Description of document:United States Cryptologic History, Series VI the NSA Period 1952 Present, Volume 5, American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945-1989, Book I: The Struggle for Centralization, 1945-1960, Thomas R. Johnson, Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1995 Requested date:28-December-2007 Released date:04-April-2008 Posted date:23-April-2008 Source of document:National Security Agency FOIA/PA Office (DJP4) 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6248 Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6248 Notes:This book is part one of a four part series, which is also part of a larger series of NSA United States Cryptologic History monographs The governmentattic.org web site (the site) is noncommercial and free to the public.The site and materials madeavailableonthesite,suchasthisfile,areforreferenceonly.Thegovernmentattic.orgwebsiteandits principalshavemadeevery efforttomakethisinformationascompleteandasaccurateaspossible,however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content.The governmentattic.org web site and itsprincipalsshallhaveneitherliabilitynorresponsibilitytoanypersonorentitywithrespecttoanylossor damagecaused,orallegedtohavebeencaused,directlyorindirectly,bytheinformationprovidedonthe governmentattic.org web site or in this file. 1;1>IS

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American Cryptology during the Cold 1945-1989 Book I:TheStruggle for Centralization1945-1960 .. !,- ."tr- -r-----.....: .....1--,'7.===,_. --:-=. HANDLEVIATALENTKEYHOLECOMINT CO THISDOCUMENT CONTD MATERIAL NOTOFOREIGN NATIONALS CIBB.ilied by NSAlCSSM123--2 Declassify on: Originating Agency's Determination Required ::ropSECAEl JOINTLY CCH-E32-95-03 TCS-S4649-95 pproved for Releaseby NSAor] 7-31-2007, FOI.A,Case #401SE1 DOCI:D:3188691 This monograph is aproduct of the National Security Agencyhistory program.Its contents and conclusions are those of the author, based onoriginalresearch,anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheofficial viewsof theNationalSecurityAgency.Pleaseaddressdivergent opinionor additionaldetailtotheCenterforCryptologicHistory (E322). This document is not to be used as asource for derivative classification decisions. DOCID:3188691 'feP SI!CIU!T ttMIlitA UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGICHISTORY Series VI The NSA Period 1952 - Present Volume 5 A merican Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945-1989 Book I:The Struggle for Centralization, 1945-1960 'Thomas R.Johnson CENTER FOR CRYPrOLOGIC HISTORY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 1995 IIAnSb! ViA 'fAt!!'" It!1I8tl!l e8MIl'" e6!'fTfteLS'f8'!'EMS r Nor f\ELEAe'JI"!bI!J 1'6 Ji'6KBI8p.; TOPSEERIiT U.,BItA' DOC:rD:3188691 MP SEERE1' YMBIYt Table of Contents Page Forewordxi Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..xiii Acknowledgementsxv BOOK I:THE STRUGGLE FOR CENTRALIZATION, 1945-1960 Chapter 1:Cryptologic Triumph and Reorganization, 1941-1949 World War II and the Intelligence Revolution1 The Way COMINT Was Organized atthe End ofthe War7 TheCJO11 The Cryptologic Allies13 Chapter 2:AFSA and the Creation ofNSA The Stone Board23 AFSA26 The Brownell Committee33 Korea36 The Country36 The Asia Dilemma38 The Invasion40 The Murray Mission41 Counterattack43 China43 AFSA and ASA Operations46 White Horse Mountain48 AFSS Introduces Tactical Warning48 The Navy51 The AFSA Factor52 Relations with ROK COMSEC and COMINT62 Korea - an Assessment64 Chapter 3:Cryptology under New Management Canine and the New Organization62 The Early Work Foree63 Fielding the Field Offices67 Civilians in the Trenches - the Civop Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..69 COMINT Reporting in Transition69 IbtdiBhB yr..... 'fl!d:1Bfff liB...uel:lB 8eMUff 8efffRebB"lBftMB4elffftll ", .. __ ,. .'''''I __:IF.A1iIAJltf.J[ u_.__Ti . 0POftZlCM mUIOmL'LS iii~ P i i C A E T ~ I ~ DOC:rD:3188691 ................ NSATraining-the Early Years. Setting Up Security0 00' 0 0 DOCID:3188691 ~Poreword (U)TheCenterforCryptologicHistory(CCH)anditspredecessorshave published thirty-seven volumes - monographs,crisis studies,source documents, bibliographies - concerningthe historyofsignalsintelligenceandinformation systemssecurity,the yinandyangofmodemcryptology.Thesepublications havetreatedspecificevents,organizationalissues,andtechnical developmentsinpeaceandwar;mosthavebeenpioneeringefforts,basedon originaldocumentation,and,inmanycases,arethefirsthistoryoftheir particular topic inanyvenue. (U)Therehasbeenastrong need,however,forasingleworktoundertake the fullsweepofcryptologichistory,providingacontextintowhichthemore specializedstudiesmaybeplaced.SuchacryptologicCook'stourshould incorporatethemilitary-politicaleventsofourtimeandthehistoryof interactionbetweencryptologicorganizationsandothercomponentsofthe intelligencecommunity- accesstoSIGINTandINFOSECislimitedto "Insiders," butit isclear that cryptologic operations donotoccur inavacuum. (U)ThomasR.Johnson'sAmericanCryptology during theColdWar,19451989meetstheserequirements admirably.Drawing onover adecadeof study andreflectiononcryptologichistory,Dr.Johnsondealswiththreefacetsof cryptologichistory:firstheexplainshowcryptologyrespondedtothe landmark events andchallenges of the post-World WarIIera.Henextprovides profoundanalysisofhoweventsandpersonalitiesaffectedthedevelopmentof cryptologyinstitutionallyandprofessionally.Finally,andevenbetter,Dr. Johnsonspinsafascinatingtaleofthesuccessorfailureofcryptologic operations in the various crises that have challenged the SIGINT system. (U)WithBooksOneandTwoofthisprojectedfour-bookworknow available,AmericanCryptology duringtheColdWaris"mustreading"forthe cryptologicprofessional.Thenarrativeandanalysisinthesefirsttwobooks areessentialbackgroundforunderstandinghowthecryptologiccommunity progressedtoitspresentconfiguration.Thisisthedefinitiveworkon American cryptology after WorldWar II. (U)For readers whomaywishto exploreAmerican cryptology prior to the modernperiod,Irecommendasacompanionpiecetothepresentbook,Dr. RalphE.Weber'sMaskedDispatches:CryptogramsandCryptologyin IIMiBhI!l Y+A'f1t1:d!!fIP IU!I"liI6U e6MIIf'l' e6f4''l'ft6L S1STl!:MS J O I ~ T L lNOT BE! F. Ii nIlI.oIl '1'9 P9ftllJ18!f U')\YION ALS xi ~DOCID:3188691 AmericanHistory,1775-1900(CCH,1993).Twomoreusefulbookswith backgroundonpre-WorldWarandWorldWarIIcryptologyareFrederickD. Parker'sPearlHarborRevisited:UnitedStatesNavyCommunications Intelligence,1924-1941(CCH,1994)andThomasL.Burns's TheOrigins of the National Security Agency,1940-1952 (CCH,1990). David A.Hatch Director, Center forCryptologic History IWJQlsil YI/io '; \bilI'F'; KilYII9hlil El9MIU'f e8tflt'Reb S1'S'feMSd'elfflfb ___- - 8 P6ft!J16IHHc'fl8UAtJ9 frf8'f Rfi!I-;fi!ARARI.1i! 'ff xii DOC:rD:3188691 Tgp SECRET l:fMIRX Preface What It Is and What It Is Not ThisbookisintendedtobeageneraloverviewofU.S.government cryptologysincetheendofWorldWarII.Itisprojectedtobeafour-book study carrying thestory to theendoftheColdWar,symbolizedbythefallof the Berlin Wall. Ihaveattemptedtoincludetheentireeffort,whichincludestheService CryptologicAgencies(astheywereoncecalled),aswellascertainCIA programs.Theseorganizationscomprisedalmostt-petotalltyofthe cryptologiceffortsofthefederalgovernment,althoughotherorganizations (FBIisagoodexample)haveoccasionally dabbledinthe discipline.Becauseit iscomprehensiveratherthanstrictlyorganizational,itcontainsinformation aboutthefieldsites,intermediateheadquartersandtheSCAheadquarters themselves.Itdoesnotcoverindetailtheorganizationalaspectsofthe creationoftheNationalSecurityAgency.Thatiscoveredingooddetailin ThomasL.Bums'sbook,TheOriginsoftheNationalSecW"ityAgency:19401952,pUblishedin1990.Thusthe coverageofeventsbetween1945and1952 issketchyandsimplytriestofillinblanksIntherecordthattheBurnsbook didnotcover. Thisisnotahistoryofprivateornongovernmentalcryptology.Although ItcoversrelationshipswithourSecondandThirdPartypartners,itdoesnot focus onthat aspect either,exceptas it contributedto the developmentof our owneffort.Ourlong-standing debttotheBritishcryptologtceffortat GCHQ shouldnotgounnoticed,however.It deservesa separate book. Ifyouarelooking forahistoryof yourspecificorganization,youwillnot findit.Thisisahistoryofevents,notorganizations.Theimportanceofthe cryptologiccontributiontoAmericansecurityissobroadastoobscure individualorganizationsand,often,thespecificpeopleinvolved.Incertain cases,however,Ihaveidentifiedmajorindividualcontributorstocryptologic history or thosewhowere,bychance,thrown intomomentous events. TwooverarchingthemescharacterizedAmericancryptologyfromtheend ofWorldWarIItotheendofthefirstNixonadministration:centralization andexpansion.TheSIGINTsystemunderwentaperiodofalmostunbroken expansionfrom1945totheAmericanretreatfromSoutheastAsia.These themes dominatethe firsttwo books inthe set. TheendoftheVietnamWarandtheeraoftheWatergatescandalsthat followedmarkedawatershed,andnewthemesofretrenchmentand decentralizationmarkedtheperiodthatfollowed.Thesewillbethethemes that open BookIII. THOMAS R. JOHNSON HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE COMINT CQNTROb S'181 EMS JOlNThY TO FOREIGN NATIONALS xiiiTge SECAIiT l:fMIRX (3)-P.L.86-36DOCID:3188691 (1)_(b)(3) OGA Acknow:ledgements My debttoothers beginswith.thestaff6fthe NSAArchives,whodroP1lE'dwhatever they weredoingwhenev,r I .theArchiveshelped with photographs, anp the staff in L32 produced. hundreds of black and white prints togo into the/.... E31 (Ge?graphics) did most oftbe map work.My debt also Ulcludes the CIA stati' histonans, ..... ....J who guided my work and opened doors to CIA materiaL. My thanks also go to the editorial staff' of Barry CarleenrI an{tYiho,for days on end, did nothing but edit this history.It was the longest work that the forCryptologid. History has attempted, and I am sure it taxed their patience, although they never said so.Also owing to theand complexity of the book, the NSA photo laboratory (E23) and NSA's printing $ervices (Y19), which did the photo reproduction and printing of this book, should he recognized for their major efforts to get out thepraise for the cover graphics. In theCryptologic Agencies, James Gilbert and Jack Finnegan, the INSCOM historians, were very responsive to my need for Army cryptologic materials.A special debt is also owed the' historical staff at the Air Intelligence Agency.Everyone on the staff, from James Pierson (now retired) to Jo Ann Himes to Joyce Homs to Juan Jlmenez, responded almostinstantlytomymanyrequestsforinformation.Their helpreso.ltedinarather morethoroughtreatmentofAirForcecryptologythanwouldhavebeenpossible otherwise. The history itself has had a large number of "readers" who plowed through the various drafts and .revisions offering helpful comments and additional information.in the Center for Cryptologic History (CCH) had ahand in its improvement, as well as a list of other readerswhocritiqued variousportions.Among them,DavidGaddy Ireserve special note for their help with the chapter on Vietnam.'---The history also had agroup of "general readers," senior Agency officials whoagreed toreadthe entireworkin draftstate.MiltonZaslow,CecilPhillips,DonaldParsons, EugeneBeeker,andDavidBoakspentlonghoursporingovervariousdrafts,offering comments and encouragement and correcting information. Finally, I wish to thank all those who, over the years, volunteered their time to sit for oral history interviews.NSA owesthem all adebt of gratitude fortheir contributions to retrieving otherwise vanished information. THOMAS R. JOHNSON HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE COMINT COJOINTLY NOTRELEIGNNATIONALS xvTOP SFcAH ttMBn-DOC:ID:3188691 TOP SgBR tlff'BkA-Footnotes Thetextisfootnotedthroughoutwithshert,abbreuiatedcitations.Morecomplete informationcanbeobtainedintheBibliography.HowelJer,afewcommentson certain footnote abbrelJiations are in order. The largest number ofcitations is fromthe Cryptologic History Collection,which is the working fileof the Center forCryptologic History.This collection is organized into sixteen series, andcitations to toot collection begin with the series number and a series ofnumbers, e.g., CCH Series V.A.29. Citations fromthe NSA ArchilJes lJarydepending on whether the document was part of an archiued collection or was still in the Retired Records collection when researched.The former begins with the accession number, followed by a location, e.g.,ACC 16824,CBTB 26. The latter begins with a box number,followed byashelflocation, e.g.,28791-2,80-079. A general bibliography andan index are included at the endofBook II. .... HANDLE VIATALENT KEYHOLE COLSYSTEMSJOINTLY NOTTO FOREIGN NATIONALS xvii!9P 5FCR!T O M B ~DOC:rD:3188691 IOP 5&CRET ttMBRJ{ Chapter 1 Cryptologic Triumph and Reorganization, 1941-1949 The combinedU.S.U.K.COMINT operation or World War IIwas perbaps the most successful large-scale intelligence operation in bistory. I~ 1 . A : 1 9 7 1WORLD WAR II AND THE INTELLIGENCE REVOLUTION TheSecondWorldWarbeganatrue"revolution"inintelligence.Theimpactof intelligence on the strategy and tactics of the Allies (andtoasomewhat lesser extent on theGermans andJapanese)wastrulyrevolutionary,anditis justnowcomingtobe recognizedforwhatitwas.ThroughthepublicationofbookslikeFrederick Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret and John Masterman's The Double CrossSystem and by the massive declassification of war records begun by the British and Americans in 1977, the true extent of this influence is now emerging. Nootherintelligencesourcehadthe revolutionaryimpact of SIGINT.WorldWarII was, in the words of historian Walter Laqueur, "a SIGINT war."The influence ofSIGINT was 80 pervasive that it is now hard to imagine howwemight have foughtthe war without it. Even prior to the direct engagement of American and British forces against the Germans andJapanese,twoof theirmostcomplexcipherswerebroken.TheBritisheffortat BletchleyParkfirstproducedplaintextreportsfromtheGermanENIGMAsystemin September1940,thesamemonththat asmallArmyteamunderWilliamF.Friedman brokethe Japanese diplomaticcipher machinecalled PURPLE.ByFebruary of 1942 the Navy had broken the JapaneseFleet Operational Code,called JN25.In 1943 the Army broketheWaterTransportCode,whilein1944aluckybattlefieldretrievalof cipher materialallowedtheArmytoreadtheJapaneseArmycodes.Whencombinedwith successesindirectionfinding,trafficanalysis,andtheexploitationofplaintext communications, SIGINT yielded a torrent of useful information. British achievements have come in forthe most scrutiny (and praise).Weknowthat Churchill "revelled" in his ability to read Hitler's mail and spent hours pondering on Nazi strategy as revealed in the decryptedmessages.The British set upaveryefficient and secure systemfor disseminating SIGINT, the precursor ofour SSO (Special Security Officer) system.Always wary of the "blabbermouth" Americans, they insisted that weadopt their system before they would share everything in the SIGINTlarder with us.As the Combined Chiefs prepared for Overlord, they knew precisely howthe Germans were reacting tothe invasionplansandwheretheywerepositioningtheirunitsfortheexpectedblow. HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE COMINT CONOiR8bS i SI'EMSJOINTLY TO FOREIGN NATIONAlS 1~..(b)(1) (b)(3) QGA DOCID:3188691 1'6' Moreover, once the invasion was launched, they knewwhat the Germans were doing and were able to adjust accordingly.As Allied troops moved across France, they moved in sync with the gold mine of intelligence which detailed most of the important German military movements.Their intelligence officers must have looked like geniuses - they were able to predict German moves before they happened and could advise commanders how to react.If every dog has its day,this wasthe day of the 0-2, the military intelligence officer.The product of breaking high-grade ciphers was called ULTRA,and it was sogood that when it was not available, as it was not at the Battle of the Bulge, the 02 corps scarcely knew what to do.A fewpredicted the German offensive, but most did not.They were weddedtothe SSO and the bonanza ofinfonnation that he could provide. ThePacificwastheAmericantheater,and theU.S.wasassuccessfulthereas the British were in Europe.Navy cryptanalysts broke JN25 in time for Admiral Nimitz to use itintheBattleof CoralSeainMayor 1942.Thesuccessof strategicSIGlNTwasso important that Nimitz had become a permanent convert.When the cryptologists at Pearl Harbor came to Nimitz with information outlining a much bigger battle shaping up in the central Pacific,theadmiralwasquicktobelieve and quicktoact.Tohis dyingdayhe credited SIGINT with the key to the victory at Midway.This tumed the war in the Pacific completely around and launched Nimitz on his Central Pacific campaign whichtook him to Okinawa.He considered SIGINT as an absolutely critical component, and he learned to useinformation fromboththe high-grade ciphertrafficandthe plaintext messagesand operator chatter.Some of his subordinates were as successful as Nimitz in the use of this intelligence, some were not.But it is hard to argue with results. SIGINTand MacArthur had aturbulent marriage.The commander in the Southwest Pacific had outstanding success in using SIGINTon Someoccasions,the most conspicuous successcominginhis1944NewGuineacampaign.Therewerealsosometailures resulting from several causes.His staff never came totrust SIGINT as didthat of Nimitz. Whentheydiduseit,itwassometimeshardtogetit meldedintothebattleplan,as MacArthurwasaclassicalintuitivedecisionmaker.Jurisdictionaldisputesbetween MacArthur and the War Department in Washington caused him tocometo distrust this strange 580 lash-up which he could not control because it did not work for him. Inthebattleforthesealanes,SIGINTagainplayedadecisiverole.TheJapanese merchant marine was devastated largely because its movements were being given away in theWater Transport Code.Sinking thedefenselessandslow-movingmerchantvessels was relatively easy when their movements wereknown beforehand.In the Atlantic, the U.S.and theBritish useddecryptedENIGMAmessagestotrackGermanU-boatsandto drivetheirwolf packs fromthesealanes.Thiswasnotquiteaseasyasgoinganer merchantmen, and themarriage between SIGINTinformation and operational procedures to effect a kill represented a very high level of military and technological expertise.It may have been the most difficult and delicate use ofSIGlNT during the war. "I,'. 'Ils'zWlloPl' Kl!llR19&1!l e8MIn'f e8!ft"R6t< s l'SftMSofomTt'Y !of6'f ItlU;!lASABhe 1'0 ,2 DOC:rD:3188691 'Fe' One other wartime accomplishment would become significant in later years.In 1944 theBritishandAmericansestablishedaTargetIntelligenceCommittee(TICOM)to interrogate captured GermanCOr.IINTpersonnel.Themajor objectivewasCOMSEC- to determine how well the German cryptologists had exploited Allied communications.The flip side of that effort was COMINT - to see how well the Germans were doing against other, and particularly Soviet, communications.TICOM was at Bletchley Park, headquarters for the British cryptologic service, Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS).Six teams of American and British COMINTerswere dispatched to the battlefields of theContinent. Theysenttheir"take"totheDocumentCenteratGC&CS.Theoriginaldocuments remained there whilethemicrofilmcopiesweresent ontoWashington.TICOMteams also captured equipment.One-of-a-kind equipment remained at GC&CS, while duplicates were sent to the United States. The new system was so successful that teams were established in the Pacific, with the British taking theleadinSoutheast Asia,theUnited States inthe CentralPacificand Japan,and jointAmericanandAustralianteamsinRabaulandBorneo.Although TICOMwasformallydissolvedinNovemberof1945,AmericanandBritishexperts continued to exploit the material foryears afterward, and TICOMwas later re-created in the United States as TAREX (Target Exploitation), minus British participation. If the strength of American SIGINTwas in providing militarily useful information, its weakness was in its organization.The Army and Navy were at constant loggerheads over thecontrolof cryptology,andattimesthefactionaldisputeswerelittleshortof catastrophic.BritishhistorianRonaldLewin,agreatadmirerof Americantechnical ingenuity which yielded the SIGINTbonanza, was frankly contemptuous of our inability to get along: The old antagonism and suspicion between Army and Navypersisted in amanner that may at times seem infantile, until it beremembered that tribal loyalty, narrowne88 of vision, and sheer egocentricitycanmakeeven themost senior and hardened officers occasionally enter asecond childhood.! Army and Navy cryptologic organizations had a long and inglorious history of failing to coordinate their efforts, dating back to the 1920s.In 1940, when the Army's success in breaking Japanese diplomatic cipher systems becameknowntotheNavy,there ensued lengthy anddifficultnegotiationstodeterminehowtheeffortwastobedivided.They finally arrived at a Solomonic solution by which the Army processed Japanese diplomatic trafficoriginating(i.e.,cipherdate)onevendaysof themonthwhiletheNavywould processtraffic fromodddays.Thisresultedin afairdivisionpolitically,but fromthe standpoint of cryptanalytic continuity it was a horror.To make matters even worse, there wasinthosedaysnothought,noconcept,of centralizedandcoordinatedintelligence analysis.Whatlittleanalysisandinterpretationwasdone(andtherewasverylittle indeed) was accomplished by each service on the traffic which it had decrypted, leaving for each acheckerboard pattern of informationin whichevery other daywas left out.This ltAffBl5B 'ItA T/(h!N'TeeMUft een'!'ftehSi ;tOUfthW NOT REIIi: A Ii AIIIi: W N NAlFI9tU\WJ 3 'fAPDOCID:3188691 'f6p S!eR!'f I:JMJtAA almostinconceivablesituationpersisteduntil1942,whendiplomatictrafficwas,by mutualagreement,lefttotheArmy,whiletheNavyconcentratedonJapanesenaval material.2 ThedisasteratPearlHarbor resultedinathoroughgoingArmy internalinvestigation.Secretaryof WarHenryStimsonpickedYale lawyerAlfredMcCormacktoleadthe way.McCormackdiscovereda scandalouslyincompetentArmy02 andanonexistent SIGINTanalysis and disseminationsystem.Hesetupa separate system called Special Branch, Military Intelligence Division, and was pickedasthefirstdeputy.(Colonel CarterW.Clarkebecamethefirst commander.)Atthesametime,the ArmyandNavyarrivedatajoint modus operandi regarding the division of overall SIGINTresponsibilities.Each servicewastoworkwhatwenowcall "counterpart" targets.Since there was littleinthewayof JapaneseArmy traffictowork,theArmytookonthe task of diplomatic intercept.The third partnerwastheFBI,whichshared Alfred McCormackwiththeNavythetaskofworking WesternHemisphereagentandclandestinetraffic.Thesethreeweretobetheonly participantsinSIGrNTforthedurationof thewar.Roosevelt'sdirectiveof July1942 specificallyexcludedtheFCC(FederalCommunicationsCommission),Officeof Censorship, and the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) from SIGINT production .s Atthe same time astanding committee of Army, Navy, and FBI COMINT officials was established.It metonlyafewtimesandhadlittlelastingimpactonorganizational matters.Meetings were frequently marred by vituperative arguments, especially between NavyandFBI,whichweresupposedtobesharingWesternHemisphereclandestine traffic.It was not cryptology's finesthour.Meanwhile,the COMINTactivities of the FCC and Censorship Bureau continued virtually unabated:Only the OSS seems tohave been temporarily frozen out of the COMINT community.Resurrected after the war as the CIA,it ffM1BbS b't T....bSPf'F IEBYIIlbfil SlftfUfi e8tl''f'ft8b36Iff'f'LY ______ t) NUl Tt 10F 5I!CRE'f4 DOCID:3188691 l'OP exactedrevengeoveraperiodofmanyyearsforhavingbeenexcludedfromwartime cryptology. ":"',.1.1,;';1 .. 1-:.."'.1';""{'''-.'-:.' :ji jO:.Jh:..... J,,,....'{,.. ;'" . ,tidr, '.".... 14 ':il ..._","..,.".II;,IF '" ';'t!.. ",.' I,tl"f;f{f" 't;JIf" 'J:;1\. ,:,. ;.,.}fj .. r -. ;:;;;-f'f'."i.JfJ..\""'4 -/ ..,.1 . >. .-: ':':,':'" '''/! rI".'"r,\,/ i,li':, ,/1', . !'I"':(j:1,'.iet4',:",;';W.:'t',,'1,..;'After months of meetings and conferences, the two sides sat down in March 1946 to siP:. the British-U.S., or BRUSA, Agreement.The paper which charted the future course ofcountries was onlyfourpageslong.(Thepolicyconferenceatwhichitwassignedwasfollowedbya technicalconferencewhichwroteallthefineprintappearinglateras.annexesand appendices.) I With the signing of the BRUSA Agreement, the BOURBON liaison offices on both sides of the Atlantic becamerepresentatives of STANCIBand LSIB: eBOURBONoltlcer, Commander Grant Manson, was invested WIth the rather cumbersome title of U.S.Liaison Officer,London SIGINTCentre (LSIC,as GC&CSwas then known) - or USLOLSIC.He reportedtoSTANCIBthrough thedeputy coordinatorforLiaison,part of thenewCJO structure.In early 1946 the British moved LSIC from its wartime location at Bletchley to Eastcote,outsideLondon,andbeganusing anewtitle,GovernmentCommunications Headquarters,orGCHQ.SpaceforMansonwasprovidedat Eastcote.TheBOURBON I I1rImI::P.l ....12\ T1rtJ!lffP !U!I....U8b8 68MUff e8ff'fft8b8....8IF8M8lJ8lffPhY J:fQlI' Riibii \oil Rblil 'IlQ16 DOC:rD:3188691 -l9Pliaison officehad maintained an office in London, and Manson had to cover two locations, in Eastcote and London.(This situation continues to this day, with NSA holding offices in bothLondonandCheltenham.)USLOnevercontrolledtheTICOMgroup,whichalso found quarters at Eastcote.21 The British, meanwhile, had amore difficult problem.While the U.S.dealt with only oneCOMINTorganization,GCHQ,theBritishhadtwo- theArmyatArlingtonHall StationandtheNavyatNebraskaAvenue.Notwishingtochoose,theBritish diplomatically located their liaison officer in the State Department building in downtown Washington.(They did, however, maintain a technical staff at Arlington Hall.)Their first liaison officer was Colonel Patrick Marr-Johnson. who had signed the BRUSA Agreement fortheBritishside.Whenheretiredin1949.hewassucceededbyTiltman,whowas alreadywellknowntotheAmericansandhadservedforatimeasTravis'sdeputyat GC&CS.This began apractice, continued to this day, of assigning very senior cryptologic officials to the respective liaison offices. and the USLO eventually became SUSLO - Senior U.S. Liaison Officer ,22 AndwhereweretheBritishDominionsinallthis?Theywerementionedinthe BRUSA Agreement, and it was agreedthat they would not be termed Third Parties. but they were not direct and immediate partners in 1946.Arrangements that Great Britain might make with them would becommunicated toSTANCIB.STANCIB,in turn.would make noarrangement with aDominion without coordination with LSIB.Thus thenowfamous UKUSA Agreement was notthat at all;at least to beginwith.It wasaBRUSA Agreement.HowitbecametheUKUSAAgreementwasadevelopmentthatspanned another eight years. Of thethreedominionswithwhichtheAmericanseventuallyassociated.the relationship with Canada began first.Canadian-American SIGINTcooperation appears to have begun in 1940, in the form of service-to-service collaboration between the respective armies andnavies.Thesedecentralized arrangements wereeventuallyovertakenbya centralizedrelationshipcentering ontheExaminationUnitof theNationalResearch Council. established in 1941 as one of those clever cover terms denoting a Canadian SIGINT organization.Its purpose was to traffic to and from the Vichy delegation in Ottawa. This unit's controlwas gradually broadened until it was the dominant forcein Canadian cryptology.(Itwasthelinear predecessor of the postwarorganizationCommunications Branch. National Research Council [CBNRC] and its successor. Communications Security Establishment [CSEJ.)By 1943 it had its own submarine tracking room and was receiving plots fromtheBritish based onENIGMAdecrypts.WhentheBritishbegancooperating with the U.S.in 1941, they requested that the U.S.bring the ExaminationUnit intothe scope of the cooperation.But the Americans were leery.They knew that the Examination Unit had been established by Herbert O.Yardley, the renegade American cryptologist who had publishedcryptologicsecrets in 1931inTheAmerican BlackChamber.The Signal IntelligenceService,whichhad beenvictimizedbyYardley'srevelations,informedthe IIhlfBI:iH 'lIft 'foAYrfIP IEH1I8I:iB e8MIN'f e8nfR8bS"i'S'fI!lMS481N'fLY )lQll' RlilhH,'.8,\8M!I "8 P8Ri!18U 17 .mp (b)(1) (b)(3) -SOUSC403 DOC:ID:3188691 (b)(3)-P.L.86-36 (b)(3)-18USC798 'Mil tillBritishthattheywerewillingtocooperateonlyif Yardleywereletgo.TheBritish, holding no brieffor Yardley, had the Canadians get rid of him, and coIlaboration with the Americans flowered.By April of 1942 details of the Canadian-American cooperation were hammered out.Collaboration was particularly close in direction rmding (DF)ofGerman naval vessels. ut the Uniled States was suspicious; Canada had just been through a major spy scandal, the Gouzenko affair (chapter 4), and USCIB wanted to go slow.Making matters wo""wastheheed of the Canadian :iCY committeeonCOMINT,eretherprickly cbaracte1fefused for several years toadopt some of the (b)(1)securityproceduresWhiChthe0 mtedtates andGreat Britain had agreeduponat the whiletheUnitedStateswantedaformaldocumenton

Major General C.P. Cabell.Thu?dl&Wlton the battle of teegal documentation while the United States got its way on Furthest fromthemainstreamweretheAustralians.British-AustralianCOMINT collaborationappearstohavebegun,inthelate1930swhenasmallAustralian cryptographic organization under the Director of Naval Intelligence began working with theBritishFar EasternCombinedBureau(FECB)inSingapore.Inearly1940an Australian naval commander named T.E. Nave set up the nucleus of an Australian SIGINT group in Melbourne, which was the origin of the modern Australian SIGINTorganization. ItsmostimportantorganizationwastheCentralBureau,setupinApril1942asa combinedAustralian-American COMINTgroup.Whenthe Americans departedin 1945, the Australian remnant of Central Bureau became Defence Signals Bureau (DSB). The British were determined that DSBshould enjoythe same status on BOURBONas the Canadian, and,immediately after thewar,began including the Australians in their technicalexchanges.But in 1947this procedure became embroiled in alengthy dispute over Australian security practices.The procedures in dispute were arcane, and the origins were almost as difficult to fathom, but both apparently originated with a spy scandal. In 1947 SIS succeeded in decrypting someKGBmessageswhichhad been sent more than ayear earlier and which contained certain classified British military estimates.The messages came fromthe Soviet embassyin Canberra,andit wasimmediatelyassumed thatanAustralianwaspassingclassifiedinformation.TheBritish,alertedbythe Americans, sent Sir Percy SiIIitoe, chief of British Secret Service, to Australia to discuss this with the prime minister.Sir Percy was under instructions to conceal the origins of the information,andwhentheprimeminister,aLaboritenamedChifley,demandedproof, Sillitoemumbledsomethingratherlameaboutapossiblemole.Afterconsiderable I1MfBbfi VIA'Mbfi'f1f lil!lTlil8fJ8 88MUfIf 88n!nebe8'fI!lIlI8lf81ff'flilt 'f8' 'l'8 P8ftf!18ff If1d'I8IfI'cb8 18 Ibl(1) Ib)(3) -50USC403 Ibl(3)-18USC798DOCID:3188691 Ibl(3) -P.L.86-36

discussion, Chifley agreed to establish a neYiAustralian security organization, called the Australian Security Intelligence Organization.\ With the Australian security housesupposedly in order,theBritish primeminister, Clement Attlee, intervened with President Trumall to get a new hearing of the Australian matter.Attlee complained in a letter to Truman that: The intermingling of American andBritish knowledge.iliaU these fieldsis so great that to be certain of denying American claseified information to tlil! we should have todeny themthe greater part of our own reports.We should thus hi! plllced in a disagreeable dilemma of having to choosebetween cutting off relations with theUniujd States in defencequestions or cutting offrelatioDs with Australia.24 With matters at the crisis level, Attlee proposed to Truman that Sir Francis Shedden, the powerfuland respected Australian defenseminister, theUnited States toplead the case.Truman accepted, and Shedden visited Washington inApril.But he was unable to sway USCIB, and the British were back to their dilemma - to choose the United States or the Commonwealth as allies.In 1949 the outcome was anything but certain. Then one of those unexpected quirks of fate intervenedwas to save the day:the LaborgovernmentunderChifleywent downtodefeatat thepOlls,\andRobertMenzies formedanewLiberal-Country Party coalitionin December.TheconservativeMenzies was able to successfully disassociate his government from the leftist. elements of the Labor government.This was critical since the actual source of the leaks was known (through the VENONA project; see chapter 4)tobetwoleftists within the Australian diplomaticcorps. WithaConservativegovernmentinpower,USCIBauthorizedalimited tesumptionof cryptologic exchange with Australia.Full resumption ofties did not occur witill953. The incident tarnished American-Australian intelligence cooperation foryears ahdcauseda serious rift with Britain which was made worse just a few years later with the KhlUS Fuchs case and the Burgess and McClean defections.It also had a deleterious afTec\ on early U.S. SIGINT efforts against the People's Republic ofChina (PRC).By1953 relationshadwarmedto the point where Australia was reincorporated as a fullCOMlNTpartner.Thefoundationsof theAustralianparticipationintheUKUSA Agreement (thenameBRUSA waschangedat British request ayear later)cameat the Melbourne Tripartite Conferenceof September 1953. ' NewZealandcameinasafIfthpartner , \New Zealand had contributed mainly DFtotheAllied cryptologic effort in WorldWar Hand had sent people to Australia to serve with the Commonwealth effort in Brisbane. '. IbUfBbB VIA 'I\\hfJlf'f IEJiJYII8bB e8l1fIN'f e8IflfR8b88'fBMBlf81Ii'ftlf Mo;r Ublii.\&.'.Rblii 'Fe P8R1!ll8If IfNfI6ItAt8 19

(h)(1) (b)(3) -18USC798 (b)(3)-50USC403 (bl(3)-P.L.86-36 DOC:rD:3188691(bl(3)-P.L.86-36 -.IDe &EeRE ro.JMIfiA Notes 1.Ronald Lewin, Tile American Magic:Code., Cipller., and tM Defeat ofJapan (New York:Fanar, Straus and GirOUl[, 1982), 24. 2.RobertL.Benson,"AHistoryof U.S.CommunicationsduringWorldWarII:Policyand Administration," manuscript pendingCCH publication.Hereafter Benlipn "History." 3.Ibid. 4.Ibid. 5.Ibid. 6.George F.Howe, "The Nanative History of AFSAlNSA," part I, unpubliShedmanuscript available in CCH. Hereafter Howe "Nanative." 7.Ibid. 8.USNSG, "U.S. Naval Communication Supplementary Activities in the Korean Conflict, June 1960 - August 1953," in CCHSerieaV.M.3.1.;Ben80n"History"; SRH149,Recordsof theNati'QnalSecurity Agency, Record Group 457,National Archives. Washington, D.C.; or&1 history interview with RAOM Earl E. Stone, 9 Feb 1983, Carmel, California by Robert D. Farley, NSA OR 383. 9.NSAretired records, CACL 60, TVC1317; [Edward S.Wiley]On Watch:tile National Security Agency'. Pa.t 40 Year. (Ft. Meade:NSAJCSS, 1986), 13. 10.CCH Series VI.1.1.l.; X.H.7.S. 11.Oral history interview with Dr. Abraham Sinkov, May1979, by Arthur J. IDale Marston, and Samuel Snyder, NSA OH 279; Howe, "Narrative." 12.Oral hiatory interview with Col. (USAF Ret.) John P. Shean, 18 April 1984., by Robert D. Farley, NSA OH 16 84; memo to Chief, AFSA90,14 Dec 1948, in CCH Seriea V.C.2.12. 13.NSAlCSS Archives. ACC 26350, CBSK 32. 14.Philip S.Meilinger, Hoyt S.Vandenberg:The Life ofaGlneral (Bloomington, Ind.:University oflndiana Press, 1989). 15.NSAlCSSArchives,ACC26350,CBSK32;oralhistoryinterviewwithGordonW.Sommers,HqsESC, January 1990. by Millard R.Ellerson and James E. Pierson; Richard R. Ferry, "A Special Hiatorical Study of the Organizational Development of United States Air Force Security Service from 1948-1963," Hq USAFSS,1963. 16."An Oral History Interview:TheElectronic Security Command- ItsRoots;FeaturingtheFounderof USAFSSlESC, Lt. Gen. Richard P. Klocko o a(b)(1) (b)(3) -P.L.86-36 DOCID:3188691 Ib)(3) -50 Ib)(3)-18 USC USC 403 798

I One small success during these early years was the development of customer liaison organizations.By1949boththeArmyG2andtheOfflceof Navalhad established informalliaison offices with their cryptologiccounterparts at Arlington Hall and NSS.When AFSA was established, thesecontinued undisturbed.Both theArmyandNavygroupsdevelopedaverycloserelationshipwithAFSA,andtheir people often worked in an intelligence production role.By the end of the Korean War, the Armyorganization,whichcalleditself SRB(SpecialResearchBranch),hadsomefIfty people.Air ForceIntelligencehad asimilargroup,whichwasgraduallysubsumedby AFSSinto alarge organization of over sixty performing bothacustomer(forAir Force Intelligence) and producer (for AFSS) role.Thus the Air Force group performed both as a producer and consumer, while the Army and Navy acted only as producers. Both CIAand State maintained smallofficeswithin AFSA,underaUSCIBedict of 1948.Although AFSA regulations permitted them to see semiprocessed intelligence. they never participated in the production process, maintaining their offices for liaison purposes only.FBI'srefusaltoestablish any office,atallreflectedJ.EdgarHoover'sadamant opposition to COMlNT centralization.13 WhileCOMINTwasfractious,COMSECiwasrelativelyserene.DuringWorldWarII there had been a single authority for joint service communications matters, the U.S. Joint Communications Board, established in July of 1942.Its principal members were the chiefs of communicationsfortheArmy,and Air Force.In1948it gavewaytoanew organization,theJointCommunications-ElectronicsCommittee(JCEC),whichreigned supremeinthisareaformanyyearsthereafter.TheJCECwasconcernedwith communications planning, standards, and interoperability, but its charter by implication gave it a determining voice in COMsi!:P policy as well. When AFSA was created, JCEC effectively transferred central COMSEC functions to it. The charter did not extend to n(m.JCS organizations, but the State Department and other civilian agencies with communieations security concerns had for years relied on the Army and Navy forCOMSECsupport, and this reliance was transferred to AFSA.AFSAbegan producing codes and ciphers for all the armed services and many of the non-DoD agencies. In addition, it undertook centralized COMSECR&D functions, planning and programming, setting of security standw;ds,and technicalsupervisionof the communicationssecurity activitiesof thearmedservices.TheSCAsretainedmanyresidualfunctions,suchas distribution ofAFSA-produced codes, security monitoring oftransmissions, and the like." WhileAFSAsuccessfully controlled thehighlytechnical functionof COMSEC,it was never abletocontrolCOMINT.Thislackof controlmadepowerfulenemies.TheState Departmentwasupsetbecause,underAFSA.thenumberof positionsallocatedto rctuaIlY declined in the three years of AFSA existence, from 64 to 51, and from almost 11 percent of the total to only 6.5 percent. IIftNBb8 .....Ift 'ftcbflN'f IEflYllebB eeMlffPeerf'f'R8l:J ST1'S'f8MS46IH'f'tfJ7 muREI ,EAgAR! E1'0 llQftBlBN lfKnONALS 32

Ib)(1: (1)(3;-')0USC403 Ib)(3-}:-18USC798DOCID:3188691 Ib)(3)-P.L.86-36 lOP SECRH ~ M B I t A 'THE BROWNELL COMMITTEE Theentireintelligencecommunitywasconcernedoverperformanceof theCOMINT systeminKorea.AFSAhadnotpredictedtheoutbreakof war.Awatchcommittee establishedunderthewingof CIAinearly1950listedKorearuthonthelist of world trouble spots, but this was not translated into action, and when the war began AFSA still i had no positions allocated to Korean military. AFSAhadnomoredangerousopponent than Walter Bedell Smith, director of Central Intelligence.In1950thewartimefeud betweentheCO MINTempireandSmith's HUMINTorganizationboiledover.On10 DecemberofthatyearSmithwrotea memorandumrecommendingthata committee be established to "survey" COMINT. Smithwas"gravelyconcernedastothe securityandeffectivenesswithwhich CommunicationsIntelligenceactivities... arebeingconducted."Hepointedto"the systemof dividedauthoritiesandmultiple responsibilities"whichwasendangering nationalsecurity.TheNationalSecurity Councilinturnforwardedthe recommendationtoPresidentTruman,who directed that a committee be formed. Walter Bedell SmithThe JCS couldnottakeheartfromthe DirectororCentrallntelli,encecomposition of thecomittee.Itschairman wasGeorgeA.Brownell, aNewYorklawyer andlaymaninintelligencematters.ThememberswereCharlesBohlen,aprominent State Department official; William H. Jackson, special assistant to the DCI; and Brigadier GeneralJohnMagruder,specialassistanttothesecretaryof defense.ThustheJoint Chiefs,whoownedtheCOMINTorganizations,hadnooneonthecommittee.It was composed of "enemies," representatives from State and CIA - the two most vocal opponents of the existing system. YSTEMS JOINTLY HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE COMI NOTTO FOREIGN NATIONALS 33 ~-- -DOCID:3188691 (b)(1) (b}(3)-50usc 403 :(b)i3)-PL86-36 (b)(3)-18USC '798 George A. Brownell The Brownell Committee held fourteen days of formal sessions, which were backed up by many days of research and data-gathering.Itsreport was ascathing indictment of the old ways ofdoing business.Its bottom line stated bluntly that ,!The added difficuJty of the problem under attack places agreater premiumthaneveronthequantityandqualityofthephysicalandintellectual resources available. and on the efficiency and clarity of the organization charged with the task. Whilemuchhasrecentlybeendonetoprovideadequatephysicalresourcesforthejob,the Committeeisconvincedthatthepresentorganizationof ourCOMINTactivitiesseriously impedes the efficiency ofthe operation, andprevents usfromattracting andretaining as much topqualityscientificmanagementmanpowerasthiscountryoughttobeinvestinginso important afield.It is highly significant totheCommitteethat thereturn of fiaey of the best wartime COMINT brains tomore attractive] llJldlfBLI!: 't'lA !'ALe!(!' l(1!JIlleL! eeMft('fS'l'S'fI!JM8 4eU4''fL.. NOT RELEAABI E TO ALS 34

DOCID:3188691

Thecommitteeconcludedthatthecreationof AFSA,coincidingasithadwiththe creation of USAFSS, had resulted in four COMINT agencies where there had formerly been two.It criticized AFSAC for obstructionism and requested that it be abolished.It attacked USAFSS as a virtually autonomous organization not operating under joint control at all. Thepositiverecommendationsof theBrownellCommitteeareworthstudying, because they encompass the present-day structure of SIGINTin the United States.AFSA shouldbegreatlystrengthened,especiallyinitsabilitytocontroltaskingatSCA collection sites.AFSA or its successor should be removed from JCS control and should be placed under USCIB,whosemembership should be revised, and whoseprocedures should be governed by avote of four,rather than unanimity, as had been the casewith AFSAC. AFSAshouldcentralizeandconsolidateprocessingoperationswhereverpossibleto increase the resources brought to bear on intractable cryptanalytic problems.The director should be upgraded to three-star rank, and should be appointed by the president to afouryearterm.Heshouldhaveaciviliandeputy.Civiliancareer developmentshouldbe encouraged to a much greater extent than formerly. ThenextseveralmonthswerespentputtingtheBrownellreportintodirective language.The result wasthe Truman Memorandum,issued on24 October1952.This memodirectedacompleterestructuringof COMINTalongthelinesthatBrownell recommended.It resolved an on-going dispute about how to change AFSA by abolishing it and creating in its place anew organization called NSA.Its directorwould work forthe secretary of defense,whowouldbecomethe "executive agent" forCOMlNTforthe entire government.On the same date the NationalSecurity Council issued arevisedNSCID 9, almost averbatim quote of the Truman Memorandum.Both documentswereclassified Top Secret,thus hiding theofficialcreation of NSAfromthe Americanpublicformany years. Allthatremainedwasforthesecretaryofdefensetoissueamemorandum establishing the new agency.He did so on4November the day that Dwight Eisenhower defeatedAdlaiStevensonforthepresidency.Thecreationof NSAwas oneof thelast historicallegaeies of twenty years of Democratic governance. The Truman Memorandum, on the advice of Lieutenant General Canine, had excluded COMBEC.Despitehisbelief thatNSAshouldhavebothaCOMINTandaCOMBECrole, Canine recommended against mixing both in the same document.Lovett's memorandum on4NovemberdidmentionthatNSAwouldinherittheCOMSECfunctionsformerly performed by AFSA.A memo in December spelled out those functions in more detail, and this marked NSA's first Cormal COMBEC charter.11 lILt HI"T" 89MUff 89NlfR9b 8YB'fBMBd8INlfbY NOT FEl E Ai" IilU: TQ P9R1!ll8If !f]l{fIOI:tJ![LS 35

DOC:rD:3188691 fep 'EEREf tJMBRA KOREA It haa become apparent ... that during the between-wars interim wehave lost, through neglect, disinterest and possibly jealousy, much ofthe effectiveness in intelligence work that we acquired sopainfullyinWorldWarII.Today,ourintelligenceoperationsinKoreahavenotyet approached the standards that we reached in the final year of the last war. General A. James Van Fleet, Commanding Genera) 8th Army, June 1952 The Country Americanintelligenceinterestandattention,sopainfullyrefocusedontheSoviet threat after World War II, were not to be rewarded.The next war occurred not in Europe, where allies and commitments were, but in Korea, a remote Asian peninsula whosename many Americans had never heard in 1950. Koreahad,throughoutitsrecordedhistory,beenabattlegroundbetweenChina, Japan, and Russia.Frequently invaded and occupied, its primary purpose seemed to be as astrategic buffer among three conflicting imperial ambitions.The most recent change of ownershiphadcomeaftertheRusso-JapaneseWar of 1904-05.Russia,theloser,was forced to cede its influence.Korea became forcibly Japanese. TheAlliedpowersrecognizedduringWorldWarIIthatKoreawasoneofthose geopoliticaloddities statushadtoberesolved.It obviouslycouldnotremain Japanese, and so at theCairo Conference of 1943 Roosevelt endorsed apolicy that would ensure a"freeandindependentKorea."AtYaltain Aprilof 1945,theBig Three(the United States, the USSR, and Britain) agreed to an Allied trusteeship, to be administered by the three plus China. Nothing further happened until the USSR declaredwar on Japanon 8August1945, simultaneously invading Manchuria and Korea.Thesudden movement of Soviet troops onto the peninsula appeared to portend Soviet occupation, and MacArthur was directed to rushtroopstothesouthernendof Korea.TheUnitedStatesproposedadivisionof inilitary occupation on the38th Parallel, splitting the peninsula roughly in half.Moscow unexpectedly agreed, and still more unexpectedly, complied. Americanforcesdwindleddowntoabout30,000by1948.InMarchof thatyear PresidentHarryTruman,followingthecountry'smoodof dedicatedmilitarybudgetcutting, decided that America would simply' have to abandon Korea to the United Nations, '11A 'PAheu'P If87f18bPJ e8MlffIP e8If'Pft6b 8'"1 SftMSJ611ffLY _.BP81t1!J18ff l'fk'l'I61f1thStlfl" "-"1'.1l! A!IIA'".II! 'Pt rop '!fRET I:JMBRA36 L S ' = l U 9 1 d . . U Q l1 0 l > T J ' = I o M I I 9 P 1 9 1 1 o i J U 9 8 & t t 1 W S S S ' i 6 1 I J . S " ; l : J Q ' S " I )( I " : n m o f . H O S 6 1 ' l J a . l 0 } lv m I O J I H . L f 1 0 S' t H S W " ' 3 ) J J 3 $ 4 0 J .1 6 9 8 8 1 : a I : > o a DOCID:3188691 rop SECRET tlM81tA to sink or swim on its own.He decided to end the American trusteeship and sponsor free elections.Soin thespring of 1948Americanforcesmarchedout of Korea.TheSouth boycotted the elections,which led to anewNational Assembly and agovernmentheaded by Syngman Rhee, a seventy-three-year-old militant anti-Communist whohad spent forty years in exile in the United States waiting fortheliberation of his homeland.TheNorth formed its own government, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), headed by a young thirty-six-year-old Communist named Kim II-sung.The peninsula was divided at the waist. Syngman RheeKim Il-sung The Asia Dilemma In 1949 catastrophe struck in the Far East.The corrupt and despotic Chiang Kai-shek andhisNationalistswereoustedbytheCommunistforcesofMaoTse-tung.Asthe Communistsmarched intoBeijing,Chiang fledtotheisland of Formosa(Taiwan),some 100 miles off the coast, followedby as much of his army as could fleewith him.By the end of the year, Maowas making confident proclamations ahout his intent to invade Formosa and drive Chiang and his army into the sea. InWashington,theadministrationwasconvulsedoverwhethertheUnitedStates should support Chiang andthe Nationalists.Inthe endthe anti-Chiang factionwon,and Truman, on 5 January 1950, issued a public statementthe United States had adopted a "hands off Formosa" policy.Ambiguity about which side of thelineKorea stood onwas IhU!9b8 VIA 'IWbBPf'f 8ellUN''f 8Sfffft6bS't S'ftI'::!tfS J6mTLY ., __ V FvREtON NATf6I'O'AL;'Nil.tlJUkA.,AkiA.Ii T61' 'EeriE IUMBRA38 (b)(1) (b)(3) -50USC403 Ib)(3)-P.L.86-36DOC:ID:3188691 lap SEGRIiiT UIIJBRA resolvedaweeklaterwhenSecretaryofStateDeanAcheson,atapressconference, described an American sphere of interestin the Pacific that implicitly excluded Korea. By June 1950 the United States had boxed itself into averyweak position inKorea. From a full army corps, it was reduced to a 500-man Korean Military Aid Group (KMAG). The U.S.had left behind plans and equipment fora50,000-man ROK(Republic of Korea) "constabulary" (rather than areal army) but devoid of heavyequipment, as the U.S.was afraid that the militant Rhee would useitinvade the North.Rhee drew up plans for a real army of 100,000, and he succeeded in extracting additional American commitments of weapons(butstillnoheavy,mobileoffensiveweapons).Onthe othersideof the38th Parallel stood aDPRK army and air forceoC,about 135,000men, equipped bythe Soviets with much of the heavy equipment that the Antericans had denied to Rhee. American military forces, overall, in 1950 were in aweakened state.Defense budgets had continued to declinefromtheir WorldWa,rII peak,and the defensebudget for1950 wasonly$12.3billion,withanauthorizedArmystrengthof 630,000(butanactual strength of only 591,000).Of these, only 108,500 were in the Far East, almost all of them in Japan. In line with administration policy, the Pentagon had no plans to defendKorea and no one there to do it.The American contingency plan forthe peninsula wasbasically to evacuate all dependents to Japan.18 Parallel to the national lack of interest in Korea was AFSA'sneglect of the problem. There were no documented high-priority national intelligence requirements on Korea, and the onlyrequirement that related all was couched in terms of keepingtrack of Soviet interest in the peninsula.At the time AFSA had"no person or group of persons working on a North Korean problem."During the previous year, SCA intercept sites had stumbled ontosom( rt0rth Koreanmessageswhichwereoriginallycollectedas .. suspecteWhenir May1949thesemessageswereidentifiedasNorth Korean,two intercept positionsatland atacticalunit not under AFSA control,weretaskedwithfollow-upcopy.AFSAhadnoKoreanlinguists,noKorean dictionaries, no traffic analytic aids, and no Korean typewriters. 19 NoonereallyexpectedaninvasioninKorea.TherewasfragmentaryHUMINT reporting, generally disbelieved by all, that there could be an invasion by North Korea in 1950.InMarchanArmyorganizationcalledtheIntelligenceIndicationsSteering Committee cited the possibility of military activity in Korea sometime in 1950.But this was set against ageneral disbelief inthe intelligence community that Korea presented a real problem. After the war broke out, there was the usual scramble by intelligence agencies to find the indicators that had been missed.AFSA, for instance, discovered traffic indicating that therehadbeenlargeshipmentsofmedicalsuppliesgoingfromtheUSSRtoKorea beginning in February.A Soviet navalOFnet in theVladivostokarea had undergone a b)11) b)(3)-50USC403 b)131-P.:.86-36 b)(3)-18USC798 Wl:"fQbS 'lIt: 'Fi',esJ'R' 18M!! 88MIlflf 88fflfftebl' NOT RELEASABLE TO F'OREIGNNXIIONALS 391=9P SECRET YMBRA DOC:I:D:3188691 lOP &iEAET t:JM11tA dramatic switch to South Korean DF tasks beginning in February.2oThis did not quiet the critics. The Invasion About0330onSundaymorning,25June1950,CaptainJosephDarrigo,aKMAG militaryadvisortotheROKpostednearKaesong,wasjarredawakebytheroarof artillery.Darrigo,theonlyAmericanonthe38thParallel,wasinthemiddleof an invasion of North Korean ground forcesinto South Korea.Hemanaged tomake it to the ROK1stDivisionheadquartersat Munsanjust aheadof theadvancingNorthKorean forces, and he spread the alarm. There appears to have been no tactical inteJIigence warning.A reporter in Seoulgot word of an invasion and rushed to the American embassy for confirmation.At the same timethathegotoffawiretoNewYork,theAmericanambassadorwascabling Washington.Hiscablehadtobeencryptedanddecrypted,and itgottherelate.The Americans learned of the invasion from the reporter in SeouI.21 ASAdecided to support the fightingwith a communicationsreconnaisancebattalion at Armylevelandthreebattalionstoserveeachof thethreecorps.The60thSignal ServiceCompanyatFortLewis,Washington,appearedtobeclosesttobeingreadyfor deployment of any ASA tactical asset, sothat organization wasselected.But it took time togetready,andinthemeantimeASAPacific(ASAPAC)inHawaiirushedasignal collection unit to the Korean peninsula, arriving there on 18 September.The Fort Lewis unit did not arrive until 9 October. 22 Meanwhile, the Truman administration had decided to help thefledglingROKarmy andgotUNbackingforthedeploymentof amultinationaldefensiveforcetoKorea. TrumandirectedMacArthurtorushthe8th ArmyfromJapantoKorea,andthefirst Americantroops reentered Korea by air on1 July.But it took time togetenoughtroops into the country, and the DPRKarmy charged ahead, pushing ROK defensive units ahead of it pell-mell.Bymid-August, ROKdefenders had been shoved into aperimeter around the port city of Pusan,thelastremaining large citystillunderthecontrolof theRhee government.When the first ASA unit arrived in September, the ROKarmy, bolstered by newly arrived American divisions (the 24th Infantry, 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry), was desperately hanging onto this slice of the Korean landmass, and the American and Korean defenders were in the middle ofa fierce struggle to retain the town ofTaegu.2S ASA'sprimary concernwastogetlinguists.Perhapstheonlytwofirst-rateArmy KoreanlinguistswereY.P.KimandRichardChun,whowerebothinstructorsatthe Army Language School in Monterey in 1950.Chun had been cleared in World War II, but Kim had never been in the COMINT business.ASAneeded linguists at Monterey totrain what was expected to be a sudden flood of Korean language students, but they also needed someone in KoreawhocouldtranslateKorean.ASAhesitated just abrief moment,and nAI'JQbI1j "loA 'flAbI1jfff I'tBYllebB BeIlIUA' eleff'f'ft8b S'iS'fI!lMSiJ81IfTtff lif6TMJhl!lASA8hB Te peRlilIBll flh'RQJT \l.i TQP SEEAET t:JMBItA 40 DOCID: .. (b)(1) (3)-P.L.86-36 3188691 TOP S!CRET tlMBRA thenKimand Chun,neither asyet actuallycleared forCOMINT,wereontheirwayto Korea to assist the newly arrived ASAtactical CQMINT unit.Untiltheir clearances came through, they worked in a locked and guarded room every day.Intercepted messages were brought in periodically.They would translate the traffic and then pass it through a slot in the wall to the communications center.24 The Air Force SecurityService likewise ~ a d one unit in the Korean area in 1950 - the 1st Radio Squadron Mobile (RSM) at Johnson Air Force Base outside Tokyo.This unit had been created in1942,aridithadsupported5th AirForcethroughMacArthur'sPacific campaign fromNewGuinea to Japan.In1950 it was still engaged in support to5th Air Force,but bythen.hadchangeditsmissionto I I ItInlate June it scrambled tochange over toKorean targets.It hadno cryptanalytic capability, and 90 began with a traflic analytic attack against North Korean airtargets.It likewisehadnoclearedKoreanlinguists,soitcoulddolittleagainst readable voice communications.25 The Murray Mission The Air Force Security Service actually beat ASA to Korea - their firstrepresentative, First Lieutenant EdwardMurray,arrivedin Taeguon19July.ButMurray'smission quickly became entangled in one of themost bizzare incidents in the history of American cryptology. When Murray arrived, 5th Air Force already had a COMINT service.The origins of that organization are very murky but appear togoback to the days after the end of World War II.At the time acivilian named Nichols,whoalsohadareservecommission as an Air Force major, headed the local Air Force Officeof SpecialInvestigations.Nichols,whose background and training in COMINT are completely unknown, decided that Korea needed a COMINTservice.TheSouthKoreangovernmentunderSyngmanRheedidnotappear interested, so Nichols proceeded on his own,seeking out theassistance of some 'Koreans with COMINT experience. Among his recruits was one Cho Yong II, whohad come fromNorth Korea, wherehe had been aradio operator and cryptanalystwiththe NorthKoreanArmy.Joining Cho was Kim Se Won,acaptainintheROKnavy.Kimhad servedasaCOMINTerwiththe Japanese army in World War II and, owing to having been interned by the U.S.Army in Hawaii, spoke excellent English.Cho, Kim, and those whoworked forthem did intercept and translation work for Nichols; the source offunding has never been discovered.In 1949 Cho, withNichols's assistance, obtained a commission in the Korean air force(ROKAF), andhisgroupdual-hattedasaprivategroupworkingforNicholsandastheROKAF COMINTservice.At about the same timethe ROKnavy set up Kim and some colleagues from the Nichols group as their COMINT service, so they, too, were dual-hatted. Ih'.PfBb8 VIA 'fAb8Pf'f IiBYII8bI!J e8MlPf'f e8Pf'fRElb 8"1'B'fBM846IIffbTf NO IRELEA&\8LE Te, POftElmf 1f1t\"l8ff1lbB 41lOP SECRET tJMBRA' DOCID:3188691 'F9' SEERn YMBRltc When the ROKarmy retreated south in July of 1950, Nichols andhis COMINTgroup retreated with them.As they fled south, fissures developed between Cho and Kim, and in late July orearlyAugusttheKimgroupseceded.ChostayedwithNicholstosupply COMINTto the Air Force, while Kim eventually hooked up with ASA units entering Korea. Nichols was reporting directly to 5th Air Force, which was releasing his reports into USAF intelligence channels at the noncodeword level. Meanwhile, AFSS had sent Murray to Johnson Air Force Base toput together adirect support package.Murray assembled some vans and other equipment from1st RSM, and on 15 July he flewto Korea to set up a mobile COMINT effort.AFSS was operating under a misty-eyed concept of COMINTas covert operations, and 1st RSMwas directed to expunge its identifications from the equipment, and to insure that Murray could not be indentified as a COMINTer.The direct support went under the codename Project WILLY. Murray's rll'st concern on arriving in Korea was linguists.Fifth Air Force offered him eight of them, straight fromtheNicholspool.The onlyproblemwasthatNicholsstilI controlled them, and the upshot was that Nichols wound up with1st RSM's equipment for use by his own operators.Asfor5th Air Force,theywere quite happywiththe support they were getting from Nichols and informed Murray that he was no longer needed.First LieutenantMurrayreturnedtoJapanon1August,havingutterlyfailedtosetupa Security Service unit in Korea and having lost his equipment to boot. The breathless nature ofNichols's coup left USAFSS spinning.A severe jurisdictional battleensued,encompassingcommandorganizationsin theUnited States,Japan,and Korea.Security Service appeared to carry the day, and Murray was ordered back to Korea on12August,armedwithaletterof authorityfromGeneralBanfill(Deputyfor Intelligence, Far East Air Force).But thestruggle was far fromover.Nicholswas still unwilling torelinquish control of his COMINTorganization, and he had thebacking of 5th Air Force.Nichols was alocal asset under their complete control, was publishing COMINT withouttherestrictivecodewordsthatlimiteddissemination,andalreadyhadthe expertisethat Murray lacked.On 17 August, 5th Air Force ordered Murray to catch the next plane out of Korea.AFSS was again out of the picture. TheNicholseffortwaslimitedbyitslackof national-leveltechnicalsupportfrom AFSA and USAFSS, and 5th Air Force eventually realized this.On 20 November, 5th Air Force reversed its earlier position and asked for the deployment ofa radio squadron mobile toKoreatoprovidesupport.Cho'sgroupbecameDetachment3of the1stRSM,and Nichols disappeared from the scene. Meanwhile, back in Tokyo 1st RSMwas trying to mobilize an effort against the North Korean air force.When Murray returned to Japan the first time he carried with him some capturedNorthKoreancodebooksturnedovertohimbyNichols.LackingKorean translators, the unit cameuponaCatholic priest named Father Harold Henry,whohad spent a number of years in Korea as an Army chaplain.AFSS agreed to give him access to "fArfALl!lfi'l' IlI!J'iIl0tl!J eOMU4'l' eOlftftOL! JOn''l'Lr NOT Rilbil:'6ABl>JlJ 'f8 P8MlJm, I4AIIONALS Tell SECRET l::IMBRA42 DOCID:3188691 lOP ,"AliT YMBM intercepted materialsbut did not agree togive him an 51clearance.He began applying thecodebookstothetraffic,andheturned outtobeaprettygoodcryptanalyst,even though he was doing the work without benefit of formal clearance.Father Henry produced the first decrypts of enciphered North Korean air traffic. 26 Counterattack While ASA and AF55 were having trouble getting organized tactically, AF5Apushed' rapidlyahead.Despiteanalmosttotallackof expertiseandresourcestoworkthe unfamiliarKoreantarget,codebreakersin Washingtonsucceededinpenetrating North Korean communications by late July.Atthe time,DPRKtroopswerebeing readied for their all-out assault on Taegu, which, if successful, might have caused the collapse of the PusanperimeterandAmericandefeat.Threedivisionsof LieutenantGeneralWalton Walker's 8th Army were on line with the remnants of five ROK divisions; opposingthem were fourteen battle-tested DPRK infantry divisions.On 26 July AF5A decrypted a North Korean message which contained much of the battle plan forthe assault on the 30th.The information reached Walker on the 29th, and he shifted his forcesto meet the attack,thus savingTaeguandthePusanperimeter.27 It wasoneof AFSA'smostconspicuous successes. On15September MacArthurlaunchedthespectacularInchoninvasion,thesecond largest amphibious landing in history,near Seoul.North Koreantroops suddenly had a large American force in the rear of their operations.On 19 September 8th Army began its breakout fromthe Pusan perimeter, andinabrief month they hadpushed DPRKforces back north of Seoul.Syngman Rhee's government formally returned to the capital on 29 September.But the dynamic and committed Rhee wanted to push the fighting into North Korea,and on 30 September, ROKtroops crossed the38th Parallel.Washingtonviewed thisdevelopmentwithanxiety.But MacArthurwasconfidentthat Chineseand Soviet forceswouldnotintervene and,likeRhee,lobbied forauthority to goallthe waytothe YaluRiver.TheCIAissuedanassessmentthatMacArthurwasright.Therisksof invadingNorthKoreaappearedminimal,andintheendtheTrumanadministration backedMacArthur.Americanforcescrossedthe38thParallelon9October,heading north. China TheChineseproblemwhichMacArthurwassoblithelyunderestimatinghadbeen building foryears.ThepostwarCOMINTeffortagainstChinesecommunicationsbegan officially in 1945 during the mission of General George Marshall to try to get Chiang Kaishek and Mao Tse-tung to the bargaining table.Marshall, familiar with what COMINThad fls\ 'Pt\&B)f'f8ElMUf'f 8Elli'fReJ:s S'j'8l'1!If1fBliEl'f REiJ:sBlt&J\-BbB 'fa FaRl!l18fi liNflEl!tAl:J6 43lOP SiCKiT WMBM (bl,1) '(bl:3) -P.L.86-36 (bl: 3) -50esc403DOCID:3188691 (b)(3)-18esc798 IOP Si'AEf l::IM11tA ....'; .. ".. ....."......... . doneduring World WarII,requestedCOldINTinformationfrombothC()mmuni9tand Nationalist communications. ASAmounted asmallboth theNationalists and Communists.r---l IIABA could still report that the two sides were farwas obvious {rom the COMINT traffic that they were determined to settle their differences on the battlefield.The Marshall mission was withdrawn in 1946, and in October oU94.9 Mao triumphed. Following the withdrawal of; he Marshall mission, the COMINTmission against China suffered,asASAemployedallavailableresourcesagainsttheSoviettaret. l.AsA....keDtonlyasmallsectionagainst Chinesecivilcommunications, Collection resources were concentratedsecurity problems.28 When American and South Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel, the Chinesehad already decidedto interveneinNorthKorea.Thedecisionwaf{taken at ameetingin Beijing from3to7October1950.Onthefll'stdayof theconference,Chineseforeign minister Chou En-Lai called Indian ambassador Panikkar to tell him of the decision, and Panikkar relayed this news to the West.But Indians were regarded as pathologically leftleaning, and Panikkar's communique was disbelieved.Chou's warning was followedup by Chinese radio broadcasts, but these, too, were disregarded.2D . HistorianClayBlair assertsthat "whenMacArthurreturnedtoTokyofromWake Island [in mid-October] he had no inkling of the CCF armies gathering in North Korea." so Thiswaswrong.AFSAhadclearand convincingevidenceof themassingof Chinese troops north of the Yalu and had published it in product reports available to the JCS, the WhiteHouse,and toMacArthur.Asearlyas July,AFSA/begannotingreferencesin Chinesecivilcommunicationstoarmyunitsmoving north. ' Railhubsin centralChina were jammedwithsoldiersontheirwaytoManchuria. i BySeptemberAFSAhad identified six of theninefieldarmies thatwerelaterinvolvedin the fightinginNorth Korea and had located them in Manchuria, near the Korean,horder.Ferries at Anshan (on the Yalu River) were being reserved {or military use.Mapso{ Korea were being ordered in large quantities.On 7 November, in voice communicatioqs intercepted and published by the COMINTcommunitylrstated, "We are already at war here:>Sl I1ldfBt:liJ Tff:A 'f1r:t:EH"P KliJ'fIl8t:1iJ e8MfIfY e8U'Pft8t; S lS'!'I!MS 481N'ftli N'6'P ftBt;81i:S1i:8bfil 'fe peMIE! Pi'6' 5EERET l::IMBRA44 DOCID:3188691 lOP SECRlil UMIlRA Douglas MacArthur with President Truman on Wake Island, 1951 That was not newsto theROKarmy.On25October aROKdivisionhadbeen badly mauled byelements of theChinese40thArmy,already reportedbyAFSAtobecloseto Korea.FivedayslaterMacArthur'schief ofstaff,LieutenantGeneralNedAlmond, reportedthathehadseenChinesePOWsbeingheldbyaROKunit.Onthefirstof November,aChineseforceattackedaU.S.unitforthefirsttime.ButCharles Willoughby,MacArthur'sG2,preferredtobelievethattheseencountersrepresented isolated PRCvolunteers rather than division-strength regular army units confronting UN troops.32 AFSA reports continued to document the presence of major Chinese forces on the Yalu, but the reporting was subtle.AFSAwasregarded as acollectionand processing agency, notasaproducerofintelligence.Therewerenodramaticwrap-ups,nopeppery conclusions - just thefacts,strung throughafloodof intelligencereports.TheCOMINT community had almost the only hard information about the status of Chinese forces.ss Intelligence agencieswere beginning topay attention.TheWatchCommittee of the JIIC,whichbegannotingChinesetroopmovementsasearlyasJune,concludedby September (probably on the basis of AFSA reporting)that these troopswere moving north rather than to the coastal provinces near Formosa.By mid-October, influenced perhaps by MacArthur'sopinions,theWatchCommitteehadconcludedthat,thoughtherewas convincing evidence that startling numbers of Chinese forceswere in Manchuria, the time forinterventionhadpassed- theyassessedthattheChinesewouldnotintervene. IlAUBLfl VIA 'I'ALBU'P IE:flYIIaLB GaMIN'f OaN'fft6L BYB'fBMBd6IH'fbY N'X bt'ft" XC!XAthOi'" &0FOREIGN45Tap SECRET l:JMBRA DOCID:3188691 IDP SECRe t:tMBM' However,encounterswithChinesegroundandairforcesinlateOctoberandearly Novembercausedthecommitteetotakeanotherlook.AdmiralArleighBurke,who commandednavalforcesintheregion,wasconvincedthatChineseinterventionwas imminent and brought up the subject twice to Willoughby, who summoned his very large staft'to try to dissuade Burke.SEven more significant, in 1953 he obtained for NSA the authority tohire under the so-called Civil ServiceRule Schedule A,which permitted NSAtohirewithout obtaining permission from the Civil Service Commission.Rather than having NSA applicants take the standard CivilServicetest andthenhaving aboard interviewthetopthreescorers NSA devised its own peculiar aptitude tests, and hired without outside interference.lO Under Canine, NSA moved in many directions at once to strengthen its civilian work force.The director got NSA a slot at the National War College in 1953, and Louis Tordella was the first appointment, Abraham Sinkov the second.ll The Training Division initiated apresupervisorytraining program,whichwascurtailedin1955infavorof anintern training program oriented more toward technical education.12 NSA began local recroiting in the Baltimore and Washington areas by 1954.13 Fielding the Field Offices Canine moved very aggressively to establish field offices.Under Stone, AFSA had had no field organization, and the censorial AFSAC appeared to guarantee continuation of the situation.ButassoonashebecameAFSAdirector,Caninemadeanend-runaround AFSAC.Onatrip to the Far East inSeptember of 1951,hegotthe concurrence of the theatercommanderforanAFSAfieldofficeandreturnedtoWashingtonwithafait accompli.Early objections byNSG were muffled when Canine named Captain Wesley A. ("Ham")Wright,oneof themostseniornavalcryptologists,toheadthenewlyformed AFSAFarEastofficein Tokyo.BythetimeAFSACgotaroundtoconsideringthis Ih\PfBbI!i Yh'.l'AhSP,T KJ5YH8l:JJ5 88MIPf'f 88ti"fft8bBYB'fl!lMB681Pf'i1bY H9T RfihSf.SA8bJ5 'fa IG7'9Ml9H- T ~ u . j R A.(b)(1) (:OJ(3)-P.L.86-36 (3)-50USC403DOCI:D:3188691

surreptitious move in January of 1952, the office already existed (offidal date:1 January! 1952) with Wright and a staf'f'ofsix.When AFSAC approved a f9tmal charter, it stripped Wright of any direct control over SCAfieldoperations,but Ca:ninehad thenucleusof a field organization and awaited only the creation of NSA toalIgment the authorities of the: chief. In Europe, Canine began by sending a top civilian, Hugh Erskine, on a survey trip, the resultof which,asintheFarEast,wastheater commandconcurrencewithanAFSA branchoffice.ThistimeCaninesubmittedhisplantoAFSACbeforeofficially establishingtheoffice.AFSACapproved,andErskinebeganworkformallyon1 September 1952 in offices in the 1.0. FEl:rbenbuilding in Frankfurt.14 NSAEUR competed for a time with an office titled NSi\UK (NSA United Kingdom), located in London, and the twosharedresponsibilityforsofueof thecontinentalCOMINTfunctions- forinstance,I lasteduntil1956,whenNSAUKwasabruptly disestablished. WhenCINCEURshifted toParis in1954,NSAEURstayedin Frankfurt but finally shifted to Camp des Loges, outside Paris, in 1963.While the policy and liaison functions resided there i 5 Once NSA was officially established, Canine moved swiftly to create more field offices. NSAAlaska(NSAAL)wascreatedinJuly1953,NSAUKon26August1953,and NSAPAC,established toadvise CINCPAC, on16 August1954.He also created at home an office to monitor field operations. 18 Backedbytheauthority of NSCID9(thepredecessor of thepresent-dayNSCID6), Canine imposed on the reluctant SCAs agroup of field offices that had basically the same poweras hehimself withintheirgeographic spheres.Theyhadtwofunctions- liaison with theater commanders and technical control of the theater COMINT system.Their main reason forexistence was to impose order on the chaotic growth of the field sites, and they established large and active technicalstaffswhichworkeddirectlywiththesites.NSA field offices could task SCA field sites directly (although they customarily did not doso). NSA'stheaterchiefsstrovetocreateacooperativeatmospherewiththeSCAs,but everyoneinvolvedrecognizedtheimpliedthreatthattheyrepresentedaspersonal emissaries of thefearedCanine.TheSCAfieldchiefs foughtthis "encroachment"into their territory with every resource at their disposal. 17 During and after World War II,Americanmilitary organization in theAtlanticand Pacific theaters contained inherent turfconflicts.In Europe, for instance, the main power residedwithCINCEUR(originallyinFrankfurt),buttherewasalsoamilitary organizationinGreatBritainthatcompetedwithitforpower.InthePacificthe competition between CINC Far East (MacArthur) and CINCPAC (Nimitz) was even more stark.And soit waswith NSA organizations.In Europe, the latent competition between Vh\: eaMIli'f eatf"l'R8b S"..B'I'I!lMSlfem'fb.... NOT REI FA S A pI F 1:0 FQAiZlQIJ tr,'.'PieffA+.t8 68 (b)(1) (b)(1)Ib)(3) -50USC40.1 Ib)(3) -50USC403(3j-r.L.86-36DOCl:D:3188691 Ib)(3)-18USC798 (J:)(3)-F.L.86-36 TOP SECRil'l::IMBRX"-the NSA officesin Great Britain and Germany was resolved in 1956, but in the Far East the competition theofficesinTokyoandHawaii continued formanyCivilians in the TrenCfhes - the Civop Program In the early 1950s NSA turned to the problem of field site collection.Military operator turnoverwashigh,someyearsashighas85percent.Thelong-rangeexpansionoC intercept positions set by JCS during the Korean War appeared to be a dead letter unless a stablemanpowerpoolk:ouldbeestablished.NSAlikedwhatit hadseen of theGCHQ ,roam oC hirincivilian operators because oUhe exceptionally long retention rates and NSAwasalsoawarethat CIAwashiring civilianoperatorsCort---------........,(t),1) Negotiations were begun with ASA,and in 1954 an agreement

(t)(3) OGArFWpuld stm wittu poolbW'-dr: ciyililnng;:t9:: four :am:e opera:s, woowou; un:::e con:; commander.For the initial group, rotation at all four bases was set at twoyears, and the grade ranges for the program were 5 through 11.The NSAplanning group waxed alittle poetic, formulating long-range plans for thousands ofoperators and an eventual NSA field site of its own. The trial group was dulyrecruited,trained,and deployed.But even as thingswere movingahead,theservices'attitudes werebeginning tocool.NSApromisedtorecruit onlyoperatorswhohadretiredfromservice,butASAandUSAFSSforesawkeen competition for their first-term operators contemplating better salaries doing the same job forNSA.By1957theserviceshadturnedagainsttheprogram,anditwasquietly discontinued.It had long-lasting beneficial results, however.It yielded, in later years, a cadre of experienced civilian operators who performed well in crisis afler crisis.18 COMlNT Reporting in Transition Thereportinglegacyof WorldWarIIwastranslations.ASAandNSGissued thousands of translations permonth, areflection of thehugevolumeoCreadabletraffic. Once the cryptanalyst had finished his or her job, and the translator had put the message intoreadableEnglish, theverbatim transcriptwasreleaSedtoeither 02 or thetheater commander(inthecaseof theArmy)orOfficeof NavalIntelligenceortheappropriate navalcommander(inthecaseof theNavy).Themechanism forthiswastohandthe informationinrawformtoanintelligenceanalystcollocatedwiththecryptologic organization.Trafficanalyticinformationwasalsopassedinbulktotheappropriate HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLEFOREIGN NATIONALS 69

DOCID:3188691 TOp &ECftE rofRA intelligence organization,which wouldput it into readable intelligence.In other words, the COMlNT factory simply passed raw information to the organization, which would itself put it in context. Thepostwarcryptologiccommunitycontinuedtoproduceprimarilytranslations, accompaniedbyalltheCOMINT technicalinformationI IIrecessary fortheserviceintelligenceanalysttoanalyzeIt. NSA was not supposed to analyze.The information (it could not be dimed with the term "report")lackedaserialization. resemblingthemodernsystem.

AFSAbegantoevolveasimilarsystem.Releasestendedmoreandmoretoward reporting rather than translations,1IReports were more, formaland had wider distribution.AFSA de.vised its own primitive Serialization system:. an example would beollowedby adate. the subject! matte.nd 13-50 inicatedthis was theproduced 1950 by tat section.But reports still contained) other.sorts of technical data later prohibited in COMINT reporting, and narrative portions were often 'Very heavy on discussion of details . than onhigher-1evel information likeunitmovements.Thedistributionwas limitedbymodern Collocated organizations (ASA,USAFSS, and NSG representatives, forexample) decided whointheirservicesshouldseetheand furtherdistributionfrom there.20 .... Early NSAreportingwasmoreformalstilLII\. DistributionwasbroaderasNSAceasedtorelyontheSeA intelligen.c:e collocatedliaisonofficestodistributefurther.ReportiHn195:l,stillcontainedOI\had finally been was still much. informationI Ibut n'!w separatedintoa"Comments"sectionattheerid.of thereport. 21.in\1953N$A excluded"COMINTtechnicaldata"fromproduct completelyan.dtori;liedOperationalManagementControlGrouptoenforcecould be used when necessary. 22.....\'\..I, . ThecmUNTreporterwasoftenbedeviledbythesameproblei'ns PeriodicallyNSAorganizationswouldchastisereportersfor "possibly"and"probably,"A1953memofoundNSAreporting"generallywith qualifying expressions as to virtually preclude their use by a consumer."2S';;fib)(1) (b)(3) -50USC403 (b)(3)-18USC798 (b)(3)-P.L.86-36 I1ldf8LE ....fA YAUU'yfueL!: eeMlffYeelofTft6L,em"I'Ll RiiI.8/&'.Bbl!l 'fa tfAliONALS

70 Ib)(1: (b)(3)-P.L.86-36 Ib)(3) -50usc403DOCID:3188691 (b)(3)-18usc798 I[TheNational Security Agency was a term shop.u In1955theHooverCommissiondeclaredthatNSA,whileproducingsomevery valuable information, was not an official member of the intelligence community.But the commission undercut this general statement by noting that the volume of COMINT was so huge that it could never all beturned over toconsumers, and by the very act of selecting individualpiecesfordissemination,NSAmadeanalyticjudgmentsaboutvalueand applicability. 211Thistrendwastocontinueandintensify.KeyNSAexecutivesknewthatthe organizationhadtomoveawayfromtranslationsandintotrueintelligencereporting. Various sources of COMINT had to besynthesized, and the results must bepackaged into a meaningful explanation of the situation.If possible, the reporter should make comments as tomeaning and, on occasion,shouldmake conclusionsbasedon COMINT.Thiswasa higher level of analysis than the rest of the intelligence community foresaw for NSA,and itwouldgettheorganizationintotroublewithconsumerswhoresentedwhatthey regarded as turfencroachment.But it was the wave of the future. NSA Training - The Early Years Training had been the"bastard child"of AFSA.Originallythetraining schoolhad been a section of the personnel office, a way station for new and uncleared personnel.New recruits weregivenunclassifiedArmytrafficanalysisand communicationsmanualsto read until their clearances came through.The training was good - many of the manuals were written by Friedman himself- but the way AFSA treated the problem was all wrong. Thestaff wasminiscule,facilitiespracticallynonexistent,andthefunctionwasalmost totallyignored.Therealtraining conceptwason-the-jobtraining inthedutysection. Almost all operations training was conducted in Production, with little centralized control andpracticallynoclassroominstruction.Therewasatrainingstaff thattriedto coordinate all this, but it did not work in the same organization as the cryptologic school, which was still part ofpersonnel.28 When the Korean War began, the training school was still in languid decay, with one hundred uncleared recruits reading musty traffic analysis manuals in the training spaces at Nebraska Avenue,supervisedbyastaff of six people.Bythe end of theyear allwas I1t.lf8M!) TriA U.SYII8hB 88MHl'fS'{8'f8MBd8IN"fI::?i.' NOT REIUS'9LoE '19 P8RI!l[8IfI4'AIiONXr:S' 71 DOCID:3188691 ~ ~chaos.Therewere1,100trainees jammedintothesamespaces,stillwithastaff of 6. Canine wasawareof the problem, and AFSAwent to worktoimprovethe situation.In April of1951 the schoolwas moved tolarger quarters at 1436 U Street, N.W., designated Tempo R.In June 1954 the schoolmoved to another World War IIbuilding - Tempo Xlocated on the north sideof East Capitol Street, in the area that isnow part of theRFK Stadium parking lot.When,in themid-1950s,NSAmovedtoFort Meade,thetraining school moved to a former hospital a couple of miles from the main NSAcomplex. Canine later separatedtraining fromtheOfficeof Personneland elevatedit tothe level of Office of Training.Its chief was named commandant of the NSA School.Canine was also a proponent of management training, which was begun in 1952, and he placed the flrSt NSA students in service war colleges in 1953. AFSA also began paying more attentionto formalclassroominstruction.Instead of the "sit in the corner and read a book" approach, it began offering a selection of classroom traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, mathematics,language,and technicaltraining.By1952 the schoolwas offering training (at some level, at least)in eighteen differentlanguages. Secretaries got instruction in clerical and stenographic skills, and there was a four-week teletype operators course forthoseassignedtocommunications.There wasalsoaoneweekindoctrinationcourseforallnewhires,withfollow-oninstructionforcertain speeialties.27 By mid-1952 AFSA was also offering three levels of management trainingjunior (presupervisory), supervisor, and executive.Classes werevery sD;Ulll,but at least a rudimentary program existed. NSAalsobeganusingeducationasinducement.BegununderAFSA,theCollege ContractProgrambeganwithacontractwithGeorgeWashingtonUniversityand amounted to NSA payment of tuition to qualifiers.Classes wereheld at Arlington Hall, Nebraska Avenue in the District, and at Thomas Jefferson Junior High School in Virginia. There was also a program for graduate students and, for a select few,. a fellowship program which offeredfull-time study away from NSA. NSA's role in broader cryptologic training within the services was less certain.Both AFSAandNSAenjoyedatheoreticaltechnicalcontrolof cryptologicstandards,which included training, but AFSA never exercised its review function.An early AFSA proPosal to create a consolidated cryptologic training school was scuttled by Brigadier General Roy Lynn,anAFSAdeputydirector,whowasconcernedaboutretainingUSAFSecurity Service independence. After1952,thingsbegantochangeasNSAbecameactiveinreviewingSCA cryptologic courses.The Agency was especially active in providing technical assistance for language training and at one time took responsibility for all language training beyond the basic level.It did not, however, try to take on COMSEC training, preferring to leave that to theSCAs. I1JdfBbI!I'Jh!r 'i'AbI!IH'f 18"1119&B 89MUfII' e8Ifll'R8b eYMBMSIJ8Uf!'C'i ~ 1 9 ' fA8bBiW.BY '1'8 P8HI8lf JfA'rIetf1lr_ ~~ ~72 DOCID:3188691 Canine continuedto strengthen the organizational position of the training function. Asit migratedupfrombranchtodivisionlevel,it tookonaddedresponsibilitiesand acquired moreresources.Thepeoplewhowereinvolvedin training inthose early days were fIrst rate - Lambros D.Callimahos (a close protege ofFriedmanl and Navy captain Thomas "Tommy" Dyer (one of the Navy's great pioneers in codebreaking) were especially notable examples.William Friedman, who had personally built the Army's cryptanalytic system,spentmuchofhiscareerasateacherandauthoredmanytextbookson cryptanalysis.With such talent and influence, it was only amatter of time before NSA's training system became a model. Setting Up Security Security was one area with which Canine had experience, and he tackled it very early. UnderAFSA,perimeterguardsatArlingtonHallandNebraskaAv.enuehadbeen uncleared.Interiorguard dutywaspulledonarotatingbasisbyreluctantuniformed cryptologists, each division taking its turn foramonth at atime.Canine eliminated the interior guard duty in early 1952 by bringing in cleared, uniformed security police.Later he decided to add some prestige to the NSA guard force and convinced the Navy to give up adetachment of Marineguardstobeginguarding thenewtemporaryNSAfacilitiesat Fort Meade in 1965.Normally reserved for embassy duty,the Marine guard detachment became a rlXture and source of pride at NSA for many years.28 Giventhesizeof thecryptologiccomplexinWashington,somesortofuniversal personnel identification system became necessary.The Army appears to have begun using personnel badges during World War II.Their badges in those days were round metal tabs with apicture overlayedwithplastic - fullycleared peoplehadredbadges,oppositethe system of today.After acostlyexperiment withglass badges,AFSAsettled on aplastic badge.Colorcodingidentifiedorganization,withsevencolorstotal.In1966the organizational affiliation began tofadeas NSAreducedthe number of colors forcleared people to fourand beganusing green badges forfullyclearedemployees.Metal badges returned in 1959 and were standard until the late 1970s.NSA employees found them ideal for scraping ice off windshields. 29 Along with abadge system, NSA began restricting area access.By1953the security division had devised three work area designations:restricted, secure, and exclusion.The "red seal" and "blue seal" tabs used for somany years todesignate compartmented areas didnot,however,comeintouseuntilNSAmovedtoitsnewquarters at Fort Meadein 1957.30 NSA's controversial experiment in polygraph screening was rooted in the Korean War. Asnewemployeesfloodedintothetrainingschoolat NebraskaAvenue,thesecurity system wasoverwhelmedwithclearancerequirements.Then,asnow,employeeswere clearedthroughacombinationoftheNationalAgencyCheckandbackground II IA K8YII8MiI eaMni'f a8ti'fRebBT.'B'fI!lMSd6m'lL'" )loor Ri:I.i i':lUsH 'ia paRl!ll8ti !:fJe'ff6!tJlrtJS 73

DOCID:3188691 ~ g pSEeR!' OMBIt( investigations, conducted by the services.By December 1950 the system was so inundated that 39 percent of AFSA employees wereuncleared.NSA security people began casting about for a quick way to process clearances and fastened their attention on the polygraph, long used by law enforcement agenciesin criminal investigations.Although polygraphs were not admissable in court, AFSA discovered that CIA had begun using them for people beingindoctrinatedforCOMINTasearlyas1948andonlytwomonthsearlier,had broadened testing to include the entire CIAwork force.31 Studies showed it tobe amore reliable indicator of loyalty than the background investigation, and it was proposed that thepolygraph betried as awaytoget an "interim" clearance.Canine approvedatrial programinJanuary1951,butimplementationwastricky.AFSAhadtobuythe equipment,recruitpolygraphexaminersfromthepolicedepartmentsandprivate detectiveagenciesaroundthecountry,buildsoundproof roomsfortheinterviews,and becomeexperienced in interpreting results in this new and experimental area of loyalty verification. The new polygraph procedures began on a trial basis at the U Street location in May of 1951.Soon examiners were working from seven in the morning to eleven at night.By the end of September, they had cleared the backlog and went back to regular hours.AFSA had suddenly acquired hundreds of employees with something called a "temporary" clearance, whostillrequiredcompletionof the backgroundinvestigationtobecome"permanent." But in the helter-skelter time of war, no one paid the slightest attention to the difference, and on the day NSA was created a large portion of the work force worked with a temporary clearance.ThissituationwouldcomebacktohauntNSAin1960whenMartinand Mitchell fledto Moscowand NSA's clearance practices were called into question.(See p. 280.) In the rush to clear people, there was considerable breakage.Examiners were used to dealing with criminal investigations, and some ofthem had trouble making the transition. Hostilequestionselicitedemotionalresponses,andtherateof unresolvedinterviews approached 25 percent.The incredibly long hours added to the stress, and by the end of the first summer it was hard to tell whowasmore stressed, the examiners or the examinees. But after avery bumpy start, things smoothed out, and the security organization claimed to have cleared up lingering administrative problems by 1953. Whenflrstbegun,thepolygraphwas"voluntary,"butCaninedeclaredthatif an applicantdidnotvolunteer,theapplicationwentnofurther.Thefictionof optional polygraphs continued until 6December 1953, after that historic date all applicants were polygraphed.But therewerealwaysexceptionstothegeneralrulethatallemployees were polygraphed.Norequirement was established to include existing employees in the system,andthemilitary,amidmuchcontroversy,refusedtoallowitspeopletobe polygraphed.32 Themodern(andusuallyfunctional,if somewhatcranky)classifiedwastedisposal system of the1990swasagooddeallesshigh-techin1952.Early destructionat both HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE COWbIT86I4imJLSYSTEMSJOINTLY LE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS TOP SEeBEr \:IMBRA74-DOCID:3188691

Arlington Hall and Nebraska Avenuewas by incineration.Burnbags werestapled shut, astheyare today,weremarkedwiththeoriginators'organization,andwereplacedin central collection locations.Once picked up, they were pitched into the rtre by amilitary detail, and destruction was certified by a commissioned officer. Inlate1951AFSA,determinedtomodernizetheprocedure,orderedtwoSomat machines,whichAFSAofficialshadseeninoperationat CIA.Themachinesoperated muchlikethepresent destructionfacilitybut onamuchsmallerscale.Therewasa whirling tub resembling a cement mixer, into which the burnbags were thrown.The door wasthen closed,water waSinjected, and the tubchurned.But theearlymodelsdidnot work very well, and the whole process was as dirty as a paper mill.NSA later returned to the old standby incinerator until something better could be devised.83 NSA AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM NSAand its director were coping with the problems - technical,organizational,and fiscal - in establishing a truly global SIGlNT syste