatiftheland

ownersarewrongtheyshouldbecontainedandifwearewrongweshould

be told thatwearewrong. So inmanycases, these thirdpartymediators

wereabletoconfrontthelandownersandtellthetruth.Theywerealsoable

toreachuswithcomplaintsfromthelandowners.222

The legitimacyof the third-partymediationwashoweverunderminedbysuspicions that the

statewasusing them instrumentally (or indeedof setting themupas tools)with theaimof

smootheningthestancetakenby land-owners.For instance,thegovernmentwasaccusedof

financingtheCommitteefortheResolutionoftheAirportConflictwhoseexistenceland-owners

became aware of, after members of another neighbourhood development committee they

contacted tomediate informed themthat thegovernmentwasunwilling tomeet themas it

endorsed another committee for the mediation process.223 At one point, members of this

government-endorsed Committee for the Resolution of the Airport Conflict approached the

localcommunitiesbutfailedtomakeanymeaningfulbreakthroughpartlybecauseland-owners

222Interviewee71September05,2014.MinistryofAviation-Official.

223Interviewee42April15,2014.Lawyer-Farmer'sSon.

180|P a g e

sawthemasaproxythroughwhichthegovernmentwantstotaketheirland.Oneoftheland-

ownersassertedthat:

there was a substantial disagreement between us and this committee.

Chargingfromthewaytheywerespeaking,wethoughtthatthesepeople

wererepresentingthegovernmentratherthanbeingmediators.Wedonot

recognisetheirimpartialitytomediatebetweenusandthegovernment.They

have not been fair from the beginning. They were on the side of the

government. Usually Akils should be on the side of the people not the

governmentandwecannotaccepttheirmediation.224

Themediation, compensationandvaluationprocess for the landandpropertyexpropriation

aroundtheairportwascharacterisedbyastruggleforlegitimacy.Attheheartofthisstruggle

laythestate’sattempttotakeoverlandinthemostefficientandeffectivemanneramidstiff

oppositionfromdedicatedgroupofvocalland-ownerswhoareavowedtoretaintheirlandor

get the highestmarket value in the shortest timepossible, andwho also spoke for broader

communityoflocalpoor.Inthebeginningthegovernmentseemedtohavefavouredaprocess

inwhichitdealswithland-ownersonanindividualbasis.Butthestatesoonchangeditsmind

whenitrealisedthatitwouldbeadministrativelyeasiertodealwithrepresentativesnotonly

fornegotiatingwiththeland-ownersinthemediationprocessbutalsoregisteringthenumber

oflandownersinthearea.Additionally,thegovernmentmayhavefearedthatpeoplewilltake

thelawintotheirhandsandwantedtohaveachannelthroughwhichcommunicationcouldbe

maintainedtocalmthesituationdown.Nevertheless,thischangeinmindcoupledwithgrowing

realisationamongtheland-ownersaboutthedangerapparentinlackofunitypavedthewayfor

the formation of the Land Owners Committee. As the government did not have an easily

searchablerecordoflandownershipintheareas,thelandowners’committeehelpeditenlist

thelistofclaimants/owners.

As the current formal judicial landscape in the country is ill equipped to dealwith disputes

betweenthegovernmentandthepublic,thenewlyformedLandOwnersCommitteerealised

thatvery limitedformaloptionsexist ifanyforthe land-ownerstocomplainaboutor legally

resist the state’s intention to expropriate their land. As a result, they considered various

224Interviewee51March30,2014.LandOwner.

181|P a g e

mechanisms to mitigate the expropriation threats including both customary and statutory

adjudicationsystems.Butoneofthekeyobstaclestoaccessingstateinstitutionswasthatthey

wereunabletoaffordsthelawyers’fees.Accordingtooneofthecommitteemembers,they:

were unable to access state institutions…only those who have influence

amongthesocietyarewelcomedingovernmentoffices.Itisdifficultforusto

meetgovernmentofficials.Statecourtsarecorruptandwedonotbelieve

that they will bring about any resolution to this conflict. If we have had

effectivestatutoryjusticesystem,wewouldhavenotneededcommitteesor

eldersformediation.225

Giventhelandowners’scepticismabouttheabilityoftheformaljudicialsystemtoaddresstheir

problem,theyhaveonseveraloccasionsmadeattemptsaimedatexploringthepossibilityof

bringingaboutpoliticalintervention,buttheyoftenhaddifficultiesingettingaudiencewithkey

decisionmakers.Atonepointinearly2013,theymanagedtoregistertheircomplaintwiththe

thenpowerfulMinisterof thePresidency,HersiHajiAli.Thiswas followedbymeetingsheld

approximatelyinMay2013(facilitatedbyinfluentialclanelders,politiciansandreligiousfigures

fromGarhajis),inwhichthegovernmentacceptedthatthereweresomemalpracticesintheway

thecasewashandledbyboththeMinistryofAviationandtheMinistryofDefence.Butthose

negotiationsstalledduetothedepartureofsomekeyMinisters–whowereinstrumentalinthe

mediation–fromthegovernment.Thefailureoftheseattemptsseemstohaveconvincedland-

owners that they do not stand a good chance of resolving their case through the formal

governmentinstitutions.Moreover,theyalsoseemedscepticalofthestatutoryjudicialsystem

duetotheexistenceoflegalloopholesthatthegovernmentcanuseagainstthem.Forinstance,

theAgriculturalLandLawstipulatesthatanybodywhodidnotpaytaxesforhis/herlandcannot

claimcompensationforsuchlandfromthegovernment.

Asland-owners’manoeuvresforinterventionfromboththestateandnon-stateactorsfailedto

bringaboutanymeaningfulresolutiontotheproblemandtheprospectofviolentencounter

loomed,theMinisterofAviation,MohamoudHashi,calledforameetingwiththoseaffectedby

theairportexpansiononthe22ndofFebruary,2013.Heinformedthemaboutthegovernment’s

intention to buy the land at currentmarket values. TheMinistermade such remarks in the

225Interviewee42April15,2014.Lawyer-Farmer'sSon.

182|P a g e

presenceofSultanMohammedandothernotablefiguresfromtheEidagaleclan.Healsosaid

that they will process payment for the land-owners who are affected by the initial 400m

expansionwhile thoseaffectedby the1200mexpansionwillhave their claims recordedand

negotiations about possible solution will commence soon.226 For the land-owners this was

welcomebutwhileawaitingfurtherdetailsonthespecificsofthisproposal,theMinistermade

provocative remarks in the media, accusing Eidagale clan members of undermining the

government’sefforttoexpandtheairport,achargethatinfuriatedtheUubaaleresidentsand

prompteddoubtsovertheseriousnessofthestateabouttheresolutionoftheissuesamicably.

Many felt thiswas aU-turn in the government’s position in the land conflict,which greatly

underminedtheirtrustinthegovernment.

Lack of financial resources for adequate legal representation is also one of the othermajor

obstaclesthatinhibitland-ownersfromusingtheformaljudicialsystem.Thismakescustomary

institutions the most crucial avenue of mediation available to land owners. It is however

important topointout that themanner inwhich traditional authorities resolve issues isnot

alwaysjustorconvenientforpoorpeople.Inotherwords,traditionalinstitutionsattimesreach

decisionswithoutconsultingthestakeholders.Forinstance,inMay2013,theSultanofEidagale

clan,Mohamed,statedthathispeople(landowners)arewillingtogiveupsomeoftheir land

(i.e.thatwhichislocatedwithin400m)subjecttothegovernment’sacceptancetocompensate

landwithinthe1200mradius.Land-ownerspointoutthattheSultanmadeahugemistakeby

issuing this statement and they do not share his views. One of the reasonswhy this is not

practical,theysay,isthefactthattherearepeoplewhowillnothaveanylandremainingfor

themwhenthe400misgiventothegovernmentfreeofcharge.Forinstance,thereisaguywho

soldhislandto48differentpeopleholdingnotarysignedagreements.Hisonlyremainingland

is locatedwithin the400m. If thegovernmentexpropriates this landwithout compensation,

peoplelikehimwillgoemptyhanded.

Thislatestmeetingfollowedbyanincreasedpresenceofsecurityforcesinthearea.227Several

warnings,statingthatland-ownerswillfacedireconsequencesshouldtheytrytostoportamper

withtheconstructionofthenewairportfence,wereissued.Thesethreatswereapparentlynot

onlyaimedatsofteningtheland-owners’standinthemediationprocessbutalsodesignedto

226Interviewee39June05,2014.Playright.

227Inabidtoshowhowseriousthegovernmentisaboutexpandingtheairportboundary.

183|P a g e

changetheirperceptionofthestateasweak.Whilethereisevidenceintheliteratureaboutthe

relationship between states’ capability and people’s perception thereof (Hutchison and

Johnson,2011),itisimportanttopointoutthatthreatsofthisnaturecontributedtoadverse

perceptionsofthestateastheyareassociatedwiththeformersocialistdictatorialregimewhich

oftenusedforcetoimplementpoliciesanddecisions.Assuch,theyformthebasisonwhichthe

legitimacyofstategovernancepracticesarequestioned.Thestalematebetweenland-owners

and thestatewas furtherexasperatedby the issuanceofapresidentialdecree in June2014

prohibitingsale,inheritance,subdivision,andtransferoflandwithin1200moftheairport.Land-

ownersinUubaalesawthisasinfringingontheirrightandlifeinthecity,bearinginmindthe

factthatlandistheonlysourceofincomeforsomeoftheresidentsinthearea.Butthefact

thatlandisincreasinglybecominganimportantwayofnegotiatingeconomicspaceinthecity

providedthegovernmentwithalineofargumenttodiscreditlandownershipclaims.Oneofthe

MinistryofPublicWorksofficialssaid:

Thesepeoplearenot legitimate land-owners.Theyare justpeoplewhodo

nothaveothersourcesofincomeandwhojustliveoffsellingpublicland.In

thepast,thereusedtobeapowerfulgovernmentandpeopleusedfearthe

statebutthisisnolongerthecase.228

Takingthefactthatlandisinevitablyoneofthemeansthroughwhichimprovementoflifeis

sought in a city ravaged by poverty, many people regard the government’s attempt to

expropriatelandwithouttangiblecompensationas“moralbankruptcyonthepartofthestate”

accordingtobothSomaliculturalvaluesandtheIslamicfaith.Onesuchcriticofthestatepointed

outthatthesepeople:

don’t own livestock or property and they don’t have someone supporting

themfromoutside.ItisnotrightforaMinistertosaythathewillcloseoff

theirland.Alltheyhaveispiecesoflandfromwhichtheygettheirlivelihoods.

Itisamoralobligationforthestatetogivereasonablecompensation,instead

ofstretchingitsmuscleonthesepoorpeople.229

228Interviewee10May29,2013.Official-MinistryofPublicWorks.

229Interviewee36August20,2014.DirectorofCivilUnit-LegalAidClinic.

184|P a g e

Compensation and property valuation remained thorny issues in the airport expansion row.

Whilethestatesoughttobeaseconomicalaspossibleinminimisingtheamountofmoneyspent

onthecompensation,land-ownerssoughttomaximisethevalueforwhichtheycangettheir

landandproperty,ofteninsistingthatanycompensationshouldbeonthebasisofmarketvalue.

Inordertoachievethis,theprocessremainednotonlycontroversialinthesensethateachside

wantedtolegitimateitsdesiresbutalsofluidinthesensethatthedynamicsoftheissuechanged

over time. For instance, the government was, in the beginning, adamant it would provide

compensationforlandwithin400mradius.Accordingtoresidentswhoparticipatedinsomeof

theearliermeetingsdiscussingtheairportexpansion,theMinisterofAviationinsistedthatthe

governmentwillconsidercompensationforbuiltstructureswithinthe400mradius,albeitonly

on thebasisof investment size.230 Thegovernment’spositionwas reinforced ina statement

madebyaSultanspeakingonbehalfofland-ownerswhotriedtobargainwithit,sayingthey

will give away land within the 400m radius if the government comes up with reasonable

compensation plan for the 1200m radius. Land-owners however rejected this proposition,

lambastingtheSultanformakingdecisionswithoutconsultingthosewhowouldbenegatively

affectedanddemandingthattheyshouldbegivenafullcompensation,theabsenceofwhich

will result in amajor conflictwith the government. Equally the land-owners rejectedpartial

compensationproposedintheearlierdiscussions,sayingthat:

whatthegovernmentisproposingisthattheywillcompensateanystructure

within the 400m but theywill not compensate for the land onwhich the

propertystands.Thisdoesnotmakesense.Howcanyouseparateproperty

andthelandonwhichitisbuilt?Weacquiredthelandbeforebuildingthe

propertyonit.231

Foritspart,thegovernmentconteststhatthepropertieswerebuiltonpubliclandillegallyand

hence they do not qualify for full compensation.While resistance to this position remained

strong, land owners have also shown willingness to accept what they called a multi-level

compensationstrategyinwhichthegovernmentfirstlycompensatesorswapslandwithsimilar

value for original landowners; secondly, addresses possible tension between original land-

230Subjecttovariationsinwhatpeoplehavebuiltwithinthisland.Somebuiltoneortworoomsandotherbuiltthreerooms.Somealsobuiltsmallbirkaswhileothersbuiltbigbirkas.

231Interviewee44April18,2014.LandOwner.

185|P a g e

ownersandthosewhoboughtlandfromthembycompensatingthelatterforbothlandvalue

andinvestmentmadesincethen;andthirdlydealdelicatelywiththosewhoselandwillentirely

beswallowedbytheairportextensionassuchpeople232cannotbesubjectedtothesamerules

as thosewhomayhavegreaterpiecesof land fromwhich thegovernmentcanobtain some

throughnegotiations.233Thiswashoweverrejectedbythegovernmentongroundsthatitdoes

nothavethefinancialresourcesformakingsuchacomprehensivecompensationforthe400m

radius.Itinsteadproposedthatitwillonlyprovidecompensationforthe1200moflandwhenit

managestogetthemoneyneededforthepurchase(Itisworthpointingoutthatthelandinthe

1200mradiusischeaperthanthelandwithintheimmediatesurroundingoftheairport,dueto

beingfurtherfromthecity).Eventhoughthegovernmentwentonrecordtosaythatitlacksthe

financialresourcesnecessaryforimmediatecompensation,land-ownersclaimthattheywere

informallytoldthatdirectivesforcompensationwillbeissuedwithinfourtosixmonths.This

promise was mainly interpreted as a delaying tactic for eventual expropriation without

compensation.Asaresult,land-ownersinsistifthegovernmentisunabletoprovidethemwith

compensationwithinreasonabletimeframe(i.e.1-12months),theyshouldletthepeopleretain

ownership.Notwithstandingthefactthatconcreteplansareyettobesharedpublicly,sources

close to governmentofficials involved in theprocess pointedout that compensationwill be

provided in a 50/50 ratio of monetary and land exchange.234 In 2014, the government

announced that itwill go aheadwith the expropriation of landwithin the 400m radius and

compensateforanystructuresbuiltinthereforvaluesdeterminedthroughagovernment-led

landvaluationprocess.Beingoneofthemostchallengingaspectsofthecompensationprocess,

thevaluationexercisewasheavilycontestedbytheland-ownerswhotermeditanexclusivist

process designed and led by government institutions without the involvement of the land-

owners. The key ministries involved in the process were the Public Works, Aviation and

232Additionally,thesepropositionsarealsomadeduetothefactthatsomepeopleareunwillingtoselltheirlandforinheritance.Forinstance,someoftheintervieweessaidthat“weinheritedthislandfromourforefathersandouridentityisingrainedinthisland.Wealsowanttoleavethesamepieceoflandtoourchildrenandthentheirchildren”it.Interviewee53March30,2014.Farmer.

233Interviewee46March30,2014.LandOwner-Taxidriver.

234Inotherwords,50%willbecompensatedformoneywhileanother50%wouldbecompensatedforlandofsimilarvalue.

186|P a g e

Agriculture.235Evaluatorslistedthelandandsharedcopieswiththelocalgovernmentandthe

MinistryofPublicWorks.While land-owners reject the legitimacyof theevaluationprocess,

officialsinvolvedintheprocessclaimthattheyhaveoverratedthepropertiesforpoliticaland

personalreasons.TheDirectorGeneralintheAviationMinistrystatedthat:

theevaluatorshaveincludedintheirreportthatIhavegiventhepeoplesome

surplus inadditiontowhatwastheirs. Iftheyhadonetraditionalmat,we

valueditastwo.Iftheyhadtwowemadethemthree.Forinstance,wehave

evaluated a house belonging to an old lady whose name is Raha for

US$30,000.Iftodayshegoestoaprivateevaluator,theymaygiveheralot

lesservalue.IwasdoingthisbecauseIalsohadapersonalresponsibilityto

thelocalpeoplefromwhomIhail236

Inspiteofassurances that land-ownershavethechoiceofconsultingprivateevaluators, the

government put in place strict guidelines. These guidelines require that any follow up

evaluationsmustbeconductedbypeoplewithatrackrecordofappraisalexercises.Oneofthe

officialsintheMinistryofPublicWorkspointedoutthat:

IfyoujustcallsomeonefromyourclanwhothenjustarguesIspentalotof

moneyinthecementofyourhousethereforeit ismorevaluablethanwas

giventoyou,thatisnotgoingtobeacceptablemeansofevaluationforus.

Sotheyhavetherightofcallinginanindependentevaluator.Theelderswill

alsobepresentintheprocess.237

However,manypeople interprettheserequirementsasastrategyaimedat limitingpeople’s

abilityinfindinglandsurveyorswhomighthavetheskillsnecessaryforpropertyevaluationbut

whodonotmeet thegovernmentbenchmark forexpertise.Moreover,manypeople cannot

affordthisexpertise.Sofar,theauthoritiesannouncedthattheycompensatedforabout90%of

the buildings, birkas (cementedwater reservoirs), bali (non-cementedwater reservoirs) and

235Theseinstitutionshaveundertakentheevaluationsprocessanddeterminedcompensationforvariouspropertiesincludingfarms,birkas,baliyo,andbuildings.

236Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.

237Interviewee10May29,2013.Official-MinistryofPublicWorks.

187|P a g e

farmswithintheimmediatevicinityoftheairport.Theypointoutthat11familiesweregivena

totalof$300,000whileanother30familiesawaitlandswaps.Theremaininglandamountingto

800,000m²,was documented and copieswere sent to the relevantministries and the local

councilrespectively(SomalilandPost,2015).Thesourceofthemoneyforthiscompensationis

contested.While the government officials claim that the treasury provided the funds, land-

owners charge that theMinistry ofAviationwasprovidedwith funds by the government of

Kuwait for not only the construction but also for the compensation of the land to be

expropriatedfortheexpansion.TheDirectorGeneraloftheMinistryofAviation,OmarSayid

AbdullahiAdam,categoricallydeniedthis,sayingthatKuwaitdonated$10mforHargeisaand

Beberaairportsbut thiswasonly for theconstructionof the fencesandrunways (Togaherer

News,2015).

Thosewhofailtoagreetothegovernmentcompensationorrefusetoselltheirlandarefaced

with theharsh realityofbeingevicted forcefully. Thegovernment isby largeunsympathetic

abouttheuseofforcetoimplementitsdecisions.Widespreadfeelingsamongthepublicofficials

indicatethattoomuchdemocracyistoblamefortheslowmotionoftheexpropriationprocess.

Oneoftheirmajorpointsofcontentioninlegitimatingsuchfeelingisthatpreviousregimeshad

nodifficulties inexpandingtheairport.The lastofthesewasSiyadBarrewhomovedpeople

awayfromtheirlandinordertopavewayfortheadditionofasecondrunway.Land-ownersare

quicktopointoutthatthereisnoreasonablecomparisontobedrawnherebecauseofthefact

thatthemilitarygovernmentatthetimewasintentonjailingpeopleforpoliticalresistanceon

theslightestpretextanddidnotdisputelandclaimsclosely.Peoplerememberedtheydidnot

care about whether the government expropriated land from them as it was increasingly

becomingapparentthattheregime’stimewasover.Theyclaimthattheyalwaysknewthatthe

regimewillbetoppledandpeoplewillgettheirlandback.238

Asevidentabove, theattempt to resort to forcebya supposedlydemocraticadministration

forms the basis on which post-conflict urban governance practices are delegitimised. For

instance, forceful eviction is believed to be tantamount to authoritarianism akin to that

experienced during the military regime, a formidable period through which government

administrativepracticesarebothlegitimisedanddelegitimised.Ontheonehand,thisperiodis

associatedwithstateeffectivenessandbureaucraticdevelopmentasthestatewaspresumably

238Interviewee46March30,2014.LandOwner-Taxidriver.

188|P a g e

able to implement its policies and practices to the book, amid divided perception of the

legitimacyofsuchactionsamongthepopulace.Ontheotherhand,thisperiodisassociatedwith

suppressionandabsenceofdialoguebetweencitizensandthegovernmentasthestateoften

employed repressivemeans to subdue any resistance to its policies or politics. The current

state’s determination to show its capacity for implementing decisions and the people’s

determination to resist such moves, makes violent confrontation almost imminent. In one

instance, eleven people accused of breaking a deal which the aviation authorities have

apparentlyreachedwithland-ownerswerearrested.Fourothersuspectschargedwiththesame

offensewerealsowantedbythesecurityagencies,andsoughtrefugeinthehouseofaSultan

whorequestedthesecurityagenciestopardonthesuspects.Thiscrimewasinrelationtothe

prohibitionagainsttamperingwiththeairportfence,breachofwhichwillallowsofficialsfrom

the Ministry to’ seek their rights from the state’. Land-owners deny the existence of this

agreement.239Inanotherinstance,seriousviolencealmosteruptedbetweenland-ownersand

security forcesasthegovernmenttriedtostopthediggingofbirka ina landadjacenttothe

Southernsideoftheairport.240

Theresidentsintheareaandmilitaryunitsalmostclashedinlate2012whenthegovernment

officialsside-steppedongoingdiscussionsanddeployedsurveyorsandconstructionworkersin

contradiction to earlier understanding that the government will not take unilateral action.

According to a local resident, government officials camewith construction technicians who

startedsurveyingtheareawithouttheconsentofthelocalland-owners.Whenresidentsasked

aboutwhatisgoingon,theyweretoldthattheofficialswillcomebackfordiscussion.Inafew

days’time,militaryunitsmovedintheareaandsetupafence,sayingthattheywillnotallow

any body to trespass. Some of the residents defied this order andwent to see themilitary

officialstoenquireabouttheirpresencebutweredetainedforbreachingthegovernmentorder.

Oneofthepeoplewhowasdetainedintheskirmishsaid:

Iwasarrestedinthebarrackandthreatenedbecauseofmyoppositiontothe

militarypresence.TheproblemstartedwhenIwastoldtomoveawaybutI

resistedandItoldthemthatIamnotgoingtobeaballoonthatgoeswith

thewind.IwasbornhereandIhavehadchildrenhereandtherestofthe

239Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.

240Interviewee45April22,2014.LandOwner.

189|P a g e

peoplearelikeme.Astheissuedragged,reinforcementwascalledinandour

childrenandwomenwerebeaten.Themilitarywasremovedbrieflyfromthe

areaonlytobereplacedwithacommando’sunit.241

Thereinvigoratedmilitarypresenceintheareahasfurtherfuelledsuspicionsandfearsabout

imminentuseofforce.Airportauthoritiesareawareofthesesuspicionsbutinsistontheroleof

themilitaryintheairportsecurity.242LocalpeoplehowevercontendthattheMinistryofAviation

ispushingthemilitaryfrombehindusingthemasaproxytofurtheritsinterest.Theyclaimthat

theAviationMinisteroncetoldthemthattheywillhavenoproblemswiththemilitaryifthey

agree with him.243 These accusations gained momentum when reports emerged about

disagreementbetweenthemilitaryandtheCivilAviationMinistry(SomalilandPost,2015).Even

though the main points of their contention remain unrevealed officially, the Ministry of

Aviation’sintentiontoregisteritscomplaintagainstthemilitarywasreportedinthepress.This

complaint apparently emanatesmainly from aviation authorities’ concern about the limited

spaceavailableattheairportfornotonlymeetinginternationalstandardsbutalsodeveloping

additionalfacilitieswhicharenecessaryforthecontinuedgrowthoftheairport.

Tothisend,aviationauthoritieswereapparentlyadvocatingfortherelocationofthemilitary

barracks to other parts of the city so as tomake the land exclusively airport property. The

differencesbetween theMinistryofAviationand themilitary forceswasmadeall themore

difficultbythePresident’sreluctancetoappeartobesidingwithoneinstitutionoveranother,

particularlyinacaseinvolvingpowerfulindividualswhoseclansareimportantforhispolitical

survival.ThisissoduetothefactthattheMinistercomesfromthePresident'sclanwhilethe

chiefofthearmedforcescomesfromequallyimportantclanfortherulingpoliticalparty,making

itdifficultforthePresidenttotakeadecisionwhichmayhavenegativepoliticalconsequences

forhisfuture.Thedivisioningovernmentinstitutionshasnotborneanymeaningfulimpacton

howthegovernmentrelatestothelandownersinUubaaleandtheirriskofforcefuleviction.

Thedangerapparenthereisthatthelackofpoliticalpowerandthefinancialresourcesnecessary

241Interviewee53March30,2014.Farmer.

242 They charge that the airport does not face a threat from outside the country and hencemilitarypresenceinthiscivilianinstallationisnotnecessary.

243Interviewee46March30,2014.LandOwner-Taxidriver.

190|P a g e

forland-owners’defenceoftheircaseincourtmayleadtogreaterdesperationandtherefore

violentresistance.Oneoftheland-ownersintheareasaid:

Wewilldefendourlandfromthosepeopleevenifitisgoingtoleadtomajor

conflict.Theant isaverysmall insectandyoumayknowhowpainful it is

whenitstings,Icanassureyouthatourfightisnotgoingtobelessstingier.244

The soldiers shouldbe told that they should stayaway fromour landand

containthemselveswithintheirbaseswhichdoesnotgobeyondtheairport

fence.Thisisnotawartime.TheGeneralChiefofStaffoftheArmedForces

doesnothavetherighttoextendthebaseintoourfarms.Wearegoingto

organiseourselvesandwewilldosomethingaboutthis.Theresultofthese

mightbeverycatastrophic.Heshouldkeephissoldiersoffourland.Nomore

bulldozersandnomorefootsoldiersrunningaroundourfarms.

Thepeoplewhowillbeaffectedbyourviolencearepoorpeoplewhoareused

by the government such as the soldiers or junior officials. Thosewho are

violatingourrightsandwantingtoexpropriate landareneveraffectedby

theactionswetakeandtheinducedviolence.245Nowlandisintheplaceof

camelthatpeopleusedtofightover.Thereisnolandthatdoesnotbelong

tosomeone.Awrongdoingmustnotbedonetoanyone.Itisbestthatthey

(government)comewithagoodheart,notevictionsandillegalexpropriation

threats.246

Thelandexpropriationaroundtheairportcanthusbeunderstoodasawayinwhichthestateis

tryingtoincreaselegitimacy.Attheheartofthisexerciseisthestate’sdeterminationtoshow

itsstrengthandabilitytocontrollandandimplementdevelopmentplansandpolicieswithout

anyformofimpediment.Butthedangerapparentinsuchanapproachtostatelegitimacyisthe

factthatitcanfacilitatefurtherlossofpublicsupportandtrustinthestate.Huntington(2006)

rejectsthenotionthatthestrengthof thestate isamajor indicatorof legitimacyandrather

244Interviewee44April18,2014.LandOwner.

245Interviewee46March30,2014.LandOwner-Taxidriver.

246Interviewee53March30,2014.Farmer.

191|P a g e

placestheemphasisontherelationshipbetweentheinstitutionsandthosewhoelectedthem.

Someofthekeypointersthroughwhichthehealthofsuchrelationshipcanbemeasuredare

foundinthewaythestateseekstobringaboutconsensusonregulatoryconformanceaswellas

themeans throughwhich it overcomes social, economic and legal obstacles to its policy or

developmentproposals.Inthecaseoftheairportexpansion,theresidentsintheareaseemto

havelosttrustinthestate.ThisisbecausepeopleinUubaalearepoorandmarginalisedbythe

systemthroughitscostlyandfrustratingredtapebureaucracy.Astheirmarginalityisreinforced

bythegovernment’seffortsaimedatimprovingpoliticallegitimacy,thepoorareforcedtoturn

to other avenues for justice and governance. The consequence is that state institutions are

weakened and people are obliged to make “further investment in non-state institutions as

potentialchannelsof”servicedelivery(Berry,2007)andprotectionagainststateaggression.The

geographical manifestation of this marginalisation of the poor emanating partly from the

struggleforlegitimacycanpartlyexplaintheperpetuationoftheclanbasedspatialsegregation

evidentinthecity.

Similarly, the mediation and compensation processes were characterised by a legitimation

struggleandmutualmistrust.Attheheartofthisstrugglewastheland-owners’reluctanceto

acceptexpropriation ingovernment termsandthestate’s inability tomeet the landowners’

demands.Nonetheless,duetotheunequalpowerrelationsbetweenthetwosides,thestate

oftenhadtheupperhandintheprocess.Forinstance,iteithercontrolledormanipulatedthe

instrumentsofmediationsuchasthecommitteesandelders.Equallytheevaluationprocesswas

controlledandledentirelybythestate.Takingthesefactorsintoaccount,itisfairtoarguethat

thelimitedmediationspaceforlandconflictsinvolvingthestateandtheinabilityofnon-state

actorssuchasthetraditionalleaderstoadjudicatetheseconflictsinamannerindependentfrom

statemanipulationsmarginalisesthepoor.Itleadstofurtherconcentrationofclansindiscrete

geographical locations, which is itself one of the single most serious obstacles to the

implementationofpoliciesandplans,asgroupidentityisusedtomobilisepeopleandresources

toresistthestate.

7.7 Conclusion

Inthischapter,Ihaveshownthatthecontrolofstatepropertyisusedasameanstolegitimise

newpoliticalorders.Butequally,thesearealsothesitesinwhichresistancetosuchordersis

mostlydemonstrated,oftendenyingfragilestatesthelegitimacytheysodesperatelyneedto

show that they are not only in power but also a better alternative to those they deposed.

192|P a g e

HutchisonandJohnson(2011)observethatinstitutionalperformanceingovernance,security

andjusticeplayasignificantroleinhowpeopleascribelegitimacytothestate.Themannerin

whichtheinstitutionsbehaveoftenunderpinsthetrustthatpeoplemayhaveinthestate.As

shown in this chapter, land and property owners in Hargeisa, particularly those involved in

conflicts, seldomtrust the state.Evidence for this canbe found in the fact thata significant

proportionofthelandconflictsinthecityaresolvedthroughpersonalnegotiationsorcustomary

mediations. It is important to point out thatwhereas peoplemay have resort to customary

institutionsasoneofmanypossibilitieswhendealingwithoneanother,thesamecannotbesaid

whenthestate isoneofthedisputantsduetothefactthatcustomary institutionsareoften

susceptibletostatemanipulation.Thesemanipulationsshrinkthemediationspaceavailablefor

urbanlandconflictinwhichthestateisapart.Asaresult,clanisoftenseenasanarenainwhich

peoplecanseekshelternotonly fromthehostilityofotherclansbutalsofrominjusticeand

aggressionbythestate.

Thelegitimacystruggleprofiledinthischapterheightensendearmenttowardscollectiveclan

identityandreinforcesthemannerinwhichpeoplemakedecisionsabouttheirchoicesofabode.

In other words, individuals who are concerned about state violence are likely to maintain

propertiesinareaspredominantlypopulatedbytheirclansoastomobilisethepublicsupport

and resources necessary for resisting against the state. This is not however to say that

concentration of clans in certain geographic locations is a complete deterrent against state

aggression.Inmanyinstances,thestateattemptstoenforcedecisionsinareawhereresisting

clansmadeastrongfoothold.Suchattemptsarehoweverbloody,resultinginserioussecurity

repercussions. In the case of the airport expansion, attempts aimed at implementing

governmentdecisionsmayontheonehandresultinpeopleputtingupviolentresistance,which

cancausedeathanddestructionofproperties,whileon theother,airport securitymightbe

compromised. This is because airport security was dependent for a long time on the local

people’scollaborationwithauthoritiesastheyusedtoinformtheauthoritiesofanyproblems

posedtothesecurityoftheairport.Ifthisissueisnotresolvedamicably,peopleintheareawill

seenoreasonwhytheyshouldcooperatewithastatethatmarginalisesthem.

In the next chapter, I discuss the breakdown of security that can result from the limited

mediationspaceforurbanlandconflictsinwhichthestateisoneofthedisputants.

193|P a g e

CHAPTER8 SECURITYIMPACTOFVIOLENTURBANLANDCONFLICTS

8.1 Introduction

Stability in Somaliland fairs better than most parts of what used to be called the Somali

DemocraticRepublicwhichdisintegratedin1991(Ali,2014,Bradburyetal.,2003).Thisispartly

attributabletothefactthatsecuritywasoftenandstillremainstobeprioritisedovertheother

functionsofthestate,247underanassumptionthatifSomalilandistobeconsideredalegitimate

polityintheregion,ithastomonopolisesecurityprovisionsinitsterritory,attimesevenatthe

expenseofcivilliberty(Stremlau,2013).Inurbancontexts,thisrelativestabilityishoweverfaced

withathreatemanatingfromstateinvolvedlandconflicts,whichinduceasignificantlevelof

violence,pittingauthoritiesagainstlocalland-ownersorclaimers.Inthischapter,Iarguethat

limitedorlackofcrediblemeansofadjudicationfortheseconflictsleadstodesperationamong

localandoftenpoordisputantswhoasaresulttakethelawintotheirhands,jeopardisingthe

relativesecurityinthecountryatlargeandHargeisainparticularandcementingclan-basedself-

segregation.Thechapterisorganisedintothreesections.Inthefirstsection,Ilookattheurban

securitydynamicsinaSomalisettingwhileinthesecond,Idemonstratehowviolenceemanating

fromurbanlandconflictsinwhichthestateisapartycanthreatenurbansecurity.Inthefinal

section,Ishowhowstatelawenforcementismitigatedbyothersocialactorsandbrieflydiscuss

theimplicationofthisforurbansecurity.Thesecomplexurbansecuritydynamicsareobscured

thanilluminatedbysimplyinvoking'hybridity'andtheideaofafusionofinstitutionsatalllevel

ofgovernance.Indeed,inthisinstance,claneldersappearnotasmanipulatedorusedbythe

state (as in the previous chapter), but rather provided recourse from outside the state to

mediateinthewakeofviolentconflicttowhichthestatewasparty.

8.2 UrbanSecurityinaSomaliSetting:TheStatusQuo

SecurityinSomalilandoperatesinacontextofpluralinstitutions–i.e.clan,Islamicandstate–

asIhavedetailedinearlierchapters.PriortothearrivalofthecolonialpowersontheSomali

shores, individualandcommunal securitywasprovided throughcontractualagreementsand

clanmembership(Lewis,1958).Beingamemberofaclan,providedonewithasenseofsafety.

Inotherwords,his/herrightscouldnotbeviolatedwithoutarepercussionfromtheclanhe/she

247Somecommentatorshavecriticisedthissecure-centricapproachtogovernanceandtermed itasanationhostageforpeace.See(Stremlau,2013).

194|P a g e

belongs.Thisistosaythatifsomeonewasharmed,revengeoftenusedtofollowquicklyunless

a peaceful resolutionwas reached before the incident deteriorates intomore violence. The

arrivalofthecolonialpowersaddedanewdimensiontothistraditionofsecurityprovisionas

theyintroducedcentralisedandhierarchicalstatesecurityinstitutions.Salariedstandingarmies

andpolicewithwhichpeoplewerenotfamiliarwereestablishedmainlyintheurbancentresin

thecoastatthebeginningbutthesewerelaterexpandedtotheinteriorpartsofthecountry.As

Ielaboratedinchapters2and4,thenewsecurityagenciesdidnothoweverreplacetheexisting

traditionalmechanismnotonlybecausethecolonialadministrationoptedtousethemasan

indirectrule,butalsoduethefactthatthenewinstitutionslackedthelegitimacyrequiredfor

peopletotrustthem.248Inchapter4,Ishowedhowsuccessivepostcolonialattemptstoremove

theclan fromthearenaofcommunalandpersonalsecurityprovisions inthecountry leftno

noticeablebehavioural,culturalandsocialchangeamongtheSomalipeople,notleastbecause

oftheutilityofAkilsasstateagents.Evenattheheightofthedictatorshipwhereclannismwas

denouncedandactsofdisobediencetostatepoliciesweremetwithaswiftandsevereresponse,

traditionalinstitutionsremainedakeyproviderforsecurity,justiceandgovernance.

Inthiscontextofthe2012violentconflictbetweenclanmilitiaandthestateIanalysehere,itis

worth invoking the various explanations for the persistence of clan loyalty for reasons of

security. Lewis (2008b)’s contention that both violence and its resolution mechanism are

inherentinSomalicultureandthereforethestatehadtoaccepttheclanasarealitythrough

whichpeople’ssocialandsecurityneedsaremanaged,isonepertinentview.Yetitiscontested

by Samatar and Samatar (1988, 1997) who blame a dishonest elite for preventing the

advancementofcivicgovernancewherethesecurityagenciescanearnthetrustofthepeople

andpromotecitizenshipasopposedtoclanship.Hispropositionthatpoorgovernancepractices

are to a significant degree an explanatory factor for endearment to clan ideals and identity

appearsrelevantinthecasediscussedherewherelandownersresortedtoarmstotrytoprevent

theirlandbeingappropriatedbythemilitaryandgrantedtoanotherindividual.

Tounderstandthedynamicsofthemilitarybaseconflict,itisimportanttounderstandthekey

actors and dynamics of urban security in the post-conflict context. Scholars have invoked a

trajectory fromtheheightenederaof clanprotection in the immediateaftermathofBarre’s

248 For instance, it could notmake sense to trust amulti clan police forcewhere in some cases theperpetratorcouldbelongtothesameclanasamemberofapoliceinvestigatingacaseinvolvingavictimfromanotherclan.

195|P a g e

removalfrompowerthroughthetimewhentheSNMadministration’slackoforganisational

cohesion and capacity to maintain public order, necessitated the use of clan elders as the

ultimatesecurityprovidersinthecountry(APD,2010).AsIdetailedinchapter2,theycastthis

asmarkingthebeginningofa‘hybrid’processinwhichthestateformalisedbyrelyingheavily

on,andincorporatingexistingtraditionalinstitutionsinordertolegitimiseitselfandbringabout

lawandorder.Thereisadebateastowhetherthishasdefusedclanconflictorgivenclanidentity

hasgainedarenewedmomentuminthepost-conflictcontext.Myargumentinthisthesis,is

thatwhatIseeastherenewedroleofclanhasunderminedtheprospectsofcosmopolitanism

inurbanplacesaspeopleinmulticlanneighbourhoodshaveself-segregatedandmovetoareas

predominantly populated by their clans (APD, 2010). The primary motivation for this self-

segregationwassecuritygrounds,aspeoplesurroundedbytheirownclanmembersperceive

themselvestobelessvulnerabletocriminalhooligansthanthoseinlessclannedspaces.

Whiletheco-existenceofpluralsecurityprovidersinSomalilandmayhaveplayedacrucialrole

in the post-conflict state building processes, their role is ambiguous, and theymay equally

becomeanobstacletoprogresspartlyduetothelackofclarityontheirrespectiverolesand

responsibilities.Sofar,veryfewattemptshavebeenmadetoconsolidatethevarioussecurity

providersinthecountryandtheseattemptshavesofarfailedtoprovideaframeworkwithin

which these institutions could be enhanced to complement each other. The existing

administrativepracticesfailtodelineatethenecessaryboundariesandconvergencesbetween

thestateandotheractorssuchastraditionalandreligiousleaders.Whileemphasisisplacedon

thedecentralisationofthestatesecurityservicesthroughtheRegionalGovernorsandtheuse

ofthetraditionalleaderswhoareongovernmentpayrolls,itsetsnoguidelinesaroundwhich

theirworkingrelationshipcouldbeshaped.Suchlackofclarityontherelationshipbetweenthe

variousactorsinvolvedinsecurityprovisionisdangerousinacountrywheregunownershipis

high(Hammond,2013),249makingviolentconfrontationbetweenclansandthestateandwithin

clanmoreimminent.

According to a report by the Danish Demining Group (2009, p. 35), some of the [key]

“characteristics of the internal safety and security environment….in Somaliland…are the

overlapping responsibilities and competencies of different security providers that have

249AccordingtoHammond(2013),41percentoftherespondentssurveyedinBuraoclaimthattheyownfirearms.Theseweaponsaremainlyautomaticrifleswhichhavethepotentialofformingaformidablemilitiashouldsomeoftheclanschoosetoresistthestateviolently.Inadditiontothishighrateofgunownershipinthecities.

196|P a g e

developedasaresponsetotheinitial–andtosomeextentremaining–capacitygaps”instate

securityprovisions. Inaddition to the traditional and religious leaders, this capacitygapwas

morerecentlyfilledbyyouthgroupswhohaveemergedasnewactorsinthepost-conflicturban

securitylandscape.Theseyouthgroupspatroltheneighbourhoodsforasmallfeeandclaimto

protectresidentsfrompettycriminalswhooftensnatchmobilephonesandburglarisehomes.

Theychargethecustomersafeerangingfrom$5to$30,dependingonthesizeoftheproperty

and thewealth of customer. Moreover, various other –more serious - challenges face the

provisionofurbansecurityinSomaliland.Theseincludethesecuritythreatsposedbyextremist

organisationsbasedintheSouth,whichhavereceivedthemostinternationalattention.In2001,

anItalianaidworkerwaskilledinBoramawhileayearlatertwoEnglishteacherswereslainin

Sheikh.Thebiggestthreatcamein2008whenamajorattack,claimingthelivesofmorethan20

peoplewascarriedoutagainsttheEthiopianconsulate,UNDPcompoundandthePresidential

HouseinHargeisa(APD,2010).Theseincidentshaveledtoarapidincreaseintheemergenceof

gatedcommunitiesinthecityasaresponsetothethreats.Almostallthemajorgovernmental

offices, aid agencies and themajor hotels in the city have fortified gates surrounding their

immediatevicinities.Nonetheless,accordingtolocalsecurityofficials,violenceandinsecurity

emanatingfromurbanlandconflictspresentsauthoritieswithmoreimmediateurbansecurity

challengesthantheoccasionalterroristrelatedthreats.250

8.3 UpsettingtheStatusquo:TheEarlyMorningWarCall

Acaseinpoint,whichcanillustratetheprecariousdynamicsofurbansecurityinSomalilandand

readyrecoursetoclanoccurredinHargeisain2012,whereclashesbetweensecurityforcesand

armedmilitiasentshockwavesthroughthecity.Theproblemwasrootedintheconfiscationof

a piece of land, located inMalka Durduro near the Somaliland Army headquarters, from a

prominentEthiopianSomalipolitician,AbdikarimAwRali.251Themovewassaidtohavebeen

necessitatedbythefactthatthearmyneededextraspaceforstoringitsmilitaryhardware.Upon

findingoutthathislandwasconfiscatedbythegovernment,theEthiopianSomalipoliticianwho

wasatthetimebasedinAddisAbaba,cametoHargeisatogetexplanationfortheconfiscation

of his land. He held high profile meetings with senior politicians and government officials

250Interviewee66August10,2014.PoliceStationCommander.

251Thelandtheyconfiscatedfromhimwasabout600x600mwhereasthelandtheygavehimwas400x400minwherethedisputehasarisen.

197|P a g e

includingthethenPresidentofSomaliland,DahirRayaleKahin.Followingthesemeetings,the

government decided to compensate him with alternative land located in a military barrack

towardstheEastofthecity.252Thebarrackswereestablishedintheareainthelate1970swhen

thesocialistmilitaryregimeexpandeditssecuritypresenceinthecityandconfiscatedlandfor

establishingmilitarybasesfromthepeopleinthearea.Accordingtolocalresident,thelandused

tobefarmsownedbyseminomadicfamilieswhosesettlementintheareadatesbacktonearly

70years.253Whilethegovernmentconstructedbuildingsandmilitaryfacilitiesinsomepartsof

the confiscated land (i.e. factory that fixes broken weapons, firearm testing facilities, and

military training grounds), other parts remained vacant. The post-conflict administration

followedsuit,limitingthemselvestothefacilitiesestablishedbytheirpredecessors.According

toaSultanwhohailsfromthearea,thisstateofvacancyseemstohaveprovidedreasonforthe

reoccupationofthelandbythepreviouscivilianowners:

Whenpeoplecamebackfromtherefugeecamps,theyresettledinthearea

which was confiscated from them. The land was vacant… they never

constructedbuildings,theyneverfencedit...inotherwordsitwasasvacant

aswhenitwasconfiscatedfromthem.254

Claimantsofthis landcontendthatthetransferofthelandconfiscatedfromthemforpublic

purposestoanotherpersonisillegalandunacceptable.Attemptsaimedatresolvingtheissue

peacefullydidnotyieldresults.Someofthegovernmentofficialswhoweresympathetictothe

civilian claimants covertly advised them that the only mechanism through which they can

pragmatically open a case against themilitary establishmentwas through their own courts.

Heedingthisadvice,theytriedtoopenacaseinthemilitarycourtsbutthecourtsrefusedto

accepttheirsubmission.Assuingthearmythroughitssubsidiaryorgansdidnotbringaboutany

change, they thenmadeanattempt tobypass the court.According to close relatives,255 the

claimantshavevisitedallthemajorfiguresinthemilitaryestablishmentincludingtheGeneral

ChiefofStaff,theDeputyGeneralChiefofStaff,andtheHeadoftheMilitaryOperations.Their

252Interviewee52June15,2014.Sultan.

253Interviewee40April25,2014.DistrictOfficer.

254Interviewee52June15,2014.Sultan.

255Interviewee83June21,2013.RelativesofOneoftheAttackers.

198|P a g e

pleaswiththemilitaryofficialsdidnothoweverresultinanyintervention.Realisingthatthey

willgetnohelporsolacefromthemilitaryestablishment,theytriedtotaketheircasetothe

SupremeCourt,thehighestcourtintheland,buttheirrequestforopeningacaseagainstthe

ArmedForceswasagaindeclined.Frustratedbythejudicialsysteminthecountry,theytriedto

getapoliticalintervention,writingaletteroutliningtheirgrievancestotheMinistryoftheOffice

ofthePresidency.TheyalsoapparentlysoughtaudiencewiththePresidentbutsixmonthsafter

theirrequest,theywerestillunabletoseehim.

IntheearlymorningofTuesday,15thofMay2012,thelandclaimantsstagedasurprisingbut

daringattackonthemilitarybarrackinquestion.Sevenpeoplelosttheirlivesandnineothers

wereinjuredintheattack(BBCSomali,2012).Thecasualtiesincludedthreemilitarypersonnel,

twomilitiamenandtwocivilianbystanderswhowereapparentlyearlyriserspreparingfortheir

nextday’sactivities.Accordingtopoliceandmilitarychiefswhocalledforapressconferenceon

thefollowingday,themilitiawerearmedwithvarioustypesofsmallarmsincludingautomatic

machineguns.ThisishardlysurprisinginSomalilandwhereavailabilityofsmallarmsisamong

thehighest intheregion.Thesecuritychiefsreportedinthemeetingthat28peoplewere in

custody,nineofwhomwereinjured(HaatufNews,2012b).Oneoftheattackers,whoidentified

himselfasSaeedMohamedAbdullah,spoketotheVoiceofAmerica’sSomaliServicefollowing

theattackandarguedthattheycarriedouttheattackbecausethegovernmentoccupiedland

theyownedforgenerations.Hesaidthelandwasforciblyconfiscatedfromthembytheprevious

militaryregimeforpublicuseonlytobegiventoabusinessman(HaatufNews,2012b).

Competing narratives surround themanner in which the incident began. The government’s

versionisthattheciviliansattackedthemilitarybasewithoutprovocation.Ontheirpart,the

assailantscontestthattheydidnotgotoattackthemilitarybutrathertoreoccupytheirland.

Whenthemilitarysawthemcampinginthecontestedland,theyrequestedthemtovacatebut

thearmedciviliansrefusedtoabidebythemilitaryorders.Nevertheless,theincidenttookthe

citybysurpriseandpoliticianswerecautiousabouttheirremarksduetotheclandynamicsof

thesituation.Itisimportanttorememberherethattheincidenthadtwodimension.Ontheone

hand, the conflictwasbetween the stateand the landowners.Butbeneath this layerof the

conflictistheclandynamics.Surprisingly,thesoldierswholosttheirlivesallcamefromtheSa’ad

MuseoftheAwalclans.Equally,theattackersallcamefromtheHabarYonissub-clanofthe

Grahajisclans.Bothclanshavemajorpresenceinthecapitalandinflammatoryremarkscould

havesparkedaclash.TheMayorofthecitywhospokeshortlyaftertheattackonanational

televisionencouragedpeoplenottotakethelawintotheirhands.TheMinisterofDefencealso

199|P a g e

condemnedtheattackbutspokeinaconciliatorymannermakingamentiontothefactthatthe

peoplewhoarefightingoverthelandnowarethesamepeoplewhofoughttogetheragainst

the previous military regime (Berbera News, 2012). Similarly, a former Minister in the

governmentAliMohamedWaranadde256whospoketothemediasaidthat"Iwanttotellthe

peoplethatwehavecomethisfarthroughdialogueandcompromisesandIamurgingpeople

nottoabandonthis....IamawareofthisproblemandIamprettysurethatithasreachedthis

farbecauseofmismanagementbutIdonotbelievethatitshouldhavereachedtothepointof

violence".257(Faarax,2012a).

8.4 CourtMartialandPostViolenceCustomaryMediation

Themilitaryandtherestofthestateinstitutionswereembarrassedandfuriousabouttheattack

stagedagainstakeymilitarybaseintheheartofthecountry.Partofthisangerwasrootedina

concernaboutpossibledamagetothestate’simage.Thisshapednotonlythemannerinwhich

the state responded heavy-handedly to the incident but also the swiftness with which it

prosecutedsuspects.Forinstance,disproportionatelevelofsecuritypersonnelandmachinery

wereusedtobringthesituationundercontrolwhileprosecutionwasspeedilyputtogetherand

militarycourtconvenedwithinunrealistic timeframe (in theSomalilandcontext)of12hours

fromthetimewhenthe incident tookplace.Onthe followingday, thecourtpassedadeath

sentenceto17peoplewhile5others,whowereunderage,weresentencedtolifeimprisonment.

Threemore peoplewhowere treated for injuries sustained during the attack awaited trial.

Speakingtothemedia,thechairmanofthefirstlevelmilitarycourtinHargeisaCol.YusufFarah

Sharmarkesaidthatthecourt’ssittingbeganintheearlymorningof16May2012andcameto

anendatabout4o'clockinthesameday(HaatufNews,2012a).Headdedthatthetrialwas

fast-trackedduetoassailants’confessionsfortheircrimes.

Concernshavebeenraisedaboutthemannerandswiftnesswithinwhichthesentenceswere

handeddown(BBCWorld,2012).Criticsarguedthatitissurprisingforadeathsentencetobe

issued within 24 hours without proper investigation to the root causes of the problem.

Moreover,thelegalityoftryingthecaseinamilitarycourtwasalsoquestioned.Accordingtoa

criminal lawyer in Hargeisa, civilians cannot be tried in a military court under the existing

256HeisnowthecurrentMinisterofInterior

257TheMinisteralsodeniedallegationslevelledagainstaprominentbusinessmancalledtheDAHASHILtohaveboughttheplace.

200|P a g e

Somalilandcriminal laws.258Themilitaryhowevercontestedifamilitaryactioniscommitted,

militaryrulemustbeapplied.259Oneofthewaysinwhichthesecuritypersonnelsoughttojustify

theirpositionwasthefactthattheydisplayedthemilitaryweaponsusedbythesuspectsina

pressconferencesheldsoonaftertheattackersweredetained(Seefigure1and2).

Figure6:Weaponsusedintheattack,asclaimedbysecurityofficials

Source:(Faarax,2012b)

258Interviewee88June14,2014.CriminalLawyer.

259Interviewee86June1,2014.MillitaryOfficial.

201|P a g e

Figure7:Governmentofficialsspeakingtothemediaintheaftermathoftheincident

Fromrighttoleft:DefenceMinister,AhmedHajiAliAdani,InteriorMinister,MohamedNurArale(Du)r,ArmyChief,IsmailShaqale,andPoliceCommissioner,AbdullahFadalIman.Source:(Faarax,2012b)

Thesentencescausedwidespreadfearaboutpossibledeteriorationofthesituation.According

toQaranNews(2012),tensionwasrunninghighinthecityaspeoplewereshockedaboutboth

theattackonthebarracks,butalsothepassingofsuchaharshsentenceagainstciviliansina

military court. This website, which is run by a blogger who hails from the Eastern

neighbourhoods of the city, reported that a demonstration was organised in New Hargeisa

neighbourhoodinresponsetothesentences.Accordingtooneofthegovernmentcritics,the

samemilitarycourtwhichrefusedtoaccepttheirsubmissionsandhearwhattheyhavetosay

aboutthelandinquestionsentencedthemtodeath.260

The military court was accused of human rights violations as it denied the suspects their

constitutional rights for fair trial and legal representation. This is because none of those

sentencedwasdefendedorlegallyrepresentedinthecourt.Someoftheotherproblemswith

the trialwere investigative flaws relating to theprosecutor’spreparationof thecase.This is

apparentinthemannerinwhichthesentencewascollectivelyrenderedwithoutaddressingkey

260Interviewee87June4,2014.OppositionMemberofParliament.

202|P a g e

investigativequestionssuchaswhetheralltheaccusedpeoplecommittedthecrimeorwhether

theywereallarmedorfiredtheirgunsatthesoldiers.Moreover,someofthepeoplewhowere

sentenced todeathwereunderageboyswhoseage ranged from15 to17.The irregularities

apparentinthewaythecasewashandledattractedcriticismfromnotonlywithinthecountry

but also outside the country. For instance, the United Nations envoy in Somalia, Augustine

Mahiga,expressedhisorganisation’sconcernovertheviolencebetweenciviliansandmilitaryin

HargeisaaswellasthesubsequentmishandlingofthecasebytheSomalilandauthorities.The

envoyinastatementexpressed:

concern about the [manner in which the] trial of these civilians was

conducted by a military [court] in contradiction of both applicable local

statutesand…[internationallawsandnorms]….Heurges[d]theimmediate

transferofthecasetoacriminalcourtandencourage[d]theauthoritiesto

ensure that fair trial rights are respected…. [finally] calling for a full,

impartial, independentandtransparent investigation intothe incidentand

itsaftermath(UNNewsCentre,2012).

Relativesofthosesentencedtodeath261suspectthatthereasonwhythecapitalpunishment

wasissuedwithinaveryshortperiodoftimeisattributabletothefactthatallthekeyfigures,

includingtheheadofthearmy,thechairmanofthecourt,andthetwoprosecutorshandlingthe

trial,werefromthesameclanasthosesoldierskilledintheattack.262Itisalsoimportanttonote

thatalltheattackerswerefromthesamesubclan,HabarYonisoftheGarhajis,inadditionto

thelocaltensions,thecasealsoattractedtheattentionoftheSomalilanddiasporawhousedit

forcritiquingthestatebuildingprocessinSomaliland.Buttheiropinionwasdivided.Whilesome

supportedthegovernmentresolvetoquickactionagainstthosewhostagedtheattackagainst

themilitary,othersweredisappointedinthemannerinwhichthegovernmenthandledthecase.

Forinstance,Yare(2012)arguedinanarticlecarriedinadiasporaownedwebsitethat:

onewouldseenoreasonwhythegovernmentmaintainsamilitarybasein

the middle of densely populated and residential area. The military is the

defenceforcesofthenationthataredesignedtoprotectthecountryfrom

261Interviewee84June15,2013.RelativesofOneoftheAttackers.

262Interviewee52June15,2014.Sultan.

203|P a g e

externalandforeignenemy.Logicallythebasesshouldhavebeenrelocated

intheborderareaofthecountryandinarm’slengthofcivilianpopulation.

Only dictatorial regimes keep a heavily fortified military base within the

vicinity[ofacivilianresidentialarea].

Someofthemessagescarriedinthediasporawebsitesweremainlyaimedatraisingawareness

about the issue and bringing about not only local resistance to the sentences but also

internationalpressureonthegovernmenttorethinkitsdecisions.Suchmessagesamplifiedthe

securitythreatsthatcanemanatefromtheviolenceandtheimplicationsthiscouldhaveonthe

relativestabilityanddemocratisationprocess inthecountrywhicharebothheavilyaidedby

Westerndonors.263Inablogpostedontheinternetintheimmediateaftermathoftheattack,

Yare(2012)arguedthat:

whatdistinguishesournationandthethingweareproudofisourtolerance

and respect for human dignity. We would not be any different from our

brothersandsistersinSomaliaifwemilitariseeverycivilissue.Civilianswho

havebeen frustratedby thewebofoppressionsandsystematicalienation

wouldhavenooptionthanusingallmeansnecessarytodefendtheirright.It

is from the government we have to expect patience, tolerance and fair

treatment. There is no doubt that the military and the police have used

excessive forces. [This] would be an insult to [the] European donors that

financetherecurrenttrainingandsalaryofthespecialpoliceunit.

Valuesandprinciplesofdemocracyenshrinedintheconstitutionwerealsousedasapointof

departureforcondemningthegovernment’sactionagainsttheassailants.IbrahimMead(2012)

whoisapoliticalanalystbasedinCanadaandcriticoftherulingparty,KULMIYE,pointsoutthat

theconstitutionsofSomalilandupholdstherightofciviliantofairtrial inaciviliancourt.The

commentatorsuspectsthatthegovernmentanticipatedthesekindsofproblemsandwasintent

to create security problems as thatwould enable it to distract the public attention from its

institutionalfailures.Heasks:

263Whoseruleoflawvalues,accordingtothesebloggers,weresupposedlyreflectedintherelationshipbetweenthepeopleandthestatetheyaid.

204|P a g e

why are the soldiers [who] were sent to the place of the incident were

selectivelyfromaparticularclantofaceaparticularclan?Manypeoplein

Hargeisabelievethatitwasdeliberatelyplannedtocreateawedgebetween

the brotherly communities [in Hargeisa] so that Siilanyo could fish in the

newly created mistrust and implanted hate between these brotherly

communitiesasabenefactoroftheseevilactivities!

Thecommentator furtheraccusedthegovernmentofpolarisingthecountryalongclan lines,

contributingsignificantlytothewideningriftsbetweenclansinSomaliland.Anexampleofthis

isthefactthatsomeeldersandbusinessmenfromGabileycalledforthegovernmenttospeed

up transportation of the bodies of their military men, also echoing out clan inclined

inflammatoryremarksintheaftermathoftheattack.Theauthorasks,‘thequestioniswhothe

soldiers died for, for a merchant or for the nation?’ Following both local and international

pressureonthegovernment,theDefenceMinisterrevealedduringabriefingtotheparliament

thatthegovernmentwasreviewingthedeathandlifeimprisonmentsentences(Hasan,2012).

Subsequently,theappealcourtofthemilitaryoverruledtheprevioussentences,reducingdeath

sentencestolifeimprisonmentandthelifeimprisonmentto10years.

TheeldersoftheHabarYonisclanfromwhichtheassailantshailwerestillunhappyaboutthe

jailingoftheirmenandthushaveembarkedoneffortsaimedatbypassingthestateinstitutions

and making the matter inter-clan issue. To this end, the elders used their network in the

customaryinstitutionstobringaboutasolutiontothisproblem.Theymetrepresentativesfrom

the deceased men’s’ clan. The point of departure for these elders was the fact that the

assailants’clan,HabarYonis,hadnointentionofengagingviolentlywiththeSa’adMuseofthe

Awal clans, of thedeceased soldiers therefore cannotbe subjected, according to customary

laws,topunitiveactionssuchasrevenge(assailants).Afteralongdiscussionbetweentheelders

ofthetwoclans,intheendtheclanofthedeceasedsoldiersagreedtotakebloodmoneyfor

theirdeceasedmembers.TheSultanwholedthedelegationfromEasternHargeisaclanssaid:

wemettheirclanleaderssuchastheSultanandtheAkilsandwerequested

themtotakemagordia(bloodmoney)264sincetheassailantsdidnotknow

theclanbackgroundofthedeceased.Wealsotoldthemthattheydidnot

264MaganddiaareSomaliorSomalisisedwordswiththesamemeaninginterchangeablyusedforbloodmoney.

205|P a g e

intendtokillthemforclanrelatedpurposes.Thehostelderswereconvinced

withourargumentandweagreedonabloodmoneyof300camelsforeach

personkilled.Eachcamelwasestimatedtocost$500.265

Theassailant’sclanbroughttheagreementpaperstocourtdemandingthattheirmenshould

bereleasedsincethetwoclanshaveagreedwithinthemselves.Thecourt,however,imposed

furtherconditionsbyinstructingtheelderstobringcloserelativesofthepeoplewhowerekilled

intheattacktocourtsoastoensurethattheyarehappywiththedecisionsmadebytheirelders.

Theassailant’selderswentbacktothedeceased’sclaneldersrequestingthemtofacilitatethe

consentofthedeceased’srelativesinwriting.ASultanfromtheHabarYonissaidthat:

webroughtthenotarysignedbytheclosefamilymembersinordertoshow

thatthecloserelativesagreedtothisarrangement.Wepaidabout$600for

theprocessofbringingthemfromtheirhometothecity.266

The aforementioned efforts aimed at releasing the jailed assailants through clan-based

negotiationswerealsoaccompaniedbysimilareffortsaimedatconvincingthestatetorelease

the assailants. For instance, six people including three Sultans, businessman, and other key

figuresrepresentingtheclansintheEasternsideofthecitymetwiththePresidentofSomaliland

and a select committee of high ranking officials including the Government Spokesman and

MinistersofInterior,Defence,ForeignAffairs,andPresidencytodiscusspossiblesolutionsfor

theviolenceanddeathofsoldiersaswellastheoutstandinglandissues.267Themeetingwith

thePresidentwasparticularlyimportantbecauseofthefactthatthemilitarycourtcomplicated

theissuefurtherbysayingthattheonlywaythroughwhichtheassailantscouldbereleasedis

through a presidential pardon. Following successful lobbying the President finally agreed to

issueapardonontheoccasionof18MaywhenSomalilandunilaterallydeclaredindependence

fromtherestofSomalia.

265Interviewee49June15,2014.Sultan.

266Ibid.

267TheSultanagainsaidthattheyinsisted:thistimeweareonlydealingwiththePresidentsinceallotherinstitutionsareunabletodoanythingabouttheproblem.Wealsotoldthemthatwestilldidn'tgiveupourlandandweneedtotalkaboutitinanothersettingandanothertimeibid.

206|P a g e

Amidweak justice system, violence emanating fromurban land conflict is the single biggest

threattosecurityinSomaliland(OCVP,2012,OCVP,2013a,OCVP,2013b).Whilethetraditional

systemiscriticisedforinabilitytodealwithlanddisputesincomplexurbansettings,theyproved

tobeuseful inresolvingdisputes inwaysthatarenotnecessarily justice-orientedbutrather

solution-oriented.Thestate’sinabilitytodeliverequitablestatutorysystemnotonlyempowers

thecustomaryinstitutionsbutalsounderminesstatelegitimacy.ForBelaundeetal.(2010,p.

50),“competinglegalregimesservetounderminethelegitimacyofthestateintheeyesofits

citizensduetothelackofcitizenparticipationinlandprocessesandtocompetingmeaningsand

usessurroundinglandbetweenandwithinthelocal,nationalandinternationallevels”.While

thisassertionisrelevant,dismissaloflegalpluralisminpost-conflictcontext,wherethestateis

unwillingorunabletodischargepublicserviceinanequitablemanner,issimplistic.Themore

pertinentquestionrelatestohowcouldtheirinteractionbemanagedinamanyinwhichthey

couldfunctionalongsideeachotherwithminimalnegativeimpactonthepopulationtheyserve.

8.5 Conclusion

Theabovecasehighlightsthedangerapparentintheunresolvedurbanlandconflictinvolving

thestate.Inotherwords,thelackofacrediblemediationavenueforsuchconflictsmayleadto

a violent encounter and undermine the long-invested security in the city. This may in turn

cementthespatialsegregationinthecityaspeoplewillseeitbeneficialtostayinareaswhere

theycouldresistthestatemoreeasilyorescapeconflict(Bryden,1994a).268Theauthoritieshave

in many cases expressed concerns about the challenges presented by the concentration of

groupsinspecificgeographicallocationstolawenforcement.Thehighrateofunemployment

amongtheyouthandtheexploitationofclanidentitycanfuelinsecurityinthecity.Riskfactors

that could draw the youth into criminal activities of this nature are “social and economic

marginalisationandvulnerability”(Widmer,2013,p.2).Thiscoupledwithstateimpunityabout

thewayinwhichitmanagesconflictscanresultinamajorshocktothealreadyfragileurban

securityinHargeisa.Notwithstandingthefactthatthestateoftenenjoys269theupperhandin

violent encounters with resisters owing to greater availability of resources and quicker

organisationalcapacity,itisimportanttobearinmindthatsuchindividualsorgroupsmayoften

havetheabilitytoexploitexistingsocialandpoliticalcleavagestodenythestatethelegitimacy

268Manypeoplefledthecityforareaspopulatedbytheirclansduringthecivilbetween1994and1997.

269Atleastforthetimebeing.

207|P a g e

andvoluntarycomplianceofrulesandregulationsitsodesperatelyneedsatatimewhenitis

grapplingwiththeburdenofnon-recognition.

Inthisexampleofaclan’srecoursetoviolenceindefenceofclanmembers’landsagainststate

appropriation,oneseestheambiguityofpluralinstitutionsofprotection,andadynamicconflict

thecontoursofwhichcannotbeexplainedby‘hybridity’insofarasthisimpliesfusedpowers

withininstitutions,ratheritpresentedacaseofoppositionbetweenclandefenceofitsmembers

interestsandstate(thelatteralsoperceivedasactinginaclannistmanner).Theresolution–if

itcanbetermedassuch,whichhasmetwithwidespreadconcernanddissatisfaction–involved

attemptsatclan-basedmediationtoreducetheseverityofchargesagainstciviliansincluding

marginalisedyouth,andhasonceagainunderminedtrustinthestateandraisedconcernsover

thelegitimacyofstateactions.Asarguedintheliteraturereviewandshownintheempirical

chapters,thecurrentdebatesabouthybridgovernancewithinwhichpluralismsits,runshortof

explaining the spatialmanifestation of the quality of interaction between the state and the

public.Thismakestheuseofalternativeconcepts,suchaslegitimacyandtrust,necessaryfor

capturingthedynamicsoftheseimperative.Thisthesisaimedtocontributeinthisregard.

208|P a g e

CHAPTER9 CONCLUSION

This thesis is the first analysis of the shapingof city space in Somaliland. I highlightedhow

currentdebatesonSomalilandexaminemainlynational levelpoliticsandgovernance. Ihave

therefore, suggesteda shift in focus to theneglected city spaceandauthority,whereurban

subjects/citizensencounterthelocalstateonadailybasis,andwherethemanifestationoflack

oftrusthasrepeatedlyfosteredatrendtowardsspatialsegregation.Thethesisshowsthatan

understanding of urban segregation in Somaliland requires going beyond the debates over

hybridpeaceandstatebuilding.Itthusextendsinsignificantnewwaystheworkofkeytheorists

ofhybridityinpost-conflictstatebuildingsuchas(Walls,2009,WallsandKibble,2010,Hagmann

andPéclard,2010,Hoehne,2013)(reviewedinchaptertwo).Thefocusinexistingdebateson

theintersectionbetweenpeaceandstatebuilding,Iargued,canobscureratherthanilluminate

theurbangovernancedynamicsthatshapesegregationofcitiesinSomaliland.Thereisaneed

toadoptconceptsthatareaimedatcapturingthequalityofinteractionbetweenthepublicand

the state at city level so as to understand the making and unmaking of urban places in

Somali/land.Thisfocusonthecityisespeciallyimportantinthelightofalarmistprojectionsof

exponentialgrowthinSomaliland’scitypopulations(UN,2014,TheWorldFactbook,2015b)yet

thereisasignificantdearthofunderstandingofurbandynamicsandconflictsoverlandwithin

cities.

Inthisstudy,Ihaveusedtheconceptsoflegitimacy,trustandsegregationtomakesenseofthe

configurationandreconfigurationofHargeisaandtoexploreurbanlandconflicts.Tocapture

howthesetheoreticalargumentsarerootedinempiricaldynamicsofurbanconfigurationand

reconfiguration, I examined urban governance in Hargeisa with the aim of explaining how

segregationhasdevelopedovertime.Iapproachedthisanalysishistoricallyandadvocatedan

urbanethnographicapproach(chapterthree).Thestudy’sempiricaldiscussionbeganwithan

examinationofthehistoryofmunicipalgovernance/politics (chapter4). I thenzoomedinon

particularaspectsofurbangovernance suchas landadministrationandconflict adjudication

mechanisms(chaptersfiveandsix).Ifinallyexaminedspecificlandconflicts–aroundHargeisa

airport and military base - to show how the interaction between the state and the public

underminestrustandfostersurbansegregation(chapterssevenandeight).

Theoverallthesiswasguidedbythequestion:whatarethekeyhistoricalprocessesandrecent

socio-political dynamics underpinning Hargeisa’s spatial character as clan-based segregated

urbanspace?Iansweredthisquestionbyarguingthaturbangovernancewas,andstillremains,

209|P a g e

acrucial factor inunderstanding theprocessandpracticesunderpinning theemergenceand

perpetuationofsegregation.ThroughoutthethesisIarguedthattheinteractionbetweenthe

stateandthepeoplecanprovideimportantcluesinunderstandingHargeisa‛sspatialcharacter.

Imaintainedthatthepolitical,economicandsocialutilitiesofclanrelationshipsinfluencehow

people choose spaces in the city. For instance, theuseof kinship as ameansofnegotiating

accesstoservicesandsupportshowshowgovernancepracticesintersectwithsocialdynamics

in shaping the configuration and reconfiguration of urban spaces in the city.My analysis of

Hargeisagovernanceandspecialdynamicswasguidedbythefollowingsub-questions:

Inthefirstsub-question,Iasked:

• Howdothehistoricallyrootedhybridmunicipalpoliticsandthetopdownurban

landadministrationexplaintheconfigurationandreconfigurationofHargeisa’s

spatialcharacter?

Toanswerthis,Iexaminedthehistoryofurbangovernanceanditslinkwiththeemergenceand

perpetuationof urban segregation. I discussed the introductionof local governanceand the

urban development trajectory in Hargeisa over time (chapter four). I argued that urban

segregationinthecityisthespatialoutcomeoftheantagonisticinteractionbetweenrulerand

ruled over time: an interaction whose foundation was laid during the colonial period and

reinforced thereafter. In other words, regimes in Somalia continued the centralised

authoritarian urban governance practices inherited from the colonial administrations. I

thereforearguedthatsegregationcanbeattributedinitiallytothecolonialstate’scentralised

topdownandrepressiveurbangovernance,andthereaftertothepostcolonialstate’sfailureto

breakwith the past. Postcolonial authorities have not Instituted effective and accountable

controloverthearbitraryterritoriesinheritedfromtheimperialpowers,andremainunableto

deliverservicesinanequitablemannerbasedonnationalcitizenship.Thisinabilityreinforced

theneedforlocalisedbelongingbasedonclanasameanstonegotiatespaceinthecity.The

consequenceisthatmostpeopledevelopedatendencyoflocatingthemselvesinareaswhere

theycouldgetaccesstoservicesandsupport(rangingfromsocio-politicaltosocio-economic)

throughtheirclannetworks. Inotherwords,segregation inHargeisacanbeunderstoodasa

response to political, economic and security problems in the city, persisting because of the

state’s incompetence inmanagingpublicservices. In the few instancewherethestatemade

concertedeffortsinimprovingaccesstoservicesonanationalbasis,cosmopolitanspaceshave

210|P a g e

emergedwhere individuals’ choiceof residencewere ratherbasedon factorsother thanan

associationwithaclan.Iarguedthatthesebriefhistoricalepisodesinwhichthestatemadean

attempttochangethefactorsunderpinningtheclan-basedcharacterofcitieswereundoneby

thefactthatthestaterevertedtotheclannishgovernancepracticesfromwhichitclaimedto

havedeparted.

Tofurthergroundtheaboveargument,Ifocussedonurbanlandmanagement(chapterfive).I

argued that landmanagementpractices inSomalilandwereoftenunderpinnedby top-down

processes inbothcolonialandpostcolonialperiods.For instance, thecolonialadministrators

hadrarelyconsultedthepeoplenortheintermediarycustomaryinstitutionsabouturbanland

management. The underlying justifications for ignoring local opinion hinged on low-level

urbanisationandtheperceptionofSomalisasbeingtooignoranttocontributetomattersof

townplanning.Thistop-downapproachcontinuedalongthesamelinesduringthepostcolonial

periodasmanyoftheurbanlandmanagementpracticesandpoliciesremainedunchanged.The

fewattempts aimedat bringing about land reforms failed. Thepolicymakingprocesses and

practicesremainlargelyimposedfromabove.Forinstance,boththeNationalUrbanPlanning

BoardandtheNationalUrbanPlanningInstituteoperateabovethelocal.Thehighlycentralised

nature of policy making instruments make local authorities junior partners. This top-down

process and the inabilityof the state to consult people about theirurbandestiny shape the

persistently negative attitudes towards the state. Thus, urban segregation is the spatial

manifestationofthedwindlingtrustinthestate.Thecontinuationofthespatialsegregationof

Hargeisa resulted froma longhistoryof top-downurban landmanagementapproach,which

alsomarginalisesthepoor.Equally,Iarguedthattheremakingoftheurbanlandmanagement

regulatoryframeworkpost-conflictwascharacterisedbyweakinstitutions,whichfailedtomake

significantchangestothequalityofinteractionbetweenthestateandthepublic.

Inthesecondsub-question,Iasked:

• What are the drivers and dynamics of urban land accessibility, conflicts and

adjudicationandhowdotheyrelatetotrust/mistrustofthestateandthecity’s

patternofsegregation?

Toanswerthis, Ishowedthattheurban landconflicts inSomalilandareadjudicatedthrough

pluralinstitutions-statutory,traditionalandtoalesserextentIslamicinstitutions(chaptersix).

Themultiplicityofactorsinvolvedinconflictresolutionishowevercharacterisedbycompetition,

211|P a g e

complementarityandcoexistence.Therelationshipsamongthemarenotaccuratelycaptured

bytheideaofhybridity.Onewayinwhichtheinstitutionscomplementeachotheristhefact

thatthetraditionalinstitutionsareendorsedbythestatetomediatecasesthatitisunableor

unwillingtoresolvethroughthestatutorysystemforpoliticalorsecurityreasons.Insuchcases,

the traditional authorities fill the gap in the state’s inability to deal with conflict. In other

instances, however, the institutions contradict each other, as the traditional institutions

interferewithcasesinthestatutorysystemintheinterestoftheirparticularclans.Customary

institutionshavesuccessfullypositionedthemselvesasabetteralternative forresolving land

conflictsforanumberofreasons.Firstly,theyarecheaperthantheprotractedandexpensive

courtprocesseswhichrequirelegalrepresentation.Secondly,theyaremoretimeeffective,as

the judgments are reachedwithin a reasonable time, ranging fromoneday to twoor three

weeks.Thirdly,theirlevelofcomplianceisgreaterasthepartiesarerepresentedbykeyfigures

fromtheirfamilywhooverseecompliance.Hencemyargumentwasthattheclan-basedspatial

segregationofHargeisaispartlyalsoageographicalmanifestationofthestrugglebetweenthe

statutoryandcustomaryinstitutions,aspeoplehavedevelopedgreaterconfidenceinthelatter

andchoosealocationwithinthecitywheretheyareaccessible.

Thethirdsubquestionasked:

• Howdo people navigate the terrain of urban institutions and howdoes this

shapethemakingandremakingofurbanspaceinHargeisa?

Theinvestigationofthissub-questioninmanywayslayattheheartofthethesisandcross-cuts

itschapters,astheanswerhingesontheresorttoclananddisaffectionwithstateinstitutions

bothlocalandnational.Popularresponsestostateurbangovernancehavehelpedproducedthe

clanbasedspatialformthatIhavesoughttoexplainthroughout. Ishowedhowthispopular

disillusionwithstatemunicipalinstitutions’authoritarianism,lackofcapacityorcorruptpractice

wasreproducedatdifferentjuncturesinthecity’smunicipalhistory(chapterfour),andinthe

disputesoverlandbroughtbeforetheLandCommission,orwhichoccurredovertheairportand

militarybasewhere the statewasparty. When investigatingeithermunicipal elections, the

workingsoftheLandCommissionortheviolencethatflaredupoverthestate’sexpansionist

endeavoursattheairportandmilitarybase,myapproachdependedoninvestigatingHargeisa

residents’viewsandpracticesinrelationtostateinstitutionsandtheirimpactonurbanspace.

The city’s inhabitants’ resort to clan and greater confidence in customary institutions, the

efficacyofthelatterinsomeinstancesofconflictresolution,andtheprominentroleofAkilsand

212|P a g e

clan elders in mediating state practice at local level remain important in explaining the

persistenceofsegregationovertime.

Inthefinalsub-question,Iasked:

• Whatarethesecurityimplicationsofunresolvedurbanlandconflictsinthecity,

howdotheyinfluencestatelegitimacyandaffectthecity’sspatialcharacter?

Thethesisshowedhowthecontrolofpublicpropertiesandinfrastructureplaysanimportant

roleinthelegitimationofnewpoliticalorders.Thiswasparticularlytransparentinthedisputes

over landat theairportandmilitarybase (chapter sevenandeight).On theonehand, such

propertiesarethesitesinwhichstatevisibilityandeffectivenessisdemonstrated,whileonthe

othertheyarethesitesinwhichstatelegitimacyiscontested.Thisstrugglecanbestbeseenin

conflictswherethestate isat loggerheadswith local landowners,as inthecaseofboththe

airportandmilitarybase.Insuchconflicts,intermediarynon-stateinstitutionssuchastheAkils

and eldersmediate between the actors in the conflict.While peoplemay have leverage on

customary institutionswhendealingwithone another (chapter 6), the same cannotbe said

whenthestateisoneofthedisputants.Thisresultsinalegitimacystruggleinwhichthestate

seekspowersinheritedfrompriorregimesandthepublicregardsthisbehaviourascomparable

totheregimestheydeposed,creatingaconditioninwhichlegitimacyisseenthroughdifferent

lenses. Such legitimacy struggles shape attitudes of endearment towards clan identity and

reinforcethemannerinwhichpeoplemakedecisionsabouttheirchoicesofabode.Individuals

whoareconcernedaboutstateviolencearelikelytomaintainpropertiesinareaspredominantly

populatedbytheirclansoastomobilisepublicsupportandresourcesnecessaryforresisting

the state. In the case of the airport expansion, the resultwas violent resistance, death and

destructionofproperty.

Ihavealsoshownthatthestate’smanipulationofthestatutoryjudicialsystemlimitsthespace

availableforurbanlandconflictadjudicationswherethestateisoneoftheactorsintheconflict.

(ItisimportanttonotethattheurbanlandCommissioninHargeisadoesnotmediateconflicts

inwhichthestateisoneofthepartiesintheconflict,asexploredinchapter5).Thisreinforces

clanandidentitypoliticsasameansofmutualsupportagainstthestate.Violentencounters

betweenthestateandthepublicreflectthelimitedspacetoengagewiththestatethroughthe

current highly corrupt judicial system. This creates dire security consequences for a town

recovering from many years of poverty and civil war, which in turn cements the spatial

213|P a g e

segregationinthecityaspeoplecontinuetoseebenefitsinstayinginareaswhere–thanksto

a concentration of fellow clan members - they can resist the state more easily. While the

authoritiesfeartheescalationofconflictswiththepublic,seeingthisasoneofthemajorthreats

facingstatestabilityingeneralandurbanplaces,inparticular,theyfailtocomeupwithpolicies

thatenabletheamicablemediationandresolutionofconflicts.Thehighrateofunemployment

amongtheyouthandthestate’simpunityaboutthewayinwhichitmanagesconflictscanresult

inamajorshocktothealreadyfragileurbansecurityinHargeisa,andhencefurtherentrench

urbansegregation.

Towrapupmyargument,itisimportanttorememberthatthecurrentfocusofstatebuilding

debates in Somali/land are concentrated at the national and subnational level (i.e., paying

attentiontoregionalratherthanurbancontexts).Keyinthesedebatesarethediscussionson

the intersection between peace and state- building. These have obscured rather than

illuminatedtheurbangovernancedynamicsthatshapesegregationofcitiesinSomaliland.The

hybridnationalorder,onwhichmuchofthedebateisfocused,failedtoshiftthecountryaway

from pastmalpractices (such as corruption, cronyism and nepotismwhere one’s economic,

politicalandsocialbelonging liesat theheartofaccess toservices).Thiscementedtheclan-

basedspatialcharactersofurbanspacesinSomaliland.Inotherwords,ashybridgovernance

failedtopresentthepeoplewithanalternativeformofbelongingbasedonaspirationsbeyond

clan. Rather, social networks based on clan remain prevalent in segregated urban spaces,

reinforcing the clan as a primeway inwhich people seek to negotiate relations and service

deliverywiththeformalstateinstitutions.

This thesis thus provides greater understandings of the plurality of urban governance

institutions, land conflicts, lack of legitimacy and their historical roots, providing important

informationnotonlytofilgapsintheacademicliteratureonSomalistudies,butalsoforallthose

engagedwithtryingtobuildaccountableurbaninstitutions,orcitizenstryingtoholdthemto

account.Thestudyhopedtoredressadearthofattentiontokeyurbanissues.Thescaleofurban

land conflicts necessitated academic enquiry, particularly to redress their neglected spatial

aspect.Moreover,therapidityofurbanisationdemandedgreaterunderstandingoftheevents,

policies,andhistoricalepisodesthathaveshapedcurrenttrendsofurbanforminthecountry,

andarelikelyalsotoinfluencefuturedynamics.Ihopetohavebeguntorectifythelacunaof

understandingaboutcontrolsoverurbanspaceandpopularresponsestocityauthorities,which

begged for urban level academic enquiry to complement the existing state-building and

governancedebates inSomaliland. Finally, thestudyprovidesan importantbasis forfurther

214|P a g e

researchontherelationshipbetweenspatialandsocio-economic trends in theconfiguration

andreconfigurationofurbanspacesinSomali/land.Littleisknown,forexampleaboutthelink

betweenurbanandruralcontextsandtheirinterdependencies,migrationanddiaspora,orhow

theinformalurbaneconomycontributestothemakingandremakingofurbanspaces.Thethesis

thus ends in the hope that this initial investigation of urban governance, land conflicts and

segregationinHargeisaandtheinsightsithasprovidedintourbanspatialformpastandpresent

canleadontonewresearchthatcandeepenunderstandingofSomaliland’scitiesandaccessto

land,justiceandsecuritywithinthem.

As shown in the restof the thesis, segregatedurban spaces canhavemajor implications for

urban governance in Somaliland. At the heart of these implications are the issues of state

legitimacy and trust. The two are interdependent: for state legitimacy cannot be achieved

withoutlayingthefoundationforpublictrustinthestate.TheSomalistate-buildingprocesses

hassofar failedtowinthetrustofthepublic, resulting intheemergence,developmentand

perpetuation of survival mechanisms (at the front of which stand segregation) aimed at

negotiating life in unfavourable spaces governed by untrusted state. On the one hand,

segregationmight enable newmigrants to negotiate space (s) in the city through their clan

networks andenabledisadvantaged communities tomobilisepeopleand resources to resist

against government policies which do not reflect their interests. But on the other hand,

segregated urban spaces might undermine security and political stability as they might be

exploitedbyindividuals(mainlyelites)hidingbehindclanidentityforpersonal,economicand

politicalgains.

Having argued throughout the thesis that urban governance contributed significantly to the

segregationinHargeisa,itisalsoimportanttonotethaturbangovernancehasthepotentialof

undoingsuchsegregationinthecity.Thisissoduetothefactthatattheheartoftheresidents’

tendencytolocatethemselvesinanareapopulatedbytheirownclanisthelackoftrustforthe

stateinstitutions.Ithereforearguethatthecreationofajust,equitable,efficient,andeffective

servicedeliverysystemislikelytobringaboutachangeinhowurbanspacesareorganisedin

Somalicities.Inotherwords,thestatehastobehaveinamannerwhichcanencouragepeople

toattachgreaterimportancetonationalcitizenshipoverclancitizenship.Stepsthatcouldbe

takenincludetheprovisionofunmediatedservicedeliverywherecitizensareabletogetaccess

to public services without beingmediated by intermediary institutions or persons. This will

reducethesignificanceandincentiveofonelocatinghim/herselfinaneighbourhoodpopulated

bytheirkinsmenandhencecosmopolitanspacesarelikelytoemerge.

215|P a g e

Thisresearchwasmainlyconcernedwithshowingthehithertoun-researchedurbangeography

ofHargeisa.Theaimwasnottocomparetheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofsegregatedforms

ofurbansettlements.Thiscouldbethesubjectofafutureresearchintotheurbangeographyof

SomalicitiesingeneralandHargeisainparticular.

216|P a g e

BIBLIOGRAPHY

————————————————————

Abdile,M.(2012)'CustomaryDisputeResolutioninSomalia',AfricanConflict&PeacebuildingReview,2,pp.87-110.

Abu-Lughold,J.andRace,S.2007.RiotsinChicago,NewYork,andLosAngeles.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

ACI(2009)PolicyandRecommendedPracticesHandbook:AirportsCouncilInternational.

Adam,H.M.(1991)'CrisisinSomalia:Prospectsforthefuture',PeaceReview,3,pp.4-9.

Aidid, S. (2015) Can the Somali Speak? #CadaanStudies: Africa is a Country. Available at:http://africasacountry.com/2015/03/can-the-somali-speak-cadaanstudies/ (Accessed:22December,2015).

Akwei, C., Tsamenyi, M. and Sa'id, H. (2012) 'Deregulation, competition, and performancemeasurementofanAfricanairport:ThecaseofKotokainternationalairportofGhana',ThunderbirdInternationalBusinessReview,54(4),pp.537-549.

Ali, N. M. (2014) 'Somaliland Security at the Crossroads: Pitfalls and Potentials', AmericanInternationalJournalofContemporaryResearch,4(7),pp.98-108.

Anas, A. (2006) 'Ethnic segregation and ghettos', in Arnott, R.J. & McMillen, D.P. (eds.) Acompaniontourbaneconomics.NewYork:BlackwellPublishing,pp.536-544.

Andersen,L.R.2011.Securitysectorreformandthedilemmasofliberalpeacebuilding.DanishInstituteforInternationalStudiesWorkingPaper2011:31:Copenhagen.

APD(2007)Nomore‘GrassgrownbytheSpear’:AddressingLand-basedConflictsinSomaliland,Hargeisa:AcademyforPeaceandDevelopment.

APD(2008)AddressingLand-basedConflictsinSomalilandandAfghanistan,Hargeisa:AcademyforPeaceandDevelopment.

APD(2010)ContestedUrbanLand:ApproachingLandManagementandLand-basedConflictsinUrbanSomaliland,Hargeisa:AcademyforPeaceandDevelopment.

Auyero, J. and Jensen, K. (2015) 'For Political Ethnographies of Urban Marginality', City &Community,14(4),pp.359-363.

Bakonyi,J.(2013)'Authorityandadministrationbeyondthestate:localgovernanceinsouthernSomalia,1995–2006',JournalofEasternAfricanStudies,7(2),pp.272-290.

Balbo,M. and Navez-Bouchanine, F. (1995) 'Urban fragmentation as a research hypothesis:Rabat-Salécasestudy',HabitatInternational,19(4),pp.571-582.

217|P a g e

Balthasar,D.(2012)State-MakinginSomaliaandSomaliland:UnderstandingWar,NationalismandStateTrajectoriesasProcessesofInstitutionalandSocio-CognitiveStandardization.DoctorofPhilosophy,LondonSchoolofEconomics.

Balthasar,D.(2013)'Somaliland'sbestkeptsecret:shrewdpoliticsandwarprojectsasmeansofstate-making',JournalofEasternAfricanStudies,7(2),pp.218-238.

Bank, L. and Southall, R. (1996) 'Traditional Leaders in South Africa’s New Democracy', TheJournalofLegalPluralismandUnofficialLaw,28(37-38),pp.407-430.

Barry,M.andBruyas,F. (2009) 'FormulationofLandAdministrationStrategy inPost-ConflictSomaliland',SurveyingandLandInformationScience,69(1),pp.39-52.

Battersby,J.(2004)'CapeTown’sModelCschools:Desegregatedanddesegregatingspaces?',UrbanForum,15(3),pp.279-291.

BBC Somali (2012) 7 ayaa lagu dilay dagaal ka dhacay Hargeysa. Available at:http://www.bbc.com/somali/war/2012/05/120515_somaliland_dagaal.shtml(Accessed:Feberuary2,2015).

BBC World (2012) Somaliland military court sentences 17 civilians to die. Available at:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18101584(Accessed:Feberuary28,2014).

Belaunde, S., Cortes, M., Hogstad, J., Ku, E., Nascimento, K. and Trzcinski, L. (2010) 'Land,Legitimacy and Governance in Cameroon', Institute for Research and Debate onGovernance.

Bellina,S.,Darbon,D.,Eriksen,S.S.andSending,O.J.(2009)'Thelegitimacyofthestateinfragilesituations',Reportprepared for theOECDDAC InternationalNetworkonConflictandFragility.

Bennett, J., Ainslie, A. and Davis, J. (2010) 'Fenced in: Common property struggles in themanagementofcommunalrangelandsincentralEasternCapeProvince,SouthAfrica',LandUsePolicy,27(2),pp.340-350.

Berbera News (2012)Wasiirka Gaashaan-dhigga iyo Maayerka Caasimadda oo ka hadlaykhasaaraha Iska hor-imaad ka dhacay Xero Ciidan oo Hargeysa ah. Available at:http://www.berberanews.com/wgaashaan-dhiga-iyo-maayarka-hargeysa-oo-ka-hadlay-khasaarihii-iska-hor-imaad-ka-dhacay-xero-ciidan/ (Accessed: Feberuary 28,2014).

Berry,S.(2007)'MarginalGains,MarketValues,andHistory',AfricanStudiesReview,50,pp.57-70.

Besteman,C.1990.LandtenureintheMiddleJubba:customarytenureandtheeffectoflandregistration.LandTenureCenterResearchPaper104:Wisconsin-Madison.

Besteman,C.(1998)'PrimordialistBlinders:AReplytoI.M.Lewis',CulturalAnthropology,13(1),pp.109-120.

218|P a g e

Besteman, C. and Roth, M. (1988) Land Tenure in the Middle Jubba: Issues and PolicyRecommendations:LandTenureCenter,UniversityofWisconsin.

Besteman,C.L.(1991)Landtenure,socialpower,andthelegacyofslaveryinsouthernSomalia.TheUniversity of Arizona. [Online] Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185505(Accessed:August13,2015).

Bjork, S. (2007) 'Modernity meets clan: Cultural intimacy in the Somali diaspora', FromMogadishutoDixon:TheSomaliDiasporainaGlobalContext.Trenton,NJ:RedSea.

Boege,V.,Brown,A.,Clements,K.andNolan,A.2008.OnHybridPoliticalOrdersandEmergingStates: State Formation in the Context of ‛Fragility’. . Berghof Research Center forConstructiveConflictManagemenWorkingPaperinForthcomingDialogueNo8.

Boege,V.,Brown,A.,Clements,K.andNolan,A.(2009a)'BuildingPeaceandPoliticalCommunityinHybridPoliticalOrders',InternationalPeacekeeping,16(5),pp.599-615.

Boege,V.,Brown,M.A.andClements,K.P.(2009b)'HybridPoliticalOrders,NotFragileStates',PeaceReview,21(1),pp.13-21.

Borsdorf,A.andHidalgo,R.(2009)'TheFragmentedCityChangingPatternsinLatinAmericanCities',TheUrbanReinventorsOnlineJournal,9(3),pp.1-18.

Bradbury, M. (2003) 'Living with Statelessness: the Somali road to development', Conflict,securityanddevelopment,3(1),pp.7-25.

Bradbury,M.(2008)BecomingSomaliland.London:JamesCurrey.

Bradbury,M.,Abokor,A.Y.andYusuf,H.A.(2003)'Somaliland:choosingpoliticsoverviolence',ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy,30(97),pp.455-478.

Briggs,P.(2012)SomalilandwithAddisAbabaandEasternEthiopia.BradtTravelGuides.

British SomalilandProtectorate (1945)ReportonGeneral SurveyofBritish Somaliland,1944.Hargeisa:BritishSomalilandProtectorate.

British Somaliland Protectorate (1951) Laws enacted during 1950-1952. Hargeisa: BritishSomalilandProtectorate.

BritishSomalilandProtectorate(1954)AnnualReviewoftheDevelopmentPlan,1953.Hargeisa:BritishSomalilandProtectorate.

British SomalilandProtectorate (1958)Annual ReviewofDevelopment, 1957-1958. Hargeisa:BritishSomalilandProtectorate.

Bruyas,F.(2006)SomalilandandPuntlandStateofSomalia:TheLandLegalFrameworkSituationAnalysis,Nairobi:UnitedNationsHumanSettlementProgramme.

219|P a g e

Bryden, M. (1994a) Report on mission to Somaliland. Available at:http://www.africa.upenn.edu/eue_web/som_dec.htm(Accessed:01March2016).

Bryden, M. (1994b) Somaliland: Going It Alone. Interview. Africa Report. Available at:http://www.mbali.info/doc173.htm(Accessed:12March2016).

Buckley,M. (2013) 'ThePriorityof Legitimacy in TimesofPolitical Transition',HumanRightsReview,14(4),pp.327-345.

Buzan,B.(2008)People,States&Fear:AnAgendaforInternationalSecurityStudiesinthePost-ColdWarEra.ECPRPress.

Cobb,J.S.andHoang,K.K.(2015)'Protagonist-DrivenUrbanEthnography',City&Community,14(4),pp.348-351.

Contini,P.(1967) 'IntegrationofLegalSystemsintheSomaliRepublic',TheInternationalandComparativeLawQuarterly,16(4),pp.1088-1105.

Copp,D.(1999)'Theideaofalegitimatestate',Philosophy&PublicAffairs,28(1),pp.3-45.

Coutard,O.(2008)'Placingsplinteringurbanism:Introduction',Geoforum,39(6),pp.1815-1820.

Dasgupta,P.(1992)'TrustasaCommodity',inGambetta,D.(ed.)Trust:MakingandBreakingCooperativeRelations.Cambridge:BasilBlackwell.

Dauskardt, R., P A (1993) 'Reconstructing SouthAfrican Cities: Contemporary Strategies andProcessesintheUrbanCore',GeoJournal,30(1),pp.9-20.

DDG(2009)CommunitySafetyandSmallArms inSomaliland,Copenhagen:DanishDeminingGroup.

DemocraticRepublicofSomalia,UrbanLandDistributionLaw(1973)GovernmentofDemocraticRepublicofSomalia.

Democratic Republic of Somalia,Urban Land Distribution Law - as amended in 1980 (1980)GovernmentofDemocraticRepublicofSomalia.

Demographia (2016) Demographia World Urban Areas. Available at:http://www.demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf(Accessed:July1,2016).

DFID (2007) Land: Better access and secure rights for poor people, London: Department forInternationalDevelopment.

Drysdale,J.(2001)WhateverhappenedtoSomalia?:HAAN.

DS (2008) Housing , Land and Property Rights in the South Central Somalia: PreliminaryAssessmentandProposedStrategiesforExpandedApproaches:DisplacementSolutions.

220|P a g e

Dunn,J.(1992)'TrustandPoliticalAgency', inGambetta,D.(ed.)Trust:MakingandBreakingCooperativeRelations.Cambridge:BasilBlackwell.

ESRC(2010)FrameworkforResearchEthics.London:EconomicandSocialResearchCouncil.

Etzioni,A.(2011)'OnCommunitarianandGlobalSourcesofLegitimacy',TheReviewofPolitics,73(1),pp.105-122.

Faarax,C.M.(2012a)CaliWaran-caddeookahadlayweerarkiidableyhubaysanikuqaadeenfadhiisin ciidan. Available at: http://www.somaliland.org/2012/05/17/cali-waran-cadde-oo-ka-hadlay-weerarkii-dabley-hubaysani-ku-qaadeen-fadhiisin-ciidan/(Accessed:Feberuary28,2014).

Faarax,C.M.(2012b)WasiirroIyoTaliyeyaashaqarankaiyoBooliskaootafaasiilkabixiyayiskahor imaadkii maanta. Available at: http://www.somaliland.org/2012/05/15/wasiirro-iyo-taliyeyaasha-qaranka-iyo-booliska-oo-tafaasiil-ka-bixiyay-iska-hor-imaadkii-maanta/(Accessed:Feberuary28,2014).

Farah,A.Y.andLewis,I.M.(1997)'MakingpeaceinSomaliland',Cahiersd'étudesafricaines,pp.349-377.

Farah,M.H.undatedSummarypaperonlegalreviewanddevelopmentofoptionsforlandpolicydevelopment and institutionalisation of the land and urban management service-provider.

Farah,M.H.andAli,N.M.undated.FinalStudyonLandOwnershipLawandPracticeinUrbanAreas-ACaseStudyinSomaliland.

FOHS(1919)BritishSomalilandandSokotra.London:ForeignOfficeHistoricalSection.

Frederiksen, T. (2014) 'Authorizing the “Natives”: Governmentality, Dispossession, and theContradictions of Rule in Colonial Zambia', Annals of the Association of AmericanGeographers,104(6),pp.1273-1290.

Fukuyama,F.(2004a)'TheImperativeofState-Building',JournalofDemocracy,15,pp.17-31.

Fukuyama,F.2004b.State-Building:GovernanceandWorldOrderinthe21stCentury.CornellUniversityPress.

Gambetta,D.(1992)'CanWeTrustTrust?', inGambetta,D.(ed.)Trust:MakingandBreakingCooperativeRelations.Cambridge:BasilBlackwell.

Gandrup,T.(2014)AttheBorderofSovereignty::AnAnthropologicalStudyofSomalilandStateFormation Investigated through the of Case of Hargeisa Egal International AirportMasterofArts,RoskildeUniversity.

Ganzglass, M. R. (1996) 'The restoration of the Somali justice system', InternationalPeacekeeping,3,pp.113-138.

221|P a g e

Gilkes,P.(1989)'Somalia:Conflictswithinandagainstthemilitaryregime'.

Gilkes,P.(1999)Somalia/Somaliland:isthereawayforward?

Gilley,B.(2006)'Thedeterminantsofstatelegitimacy:Resultsfor72countries',Internationalpoliticalsciencereview,27(1),pp.47-71.

Gokah,T.(2006)'Thenaïveresearcher:DoingsocialresearchinAfrica',InternationalJournalofSocialResearchMethodology,9(1),pp.61-73.

Goodhand, J. (2000) 'Research in conflict zones: ethics andaccountability',ForcedMigrationReview,8,pp.12-15.

Goodstein, J. D. and Velamuri, S. R. (2009) 'States, Power, Legitimacy, and MaintainingInstitutional Control: The Battle for Private Sector Telecommunication Services inZimbabwe',OrganizationStudies,30(5),pp.489-508.

Graham, S. and Marvin, S. (2001) Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures,TechnologicalMobilitiesandtheUrbanCondition.Routledge.

Gubrium, J. F. (2007) 'Urban Ethnography of the 1920s Working Girl', Gender, Work &Organization,14(3),pp.232-258.

Gulaid,M.A.undated.AnatomyofPerseverance.

Gundel,J. (2006)Thepredicamentofthe‘Oday’:Theroleoftraditionalstructures insecurity,rights, lawanddevelopment in Somalia,Nairobi:DanishRefugeeCouncil andOxfamNovib.

Gupta,A.(1995)'Blurredboundaries:thediscourseofcorruption,thecultureofpolitics,andtheimaginedstate',Americanethnologist,22(2),pp.375-402.

Gupta,A.andSharma,A.(2006)'Globalizationandpostcolonialstates',Currentanthropology,47(2),pp.277-307.

HaatufNews(2012a)'MaxkamadaCiidankaQarankaOoXukunDilIyoXabsiDaa’inKuRiday22Qof Oo Weerar Ku Qaaday Xero Ciidan', Haatuf Available at:http://www.haatuf.net/2012files/1208.html(Accessed:March4,2015).

HaatufNews(2012b)'Milatraigaiyobileyskaoosoobandhigayhubkiilagusooweerarayxeradaciidanka qaranka', Haatuf Available at: http://www.haatuf.net/2012files/1193.html(Accessed:March4,2015).

Hagmann,T. 'Reclaiming sovereignty: landconflicts,property restitutionandcityplanning inHargeisa,Somaliland',UrbanProperty,GovernanceandCitizenshipintheGlobalSouthUniversityofCopenhagen,23-26June.

Hagmann,T.andHoehne,M.V.(2009)'Failuresofthestatefailuredebate:EvidencefromtheSomaliterritories',JournalofInternationalDevelopment,21(1),pp.42-57.

222|P a g e

Hagmann,T.andPéclard,D.(2010)'NegotiatingStatehood:DynamicsofPowerandDominationinAfrica',DevelopmentandChange,41(4),pp.539-562.

Hammond, L. (2013) Safety, Security and Socio-Economic Wellbeing in Somaliland, London:SOAS,UniversityofLondon.

Hammond, L. (2014) 'History, Overview, Trends and Issues in Major Somali RefugeeDisplacements in the Near Region (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Yemen)',Bildhaan:AnInternationalJournalofSomaliStudies,13(1),pp.7.

Harrison,P.,Huchzermeyer,M.andMayekiso,M.(2003)ConfrontingFragmentation:HousingandUrbanDevelopmentinaDemocratisingSociety.UniversityofCapeTownPress.

Hasan, Y. M. (2012) Somaliland: Army to Review Death Sentences Imposed on Civilians:Somaliland Sun. Available at:http://somalilandsun.com/index.php/politics/government/983-somaliland-army-to-review-death-sentences-imposed-on-civilians.

Hashi,A.(2005)'Theimplicationsoftraditionalleadership,“Guurti”andothernon-stateactorsinlocalgovernanceinSomaliland',WorldBank,pp.405-422.

Hassan,A.I.(2012)Somaliland:ProspectsforEconomicDevelopmentandFuturePrioritiesforInvestment. Available at: http://www.somalilandfoundation.com/home/?p=827(Accessed:01March2016).

Hassan,M.(2015)SendingRemittanceasTransnationalKinshipPractices:ACaseStudyofSomaliRefugeesinLondon.DoctorofPhilosophy,GoldsmithsCollege,UniversityofLondon.

Hersi,M.F. (2009) 'GlobaLex -ResearchGuideto theSomalilandLegalSystem'.Availableat:http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/somaliland.htm (Accessed: September 30,2013).

Hertz, R. and Imber, J. B. (1993) 'Fieldwork in elite settings: An introduction', Journal ofContemporaryEthnography,22(1),pp.3-6.

Hess,R.L.(1964)'The‘madMullah’andnorthernSomalia',TheJournalofAfricanHistory,5(03),pp.415-433.

HM (2010) District participatory planning and budgeting process: district developmentframework:HargeisaMunicipality.

Hoehne,M. (2015)MarkusHoehne:Criticalwhiteness in Somali studiesandhow to improveanalysesofSomaliaffairs-SahanJournal.Availableat:http://sahanjournal.com/oped-critical-whiteness-somali-studies-improve-analyses-somali-affairs/ (Accessed: 22December,2015).

Hoehne,M.V. (2009) 'Mimesis andMimicry inDynamics of State and Identity Formation inNorthernSomalia',Africa,79(02),pp.252-281.

223|P a g e

Hoehne,M.V.(2011)Noeasywayout:TraditionalauthoritiesinSomalilandandthelimitsofhybridpoliticalorders.DIISWorkingPaper.

Hoehne,M.V.(2013)'Limitsofhybridpoliticalorders:thecaseofSomaliland',JournalofEasternAfricanStudies,7(2),pp.199-217.

Hoffman,K. andKirk, T. 2013.Public authority and theprovisionofpublic goods in conflict-affectedandtransitioningregions.JusticeandSecurityResearchProgrammeWorkingPaper7:London.

Huntington,S.P.(2006)Politicalorderinchangingsocieties.YaleUniversityPress.

Hussein, K. A. (2013) Beeraleyda Deegaanka Uubaale Waqooyi Ee Dulleedka MadaarkaHargeysaOoCabashoXooganKaMuujiyeyDhulkoodiiOoAyXukuumaduSiBadheedhaUla Wareegayso. Available at: http://qumannews.com/articles/225/Beeraleyda-Deegaanka-Uubaale-Waqooyi-Ee-Dulleedka-Madaarka-Hargeysa-Oo-Cabasho-Xoogan-Ka-Muujiyey-Dhulkoodii-Oo-Ay-Xukuumadu-Si-Badheedha-Uga-Wareegayso-Kana-Digay-Khasaare-Halkaas-Ka-Dhaca.

Hutchison,M.L.andJohnson,K.(2011)'Capacitytotrust?Institutionalcapacity,conflict,andpoliticaltrustinAfrica,2000–2005',JournalofPeaceResearch,48(6),pp.737-752.

Hyndman,J.(2001)'TheFieldasHereandNow,NotThereandThen',GeographicalReview,91,pp.262-272.

ICAO (1944)Convention on international civil aviation,Montreal: International Civil AviationOrganization.Availableat:http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdf(Accessed:18February2016).

ICAO (1974) The Convention on International Civil Aviation: Annexes 1 to 18, Montreal:International Civil Aviation Organization. Available at:http://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/nationalitymarks/annexes_booklet_en.pdf(Accessed:18February2016).

ICAO (2003)Aeronautical InformationServicesManual,Montreal: InternationalCivilAviationOrganization. Available at:http://www.icao.int/NACC/Documents/Meetings/2014/ECARAIM/REF09-Doc8126.pdf(Accessed:18February2016).

ICAO (2005) Runway Safety Toolkit, Montreal: International Civil Aviation Organization.Availableat:http://www.icao.int/safety/runwaysafety/pages/rnwytlkt.aspx(Accessed:18February2016).

ICAO (2006) Aircraft Operations: Construction of Visual and Instrument Flight Procedure,Montreal: International Civil Aviation Organization. Available at:http://code7700.com/pdfs/icao_doc_8168_vol2.pdf(Accessed:18February2016).

ICAO (2013a) 2014–2016 Global Aviation Safety Plan, Montreal: International Civil AviationOrganization. Available at:

224|P a g e

http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/10004_cons_en.pdf (Accessed: 18February2016).

ICAO(2013b)AirportsEconomicsManual,Montreal: InternationalCivilAviationOrganization.Available at: http://www.icao.int/sustainability/documents/doc9562_en.pdf(Accessed:18February2016).

ICAO (2013c) Safety Management Manual (SMM), Montreal: International Civil AviationOrganization. Available at:http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/10004_cons_en.pdf (Accessed: 18February2016).

ICAO (2014)Airport servicesmanualpart1:Rescueand fire fighting,Montreal: InternationalCivilAviationOrganization.Availableat:http://www.icao.int/safety/pages/rescue-fire-fighting.aspx(Accessed:18February2016).

Irons,R. (2013)Churchilland theMadMullahofSomaliland:betrayaland redemption1899-1921Barnsley:Pen&SwordMilitary.

Jeng,A.(2014)'TransitionalJusticeandPostconflictReconstructioninSomalia:TheRoleoftheAfricanUnionandPointersProvidedbyIt',NortheastAfricanStudies,14(2),pp.45-76.

Johnson,K.andHutchison,M.(2012)'Hybridity,PoliticalOrderandLegitimacy:ExamplesfromNigeria',JournalofPeacebuilding&Development,7(2),pp.37-52.

K’Akumu, O. A. and Olima, W. H. (2007) 'The dynamics and implications of residentialsegregationinNairobi',HabitatInternational,31(1),pp.87-99.

Kaplan,D.H.andDouzet,F.(2011)'ResearchinethnicsegregationIII:Segregationoutcomes',UrbanGeography,32(4),pp.589-605.

Kaplan, D. H. andWoodhouse, K. (2005) 'Research in ethnic segregation II: Measurements,categoriesandmeanings',UrbanGeography,26(8),pp.737-745.

Kapteijns,L.(2004)'IMLewisandSomaliclanship:Acritique',NortheastAfricanStudies,11(1),pp.1-23.

King, A., Mohamed, A. M. and Addou, S. I. (2003) Hargeisa Urban Household EconomyAssessment,Nairobi:FEWSNET,FAO.

Kooy,M.andBakker,K.(2008)'Splinterednetworks:ThecolonialandcontemporarywatersofJakarta',Geoforum,39(6),pp.1843-1858.

Laurence,M.andThomas,C.(2010)TheProphet'sCamelBell.McClelland&Stewart.

LeSage,A.(2011)'StatelessjusticeinSomalia:Formalandinformalruleoflawinitiatives'.

225|P a g e

Lemay-Hébert,N.(2009)'StatebuildingwithoutNation-building?Legitimacy,StateFailureandtheLimitsof the InstitutionalistApproach', Journalof InterventionandStatebuilding,3(1),pp.21-45.

Lewinson,A. S. (2007) 'ViewingpostcolonialDares Salaam,Tanzania through civic spaces: aquestionofclass',AfricanIdentities,5(2),pp.199-215.

Lewis,I.M.(1955)'SufisminSomaliland:AStudyinTribalIslam',BulletinoftheSchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies,17(03),pp.581-602.

Lewis,I.M.(1958)'ClanshipandcontractinnorthernSomaliland',JournaloftheInternationalAfricanInstitute,29,pp.274-293.

Lewis,I.M.(1961)Apastoraldemocracy:astudyofpastoralismandpoliticsamongtheNorthernSomalioftheHornofAfrica.O.U.P.

Lewis, I.M. (1989) 'TheOgadenand theFragilityofSomaliSegmentaryNationalism',AfricanAffairs,88,pp.573-579.

Lewis,I.M.(1993)'MisunderstandingtheSomalicrisis',AnthropologyToday,9(4),pp.1-3.

Lewis, I. M. (1998) 'Doing Violence to Ethnography: A Response to Catherine Besteman's"RepresentingViolence and'Othering'Somalia"',Cultural anthropology, 13(1), pp. 100-108.

Lewis,I.M.(2004)'VisibleandInvisibleDifferences:TheSomaliParadox',Africa:JournaloftheInternationalAfricanInstitute,74(4),pp.489-515.

Lewis,I.M.(2008a)UnderstandingSomaliaandSomaliland:culture,history,society.London:Hurst&Co.

Lewis,I.M.(2008b)UnderstandingSomaliaandSomaliland:Culture,History,Society.ColumbiaUniversityPress.

Lewis, I.M.andMayall, J. (1995) 'AStudyofDecentralisedPoliticalStructuresforSomalia:AMenuofOptions',London:TheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience.

Lieberherr,E.'Theroleofthroughputintheinput-outputlegitimacydebate:InsightsfrompublicandprivategovernancemodesintheSwissand'.

Lindley, A. 2009. LeavingMogadishu: TheWar on Terror andDisplacementDynamics in theSomaliRegions.MICROCONResearchWorkingPaper15.

Little,P.(2003)Somalia:economywithoutstate.Indiana:IndianaUniversityPress.

Luhmann,N.(1992)'Familiarity,Confidence,Trust:ProblemsandAlternatives',inGambetta,D.(ed.)Trust:MakingandBreakingCooperativeRelations.Cambridge:BasilBlackwell.

226|P a g e

Luling,V. (2006) 'Genealogyastheory,genealogyastool:aspectsofSomali ‘clanship’',SocialIdentities,12(4),pp.471-485.

Lund,C. (1997) 'Legitimacy, land&democracy inNiger',ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy,24(71),pp.99-112.

Lund,C.(2006)'TwilightInstitutions:PublicAuthorityandLocalPoliticsinAfrica',DevelopmentandChange,37(4),pp.685-705.

Macoloo,G.(1998)'TherelevanceofKenya'surbansettlementpoliciesforIndependentSouthAfrica',SouthAfricanGeographicalJournal,80(2),pp.81-85.

Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of LateColonialism.NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Mapsofworld(2014)MapofHargeisa.SanJose:MapXL.

Massey,D.S.andDenton,N.A.(1988)'Thedimensionsofresidentialsegregation',Socialforces,67(2),pp.281-315.

Mbembe,J.A.(2004)'AestheticsofSuperfluity',PublicCulture,16(3),pp.373-405.

MCAAT (2012 ) Somaliland’s Civil Aviation: A Gateway to Socio-economic Recovery &Development,BriefonSomaliland’sAirports:MinistryofCivilAviationandAirTransport.

MCAAT (2016)“Qorshahayguwaxaweeye inMadaarkaCigaal InternationalAirportuunoqoGarooniskuxidhaGeeskaAfricaoodhan,hadaytahayAlaabiyoRakaaba,”MinistryofAviation and Air Transport. Available at: http://www.slaviation.org/index.php/285-qorshahaygu-waxa-weeye-in-madaarka-cigaal-international-airport-uu-noqo-garoon-isku-xidha-geeska-africa-oo-dhan-haday-tahay-alaab-iyo-rakaaba (Accessed: 01March2016).

McAuslan,P.(2006)'Legalpluralismasapolicyoption:Isitdesirable?Isitdoable',inCAPRI(ed.)LandRightsforAfricanDevelopment:Vol.PolicyBriefs.Washington,DC:CAPRI,pp.9-10.

Mead, I. (2012)Siilanyo’sDebacle inhis ‟quusta call”and theHargeisakillings.Availableat:http://www.longlivesomaliland.com/Siilanyos Debacle in his Quusta call and theHargeisakillings.htm(Accessed:Feberuary28,2014).

Menkhaus,K. (2003) 'State collapse inSomalia: Second thoughts',ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy,30(97),pp.405-422.

Menkhaus,K. 'Governance intheHinterlandofAfrica’sWeakStates:TowardaTheoryoftheMediated State'. American Political Science Association Annual Conference,Philadelphia.,2006.

Menkhaus,K.J.(2006b)'GovernancewithoutGovernmentinSomalia:Spoilers,StateBuilding,andthePoliticsofCoping',InternationalSecurity,31(3),pp.74-106.

227|P a g e

Author(undated)AnanalyticalframeworkforurbanfragmentationanalysisintheGlobalSouthcity.Questioningurbanplanningpracticesthroughaninstitutionalapproach.

Millman,B.(2013)BritishSomaliland:AnAdministrativeHistory,1920-1960.Taylor&Francis.

Mirre,H.(2015)Somalithoughtleadersandtheinadequacyofwhitecolonialscholarship:SahanJournal. Available at: http://sahanjournal.com/cadaanstudies-white-colonial-scholarship/(Accessed:22December,2015).

MNPD (2011) Somaliland National Vision 2030. Hargeisa:Ministry of National Planning andDevelopment,RepublicofSomaliland.

MNPD(2012)SomalilandNationalDevelopmentPlan(NDP)2012–2016.Hargeisa:MinistryofNationalPlanningandDevelopment,RepublicofSomaliland.

Moehler,D.C.2005.Freeandfairorfraudulentandforged:electionsandlegitimacyinAfrica.AfrobarometerWorkingPaper55:CapeTown.

Mohamed,A.D.andLoewenthal,D.(2009)'ResearchReflections',JournalofEthicsinMentalHealth,4(1),pp.1-6.

Mohamed,J.(1996)ConstructingcolonialhegemonyintheSomalilandProtectorate,1941-1960.DoctorofPhilosophy,UniversityofToronto.

Mohamed,J.(2002a)'TheEvilsofLocustBait:PopularNationalismDuringthe1945AntiLocustControlRebellioninColonialSomaliland',Past&Present,174(1),pp.184-216.

Mohamed, J. (2002b) 'ImperialPoliciesandNationalism inTheDecolonizationofSomaliland,1954-1960',TheEnglishHistoricalReview,117(474),pp.1177-1203.

Mohamed, J. (2004) 'The Political Ecology of Colonial Somaliland', Africa: Journal of theInternationalAfricanInstitute,74(4),pp.534-566.

Mohamud, H. (2015) #Cadaanstudies contra Somali Studies: An encounter with colonialepistemology.Availableat:http://www.warscapes.com/opinion/cadaanstudies-contra-somali-studies-encounter-colonial-epistemology(Accessed:22December,2015).

Moolla,F.(2009)'OfGoatsandGreatHope',AfricanCitiesReader,1.

MTI(2014)AnInvestmentGuidetoSomaliland:Opportunities&Conditions.Hargeisa:MinistryofTradeandInvestment,RepublicofSomaliland.

Muhammad,M.S.,Kasim,R.andMartin,D.(2015)'AReviewofResidentialSegregationandItsConsequencesinNigeria',MediterraneanJournalofSocialSciences,6(2S1),pp.376.

Munene, I. I. (2012) 'Our University: Ethnicity, Higher Education and the Quest for StateLegitimacyinKenya',HigherEducationPolicy,26(1),pp.43-63.

228|P a g e

Murunga,G.R.(2012)'ThecosmopolitantraditionandfissuresinsegregationisttownplanninginNairobi,1915–23',JournalofEasternAfricanStudies,6(3),pp.463-486.

Myers, G. A. (2003) Verandahs of power: Colonialism and space in urban Africa. SyracuseUniversityPress.

Myers,G.A.(2010)'SevenThemesinAfricanurbandynamics'.

Namibia,N.andUbink,J.(2011)'Enhancinglegalempowerment'.

Navez-Bouchanine,F.(2002)'Lafragmentation:sourcesetdefinitions’',inNavez-Bouchanine,F.(ed.) 'La Fragmentation En Question: Des villes entre fragmentation spatiale etfragmentationsociale?:L'Harmattan.

Navez-Bouchanine,F. (2003) 'La fragmentationenquestion',Autrepart-BondyParis, (27),pp.137-138.

Nora,S.andRéginas,N.(2014)'TheEyeoftheBeholder:ServiceProvisionandStateLegitimacyinBurundi',AfricaSpectrum,49(3),pp.3-28.

Norton,G.andFlyktningeråd(2008)Land,property,andhousinginSomalia.NorwegianRefugeeCouncil.

Notten, M. andMacCallum, S. H. (2005) The Laws of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation forEconomicDevelopmentintheHornofAfrica.RedSeaPress.

OCHA (2012) Somaliland Administrative Map. Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs.

OCVP (2012)District Conflict and Security Assessment Report BURAO, Hargeisa andNairobi:ObservatoryofConflictandViolencePrevention.

OCVP(2013a)DistrictConflictandSecurityAssessmentReportERIGAVO,HargeisaandNairobi:ObservatoryofConflictandViolencePrevention.

OCVP(2013b)DistrictConflictandSecurityAssessmentReportGABILEY,HargeisaandNairobi:ObservatoryofConflictandViolencePrevention.

OCVP(2014)BaselineAssessmentonLandOwnershipandLandRightsinSomaliland,Hargeisa:ObservatoryofConflictandViolencePrevention.

OECD (2010) The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity, Paris:OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment.

Omar,Y.S.andOsman,K.M.2016.AstoryWeMustTell:OurPeaceJourneytoHargeisa,BosasoandMogadishu

229|P a g e

Parnell,S.(1991)'Sanitation,segregationandtheNatives(UrbanAreas)Act:Africanexclusionfrom Johannesburg's Malay Location, 1897–1925', Journal of Historical Geography,17(3),pp.271-288.

Peach,C.(1996)'Goodsegregation,badsegregation',Planningperspectives,11(4),pp.379-398.

Pegg,S.andKolstø,P.(2015)'Somaliland:Dynamicsofinternallegitimacyand(lackof)externalsovereignty',Geoforum,66,pp.193–202.

Pesek,M. (2011) 'Foucault hardly came to Africa: Some notes on colonial and post-colonialgovernmentality', Entangled Histories: Reflecting on Concepts of Coloniality andPostcoloniality,pp.41-60.

Pieterse, E. (2005) 'At the limitsofpossibility:workingnotesona relationalmodelofurbanpolitics',A.SimoneandA.Abouhani(Eds),pp.138-173.

Pieterse,E.(2006)'Buildingwithruinsanddreams:SomethoughtsonrealisingintegratedurbandevelopmentinSouthAfricathroughcrisis',UrbanStudies,43(2),pp.285-304.

Prunier,G.(1998)'SomalilandgoesitAlone',CurrentHistory,97(619),pp.225.

QaranNews(2012)HargeyaoocaawakacsaniyomudahaaraadyokabilaabmayNewHargeysa.Availableat:http://www.harowo.com/archives/2360(Accessed:Feberuary28,2014).

Ranter,H.(2016)ASNAircraftaccidentFokkerF-27Friendship600RF6O-SAZHargeisa.Availableat:http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19890628-1(Accessed:16April2016).

Ray,D.I.(1996)'DividedSovereignty',TheJournalofLegalPluralismandUnofficialLaw,28(37-38),pp.181-202.

Rayne,H.(1921)Sun,SandandSomals.Leavesfromthenote-bookofaDistrictCommissionerinBritishSomaliland...With12plates.London:H.F.&G.Witherby.

Renders,M.(2007)'Appropriate'Governance-Technology'?SomaliClanEldersandInstitutionsintheMakingofthe'RepublicofSomaliland'',AfricaSpectrum,42(3),pp.439-459.

Renders,M.andTerlinden,U. (2010) 'NegotiatingStatehood inaHybridPoliticalOrder:TheCaseofSomaliland',DevelopmentandChange,41(4),pp.723-746.

RepublicofSomaliland,AgriculturalLandOwnershipLaw(1999)GovernmentofSomaliland.

TheConstitutionoftheRepublicofSomaliland(2001)GovernmentoftheRepublicofSomaliland.

RepublicofSomaliland,UrbanLandLaw(2002a)GovernmentofSomaliland.

RepublicofSomaliland,XeerkaIsmaamulkaGoboladdaIyoDegmooyinka(2002b)GovernmentoftheRepublicofSomaliland.

230|P a g e

RepublicofSomaliland,UrbanLandLaw(2002amendedin2008)GovernmentofSomaliland.

Republic of Somaliland, Xeer Nidaamiyaha Ka Gar-Naqa Dacwadaha Idaariga Ah Ee DhulkaMagaalooyinkaSomaliland(2013).

Republic of Somaliland (undated) Establishment Charter of Land and Urban ManagementInstitute.HargeisaGovernmentofSomaliland.

Richards, R. (2015) 'Bringing the Outside In: Somaliland, Statebuilding and Dual Hybridity',JournalofInterventionandStatebuilding,9(1),pp.4-25.

Rotberg,R.(2004)'Thefailureandcollapseofnation-states',inRotberg,R.(ed.)Whenstatesfail:causesandconsequences.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Roth,M.(1989)SomaliaLandPoliciesandTenureImpacts:TheCaseoftheLowerShabelle.LandTenureCenter,UniversityofWisconsin-Madison.

Samatar,A. I. (1985) 'Underdevelopment inSomalia:DictatorshipwithoutHegemony',AfricaToday,32(3),pp.23-40.

Samatar,A.I.(1988)'TheState,AgrarianChangeandCrisisofHegemonyinSomalia',ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy,pp.26-41.

Samatar, A. I. (1989) The state and rural transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884-1986.Madison,Wis.:UniversityofWisconsinPress.

Samatar,A.I.(1992)'DestructionofStateandSocietyinSomalia:BeyondtheTribalConvention',TheJournalofModernAfricanStudies,30(4),pp.625-641.

Samatar,A.I.(1997)'LeadershipandEthnicityintheMakingofAfricanStateModels:BotswanaversusSomalia',ThirdWorldQuarterly,18,pp.687-707.

Samatar,A.I.(2006a)'DebatingSomaliidentityinaBritishtribunal:thecaseoftheBBCSomaliService',TheArabWorldGeographer,10,pp.36-88.

Samatar,A.I.(2006b)'TheMiracleofMogadishu',ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy,33(109),pp.581-587.

Samatar,A.I.(2009)'FaithlessPowerasFratricide:IsthereanAlternativeinSomalia?',9,pp.63-81.

Samatar,S.S.(1982)OralPoetryandSomaliNationalism:TheCaseofSayidMahammad'AbdilleHasan.

Sassen, S. (2002) 'Topographies urbaines fragmentées et interconnexions sous-jacentes', inNavez-Bouchanine,F.(ed.)Lafragmentationenquestion:Desvillesentrefragmentationspatialeetfragmentationsociale.Paris:L’Harmattan.

231|P a g e

Schlee,G.(2013)'Customarylawandthejoysofstatelessness:idealisedtraditionsversusSomalirealities',JournalofEasternAfricanStudies,pp.37-41.

Schmidt,V.A.(2013)'DemocracyandlegitimacyintheEuropeanUnionrevisited:input,outputand‘throughput’',PoliticalStudies,61(1),pp.2-22.

Serunkuma, Y. (2015)OnTheNew Somali Studies: A ResponseWardheerNews. Available at:http://www.wardheernews.com/new-somali-studies-response/ (Accessed: 24December,2015).

Skalník,P.(1996)'AuthorityVersusPower',TheJournalofLegalPluralismandUnofficialLaw,28(37-38),pp.109-121.

Somaliland Post (2015) "Madaxweyne 800 Oo Kun OoMitir Oo Dhul Ah OoMadaarka LooXadeeyayDadkiiDeganaaWaxBedelAhMaanuSiin"WasiirkaHawlahaGuud.Availableat:http://www.somalilandpost.net/?p=39798.

Spinks,C.(2001)ANewApartheid?:UrbanSpatiality,(fearOf)Crime,andSegregationinCapeTown, SouthAfrica. London School of Economics andPolitical Science,DevelopmentStudiesInstitute.

Stremlau,N.(2013)'Hostagesofpeace:thepoliticsofradioliberalizationinSomaliland',JournalofEasternAfricanStudies,7(2),pp.239-257.

Sugule,C.1962.NinLaguSeexdoowHaSeexan.

Sugule,C.1966.DhagaxiyoDadabLaysKumaDhufto

Swayne, H. G. C. (1996) Early days in Somaliland and other tales : a pioneer's notebookEdinburgh:PentlandPress.

The World Factbook (2015a) Somalia: Population: Central Intelligence Agency Available at:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html (Accessed:July1,2016July1,2016).

TheWorldFactbook (2015b)Somalia:Urbanisation:Central IntelligenceAgencyAvailableat:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html (Accessed:July1,2016.

Thorne, K. (2011) 'Rule of Law through imperfect bodies? The informal justice systems ofBurundiandSomalia'.

Togaherer News (2015)AgaasimahaWasaaradda Duulista Oo Eedo Xildhibaan Dheeg Uu UJeediyey Madaarka Hargeysa Ku Tilmaamay Been Abuur Iyo Xogogaalnimo La’aanAvailableat:http://togaherer.com/gudaha-ka-akhri-agaasimaha-wasaaradda-duulista-oo-eedo-xildhibaan-dheeg-uu-u-jeediyey-madaarka-cigaal-ku-tilmaamay-been-abuur-iyo-xogogaalnimo-laaan-sawiro/.

232|P a g e

TogahererNews(2016)DadDanyarAhOoDaganDeegaankaUubaaleEeKoonfurtaMagaaladaHargeysa Ayaa Cabasho Xoogan Ka Muujiyey Taar-ka Lagu Wareejiyey GaroonkaDiyaaradaha Ee Hargeysa. Available at: http://togaherer.com/dad-danyar-ah-oo-dagan-deegaanka-uubaale-ee-koonfurta-magaalada-hargeysa-ayaa-cabasho-xoogan-ka-muujiyey-taar-ka-lagu-wareejiyey-garoonka-diyaaradaha-ee-hargeysa/.

Tonkin,E.(1984)'ParticipantObservation',inEllen,R.F.(ed.)Ethnographicresearch:aguidetogeneralconduct:AcademicPress.

Tracey,B.andBurgess,J.(2001) 'Thefocus-groupexperience', inLimb,M.&Dwyer,C.(eds.)QualitativeMethodologiesforGeographers:IssuesandDebates.Edinburgh:Arnold.

Treasury,Treasury(1958)MemorandumbytheActingFinancialSecretaryontheEstimatesfor1956/57London:HerMajesty’sGovernmnet.

Tröger,S.(2009)'FragmentedorIncluded?—ImpactsofGlobalizationonAddisAbaba'sPoor',Erdkunde,pp.257-268.

Turkstra, J. (2008)Municipal Revenue Generation Through Property Taxation: the case ofHargeisa,Nairobi:UNHabitat.

Turton,E.R.(1972)'SomaliResistancetoColonialRuleandtheDevelopmentofSomaliPoliticalActivityinKenya1893–1960',TheJournalofAfricanHistory,13(01),pp.119-143.

Tyler,T.R.(2006)'Psychologicalperspectivesonlegitimacyandlegitimation',Annualreviewofpsychology,57,pp.375.

UN(2006)Somali JointNeedsAssessment:Governance,Security,andtheRuleofLawClusterReport,UnitedNations.,Nairobi:UnitedNations.

UN (2014)World Urbanization Prospects The 2014 RevisionUnited Nations, Department ofEconomicandSocialAffairs,PopulationDivision

UNNewsCentre(2012)'UNenvoyinSomaliaconcernedoverviolentclashesinHargeisa',UNDailyNews,21May

vanderHaar,G.,Heijmans,A.andHilhorst,D.(2013)'Interactiveresearchandtheconstructionofknowledgeinconflict-affectedsettings',Disasters,37,pp.S20-S35.

VanKempen,E.T.(1994)'Thedualcityandthepoor:socialpolarisation,socialsegregationandlifechances',UrbanStudies,31(7),pp.995-1015.

Venema, J. H., Alim, M., Vargas, R. R., Oduori, S. and Ismail, A. (2009) Land Use PlanningGuidelinesforSomaliland.TechnicalProjectReportL-13.,Nairobi:FAO-SWALIM.

Visser,G.(2013) 'LookingbeyondtheurbanpoorinSouthAfrica:thenewterraincognitaforurbangeography?',CanadianJournalofAfricanStudies,47(1),pp.75–93.

233|P a g e

vonTrotha,T.(1996)'FromAdministrativetoCivilChieftaincy',TheJournalofLegalPluralismandUnofficialLaw,28(37-38),pp.79-107.

Walls,M.(2009)'TheemergenceofaSomalistate:BuildingpeacefromcivilwarinSomaliland',AfricanAffairs,pp.19.

Walls,M.(2011)StateformationinSomaliland:bringingdeliberationtoinstitutionalism.DoctorofPhilosophy,UniversityCollegeLondon.

Walls, M. and Kibble, S. (2010) 'Beyond Polarity: Negotiating a Hybrid State inSomaliland/Jenseits der Polarität: Das Aushandeln eines hybriden Staates inSomaliland',AfricaSpectrum,45(1),pp.31-56.

WarOfficeGeneralStaff (1907)MilitaryreportonSomaliland.1907.VolumeI.Geographical,descriptive,andhistorical.London:S.l:HMSO.

Watson,V.(2009)'‘Theplannedcitysweepsthepooraway…’:Urbanplanningand21stcenturyurbanisation',ProgressinPlanning,72(3),pp.151-193.

WB(2014)PanelDiscussion:DriversofEconomicGrowthinSomaliland:WorldBank.Availableat:http://slministryofplanning.org/images/7HLACF/12_DriversofEconomicGrowthinSomaliland-combined.pdf(Accessed:December12,2015).

WB(2015)NewWorldBankGDPandPovertyEstimatesforSomaliland:WorldBank.Availableat: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/01/29/new-world-bank-gdp-and-poverty-estimates-for-somaliland(Accessed:December6,2015).

WB and IBRD (2012) Doing Business in Hargeisa, Washington, D.C.: World Bank and theInternationalFinanceCorporation.

Widmer,M. (2013) Youth for Change: Theory of change for the Joint Programme on youthrehabilitationintheSomaliregion:UnitedNationDevelopmentProgram.

WiuffMoe, L. (2011) 'Hybrid and ‘Everyday’ Political Ordering: Constructing and ContestingLegitimacyinSomaliland',TheJournalofLegalPluralismandUnofficialLaw,43(63),pp.143-177.

Wojkowsk, E. 'How informal justice systems can contribute'. United Nations DevelopmentProgramme.

WPR (2016) Somalia Population (2016): World Population Review. Available at:http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/somalia-population/ (Accessed: July 1,2016).

Yare, A. (2012) SOMALILAND: Where is the Justice in our Justice System? Available at:http://www.somalilandpress.com/somaliland-where-is-the-justice-in-our-justice-system/(Accessed:Feberuary28,2014).

————————————————————

234|P a g e

TNACAA/23/6/01FutureorganisationoftowncouncilsinSomaliland.

TNACO535/80/1Townshipamendmentordinance.Expropriationoflandordinance.

TNACO535/126/16FutureAdministrationofSomaliland.

TNACO535/126/20CompensationfortheremovalofwattleanddaubstructuresinHargeisatown.

TNACO535/141/7Theseatofgovernment.

TNACO535/141/11Reorganisationofadministration:advisorycouncillegislation.

TNACO535/149/4LandTenure.

TNA CO 535/152/3 The reorganisation of native administration: Somali representation andintroductionoflocalgovernment.

————————————————————

235|P a g e

APPENDIXES

I. ConsentFormforProjectPartcipants

CONSENTFORMFORPROJECTPARTICIPANTS

PROJECT TITLE:Urbangovernance, land conflicts and segregation inHargeisa, Somaliland:

historicalperspectivesandpost-conflictdynamicsProjectApprovalReference:

Iagreetotakepartintheabovementionedresearchproject.Ihavehadtheprojectexplained to me and I have accepted to participate in the study. I understand thatagreeingtotakepartmeansthatIamwillingto:- Beinterviewedbytheresearcher- Allowtheinterviewtobevideorecorded/audiorecorded- MakemyselfavailableforafurtherinterviewshouldthatberequiredIunderstandthatanyinformationIprovideisconfidential,andthatnoinformationshallberevealedinamannerthatwillleadtothediscoveryofmyidentitylessotherwiseallowed.Iunderstandthatmyparticipationisvoluntary,thatIcanchoosenottoparticipateinpartorallofthestudy,andthatIcanwithdrawatanystage.Name:Signature:Date:Ibelievethat___________________________(name)understandstheaboveprojectandgiveshis/herconsentvoluntarily.Name:Signature:Address:Date:

236|P a g e

II. InformationSheetforProjectPartcipants

INFORMATIONSHEETFORPROJECTPARTICIPANTS

DearSir/Madam,YouareinvitedtotakepartinastudyonPost-conflictinstitutionaldynamicsandaccesstoland,justiceandsecurityinHargeisa,Somaliland.Participationinthisstudyisvoluntaryandwhetherornotyoutakepartinthisstudyisyourchoice.Participantscanwithdrawfromtheinterviewatanypointduringtheresearchprocess.ThisParticipantInformationSheetwillhoweverhelpyoudecideifyou’dliketotakepart.Itsetsoutwhywearedoingthestudyandwhatyourparticipationwouldinvolve.Wewillgothroughthisinformationwithyouandansweranyquestionsyoumayhave.Ifyouagreetotakepartinthisstudy,youwillbeaskedforeitheraverbalorwrittenconsent.YouwillbegivenacopyofboththeParticipantInformationSheetandtheConsentFormtokeep.Pleasemakesureyouhavereadandunderstoodallthepages.YoursfaithfullyAbdifatahTahir

237|P a g e

WHATISTHEPURPOSEOFTHESTUDY?

Thepurposeofthisstudyisto:¾ understandtheinstitutionaldynamicsinthepostconflictSomalilandandtheprocessesand

conditionunderwhichtheyemerge.¾ documenttheexperienceoflocal/urbancommunitieswithinstitutionsgoverningresources

andservices.¾ fill the gaps in knowledge about the nexus between institutional dynamics and access to

resourcesandservices.¾ provideaninputintothedebatesoninstitutionalbuildingandcontributetotheenhancement

ofcurrentprocessesandthinking.WHATWILLMYPARTICIPATIONINTHESTUDYINVOLVE?

Youmightbeaskedto:¾ participate inasemistructured interviewwhereyouwouldbe interviewed individuallyand

couldalsobere-interviewed.¾ participateinakeyinformantinterviewsandyouwouldbeinterviewedindividuallyandcould

alsobere-interviewed¾ participateinafocusgroupdiscussionwhereyouwillparticipateinagroupdiscussionwith

otherparticipants.¾ sharedocumentsorinformationnecessaryforthisstudy.

WHATHAPPENSTOMYINFORMATIONAFTERITHASBEENCOLLECTED?

Theinformationcollectedfromyoumightbe:¾ usedforresearchpurposesonly¾ sharedthroughacademicforums¾ sharedthroughacademicpublications

WHODOICONTACTFORMOREINFORMATIONORIFIHAVECONCERNS?

Ifyouhaveanyquestions,concernsorcomplaintsaboutthestudyatanystage,youcancontacttheresearcherortheresearchandEnterpriseCo-OrdinatorattheSchoolofGlobalStudies:AbdifatahTahirDoctoralResearcherEmail:a.i.tahir@sussex.ac.ukTel:+252634891188

OrMrsJaynePaulinResearchandEnterpriseCo-OrdinatorGlobalStudies,ArtsCC162Email:J.E.Paulin@sussex.ac.ukTel:+441273877107