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V. 5ta trn

(U) Dodeinq Armaeeddon:The Third'World V{aV ThatAlmost Was, tg1l

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(U) With the comfort and hindsight of a half-century, President Harry Truman's decision tocommit American power to save South Koreafrom Communist aggression in late June 1950stands as perhaps America's finest moment of theCold War. By rnaking a difficult commitment, bysacrificing 5o,OoO American Iives in the end,Truman upheld Western values and interestswhere they were directly threatened. It is easy tooverlook the unpopularity and unpleasantness ofa war which, though necessary, neverthelessremains unknown to most Americans today. Oursacrifices in Korea beginning in the disastroussummer of rgSo merit recognition and honor intheir own right, yet they deserve our attention foranother reason almost cornpletely neglected inaccounts of the period. By dispatching the 24thInfantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions frorn comfort-able occupation duty in Japan to death anddestruction in Korea in mid-summer 195o, theUnited States actualll'did nothing less than savethe rvorld from a global conflagration.

(U) The issue was found not in Asia but on theother side of the planet: in Stalin's private warwith Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. Determined todestroy Tito and his heretic Communist regime atany cost, Stalin was impatiently planning for anall-out invasion of Yugoslavia by the Soviet mili-tary and East European satellite forces. As U.S.and NATO records indicate, the thoroughlyplanned Soviet attack would have resulted inWestern military commitment and almost cer-tainly nuclear response. It would have been theThird World War.

(U) Perhaps ironically, Stalin was initiallyinflamed by Tito's revolutionary ardor.Beginning in mid -1947, Tito's intelligence appa-

ratus opened the "Greek line," supplyingCommunist insurgents in neighboring Greecer,r,ith weapons and supplies, dn effort whichquickly outpaced Soviet support to the guerrillas;IO,OOO Yugoslav "volunteers" fought alongsidetheir Greek allies too. Stalin found Tito's fenrorand undue risk-taking troubling; indeed, theGreek issue rvas the last of a long series ofYugoslav actions Moscow disliked. Stalin sentTito a letter criticizing the "Greek line," observingthat the Communist insurgency stood no chanceof success due to support for Athens by theUnited States, "the strongest state in the world." '

(U) When Belgrade astonishingly refused toback down, Moscow exacted retribution. OnJune 28, L948, Serbia's national day, Stalinexpelled Yugoslavia from the CommunistInformation Bureau the Cominform, theMoscow-led successor to the Comintern - settingoff an unprecedented conflict in Communist

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ranks rvhich would nearly provoke the ThirdWorld War. The Soviets immediately dispensedvitriolic propaganda, denouncing Tito and hisgovernment as a "spy group" in the pay ofAmerican and British "imperialism." 2 Purges ofalleged "Titoists" began with fervor throughoutthe Soviet bloc, nor,vhere more thoroughly than inHungary, the satellite on the frontline of theYugoslav menace. L6szl6 Rajk, Budapest's interi-or minister, was executed in mid-1949 for hissupposed ideological deviation, while theHungarian People's Army simultaneously saw adozen generals and 1,100 high-ranking offrcerspurged, and some executed, for alleged pro-Yugoslav sentiments.s

(U) Purges and executions were by no meanslimited to the Soviet side. The split drove a wedgethrough Yugoslav Communism. To rid his regimeof pro-Soviet elements, Tito commenced a cleans-ing of his parry, army, and secret police every bitas thorough and brutal as any Stalinist depreda-tions. Against suspected Soviet loyalists, Titounleashed his formidable secret police, UDBa,setting off an intelligence war of epic propor-tions.a The hunt for traitors, known as ibeouci(from IB or Informbfro, Serbo-Croatian for theCominform), was pursued with vigor, led person-ally by Tito and his feared secret police chief,Aleksandar Rankovic. It was a fight which Tito,the former star NI(fD iilegal, with thirty-threecovernames to his credit, was well equipped topursue.t

(U) The UDBa crackdown on suspectedibeouci was particularly severe in Montenegro,Yugoslavia's smallest republic, whereCommunism had the deepest roots and an entireUDBa division was employed to quell local dis-sent.6 Tito's fears of Soviet subversion were notmisplaced. Not only did Stalin's intelligence serv-ice, the MGB, possess numerous agents through-out Yugoslavia, but Tito's military and secretpolice were among the most deeply penetratedinstitutions. Thousands of army and state securi-ty officers trained in the Soviet Union were imme-

diately placed under suspicion; in the end, 7,oOO

army offrcers and 1,7oO UDBa officials, many ofthem high-ranking, were purged as ibeouci.Probably IOO,OOO Yugoslav Communists sus-pected of disloyalty were sent to brutal politicalprisons, where thousands died.'

(U) MGB moles existed throughout the Titoregime. Two cabinet ministers and even the headof Tito's bodyguard were uncovered as ibeouci.Particularly embarrassing for Belgrade were thedefections of many officials to the Soviet bloc.The worst incident came in August 1948, whenthree senior affny officers plotting a coup d'6tatwith Soviet backing attempted to defect. UDBacaptured Major C'eneral Branko Petricevic andColonel Vlado Dapcevic from the main political

(U) Tito rn marshal's uniforrn

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directorate, the latter being head of military agt-prop, while the third plotter, Colonel-GeneralArso Jovanovic, was killed near the Romanianborder. Significantly. all three men wereMontenegrins, while Jovanovic had been thewartime chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army. TheSoviet conspiracy could go no higher.s

(U) The ranla of Yugoslavs who sought refugein the Soviet bloc, what Tito termed the inform-birouska emigracija, swelled to 3,5oo in neigh-boring satellites, where they were put to work inthe rising propaganda war. The Soviets soonformed special combat units, including three"international brigades," in Hungary, Romania,and Bulgaria, Er ominous development forBelgrade. Their ranks were filled with Yugoslav6migr6s but others too; the 2nd InternationalBrigade, garrisoned in western Bulgaria, included6,000 "volunteers" frorn East Germany as well as

a battalion of parachutists. Significantly, its com-mander was Aleksa Micunovic, a former seniorstaff offrcer in Tito's army.e

(U) Violent border incid.ents alongYugoslavia's Iong Eastern frontiers quicklyexpanded sevenfold. Soviet-sponsored saboteurs

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(U) Tito's ruling

triumvirate:

Milovan Dlilas

(left), Edrard

!<ardell (center),

Aleksandar

Rankovic, thesecet police chief

(right)

(diuerzanry) conducted regular eross-borderraids as part of a constant insurgency campaignto destabilize Yugoslavia. UDBa border detach-ments fought frequent firefights, resulting inhundreds of deaths; according to Belgrade, in thefive years after the split, over 7AO 6migr6sattempted to infiltrate Yugoslavia from Hungary,Romania, and Bulgaria, and t6o of them werecaptured and forty were killed by Tito's securityforces. Over a hundred Yugoslav soldiers andpolicemen also died, including some senior UDBaofficers.to

(U) Stalin's declaration of war on the Titoistheresy was initially greeted with unconcealed gleeby the U.S. government. To our ambassador inMoscow, the split was nothing less than "a God-send to our propagandists," offering Washingtonnovel options in the budding Cold War. Even themore analyic Policy Planning Staff at the StateDepartment concluded immediately that thebreak amounted to "an entirely new foreign poli-cy for this Government." Yet the StateDepartment's goal of maintaining balance in theStalin-Tito struggle would prove almost impossi-ble to achieve.rl

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-GS#StlThe West at once accrued strategicbenefits from the Belgrade-Moscow split.Immediately following Yugoslavia's expulsionfrom the Cominform, Tito suspended aid to theGreek Communist resistance in Greece, evensealing the frontier, an action which trapped

(U) Stalin was determined to exterminate theTitoist menace. As Robert Conquest, the preemi-nent scholar of Soviet totalitarianism, explained,the Yugoslav upstart became "a major villainalmost at Trotsky's level in Stalin's personal psy-chodrama." Stalin planned to employ the samemethods which had silenced Trotslqy - propagan-da, intimidation, and assassination. Fittingly, hehad admonished Tito with the warning: "Wethink the political career of Trotsky is quiteinstructive." Stalin confidently informedKhrushchev, "I will shake my little finger andthere will be no more Tito." B The reality was fardifferent. In addition to the hundreds of raidsconducted by Soviet bloc conrmandos insideYugoslavia, Moscow attempted to assassinateTito on several occasions. In one case, the MGBplanned to gun down the Yugoslav Politburowhile its members relaxed over a pool table atTito's villa. AII the assassination schemes were cutshort by UDBa's tenacious counterintelligencework.'a

(tI) In response, Stalin sought a direct mili-tary solution to his Yugoslav problem.Subversion and sabotage having failed, crushingthe Titoist heresy with the might of the Red Armybecame the preferred option. The details of Sovietmilitary planning to annihilate fitoism, suspect-ed by NATO intelligence, were confirmed by thedefection of General B6Ia Kir6ly after the 1956

Hungarian revolution. KirAly, appointed com-mander of Hungary's planned invasion force, wit-nessed the Soviet bloc's decision for invasion andthe dramatic increase of his country's military inpreparalion for war. As Kir6ly recounted, a Sovietcolonel who visited his office in July 1951 casti-

i,.gated him for teaching ofificers the geography of

i"

any country but Yrrgoslavia: "Your students mustbe taught one battleground only, the territory ofthe enemy, Yugoslavia." 6

\$|The intelligence seryices of frontline satel-lite states had grown commensuratelv. The

(U) Soviet invasion plans forecast a massivepush by an infantry-heavy first echelon, com-posed of Hungarian and Romanian troops; thebrunt would be borne by the 3OO,OOO-strong

4,000 Greek

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Hung4rian People's Army, whigb would pierceYugoslav defenses in the flat northern prgvince ofVojvodina, opening the door to Belgrade, which

i would be taken by mechanized Soviet forces, forming the invasion's second, decisive echelon., While fito's forees were expected to offer stiffiresistance, a rapid, if hard-fought victory wasanticipated. Crushing Yugoslavia had become theentire raison d€tre of'the satellite armies. Thepurpose of Hungary's unprecedented militarybuildup wffi, Colonel-General Mih6ly Farkas, thear,my chief, explained, to counter "aggression byTitoist bandits against the sacred territory of oursoeialist fatherland."'e

fV/Str}In early 1951, Yugoslav feats_p[_aSoviet invasion had reached a fever pi

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(U) Washington lacked vital intelligenceregarding Soviet intentions; the SIGINT systemin particular offered few insights into high-levelSoviet military and political planning, thanks tothe treachery of AFSA employee WilliamWeisband, which compromised numerous high-level cryptologic successes against Moscow.t2Nevertheless, in August lgSO CIA assessmentsconcluded that while Yugoslavia's quarter-mil-lion-strong army might stand a chance againstthe satellite armies of Hungary, Romania, andBulgaria, the presence of six Soviet divisions inthose satellites tipped the balance; against a com-bined Soviet bloc invasion, Tito's forces would besoon overwhelmed. Hence the CIA concludedthat Yugoslav resistance was dependent "on thedegree and promptness of Western assistance." 2s

(U) Washington's concerns grew grave.George Kennan, the early Cold Warrior, initiallygreeted the Moscow-Belgrade split as an unparal-leled opportunity; Kennan reasoned that the"gain" of Yugoslavia in the Western camp offsetthe recent "loss" of China. Yet by late May 195O, amonth before Korea exploded, Kennan hadgrown concerned about a pro)ry war in theBalkans, speculating that a Soviet attack was like-ly. On June 29, 1950, four days after the invasionof South Korea, Yugoslavia topped the NationalSecurity Council's list of "chief danger spots."Moscow propaganda denounced Tito as a"Syngman Rhee" in Belgrade, heighteningWestern worries. Kennan soon concluded that alikely Soviet attack on Yugoslavia would merelybe a prelude to the Third World War.ta

(U) To ready the Yugoslav military for war,the United States embarked on an adventurous

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military assistance scheme. In the year followingthe Korean invasion, Washington providedBelgrade with $ZZ.S million in military aid; by themid-r9sos, military aid would total a half-billiondollars. In June 1951, General Koca Popovic, theYugoslav chief of staff, even visited Washingtonfor joint planning discussions. ProdigiousAmerican military assistance to Yugoslavia tvas asironic as it was unanticipated. Before the splitwith Moscow, the radical regime in Belgrade hadjustly been denounced as "soviet SatelliteNumber One" in Western media, and the U.S.-Yugoslav relationship had been tense; in the con-tested Trieste area, occupied by U.S. and Britishtroops, Tito's forces in 1946 had forced down oneU.S. C-47 cargo aircraft and shot down a second,killing the crew.2s

In addition to overt U.S. militarv aidto Tito,

(U) Four years before it had all looked verydifferent. By late September 1951, the U.S. intelli-gence community already regarded Yugoslavia asa valuable de facto ally and anti-soviet bulwark. eCIA special estimate projecting developmentsover the next twenty-four months countedYugoslavia alongside future NATO membersGreece, Turkey, and Spain in Western militarytotals, indeed as "a major increment to NATOstrength" - in the event of war with the Sovietbloc. The estimate concluded that Soviet "localaggression" against Yugoslavia was likely: "theUSSR may be compelled to act soon." T

(U) From NATO's viewpoint, Yugoslavia'r s€r'v€d os a "shield" for vulnerable Italy andGreece; Slovenia's Ljubljana Gap in particularwas a critical component of Western defenses,and in mid-tgSz Belgrade announced it woulddefend the vital gap with four corps, a dozen divi-sions in all, more than a third ofjfito's army. InSeplember 1951, the Suprerne AlJied CommanderEurope (SACEUR) ordered that Italy would bedefended at the Isonzo River line - half of whichwas actually inside Yugoslav territory.'*

(U) Despite the West's crash military aid pro-gram to Y-ugoslavia, fears ofrinvasion and a widerconflict continued to mount in NATO capitals. Inearly February 1951, the British Chiefs of Staffannounced, that a direct Soviet attack onYugoslavia I "would le-ad to world war."Washington agreed that Stalinist aggression onYugoslavia "might well be the prelude to a globalwar." NATO concerns,about what was termed a"second Korea", in Europe were increased by abroad acceptance that, unlike in Korea, aCommunist offiensirre against Tito could not belocalizedi or, 3s', the British Chiefs of Staff

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expressed it, "it is always likely that an attack onYugoslavia would spread to a global war." 2e

(U) Given NATO's overwhelming weakness inconventional forces, it was inevitable that thenuclear issue came to the fore. Within weeks ofthe invasion of South Korea, Washington hadaccepted in principle that due to the dearth ofconventional forces, atomic weapons would prob-ably have to be used to defend Yugoslavia againstSoviet attack. America's "freedom of action toemploy atomic weapons in such a localized con-flict if the situation dictates" was a jealouslyguarded prerogative, as well as the strategic logicunderpinning NATO policy towards Yugoslavia.Given that the conventional balance in theBalkans continued to deteriorate - by early 1951,not counting Soviet garrisons, Hungary, Romaniaand Bulgaria possessed standing forces morethan twice the size of Tito's army - any NATOdefense of Yugoslavia would require nuclearbacking to be viable.so

Cryptologic Quarterly

(U) Fortunately for all concerned, the long-awaited Soviet attack never came. The war feverincreased substantially with the June 25, 19SO,

invasion of South Korea; in the satellites, propa-ganda and planning grew more frenzied. ToGeneral Kir6ly, the activities appeared coordinat-ed with the putative attack on Tito: "That coordi-nation indicated that there was a direct relation-ship between the timing of the Korean aggressionand the completion of preparations for waragainst Yugoslavi a." 3t Washington's unexpeeted-ly strong response to North Korean aggressionwas dismaylng to the Soviets: If America wouldcommit two divisions at once, and eventuallymore than a half-dozen, to save South Korea,what might it do to rescue the strategically vitalTito?

(U) Nevertheless, Soviet military planningcontinued, undaunted by events in the Far East.Major maneuvers in Hungary in January 1951,involving 8O,OO0 satellite troops, simulated aninvasion of Yugoslavia; it was a dry run.Ominously, the war games placed American

(V) Planned Soviet invasion o( Vugoslavia, 1950

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ty and as an unofficial NATO associate memberfor decades to come.sa

troops in the Yugoslav second defensive echelon:war with NATO was now assumed. The SovietUnion, now a nuclear power too, was unintimi-dated by Western military power. Yet the January1951 maneuvers would be the higlr-water mark ofthe war that almost was. Thereafter, the threatslowly receded; Stalin's willingness to risk worldwar - even atomic war - waned, and plans for all-out invasion were quietly shelved. As Kir6ly, whowitnessed the high-level proceedings, recalled, astrong American defense of South Korea "nippedStalin's pet projeet in the bud." 32

(U) Stalin resigned himself to resolving hisTito problem short of all-out war. Assassinationefforts continued, spurred on by the USSR'shumiliating upset loss to Yugoslavia at the 1952soccer Olympics, an event which resulted in thedismissal of senior Soviet officials denounced ashaving "dishonored themselves and the entirenation and all people working for peace." The lastassassination plan involved the noted Soviet ille-gal Iosif Grigulevich, known as MAX, who hadbeen involved in the first, unsuccessful attempt tokill Trotsky. Grigulevich volunteered for an out-Iandish plot to kill Tito with a lethal dose of eitherplague or poison gas; it was all "childish andnaive," according to Pavel Sudoplatov, the topMGB expert in "wet affairs." And it never hap-pened. late on March 1, 19SS, the MGB sentStalin a report explaining that MA)( had not yetbeen dispatched to Belgrade. It may have beenthe last report the Soviet dietator ever read, forStalin suffered a fatal stroke in the predawn hoursof March 2. His obsession with Tito lasted to thevery end.s

(U) With Stalin gone, relations betweenBelgrade and Moscow began to slowly improve.By May 1955, when Khrushchev visited Belgrade,Soviet-Yugoslav relations had healed, though Titowould remain outside Soviet bloc military, politi-cal, and economic structures in perpeturty; therift, though no longer ominous, was permanent.For Western planning purposes, Yugoslaviawould continue to function as a strategic necessi-

(U) Until Tito's death in 198O, Soviet militarythreats remained a concern for Yugoslavia,though only the Soviet invasion ofCzechoslovakia, with its potential Yugoslav paral-lels, seriously alarmed Tito. Decades after theintelligence war which Stalin lost, Belgrade fearedSoviet subvercion and espionage. UDBa sensedSoviet machinations behind manifestations ofantiregime sentiments, partieularly Croatiannationalism, by no means entirely incorrectly.Certainly KGB interest in Yugoslav 6migr6sremained high through the 197os.3s As a result,the Yugoslav secret police monitored the activi-ties of the informbirouska emigracLl'o, especiallywhat it termed the "enemy emigration." AgainstCominformists in exile, Tito's spres showed nomercy and never forgot an enemy. As late as 1975,Yugoslav agents in Bucharest kidnapped MadoDapcevic, the army colonel arrested in 1948attempting to defect, and brought him back toBelgrade to stand trial for his continuing pro-Soviet agitation.s6

(U) In the end, robust American intenrentionto resist Communist aggression in East Asia dur-ing the blood-stained summer of 1950 ultimatelypreserved much more than the freedom of SouthKorea. That accomplishment, though consider-able and defended to this day in a war that neverformally ended, nevertheless pales by compari-son with the little-known achievement of pre-venting a world war, even an atomic holocaust.By their sacrifices, the doomed men of Task ForceSmith, the heroes of Inchon, the scarred veteransof Chosin, prevented armageddon. They fullyearned their rightful place alongside their olderbrothers in what we have lately termed "TheGreatest Generation." It is fashionable today tohail the veterans of the Second World War as "thekids who saved the world," and rightly so. Yet thefine young men of t95o did no less, though fewknew it then - or now.

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(U) Notes1. (U) Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito:

Cominformfst Splfts in Yugoslau Communism(Ithaca, I{Y, 1988), 35; Robert Conquest, Stch'n;Breaker of Nations (NewYork, t99t), 286.

2. (U) See Petar Po ak, Reznlucija Informbiroa@ije i poslije) (7agreb,1988), Zt-8o, r$-20.

3. ru) G.M. Adibekov, Kominform i posleuoen-

naya Europa 1947-1956 gg. (Moscow, 1994), 150-169.

4. (U) State Security Directorate (UprauaDr aune Bezbednostr), said by Yugoslavs to stand forLIDBa - tr:oja sudbo ('UDBa - your fate'); on its ori-gins (from its foundation in 1944 until t946, it was

known as the Department for the Protection of thePeople, or OZNa) see Milovan D elebd ic,Abaueitajna slu ba u narodnooslobodilockom ratu1941- 1945 (Belgrade, 1987), l3-4o, 41-48, 266-269.

5. U) On the UDBa chief, see Jovan Kesar andPero Simic, LEI{A: Alelcsandar Rankourc (Belgrade,

1990); Tito's own espionage career is elaborated inPero Simic,Tito agent Kominterne (Be1grade, l99O).

6. (U) Branislav Kovacevic, "O Informbirou uCrnoj Gori" in 1948 - Jugoslauija i Kominform:Petdeset Godina kasnije (R Petkovic, ed.) (Belgrade,

1998), 127-L48.

z. (U) Banac, Withstalin, ts7-t62,246-249.8. (U) Ibid., t29-13o; Christopher Andrew and

Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: TheMitrokhinArchiue and the Secret History of the KGB(NewYork, 1999), 356-357. (S) Not all defections wereone-way: in July 1949 Toma Elekes, an ethnicHungarian officer in Romanian intelligence, comman-deered a light plane and flew to Novi Sad, Yugoslavia;for his trouble, Elekes spent over a half-year in UDBacaptivity alongside numerous Cominformists - see

17th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment (TriesteU.S. Troops), lnterrogation Report, M-9OS-15,29 Jan1951.

9. (U) Ivo Banac, "Yugoslav CominformistOrganizations and Insurgent Activity: 1948-1954" inAt the Bink of Wor and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Sph?

in a Historic Perspectiue (W. Vucinich, ed.) (NewYork, 1982),240-249.

10. (U) Ibid., 243-245; Beatrice Heuser, Western'Containment' Policies in the Cold War: The YugoslauCase, 1948-53 (London, 1989), 149.

Cryptologic Quarterly

11. (U) Foreign Relorions of the United Srares

GRUS) 1948: VoI.IV (Washington, DC, 1974), ro79-

13. (U) Conquest, Stalin,297. .,' l

14. (U) Marko Lopu5ina, Ubij bli njeg st)og:

Jugoslouenska tajna polictja Ig4S-tggS (Belgsade,

1996), 101-117. ,, ,'

15. (U) B6la Kir6ly, "The Aborted Soviet MilitaryPlans Against Tito's Yugoslavia" in .At the Brink,: of Warand Peace: The Tito-Staltn Sptft in a HistoricPerspectiue (W. Vucinich, ed.) (New York, tg8?),273-276. ,

16. (U) S6ndor Mucs, A magyar ndphadseregmegszerrezdse ds fejloddse 1945-1948 (Budapest,1963), 184; Zoltan D. Barany, Soldiers qnid'Politr'cs in

lo81, 1082-1083.

Eastern Europe, 1945-90: The Cose of Hur,tgar? (New

19. (U) Kir6ly, "Aborted€oviet Military Plaps"284-5; Calloc'h, tJn dpisode oublid, rc;S'.

25 Apr 195r.

21.

22. (U) See [,...Benson,

The Korean War: fheii:SIGIITIT 'Background (CCH

23. (U) Lorraine tgs,,Keepintg Tito Afloat: The

United Stafes, Yugb$Iayia, and the CoId War(University Park, PA,!WZ), 86-88.

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24. (V) Ibid., 81-82; Heuser, Western' Containmen t', r5o- lS3.

25. (U) Lees, Keeping Tito AJloat, 13-14, tlo-trl;Heuser, Western' Containment', 162-17 O.

27. (U) "CIA Special Estimate 13: ProbableDevelopments in the World Situation Through Mid-1953" in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA UnderHarry Trumon (M. Warner, ed.) (Washington, DC,

1994), 419, 423-424.28. (U) Heuser, Western'Containment', L55-156;

Beatrice Heuser, "Yugoslavia in Western MilitaryPlanning, 1948-53" in Yugoslauia's SecurityDilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defence andForeign Poliq (M. Milivojevic, J. Allcock, P. Maurcr,eds.) (Odord, 1988), B9-r4o.

29. (U) Heuser, "Yugoslavia," L42-L43.

30. (U) FRUS 195o: Vol. I, (Washington, DC,

t97 4), 37 6-389 ; Heuser, "Yugoslavi a," l3Z, 146-L49 .

31. (tD Kir6ly, "Aborted Soviet Military Plans,"286.

32. (I, Ibid., 286-287. Kir6ly's accountceptions are widely accepted in Hungary

'(b) (1)(b) (3)-18 usc 798(b) (3)-s0 usc 403(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Interview, Dr. GGza Jeszensky, 16 Nov 2OOO;

Jeszensky.; Hungary's current ambassador inWashington, is an esteemed historian and served. as

the first post-Communist Hungarian foreign minister(rsgo-s+).

33. (U) Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov,Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an llnuanted. Witness

- A Souiet Spymaster (Boston, 1994), 335-339;fuidrew and Mitrokhin, Surord 357-358.

34. ru) For details see Pierre Maurer, Lardconcil-iation soui4to-yougoslaue 1954-1958: Illusions etd4sillusions de fito (Fribourg, 1991). \dhen MarshalZhukov traveled to Belgrade in 1957, he confirmedStalin's war plans by askingTito, "Did you know, com-

rade, what we wanted to do to you in 1951?" to whichTito replied, "You know, comrade, so did Hitler." -Heuser, Western Containment', 129.

35. (U) Marko Iopu5ina, Ubij bli njeg suog 2:Akcije Dr aune Bezbednosti protiu ipijuna 1946-1997(Belgrade, 1997), 20.3-34; Eduard Van Der Rhoer, The

Shadous Netusork: Espionage as an Instntment ofSouiet Policy (New York, 1983), 12.

36. (U) Dragan Ganovic, Teroristi iz "fieste

kolone": Dokumentarna hronika o teroristickojaktiunosti protiu Jugoslauye (Belgrade, 1979). 143-

154; Slavko Curuvija, Ibeouac: Ja, Vlado Dapceuic(Belgrade, 1990), 246-258; Milenko Doder,Jug oslauenska neprijateljska emigracij a (7agreb,1979), 133-198.

and per-today -

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