Nuke Strikes Back REYNOLDS ELECTRICAL & ENGINEERING...

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

Énergie et Sécurité • • No. 26AN IEER PUBLICATION Selected articles published in

VOLUME 11, NUMBER 4 September 2003

S E E U S A B L E N U K EO N P A G E 2

E N D N O T E S , P A G E 7

I N S I D EDear Arjun on mini-nukes, lowyield nukes, and bunker busters .............14

Atomic Puzzler ........................................ 15

Cabriolet nuclear weapon test, conducted at the Nevada TestSite on January 26, 1968. While the 2.3 kiloton test was anunderground explosion, buried at a depth of 171 feet, the falloutpattern extended approximately 75 miles in length and 19 mileswide. The test released 6,000 curies of iodine-131 and produced acrater 361 feet in diameter and 118 feet deep.

REYN

OLD

S EL

ECTR

ICA

L &

EN

GIN

EERI

NG

CO

MPA

NY,

VIA

DO

E A

TOM

IC C

ENTU

RY

PHO

TO G

ALL

ERY,

ww

w.d

pi.a

nl.g

ov/p

h_ga

llery

/ph_

galle

ry.h

tm

Back to theBad Old DaysB Y A R J U N M A K H I J A N I

A N D L I S A L E DW I D G E

During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclearweapons establishment generally putproduction ahead of human andenvironmental health. Nuclear

weapons plant officials deceived workersand assured them that factory conditionswere safe and within regulatory limits eventhough the officials knew they weren’t.Immediately following nuclear weaponstests, soldiers were told to march intoground zero without adequate radiationprotection or even measurement of doses.The nuclear weapons establishment locateda test site in Nevada knowing that it wouldblow fallout over essentially the entirecontinental United States. In 1997, theNational Cancer Institute estimated that50,000 people would get thyroid cancerdue to exposure to radioactive iodine infallout from weapons testing in Nevada.

Much of the harm was often done insecret, as illuminated by the statement of

The “Usable”Nuke Strikes BackB Y B R I C E S M I T H

Many people had hoped that, withthe end of the “Cold War”between the United States and theSoviet Union, the world would

finally turn towards a path of completenuclear disarmament. However, instead ofseeing nuclear weapons relegated to the dustbin of history, we have in fact witnessedwhat retired General George Lee Butler,former head of U.S. Strategic Command(STRATCOM), has called the “creeping re-rationalization of nuclear weapons” broughtabout “by the very people who stood to losethe most by the end of the nuclear era.”1

The extent of this “creeping re-rationalization” was made clear tothe world last year when excerpts from the classified NuclearPosture Review (NPR) were leaked to the press.2 Not since the daysof the Reagan administration has U.S. nuclear policy been so widelyand prominently discussed as following these reports. In particular,two closely related elements of the NPR have received the majorityof this attention. The first is the explicit statement that the U.S.should be prepared to use nuclear weapons against a specific list ofpotential target countries: Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran,Syria, and Libya. At the time of its publication, the last four ofthese countries did not possess nuclear weapons and presumably donot possess them now. According to the NPR, these countries madethe list because U.S. nuclear weapons must “continue to provideassurance to security partners, particularly in the presence of knownor suspected threats of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks or inthe event of surprising military developments.”3 The inclusion of“surprising military developments” is particularly important givenits broad definition, and represents a significant expansion of therole of nuclear weapons in the U.S. military posture.

The second widely discussed portion of the NPR deals with thePentagon’s desire to explore so-called “advanced concepts” such aslow-yield warheads and earth-penetrating weapons which it claimswould provide “important advantages for enhancing the nation’sdeterrence posture.”4

In April 2002, Dr.Everet Beckner,Deputy Administratorfor Defense Programsat the National

S E E B A D O L D D A Y S O N P A G E 9E N D N O T E S , P A G E 1 6

SCIENCE FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION 2 VOL . 1 1 , NO. 4 , S EPTEMBER 2003

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

U S A B L E N U K EF R O M PAG E 1

S E E U S A B L E N U K E O N P A G E 3E N D N O T E S , P A G E 7

Nuclear Security Agency, testified that the Robust Nuclear EarthPenetrator (RNEP) would be the initial focus of this program. Inorder to support the eventual development of these new weapons,the NPR also calls for the Department of Energy to accelerate itsplans to build a so-called Modern Pit Facility which, in its largestprojected form, could produce the nuclear triggers for 450 to 900nuclear warheads every year.

U.S. nuclear policy through timeSince it first unleashed nuclear weapons upon the world atHiroshima, the United States has had a nuclear policy that includedthe first use and the threat of first use in a variety of situations.However, the role of that policy in the U.S. military posture hasvaried greatly over time. From 1945 to the Cuban missile crisis,nuclear weapons played a prominent role and the United States usednuclear threats many times, and of course actually used nuclearbombs to destroy two cities. Between the mid-1960’s and the end ofthe 1970’s, the first use of nuclear weapons was contemplated, as forinstance in Vietnam, but the policy was much muted and largelyreplaced by the posture of Mutually Assured Destruction. Thedoctrine of limited and winnable nuclear war made a comeback in1979 with Presidential Directive 59 during the Carter administra-

tion, and was carried even further by the Reagan administration. Itwas again muted, however, towards the end of the 1980’s and intothe 1990’s as the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union dissolved. Inthe current administration, however, the role of nuclear weapons inthe U.S. military posture has been explicitly revived in a form thatappears more threatening than at any time since the 1940’s.

Combined with the explicit rejection of a no first use policy5, theNPR thus raises the specter of a pre-emptive nuclear strike againstsuspected chemical or biological weapons facilities in a non-nuclearstate. This prospect is made all the more troubling given the recentexperience with intelligence in the United States and Britain con-cerning Iraq’s supposed chemical and biological weapons programsthat was widely used to justify the March 2003 invasion.

The global significance of the U.S. nuclear doctrine can hardly beoverstated. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the U.S. posture hasbeen a major driving force behind global nuclear proliferation.Examples of this can be seen from Stalin’s 1945 order to radicallyaccelerate and expand the Soviet nuclear program following the U.S.attack on Hiroshima6 to India’s decision to push ahead with theirnuclear program following the intervention of the nuclear-armed

SCIENCE FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTIONScience for Democratic Action is published fourtimes a year by the Institute for Energy and En-vironmental Research:

6935 Laurel Avenue, Suite 204Takoma Park, MD 20912, USA

Phone: (301) 270-5500FAX: (301) 270-3029E-mail: [email protected]

Web address: www.ieer.org

The Institute for Energy and Environmen-tal Research (IEER) provides the public andpolicy-makers with thoughtful, clear, and soundscientific and technical studies on a wide range ofissues. IEER’s aim is to bring scientific excellenceto public policy issues to promote the democrati-zation of science and a healthier environment.

IEER StaffPresident: Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D.

Librarian: Lois ChalmersBookkeeper: Diana Kohn

Outreach Director, United States:Lisa Ledwidge

Project Scientist: Annie MakhijaniAdministrative Assistant:

Betsy Thurlow-ShieldsScience Fellow: Brice Smith, Ph.D.

Thank You to Our SupportersWe gratefully acknowledge our funders whosegenerous support makes possible our project toprovide technical assistance to grassroots groupsworking on nuclear weapons-related issues, andour global outreach project.

Colombe Foundation • EducationalFoundation of America • Ford Foundation •

John D. and Catherine T. MacArthurFoundation • John Merck Fund •

Stewart R. Mott Charitable Trust •New Cycle Foundation • New-Land

Foundation • Ploughshares Fund • PublicWelfare Foundation • Simons Foundation •

Town Creek Foundation

Thanks also to the SDA readers who havebecome donors to IEER. Your support is deeplyappreciated.

Credits for This IssueProduction: Cutting Edge Design

Science for Democratic Actionis free to all readers.

Editor: Lisa Ledwidge

We invite the reprinting, with proper credit,of materials from this newsletter. We alsoappreciate receiving copies of publications inwhich articles have been reproduced.

In the cur r en t admin i s t ra t i on , th e ro l e o f nuc l ea r

weapons in the U. S . m i l i t a ry pos tur e has be en

exp l i c i t ly r ev ived in a f o rm tha t appear s more

thr ea t en ing than a t any t ime s in c e the 1940 ’ s .

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○


S E E U S A B L E N U K E O N P A G E 4E N D N O T E S , P A G E 7 , 8

USS Enterprise battle group in the 1971 Indo-PakistaniWar as part of a U.S. “tilt” towards Pakistan.7

As these events did in the past, the expanding rolefor nuclear weapons envisioned today by the Bushadministration puts great pressure on disarmament andnon-proliferation efforts. The National Academy ofSciences Committee on International Security andArms Control, formerChairman of the JointChiefs of Staff JohnShalikashvili, and eventhe House ArmedServices Committeehave all warned that ifthe strongest militarypower in the worldclaims to need nuclearweapons in order toensure its nationalsecurity and to deterthe use of chemical and biological attacks, then othercountries will be far more likely to use this samejustification in their quest forthe bomb.8

Potential targetsOf particular concern is the impact this so-called“counter-proliferation” role for nuclear weapons willhave on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).On April 5, 1995, then President Clinton publiclyreaffirmed a 1978 pledge by Jimmy Carter that theUnited States would not use nuclear weapons againstnon-nuclear states party to the NPT unless theyattacked in “association or alliance” with a nuclearweapon state.9 Similar commitments, referred to asNegative Security Assurances, were given by all fiverecognized nuclear weapon states as part of their effortto achieve the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.These pledges were noted “with appreciation” in theUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 984 whichwas unanimously adopted on April 11, 1995. Thecommitments made by the nuclear weapons states inthis resolution have been broadly interpreted. Forinstance, Edward Gnehm, then Deputy PermanentRepresentative of the United States to the UnitedNations, has stated that the resolution “promises that,in the event that the non-nuclear weapons states are thevictims of an act or a threat of nuclear aggression, theSecurity Council — and above all its nuclear-weaponmembers — will be immediately involved.”10 Inaddition, all five nuclear weapon states have signed theadditional protocols to the Latin American, SouthPacific, and African Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaties inwhich they pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear

weapons against parties to the treaties. However, theUnited States has not ratified the South Pacific orAfrican protocols.

The inclusion of non-nuclear countries as potentialtargets in the NPR was codified as national policy inthe recent “National Strategy to Combat Weapons ofMass Destruction.”11 This strategy document, whichruns directly counter to the 1995 Negative SecurityAssurances as well as UN Resolution 984, states that

the United Statesreserves the right to“respond with over-whelming force -including throughresort to all of ouroptions” following anyattack with nuclear,chemical, or biologicalweapons. Administra-tion sources report thatthe classified versionof this report, called

the “National Security Presidential Directive 17” (alsoknown as the “Homeland Security Presidential Direc-tive 4”), explicitly states that “overwhelming force”potentially includes the use of nuclear weapons.12 Suchthreats seriously weaken the NPT and will actuallyencourage nuclear proliferation if a United NationsSecurity Council resolution and the associated NegativeSecurity Assurances cannot be trusted to provide anassurance of security.

Bunker bustersThe earth penetrating weapons discussed in the NPRare often advertised as desirable for their ability toreduce “collateral damage” when attacking what arecalled Hardened or Deeply Buried Targets. However, itis rarely noted that this reduction comes in comparisonto the staggering destruction of a 9-megaton surfaceblast which would be required for a non-penetratingweapon to destroy the same buried structures. Expertanalysis has concluded that these penetrating weaponswill never be able to bury themselves deep enough tocontain their blast, and will instead send out a cloud ofhighly radioactive dust and debris in what has beencalled a “roman candle” explosion.13

Government scientists have been reported as sayingthat a 1 kiloton (kT) weapon would only have to digdown 175 feet to contain the radioactivity.14 Neglectingfor a moment that this depth is well beyond what isphysically possible for modern earth penetrating weap-ons, engineers at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) have foundthat even a 100 ton (0.1 kT) bomb needs to be buried186 feet deep in order to have any confidence that its


I f th e s t ronge s t mi l i t a ry power in the wor ld c l a ims

to ne ed nuc l ea r weapons in o rder t o ensure i t s

na t i ona l s e cur i ty and t o de t e r the u s e o f chemica l

and b i o l og i ca l a t t a cks , th en o the r coun t r i e s wi l l b e

f a r more l i k e ly t o u s e th i s s ame ju s t i f i c a t i on

in the i r que s t f o r the bomb .

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○




sealed shaft would not leak significant amounts ofradiation.15 To make matters worse, a warhead deliveredby an earth penetrator would need to be buried evendeeper than those tested in Nevada because, unlike thecarefully sealed test shafts used at the NTS, a burrowingbomb would likely leave a chimney behind it throughwhich fallout could easily escape. (See cover photo.)

Given the intensity and distribution of local falloutthat would result from realistic burial depths, if even a1 kiloton weapon were used near an urban area in theGlobal South,16 it is estimated that “several tens ofthousands of casualties” would result.17 In addition, ananalysis by the Natural Resources Defense Council(NRDC) found that an attack on a hypotheticalunderground facility in west Pyonyang, North Koreawith a higher yield warhead similar to one currently inthe stockpile (the B61-11) would likely result in430,000 to 550,000 causalities depending upon theavailability of shelter.18 Such strikes can hardly becalled surgical, and if this wasn’t enough, one of thewarheads currently under investigation for use in theRNEP (the B83) has a rated yield of 1 megaton, whichis roughly 3 times that of the weapon examined in theNRDC analysis.

Finally, given the current procedures for certifyingnew weapons, it is highly unlikely that any new designwould be accepted for mass production without firstbeing fully tested. This connection between newweapon designs and the need for nuclear testing hasbeen expressed for years at high levels in the nuclearestablishment by people like Stephen Younger, formerAssociate Laboratory Director for Nuclear Weapons atLos Alamos National Lab, and by groups like theNational Research Council, a non-profit institutionorganized by the National Academy of Sciences toprovide technical analysis to the government.19 Inaddition to the potential for testing new designs toverify their functionality, the military may also requirenuclear tests in order to determine the effectiveness ofearth penetrating weapons at destroying hardenedtargets. In fact, between 1987 and 1992, at least threeunderground tests were conducted for the DefenseNuclear Agency (now called the Defense ThreatReduction Agency) in order to aid in the developmentof models for predicting the effect of a nuclear explo-sion on deeply buried structures.20

The likelihood of a nuclear test being conducted,which if it occurred would almost certainly doom theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) before it evenenters into force, is made all the more plausible due tothe open hostility the Bush administration has shown forthe CTBT21 combined with the fact that the NPRexplicitly states that it may not be possible to maintainthe current testing moratorium for the indefinite future.22

Despite being removed from an initial U.S. House ofRepresentatives spending bill, the Bush administrationhad requested $25 million in the next fiscal year toshorten the time for conducting underground tests to 18months from the current time of three years.

A not so new doctrineIt is little recognized that these ideas expressed in theNPR are not all that new. While the Bush administra-tion is the first to so openly and actively embrace theideas at a high level and begin to implement them asdeclared national policy, military planners and weaponscientists have actively sought to maintain the U.S.stockpile and develop new nuclear weapons for use as a“deterrent” against chemical and biological weaponsproliferation in the Global South going all the way backto the fall of the Berlin Wall.23

As the Cold War came to an end, so too did thestated justification for maintaining a vast and expensivenuclear weapons infrastructure. It was not long,however, before a new rationalization for these weaponsbegan to take shape. Even before the Berlin Wall camedown in 1989, 150 members of the nuclear weaponsestablishment, including representatives from industry,met at the Los Alamos Center for National SecurityStudies to seek a new, post-Cold War mission forthemselves. At this meeting, several participants werealready arguing for a revision of the U.S. nuclearposture in order to deal with the proliferation ofnuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.24 Thissentiment was echoed the following year in the “Mili-tary Net Assessment” published by the Joint Chiefs ofStaff which pointed to “increasingly capable ThirdWorld threats” as a potential justification for maintain-ing the country’s nuclear stockpile.25

These ideas were further elaborated in the 1991“Strategic Deterrence Study” (also known as the “ReedReport”) commissioned by the Strategic Air Command.The draft report stated its concern that “the growingwealth of petro-nations and newly hegemonic powers isavailable to bullies and crazies” and called for a newtargeting strategy that would include the ability toassemble “a Nuclear Expeditionary Force...primarily foruse against China or Third World targets.”26 Elevatingthis thinking to the level of national defense policy,then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney issued the top-secret Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy(NUWEP) in 1991 which required the military tobegin planning for nuclear strikes against countriescapable of developing nuclear, chemical, and biologicalweapons.27 As far back as the late 1980’s, the UnitedStates included some countries in the Global South aspart of its overall targeting of the U.S.S.R. and it allies;however, the war plan that grew out of NUWEP was

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○




the first to explicitly include non-nuclear countries dueto proliferation concerns.28

Significantly, the idea of using nuclear weapons todeter countries from acquiring or using non-conven-tional weapons was linked right from the start to thedesire for new types of nuclear weapons. In a 1991article in Strategic Review, Los Alamos researchersThomas Dowler and Joseph Howard III claimed thatdue to its reliance on high-yield weapons that wouldcause massive civilian casualties, “the existing USnuclear arsenal had no deterrent effect on Saddam, andit is unlikely to deter a future tyrant.”29 They went onto argue for the development of a “tiny-nuke” with ayield of 1 kT (1000 tons), a “mini-nuke” with a yieldof 100 tons, and a “micro-nuke” with a yield of 10tons. Quick to follow such advice, in 1991 the AirForce launched “Project PLYWD” (Precision Low-Yield Weapons Design) to investigate “a credible optionto counter the employment of nuclear weapons byThird World nations.”30

The push for low-yield nuclear weapons was curbedsharply in 1993, however, when U.S. RepresentativesElizabeth Furse (D-Oregon) and John Spratt (D-SouthCarolina) introduced an amendment as part of thefiscal year 1994 Defense Authorization Act whichbarred the Secretary of Energy from conducting“research and development which could lead to theproduction by the United States of a new low-yieldnuclear weapon,” defined in the statute as a weaponwith a yield of less that 5 kT. Despite this setback,planning for a nuclear role in countering the prolifera-tion of non-conventional weapons continued to expand.

“Planners should not be too rational”Following the 1993-94 Nuclear Posture Review, whichended by essentially adopting in whole the nucleardoctrine of the previous Bush administration,STRATCOM was assigned the task of drawing up planswith regional commanders for nuclear strikes againstcountries seeking to acquire nuclear, chemical, andbiological weapons.31 This led to the creation of theSILVER Books (Strategic Installation List of VulnerabilityEffects and Results) which were plans for “a series of‘silver bullet’ missions aimed at counter-proliferation.”32

The likely targets of such operations would be countriessuch as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. By the end of1994 a proposed SILVER Book was ready for the U.S.European Command and a similar plan was underdevelopment for the Pacific Command. The regionalcommanders, however, were reluctant to allowSTRATCOM to take control of the counter-proliferationmission, and in 1995 the project was officially terminated.

The termination of the SILVER Books project,however, did not signal an end to the idea of counter-

proliferation. In that same year, the Strategic AdvisoryGroup at STRATCOM issued a review called “Essen-tials of Post-Cold War Deterrence” which focused onthe continued need for nuclear weapons. The essentialrecommendation of this report was that deterrence willonly work if the United States is capable of “holding atrisk” what an adversary values most. It goes on to addthough that “planners should not be too rational aboutdetermining what that includes.”33 To illustrate theirpoint, the authors recall the following anecdote fromthe Lebanon war.

The story of the tactic applied by the Soviets during theearliest days of the Lebanon chaos is a case in point.When three of its citizens and their driver were kid-napped and killed, two days later the Soviets had deliveredto the leader of the revolutionary activity a packagecontaining a single testicle- that of his eldest son-with amessage that said in no uncertain terms, “never botherour people again.” It was successful throughout the periodof the conflicts there. Such an insightful tailoring of whatis valued within a culture, and its weaving into a deter-rence message, along with a projection of the capabilitythat can be mustered, is the type of creative thinking thatmust go into deciding what to hold at risk in framingdeterrent targeting for multilateral situations in the future.

The authors of the report go on to lament “that oursociety would never condone the taking of such actionsmakes it more difficult for us to deter acts of terror-ism.” Therefore, the report concludes that for deter-rence to be successful “it hurts to portray ourselves astoo fully rational and cool-headed” and advocates thatour national persona should make it clear that “the USmay become irrational and vindictive if its vitalinterests are attacked.” The policy of irrationality asadvocated in this report runs directly counter to thevery foundation of all treaty-based non-proliferationand disarmament agreements which are built upon theassumption that governments can be counted on tokeep their promises. The implications of such sugges-tions as these put forth by the Strategic AdvisoryGroup are unlikely to be missed by those countries, likeNorth Korea, who may already feel threatened by theU.S. military posture.

That following February, nearly seven years after thefall of the Berlin Wall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formallyenshrined the new role for nuclear weapons in its “Doc-trine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations.”34 In itsopening line, this doctrine states that “the purpose of USnuclear forces is to help deter the use of weapons of massdestruction,” which the document defines as including“nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.”This adoption of the counter-proliferation mission in

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○



official policy was further strengthened in November1997, when then President Clinton issued PresidentialDecision Directive (PDD) 60 ordering, among otherthings, that the military begin general planning forpotential nuclear strikes in response to a chemical orbiological attack. Significantly, the U.S. Arms Control andDisarmament Agency, which had lost its independence in1996 after being merged into the State Department, wasnever even consulted in the preparation of PDD 60.35

The B61-11As this new mission for nuclearweapons was being officially formu-lated throughout the early 1990’s,interest was also renewed in thedevelopment of earth penetratingnuclear weapons. Exploding a nuclearweapon underground channels amuch greater percentage of its energyinto the earth as compared to exploding it at thesurface. Going back to the 1950’s, penetrating weaponshad been sought for their ability to destroy hardenedtargets. However, as higher and higher yield weaponsbecame available, interest in earth penetrating warheadsdiminished. The concept saw a brief revival under bothCarter and Reagan, but it was not until the Clintonadministration that a new earth penetrating weapon, theB61-11, was added to the stockpile.

The development of the B61-11 began in October1993 when Harold Smith, then Assistant to the Secre-tary of Defense for Atomic Energy36 asked the AirForce to study replacing the B53 gravity bomb with amodified weapon from the active stockpile.37 At thetime, the B53 was the largest bomb in the arsenal witha yield of 9 megatons and lacked many of the safetyfeatures present on more modern weapons. Nicknamed“Crowdpleaser,” the B53 was originally designed as a“city buster,” however, the Reagan administrationhalted its retirement in 1987 and reassigned it the taskof destroying deeply buried Soviet command bunkersand other highly hardened targets.38

No new nuclear capability had been added to the U.S.arsenal since 1989. The Clinton administration’s Assis-tant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policywas concerned that Congress would not support a projectto develop an earth penetrating bomb for use againstburied structures. Therefore, it was decided not to submitthe plans to the Nuclear Weapons Council for approval.39

However, by 1994 the climate had begun to change, withthe first Nuclear Posture Review40 recommending thereplacement of the B53. Control of Congress had passedto Republicans more openly supportive of nuclearweapons, in broad agreement with the Clintonadministration’s Pentagon. The project was speeded up

and in early 1995 it was finally approved by the NuclearWeapons Council.

The resulting weapon, the B61 modification 11 (B61-11), has a special hardened outer casing and a variableyield from 0.3 to 340 kilotons. Because it is much lighterthan the 8,900 lb. B53 it can be delivered by the B2-AStealth bomber or even by the F-16 fighter jet. After atotal of 13 full scale drop tests in 1996, three in Alaskaand 10 at Tonopah Test Range in Nevada, the weaponwas accepted by the military into the stockpile. Thetesting, however, showed the limitation of the weapon’sability to penetrate into the ground. Designed to burrow15 meters before exploding, tests showed that the B61-11

could penetrate only 6 meters into drysoil41 or just 2 to 3 meters into frozentundra42 when dropped from 40,000feet. Even before these tests had beencompleted, however, the intended useof the B61-11 was unveiled to theworld by Harold Smith, then Assis-tant to the Secretary of Defense for

Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs,at a breakfast with reporters when he mentioned it as anoption for destroying a supposed underground chemicalweapons plant Libya was constructing at Tarhunah.Although the threat was quickly retracted, this incidentonce again drew tight the connection between the newdesigns and the new missions for nuclear weapons.43

“The very people who stood to lose the most”From the earliest days of the first Bush administrationthrough the end of the Clinton presidency, the jointdoctrines of counter-proliferation and the developmentof new, more “usable” weapons showed a remarkableconsistency as they advanced from study groups andjournal articles to declared military policy and physicalweapons. This slow evolution was driven primarily byan extensive nuclear establishment seeking justificationfor its continued existence in the post-Cold War era.When the second Bush administration came to powerin 2001, however, several key nuclear weapons advo-cates were given positions of political power sufficientto rapidly elevate much of this strategic thinking to thehighest levels of national policy.

For example, in many essential respects the NuclearPosture Review closely follows the ideas laid out in aJanuary 2001 report published by the National Institutefor Public Policy entitled “Rationale and Requirementsfor U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control.” This reportwas prepared in part by former Pentagon and govern-ment officials, and several study participants now holdimportant positions with the Administration including

� Stephen J. Hadley, who is now serving as the DeputyNational Security Advisor;


Nicknamed “Crowdp l ea s e r, ”

th e B53 was o r i g ina l ly

de s i gned a s a “ c i ty bus t e r. ”

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○



S E E U S A B L E N U K E O N P A G E 8

� Robert Joseph, now Senior Director for ProliferationStrategy, Counterproliferation, and HomelandDefense at the National Security Council;

� Stephen Cambone, former Principal Deputy UnderSecretary of Defense for Policy and currently theUndersecretary of Defense for Intelligence; and

� William Schneider, who is the Chairman of theDefense Science Board.

In addition, the President and co-founder of theNational Institute for Public Policy and the head of thenuclear forces study was Keith Payne. While workingfor Herman Kahn at the Hudson Institute, Dr. Payneco-authored an essay entitled “Victory is Possible” inwhich he advocated that the United States have “thecapability, and the determination, to wage nuclear warat ever higher levels of violence until an acceptableoutcome is achieved.”44 In 2001, Dr. Payne wasappointed chairman of the Pentagon’s DeterrenceConcepts Advisory Panel, and subsequently served asthe Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for ForcesPolicy in 2002 and 2003.

Other administration officials with close ties to thenuclear weapons complex or who have played impor-tant roles in the development of the counter-prolifera-tion doctrine include

� Dick Cheney, who as Secretary of Defense firstordered the military to begin planning for nuclearstrikes against countries in the Global South back in1991 and is now Vice President;

� Franklin Miller, who was the principal author ofPDD 60 and led the 1996 campaign to greatly expandthe number of targets in China and is now the SeniorDirector for Defense Policy and Arms Control at theNational Security Council; and

� Stephen Younger, who as Associate LaboratoryDirector for Nuclear Weapons at Los AlamosNational Laboratory was an outspoken advocate forlow-yield nuclear weapons and is now director of thePentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

In addition to the interests of the nuclear establish-ment, these weapons remain big business for manydefense contractors as well. Going all the way back tothe 1989 Los Alamos meeting where the ideas ofcounter-proliferation were first aired publicly, therehave been those with ties to the defense industry thathave vocally advocated the continued role of nuclearweapons in the U.S. military posture. Of particularimportance in this respect is the Lockheed Martincorporation (the largest military contractor in theUnited States for fiscal year 2002), with whom 8current policy makers have had direct or indirectrelationships.45 Lockheed receives more than $1 billion

every year from the Department of Energy to run theNevada Test Site, where new weapons testing wouldlikely be carried out, and to operate Sandia NationalLaboratories, where preliminary design work on earthpenetrating concepts is already underway. Additionally,Northrop Grumman (the country’s third largestmilitary contractor in 2002), with whom 7 administra-tion officials have had connections,46 was awarded ajoint contract in May 2003 along with Lockheed todevelop a new “point-and-click” interface for planningnuclear strikes. This new infrastructure will be requiredto handle the tenfold increase in potential targets that isprojected to occur over the next 4 years as the newposture is put into effect.47

Driven essentially by a relatively small set ofinstitutional interests with much to lose from theabolition of nuclear weapons, U.S. policy has steadilyevolved over the past decade to the point where it nowthreatens the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Compre-hensive Test Ban Treaty, and perhaps more than half amillion people from a single weapon. Lacking therestraint imposed on planners during the Cold War bythe Soviet Union, the nuclear advocates within thecurrent administration have succeeded in pushing therole of these weapons into the foreground with suchactions as the explicit naming of potential targets in anational policy document. By actively embracing thedevelopment of new nuclear weapons and the expan-sion of their role to include “deterrence” of all non-conventional weapons as well as a potential response to“surprising military developments,” the Bush adminis-tration has set the United States and the world on adangerous path toward resumed nuclear testing andglobal proliferation and, most troubling, toward thepotential first use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshimaand Nagasaki were destroyed in a pair of blindingflashes 58 years ago.

1. George Lee Butler, “A wake-up call,” Fourth World Review 108 &109 (2001).

2. Michael Gordon, “U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Weapons and NewTargets,” New York Times, March 10, 2002; and William Arkin, “Se-cret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable,” Los Angeles Times, March 10,2002.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review,” submittedto Congress December 31, 2001.

4. ibid.

5. Office of the President of the United States, “National Strategy toCombat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” December 2002; and WadeBoese, “Bush Administration Releases Strategy on WMD Threat,”Arms Control Today, January/February 2003.

6. David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, Yale Univer-sity Press, New Haven (1983).

7. Admiral L. Ramdas (ret.), “Nuclear Disarmament and South Asia,”Press Briefing at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., May 8,2000; and George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact onProliferation, University of California Press, Berkeley (1999).

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○



8. Committee on International Security and Arms Control, NationalAcademy of Sciences, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons Policy,” Na-tional Academy Press, Washington, D.C. (1997); General John M.Shalikashvili (ret.), “Findings and Recommendations Concerning theComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” January 2001; and Re-port of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representa-tives, on H.R. 2401, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994,July 30, 1993.

9. U.S. Department of State, “Statement by the Honorable Warren Chris-topher, Secretary of State, Regarding a Declaration by the Presidenton Security Assurance for Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to theTreaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” April 5, 1995.

10. Judy Aita, “Security Council Gives Assurances in Case of NuclearAttack,” United States Information Agency, April 11, 1995.

11. Office of the President of the United States, “National Strategy toCombat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” December 2002.

12. Boese, 2003, op.cit.

13. Robert Nelson, “Low-Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons,”Science and Global Security 10 (2002).

14. Walter Pincus, “U.S. Studies Developing New Nuclear Bomb,” Wash-ington Post, April 15, 2001.

15. Christopher Paine, Thomas Cochran, Matthew McKinzie, and Rob-ert Norris, “Countering Proliferation or Compounding It?,” NaturalResources Defense Council, May 2003.

16. The term Global South refers to the group of countries comprisingthe majority of the world’s population which is often referred to asthe “Third World.” The concept of a Global North and a GlobalSouth was first put forth in 1980 in a report by the Independent Com-mission on International Development Issues called “North–South:A Programme for Survival” which calls for a re-assessment of theconcept of development as well as for more equitable economic rela-tions between countries.

17. Nelson, 2002, op. cit.

18. Paine et al., 2003, op. cit.

19. Stephen Younger, “Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century,”Los Alamos National Laboratory LAUR-00-2850, June 27, 2000;and National Research Council, Commission on Physical Sciences,Mathematics, and Applications, Naval Studies Board, Committee onTechnology for Future Nuclear Forces, Panel on Weapons, “Tech-nology for the United States Navy and Marine Corp, 2000-2035:Becoming a 21st Century Force,” National Academy Press, Wash-ington, D.C. (1997).

20. Paine et al., 2003, op. cit.

21. D. Kimball, “CTBT Rogue State?,” Arms Control Today, December2001.

22. U.S. Department of Defense, 2001, op. cit.

23. Patric Garrity et. al., “The Future of Nuclear Weapons: DebatingThe Future,” Los Alamos Science 17 (1989).

24. ibid.

25. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “1990 Joint Military Net Assessment,” March1990.

26. Strategic Advisory Group of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Group,US Strategic Air Command, “The role of nuclear weapons in the newworld order,” Navy News and Undersea Technology, January 13, 1992.

27. William Arkin, “Agnosticism When Real Values Are Needed:Nuclear Policy in the Clinton Administration,” Federation of Ameri-can Scientists Public Interest Report, September/October 1994.

28. Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons ofMass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy,” British American Se-curity Information Council, March 1998.

29. T.W. Dowler and J.S. Howard III, “Countering the threat of the wellarmed tyrant: A modest proposal for small nuclear weapons,” Stra-tegic Review, Fall 1991.

30. William Arkin, “Nuclear Junkies: Those Loveable Little Bombs,”Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, July/August 1993.

31. Kristensen, 1998, op. cit.

32. US STRATCOM, “The SILVER BOOK Concept: Providing Mili-tary Options to Counter Proliferation,” July 1993. Partially declassi-fied and released under a Freedom of Information Act Request, 1995.

33. U.S. Strategic Command, “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence,”partially declassified and released under a Freedom of InformationAct Request, 1995.

34. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Opera-tions” (Joint Pub 3-12.1), February 9, 1996.

35. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on NuclearArms,” Washington Post, December 7, 1997.

36. The Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for AtomicEnergy was officially renamed the Office of the Assistant to the Sec-retary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological DefensePrograms in February 1996.

37. Greg Mello, “The Birth of a New Bomb,” Washington Post, June 1,1997.

38. Brian Hall, “Overkill is Not Dead,” New York Times, March 15, 1998.

39. Kristensen, 1998, op. cit. The Nuclear Weapons Council is a high-level government body made up of officials from the Departments ofEnergy and Defense that is charged with making policy decisions con-cerning nuclear weapons, and must report annually on its activities toboth the House and the Senate. In addition to support staff managedby the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemicaland Biological Defense Programs, the council is made up of the UnderSecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, theVice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaryfor Nuclear Security of the Department of Energy.

40. The 1993-1994 Nuclear Posture Review was the first to carry thisspecific name. Previously, incremental changes in nuclear weaponspolicy took place under the annual re-evaluation of the SIOP (Stra-tegic Integrated Operating Plan).

41. Mark Bromley, David Grahame, and Christine Kucia, “Bunker Bust-ers: Washington’s Drive for New Nuclear Weapons,” British Ameri-can Security Information Council, July 2002.

42. Nelson, 2002, op. cit.

43. Kristensen, 1998, op. cit.; and Greg Mello, “New Bomb, No Mis-sion,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, May/June 1997.

44. Colin Gray and Keith Payne, “Victory is Possible,” Foreign Policy,Summer 1980.

45. William D. Hartung and Jonathan Reingold, “About Face: The Roleof the Arms Lobby In the Bush Administration’s Radical Reversalof Two Decades of U.S. Nuclear Policy,” World Policy Institute Spe-cial Report (May 2002).

46. ibid.

47. William Arkin, “A New Nuclear Age ,” Los Angeles Times, July 6,2003.

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○


B A D O L D DAYSF R O M PAG E 1

S E E B A D O L D D A Y S O N P A G E 1 0E N D N O T E S , P A G E 1 6

then Deputy Secretary of Energy W. Henson Moore in1989, during the administration of President GeorgeH.W. Bush, on his visit to Rocky Flats in June of thatyear. Nuclear weapons production, he told the press,has been “a secret operation not subject to laws . . . noone was to know what was going on.” He added that“the way the government and its contractors operatedthese plants was: This is our business, it’s nationalsecurity, everybody else butt out.”1

The “everybody else” he was refer-ring to was not a foreign power, butthe people of the United States.

In the 1990s it seemed the nuclearestablishment might turn over a newleaf. Many nuclear weapons plants wereshut during the administration of BushI, who also signed a 9-month nuclear test moratoriuminto law in 1992, which was extended by Congress thefollowing year. In 1995, the Clinton administration agreedthat the nuclear weapons states parties to the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty were obliged to actually achievecomplete nuclear disarmament. In 1996, the United Statessigned the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. An historicstep was taken in 1993 by then Secretary of Energy HazelO’Leary when she announced an unprecedented opennessinitiative. In early 2000, the Energy department acknowl-edged for the first time that half a million nuclearweapons workers had been put in harm’s way because oftheir occupational radiation exposures.

However, evidence is increasing that the nuclearestablishment is back to its bad olddays. Plans for building a plant tomanufacture plutonium pits fornuclear weapons are marching ahead.Nuclear weapons designers are eagerto resume design of new nuclearweapons. There is more and moreserious talk of abrogating theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the U.S. Senatefailed to ratify in 1999. Environmental and healthconsiderations are once more being shoved into secondplace, if that. Secrecy is back, too. The one differencetoday is that the government is, in some cases, openlyestimating that people will be a risk and some will dieas a result of building new nukes.

The bad old daysIEER has long documented the poor environmental andhealth track record of the DOE.2 The DOE is respon-sible for developing and maintaining U.S. nuclearweapons and for managing the massive environmentalmesses created by past weapons production. A greatdeal has, in the past, been swept under the rug of

national security, only later to be revealed to be gratu-itously damaging to people’s health and the environ-ment. Examples abound:

� During the 1950s it was well known that exposure toradon and its decay products in unventilated mineswas a health hazard and increased the risk of lungcancer, but the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),DOE’s predecessor, did not require that the mines beventilated, choosing instead to emphasize production.

� From the 1940s into the 1970s,more than 23,000 people were sub-jected to radiation experiments, manywithout their informed consent. Theywere administered by the AEC, DOE,Department of Defense, NASA andDepartment of Veterans Affairs forpurposes including radiation weapon

development and determining radiation’s effects onmilitary personnel performance in the battlefield. Oneexperiment involved feeding oatmeal with radioactivetrace elements to more than 100 boys at a Massachu-setts school. Others were testicular irradiation experi-ments on prisoners to determine what doses inducesterility, and experiments on pregnant women. In1993, upon learning of a particularly troubling seriesof experiments involving the injection of plutoniuminto unknowing subjects, then Secretary O’Learyremarked, “The only thing I could think of was NaziGermany.”3

� In the 1950s and early 1960s, most workers at theFernald nuclear weapons plant near Cincinnati wereoverexposed to uranium without their knowledge or

consent. Because of the toxicity ofuranium as a heavy metal, manyworkers probably also sufferedkidney damage. Yet they were re-assured that they were not beingharmed.4

� In other nuclear weaponsplants, AEC and plant managers were aware thatworkers were being overexposed over prolongedperiods of time, yet there was no indication theyshared this information with the workers. In fact,there are documents showing that they deliberatelydeceived workers about the levels of radiation towhich they were being exposed.5

� During the 1950s and early 1960s, the era of atmo-spheric nuclear testing, the U.S. government wassecretly informing photographic film producers ofexpected fallout patterns so they could protect theirfilm supply. This practice started after the NationalAssociation of Photographic Manufacturers threat-

In the 1990s i t s e emed the

nuc l ea r e s t ab l i shment migh t

turn over a new l ea f .

However, ev idence i s i n c r ea s ing

tha t the nuc l ea r e s t ab l i shment

i s back t o i t s bad o ld days .

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

SCIENCE FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION 1 0 VOL . 1 1 , NO. 4 , S EPTEMBER 2003

B A D O L D DAYSF R O M PAG E 9


ened to sue for damages caused by exposure of theirfilm products to radioactive fallout. While warningEastman Kodak and its ilk about tests dates and winddirections, the U.S. government did nothing to informdownwinders so they could take precautions, nor didthey inform milk producers so that they could protecta vital component of the food supply.

� Poor radioactive waste disposal practices throughoutthe Cold War—like dumping high-level liquidradioactive wastes from reprocessing into tanks that arenow leaking into the ground near the Columbia Riverand injecting radioactive wastes directly into the sole-source Snake River Plain Aquifer—endanger some ofthe most important water resources in the UnitedStates and threaten human and ecological health.

Back to the bad old daysThere are three ways in which the U.S. government issliding back to the bad old days. The first involvesnuclear weapons plans and activities that are harmful tonational and global security (see accompanying articleon page 1). The second relates to reneging on promisesand plans to clean up the nuclear complex in a mannerthat would prevent radioactive and toxic wastes of pastweapons production from posing severe threats towater, soil, and future generations. The third relates tocreating new health and environmental problems andrisks from new nuclear weapons production.

In one of the most alarming and telling moves, theDOE has asked Congress to allow it to reclassify wastescurrently designated as “high-level” and hence requir-ing deep geologic disposal as “incidental waste” thatcould be disposed of in shallow burial sites. If it isactually permitted to leave vast amounts of radioactiv-ity in place in shallow dumps, capped or grouted, theDOE would be putting some of the most preciouswater resources of the United States at risk, including:

� The Columbia River in Washington and Oregon,which is the largest river in the West.

� The Snake River Plain Aquifer in Idaho, which is asole source aquifer for much of southern Idaho,where 75 percent of the country’s commercialrainbow trout are grown.

� The Savannah River in South Carolina and Georgia,and possibly the Tuscaloosa aquifer.

� The Rio Grande, downstream of Los Alamos.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is consideringallowing the wholesale release of radioactively contami-nated materials from the nuclear weapons complex intothe civilian economy, while leasing contaminatedbuildings in the complex to non-nuclear workers. Thesetwo policies have the effect of dispersing some of theradioactive wastes among the people and concentratingpeople close to some of the radioactive contamination.

Sites under consideration for the DOE’s Modern Pit Facility: Los Alamos National Laboratory and Carlsbad, both inNew Mexico; the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina; the Nevada Test Site, 60 miles from Las Vegas;and the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas.

Los AlamosNationalLaboratory

Carlsbad

SavannahRiver Site

NevadaTest Site

Pantex Plant

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○



B A D O L D DAYSF R O M PAG E 1 0

Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the governmentis now actually estimating that new weapons programswould cause cancer deaths among workers and exposethe public to significantrisks. We have analyzed twoproposed facilities.

Modern Pit FacilityThe DOE’s NationalNuclear Security Adminis-tration (NNSA) recentlyrevealed data indicating that roughly 9 workers willdie from radiation-induced cancer over a 40 yearoperating period of the proposed Modern Pit Facility(MPF), assuming normal operations and a 450 pit peryear production level.6 The NNSA wants to buildthe facility in order to manufacture more plutonium“pits” for the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Pits are the triggersthat initiate the explosion in modern thermonuclearwarheads.

The MPF would violate DOE’s own guidelines.Normal operation of a 450 pit per year facility wouldlead to average worker exposures in excess of theinternal DOE recommended administrative standard atnuclear facilities. Exposure and death estimates increaseas the number of pits per year increases and if acci-dents were accounted for. If the facility is run ondouble shifts, the Draft Environmental Impact State-ment (EIS) for the MPF notes that all “adverse healthimpacts to MPF workers would be approximatelydouble,” and therefore expected worker deaths wouldjump to 18.7

More than one in four of the potential accidentsanalyzed for the proposedfacility would violate theDOE’s own guideline forradiation exposure to thepublic, some by as much as400%. In addition, theaccidents analyzed by thegovernment represent only afraction of possible scenarios, masking the full truthabout the overall risk posed to the public.

At three of the MPF candidate sites (Los AlamosNational Laboratory, Carlsbad, and the Pantex Plant),one-third to one-half of the accidents analyzed for aplant capable of producing 450 pits per year would leadto exposures in excess of the DOE guidelines for amember of the public.8 The Draft EIS claims that oncea specific site is chosen, the agency will then determinehow to bring it into compliance with the regulations.

A specific example of the deficient analysis ofpotential accidents regards wildfires at one of thecandidate sites, Los Alamos National Laboratory

(LANL). In the immediate wake of the Cerro GrandeFire in 2000, LANL meteorologist Jeff Baars per-formed a detailed analysis of historical data to deter-mine the joint probability of strong winds and Highto Very High fire danger. His analysis concluded that

“a major fire moving up tothe edge of the laboratoryis not only credible butlikely,” and that such a firecould be expected to occurapproximately once every10 years. The Draft EIS

acknowledges that wildfires may initiate accidents atthe proposed facility, however the DOE restricted theanalysis of natural disasters to only a single case,namely a serious earthquake. While the consequencesof such an earthquake are indeed very serious, itsprobability of occurring is very small. The Draft EISestimates the likelihood of such a disaster is just 1 in100,000 years. Thus, the probability that a wild firewill occur that could threaten a pit production facilityand associated supporting structures located at LosAlamos could be between one and ten thousand timesgreater than that associated with the earthquakeconsidered in the Draft EIS.

The DOE argues that making new plutonium pits isnecessary because the pits might get old and notexplode destructively enough. However, there is noscientific basis for a decision to build an MPF for thepurpose of replacing pits in the current arsenal. DOEhistorical data show that there have never been agingrelated safety problems in the primaries, or pits, ofnuclear weapons. Reliability related aging problems inprimaries have been inconsequential. Even the MPFDraft EIS states that “To date, only minor age induced

changes have been observedand there is no directevidence that these affectpit performance, reliability,and safety.”9 While theDOE/NNSA has a capacityto make certified pits atLANL that is expected to

reach 20 pits per year by 2007, there is no seriousevidence that even a 20 pit per year capacity is needed.

The reliance on “classified analyses” in the DraftEIS10, a document designed for the purpose of invitingcomments from the public on proposed MPF plans,raises many questions as to the ability of the public toaccurately gauge for itself the need for pit production.Nearly this identical argument was used in the wake ofthe closure of Rocky Flats following a Federal Bureau ofInvestigation raid that shut the facility down for perva-sive violations of health, safety, and environmental laws.

The government i s now ac tua l ly e s t imat ing

tha t new weapons programs wou ld cause

cance r dea ths among worker s

DOE h i s t o r i c a l da ta show tha t the r e have

never be en ag ing r e l a t ed sa f e ty prob l ems in

the pr imar i e s , o r p i t s , o f nuc l ea r weapons .

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○




According to the New York Times, when asked about theEnergy Department’s stated urgency to reopen pitproduction at Rocky Flats, then Secretary of EnergyWatkins “used an argument that hisdepartment had not used since themid-1980’s: National securityrequires a prompt reopening of theplant but the reasons cannot bepublicly discussed because they areclassified.” In fact, Rocky Flats wasnever restarted and the country didquite well without it.

So if plutonium pit aging is not themain reason for building an MPF,what is? The principal motivation appears to be thecreation of a capability to mass manufacture entirely newnuclear weapons that require pits of new designs. Theoverview of the Draft EIS states:

While a small interim capacity is currently beingestablished at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),classified analyses indicate projected capacity require-ments (number of pits to be produced over a period oftime), and agility (ability to rapidly change production ofone pit type to another, ability to simultaneously producemultiple pit types, or theflexibility to produce pits of anew design in a timely manner)necessary for long-term supportof the stockpile will require along-term pit productioncapability.11 (emphasis added)

IEER has analyzed thedeleterious effects of theModern Pit Facility theNuclear Non-Proliferation and Comprehensive TestBan treaties in its comments on the MPF Draft EIS,which can be found on the web at www.ieer.org/comments/mpf.html.

Chemical and Metallurgical Research BuildingReplacement ProjectAnother proposed facility that harks back to the dayswhen the nuclear establishment in effect sacrificedhuman health based on a warped view of nationalsecurity is the Chemical and Metallurgical ResearchBuilding Replacement Project at the Los AlamosNational Laboratory.12

The Draft Environmental Impact Statement for theChemical and Metallurgical Research Replacementbuilding (CMRR Draft EIS) is perhaps the mostunusual EIS to have been issued by the DOE. The newfacility has been proposed to replace one that is half-a-century old, yet the consequences of severe accident

estimates of cancer fatalities have gone up dramatically.The most severe consequences estimated for an acci-dent at the existing CMR projects two cancer deaths inthe fifty mile radius. The corresponding estimate forthe new facility is more than 80 cancer deaths.

The CMR Replacement Facilityis proposed primarily to createadvanced capabilities for analyticalchemistry and for materials charac-terization related to nuclear materi-als, non-radioactive analogs, andother aspects of nuclear weaponsprograms that are part of the DOE“Stockpile Stewardship” Program.13

Like the MPF, the need for theCMRR building has not been

justified. The facility also will create significant risks tohuman health and the environment. The CMRR DraftEIS shows that emissions to the air from routineoperations would increase greatly. Actinide releases,including plutonium, would increase by more than 25times and there would be significant releases of fissionproduct noble gases, including krypton-85, xenon-131m, and xenon-133. The new facility would alsorelease 1,000 curies of tritium, mostly in the morehazardous form of radioactive water vapor.

The “facility wide spill”caused by an earthquake, oneof the accident scenariosevaluated in the CMRR DraftEIS, would violate the DOE’sown guideline for the most-exposed offsite individual. Thedose to that hypotheticalperson would be 4 to 10 timesthe guideline. The DOE doesnot acknowledge this potentialviolation in the Draft EIS.14

Like the MPF, the accident analysis in the CMRRDraft EIS suffers from a number of technical deficien-cies. The analysis provides no sound and sufficientscientific basis for the Draft EIS’s conclusion of lowoverall risk, given the conclusion of high accidentconsequences for several of the postulated events. Italso appears therefore to misstate the risks arising fromthe various events that are postulated.

Appendix C of the CMRR Draft EIS lists fivedifferent accidents estimated to result in cancer deathsin the offsite population within 50 miles of the facility.For instance, in case of a fire that “engulfs the entirecontents of plutonium” in the main vault, amountingto 5.7 million grams, the total estimated amount ofrespirable plutonium released would be only about onefour-thousandth of that. The event probability is

The new CMR Fac i l i ty has be en propos ed

to r ep l a c e one tha t i s ha l f - a - c en tury

o ld , ye t th e cons equence s o f s ever e

ac c id en t e s t imat e s o f c ance r f a t a l i t i e s

have gone up dramat i ca l ly.

The pr inc ipa l mot iva t i on f o r

bu i l d ing a Modern P i t Fac i l i ty

appear s t o b e the c r ea t i on o f a

capab i l i ty t o mass manu fa c tur e

en t i r e ly new nuc l ea r weapons .

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○



assumed as one in a million. And voilà, the risk to thepublic become minuscule - a chance of about 7 in amillion of a fatal cancer per year in the entire popula-tion in a fifty mile radius.

However, given the reality of intense fires in theregion, this does not appear to be a credible estimate.This kind of result may be credible in Cheerapunji,which is the wettest place on Earth, or somethingresembling it, but not in semi-arid New Mexico.Astonishingly, the CMRR Draft EIS makes no mentionof the immense Cerro Grande Fire in May-June 2000that almost engulfed LANL and destroyed more than200 homes in the Los Alamos townsite. The fire’ssmoke plume was visible from orbit and crossed a four-state area into western Kansas.15 New Mexico has beensuffering from an extended drought and is at risk oflarge forest fires. Toassume that the risk of afire in the main vaultwithout an analysis offires that have occurredhistorically, and theprobability that theymight reach the mainvault of the proposed facility, is unscientific andrenders the Draft EIS risk estimates invalid.

The possibility that the Rio Grande near LosAlamos and a considerable downstream area would beseverely contaminated with plutonium in the aftermathof the more severe accidents is also not discussed in theCMRR Draft EIS. This could be among the mostdamaging consequences of, for instance, a main vaultfire or a facility wide spill.

The root of the problem is that the inventory ofplutonium-239 and other radionuclides that the DOE/NNSA proposed to store in the proposed CMRreplacement facility is about 30 times the inventorycurrently at risk in the CMR building. The amountcurrently at risk is stated to be 200 kilograms. In theaftermath of the Cerro Grande fire, a good case can bemade that large inventories of plutonium do not belongin the Los Alamos area precisely because the entirefacility as well as the towns of Los Alamos and WhiteRock, as well as the nearby San Ildefonso pueblo couldbe seriously affected. Other pueblos and towns fartheraway such as Española and Santa Fe could be at seriousrisk. The possibility that LANL, which is now at thecenter of the nuclear weapons establishment, wouldhave to be abandoned along with its namesake town inthe event of three or four of the events described is noteven mentioned in the CMRR Draft EIS. What any ofthese events would do to the economy and society ofNew Mexico is, of course, not broached at all.

Also problematic is the omission of frank discussionof the impact of a severe accident on Native Ameri-cans. Given that one of the severe incidents postulatedmight result in high levels of plutonium contaminationthat could raise the possibility of one of more pueblosbecoming too polluted to live and farm on, and giventhe fact that Native American identity is closely tied tospecific lands, the statement by the DOE/NNSA thatoperation of the new CMR facility “would not posedisproportionately high or adverse environmental risksto low-income or minority populations living in thepotentially affected areas”16 without an accompanyinganalysis of how much plutonium would be depositedon pueblo lands is cavalier at best.

Radioactive material “recycling”The DOE is not the only nuclear agency that is regress-ing headlong to a polluting past. The U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission isproposing to releaseradioactively contami-nated materials into themarketplace. 17

A formal proposal toput contaminatedradioactive materials into

circulation in the commercial economy, either inrestricted or unrestricted form, has been reincarnatedseveral times, starting from the mid-1980s. It is still abad idea. It is still the old proposal of putting radioac-tive materials into circulation because they are deemed“below regulatory concern” (BRC).

IEER has long objected to any circulation of radioac-tively contaminated materials in the commercial economyin any guise, restricted or not. The models for calculatingestimated doses to the public from such materials havebeen shown to be inadequate, flawed, and incomplete.There can be no realistic modeling of behaviors ofmaterials that have not been sampled volumetrically andwhose contamination is subject to vast uncertainties.Alternatively, testing for surface contamination beforerelease is grossly inadequate and cannot provide a scien-tific basis for individual or population dose estimation.

Additionally, once deregulated, the process will beopen to fraud and abuse. Given the large expendituresnow being made to dispose of low-level radioactivewaste in controlled facilities, the temptations to mix insuch waste with BRC materials would be considerable.Regulators would have little control over such dilutionand cheating because they would already have deregu-lated a vast stream of materials and exempted it frommeaningful oversight. Such cheating and fraud couldcreate large-scale economic disruption.


Aston i sh ing ly, th e CMRR Dra f t E I S makes no

ment i on o f th e immense Cer ro Grande F i r e

tha t a lmos t engu l f ed LANL

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○


Dear Arjun,What is the difference between mini-nukes, low-yieldnukes, and bunker busters?— Inquisitive Ian in Idaho

Dear Inquisitive Ian,Nuke is a misspelling of “newke,” which was a favorite

alcoholic drink of the Mayans. Mini-newkes were servedin short cocktail glasses. Low-yield newkes were served inyears of drought. Bunker busters were for the guys thatwere holed up in defensive positions without anything todo. But since the Europeans took over, these terms havebeen used to describe new classes of nuclear weapons thatare in development in the United States. Before gettinginto the terminology itself, you may need some back-ground on the subject.

A low-yield nuclear weapon is defined as one with ayield of less than 5-kilotons of TNT equivalent.1 Thefirst public discussion of the low-yield weapon conceptwas done by two Los Alamos weapons scientists. Theyoffered four types of weapons designs in an article thatappeared in the Fall 1991 issue of Strategic Review.2 Theweapon types were:

� “micro-nukes”- weapons with a 10-ton yield that can beused to destroy bunkers or runways,

� “mini-nukes”- weapons with a 100-ton yield to counterballistic missiles,

� “tiny nukes”- weapons with a 1,000-ton yield forbattlefield use against enemy units, and

� exotic-technology warheads (see discussion below).

These days, the terms mini-nukes, bunker busters, andlow-yield nukes are often used interchangeably; howeverthat is not always technically correct. The term “bunkerbuster” can be applied to both conventional and nuclearbombs. A bunker buster is any bomb that is capable ofdestroying hardened targets and underground bunkers andis in the class of “earth penetrating weapons” (EPW).EPWs are designed the hit the ground at high speed andpenetrate the ground before exploding. There is a limiteddepth to which a bomb can penetrate the earth. Theweapon’s destructive effect comes from the fact that theground shock wave created by the explosion can propagateand, in effect, increase the yield of the explosion. Thisprocess is called “coupling,” where the energy of theexplosion is transferred through the ground.3

The United States currently has both conventional andnuclear EPWs in its arsenal. The largest conventional EPWweighs over two tons and is capable of penetrating six metersof concrete or 30 meters of earth. The United States hasapproximately fifty nuclear EPWs with a yield of 0.3 to 340

D E A R A R J U N

kilotons. This weapon, the B61-11, is a modified version ofanother weapon and because of this, it did not need to betested. It entered the arsenal after the 1991 Gulf War. A 0.3kiloton weapon that penetrated 3 meters could destroy ahardened bunker buried under 15 meters of hard rock orconcrete. A 340-kiloton weapon that penetrated the samedistance would destroy a target 70 meters below the surface.4

For fiscal year 2004, the Bush administration requested$15.5 million for the development of a Robust Nuclear EarthPenetrator. The administration’s goal is to have a weapon thatcould destroy a bunker that is located 300 meters belowground. As suggested above, a low-yield weapon would notserve this purpose. One option the administration is investi-gating is modifying the B-83 warhead, which can have a yieldof as much as one megaton (1,000 kilotons).5

The proponents of the development of such weaponsoften argue that because the explosion takes place under-ground, much of the fallout would be contained within theearth itself. However, careful analysis shows that thiswould not be the case.

Development of these “usable” nukes could pave theway for other new weapons. Weapons designers are insearch of more “exotic” warheads that would give themilitary a wider range of capabilities. One such example isthe pure fusion bomb. In these weapons, an explosion by afission trigger (where atoms split) causes the fusion ofdeuterium and tritium (heavy forms of hydrogen) which,in turn, releases very high energy neutrons. Pure fusionweapons would produce very little fallout (of activationproducts) in contrast to fission weapons and present-daythermonuclear weapons. Thus far, pure fusion weaponshave not proven to be technically feasible because only afission reaction is capable of creating the temperatures andpressures necessary to drive a fusion reaction that gives anet energy output. Research at Los Alamos, Sandia andLivermore National Laboratories on various projects couldlead to the development of these weapons even thoughthere is no announced goal to develop them.6

1. One kiloton equals 1,000 tons. By comparison, the bomb droppedon Hiroshima had a yield of 12-15 kilotons.

2. Thomas Dowler and Joseph S. Howard III, “Countering the Threatof the Well-armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small NuclearWeapons.” Strategic Review, Fall 1991.

3. Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, “Earth Penetrating Weapons,”Union of Concerned Scientists. No date given.

4. ibid.

5. Senator Daniel Akaka, “Nuclear Earth Penetrator Weapons: TheMyth and Danger,” Congressional Record, April 11, 2003.

6. For a more details, see Hisham Zerriffi and Arjun Makhijani, “PureFusion Weapons?” in Science for Democratic Action, vol. 6 no. 4/vol.7 no. 1 double issue, October 1998.

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○


Calculating Estimated Fatal Cancersfor Modern Pit Facility Workers

Sharpen your technical skills with Dr. Egghead’s

At o m i c P u z z l e r

Dr. Egghead and his unbelievably curious dog,Gamma, recently pored over the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear SecurityAdministration (DOE/NNSA) document, Draft

Supplemental Programmatic Environmental ImpactStatement on Stockpile Stewardship and Management for aModern Pit Facility. In it, despite attempts at obfusca-tion*, they found some remarkable nuggets of informa-tion which, after doing some simple calculations, revealthe estimated numbers of cancer deaths for workers inthe facility. Can you recreate their calculations?

The DOE/NNSA estimates that annual doses to allworkers added together will be as shown in the table.Cancer fatality estimates in a population depend on thetotal population dose (also called collective dose), whichcan be measured in “person-rem.” Person-rem is doseper person multiplied by the number of people. Apopulation dose of 2,500 person-rem is estimated tocause one fatal cancer in the exposed population.

Calculate the total dose to workers over the 40 yearlife of the facility for each of the 3 possible capacitylevels, 125 pits per year (ppy), 250 ppy and 450 ppy (a

through c in the table below).Then estimate the total number ofexcess cancer deaths expected foreach capacity level (d through f).

*While the fine print of thenumbers in the Draft EIS does showthe collective doses as in the tablebelow, the text says nothing about population doses.Rather it describes the situation as follows:

Statistically, for the average worker, a 290 mrem/yr[millirem per year] dose translates into a risk of one fatalcancer every 8,620 years of operation; a 390 mrem/yrdose translates into a risk of one fatal cancer every 6,410years of operation; a 510 mrem/yr dose translates into arisk of one fatal cancer every 4,900 years of operation.

Bonus question: Can you explain whether and how thisstatement is (or is not) compatible with the populationdose estimates for all workers and the estimates ofcancer fatalities that you have just calculated?

RADIATION DOSE ESTIMATES FOR MPF WORKER POPULATION, ALL CANDIDATE SITES

Capacity Collective dose to all workers Total dose to workers Expected number of excess(in pits per year) per year (in person-rem) over 40 years cancer deaths

125 ppy 160 (a) (d)

250 ppy 310 (b) (e)

450 ppy 560 (c) (f)

DATA FROM MPF DRAFT EIS, TABLE 5.2.9.1-2, PAGE 5-48 (SAME FOR ALL CANDIDATE SITES).

Send us your completed puzzler via fax (1-301-270-3029), e-mail ([email protected]), or snail mail (IEER, 6935 Laurel Ave., Suite 201,

Takoma Park, Maryland, 20912, USA), postmarked by October 24, 2003. IEER will award a maximum of 25 prizes of $10 each to

people who send in a completed puzzler (by the deadline), right or wrong. One $25 prize will be awarded for a correct entry, to be

drawn at random if more than one correct answer is submitted. International readers submitting answers will, in lieu of a cash prize

(due to exchange rates), receive a copy of the book by IEER and Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, Rule of Power or Rule of Law?An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties (Apex Press, 2003).

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○


The Institute for Energy andEnvironmental Research6935 Laurel Avenue, Suite 201Takoma Park, MD 20912 USA

Address service requested.

Printed with vegetable oil based ink onprocess chlorine free recycled papercontaining 100% postconsumer waste.

NON-PROFITUS POSTAGE

PAIDMERRIFIELD, VAPERMIT #1112

It is astonishing that BRC-type proposals keep comingback without any sound technical answers to the substan-tive objections along the lines above that have long beenraised. Passing liabilities from within the nuclear establish-ment onto the public encourages lax and pollutingbehavior and is damaging for public health and theenvironment. The proposal should be buried for good.

Concluding queryNew nuclear weapons plants and plans are being put

in place at a very high price – in terms of reducedsecurity, increased proliferation risks, and greater healthand environmental damage. It is a central tenet ofradiation protection that health risks imposed must beaccompanied by some benefits to the parties beingexposed. In this case, there appear to be only costs forthe vast majority. Could it be that the “benefits” ofthese programs are mainly to a nuclear weaponstechnocracy trying to perpetuate itself and at great costto the public and to future generations, as it did back inthe bad old days?

1. As quoted in The Washington Post, 17 June 1989.

2. See the IEER reports: Arjun Makhijani and Michele Boyd, Poison inthe Vadose Zone: An examination of the threats to the Snake River Plainaquifer from the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Labo-ratory, 2001; and Marc Fioravanti and Arjun Makhijani, Containingthe Cold War Mess: Restructuring the Environmental Management ofthe U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex, 1997. Also see Arjun Makhijani,Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih, eds., Nuclear Wastelands: A GlobalGuide to Nuclear Weapons Production and Its Health and Environmen-tal Effects (MIT Press, 2000).

3. Arjun Makhijani and Ellen Kennedy, “Human Radiation Experimentsin the United States,” Science for Democratic Action, vol. 3 no. 1, Winter1994, online at www.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_3/3-1/humanex.html.

4. Arjun Makhijani, “Fernald Workers’ Radiation Exposure,” Sciencefor Democratic Action, vol. 5 no. 3, October 1996, online atwww.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_5/5-3/fernwork.html.


5. Arjun Makhijani, Bernd Franke, and Hisham Zerriffi, PreliminaryPartial Dose Estimates from the Processing of Nuclear Materials at ThreePlants during the 1940s and 1950s, an IEER study commissioned byUSA TODAY newspaper, 2000. Online at www.usatoday.com/news/poison/uranium.htm.

6. See IEER’s Comments on the U.S. Department of Energy Draft Supple-mental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on StockpileStewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility, July 16, 2003,by Brice Smith and Arjun Makhijani, online at www.ieer.org/com-ments/mpf.html.

7. U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration, Draft Supple-mental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on StockpileStewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility, May 2003,DOE/EIS-236-S2 (hereafter called MPF Draft EIS),Table 3.5.1-1,p. 5-49. The risk to the entire worker population is given as 0.22 peryear for the 450 pit per year option (p. 3-39). The MPF Draft EIS isonline at www.mpfeis.com/DEISTOC.htm.

8. The accident scenarios include a “Beyond Evaluation Basis Earth-quake with Fire,” “Fire in a Single Building,” and “Explosion in aFeed Casting Furnace” (MPF Draft EIS, 2003, p. C-7).

9. MPF Draft EIS, 2003, p. G-58.

10. MPF Draft EIS, 2003, p. 1-1.

11. ibid.

12. This section borrows from IEER’s Comments on the Draft Environ-mental Impact Statement (EIS) For the Proposed Chemical and Metal-lurgical Research (CMR) Building Replacement Project at the LosAlamos National Laboratory (LANL), by Arjun Makhijani, June 30,2003, online at www.ieer.org/comments/cmr.html.

13. See Hisham Zerriffi and Arjun Makhijani, The Nuclear SafetySmokescreen: Warhead Safety and Reliability and the Science BasedStockpile Stewardship Program, IEER, 1996. Excerpts online atwww.ieer.org/reports/sbss-sum.html.

14. CMRR Draft EIS, 2003, p. C-13 to C-15.

15. M. Diana Webb and Kelly Carpenter, “Los Alamos After the CerroGrande Fire,” American Planning Association 2001 National Plan-ning Conference, March 14, 2001.

16. CMRR Draft EIS, 2003, p. 4-27.

17. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rulemaking on Controllingthe Disposition of Solid Materials, 68 FR 40: 9595-9602, February28, 2003. Online at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2003/03-4752.htm.

Nuke Strikes Back REYNOLDS ELECTRICAL & ENGINEERING...

Documents

Transcript of Nuke Strikes Back REYNOLDS ELECTRICAL & ENGINEERING...