Notice of Appeal Court of Appeal Fourth Restatement 2090615

8/14/2019 Notice of Appeal Court of Appeal Fourth Restatement 2090615

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNEIN THE COURT OF APPEAL Court No. 3731/09

BETWEEN

HAROLD JAMES JOHNSON Appellant

and

PIPPIN PATRICIA CRESSY and othersand others according to the Schedule

Respondents

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Date of Document: June 2009 Solicitors Code: 18081

Filed on behalf of:The Defendant, Harold James JohnsonPrepared by:Harold James Johnson1st Floor, 141 Osborne StreetSouth Yarra Victoria 3141

Telephone: 03 9279 3932Facsimile: 03 9279 3955Ref: HJJ/PC/VSC966507

To: The Respondents

And to: The First Respondents SolicitorsBerry Family Law1st Floor, 399 King StreetMelbourne Victoria

And to The Second and The Third Respondents SolicitorsLander & RogersLevel 16, 600 Bourke StreetMelbourne Victoria

TAKE NOTICE that the appellant complaints of the judgment and orders of the Honourable Justice

Kaye given and made as follows:

APPEAL

1. The Appellant Defendant appeals against the whole of the Judgements, Orders and Rulings of

given by the Learned Trial Judge between 2 December 2008 and 9 April 2009, including the

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Judgements given by the Trial Judge on 11 February 2009 (twice) and on 25 February 2009

('the Trial'). Some but certainly not all of those Orders and Rulings have been authenticated by

the Trial Judge in writing, and those authenticated ones are set out in the attachments to this

Notice.

2. The Appellant Defendant's appeal raises serious, carefully detailed and thoroughly substantiated

allegations of misconduct and improprieties:

a. by the Trial Judge during the Trial and subsequent to the Trial;

b. by the Plaintiff First Respondent's current solicitors and counsel during, prior to and

subsequent to the Trial;

c. by the Plaintiff First Respondent's former solicitors (the Second and Third Respondents)

and former counsel; and

d. by the Plaintiff First Respondent.

3. The Appellant Defendant's appeal also raises serious, carefully detailed and thoroughly

substantiated allegations of misconduct and improprieties:

a. by several Justices in the Commercial and Equity Division of the Trial Division of this

Honourable Court (including Justice Cavanaugh and Justice Hansen) in respect of their

judgements, orders and rulings made in interlocutory hearings in numbered proceedings

9665 of 2007 prior to the Trial, between February 2008 and September 2008;

b. by the Chief Justice and Justice Coghlan in the Court of Appeal Division of his

Honourable Court in respect of their judgements, orders and rulings made in numbered

proceedings 3731 of 2009 on 15 May 2009; and

c. by several Justices in the Commercial and Equity Division of the Trial Division of this

Honourable Court in respect of their judgements, orders and rulings made in interlocutory

hearings in numbered proceedings 9263 of 2008 and 10222 of 2008 between March

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2009 and June 2009 (namely Associate Justice Evans, Justice Hansen (again) and

Associate Justice Daly).

ORDERS SOUGHT

4. The Appellant Defendant asks the Court of Appeal to grant the following orders:

a. That all of the Judgements and Orders and Rulings of the Trial Judge favouring the

Plaintiff First Respondent be reversed;

b. That all of the Judgements and Orders and Rulings of the Trial Judge favourable to the

Second and Third Respondents be reversed;

c. That the Plaintiff First Respondent's Claims be dismissed and judgement ordered against

her on her Claim in favour of the Appellant Defendant;

d. That the Appellant Defendant's counterclaims against the Plaintiff First Respondent be

upheld, with the Appellant Defendant being given liberty to apply on the question of

damages;

e. That the Appellant Defendant's counterclaims against the Second and Third

Respondents be upheld, with the Appellant Defendant being given liberty to apply on the

question of damages;

f. That pursuant to Order 63.23 the Third Respondent, the Plaintiff First Respondent's

current solicitors and the Plaintiff First Respondent's current counsel pay one third each

of the Appellant Defendant's legal costs of the proceedings, inclusive of this appeal on a

full indemnity solicitor-client basis, with the Appellant Defendant being given liberty to

apply on the question of costs.

g. That instead of the Plaintiff First Respondent paying the Appellant Defendant damages

as to be assessed on the upholding of the Appellant Defendant's counterclaims against

her, the Plaintiff First Respondent's current solicitors and the Plaintiff First Respondent's

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current counsel pay one third each of the Appellant Defendant's damages and loss (in

addition to costs).

OVERVIEW OF THE GROUNDS OF THE APPEAL

Overview and Summary of Appeal

5. The foundation of the Trial Judge's Judgements, Rulings and Orders was his finding that the

Appellant Defendant and the Plaintiff First Respondent were a de facto couple from late 1998 up

until May 2007. All of the Trial Judge's findings flowed from this errant foundation.

6. The Appellant Defendant appeals that the Trial Judge erred in this foundation finding as:

a. The Trial Judge erred and cause substantial abuse of process by trying the Plaintiff First

Respondent's claims against the Appellant Defendant on 2 December 2008 without

proper pre-trial steps and without finalised pleadings and by depriving the Appellant

Defendant of the benefit of his restated claims against the Plaintiff First Defendant (as

restated by him under proceedings number 9263 of 2008, which the Trial Judge refused

without proper consideration to consolidate).

b. The Trial Judge erred and caused substantial abuse of process by trying and rejecting

the Appellant Defendant's claims when the misleading and deceitful actions of the

Plaintiff First Respondent and her solicitors and counsel caused the competing claims to

be set down for trial a year or more early than they should have been tried denying the

Appellant Defendant the opportunity of pre-trial stages and to the opportunities to have

his pleadings settled by independent legal representation, and denying him the

opportunity to have independent legal representation at Trial.

c. The foundation finding was contrary to the evidence (and especially contradicted by the

independent evidence on which the Trial Judge was legally bound to base his findings);

d. The foundation finding was contrary to the applicable law;

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e. Was the product of a grossly defective Trial process (including a wanton neglect of

normal Trial processes and introduction of steps (such as preliminary sanity inquisitions)

that were an abomination against State, Federal and International constitutional and

human rights laws);

f. Was induced by the Appellant Defendant's stricken financial situation, as caused by the

unlawful actions of the Plaintiff First Respondent and fraudulent professional misconduct

of the Second and Third Defendants and the Plaintiff First Respondent's solicitors and

counsel representing her during the pre-trial period and at the Trial.

7. The Appellant Defendant appeals that even if the Court of Appeal upholds that errant foundation

finding by the Trial Judge, that foundation finding alone was insufficient, given the absence of

any actual evidence by the Plaintiff First Respondent that she could, let alone did financially

support the Appellant Defendant (that, in the language of "constructive trust" and Part 9 of the

Property Law Act, that she made any financial or non-financial contributions to the benefit of the

Appellant Defendant at any time during the relevant period, the Trial Judge was not empowered

under Part 9 of the Property Law Act to grant the Plaintiff First Respondent any interest in the

Appellant Defendant's assets (or by way of judgement debt, an estimated monetary equivalent

thereto).

8. The Appellant Defendant appeals that even if the Trial Judge was lawfully empowered to grant

the Plaintiff First Respondent an interest in the Appellant Defendant's assets (or by way of

judgement debt, as he did, an estimated monetary equivalent thereto) the Trial Judge was

required by law to subtract from her entitlement an amount equal to the "negative contributions"

and especially the negative financial contributions of the Plaintiff First Respondent, which should

have resulted in the Trial Judge ordering the Plaintiff First Respondent to pay the Appellant

Defendant at least $121,000 (in lieu of the $105,000 order in her favour).

9. The Appellant Defendant appeals that the Trial Judge compounded his procedural errors and

finding, as summarised in the above three paragraphs:

a. by trying and rejecting the Appellant Defendant's claims against the Second and Third

Respondents on 2 December 2008 without proper pre-trial steps and on the basis of his

holding statement of his claims (filed in February 2008) rather than as the Appellant

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Defendant had restated them in November 2008 (filed in the non-consolidated

Proceedings;

b. by trying and rejecting the Appellant Defendant's claims when the misleading and

deceitful actions of the Plaintiff First Respondent and her solicitors and counsel caused

the competing claims to be set down for trial a year or more early than they should have

been tried denying the Appellant Defendant the opportunity of pre-trial stages and to

the opportunities to have his pleadings settled by independent legal representation, and

denying him the opportunity to have independent legal representation at Trial.

c. By upholding a no-case to answer application by the Second and Third Respondents,

when their fraud and misconduct and ulterior purposes were manifestly demonstrated:

i. By the independent evidence given to them by the Appellant Defendant prior to

Trial;

ii. By the independent evidence produced by the Appellant Defendant at the Trial

(including the evidence the Appellant Defendant uncovered and recovered from

the Plaintiff First Respondent during the December 2008 - January 2009 Trial

recess);

iii. By "the paucity of the [Plaintiff First Respondent's] evidence (read "almost total

absence" for "paucity");

iv. By the heavy handedness of the Plaintiff First Respondent's solicitors (including

the Second and Third Respondent) in the registration and abuse of their powers

as caveators, and the proceedings they issued for Plaintiff First Respondent

against the Appellant Defendant;

v. By the gross champetry and maintenance practised by the Second and Third

Respondents and their successors (to the detriment of both the Appellant

Defendant and the Plaintiff First Respondent herself).

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BACKGROUND TO THE APPEAL

The Plaintiff First Respondent's Claims

10. The Plaintiff First Respondent's claims ('Claims') against the Appellant Defendant:

a. Were first written for her by the Second and Third Respondents and recorded in her

Caveat dated about 5 May 2007;

b. Were secondly written for her by the Second and Third Respondents and her original

counsel in her Statement of Claim in proceedings number 9665 of 2007 dated November

2008, which the Second and Third Respondents prepared and filed and served and

notified to the Registrar of Titles in order to prevent the Plaintiff First Respondent's

Caveat from being cancelled by the Registrar of Titles;

c. Were thirdly re-written for her by her current solicitors and counsel in her Amended

Statement of Claim in proceedings number 9665 of 2007 dated 4 or 5 December 2008

(being three or four days into the Trial).

11. The Appellant Defendant has at all times complained that the Plaintiff First Respondent's Claims

were and are vexatious, oppressive and an abuse of process, being brought by her not to

vindicate any rights that the Plaintiff could legitimately claim against the Appellant Defendant but

for the ulterior purpose of causing unlawful damage and harm o the Appellant Defendant with the

intention of unlawfully extracting money and property from the Appellant Defendant;

The Misconduct of the Second and Third Respondents

12. The Appellant Defendant has at all times complained that the actions of the Second and Third

Respondents and in turn the actions of their successors, the Plaintiff First Respondent's current

solicitors and counsel, namely their issue and promotion and champetry and maintenance of the

Plaintiff First Respondent's Claims were done by them not to vindicate any rights that the Plaintiff

First Respondent could legitimately claim against the Appellant Defendant but for the ulterior

purpose of causing unlawful damage and harm to the Appellant Defendant with the intention to

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unjustly and unlawfully enrich the Third Respondent at the expense of the Appellant Defendant

and, even and as it transpires, contrary to the interests of the Plaintiff First Respondent.


Respondents manifest further illegality because the Third Respondent (and its employee agent

the Second Respondent) were acted contrary to:

a. their legal and ethical duties to the Court and the administration of justice;

b. their legal and ethical duties to the Appellant Defendant;

c. their legal and ethical duties to the Plaintiff First Respondent, which duties were

enhanced by their special knowledge of the Plaintiff First Respondent's major emotional

and mental health problems and histories.

14. The Third Respondent and their employee agent the Second Respondent contravened their

legal and ethical duties to the Court and the due administration of justice, including:

a. duties to exercise due diligence (meaning to undertake due investigations of assertions

and facts before issuing or maintaining legal proceedings), due care and due skill;

b. duties not to act in a way that would tend to defeat the interests of justice;

c. duties not to issue or maintain a claim that was brought for ulterior purposes and is

vexatious, oppressive and an abuse of the process of the Courts.

15. The Third Respondent and its employee agent the Second Respondent contravened legal and

ethical duties owed by them to the Appellant Defendant:

a. Because in accepting instructions from and acting for the Plaintiff First Respondent the

Third Respondent was turning its back on a 9 year client-solicitor relationship between

the Third Respondent and the Appellant Defendant and pursuant to that substantial

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relationship the Appellant Defendant had overseen the annual provision of millions of

dollars of Government legal work provided to the Third Respondent;

b. Because in registering a caveat and claiming an interest as a chargee in the Appellant

Defendant's property, 166 Queen Street Altona, the Third Respondent acquired duties to

the Appellant Defendant (1) firstly, to investigate beforehand the merit of the assertions of

fact on which that charge and caveat were based, and (2) secondly, duties of a

mortgagee/chargee/caveator not to unduly interfere with or cause waste to the Appellant

Defendant's property the subject of their claim;

c. Because the Appellant Defendant is a member of the general public to whom the Third

and Second Respondents owe general duties arising as incidental to their general duties

to the public and the Courts and the due administration of justice.

16. The Second and Third Respondents duties to the Plaintiff First Respondent, which were

enhanced by their special knowledge of the Plaintiff First Respondent's deep seated and long-

term mental health problems such as their knowledge of:

a. the assault and battery and domestic violence she committed on 30 September 2007

against her own children and home,

b. the burglary and theft of evidence she committed on 16 November 2007 against the

Appellant Defendant; and

c. her mental and criminal health problems as admitted by her and recorded in the

December 2007 Report prepared by Psychologist Dr David List);

17. The Second and Third Respondents turned their backs on their duties to the Court, the Appellant

Defendant and the Plaintiff First Respondent:

a. by taking from the Plaintiff First Respondent in May 2007 a purported charge over the

Appellant Defendant's property 166 Queen Street Altona and registering a Caveat which

totally restricted the Appellant Defendant's rights to deal with that property; and

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b. by their actions since that date which have been primarily to bring the Third Respondent

the most amount of money they could muster so as to maximise the returns they sought

under that charge and caveat.

18. More specifically, the Second and Third Respondents turned their backs on their duties to the

Court, the Appellant Defendant and the Plaintiff First Respondent:

a. By their failure in May 2007 to do any due diligence investigations on, or to obtain any

independent evidence from the Plaintiff First Respondent or elsewhere to substantiate

the Plaintiff First Respondent's Claims as written up in May 2007 in the Plaintiff First

Respondent's Caveat over the Appellant Defendant's properties;

b. By their failure in May 2007 to do any due diligence investigations, or to obtain any

independent evidence from the Plaintiff First Respondent or elsewhere to substantiate

the Plaintiff First Respondent's claim to be entitled to grant the Third Respondent an

equitable charge and allow the Third Respondent to register a caveat against the

Appellant Defendant's property 166 Queen Street Altona;

c. By their failure between May 2007 and November 2007 to do any due diligence

investigations, or to obtain any independent evidence from the Plaintiff First Respondent

or elsewhere to substantiate the Plaintiff First Respondent's claims before preparing and

issuing and filing the First Respondent's Statement of Claim;

d. By compounding their failures to do any of the abovementioned due diligence

investigations between May 2007 and November 2007 on their own initiatives by failing

to undertaking any due diligence investigations at any time during 2007 or 2008 (before

ceasing to act) after the Appellant Defendant made substantial disclosures to the Second

and Third Respondents and put them on full inquiry as to the fraudulent and scandalous

nature of the Plaintiff First Respondent's Claims;

e. By further compounding their failures to do any of the abovementioned due diligence

investigations between May 2007 and November 2007 on their own initiatives, when

handing over carriage of the proceedings to the Plaintiff First Respondent's current

solicitors and counsel:

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i. by failing to put the Plaintiff First Respondent's current solicitors and counsel on

notice of the necessity that they undertake due diligence investigations and seek

independent evidence from the Plaintiff First Respondent;

ii. by failing to inform the Plaintiff First Respondent's current solicitors and counsel of

the opinions expressed in March 2008 by counsel retained by them, Dr Richard

Ingleby (who inter alia settled her Statement of Claim) that the Plaintiff First

Respondent's Claims were vexatious and oppressive, were fraudulent and "has

[sic] gone way to far."

Misconduct by the Plaintiff First Respondent's Current Solicitors and Counsel


Respondents successors, the Plaintiff First Respondent's current solicitors and counsel, namely

their continuing promotion and champetry and maintenance of the Plaintiff First Respondent's

Claims were done by them not to vindicate any rights that the Plaintiff First Respondent could

legitimately claim against the Appellant Defendant but for the ulterior purpose of causing

unlawful damage and harm to the Appellant Defendant with the intention to unjustly and

unlawfully enrich themselves at the expense of the Appellant Defendant and, even and as it

transpires, contrary to the interests of the Plaintiff First Respondent.

20. The Appellant Defendant has at all times complained that the actions of the Plaintiff First

Respondent's current solicitors and counsel manifest further illegality because the they have at

all times acted contrary to:

a. their legal and ethical duties to the Court and the administration of justice;

b. their legal and ethical duties to the Appellant Defendant;

c. their legal and ethical duties to the Plaintiff First Respondent, which duties were

enhanced by their special knowledge of the Plaintiff First Respondent's major emotional

and mental health problems and histories.

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21. More specifically, the Plaintiff First Respondent's current solicitors and counsel turned their

backs on their duties to the Court, the Appellant Defendant and the Plaintiff First Respondent:

a. by their continued and even more aggressive champetry and maintenance of the Plaintiff

First Respondent's Claims, that they knew or ought but for their recklessness and/or the

misconduct of the Second and Third Respondents for failing to communicate their own

knowledge, were vexatious, oppressive and fraudulent claims;

b. by their vexatious, oppressive and abusive pursuit of interlocutory orders and reliefs that

they knew the Plaintiff First Respondent was not entitled to seek because, as she swore

in her Affidavit dated 6 June 2008 prepared by them, she did not have the money to pay

for her legal costs of a trial (and ergo did not have the money to meet any orders to pay

damages to the Appellant Defendant in the event that her Claims were dismissed at

Trial);

c. by their vexatious, oppressive and abusive failure to observe normal pre-trial stages

(discover, interlocutory, finalisation of pleadings) before applying to have the matter set

down for trial;

d. by their vexatious, oppressive, abusive, fraudulent and deceitful conduct and tactics

during the Trial (as expanded upon below);

e. by their vexatious, oppressive, abusive, fraudulent and deceitful conduct subsequent to

the Trial;

f. by their vexatious, oppressive, abusive, fraudulent and deceitful conduct and tactics in

respect of the related Federal Magistrates Court proceedings.

The Defendant's Defence and Counterclaims

22. The Defendant filed and served his response to the Plaintiff First Respondent's Claims:

a. Firstly in January 2008, when he filed his defence in these proceedings, a 3 sentence, 3

line total denial of all of her Claims;

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b. Secondly, in February 2008 by filing in proceedings number 9665 of 2007 counterclaims

against the Plaintiff First Respondent and the Second and Third Respondents;

c. Thirdly, in late November 2008 by filing in proceedings number 9263 of 2008 which

commenced a week or two earlier in November 2008, which pleadings contained:

i. his defence to those claims of his mortgagee in those proceedings;

ii. his restated counterclaims against the Plaintiff First Respondent and the Second

and Third Respondents (and continuing to be so-named as the First, Second and

Third Defendants by Counterclaim);

iii. his first statement of his corresponding claims against:

1. the Plaintiff First Respondent's original counsel;

2. the Plaintiff First Respondent's current solicitor, his law firm; and

3. the Plaintiff First Respondent's current counsel (each of them named as

the Fourth to Seventh Defendants by Counterclaim);

iv. his first statement of his claims against other persons intimately involved, or

intimately refusing to be involved, in the matters that gave rise to both sets of

proceedings (and named as the Eighth to Thirteenth Defendants by

Counterclaim).

d. Fourthly, in his Amended Defence and Counterclaim dated March 2009 and filed in

proceedings number 9263 of 2008.

23. The Appellant Defendant has maintained at all times (including in his twenty plus page

submission handed to and ignored by the Trial Judge at Trial on 2 December 2008) that his

pleadings were just holding documents, prepared by him as a commercial and government law

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solicitor of 18 plus years good standing but with no advocacy or litigation experience or training

whatsoever, as an interim measure until they could be reviewed and settled by appropriately

trained and experienced independent solicitors and counsel retained by him for the purpose.

FIRST GROUNDS OF APPEAL ABUSE OF PROCESS AND DENIAL OF NATURAL

JUSTICE

Proceeding No. 9665 of 2007 were not ready for Trial on 2 December 2008

24. The Trial Judge erred in ruling that the proceedings number 9665 of 2007 were ready to be tried

by Him on and from 2 December 2008.

25. The Trial Judge should have ruled that the proceedings number 9665 of 2007 were not ready to

be tried and should have vacated the 2 December 2008 trial date for the following reasons:

a. The pre-trial stages had not been finished (or even started):

i. There had been no orders for discovery and no discovery had been made (the

barest of orders for preliminary discovery were made in March 2008 but, in any

case as the Trial Judge subsequently found, the Plaintiff First Respondent failed

to comply with even those preliminary orders);

ii. There had been no orders for or exchange of interrogatories;

iii. Neither/none of the parties had as at 2 December 2008 finalised their pleadings,

which could not be finalised until after discovery and interrogatories had been

completed (and the Plaintiff First Respondent's counsel demonstrated this when

with the blessing of the Trial Judge the Plaintiff First Respondent's filed and

served an Amended Statement of Claim 3 or 4 days after the commencement of

the Trial).

b. Instead, the Plaintiff First Respondent's current solicitors and counsel had wrongly and

fraudulently obtained the trial date of 2 December 2008 by making a fraudulent and

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deceptive statement to the Court (to Master Kings) in August 2008, that they estimated

the trial would be of two days duration, but:

i. The Appellant Defendant had no knowledge of and was therefore unable to attend

that August 2008 hearing before Master Kings to voice his earlier (March 2007)

estimate of 3 to 4 weeks;

ii. The Plaintiff First Respondent's current solicitors and counsel failed in their duties

to the Court to inform Master Kings (1) firstly that normal pre-trial stages of

discovery, interrogatories and finalisation of pleadings had not been completed or

even commenced; and (2) of the Appellant Defendant's estimate of 3 to 4 weeks

(in the event, the Trial lasted 16 days);

26. The Trial Judge:

a. Should have either adjourned the proceedings to be re-listed before the Listing Master or

alternatively should Himself have made orders for discovery to be made, interrogatories

to be done and pleadings to be completed by the parties, before the proceedings could

be re-set down for trial;

b. Should have disciplined the Plaintiff First Respondent's solicitors and counsel for grossly

unethical misconduct for having the matter set down for trial before crucial pre-trial steps

in the proceedings had even been initiated, and for their further grossly unethical

misconduct in setting the matter down for trial on a wholly inappropriate and deceitful

estimate of 2 days trial duration; and

c. Should have ordered that the Plaintiff First Respondent's solicitors and counsel pay the

Appellant Defendant's costs (as a fixed amount calculated on a full indemnity solicitor-

client basis) pursuant to Rule 63.23.

The (Unlawful) Insanity Inquisition

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27. The Trial Judge compounded his error of process described above because He should not have

entertained, at the outset of the Trial on 2 December 2008, an unlawful insanity inquisition

against the Appellant Defendant.

28. It is not and has not been any part of the laws of this land since the Stuart King's Star Chamber

was supposedly abolished in 1642 that a defendant is required to first satisfy the presiding judge

as to his sanity in order to have the right to defend himself in proceedings in this Honourable

Court and nothing in the Constitution of this State or the Supreme Court Act or the Rules of this

Honourable Court made under those statutes, or at common law, empowers a Judge to require a

defendant to pre-qualify himself by passing any form of sanity inquisition before he is allowed to

defend himself against claims brought against him in this Honourable Court.

29. The Trial Judge's decision (at the instigation of the Plaintiff First Respondent's counsel Graeme

Devries) to spend almost all of the first day of a supposed two day trial conducting an unlawful

inquisition into the Appellant Defendant's mental capacity to defend himself at Trial:

a. was an affront to the basic human rights of every Australian, rights supposedly protected

under our State and Federal Constitutions, under the Victorian Charter of Human Rights

and Responsiblities, under the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (to

which Australia is a recent, minor signatory) and even under the 1689 English Bill of

Rights (which operates even in the United States and its external territories such as

Guantanamo Bay) and the 1215 Magna Charta.

b. was all the more repugnant (if that were possible) by virtue of the fact that the Appellant

Defendant is not just a natural citizen of this State and country, but is a highly intelligent

and highly educated man (as the Trial Judge subsequently found) who has been a

solicitor of 18 years good standing (as the Trial Judge subsequently found) and who

despite not having any training or experience as a litigator (as the Trial Judge

subsequently found) demonstrated during the Trial many abilities of a natural advocate

(as the Trial Judge subsequently found);

c. Cannot be justified by reference to any laws or procedures acceptable in Courts of law in

this State and this Country because it is the sort of heavy handed tyranny that survivors

of despotic regimes such as Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia complain about.

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d. Creates a frightening legal precedent for future trials in this State and country.

30. the Appellant Defendant's continuing sanity (under frightening circumstances of oppression) was

vindicated:

a. not only by the Trial Judge's December 2008 and February 2009 findings as to the

Appellant Defendant's sanity, intelligence and abilities as a solicitor recounted above; but

b. also by the May 2009 findings of a subsequent post-Trial inquisition (probably an unlawful

reprisal action) by the Legal Services Commissioner through her delegate the Law

Institute of Victoria that was instigated Federal Magistrate Daniel O'Dwyer ("strongly

urged" by the Plaintiff First Respondent's Counsel, Graeme Devries) in April 2009.


a. Should have rejected the Plaintiff First Respondent's counsel's Graeme Devries unlawful

application under Order 15 to have the Appellant Defendant declared a handicapped

person, on mental incapacity grounds;

b. Should have disciplined the Plaintiff First Respondent's counsel Graeme Devries for

seriously unethical behaviour for attempting to launch such an inquisition The Trial

Judge most certainly should not have thanked and congratulated Graeme Devries for

instigating this inquisition.

Failure to Consider the Contemptuous Federal Magistrates Court Orders

32. The Trial Judge compounded his errors of process described above because he failed to

investigate or appreciate the Appellant Defendant's pleas, even in the context of the unlawful

insanity inquisition, that the Appellant Defendant was under pain of breach unlawful (but

nonetheless extant) orders made by Federal Magistrate Daniel O'Dwyer in the Federal

Magistrates Court on 9 September 2008 that purportedly on penalty of up to 2 years

imprisonment or $20,000 fine prohibited the Appellant Defendant from referring to or using any of

the affidavits or evidence in the related Family Law Act proceedings (in which he was the

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Applicant) in evidence at the Trial before the Trial Judge (the 'Contemptuous Federal

Magistrates Court Orders').

33. The Trial Judge compounded his errors of process described above by failing to appreciate that

the Contemptuous Federal Magistrates Court Orders:

a. Were 95% or more drafted by the Plaintiff First Respondent's counsel Mr Graeme

Devries and purported to place no such handicap or pain on the Plaintiff First

Respondent or her solicitors or counsel;

b. Were such that:

i. the Appellant Defendant was (as he protested to the Trial Judge) prima facie in

breach of them (and at penalty of imprisonment) simply by mentioning them to the

Trial Judge, and was by their force completely shut out from responding to any of

the scandalous allegations put by the Plaintiff First Respondent's counsel in the

context of the unlawful insanity inquisition; and

ii. it was not within the powers of the Plaintiff First Respondent's counsel to waive

those Federal Magistrates Court Orders (as the Plaintiff First Respondent's

counsel purported to do) to allow the Appellant Defendant to participate in the

unlawful insanity inquisition;

iii. the Trial Judge was perhaps confused into thinking that the Appellant Defendant

might be somewhat insane (just by reason of describing them) when the Trial

Judge should better have thought that Federal Magistrate Daniel O'Dwyer and the

Plaintiff First Respondent's counsel might be somewhat insane (by reason of

them making them).


a. Should have ruled that Federal Magistrate Daniel O'Dwyer and the Plaintiff First

Respondent's counsel Graeme Devries had both committed contempts of the Federal

Parliament, the State Parliament, the Federal Magistrates Court and the Victorian

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Supreme Court, for their respective parts in the making of the Contemptuous Federal

Magistrates Court Orders;

b. Should have ordered that these proceedings number 9665 of 2007 not be re-set down for

trial until the Appellant Defendant had first been given reasonable opportunity to appeal

the Contemptuous Federal Magistrates Court Orders and have them set aside, so that

they did not unlawfully prejudice the Appellant Defendant's ability to defend himself (and

to present his counterclaims) in these proceedings.

Failure to Consider the Consolidation Application

35. The Trial Judge compounded his errors of process described above because he should not have

rejected the Appellant Defendant's application on 2 December 2008 that the original proceedings

number 9665 of 2007 and the one month old proceedings number 9263 of 2008 (in which the

Appellant Defendant had restated his counterclaims against the three Respondents) needed to

be heard together.

36. The Trial Judge should have considered:

a. the Appellant Defendant's twenty plus page submission of 2 December 2008;

b. the Appellant Defendant's pleadings, namely his Defence and Counterclaim prepared

and filed in proceedings number 9263 of 2008;

c. the Appellant Defendant's summons (in proceedings number 9263 of 2008) that was

returnable on 1 December 2008 (but not heard) seeking to have the two proceedings

consolidated and heard jointly, with pleadings in one proceedings being treated as

pleadings in the other, and evidence in one proceedings being treated as evidence in the

other.

37. The Trial Judge reluctantly received the Appellant's twenty plus page submission of 2 December

2008 but returned it to the Appellant Defendant within less than 3 minutes, manifestly without

proper consideration; The Trial Judge refused to receive or review a copy of his Defence and

Counterclaim filed in proceedings number 9263 of 2008.

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38. The Trial Judge should have either adjourned the Appellant Defendant's application for

consolidation of the two sets of proceedings or should himself have made orders for the two sets

of proceedings to be consolidated, all as part and parcel of the orders necessary for pre-trial

stages to be completed before the proceedings number 9665 of 2007 could be re-set down for

trial.

Refusal to allow the Appellant Defendant to proceed without revised pleadings

39. The Trial Judge repeatedly, wrongly:

a. Refused to allow the Appellant Defendant to amend his counterclaims filed in

proceedings number 9665 of 2007 (in effect, to expand them as filed in proceedings

number 9263 of 2008) on the same basis that the Trial Judge allowed the Plaintiff First

Respondent's counsel to amend her Statement of Claim, three days into the Trial; and

b. Refused to allow the Appellant Defendant to try his claims of ulterior purpose against the

Plaintiff First Respondent and especially against the Second and Third Respondents,

without the necessity of formal pleadings, despite the Trial Judge having the power to

allow the Appellant Defendant's case to proceed on these grounds without necessity of

written pleadings, and despite there being no injustice to (especially) the Second and

Third Respondent's, whose counsel admitted at Trial were aware all along of the

Appellant Defendant's statements informing them that the Plaintiff First Respondent's

Claims were fraudulent and as such oppressive, vexatious and oppressive.

40. The Trial Judge should have allowed the Appellant Defendant to try his claims against each of

the Respondents as restated by the Appellant Defendant in his counterclaims filed in

proceedings number 9263 of 2008.

Summary of First Grounds of Appeal - Denials of Fair Hearing and Natural Justice

41. By reason of:

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44. The Trial Judge should have dismissed the Plaintiff First Respondent's Claims on the basis that

on the evidence brought by her to Trial she had failed to satisfy the Trial Judge on the balance of

probabilities as to any of the following three things (especially as she had to demonstrate all

three to him to succeed in her Claims):

a. that she had lived under the same roof as the Appellant Defendant for at least 2 years

ending no later than 2 years before late November 2007 (the date of her Statement of

Claim);

b. that she had so lived with the Appellant for (a relevant and sufficient part of) that period

as part of a bona fide domestic couple relationship and not on some other basis; and

c. that she made direct and indirect, financial and non-financial contributions towards the

well being of the Appellant Defendant sufficient to warrant the Judge attributing to her a

corresponding percentage interest in the Appellant Defendant's properties.

45. Additionally, or alternatively, if there was scope for the Trial Judge to correctly find (in fact and in

law Plaintiff) that the First Respondent successfully demonstrated all three of these things to the

Trial Judge on the balance of probabilities, then the Trial Judge should have found, again on the

balance of probabilities, that the negative contributions of the Plaintiff First Respondent from May

2007 were sufficient to warrant the Judge attributing her a diminished (and in fact a negative)

interest in the Appellant Defendant's properties.

The "paucity of the [Plaintiff's] evidence"

46. The "paucity of the [Plaintiff's] evidence" complained of by the Trial Judge can be summarised as

follows:

The Paucity of the "romantic relationship" evidence and the contrary romantic

relationship evidence

a. The Plaintiff First Respondent claimed to have lived in a domestic couple relationship

with the Appellant Defendant from late 1998 up to and including May 2007;

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b. At trial the Plaintiff First Respondent produced evidence by way of two Valentine Cards

dated February 1999 and February 2000, which were evidence of a romantic relationship

of sorts with the Appellant Defendant during 1999 and that it had ended by February

2000.

c. The Plaintiff First Respondent failed to produce any evidence at Trial demonstrating any

romantic relationship with the Appellant Defendant at any time after 2000.

d. The Appellant Defendant produced evidence at Trial by way of independent witnesses,

admissions by the Plaintiff First Respondent at Trial, including extracts from her

handwritten journals and diaries) of the Plaintiff First Respondent's romantic relationships

during 2000 and 2007 with other men including:

i. Her (married with children) boyfriend Peter Cockram (between 2001 and 2002,

and possibly starting in 2000 and possibly ending in 2003 or later);

ii. Her (married with children) boyfriend, Marc (starting in 2006, possibly September

2006 and ending in 2007 or possibly according to the Plaintiff First Respondent's

testimony continuing into 2008);

iii. Her live-with boyfriend, Yuri (starting in 2007 or possibly 2006 and possibly still

continuing as at the Trial).

e. The Appellant gave evidence at Trial of the Appellant Defendant's monogamous romantic

relationships with other women, namely:

i. With Elizabeth (between early 2004 up to the end of 2006); and

ii. With Stella (from January 2007 up until September 2007),

and he further gave evidence at Trial why, for their personal safety, he did not wish to risk

calling Elizabeth or Stella, or his (estranged but still legally married wife) Julie Johnson as

witnesses.

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The paucity of the "living under the same roof" evidence

f. The Plaintiff First Respondent failed to produce at Trial any evidence demonstrating that

she and the Appellant Defendant had lived together under the same roof at any time

during the period from late 1998 to December 2007, except for the (irrelevant) period of

May 2001 to July 2003 (being an period too early and therefore irrelevant to the Plaintiff

First Respondent's Claims even without having to consider her further claims that she

and the Appellant Defendant were living under the same roof as a de facto couple). [The

Appellant Defendant has at all times admitted to the extent that he shared his homes with

the Plaintiff First Respondent and some/all of her children during this period because she

and the children would otherwise have been homeless, but has at all times refuted that

he and she were a couple even during that limited period).

g. The Appellant Defendant:

i. produced independent evidence at Trial confirming that the Appellant Defendant

and the Plaintiff First Respondent did not live under the same roof at any time

prior to June 2000 (being the date that the Appellant Defendant and the Plaintiff

First Respondent jointly registered the birth of the Plaintiff First Respondent's third

and youngest child the Birth Certificate stating their respective addresses at that

date.

ii. Produced independent evidence at Trial (by way of the testimony of an

independent eye-witness) demonstrating that the Plaintiff First Respondent lived

as a single mother with her three children at the house 166 Queen Street Altona

at all relevant times from June 2006;

iii. Produced independent evidence at Trial (by way of the testimony of independent

eye-witnesses and formal residential tenancy agreements) demonstrating that theAppellant Defendant lived in an apartment (909 and then 2302) at 668 Bourke

Street Melbourne, some 15 20 kilometres distant from the Plaintiff First

Respondent, at all relevant times from July 2003;

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h. At Trial the Plaintiff First Respondent's counsel pointed to a few documents of the

Appellant Defendant's (documents that her Counsel could not have seen prior to 2

December 2008) that linked him to his property 2 Dorrington Street Point Cook, but those

linkages were circumstantial and remote and did nothing more than evidence the

Appellant Defendant's ownership of that property. [And being so tenuous and

circumstantial and ambiguous, these did not constitute evidence of the Appellant

Defendant actually living at that address from July 2003 and certainly did not carry the

same weight or refute the unambiguous independent evidence presented at Trial

demonstrating that the Appellant Defendant lived at Bourke Street Melbourne at all

relevant times from July 2003.

The paucity of the "contributions" evidence

i. The Plaintiff First Respondent failed to produce at Trial any evidence that at any time

during the relevant period (that is, at any time prior to May 2007) she had any source of

income or money out of which she could have financially supported the Appellant

Defendant.

j. Accordingly, the Plaintiff First Respondent failed to produce at Trial any evidence that she

financially supported the Appellant Defendant.

k. The Trial Judge should have dismissed the Plaintiff First Respondent's Claims solely by

reason of her failure to produce any evidence to support her claims of "contributions" and

should have held.

l. The Appellant Defendant produced at Trial evidence in the form of copies should have

been fatal

The paucity of the Plaintiff's excuse for not bringing any evidence to Trial

m. The Trial Judge rightly refused to accept the Plaintiff First Respondent's wild

unsubstantiated claims that the Appellant Defendant in August 2007 burgled her home

and stole her evidence (the 'Dingo Stole the Appellant Defendants evidence' claims,

as the Appellant Defendant described them at Trial):

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i. The Trial Judge could not lawfully make such findings having regard to the

principles in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (and the seriousness of any allegations of

any impropriety or deceit made against the Appellant Defendant as a solicitor of

18 plus years good standing;

ii. The Trial Judge rightly found that her claims were illogical;

iii. Nevertheless the Trial Judge was sufficiently distracted by her claims that:

1. the Trial Judge failed to properly apply the principles in Jones v Dunkel (it

following from the fact that the Plaintiff First Respondent's solicitors and

counsel subpoenaed the Appellant Defendant's mortgagees to produce

copies of his loan and banking documents instead of proper discovery and

pre-trial steps, there was no excuse for the Plaintiff First Respondent's

solicitors not subpoenaing the Plaintiff First Respondent's employers (if

she had any), banks (if she had any) and even the Australian Taxation

Office's records for her (if they have any) to deliver evidence in Court (if

there were any) of her having any sources of income;

2. The Trial Judge failed to properly carry through with his findings regarding

the Plaintiff First Respondent's credibility:

a. That she had lied to the Trial Judge in claiming that she made

financial contributions to the Appellant Defendant's deposits for his

properties;

b. That she had lied to the Trial Judge about complying with Justice

Wheelan's pre-trial discovery orders of March 2008 (As the Trial

Judge found, the Appellant Defendant found most of the

documents she was supposed to deliver to the Appellant

Defendant in March 2008 had been left abandoned by her at the

Point Cook house in December 2008 and he produced these as

Exhibit ## on the resumption of the Trial on 9 February 2009);

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c. That she had burgled the Appellant Defendant's home in

November 2007 and stolen substantial personal and business

records and equipment belonging to the Appellant Defendant and

then lied to the Police in December 2007 and to the Second and

Third Respondents and to Justice Wheelan in March 2008, and to

the Trial Judge in December 2008 claiming to have handed all of

the stolen things to the Police (As the Trial Judge found, the

Appellant Defendant found more of the documents and equipment

she was supposed to have handed over to the Police in December

2007 and to the Second and Third Respondents in March had

been left abandoned by her at the Point Cook house in December

2008 and he produced these as Exhibit ## on the resumption of

the Trial on 9 February 2009)

THIRD GROUNDS OF APPEAL MATHEMATICAL MISCALCULATIONS

47. Even on the assumption that the Appellant Defendant and the Plaintiff First Defendant had been

a de facto couple for 9 years, the Trial Judge erred in finding that the Plaintiff First Respondent

made positive contributions to the Appellant Defendant's assets:

a. The Plaintiff First Respondent did not produce any evidence at Trial of even a dollar of

income or money during any of the relevant period from which she could have supported

b. The Trial Judge's wrong finding (based on the strongly urged deceptions of the Plaintiff

First Respondent's counsel, and ignoring the Appellant Defendant's Exhibit 14 four full

years worth of fee invoices) that the Appellant Defendant was living beyond his means

and dependent on financial support from an unidentified source, even if that story were

true, was not per se evidence that the Plaintiff First Respondent had the means to be or

was a source of financial support for the Appellant Defendant.

c. The Trial Judge erred in this finding as it was totally contradictory to the independent

evidence and the Plaintiff First Respondent brought no evidence to trial to support it.

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48. Even if the Trial Judge had been correct in the assumption that the Appellant Defendant and the

Plaintiff First Respondent were a de facto couple for 9 years, and his assumption that the

Plaintiff First Respondent had a source of money other than the Appellant Defendant during the

relevant period, and that the Plaintiff First Respondent financially supported the Appellant

Defendant (whether he needed it, or as in fact, he didn't need it) the Trial Judge erred in finding

that the Plaintiff First Respondent's contributions were worth 50% of the Appellant Defendant's

assets:

a. The Plaintiff First Defendant's contributions as home-maker were, according to the

evidence, more negative than positive and could not be measured as the equal of six

ordinary reasonable "committed and devoted couples";

b. According to the evidence, at least two, and probably all three of the Plaintiff First

Respondent's children were not biologically or legally the Appellant Defendants;

c. The Appellant Defendant was on the evidence rarely at the Plaintiff First Respondent's

premises during the relevant period so there was hardly any scope for him to receive

the benefit of any "non-financial contributions" even if the Plaintiff First Respondent were

capable of making them.

d. The Trial Judge failed to take into account the negative financial contributions caused tothe Appellant Defendant by the Plaintiff First Respondent and her lawyers (including the

Second and Third Respondents) heavy handed use and abuse of the caveats that they

struck over the Appellant Defendant's properties notably the Altona property where she

was in residence, causing a $226,000 negative contribution that in the wash-up the

Plaintiff First Respondent should have to bear as to 100%.

FOURTH GROUNDS OF APPEAL: TRIAL JUDGE IGNORED IMPACT OF MY CALDERBANK

OFFER ON ISSUES OF COSTS:

49. On 1 April 2008 the Appellant Defendant offered the Plaintiff First Respondent a property free

from encumbrances (the Appellant Defendants remaining Hoppers Crossing property recently

valued by the Court at $250,000) plus up to $50,000 to pay her new lawyers (Berry Family Law,

barely 3 weeks in the saddle). An offer some 2 to 3 times more generous than the amount the

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Trial Judge ordered me to pay her in February 2009. The only catch, aware of Ms 1999s mental

problems (as her lawyers almost certainly were also by then) the Appellant Defendant stipulated

that the house be put in her 8 year old daughters name (in trust). A might generous Calderbank

offer, even if rejected by the Plaintiff First Respondents lawyers as not to their liking. More than

enough to make the Plaintiff First Respondents lawyers liable to pay the Appellant Defendants

$900,000 in legal costs (incurred to Sutton Lawyers Pty Ltd) under Rule 63.23 and thereabouts.

FIFTH GROUND OF APPEAL: TRIAL JUDGES FAILURE TO CONSIDER DAMAGES

FROM BURGLARY AND THEFT OF PERSONAL BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, RECORDS

AND EVIDENCE

50. the Plaintiff First Respondents burglary on the Appellant Defendant did a lot more than $25

damage. The Trial Judge erred in fact and law by fixing his damages as a nominal $25 and by

refusing to hear the Appellant Defendant on issues of quantum of damages. These exceeded

the $105,000 the Appellant Defendant was ordered to pay the Plaintiff First Respondent, by a

considerable margin.

FIFTH GROUND OF APPEAL: NO PRE-TRIAL STEPS / INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION

51. These denials of natural justice, had a number of serious flow on consequences, including

depriving me the sort of pleadings and representation the Appellant Defendant would have had if

this had gone to trial according to ordinary procedures, after discovery etc, on a proper estimate

of 4 6 weeks trial (up from the 3 4 weeks the Appellant Defendant had estimated in March

2008), with a likely trial date of late 2009 or early 2010.

52. For example, if the Appellant Defendant had been independently represented, there is a much

better chance the Trial Judge would have required the Plaintiff First Respondents lawyers to

wait until pre-trial stages like discovery had been completed, and pleadings settled after

discovery, before the matter proceeded to trial. The Trial Judge might have understood that the

Appellant Defendants claims against the Plaintiff First Respondent and against her original

solicitors needed, at the very least, to be tried according to the Appellant Defendants November

2008 draft (amateurish, holding) pleadings, not the February 2008 ones.

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53. Another flow on of being unrepresented by experienced lawyers at this bush wack ambush trial

on 2 December 2008, the Appellant Defendant now realises with the Appellant Defendants 20

days of novitiate experience as an (self-) advocate that the Appellant Defendant should not have

put himself into the witness box at Trial. Given the paucity of the Plaintiff First Respondents

evidence, and the Appellant Defendants inability to run the Appellant Defendants counterclaims

since the Trial Judge was holding me to totally inadequate, raw, February 2008 draft pleadings,

the Appellant Defendant should have just moved for a no case to answer and orders for costs

under rule 63.23 (mind you, that was more or less what the Appellant Defendant was compelled

to do and did do in any case as the transcripts show). Imagine if the Plaintiff First Respondents

counsel, Graeme Devries, had been deprived the opportunity to scandalously and unjustifiably

attack me in the witness box (cross examining me with documents stolen by his client, not

discovered to me before the Trial), his using documents he had only seen first time on 2

December 2008 that were mere indications of the Appellant Defendants ownership of the

Appellant Defendants properties (notably the Appellant Defendants Point Cook properties) and

his corrupt attempts (which the Trial Judge loved) to puff indicia of ownership into indicia of

residency (despite eye-witness and other independent evidence point out the falsity of his

submissions). Neither Devries nor Justice Kaye would have got away with a fraction of their

unlawfulness if the Appellant Defendant had the benefit of a properly timed and sequenced trial,

with properly drafted pleadings and proper legal representation.

54. With independent experience legal representation, the Plaintiff First Respondent would have

been properly cross-examined by a lawyer who knew what they were doing. Not a complete

novice, like the Appellant Defendant, who had no idea until going into the witness box on the

fourth day that when the Judge said he had read all the papers he meant just the Statement of

Claim (as amended that morning, day 4 of the Trial) and the Appellant Defendants February

2008 holding draft defence and counterclaims. What kind of Court is it where the Judge doesnt

read the hundreds of pages of affidavits and exhibits before the trial? A whole body of evidence

that the Appellant Defendant thought the Judge had read and understood, and the Appellant

Defendant finds out after the Plaintiff First Respondents case had closed that they werent even

in evidence because the Appellant Defendant had been ambushed and didnt know that the

Appellant Defendant had to bring these materials into evidence by cross-examining her. Add to

this the Appellant Defendants physical pain, chronic back ache meaning the Appellant

Defendant had been awake and standing upright (unable to sit or to lay down) from 6 am

Monday 1 December 2008 through until about 3 am on Friday December 2009.

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SEVENTH GROUNDS OF APPEAL: JUDICIAL BIAS

55. The Trial Judge exhibited gross judicial bias by reason of his grossly incompetent and unlawful

decision making, such as in the following 11 examples of serious abuse, bias perhaps amounting

to misconduct in office and contempt of the laws of this land and perversion of the course of

justice in these proceedings.

a. The insanity inquisition described above is this now part of the laws of Victoria and/or

Australia that a defendant has to pass a pre-trial sanity test? Does it apply to all

Victorians/Australians, or only self-represented ones? Does it only apply to solicitors of

18 years good standing, or does it apply to legal practitioners of more or of less years

good standing?

b. The No-consolidation application The Trial Judge didnt even receive or look at the

Appellant Defendants November 2008 redrafted pleadings until 5 February 2009 and

even then, only for the purposes of throwing out the Appellant Defendants subpoena that

the Legal Services NON-Commissioner give evidence explaining her dereliction of

statutory duties, AND to order me to pay that statutory authorities legal costs of evading

judicial accountability for her statutory derelictions.

c. The Trial Judge failed to hear the Appellant Defendants submissions that He have

regard to the issues of perversion and contempt raised in the Federal Magistrates Court

Orders made in September 2008 by Federal Magistrate Daniel ODwyer (at the strong

urging of and substantially as drafted by the Plaintiff First Respondents counsel Graeme

Devries (re-issued version of late February 2009 attached). The Trial Judge erred by

failing to apply contempt laws against James Turnbull, Peter Berry, Graeme Devries and

Daniel ODwyer. The Trial Judge erred by failing to apply contempt laws and perjury laws

against the Plaintiff First Respondent and her ex-boyfriend Peter Cockram and against

the perjuring contemptuous process server Wittekind who pretended to serve subpoena

on Peter Cockram, but didnt.

d. The Trial Judge demonstrated bias and prejudice in his grumblings against the Appellant

Defendant, including his immortal 10 Plaintiffs died while this Trial has been running

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suggesting the Appellant Defendant was a sinner for standing tall and defending himself

against this outrageous claim brought by the Plaintiff First Respondents lawyers with a

paucity of the evidence, suggesting that the Appellant Defendant should just hand over

all the Appellant Defendant owns lock and key to them cause theyre nice and (allegedly)

hes not. The Trial Judge failed to show any concern about the mortality rate for

Defendants in waiting. Nor did the Trial Judge show any concern for the Appellant

Defendants obvious physical pains especially during the first week of the Trial when the

Appellant Defendant, on medial advice of his local general practitioner, should have been

in hospital with back pain, not defending himself in a Court room.

e. The Trial Judges take on Mr C.Ps evidence (apparently Peter Cockram, self-confessed

stalker of the Plaintiff First Respondent is entitled to anonymity under section 121 of the

Family Law Act, but the Plaintiff First Respondent, the Appellant Defendant and their

respective children are not. The Trial Judge should have found that Peter Cockram was

lying in the box. The Trial Judge erred for finding that the explanation for Peter

Cockrams lack of evidence must have been that the Appellant Defendant was a crazy

person who subpoenaed a total random stranger into the witness box. The Trial Judge

should have recalled Peter Cockram after a Purana Taskforce Senior Detective was able

to give evidence to show that Cockram, like his ex-girlfriend the Plaintiff First Respondent

was lying and perjuring in the witness box, to face contempt and perjury charges.

f. The Trial Judge erred in His publishing a no case to answer judgement on the Appellant

Defendants February 2008 version of the Appellant Defendants counterclaim against

Harwood Andrews Lawyers (something rarely sought and very rarely given according to

their Legal Practitioners Liability EVASION Committee funded counsel) on 11 February

2009, even before the Appellant Defendant had given the Appellant Defendants closing

submissions, and where the circumstances and evidence all showed that the Appellant

Defendants case against them speaks for itself and that the Second and Third

Respondents have no answer to the case.

g. The Trial Judge demonstrated substantial prejudice and bias (and perhaps also more

than a little misplaced paranoia) in His assorted abuses of the Appellant Defendant for

wasting time (No, the Plaintiff First Respondent lawyers wasted the Courts time and his,

and wasted the Appellant Defendants assets bringing this blackmail claim in the first

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place), raising irrelevant issues (No, these were relevant issues, just that the Trial

Judge didnt want them raised because he didnt want to deal with them), and that the

Appellant Defendant (never having been an advocate before and hopelessly out funded

and out-manoeuvred by a raft of gross misconduct and abuse) was trying to take control

of His Court room.

h. The Trial Judge demonstrated substantial prejudice and bias in his abuse of the Appellant

Defendant on 3 December 2008 for wanting to do as the Appellant Defendants local GP

(one block from the Court, on corners of William and Bourke Streets, and one block from

the Appellant Defendants former home of 5 years) and take the Appellant Defendants

chronically sore back to St Vincents Hospital for X-rays and treatment the Appellant

Defendant should have been in hospital that week not in a Court Room.

i. The Trial Judge demonstrated substantial prejudice and bias by insisting that the

Appellant Defendant start the Appellant Defendants closing submissions on the

afternoon of 11 February 2009 when the Appellant Defendant (For the benefit of any

Amnesty International or Rightswatch people reading the transcript in the near future,

had the luxury of almost 3 hours sleep for three nights in a row) was barely able to stand

on the Appellant Defendants feet (suffering the extra blows of being labelled that morning

by Ms Sofranou and by the Trial Judge as a faux human rights lawyer, while Harwood

Andrews were labelled as good dutiful lawyers just going about their jobs properly to

protect their client). What a sick cruel joke meinen Frauen und Herren and Answuralten.

What a sick joke on society. What criminal contempt and perversion.

j. On 17 March Associate Justice Gardiner revealed that he would not hear any part of

these proceedings between myself and Graeme Devries (the 7th Defendant by

Counterclaim in the Appellant Defendants restated counterclaims recorded as

proceedings number 9263 of 2008) because of their 30 year friendship, and that all of the

judges in the Masters Court, with the exception of Associate Justice Daly are similarly

afflicted by conflict (of the kind that the High Court described in Johnson v Johnson

[200] 118 CLR 488 though not found to be present in that case). This explains the

actions past of Associate Justice Kings and the actions past and present of Associate

Justice Evans. Given this high strike rate in the Masters Court, the Appellant Defendant

suspect that a similar high strike rate applies (but has not been disclosed) by the Judges

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in the Trial Division Courts (including perhaps Kaye J, Cavanough J, Hansen J) and

perhaps also in the Court of Appeal (including the Chief Justice herself). This needs to

be investigated as it goes a long way to explaining some of the extraordinary conduct of

those Judges in previous hearings in these proceedings. Even by the time of the first

Practice Court hearing in February 2008, these claims between the Plaintiff First

Respondent and the Appellant Defendant had ceased to be a legal battle between her

and the Appellant Defendant (all the Appellant Defendant wanted and want to do is see to

the safety and security of her children whilst still providing for the Appellant Defendants

own). Since February 2008 the Plaintiff First Respondent has never stood to benefit

economically from these legal proceedings. Since February 2008 this has been a battle

of oppression by a very legally and financially powerful clique (the Plaintiff First

Respondents lawyers, the Plaintiff First Respondent4 lawyers 8 lawyers, the Judiciary

and powerful but corrupt statutory bodies like the Legal Practitioners Liability EVASION

Committee and the Legal Services NON-Commissioner) against the Appellant

Defendant. A real coalition of Goliaths versus a single solitary David (a David reduced

by early financial oppression to Tom Thumb dimensions).

k. The Trial Judge showed substantial prejudice and bias by congratulating (rather than

punishing) the Plaintiff First Respondents lawyers for initiating the unlawful insanity

inquisition against the Appellant Defendant at the outset of the Trial (despite telling them

at first that they had no right or standing to do so). That insanity inquisition failed against[the Trial Judges] better judgement on that day. But that insanity inquisition created an

environment of insurmountable prejudice and bias against the Appellant Defendant that,

added to and on top of all of the other substantial miscarriages of justice that had

occurred, meant that it was impossible for the Trial Judge to give, or to be seen to give,

the Appellant Defendant an unbiased and non-prejudicial hearing.

l. The Trial Judge showed substantial prejudice and bias at the closure of the Trial by

congratulating the Plaintiff First Respondents lawyers for a job well done, in the mostdifficult of circumstances.

DATED: 12 15 June 2009

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HAROLD JAMES JOHNSON

Solicitor and Appellant

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL Court No. 3731/09

BETWEEN


and

PIPPIN PATRICIA CRESSY and othersand others according to the Schedule

Respondents

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES


and

PIPPIN PATRICIA CRESSY First Respondent

and

DAVID WILLIAM HANLON Second Respondent

and

HARWOOD ANDREWS PTY LTDABN 98 076 868 034

Third Respondent

Notice of Appeal Court of Appeal Fourth Restatement 2090615

Documents

Transcript of Notice of Appeal Court of Appeal Fourth Restatement 2090615