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Attracted by his dynamic image and promises ofreform, a large majority of the French public electedNicolas Sarkozy to the presidency of France in May2007. A month later, Sarkozy’s party won a majority inthe National Assembly, and he followed the electionwith a whirlwind of activities and initiatives. Two yearslater, however, as the economic crisis spread, Sarkozy’sapproval rating was as low as that of his predecessor,Jacques Chirac, and he was struggling to maintain theloyalty of his own majority.

The French electorate has been highly critical of those who have governed them under the Fifth Republic. In every legislative election between1981 and 2007, they have favored the opposition.Nevertheless, French citizens now appear to have moreconfidence in the key institutions of the Republic thanat any time in French history. Increasingly, however,they have little confidence in the politicians who arerunning them. The stability of the Republic has sur-prised many of the French, as well as the outside world.By combining two models of democratic government,the presidential and the parliamentary, the FifthRepublic has succeeded in a constitutional experiment

that now serves France well. For the first time since theFrench Revolution, there is no important politicalparty or sector of public opinion that challenges thelegitimacy of the regime.

CURRENT POLICY CHALLENGES

At a time in U.S. history when the party system ishighly polarized around fundamental socioeconomicissues and the government is immersed in a war thathas divided the country, French politics—at least mostof the time—seems almost tranquil by comparison.The French have lived with divided government(cohabitation) for most of the period since 1986 with-out impeding government effectiveness or undermin-ing institutional legitimacy. At the same time, theFrench electorate is clearly concerned about many ofthe same issues that concern Americans.

In 2010, French citizens were most worried aboutthe economy, unemployment, crime, and urban vio-lence. These problems are often considered problemsof the “suburbs,” since impoverished neighborhoods,frequently with large immigrant populations, are often

POLITICS IN FRANCEMartin A. Schain

C H A P T E R

9

Population64.7 million

Territory211,208 square miles

Year of Independence486

Year of Current Constitution1958

Head of StatePresident Nicolas Sarkozy

Head of GovernmentPrime Minister François Fillon

LanguagesFrench 100%, with rapidly declining regionaldialects (Provença, Breton, Alsatian, Corsican,Catalan, Basque, Flemish)

ReligionRoman Catholic 89.5%, Muslim 7.5%, Protestant 2%,Jewish 1%

FR

AN

CE

Country Bio

197


198 Politics in France

found in the old working-class suburbs surroundinglarge cities. As the economic crisis deepened in 2009and 2010, there was increasing concern in Franceabout the stability of the Euro, and the impact of eco-nomic collapse in other parts of the Euro-zone(Greece in particular) on the French economy. Frenchvoters were increasingly aware that economic growthwas linked to growth in other parts of the EuropeanUnion (EU).

We should emphasize that many of the issues atthe heart of contemporary American politics are of lit-tle concern to the French. French citizens are not muchconcerned about the size of the state. Recent conserva-tive governments have tried to reduce the level of pub-lic spending, but there is little support for massive cutsin the welfare state programs. Such welfare programshave always been more extensive in France than in theUnited States. In fact, surveys show that French votersare willing to sacrifice a great deal to maintain theseprograms, as well as state-subsidized social security andlong vacations. Although the unemployment rate inFrance was about a third higher than that of the UnitedStates until the current economic crisis, it is now aboutthe same. The French poverty rate, on the other hand,is among the lowest in the advanced industrial democ-racies and less than half that of the United States.

On the other hand, unlike their American coun-terparts, French voters are deeply concerned about theenvironmental and health consequences of geneticallymodified organisms. Far more than Americans,French citizens are willing to pay for efforts to reducepollution. Gas prices are more than double those inthe United States, and state subsidies for a growingpublic transportation network are not challenged bypublic opinion.

Multiculturalism related to integrating a large andgrowing Muslim population (the largest in Europe) isanother important policy challenge. In an effort topromote civic integration, the government passed leg-islation in 2004 prohibiting students in public schoolsfrom wearing conspicuous religious symbols, includ-ing Islamic head scarves worn by women. In 2010, thegovernment proposed a ban on the burqa (a full-bodycovering) worn by few Muslim women in France. Onthe other hand, the government also promised reformsto address the special needs of immigrants. Thesepromises have resulted in few concrete proposals, butthey have renewed public debates on public policytoward immigrants.

Finally, although there was widespread sympathyfor the United States just after the September 11, 2001,attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,there was a perceptible rise in anti-American senti-ment and distrust of American policy in the wake ofthese events. This distrust generated a major transat-lantic crisis when France took the lead in resisting theAmerican-led military action against Iraq in thespring of 2003. A broad consensus of public opinionand political parties supported French opposition tothe war. These tensions have moderated since Sarkozybecame president, and tensions in the U.S.–Frenchrelationship eased considerably as the Obama admin-istration tilted policy toward greater multilateral col-laboration in 2009 and 2010.

Nicolas Sarkozy was swept into office in June 2007and gained considerable acclaim by appointing bothminority women and Socialists to his Cabinet. Duringhis first year in office, however, the government passedrelatively little legislation to deal with the problems onwhich he focused during the presidential campaign.By the end of 2008, the president’s program was con-strained even further by the emerging economic crisisand by massive strikes in reaction to presidential pro-posals to reorganize the education system. Indeed,France is the only major industrial country in whichthe reaction to the declining economy has been grow-ing social unrest. In addition, the government hasbecome more vulnerable as the president’s popularitydeclined, and after his party suffered a major defeat inthe regional elections of March 2010.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

France is one of the oldest nation-states of Europe.The period of unstable revolutionary regimes that fol-lowed the storming of the Bastille in 1789 ended in theseizure of power by Napoléon Bonaparte a decadelater. The French Revolution began with the establish-ment of a constitutional monarchy in 1791 (the FirstRepublic), but the monarchy was overthrown the fol-lowing year. Three more constitutions precededNapoléon’s seizure of power on the eighteenth day ofthe revolutionary month of Brumaire (November 10,1799) and the establishment of the First Empire threeyears later. The other European powers formed analliance and forced Napoléon’s surrender, as well as therestoration of the Bourbon monarchy. Another revo-lution in 1830 drove the last Bourbon from the French


Martin A. Schain 199

throne and replaced him with Louis Philippe of theHouse of Orléans.

Growing dissatisfaction among the rising bour-geoisie and the urban population produced stillanother Paris revolution in 1848. With it came theproclamation of the Second Republic (1848–1852)and universal male suffrage. Conflict between its middle-class and lower-class components, however,kept the republican government ineffective. Out of the disorder rose another Napoléon, Louis Napoléon,nephew of the first emperor. He was crownedNapoléon III in 1852 and brought stability to Francefor more than a decade. However, his last years weremarked by ill-conceived foreign ventures. After hisdefeat and capture in the Franco-Prussian War (1870),France was occupied and forced into a humiliatingarmistice; radicals in Paris proclaimed the ParisCommune, which held out for two months in 1871,until crushed by the conservative government forces.In the commune’s aftermath, the struggle betweenrepublicans and monarchists led to the establishmentof a conservative Third Republic in 1871. The ThirdRepublic was the longest regime in modern France,surviving World War I and lasting until France’s defeatand occupation by Nazi Germany in 1940.

World War II deeply divided France. A defeatedFrance was divided into a zone occupied by theGermans and a “free” Vichy zone in the southern halfof France, where Marshall Pétain led a governmentsympathetic to the Germans. From July 1940 untilAugust 1944, the government of France was a dictator-ship. Slowly, a resistance movement emerged underthe leadership of General Charles de Gaulle. It gainedincreased strength and support after the Allied inva-sion of North Africa and the German occupation ofthe Vichy zone at the end of 1942. When Germanforces were driven from occupied Paris in 1944, deGaulle entered the city with the hope that sweepingreforms would give France the viable democracy it hadlong sought. After less than two years, he resigned ashead of the Provisional Government, impatient withthe country’s return to traditional party politics.

In fact, the Fourth Republic (1946–1958) disap-pointed many hopes. Governments fell with disturb-ing regularity—twenty-four governments in twelveyears. At the same time, because of the narrowness ofgovernment coalitions, the same parties and the sameleaders tended to participate in most of these govern-ments. Weak leaders had great difficulty coping with

the tensions created first by the Cold War, then by theFrench war in Indochina, and finally by the anticolo-nialist uprising in Algeria.

When a threat of civil war arose over Algeria in1958, a group of leaders invited de Gaulle to return topower and help the country establish stronger and sta-bler institutions. De Gaulle and his supporters formu-lated a new constitution for the Fifth Republic, whichwas enacted by a referendum in 1958. De Gaulle wasthe last prime minister of the Fourth Republic andthen the first president of the newly established FifthRepublic.

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

Geographically, France is at once Atlantic,Continental, and Mediterranean; hence, it occupies aunique place in Europe. In 2010, a total of 64.7 millionpeople, about one-fifth as many as the population ofthe United States, lived in an area one-fifteenth the sizeof the United States. More than 3.6 million foreigners(noncitizens) live in France, more than half of whomcome from outside of Europe, mostly from NorthAfrica and Africa. In addition, nearly 2 million Frenchcitizens are foreign-born. Thus, almost 10 percent ofthe French population is foreign-born, slightly lessthan the proportion of foreign-born in the UnitedStates.

Urbanization has come slowly to France, but it isnow highly urbanized. In 1936, only sixteen Frenchcities had a population of more than 100,000; there arenow thirty-nine. More than one-quarter of the urbanpopulation (and almost 20 percent of the total popula-tion) lives in the metropolitan region of Paris. Thisconcentration of people creates staggering problems.In a country with centuries-old traditions of adminis-trative, economic, and cultural centralization, it hasproduced a dramatic gap in human and materialresources between Paris and the rest of the country.The Paris region supports a per capita income almost50 percent higher and unemployment substantiallylower than the national average. The Paris region alsohas the highest concentration of foreigners in thecountry (twice the national percentage), and there aredeep divisions between the wealthier and the poorertowns in the region.

Recent French economic development compareswell with that of other advanced industrial countries.In per capita GDP, France ranks among the wealthiest



nations of the world, behind the Scandinavian coun-tries, the United States, and Britain; it is ahead ofGermany, Japan, Italy, and the average for the EU (seeChapter 1). During the period from 1996 to 2006, theFrench economy grew at about the EU average, butwith an inflation rate at a little more than half theEuropean average. The economy remained stagnantthrough the beginning of 2010, and avoided the worstpredictions of decline. Nevertheless, with the crisis ofthe euro that emerged in 2010, France’s economic fatewas tied to that of the rest of Europe, and it now facesits greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression.1

Unemployment remains relatively high comparedwith the averages of the EU and the United States. In2008, with an unemployment rate of 7.8 percent,France was already experiencing some of the sameproblems as some of the poorer countries of Europe:long-term youth unemployment, homelessness, and adrain on social services. All of these problems grewworse in 2009 as unemployment moved rapidly higherto almost 10 percent.

The labor force has changed drastically since theend of World War II, making France similar to otherindustrialized countries. During the 1990s, the laborforce grew by more than 1.6 million, continuing agrowth trend that was greater than in most Europeancountries. Most of these new workers were young peo-ple, and an increasing proportion consisted of women.However, the size of the French workforce has leveledoff since 2000, and is projected to decline after 2011 asthe population ages.

In 1954, women made up 35 percent of the laborforce; today they make up 46 percent (about two-thirds of French women of working age). For over acentury, the proportion of employed women—mostlyin agriculture, artisan shops, and factories—washigher in France than in most European countries.Today, most women work in offices in the servicesector of the economy. Overall, employment in the service sector has risen from 33 percent in 1938 to77 percent today, above the average for the EU.

By comparison with other countries in the EU,the agricultural sector of France is less important eco-nomically, but it remains important politically. Francehas more cultivated acreage than any other country inthe EU. In spite of the sharp decline in the proportionof the population engaged in agriculture (it is now justover 3 percent), agricultural production increasedmassively during the past quarter century.

Since 1945, there have been serious efforts to mod-ernize agriculture, such as farm cooperatives, the con-solidation of marginal farms, and improvements intechnical education. Particularly after the developmentof the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in theEuropean Community between 1962 and 1968, consol-idation of farmland proceeded rapidly. By 1985, theaverage French farm was larger than that of any countryin Europe except Britain, Denmark, and Luxembourg.

French business is both highly dispersed andhighly concentrated. Even after three decades of struc-tural reorganization of business, almost two-thirds ofthe 3.5 million industrial and commercial enterprisesin France belong to individuals. As in other advancedindustrial societies, this proportion has been slowlyincreasing.

From the perspective of production, some of themost advanced French industries are highly concen-trated. The few firms at the top account for most of theemployment and business sales. Even in some of theolder sectors (such as automobile manufacture, shipconstruction, and rubber), half or more of theemployment and sales are concentrated in the top fourfirms.

The organization of industry and commerce haschanged significantly since the 1990s. Privatization,initiated in the 1980s and mandated by the EU in the1990s, has reduced the number of public enterprisesby 75 percent and the number of those working inpublic enterprises by 67 percent. Despite a continuingprocess of privatization, relations between industryand the state remain close. In addition, more than 20percent of the civilian labor force works in the civilservice, which has grown about 10 percent during thepast fifteen years, and more than a million peoplework for the ministry of education, almost all of themteachers.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION

The Constitution of 1958 is the sixteenth since the fallof the Bastille in 1789. Past republican regimes, knownless for their achievements than for their instability,were invariably based on the principle that Parliamentcould overturn a government that lacked a parliamen-tary majority. Such an arrangement works best whenthere are relatively few political parties, and when theinstitutional arrangements are not deeply challengedby important political parties and their leaders. These



assumptions did not apply to the first four republics,and at least in the early years, the Fifth Republicseemed to be destined to suffer a similar fate.

By 1981, however, the fate of the Republicappeared to be secure. Direct popular election of thepresident has greatly augmented the legitimacy andpolitical authority of the office. It has also had animpact on the party system, as the contest for thepresidency has dominated party strategies. WhenFrançois Mitterrand won the presidential election of1981, as the leader of a coalition of the left thatincluded the French Communist Party, the insti-tutional arrangements of the Fifth Republic weredecisively secured.(See Figure 9.1)

Beyond the Constitution itself, there are severalprinciples that have become so widely accepted thatthey can be thought of as constitutional principles.The first of these is that France is a unitary state: a “oneand indivisible” French Republic.2 A second principleis that France is a secular republic, committed toequality, with no special recognition of any groupbefore the law. These principles have special meaningfor democracy in France, since they were regularly vio-lated by the multitude of nondemocratic systems inFrance after 1789.

Since the First Republic in the eighteenth cen-tury, when the Jacobins controlled the revolutionaryNational Assembly, the French state has been charac-terized by a high degree of centralized political andadministrative authority. Although there have alwaysbeen forces that have advocated decentralization ofpolitical authority, as well as deconcentration ofadministrative authority, the French unitary stateremained (formally) unitary. Essentially, this meantthat subnational territorial units (communes,departments, and regions) had little formal decision-making autonomy. They were dominated by politicaland administrative decisions made in Paris. Bothstate action and territorial organization in Francedepended on a well-structured administration,which kept the machinery of the state functioningduring long periods of political instability andunrest. The reinforcement of departmental govern-ments and the establishment of elected regionalgovernments between 1982 and 1986 decentralizedsome decision-making power. Nevertheless, thesegovernments do not have any substantial tax power,and have remained overwhelmingly dependent oncentralized financing for almost all their projects.

Secularism is a separation of church and statethat is quite different from that in the United States. Itderives from the militant opposition to the estab-lished power of the Catholic Church both before the

F I G U R E 9 . 1French Presidents and PrimeMinisters since 1958

MauriceCouve de Murville

1968

JacquesChaban-Delmas Georges Pompidou1969

Pierre Messmer 1972

Jacques Chirac 1986

Laurent Fabius 1984

Raymond Barre 1976

Michel Rocard 1988

Edith Cresson 1991

Pierre Bérégovoy 1992

Edouard Balladur 1993

Jacques ChiracAlain Juppé 1995

Lionel Jospin 1997Jean-Pierre Raffarin 2002

Nicolas SarkozyFrançois Fillon 2007

Dominique di Villepin 2005

PRESIDENTPRIME MINISTER YEAR

Valéry Giscardd’Estaing

1974Jacques Chirac

François Mitterrand1981Pierre Mauroy

Charles de GaulleMichel Debré 1958

1962Georges Pompidou



of the past, abstraction and symbolism identify a wayof thinking about politics, and distrust of governmentrepresents a dominant value that crosses class andgenerational lines.

The Burden of History Historical thinking canprove to be both a bond and—as the U.S. Civil Wardemonstrates—a hindrance to consensus. TheFrench are so fascinated by their own history thatfeuds of the past are constantly superimposed onthe conflicts of the present. This passionate use ofhistorical memories—from the meaning of theFrench Revolution to the divisions between Vichycollaboration and the Resistance during the SecondWorld War—complicates political decision-making.In de Gaulle’s words, France is “weighed down byhistory.”

Abstraction and Symbolism In the Age ofEnlightenment, the monarchy left the educated classesfree to voice their views on many topics, provided the

The French National Assembly

Source: Thomas Coex/AFP/Getty Images

Revolution and in nondemocratic regimes. Thus, ithas a militant and ideological aspect that derives fromthe deep historical conflicts of the last two centuries,which has not, however, prevented the granting ofstate subsidies to religious schools.

Law and tradition in France are also biasedagainst the recognition of special rights and benefitsfor religious, ethnic, and national groups. In theory,this means that there is no recognition of “minorities”or multicultural rights (as in Britain or the UnitedStates). However, in practice, programs favoring spe-cial school funding and “positive discrimination” foruniversity entry for students from poorer geographicareas have existed for many years.

POLITICAL CULTURE

Themes of Political Culture

There are three ways in which we understand politicalculture in France: history links present values to those



discussion remained general and abstract. The urge todiscuss a wide range of problems, even trivial ones, inbroad philosophical terms has hardly diminished. Theexaltation of the abstract is reflected in the significanceattributed to symbols and rituals. Rural communitiesthat fought on opposite sides in the French Revolutionstill pay homage to different heroes two centurieslater.3 Street demonstrations of the left and the righttake place at different historical corners in Paris—theleft in the Place de la Bastille, the right at the statue ofJoan of Arc. This tradition helps explain why a nationunited by almost universal admiration for a commonhistorical experience holds to conflicting interpreta-tions of its meaning.

Distrust of Government and Politics The French havelong shared the widespread ambivalence of moderntimes that combines distrust of government with highexpectations for it. The French citizens’ simultaneousdistrust of authority and craving for it feed on bothindividualism and a passion for equality. This attitudeproduces a self-reliant individual convinced that he isresponsible to himself, and perhaps to his family, forwhat he was and might become. The outside world—the “they” who operate beyond the circle of the family,the family firm, and the village—creates obstacles inlife. Most of the time, however, “they” are identifiedwith the government.

Memories reaching back to the eighteenth cen-tury justify a state of mind that is potentially, if seldomovertly, insubordinate. A strong government is consid-ered reactionary by nature, even if it pretends to beprogressive. When citizens participate in public life,they hope to constrain government authority, ratherthan encouraging change, even when change is over-due. At times, this individualism is tainted with anar-chism. Yet the French also accommodate themselvesrather easily to bureaucratic rule. Since administrativerulings supposedly treat all situations with the sameyardstick, they satisfy the sharp sense of equality pos-sessed by a people who feel forever shortchanged bythe government and by the privileges those in powerbestow on others.

Although the Revolution of 1789 did not breakwith the past as completely as is commonly believed, itconditioned the general outlook on crisis and com-promise, and on continuity and change. Suddenchange rather than gradual mutation, dramatic con-flicts couched in the language of mutually exclusive,

radical ideologies are the experiences that excite theFrench at historical moments. The French are accus-tomed to thinking that no thorough change can everoccur except by a major upheaval (although this is notalways true). Since the great Revolution, every Frenchadult has experienced occasions of political excite-ment followed by disappointment. This process hassometimes led to moral exhaustion and widespreadskepticism about any possibility of change.

Whether they originated within the country orwere brought about by international conflict, most ofFrance’s political crises have produced a constitutionalcrisis. Each time, the triumphant forces have codifiedtheir norms and philosophy, usually in a comprehen-sive document. This explains why constitutions havenever played the role of fundamental charters. Prior tothe Fifth Republic, their norms were satisfactory toonly one segment of the polity and hotly contested byothers.

The most important change since 1958 is thegrowing public confidence in the Fifth Republic’s con-stitutional institutions. And despite growing disillu-sionment with politicians, this confidence has grownstronger. Moreover, there is little significant variationin trust in institutions among voters by their partyidentity. French people invariably give the highest con-fidence ratings to institutions closest to them—that is,to local officials, rather than to political parties ornational representatives (see Figure 9.2). In recentyears, distrust of government officials has been high,but expectations of government remain high as well.

Religious and Antireligious Traditions

France is at once a Catholic country—65 percent of the French population identified themselves asCatholic in 2008 (down from 87 percent in 1974)—and a country that the Church itself considers “de-Christianized.” Only 5 percent attended church regu-larly in 2008 (down from 21 percent in 1974), and 87percent either never go to church or go only occasion-ally for ceremonies such as baptism or marriage.4

Until well into the twentieth century, the mutualhostility between the religious and the secular was oneof the main features of the political culture. Since theRevolution, it has divided society and political life atall levels. Even now there are important differencesbetween the political behavior of practicing Catholicsand that of nonbelievers.



French Catholics historically viewed the Revolutionof 1789 as the work of satanic men. Conversely, enemiesof the Church became militant in their opposition toCatholic forms and symbols. This division continuedthrough the nineteenth century. Differences between thepolitical subcultures of Catholicism and anticlericalismdeepened further with the creation of the ThirdRepublic, when militant anticlericalism took firm con-trol of the Republic. Parliament rescinded the centuries-old compact with the Vatican, expelled most Catholicorders, and severed all ties between church and stateso that (in a phrase often used at the time) “the moralunity of the country could be reestablished.” The Popematched the militancy of the Republic’s regime byexcommunicating every deputy (member of Parlia-ment) who voted for the separation laws in 1905. As inother European Catholic countries, the differencebetween the political right and left was largely deter-mined by attitudes toward the Catholic Church.

The gap between Catholics and agnostics nar-rowed during the interwar period and after they foundthemselves working side by side in the resistance move-ment during World War II. Religious practice has been

declining in France and many other industrializedcountries since the 1950s. With less than 5 percent reg-ular (once a week) church attendance, farmers are themost observant group, and blue-collar workers the least.In addition to secularization trends, important changeshave occurred within the Catholic subculture. Today, thevast majority of self-identified Catholics reject some ofthe most important teachings of the Church, includingits positions on abortion, premarital sex, and marriageof priests. Only 16 percent of identified Catholics per-ceive the role of the Church as important in politicallife, and Catholicism no longer functions as a well-integrated community with a common view of theworld and common social values. During the decadefrom 1997 to 2007, the number of priests declined bymore than 25 percent, and even ceremonial eventsmore frequently practiced (baptisms, confirmations,and church marriages) have continued to decline.Nevertheless, among the smaller and aging group ofpracticing Catholics, there has been a tendency tomove to the political, even radical, right since 2002.5

Most private schools in France are nominallyCatholic parochial schools, which the state subsidizes.

F I G U R E 9 . 2Feelings of Confidence in Various Political InstitutionsPeople have more confidence in their local mayor than in their national government.

0

20

40

60

80

Parties Mayors National AssemblyDeputies

PrimeMinister

President5th RepublicConstitution

ConstitutionalCouncil

Per

cent

age

10

30

50

70

Source: Sofres, L’État de l’Opinion 2001 (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 2001), 81.



The status of these schools (in a country in which statesupport for Catholic schools coexists with the separa-tion of church and state) has never been fully settled.In 2008, 13 percent of primary schools and 31 percentof secondary schools were private.

French Jews (numbering about 600,000 or about1 percent of the population) are so well integrated intoFrench society that it is not possible to speak of aJewish vote. One study demonstrates that, like otherFrench voters, Jews tend to vote left or right accordingto degree of religious practice. Anti-Semitic attitudesand behavior are not widespread in France. However,attacks against Jews and Jewish institutions—mostlyby young North African men in mixed areas of largecities—increased dramatically in parallel with theemergence of the second intifada in the Middle East(2000–2002), but have since declined. These incidentswere also related to emerging patterns of urban ethnicconflict in France.

Protestants (1.7 percent of the population andgrowing) have lived somewhat apart. There are heavyconcentrations in Alsace, Paris, and in some regions ofcentral and southeastern France. About two-thirds of Protestants belong to the upper bourgeoisie.Protestants hold a large proportion of high publicpositions. Until recently, they usually voted more left-ist than others in their socioeconomic position orregion. Although many Protestants are prominent inthe Socialist Party, their electoral behavior, like theiractivities in cultural and economic associations, isdetermined by factors other than religion.

Islam is now France’s second religion. There are 4million to 4.5 million Muslims in France, two-thirds ofwhom are immigrants, or whose descendants are fromMuslim countries. The emergence of Islamic institu-tions in France is part of a larger phenomenon ofintegrating new immigrants. In the last decade, theaffirmation of religious identification coincided with(and to some extent was a part of) the social and politi-cal mobilization of immigrants from Muslim countries.

In 2002, the government created the FrenchCouncil of the Muslim Religion (CFCM) to representIslam with public authorities (similar institutions existfor Jews and Catholics). A survey in 2005 notes thatregular attendance of services at mosques is just above20 percent—somewhat higher than average for thegeneral population. More than 70 percent of thosewho identify as Muslims say that they attend servicesonly occasionally.6

The growth of Muslim interests has challengedthe traditional French view of the separation of churchand state. Unlike Catholics and Jews, who maintaintheir own schools, or Protestants, who have supportedthe principle of secular state schools, some Muslimgroups insist on the right both to attend state schoolsand to follow practices that education authorities con-sider contrary to the French tradition of secularism.Small numbers of Muslims have challenged dresscodes, school curriculums, and school requirementsand have more generally questioned stronger notionsof laïcité (antireligious atheism).

In response to this challenge, the FrenchParliament passed legislation in 2004 that banned thewearing of “ostentatious” religious symbols in primaryand secondary schools. Although the language is neu-tral about religion, the law is widely seen as an attemptto prevent the wearing of Islamic head scarves. Thenew law was strongly supported by the French public,with surprisingly strong support among Muslims. In2010, at the end of a long and confusing public debateabout French identity in the context of a regional elec-tion campaign, the government proposed a ban on anygarment that was “designed to hide the face,” a refer-ence to the burqa worn by few Muslim in France.

In this context, it is important to point out thatsurveys indicate that French Muslims are better inte-grated than are those in other European countries(Britain and Germany, for example).7 They identifymost strongly as French, rather than Muslim; have thestrongest commitment to “adopt national customs,”rather than remaining distinct (78 percent); and havethe most favorable view of their fellow citizens who areChristian or Jewish.

Class and Status

Feelings about class differences shape a society’sauthority pattern and the style in which authority isexercised. The French, like the English, are consciousof living in a society divided into classes. But sinceequality is valued more highly in France than inEngland, deference toward the upper classes is far lessdeveloped, and resentful antagonism is widespread.

The number of citizens who are conscious ofbelonging to a social class is relatively high in France,particularly among workers. About two-thirds ofworkers in 2002 self-identified as working-class.8

There is some evidence that spontaneous class identity



has been declining, although in 2002 all social groupsexpressed a sentiment of belonging to a social classthat was as high as, or higher than, that of workers.Nevertheless, class identity is a poor predictor of vot-ing patterns in France. Among blue- and white-collarworkers in 2007, over 40 percent (far higher than anyother group) identified with neither the left nor theright; they were also the most likely to feel closest tothe extreme right.9

Economic and social transformations have noteradicated subjective feelings about class differencesand class antagonism. Indeed, periodic strike move-ments intensify class feelings and commitments to act.However, as the number of immigrant workers amongthe least qualified workers has grown, traditional classdifferences are cross-cut by a growing sense of racialand ethnic differences.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

French political attitudes have been shaped throughexperience with the political system as well as throughsome key institutions and agents. Some agents, such aspolitical associations, act to socialize political valuesquite directly, while others, such as the family and themedia, act in a more indirect manner.

Family

Particularly during the last forty years, the life of theFrench family, the role of its members, and its relation-ship to outsiders has undergone fundamental, andsometimes contradictory, changes. Very few peoplecondemn the idea of couples living together withoutbeing married. During the past generation, the Frenchmarriage rate has declined by more than 30 percent (toabout half that of the United States), while the propor-tion of the population living as couples has remainedat about 48 percent. Therefore, it is not surprising thatin 2006, 59 percent of all first-born children were bornoutside of marriage (compared with 6 percent in1968), including the children of the Socialist presiden-tial candidate in 2007 and the Minister of Justice in thepresent government. Very few of these children are inone-parent families, however, since in virtually allcases, they are legally recognized by both parentsbefore their first birthday. Nevertheless, 18 percent ofyoung people below age twenty-five lived with only

one of their natural parents in 2005, mostly due todivorce. The number of divorces was 43 percent of the(very much reduced) number of marriages in 2002,and it has almost doubled since 1976, when new andmore flexible divorce legislation came into effect.

Legislative changes have only gradually modifiedthe legal restrictions on married women that existed inthe Napoléonic legal codes. Not until 1970 did law pro-claim the absolute equality of the two parents in theexercise of parental authority. The employment ofmore married women (80 percent of women betweenthe ages of twenty-five and forty-nine are in the laborforce) has affected the family’s role as a vehicle ofsocialization. Working women differ from unemployedwomen with regard to religious practice, political interest, electoral participation, party preference, andso on. In their attitudinal orientations, employedwomen are far closer to the men of the same milieu,class, or age group to which they belong than to womenwho are not employed.10

Although family structure, values, and behaviorhave changed, the family remains an important struc-ture through which political values broadly conceivedare transmitted from generation to generation. Severalstudies demonstrate a significant influence of parentsover the religious socialization and the left/right polit-ical choices made by their children. Moreover, in sur-veys, young people consistently indicate that theyvalue their family in their lives.

The effectiveness of the family in socializing gen-eral religious and ideological orientations does notmean that succeeding generations do not have forma-tive experiences of their own or that there are no significant political differences by age. Therefore,political socialization is a product not only of the fam-ily experiences, but also of childhood experiences withpeers, education, and the changing larger world. Forinstance, young people of Algerian origin, born inFrance, are far less likely than their counterparts bornin Algeria to practice their faith.11

Associations and Socialization

The French bias against authority might have encour-aged social groups and associations if the egalitarianthrust and the competition among individuals did notwork in the opposite direction. The French ambiva-lence about participation in group life is not merelynegativistic apathy, but also reflects a lack of belief in



the value of cooperation. On the one hand, this cul-tural ambivalence is reinforced by legal restrictions onassociational life, as well as by a strong republican tra-dition hostile to groups serving as intermediariesbetween the people and the state. On the other hand,the state and local governments traditionally subsidizenumerous associations (including trade unions).Some associations (not always the same ones that weresubsidized) receive privileged access to decision-mak-ing power.

After World War II, overall membership in associ-ations in France was comparable to that in otherEuropean countries, but lower than in the UnitedStates. However, group membership in France wasconcentrated in politicized associations that rein-forced existing political divisions. Membership in keyprofessional organizations, especially trade unions,was much lower in France than in other Europeancountries.

The number of associations has sharply increasedover the past two decades, while the overall percentageof membership among the adult population hasremained relatively constant. In a 2004 survey, 28 per-cent claimed to belong to one or more associations.This percentage has increased during the last thirtyyears, but has remained about the same for the lastdecade.12

The pattern of association membership, however,has changed considerably. The traditional advocacyand political groups, politicized unions, and profes-sional associations suffered sharp declines in absolute(and proportional) membership. Sports associations,self-help groups, and newly established ethnic associa-tions now attract larger numbers of people. As moremiddle-class people have joined associations, working-class people have dropped out.13

To some extent, these changes reflect shifting atti-tudes about political commitment in France. Althoughassociational life remains strong, militantisme (volun-tary work, with its implication of deep and abidingcommitment) has clearly diminished. Older advocacyand professional associations that were built on this kind of commitment have declined. Newer groups are built on different and often more limitedcommitment.

New legislation has also produced changes. A1981 law made it possible for immigrant groups toform their own organizations. This encouraged theemergence of thousands of ethnic associations.

Decentralization legislation passed a few years laterencouraged municipalities to support the creationof local associations, some to perform municipalservices.

Even with these changing patterns, there remainuncertainties about the role of associations, old andnew, in the socialization process. Some observers seemto confirm that membership in French organizationsinvolves less actual participation than in U.S. or Britishorganizations and hence has less impact on social andpolitical attitudes. Cultural distrust is manifest less inlower overall membership than in the inability oforganizational leaders to relate to their members andto mobilize them for action.

Education

One of the most important ways a community pre-serves and transmits its values is through education.Napoléon Bonaparte recognized the significance ofeducation. Well into the second half of the twentiethcentury, the French educational system remained animposing historical monument in the unmistakablestyle of the First Empire. The edifice Napoléon erectedcombined education at all levels, from primary schoolto postgraduate professional training, into one cen-tralized corporation: the imperial university. Its jobwas to reinforce the national doctrine through uni-form programs at various levels.

As the strict military discipline of the Napoléonicmodel was loosened by succeeding regimes, each hasdiscovered that the machinery created by Napoléonwas a convenient and coherent instrument for trans-mitting the values—both changing and permanent—of French civilization. The centralized imperial uni-versity has therefore never been truly dismantled. Theminister of education presides over a ministry thatemploys more than a million people and controls cur-riculums and teaching methods, the criteria for selec-tion and advancement of pupils and teachers, and thecontent of examinations.

Making advancement at every step dependentupon passing an examination is not peculiar to France(it is also found in Japan and other countries). What isdistinctly French is an obsessive belief that everybodyis equal before an examination. The idea that educa-tion is an effective weapon for emancipation andsocial betterment has had popular as well as officialrecognition. The baccalauréat—the certificate of



completion of the academic secondary school, thelycée—remains almost the sole means of access tohigher education. Such a system suits and profits bestthose self-motivated middle-class children for whomit was designed.

During the Fifth Republic, the structure of theFrench educational system has undergone significantchange, even while the basic features have remained inplace. The secondary schools, which trained only700,000 students as late as 1945, now provide instructionfor 5.5 million. Between 1958 and 2007, the number ofstudents in higher education rose from 170,000 to 2.3million. By 2006, the proportion of twenty- to twenty-four-year-olds in higher education (40 percent) wascomparable to that in any other European country.14

The introduction of a comprehensive middleschool with a common core curriculum in 1963altered the system of early academic selection. Otherreforms eliminated rigid ability tracking. However, theimplementation of reforms, whether passed by gov-ernments of the right or the left, has often faced diffi-cult opposition from middle-class parents and fromteachers’ unions of the left. Although more than 80percent of the students who sat for the examinationpassed the baccalauréat in 2006 (more than double theproportion of 1980), education reforms have alteredonly slightly the vast differences in the success ofchildren from different social backgrounds.

Because of the principle of open admission, everyholder of the baccalauréat can gain entrance to a uni-versity. As in some American state universities, how-ever, there is a rather ruthless elimination at the end ofthe first year (particularly for students in such fields asmedicine) and sometimes later. Students of lower-class backgrounds typically fare worse than the others.In addition, the number of students from such back-grounds is disproportionately large in fields in whichdiplomas have the lowest value in the professionalmarket and in which unemployment is greatest.

The most ambitious attempt to reform the univer-sity system came in the wake of the student rebellion of1968, followed by other reforms in the 1970s and1980s. They strove to encourage the autonomy of eachuniversity; the participation of teachers, students, andstaff in the running of the university; and the collabo-ration among different disciplines. The governmentsubsequently withdrew some of the reforms. Othersfailed to be implemented because of widespread resis-tance by those concerned. Administrative autonomy

has remained fragmentary, as the ministry has held thefinancial purse strings as well as the right to grantdegrees. After 2007, the autonomy question was onceagain on the agenda, this time with the objective ofmaking French universities more competitive on theEuropean and the global level. Nevertheless, the widelylamented crisis of the university system has hardly beenalleviated, although the size of the student populationappears to have stabilized.

Since 2003, the most important symbolic changein French higher education has been the introductionof affirmative-action programs (“positive discrimina-tion”) for students in “priority education zones”—schools in poor areas, generally in or near larger cities.Some of the elite institutions of higher education(Sciences-Po in Paris, for example) have created linksto some of these schools and have established specialconditions of admission for their best students.Although these programs involve only a handful ofstudents, these experiments are important becausethey represent the first affirmative effort to integratepotential leaders from immigrant communities intothe French system (which we will discuss later).

An additional characteristic of the French systemof higher education is the parallel system of grandesécoles, a sector of higher education that functions out-side of the network of universities under rules that per-mit a high degree of selectivity. These schools includethe most prestigious schools of higher education inFrance. While most are state institutions, some are pri-vate and fee-paying. As university enrollment has mul-tiplied, the more prestigious grandes écoles have onlymodestly increased the number of students admittedupon strict entrance examinations.15 For more than acentury, the grandes écoles have been the trainingground of highly specialized elites. These schools pre-pare students for careers in engineering, business man-agement, and the top ranks of the civil service, and, incontrast to university graduates, virtually all graduatesof the grandes écoles find employment and oftenassume positions of great responsibility.

Socialization and Communication

The political effectiveness of the mass media is oftendetermined by the way in which people appraise themedia’s integrity and whether they believe that themedia serve or disturb the functioning of the politicalsystem. In the past, business firms, political parties,



and governments (both French and foreign) oftenbacked major newspapers. Today, most newspapersand magazines are owned by business enterprises,many of them conglomerates that extend into fieldsother than periodical publications. In spite of agrowth in population, the number of daily newspa-pers and their circulation has declined since WorldWar II. The decline in readership, a common phe-nomenon in most European democracies, is due tocompetition from other media, such as television,radio, and the Internet.

Television has replaced all other media as a pri-mary source of political information in France andother Western democracies.16 It is increasingly the pri-mary mediator between political forces and individualcitizens, and it has an impact on the organization andsubstance of politics. First, a personality that plays wellon television is now an essential ingredient of politics.As in other countries, image and spectacle are impor-tant elements of politics. Second, television helps setthe agenda of political issues by choosing among thegreat variety of themes, problems, and issues dealtwith by political and social forces and magnifyingthem for the public. Finally, television now providesthe arena for national electoral campaigns, largely dis-placing mass rallies and meetings.

Confidence in various sources of political infor-mation varies among different groups. Young peopleand shopkeepers are most confident in radio and tele-vision information, while managers are more confi-dent in the written press than television for politicalinformation.

Until 1982, all radio and television stations thatoriginated programs on French territory were ownedby the state and operated by personnel whom thestate appointed and remunerated. Since then, the system of state monopoly has been dismantled. As afirst and quite important step, the Socialist govern-ment authorized private radio stations. This moveattempted to regularize and regulate more than athousand existing pirate radio stations. Inevitably,this vast network of 1,600 stations was consolidatedby private entrepreneurs who provide programmingservices and in some instances control of a large num-ber of local stations.

The 1982 legislation also reorganized the publictelevision system. It granted new rights of reply to gov-ernment communications and allotted free time to allpolitical parties during electoral campaigns. During

the following years, however, even greater changeswere produced by a process of gradual privatizationand globalization of television broadcasting. Today,more than nine hundred television channels fromthroughout the world are available to French viewers(depending on the system that they choose) comparedwith three in 1980 and thirty in 1990.

With stunning rapidity, the Internet has chal-lenged all other media. France pioneered Internetcommunication in 1981 with telephone-linked com-puter service—the Minitel— that, by the late 1990s,provided over 25,000 video services to 20 percent ofthe households in France.17 The Internet rapidly over-took the Minitel after 2000, however. In 2000, about 14percent of the French population used the Internet,compared with 41 percent four years later, and 69 per-cent in 2009, just below Norway, Denmark, Sweden,the United Kingdom, and Germany, but well above theEuropean average. Although many French householdsstill have their Minitels stored in the closet, they usethe Internet on their computers for communication,information and entertainment.

RECRUITMENT AND STYLE OF ELITES

Until the Fifth Republic, Parliament provided the coreof French decision-makers. Besides members ofParliament, elected officials of municipalities ordepartments, some local party leaders, and a few jour-nalists of national renown are counted among what isknown in France as the political class. All together,they comprise not more than 15,000 or 20,000 people.From about 1879 on, professionals (lawyers, doctors,and journalists) dominated the Chamber of Deputies,now the National Assembly. The vast majority werelocal notables, trained in law and experienced in localadministration.

A substantial change in political recruitmentoccurred during the Fourth Republic, when the per-centage of self-employed and farmers became aminority. The steadily diminishing share of blue-and white-collar workers during the Fifth Republicis due partially to the professionalization of parlia-mentary personnel, as well as to the decline of theCommunist Party.

Strikingly, a large number of legislators now comefrom the public sector—almost half the deputies inthe 1980s and 32 percent after the victory of the right



in 2007. The number of top civil servants in theNational Assembly has risen constantly since 1958,and the left landslide of 1981 accentuated this process.Although the majority of high civil servants usuallylean toward parties of the right, more than half ofthose who sat in the National Assembly elected in 2007were part of the Socialist group.

Even more important than their number is thepolitical weight that these legislator-bureaucrats carryin Parliament. Some of the civil servants who run forelection to Parliament have previously held positionsin the political executive, either as members of theministerial staffs or as junior ministers. Not surpris-ingly, they are frequently candidates for a post in theCabinet.

More than in any other Western democracy, thehighest ranks of the civil service are the training andrecruitment grounds for top positions in both politicsand industry. Among the high civil servants, about3,400 are members of the most important administra-tive agencies, the five grands corps, from which thevast majority of the roughly five hundred administra-tors engaged in political decision-making are drawn.18

The recruitment base of the highest levels of the civilservice remains extremely narrow. The knowledge andcapability required to pass the various examinationsgive clear advantages to the children of senior civil ser-vants. As a result, the ranking bureaucracy formssomething approaching a hereditary class. Pastattempts to develop a system of more open recruit-ment into the higher civil service have been only mar-ginally successful.

The École Nationale d’Administration (ENA)and the École Polytechnique, together with the othergrandes écoles, play an essential role in the recruit-ment of administrative, political, and business elites.Virtually all the members of the grands corps arerecruited directly from the graduating classes of theENA and the Polytechnique. What differentiates themembers of the grands corps from other rankingadministrators is their general competence and mobility. At any one time, as many as two-thirds of themembers of these corps might be on leave or on special missions to other administrative agencies orspecial assignments to positions of influence.

They might also be engaged in politics as membersof Parliament (thirty-seven in the National Assemblyelected in 2007), local government, or the executive.

Twelve of the eighteen prime ministers who haveserved since 1959 were members of a grand corps andattended a grande école. The percentage of ministers inany given government who belong to the grands corpshas varied between 10 and 64 percent—64 percent ofthe ministers in 2009. Thus, the grandes écoles–grandscorps group, though small in membership, produces aremarkable proportion of the country’s political elite.

The same system is increasingly important inrecruiting top-level business executives. Members ofthe grands corps can move from the public sector tothe private sector because they can go on leave foryears, while they retain their seniority, their pensionrights, and the right to return to their job. (Few wholeave do in fact return to serve as civil servants.)19 In2007, 75 percent of the members of the executiveboards of the 40 largest companies in France weregraduates of a grande école. The relationship betweenthe grandes écoles and the grands corps on the onehand and politics and business on the other hand pro-vides structure for an influential elite and surviveschanges in the political orientation of governments.While this system is not politically monolithic, thenarrowness of its recruitment contributes to a persis-tent similarity of style and operation and to the fairlystable—at times rigid—value system of its operators.

For outsiders, this tight network is difficult topenetrate. Even during the 1980s—the period whenindustrial restructuring and privatization of state-runenterprises encouraged a new breed of freewheelingbusinesspeople in the United States and in Britain—asimilar process had a very limited impact on therecruitment of new elites in France.

The Importance of Gender

The representation of women among French politicalelites is almost the lowest in Western Europe. Womenmake up well over half the electorate, but made upbarely 18.5 percent of the deputies in the NationalAssembly in 2007 and only 18.2 percent of Senatemembers in 2008. The percentage of women in poli-tics is higher at the local level, where they made up 32percent of the municipal councilors and almost 14percent of the mayors in 2008, 40 percent more thanseven years before.

Political parties structure access to political repre-sentation far more in France than in the United States.



The left has generally made a greater effort to recruitwomen than has the right. Thus, when the Socialistsand Communists gained a substantial number of seatsin the 1997 legislative elections, the proportion ofwomen in the National Assembly almost doubled.

In contrast to the United States, political advance-ment in France generally requires a deep involvementin political parties, with a bias in favor of professionalpoliticians and administrators. However, relatively fewwomen have made this kind of long-term commitmentto political life. One woman who has is Ségolène Royal.A graduate of the ENA and a member of the Council ofState (one of the five grands corps), she has also been aSocialist government minister, a deputy (member) inthe National Assembly, and president of one of theregions of France. She was the (defeated) Socialist can-didate for the presidential elections in 2007.

Periodically, governments and the political partiesrecognize this dearth of women in representative insti-tutions, but little has been done about it. By the 1990s,leaders of all political parties favored amending theConstitution to permit positive discrimination to pro-duce greater gender parity in representative institu-tions. Thus, with support of both the president of theRepublic and the prime minister, and without dissent,the National Assembly passed an amendment inDecember 1998 stipulating that “the law [and not theconstitution] determines the conditions for the orga-nization of equal access of men and women to elec-toral mandates and elective functions.” Enforcementlegislation requires greater gender parity, at least in theselection of candidates. This is a significant departurefor the French political system, which has resisted theuse of quotas in the name of equality.

Perhaps the most important change in the politi-cal behavior of French women is in the way they vote.During the Fourth Republic, a majority of womenconsistently voted for parties of the right. However, aschurch attendance among women has declined, theirpolitical orientation has moved from right to left. Inevery national election between 1986 and 1997, a clearmajority of women voted for the left. By 2002, how-ever, the pattern of voting among women changedonce again. In both 2002 and 2007, women supportedboth Chirac and Sarkozy more than men, even thoughSarkozy’s opponent in 2007 was a woman. On theother hand, women have given far less support thanmen to the extreme right.20

INTEREST GROUPS

The Expression of Interests

As in many other European countries, the organiza-tion of French political life is largely defined within thehistorical cleavages of class and religious traditions.Interest groups have therefore frequently shared ideo-logical commitments with the political parties withwhich they have organizational connections.

Actual memberships in most economic associa-tions have varied considerably over time by sector, butthey are generally much smaller than comparablegroups in other industrialized countries. In 2005, nomore than 8 percent of workers belonged to tradeunions (the largest decline in Western Europe over thepast twenty-five years). About 50 percent of Frenchfarmers and 75 percent of large industrial enterprisesbelong to their respective organizations.21 Historically,many of the important economic groups have experi-enced a surge of new members at dramatic momentsin the country’s social or political history. But mem-berships then decline as conditions normalize, leavingsome associations with a membership too small to jus-tify their claims of representativeness.

Many groups lack the resources to employ a com-petent staff, or they depend on direct and indirectforms of state support. The modern interest-groupofficial is a fairly recent phenomenon that is foundonly in certain sectors of the group system, such asbusiness associations.

Interest groups are also weakened by ideologicaldivision. Separate groups defending the interests of workers, farmers, veterans, schoolchildren, and con-sumers are divided by ideological preferences. The ideological division of representation forces each organization to compete for the same clientele inorder to establish its representativeness. Consequently,even established French interest groups exhibit a radicalism in action and goals that is rare in otherWestern democracies. For groups that lack the means ofusing the information media, such tactics also become away to put their case before the public at large.

The Labor Movement

The French labor movement is divided into nationalconfederations of differing political sympathies,although historical experiences have driven labor to



avoid direct organizational ties with political parties.22

Union membership has declined steeply since 1975,although union membership is declining in almostevery industrialized country (refer back to Figure 3.1).The youngest salaried workers virtually deserted thetrade-union movement in the 1990s. Although thedecline in membership has slowed slightly in recentyears, recruitment of young workers has lagged.In addition, after 1990, candidates supported bynonunion groups in various plant-level elections haveattracted more votes than any of the established unionorganizations.23 In fact, unions lost members and(electoral) support at the very time when the Frenchtrade-union movement was becoming better institu-tionalized at the workplace and better protected bylegislation.

Despite these clear weaknesses, workers still main-tain considerable confidence in unions to defend theirinterests during periods of labor conflict. Support forcollective action and confidence in unions and theirleadership of strike movements remain strong. Indeed,

during the massive strikes, public support for the strik-ers was far higher than confidence in the governmentagainst which the strikes were directed.24 Nevertheless,strike levels have declined over the past thirty years,and most strikes are limited to the public service.Moreover, their impact has been limited by a legalrequirement to provide minimum service.

The decline in union membership has notencouraged consolidation. Unlike workers in theUnited States, French workers in the same plant orfirm may be represented by several union federations.As a result, there is constant competition amongunions at every level for membership and support.Even during periods when the national unions agreeto act together, animosities at the plant level some-times prevent cooperation.

Moreover, the weakness of union organization atthe plant level—which is where most lengthy strikesare called—means that unions are difficult bargainingpartners. Unions at this level maintain only weak con-trol over the strike weapon. Union militants are quite

Demonstration by medical interns in Paris in early 2003.

Source: Pascal Le Segretain/ Getty Images



adept at sensitizing workers, producing the precondi-tions for strike action, and channeling strike move-ments once they begin. However, the unions haveconsiderable difficulty in effectively calling strikes andending them. Thus, unions depend heavily on thegeneral environment, what they call the “social cli-mate,” in order to support their positions at the bar-gaining table. Because their ability to mobilize work-ers at any given moment is an essential criterion oftheir representativeness, union ability to representworkers is frequently in question.

The left government passed legislation in 1982and 1983 (the Auroux laws) to strengthen the unions’position at the plant level. By creating an “obligation tonegotiate” for management and by protecting the rightof expression for workers, the government hoped tostimulate collective negotiations. However, because oftheir increasing weakness, unions have not taken fulladvantage of the potential benefits of the legislation.This law refocused French industrial relations on theplant level, just where unions were weakest.

The oldest and the largest of the union confedera-tions is the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT)(General Confederation of Labor). Since World WarII, the CGT has been identified closely with theCommunist Party, with which it maintains a consider-able overlap of leadership. Yet by tradition and by itsrelative effectiveness as a labor organization, it enrollsmany non-Communists among its members. Its dom-ination diminished in the 1990s, however, mostlybecause the CGT lost more members and supportthan all other unions.

The second-largest labor organization in terms ofmembership is now the Confédération FrançaiseDemocratique du Travail (CFDT) (French Demo-cratic Confederation of Labor). An offshoot of aCatholic trade union movement, the CFDT’s earlycalls for worker self-management (autogestion) wereintegrated into the Auroux laws. The leaders of theCFDT see the policy of the confederation as an alter-native to the oppositional stance of the CGT. TheCFDT now offers itself as a potential partner to mod-ern capitalist management.

This movement to the center created splits withinseveral CFDT public-service unions and resulted inthe establishment of a national rival, the SolidaireUnitaire et Democratique (SUD) (Solidarity Unitedand Democratic), in 1989. The SUD, in turn, was inte-grated into a larger group of twenty-seven militant

autonomous civil-service unions, G-10 (le Groupe desdix), in 1998.

The third major labor confederation, ForceOuvrière (FO) (Workers’ Force), was formed in 1948in reaction to the Communist domination of the CGT.Although its membership is barely half that of the twoother major confederations, the FO made gains inmembership in the 1990s and continues to have influ-ence among civil servants.

One of the most important and influential ofthe “autonomous” unions is the Fédération del’Education Nationale (FEN) (Federation of NationalEducation)–the teachers’ union. At the end of 1992, asa result of growing internal conflict and decliningmembership, the FEN split. The core FEN group con-tinued. The rump of the FEN joined with other inde-pendent unions to form the Union Nationale desSyndicats Autonomes (UNSA) (National Union ofAutonomous Unions). In October 1994, the UNSAwas officially recognized by the government. In legalterms, this means that the government placed theUNSA on the same level as the other national confed-erations. Nevertheless, by 1996, the FEN (and theUNSA) was substantially weakened when the rival LaFédération Syndicale Unitaire (FSU) (United UnionFederation)—which is close to the CommunistParty—gained greater support in social elections(elections for shop stewards, shop committees, andunion representatives), support that has been reaf-firmed since then.

In addition to the fragmentation that results fromdifferences within existing organizations, there arechallenges from the outside. In 1995, the NationalFront (FN) organized several new unions. When thegovernment and the courts blocked these initiatives,the extreme-right party began to penetrate existingunions.

Thus, at a time when strong opposition to govern-ment action seems to give union organizations anopportunity to increase both their organizationalstrength and their support, the trade union movementis more fragmented than ever. As in the past, infre-quent, massive strike movements have accentuateddivisions and rivalries, rather than provoking unity.

Business Interests

Since the end of World War II, most trade associationsand employers’ organizations have kept within one



dominant and exceptionally well-staffed confedera-tion, renamed in 1998 the Mouvement des Entreprisesde France (MEDEF) (Movement of French Business).However, divergent interests, differing economic con-cepts, and conflicting ideologies frequently prevent thenational organization from acting forcefully. At times,this division hampers its representativeness in negotia-tions with government or trade unions. Nevertheless,the MEDEF weathered the difficult years of thenationalization introduced by the Socialists and therestructuring of social legislation and industrial relations without lessening its status as an influentialinterest group.

Because the MEDEF is dominated primarily bybig business, shopkeepers and the owners of manysmall firms feel that they are better defended by moremovement-oriented groups.25 As a result, a successionof small-business and shopkeeper movements havechallenged the established organization and haveevolved into organized associations in their own right.

Agricultural Interests

The defense of agricultural interests has a long recordof internal strife. However, under the Fifth Republic,the Fédération Nationale des Syndicats Agricoles(FNSEA) (National Federation of Agricultural Unions)is the dominant group among several farm organiza-tions. The FNSEA has also served as an effective instru-ment for modernizing French agriculture.

The rural reform legislation of the 1960s providedfor the “collaboration of the professional agriculturalorganizations,” but from the outset, real collaborationwas offered only to the FNSEA. From this privilegedposition, the federation gained both patronage andcontrol over key institutions that were transformingagriculture. It used these instruments to organize alarge proportion of French farmers. After establishingits domination over the farming sector with the support of the government, it then periodicallydemonstrated opposition to government policy withthe support of the vast majority of a declining numberof farmers.26

The principal challenges to the FNSEA in recentyears are external—from Europe and the world mar-ket—rather than internal. The agricultural sector hassuffered from the fruits of its own productive success.Under pressure from the EU, France agreed in 1992 tomajor reforms of the CAP that took substantial

amounts of land out of production and replaced someprice supports with direct payments to farmers. Theenlargement of the EU toward the East has heightenedpressures to reduce further the budget of CAP. Thesubstantial opposition in France (and other parts ofEurope) to the importation of genetically modifiedagricultural products has increased the tensionswithin the World Trade Organization (WTO).

French organized interests are expressed throughan impressive range of different kinds of organiza-tions, from the weak and fragmented trade-unionmovement to the well-organized FNSEA. Overall,what seems to differentiate French groups from thoseof other industrial countries is their style of expressionand their forms of activity.

Means of Access and Styles of Action

In preceding regimes, organized interests sawParliament as the most convenient means of access topolitical power. During the Third and FourthRepublics, the highly specialized and powerful parlia-mentary committees often seemed to be little morethan institutional facades for interest groups that fre-quently substituted bills of their own design for thosesubmitted by the government.

Among the reasons given in 1958 for reformingand rationalizing Parliament was the desire to reducethe role of organized interests in the legislative process.By and large, this has been accomplished. But interestgroups have not lost all influence on rulemaking andpolicy formation. To be effective, groups now use thechannels that the best-equipped groups have longfound most rewarding, channels that give them directaccess to the administration. The indispensable collab-oration between organized private interests and thestate is institutionalized in advisory committees thatare attached to most administrative agencies. Thesecommittees are composed mainly of civil servants andgroup representatives. Nonetheless, tendencies towardprivileged access, sometimes called neocorporatism(democratic corporatism) (see Chapter 4), have,except in the areas of agriculture and big business,remained weak in France.

It is not surprising that some interests haveeasier access to government bureaus than others. Anaffinity of views between group representatives andpublic administrators might be based on commonoutlook, common social origin, or education. High



civil servants tend to distinguish between “profes-sional organizations,” which they consider seriousenough to listen to, and “interest groups,” whichshould be kept at a distance. The perspectives ofinterest representatives tend to reflect their ownstrength, as well as their experience in collaboratingwith different parts of the state and government.Trade-union representatives acknowledge theirreliance on the social climate (essentially the level ofstrike activity) to bargain effectively with the state.Representatives of business rely more on contactswith civil servants. Agricultural interests say that theyrely more on contacts at the ministerial level.27

Central to the state interest-group collaborationdescribed as “neocorporatism” is the notion that thestate plays a key role in both shaping and defining thelegitimacy of the interest-group universe. The state alsoestablishes the rules by which the collaboration takesplace. The French state, at various levels, strongly influ-ences the relationship among groups and even theirexistence in key areas through official recognition andsubsidies. Although representative organizations mayexist with or without official recognition, this designa-tion gives them access to consultative bodies, the rightto sign collective agreements (especially importantin the case of trade unions), and the right to obtain

certain subsidies. Therefore, recognition is an impor-tant tool that both conservative and Socialist govern-ments have used to influence the group universe.

The French state subsidizes interest groups, bothindirectly and directly. By favoring some groups overothers in these ways, the state seems to conform toneocorporatist criteria. However, in other ways, theneocorporatist model is less applicable in France thanin other European countries. Neocorporatist policy-making presumes close collaboration between thestate administration and a dominant interest group(or coalition of groups) in major socioeconomic sec-tors. Yet what stands out in the French case is theunevenness of this pattern of collaboration.28

If the neocorporatist pattern calls for interest-group leaders to control organizational action andcoordinate bargaining, the French interest groups’mass actions—such as street demonstrations, “wild-cat” strikes, and attacks on government property—areoften poorly controlled by group leadership. Indeed, itcan be argued that group protest is more effective inFrance (at least negatively) than in other industrializedcountries because it is part of a pattern of group–staterelations. Protests are limited in scope and intensity,but the government recognizes them as a valid expres-sion of interest (see Box 9.1).

B O X 9 . 1Protest in France

During the Socialist governments of the 1980s, anincreasing number of people—farmers, artisans, peo-ple in small businesses, truckers, doctors, medical students—took to the streets to protest impending leg-islation, often out of fear for their status. The demon-strations frequently led to violence and near-riots. Thesame scenario took place later under conservativegovernments. Demonstrations by college and high-school students forced the withdrawal of a planned uni-versity reform in 1987. A planned imposition of a“youth” minimum wage in 1994, ostensibly to encour-age more employment of young people, was droppedwhen high-school students opposed it in the streets ofParis and other large cities. After a month of public-ser-vice strikes and massive demonstrations in 1995, thenew Chirac government abandoned a plan to reorga-nize the nationalized railway system and revised a plan

to reorganize the civil service. A year later, strikingtruckers won major concessions from a still-weakenedgovernment. In the autumn of 2000, a protest led bytruckers and taxi drivers (that spread to England)against the rising price of oil and gasoline forced thegovernment to lower consumer taxes on fuel. Finally, in2006, the government passed legislation to establish awork contract (one among many) meant to encourageemployers to hire young people under the age oftwenty-five by making it easier to fire them during thefirst two years of their employment. After a three-monthstruggle of street demonstrations and school occupa-tions by many of the same young people who weresupposed to be the beneficiaries of the law (which wassupported by all of the major trade unions and themajor parties of the left—at least initially), the law waswithdrawn.



POLITICAL PARTIES

The Traditional Party System

Some analysts of elections see a seemingly unalterabledivision of the French into two large political families,usually classified as the “right” and the “left.” As late as1962, the opposition to de Gaulle was strongest indepartments where left traditions had had a solidfoundation for more than a century. The alignments inthe presidential contest of 1974 and the parliamentaryelections of 1978 mirrored the same divisions. Soonthereafter, however, the left’s inroads into formerlyconservative strongholds changed the traditional geo-graphic distribution of votes. Majorities changed ateach legislative election between 1981 and 2002, andfew departments now remain solid bastions for eitherthe right or the left.

The electoral system of the Fifth Republic favors asimplification of political alignments. In most con-stituencies, runoff elections result in the confrontationof two candidates, each typically representing one ofthe two camps. A simple and stable division couldhave resulted long ago in a pattern of two parties orcoalitions alternating in having power and being inopposition. Why has this not occurred?

Except for the Communists until the late 1970s,and more recently the Socialists and the Union for aPopular Movement (UMP), French political partieshave mostly remained weakly organized. French par-ties developed in a mainly preindustrial and preurbanenvironment, catering at first to upper-middle-classand later to middle-class voters. Their foremost andsometimes only function was to provide a frameworkfor selecting and electing candidates for local,departmental, and national offices. Even among thebetter-organized parties, organization has been bothfragmentary at the national level and local in orienta-tion, with only modest linkage between the two levels.

This form of representation and party organiza-tion survives largely because voters support it. An elec-torate that distrusts authority and wants protectionagainst arbitrary government is likely to be suspiciousof parties organized for political reform. For all theirantagonism, the republican and antirepublican tradi-tions have one thing in common: their aversion towell-established and strongly organized parties. As lateas the 1960s, no more than 2 percent of registered vot-ers were party members. In Britain and Germany, forexample, some parties have had more than a million

members, a membership level never achieved by anyFrench political party. Organizational weakness con-tributes to the endurance of a multiparty system.

In a two- or three-party system, major partiesnormally move toward the political center in order togain stability and cohesion. But where extreme partyplurality prevails, the center is unable to become apolitical force.

Nevertheless, the Fifth Republic created a newpolitical framework that has had a major, if gradualand mostly unforeseen, influence on all parties and ontheir relationships to each other. The emerging partysystem, in turn, influenced the way in which politicalinstitutions actually worked. The strengthening ofparliamentary party discipline in the 1970s gavemeaning to the strong executive leadership of presi-dent and prime minister and stabilized the politicalprocess. The main political parties also became theprincipal arenas within which political debates alter-native policies were developed.

The main political parties dominate the organiza-tion of parliamentary work and the selection of candi-dates, but they have become far less important as massmembership organizations. In the 2007 national elec-tions, the four main parties were supported by 78 per-cent of the electorate, with the FN and the Greensattracting an additional 15 percent. If we include theFN and the Greens, less than 10 percent of the electorate supported an array of issue-based and personality-based parties, a sharp decline comparedwith 2002. Nine parties are represented in the NationalAssembly in four parliamentary groups—two in theright majority, two allied in the left opposition.

The Main Parties: The Right and Center

Union for a Popular Movement The UMP is the mostrecent direct lineal descendant of the Gaullist party.The original Gaullist party was hastily throwntogether after de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958. Inseveral respects, the early Gaullist party differed fromthe traditional conservative parties of the right. Itappealed directly to a broad coalition of groupsand classes, including a part of the working class. Theparty’s leadership successfully built a membershipthat at one time reached several hundred thousand. Yetthe membership’s role was generally limited to appear-ing at mass meetings and assisting in propagandaefforts at election time. An important novelty was



TA B L E 9 . 1Voting Patterns in the 2007 Legislative ElectionsLeftist parties disproportionately gain support from the young and white-collar employees, while UMP/UDF draw more votes from older voters and the bourgeoisie.

PS/PC/Greens +Other Left (%)

UMP/UDF + OtherRight (%)

Extreme RightFN/MNR (%)

SexMen 36 50 7

Women 38 56 2

Age18–29 43 49 1

30–49 39 52 5

50+ 32 56 6

ProfessionShopkeepers, craftsmen, and businesspeople 21 62 1

Executives, professionals, and intellectuals 41 44 1

Middle management 45 47 1

White-collar 39 49 6

Workers 32 48 16

Unemployed 43 40 15

Level of EducationNo degree 34 52 9

Vocational degree 36 55 6

High school (academic) 45 49 3

Higher education 38 55 2

All Voters 37 53 4

that the party’s representatives in Parliament followedstrict discipline in voting on policy. Electoral suc-cess increased with each contest until the landslideelection—held after the massive strikes and studentdemonstrations of May through June 1968—enabledthe Gaullists to hold a majority in the NationalAssembly. This achievement had never before beenattained under a republican regime in France.

For sixteen years (from 1958 to 1974), both thepresidency and the prime ministership were inGaullist hands. In 1974, after the death of both Charlesde Gaulle and Georges Pompidou, Valéry Giscardd’Estaing, a prominent conservative who was not aGaullist, was elected president. After 1974, the Gaullistparty’s status deteriorated and electoral supportdeclined.

For a time, Jacques Chirac reversed the party’sdecline by restructuring more as a mass party, and

renaming it the Rally for the Republic (RPR). In fact,the RPR was quite different from its Gaullist predeces-sors. Although Chirac frequently invoked Gaullism ashis inspiration, he avoided the populist language thathad served the movement at its beginnings. The RPRappealed to a restricted, well-defined constituency ofthe right, similar to the classic conservative clientele. Itselectorate overrepresented older, wealthier voters, a

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