Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation...

97
1 UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK WARWICK CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF SPORT IN SOCIETY MA: Sport, Politics and Society, 1995-96 THESIS The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football NEIL CARTER 27 September 1996

description

The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football, MA Dissertation, 1996, University of Warwick

Transcript of Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation...

Page 1: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

1

UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK

WARWICK CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF SPORT IN SOCIETY

MA: Sport, Politics and Society, 1995-96

THESIS

The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football

NEIL CARTER

27 September 1996

Page 2: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

2

CONTENTS Pag

e List of Appendices i Acknowledgements ii Introduction iii Chapter 1 Infant Hercules’ Painful Growth 1 Chapter 2 The Legacy of the Gypsy Curse 5 Chapter 3 Decline and Fall: Renaissance and Reformation 12 Chapter 4 Down by the Riverside 23 Chapter 5 Who wants to go to a ‘dehumanised landscape’? We do! 35 Chapter 6 The Emasculation of Football 44 Chapter 7 Financing the Riverside Revolution 58 Chapter 8 Our Friends in the North East 68 Conclusion 80 Bibliography 83

Page 3: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

3

LIST OF APPENDICES Chapter 1 Appendix 1 Plan of Middlesbrough and the Ironmasters District, 1901 Chapter 2 Appendix 1 Archibald Leitch’s sketch of Ayresome Park, 1903 Chapter 4 Appendix 1 Map of Central Middlesbrough Appendix 2 Picture of Ayresome Park and surrounding area Appendix 3 Picture of Middlehaven Docks circa 1980-90 Appendix 4 Plan of Middlesbrough Dock Redevelopment Scheme Chapter 6 Appendix 1 Sketch of Riverside Stadium Appendix 2 Details of Riverside Stadium Appendix 3 Extract of Interview with Terry Tasker

Page 4: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

4

INTRODUCTION

“Middlesbrough? Aren’t they the team that’s in the headlines at the moment?” “Yeah. But we preferred it when we were crap!”1

This thesis is a contemporary historical study on Middlesbrough Football

Club’s relocation to the Riverside Stadium. It will examine the impact of the new

stadium on the club, its supporters and the wider public of Teesside in general.

Middlesbrough’s move to the Riverside stadium can also be considered a

seminal development in the context of British football’s increasing commercialism.

The club has always had a reputation for mediocrity and of being under-achievers but

the construction of the new stadium enticed former England captain Bryan Robson to

become manager and enabled the club to establish a financial base from which to

challenge the Premiership elite. This elevation was compounded by the signing of

Juninho, at the time, the Brazilian Footballer of the Year. This was a further statement

of the club’s ambition as Juninho was then the most sought after footballer in the

world. Yet he chose “... the most unfashionable club in the world.”2 Therefore, the

transformation that has occurred at Middlesbrough is a role model for other football

clubs that share a similar background and status.

The first two chapters will summarise the history of Middlesbrough - the town

and football club, and this will be followed by a chapter on the club’s demise during

the 1980’s, a time of flux for football in general. In Chapter 4 an account will be

given of the economic and political processes behind the move to the Riverside

stadium. In Chapter 5 the reaction of the fans will be considered on the club moving

from its old ground at Ayresome Park to its new stadium, followed by a chapter that

1 This conversation took place on a Network South East train between a South London commuter and a Middlesbrough fan (a student from Oxford) en route to the Wimbledon versus Middlesbrough Premiership game on Saturday 18 November 1995.

Page 5: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

5

describes how a culture clash has developed between Middlesbrough fans. A

theoretical framework will be used to explain this development, taking into account

how football’s new commercial approach aims to exploit all avenues of potential

income. This will be followed by Chapter 7, an analysis of how the club are raising

the finance to subsidise a team building programme. Finally, Chapter 8 analyses the

recent upsurge in interest in Middlesbrough Football Club and its effects on the local

community. This will be contrasted against the attitudes of the supporters and the

background of Middlesbrough, the town, as a locality with its own identity.

The methodology undertaken has involved the use of primary source materials

in the form of oral interviews with people who I thought relevant to the aims and

needs of the thesis. I had intended to interview the Middlesbrough Chairman, Steve

Gibson but he was not forthcoming. The club’s Chief Executive, Keith Lamb, did

grant me an interview slot but he was on the telephone for the duration of my allotted

time. I was then given the opportunity to interview the Stadium Manager, Terry

Tasker on two occasions.(No full transcripts of these interviews have been included in

the appendices but they have been transcribed and are available on cassette tape.)

Football fans were also used as a source for qualitative quotes in a variety of

ways. Firstly, I undertook 3 surveys, one on Middlesbrough fans before a game

outside the Riverside Stadium The other two were on Newcastle fans; the first survey

was conducted at the Riverside before a Middlesbrough-Newcastle match; the second

in Newcastle. Another source that was utilised was the Middlesbrough fans’ internet

mailing list. I mailed a questionnaire to the mailing list, and then followed up the

answers I received. In addition, by reading the mailing list contributions I was able to

extract fans’ opinions and attitudes on certain subjects relevant to my thesis. The CD-

2 Interview with Rob Nichols

Page 6: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

6

ROM and the micro-fiche facilities available at the University of Warwick and

Middlesbrough Central libraries were also used in the search for information from

articles and contemporary newspapers. Overall, the sources I had access to were

satisfactory, although there is certainly a lot more information still to be discovered

about the subject.

Page 7: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

7

Chapter 1

Infant Hercules’ painful growth

“Middlesbrough was a town which had won a name without history, an importance without antiquity”3 “They’re closing down the textile mill across the railroad tracks Foreman say these jobs are going and they ain’t coming back to your hometown.”4

William Gladstone on a visit to Middlesbrough in October 1862 referred to

the town as an “Infant Hercules”.5 He was commenting on Middlesbrough’s industrial

and urban boom during the 19th century when the town expanded dramatically. In

1801 it contained only 4 houses and 25 inhabitants and even by 1831 its population

was only 154. By 1841 the number had jumped to 54636 and by 1901 to 91,302.7

Throughout this period Middlesbrough was a thriving place. Its location was ideal to

take advantage of the economic and industrial changes that Britain was undergoing.

In the context of English history Middlesbrough’s growth is relatively recent.

The origins of Middlesbrough as a town stem from the world’s first railway, the

Stockton-Darlington line that opened in 1825.8 That route was used to transport coal

from the South Durham coalfields to Stockton and then by sea to London and the

South. However, it was discovered that Stockton as a port was inadequate for large

colliers and Middlesbrough replaced it as the port because the water there was deeper.

The railway between Stockton and Middlesbrough was completed on 27 December

1830.9 The person who initiated the port development was Joseph Pease, a merchant

3 Briggs, A., Victorian Cities, London, Oldham Books, 1963, p .247 4 Springsteen, B., ‘My Hometown’ from Born in the USA, Columbia Records, 1984 5 Briggs, 1963, op. cit. 6 ibid., p. 248 7 ibid., p. 253 8 Carson, R. A Short History of Middlesbrough, Middlesbrough Borough Council, 1977, p. 13 9 ibid.

Page 8: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

8

from Darlington who came to be regarded as the father of Middlesbrough. Pease

ensured the prosperity of the region by inviting Henry Bolckow and John Vaughan to

invest capital in new industry in 1841.10 Their area of enterprise was the

manufacturing and processing of iron. Pease offered them a site for their ironworks

near to the river and rail link at what was to be known as the Ironmasters site.11

Originally ironstone was imported to the ironworks from places miles outside

Middlesbrough. However, in 1850 ironstone was discovered in the Cleveland Hills at

Eston.12 This completely transformed the region’s landscape. Iron to Middlesbrough

was to become what gold was to California and Victoria, “Middlesbrough was in a

sense the British Ballarat”. In 1851 Middlesbrough had one blast furnace, by 1861

there were over 40 furnaces.13 By 1871 90 blast furnaces ringed the Tees, with

Teesside producing nearly a third of the country’s iron output.14 By the latter decades

of the nineteenth century steel replaced iron as Teesside’s main staple industry.

Around 1875 Bolckow and Vaughan produced the first steel on Teesside using the

Bessemer process,15 allowing Cleveland ore to be used in the steel making operation.

Dorman Long took advantage of this development and switched to steel production. It

was to become Teesside’s major steel company by taking over the area’s other steel

companies.16 In addition to iron and steel, the shipbuilding and engineering industries

expanded rapidly with Head Wrightson, formed in 186617 becoming Teesside’s

dominant engineering firm.18

10 Briggs, 1963, op. cit. p. 254 11 See Appendix 1 12 Briggs, 1963, op. cit. p. 255 13 ibid., p. 256 14 Benyon, H. et al, A Place Called Teesside: A Locality in a Global Economy, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1994, p. 26 15 ibid., pp 26-27 16 In 1914 it won the contract to build the Sydney Harbour Bridge. ibid., p. 29 17 ibid., p. 27 18 During the 20th Century Head Wrightson, Dorman Long and ICI were Teesside’s three biggest employers.

Page 9: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

9

This economic transformation had huge social implications as Middlesbrough

became a “turbulent urban frontier”19 with a “melting pot” community. The

proportion of Middlesbrough’s inhabitants born outside Yorkshire remained high

throughout the rest of the 19th century, including immigrants from the West

Midlands, Wales, Scotland and a large population originating from Ireland. Thus,

throughout the 19th century Middlesbrough’s community developed at a speed that

produced profound transformations in the town’s economic and social structure allied

to the industrial innovations of the period. These changes were observed by Lady

Florence Bell,20 in her study, ‘At the Works’, published in 1907,

“there springs, and too rapidly into existence a community of a preordained inevitable kind, the members of which must live near their work. They must therefore have houses built as quickly as possible; the houses must be cheap ... rows and rows of little brown streets ... A town arising in this way can not wait to consider anything else than time and space ... It is, unhappily for the most part a side issue for the workman whether he and his family are going to live under healthy conditions. The main object of his life is to be at work; that is the absolute necessity”.21

After the First World War Teesside symbolised the national economic slump

as heavy industries suffered through a fall in export orders and a rise in imports,

causing problems of over-capacity. Areas such as Teesside, where heavy industries

were located suffered acute unemployment. In 1932 the wards of Middlesbrough East

and Middlesbrough West each had an unemployment rate of 27.7%, the sixth highest

in the country.22 J.B. Priestley encapsulated the decline when visiting Stockton in

1933,

“... the shipyards and slips, the sheds that are beginning to tumble down, the big chimneys that have stopped smoking, the unmoving cranes and one small ship where once there were dozens”.23

19 Briggs, 1963, op. cit. p. 251 20 The wife of Sir Hugh Bell a Middlesbrough ironmaster 21 Benyon, 1994, op. cit. pp 19-20 22 Stevenson, J. and Cook, C., The Slump: Society and Politics During the Depression, London, Quartet, 1977, p. 109 23 Benyon et al, 1994, op. cit. p.14

Page 10: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

10

After 1945 the area’s economy prospered, mainly from capital investment in

ICI at its new Wilton works.24 Chemicals and steel were now the region’s main staple

industries. In the 1960’s Teesside became a focal point for Government modernisation

policies for the North East economy. “Teesplan” was formulated in 196825 as an

attempt by the state to manage an economic expansion of Teesside. It was predicted

that within 25 years factories producing consumer goods would be employing more

people than traditional industries. However, this did not materialise as the

manufacturing base declined and unemployment escalated as the chemical and steel

industries faced international pressure.

Therefore, by the 1980s the Teesside economy was characterised by recession,

job loss, high unemployment and general retrenchment. Unemployment rates in

Cleveland exceeded 20% and were among the highest in the UK.26 The region became

an industrial wasteland as areas that had once been the sites of Teesside’s enterprise

became empty. Teesside faced deep-rooted economic structural problems, stemming

from the area’s reliance on two primary industries, steel and chemicals, ironically, the

industries that had built Teesside’s wealth.

24 ICI’s first Teesside plant was built north of the Tees at Billingham after the First World War 25 Benyon et al, 1994, op. cit. p. 102 26 ibid., p. 1

i

iComment:

Comment:

Page 11: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

11

APPENDIX 1 Plan of Middlesbrough and the Ironmasters District, 1901 (Source: Benyon et al, 1994, op. cit. p. 18) Note that the grid-iron pattern represents the district of St. Hildas (‘Old’ Middlesbrough) the town’s first urban settlement and its proximity to the Dock and railway. Ironically the Dock is where the Riverside stadium is situated.

Page 12: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

12

Chapter 2

Legacy of the Gypsy Curse

“Every football club’s image is formed around its success or failure on the pitch. The that until a year ago Middlesbrough were associated with mediocrity speaks volumes about our history”.27

Middlesbrough Football Club was formed on 18 February 1876 and is the

oldest of the North East’s major clubs28. The club’s original name was Middlesbrough

Association and was formed by members of the town’s amateur cricket club who

wanted to stay in touch during the winter. The venue for their meetings was the gym

of the Albert Park Hotel.29

Since Middlesbrough’s inception there have been great matches played by

great players in front of large passionate crowds reinforcing the cliché that the North

East is a hotbed for football. Despite this, throughout its history Middlesbrough has

never won a major trophy or qualified for European competition. The highest they

have been placed in the Football League is 3rd in 1913-14, and they also finished 4th

in 1938-39 with what is generally regarded as the club’s finest ever team. Subsequent

events meant the team was never able to fulfil its potential and so great players like

Camsell, Fenton, Hardwick and Mannion never attained championship honours.

Most mystifyingly of all for a club of Middlesbrough’s status it has never

reached an FA Cup semi-final. When smaller clubs such as Bury and Wimbledon

have achieved Cup wins it became a common belief amongst fans that Boro was

cursed. Middlesbrough fans believe this ill-luck originates from when the club moved

27 Steve Gibson in Middlesbrough Football Club Official Handbook, 1995, op. cit. p. 11 28 Rippon, A., Great Soccer clubs of the North East, Ashbourne, Moorland, 1981, p. 78 29 Middlesbrough Football Club Official Handbook , Leicester, Polar, 1995, p. 108. A legend had previously grown that the club was formed during a tripe supper at the Talbot Hotel in the Old Market Place of Old Middlesbrough, the area known as St. Hildas.

Page 13: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

13

to Ayresome Park in 1903. The site for the ground had been chosen in January 1901

and this entailed evicting its existing occupants, a group of gypsies.30 Fans believe a

curse was struck upon the club by the gypsies and is a bona fide reason for the club’s

lack of success.

During its early history in the 19th century Middlesbrough did not enjoy much

success either. One reason was the split between differing factions within the club

over the issue of professionalism. It was legitimised in 1885 by the Football

Association,31 but initially Middlesbrough members refused to countenance it.

However, by 1889 a breakaway movement within the club had gained momentum and

a new, professional club Middlesbrough Ironopolis Football Company was formed.32

The old club then followed suit and played its first game as a professional club a week

before Ironopolis on 7 December 1889.33

An amalgamation was proposed under the name of Middlesbrough and

Ironopolis Football and Athletic Company in an attempt to join the Football League in

May 1892 but the League refused the application.34 Again both clubs went their

separate ways. Middlesbrough reverted back to amateur status, whilst in 1893 the

‘Nops' joined the Football League. However, because of financial pressures they

folded after that 1893-94 season.35 Middlesbrough went on to dominate amateur

football, enjoying success in the FA Amateur Cup in 1895 and 1898,36 and the only

option left open to them was to enter the Football League. The breach with the people

from Ironopolis was healed and the club again became a professional outfit on 28

30 Paylor, E. and Wilson, J., Ayresome Park Memories, Derby, Breedon Books, 1995, p. 8 31 Mason, T., Association Football and English Football 1863-1915, Brighton, Harvester, 1980, p. 74 32 Rippon, 1981, op. cit. p. 80 33 ibid. 34 ibid. 35 ibid., p. 81 36 Glasper, H., Middlesbrough: A Complete Record 1876-1989, Derby, Breedon, 1989, p. 14. It was the club’s last cup success until winning the Anglo-Scottish Cup in 1975 - an achievement that hardly

Page 14: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

14

February 1899.37 Middlesbrough was elected to the Football League on 19 May 1899

and their first game was a 3-0 defeat at Lincoln City on 2 September later that year.38

The social matrix of Middlesbrough supporters probably changed during this

period of turmoil. Perhaps it could be said that the split over Professionalism and

Amateurism represented the changing social make-up of the town’s football

supporters. During its amateur existence before 1889 newspaper sketches reflect

fashions more in keeping with a middle-class audience. After this period there is a

change to the cloth-capped stereotypical image of football fans. Regarding

Middlesbrough, each faction perhaps reflected their allegiance - the middle-classes

with the old club, the working-classes to Ironopolis. However, a riot between

Middlesbrough and Stockton fans in January 1889 slightly undermines this

argument.39

The changing social and economic circumstances of this period meant an

increase in wealth and leisure time for workers generally and they were to use a

portion of each dedicated to football. As Middlesbrough was a heavily industrialised

area it would have been a classic example of this process. When Ayresome Park was

built it was designed mainly to cater for a working-class audience, an example being

the Spion Kops behind each goal, but Middlesbrough still attracted middle-class fans.

This was represented in the construction of the North Stand “... a bourgeois island in a

registers on the Richter scale of footballing triumphs. It was even won by an own-goal in a two-legged final against Fulham that ended 1-0! 37 Rippon, 1981, op. cit. p. 82 38 ibid., pp 82-83 39 Carter, N., The Modernisation of Football: A Case Study of Middlesbrough Football Club 187-1914 (Thesis) Polytechnic of North London, Unpublished, 1989

Page 15: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

15

sea of working-class faces”.40 Overall though, the actual socio-occupational

composition of these crowds is unclear.41

Supporters of Middlesbrough have had to look for different forms of success

to take pride in because of no cup or championship wins. One popular belief was that

Ayresome Park had the best playing surface in the country. Another source of pride

was Ayresome Park itself with its tradition and reputation as one of the best stadiums

in the country, culminating with it being chosen as one of the venues for the 1966

World Cup in England. It had previously staged three England internationals in 1905,

1914 and 1937 and other representative games.42 The first league match played there

was against local rivals Sunderland on 12 September 1903. The crowd was

approximately 30,000 paying receipts of £906 and saw Sunderland win 3-2. The first

match illustrated a pattern concerning Middlesbrough Football Club. Firstly, the large

crowd indicates the Teesside public’s appetite for football, and secondly, having to

live in the shadow of local rivals Newcastle and Sunderland. Newcastle have won the

League Championship four times and the FA cup six, whereas Sunderland have won

six League titles and two FA Cups although none recently.43

However, despite its paucity of honours Middlesbrough has contributed

towards the game’s history in other guises. Alan Shearer’s world record transfer fee of

£15 million from Blackburn to Newcastle in July 1996 reminds one that

Middlesbrough was the first club to pay £1000 for a player when Alf Common joined

from Sunderland in February 1905.44 In 1906 Steve Bloomer the legendary Derby and

England forward joined the club in dubious circumstances. The move was a shock as

40 Mason, 1980, op. cit. p. 153 41 In the 1881 Middlesbrough Occupational Structure Census, Industrial Workers accounted for 45% of the town’s population, with iron and steel accounting for 55% of the industrial class , Carter, 1989, op. cit. note 3, p. 30 42Glasper, 1989, op. cit. p. 66 43 Rippon, 1981, op. cit. p 43 and p. 77

Page 16: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

16

Bloomer was considered the game’s first superstar.45 In the 1926-27 season George

Camsell set a then league record 59 goals as Middlesbrough romped away with the

Second Division title.46

Either side of the Second World War Wilf Mannion played for the club and is

regarded as Middlesbrough’s greatest ever player. As an inside forward he appeared

in 26 England internationals scoring twice for Great Britain when they beat the Rest

of Europe 6-1 in 1947 at Hampden Park. Fellow Middlesbrough player George

Hardwick was the captain and Boro was the only club to be represented by two

players in the Great Britain team.47 The next Middlesbrough player to have a major

influence on the club and football in general was Brian Clough. He had an amazing

goal scoring record of 204 in 222 games for Middlesbrough between 1955-6148 but it

was as a manager that he enjoyed his greatest successes.

When the 1966 World Cup came to England Ayresome Park was chosen as a

venue instead of Newcastle, although Middlesbrough was the in the Third Division

for the first time in their history. However, the competition reinvigorated the Boro

fans and the club was promoted the next season. The fans new found enthusiasm

owed more that a little to one of the most sensational results in World Cup history,

North Korea’s 1-0 victory over Italy. The 1970’s saw a relatively successful period

for the club mainly due to the appointment of England World Cup winner Jack

Charlton as manager. He guided Boro to promotion to Division One in 1974 in

record-breaking fashion and established them as a respected top flight outfit for the

next three seasons. This period reached its climax in October 1976 when

44 ibid., p. 85 45 ibid., p. 86 46 ibid., p. 91. Dixie Dean of First Division Everton broke the record the next season with 60 goals. The record stands to this day 47 Glasper, 1989, op. cit. p. 121

Page 17: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

17

Middlesbrough briefly headed the League.49 Earlier that year Middlesbrough had

reached the semi-final of the League Cup only to lose to Manchester City.

In the context of football’s past Middlesbrough’s overall record can only be

described as mediocre. The club was in Division One for most of its history but it was

rarely a major threat to other clubs in the pursuit of trophies. Thus, by the end of the

1970’s the club was still experiencing the same fortunes as it had since it entered the

Football League in 1899. Middlesbrough was still an average club. What success it

did achieve was minimal in terms of the wider football stage. Nonetheless it was

important for Middlesbrough fans who continued to support the club in impressive

numbers considering the absence of success - during the 1980-81 season

Middlesbrough had three crowds over 35,000 within a month.50 Despite this

appearance of normality the following decade was to prove a period of turbulent

change for football overall and Middlesbrough in particular.

The 1980s began with the deaths of two people outside Ayresome Park. On 12

January 1980 Mr and Mrs Roxby were crushed whilst waiting for their son after a

match between Middlesbrough and Manchester United when a brick pillar, and the

two gates it was supporting on the South East corner collapsed. The tragedy occurred

when Manchester United fans tried to push the gates open after they had been locked

in to prevent them from mixing with Middlesbrough supporters.51 It was an

indictment of the times - a measure to prevent outbreaks of violence in the decaying

48 ibid., p. 100. He won every major honour in the game (none for Middlesbrough though), except, ironically when one considers Middlesbrough’s history in that competition, the FA Cup. 49 Paylor, E., Middlesbrough Football Club, Manchester, Archive, 1989, picture 108 50 Glasper, 1989, op. cit. p.320. The record attendance at Ayresome Park was 53,802, 27 December 1949 for a Football League game between Middlesbrough and Newcastle United 51 Inglis, S., Football Ground of Britain, London, Collins Willow, 1996, p. 247

Page 18: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

18

stadium that Ayresome Park had become. This was a common theme within football

during this period and nothing seemed to be able to arrest its decline.52

Thus, by 1980 football was in a parlous condition. Attendances were falling

and football hooliganism was at the heart of the game’s problems as were its decaying

stadiums. The turmoil that Middlesbrough was to undergo during this decade was

symptomatic of the turbulence that football was to experience.

52 Later in that year on 6 September Craig French, a Boro fan was killed after an incident with Nottingham Forest fans. Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 35

Page 19: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

19

APPENDIX 1 Archibald Leitch’s sketch map of Ayresome Park in 1903 (Source: Inglis, S., Football Grounds of Britain, London, Collins Willow, 1996) Ayresome Park was actually Middlesbrough’s fourth ground. The founders of the club began playing at the Old Archery Ground in Albert Park in 1876. The club was forced to move to Breckon Hill Road in March 1879 by the local Parks Committee because of the damage done to the turf through the increasing spectators. In 1880 the club moved again to Linthorpe Road where Middlesbrough Cricket Club played. Ayresome Park was designed by Archibald Leitch, the foremost designer of his day (he had worked on Ibrox and later Hampden Park) early in 1903, and taking only number of nine months to build. The capacity of the new stadium was 40,000 and built at a cost of £10,437. The South Stand (on the left of the sketch) had been moved from the Linthorpe Road ground. The North Stand exhibited Leitch’s trademark gable, similar to those at Newcastle and Liverpool. The stand was in use until Ayresome Park’s last game in 1995. (Source: Glasper, H., 1989, op. cit. p. 62)

Page 20: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

20

Chapter 3

Decline and Fall: Renaissance and Reformation

“I was left holding the baby. There was nothing I could do about it”.53 “But the thing was, I trusted the system: I knew that I could not be squashed to death, because that never happened at football matches”.54

The fortunes of a football club are inextricably linked with their results.

Sometimes the destiny of the club can hinge on one result. In the case of

Middlesbrough the date 10 March 1981 is indelibly etched on the memory of

everyone connected with the club, fans and staff alike. On that day Middlesbrough

lost an FA Cup quarter-final tie (again) in a replay at Wolves 3-1. The Club had

appeared in four quarter-finals in seven seasons and had even lost to struggling

Second Division Orient in 1978 but this loss to Wolves was particularly hard to take

and broke the heart of the club. It seemed to encapsulate a century of frustration for

the fans, of whom 10,000 had travelled to Wolverhampton, and was the catalyst that

led to the death of the old club, the rise of the new and ultimately Middlesbrough’s

relocation to the Riverside Stadium.

Middlesbrough went from 12th in Division 1 in 1981 to being relegated to

Division 3 in 1986 but the results on the field were only partly responsible for the

club’s rapid decline to liquidation in 1986. Important players were sold for large

transfer fees but the money was then wasted on mediocre players unable to prevent

the slide. This was compounded by the fall in average attendances: from 22,080 in

1980-81 to 7109 in 1985-86.55 It meant directors were unable to find the income to

53 Interview with Jack Hatfield 54 Hornby, N., Fever Pitch, London, Victor Gollancz, 1992, p. 129 55 Glasper, 1989, op. cit. p. 71

Page 21: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

21

match the loss of revenue, adding to an increasing debt. The club was reported to be

losing £12,000 a week when it appointed Malcolm Allison manager in October 1982.

At the end of the financial year in the summer of 1984 the club reported a loss of

£300,000 and the debt had increased to £1.2 million.56

It represented an example of the economic climate of the day as

Middlesbrough’s fortunes followed those of the Teesside economy as a whole.

Teesside was experiencing mass unemployment in its traditional industries, steel and

manufacturing in particular. These workers had provided the bedrock of the club’s fan

base, and their curtailed spending power was to be reflected on Middlesbrough’s

finances.

Middlesbrough’s situation was similar to a number of clubs who were in crisis

during this period. Clubs such as Wolves, Bristol City, Tranmere and Swansea, like

Middlesbrough, were all saved at the last minute.57 Crowds overall had fallen,

dropping to a post-1945 low in the 1985-86 season as total Football League

attendances dipped below 17 million.58 This was the season following the Bradford

and Heysel disasters. Football, like Middlesbrough, during this period had reached its

nadir.

Furthermore, Ayresome Park was deteriorating physically. After the fire at

Bradford City’s ground in 1985 Cleveland County Council imposed stringent safety

measures on the ground. For the start of the 1985-86 season the Safety Certificate for

the whole ground was not renewed and capacity was reduced from 42,000 to 10,658

at a stroke.59 To illustrate how deep-rooted the Club’s problems were the reduction

was not a problem as Boro was only getting crowds of 6000 at the time. However,

56 Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 75 57 Inglis, 1996, op. cit. p. 247 58 Williams, J., English Football Stadia After Hillsborough, University of Leicester, Sir Norman Chester Centre for Football Research, 1994, Figure 2

Page 22: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

22

Sunderland were scheduled to play at Christmas. The fixture attracted a crowd of

19,701 but a multitude of faults had to be corrected to increase Ayresome Park’s

capacity. The money spent to keep the stadium safe meant none could be used to buy

players needed to prevent Middlesbrough being relegated to the Third Division.60

Decaying stadia was a familiar theme throughout football in the 1980’s and

was highlighted by the catastrophes at Bradford and Hillsborough. After the Bradford

City Fire in 1985 all local councils enforced stringent safety measures on grounds

under their remit. For example, Wolves’ Molineux was dilapidated to the extent that

Wolverhampton Metropolitan Council closed half the ground because it did not meet

safety standards.61 Charlton Athletic was forced to leave The Valley because they

were unable to meet the repair bill of £2 million required to comply with the new

safety regulations.62

Middlesbrough’s results on the pitch mirrored their financial plight off it. A 2-

1 defeat by Shrewsbury on the final day of the ‘85-86 season condemned

Middlesbrough to the Third Division. It was to be the last game played by the club

formed under the name of Middlesbrough Football and Athletic Club from a share

issue of 1000 £1 shares in 1892.63 An element of pathos enveloped the club. It had

just been relegated, was about to fold and its supporters ran amok before, during and

after the Shrewsbury game. The turmoil and degeneration of the Football Club over

59 Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 40 60 Middlesbrough’s predicament was exacerbated by the on-going saga of the Sports Hall adjoining Ayresome Park after the club received grants including one from the Sports Council. Work first started on the £1.3 million project in 1979. It had been intended to open it for public use but according to Middlesbrough Council it was erected without planning permission. In 1983 it was announced that the Sports Centre could not be opened as it did not meet building and fire regulations. The football club then spent more money on it in an attempt to meet the measures. Despite it being eventually opened the lack of facilities available compared to the original plans deemed it a ‘White Elephant’. The Club utilised it for training purposes but the Sports Centre never realised its original objective. Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 75 61 Inglis, 1996, op. cit. p. 409 62 ibid., p. 107 63 Carter, 1989, op. cit. p. 21

Page 23: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

23

the previous five years reached its climax that day. The Club was to die and the

supporters vented their anger on the citizens of Shrewsbury - symbolic of football’s

problems during this era.

It was realised that for professional football to continue in Middlesbrough the

old club had to die and a new club reformed in its place. Just before relegation, on 15

April the Chairman, Alf Duffield, resigned as his company ITM had gone out of

business. The board was then headed by Steve Gibson, who had become the club’s

youngest ever director at 26 when he joined the board in November 1984.64 The then

chairman, Mike McCullagh, in an attempt to raise capital was offering directorships

for £25,000 and Gibson took up the offer.65

Gibson provided a contrast with the club’s other directors. He was young

compared to some of the others and was also a product of the Thatcher economic age,

a young entrepreneur, described as a “financial whizz kid”.66 He was able to make his

chemical haulage company, ‘Bulkhaul’, survive and prosper in a harsh economic

climate. This contrasted with the other directors who were the archetypal local

businessmen; Jack Hatfield, vice-Chairman at the time of liquidation owned a

Middlesbrough sports shop inherited from his family that had been connected with the

club since 1912.67 Gibson was to ignore potential directors from this background and

instead pursue the financial co-operation of blue-chip companies.

Once at the helm Gibson asked the remaining directors to grant him full

executive powers and he then dismissed the rest of the board. His aim was to form a

consortium made up of private and public funds and reconstitute a new club and

company. But before that could happen the old club was allowed to die. The first step

64 Paylor, 1989, op. cit. picture 133 65 Interview with Jack Hatfield 66 ibid. 67 Letter from Jack Hatfield Sport Shop to Middlesbrough Football Club, 31.10.95

Page 24: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

24

involved Gibson inviting Duffield to bring a winding up order to the High Court

against Middlesbrough as he was owed £600,00068 for monies loaned to the club for

essential building work to ensure the stadium retained its Safety Certificate.69 This

meant the club went into voluntary liquidation.

However, the Football League prohibited the club from using the method of

voluntary liquidation to resurrect itself as it attracted a lot of bad publicity from

creditors. The creditors of liquidated companies only received a small percentage of

the money owed to them. They then suffered the frustration of seeing clubs rise again

and carry on trading as if nothing had happened, because the amount of debt to be

repaid by a company was reduced by voluntary liquidation, Bristol City was a prime

example of this. Ultimately the Club had to pay all creditors in full, in total £2

million.70 Jack Hatfield went as the club’s representative to the Football League’s

annual meeting and he was told by its chairman, Bill Fox of Blackburn Rovers, “If

you don’t pay your bills your out”.

Gibson desperately searched for members to join the consortium. ICI joined as

they did not want the club to fold. They felt the club was an asset to them as it

provided corporate hospitality for ICI guests and had had a £10,000 sponsorship deal

with the club that entitled them to a number of tickets per game. Their representative

was Colin Henderson, who organised ICI’s sports benevolent fund, and ICI’s

sponsorship deal with Middlesbrough was part of that.71 Jack Hatfield recalls ICI

were at one time very close to the club but then pulled out of the sponsorship when

Mike McCullagh was chairman between October 1982 and December 1985, saying

they were not satisfied with how their money was being utilised. Scottish and

68 Evening Gazette, Middlesbrough, 10.6.86, p. 1 69 Interview with Jack Hatfield 70 Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 174 71 Interview with Jack Hatfield

Page 25: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

25

Newcastle Breweries also joined, and were represented by Graham Fordy.72

Middlesbrough Council were also prepared to give £200,00 to the consortium.73 The

final member was to be Henry Moszkowicz, a lifelong fan who lived in London, he

had replied to an advert in The Times,74 highlighting the desperation of the situation.

The original five members put up £200,000 each except Gibson’s Bulkhaul company

whose contribution was £100,000.75

The composition of the consortium signalled a break from the past as the

club’s hierarchy was dominated by major companies. Small, local businessmen who

had been emotionally, as well as financially involved with the club were replaced by

others who had different motives. ICI for example wished to use the club for

corporate hospitality purposes. Jack Hatfield recalls his symbolic, final meeting with

Gibson as he told Hatfield, “Leave it to me I will go out and get some backers. We’ll

form a consortium. I’ll report back to this board”. Ten years later Hatfield is still

waiting.

On 30 July the club was officially wound up in the High Court and put in the

hands of the Official Receiver.76 The Inland Revenue had replaced Alf Duffield as the

main petitioner as he no longer intended to proceed with a winding-up order.

However, a new winding up order could not be produced until 6 October because of

the ‘long vacation’ of the High Court.77 This gave the consortium more time to deal

with the problems set before them. These included coming to an agreement with the

Official Receiver to buy the assets of the old club, and appeasing the Football League

and their conditions. Consortium members had to sign a performance bond for £2.5

72 Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 174 73 Middlesbrough Council later withdrew from the consortium on 25 July but put forward a loan of £500,000 that was guaranteed by the other consortium members. Evening Gazette, 16.8.86, p. 1 74 Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 174 75 ibid. 76 ibid., p. 176

Page 26: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

26

million that could be called in to settle debts if obligations were not met. The Football

League also demanded that Middlesbrough start the ‘86-87 season with £350,000

working capital and the Professional Footballers Association insisted that financial

commitments were met. Finally, the opening game of that season, at home to Port

Vale had to take place before midnight Saturday 23 August.78

On 1 August Ayresome Park was padlocked by the Official Receiver, the

players and staff were no longer employed by the Football Club which had ceased to

exist. Delicate negotiations continued with all relevant parties under a veil of secrecy.

These included the Football League, the Official Receiver and the Midland Bank,

with whom the consortium came to a compromise with over the purchase of

Ayresome Park. On 22 August at 6.30pm, ninety minutes past the deadline imposed

by the Football League, it was announced that a survival package had been produced

to satisfy all parties.79 The next day Boro played their first game as a new company.

The venue was not Ayresome Park though as it was not up to the standard required.

Instead the game was played at Hartlepool’s Victoria Ground at 6.30pm after

Hartlepool had finished their game. The attendance was 3690, an indication that

Teessiders were not convinced about the Club’s future prospects.80

Thus from these humble beginnings at Hartlepool, considered the most

unfashionable club in the League, that had had to apply for re-election to the Football

League a record number of times, Middlesbrough began a new era with a 2-2 draw

against Port Vale. The contrast with the current situation could not be more stark. The

consortium had been forced to scrape around for any assistance it could get as well as

relying on the Football League and Hartlepool. Today ten years later Middlesbrough

77 ibid., p. 175 78 ibid., p. 176 To demonstrate the seriousness of the situation Middlesbrough were erased from the football pools for the whole of the oncoming season. 79 Evening Gazette, 23.8.86, p. 1

Page 27: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

27

are playing in front of full houses of 30,000 in a new stadium where a host of

international parade their skills. It is this turn around in fortunes that forms the focus

of this thesis.

The intervening years between Middlesbrough’s revival and relocation was

the most wayward period in its history in terms of results on the pitch. The club was

involved in a relegation battle or promotion campaign in every season bar one. There

was also turbulence in the boardroom during this period. The result was that Steve

Gibson became Chairman of the club and in a position to guide the club into its new

stadium. However, before that could occur the club had to undergo structural changes

every bit as revolutionary as those in 1986.

The constitution of the new company was devised under a new title for the

club, Middlesbrough Football and Athletic Company (1986) Ltd. Colin Henderson,

the representative of ICI became the chairman. The other directors were Moszkowicz,

Graham Fordy and Gibson, the only director to survive from the pre-liquidation

board. Reg Corbidge a second representative from Scottish and Newcastle Breweries

later joined the board as a fifth director. On 1 December 1986 a Chief Executive,

Keith Lamb,81 was appointed to underline the new company’s determination to run

the club on a more professional, business-oriented footing. Previously, a secretary,

Harry Green, had handled the club’s affairs for twenty years.82

There were 825,000 £1 shares issued but they were allocated only amongst

board members. Henry Moszkowicz, who had made his fortune selling stationary, and

his wife were the leading shareholders with 300,000 shares, ICI and Scottish and

Newcastle both had 200,000, Bulkhaul 125,000.83 It was a very low capital base to

80 Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 174 81 ibid., p. 178 82 Interview with Jack Hatfield 83 Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 177

Page 28: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

28

start a new company from and would cause problems later. The board declared that

safeguards had been built into the new constitution to prevent the club being plunged

back into a situation similar to 1986. One condition was that directors were unable to

sell on their shares but instead had to offer them to the other directors. However, this

may have had more to do with a safety-first business policy rather than specific

articles written into the new constitution because the policy of the board dictated what

direction the club took, and this could and did change.

The first signs of unease in the boardroom was the resignation of Moszkowicz

from his directorship over policy disagreements in 1987.84 In addition, a major

structural survey of Ayresome Park was carried out in 1988 and it showed a lot of

work was needed to make the stadium safe. The continuing decay of the ground

prompted a division in the board over the fundamental issue of how the football club

was to meet the requirements of the Taylor Report. It required all football clubs in the

top two divisions to have all-seater stadia by August 1994 following the Hillsborough

Disaster in 1989.85 Henderson favoured staying at Ayresome Park, whereas Gibson

supported by Keith Lamb was keen on a complete move.86 What also emerged here

was a dichotomy over the club’s future direction. Henderson promulgated a ‘Safety-

First’ approach towards running the club. He had been affected more than most by the

crisis in 1986 and just did not want to take any risks again. However, Gibson and

Lamb backed-up by Fordy and Corbidge were willing to be more adventurous.

The rift between Henderson and Gibson deepened during Middlesbrough’s

relegation from the Premier League in 1992-93 as the battle in the boardroom became

linked to the need to sort out the shareholding issue. Scottish and Newcastle withdrew

84 ibid., p. 181 85 Black, J. and Lloyd, M, ‘Football Stadia Developments’, Town Planning Review, 65, 1, 1994, p. 5 86 Source: Interview with Rob Nichols, editor of Middlesbrough fanzine Fly Me To The Moon, (FMTTM), 4.7.96

Page 29: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

29

their involvement after being surcharged by the Football League along with the club’s

other directors for failing to pay off all the old company’s creditors on time.87 The

shares were redistributed to the other shareholders on a pro rata basis. The boardroom

power struggle came to a head in April 1993 when after relegation Henderson

resigned. A week before his announcement he had attended a highly charged Teesside

Football Supporters Association (FSA) meeting where fans were critical of his

stewardship of the club. Henderson resigned from the Chair, but retained his

directorship.88 The position of Chairman was in abeyance until September of that year

when Gibson took over the helm.

These changes led to important changes for the club. It was finally resolved in

February 1994 at an extraordinary meeting of shareholders when Moszkowicz

decided to sell his shareholding to Gibson who then had 68% of the shares.

Henderson was replaced by George Cooke as ICI’s representative on the board. There

was another total restructuring of the board with the other two directors Corbidge and

Fordy leaving it and taking up commercial positions within the Club. Scottish and

Newcastle had withdrawn their shareholding and this meant Corbidge and Fordy

could no longer sit on the board as they had previously represented that company.89

Thus, the power for decision-making within the Club was invested in one man, Steve

Gibson. He was now in total control of the club and was in a position as benefactor to

pursue his plans for the club without interference from other board members. In fact

he had already begun to realise his vision for the future of the club as soon as he

became Chairman. A month later there was a deliberate leak to the Press that the Boro

was ready to quit Ayresome Park.90

87 Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 194 88 Interview with Rob Nichols 89 Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 194 90 Evening Gazette, 19.10.93, p. 26

Page 30: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

30

Chapter 4

Down by the Riverside

“Ayresome Park had become a blight on people living in that area”91 “We believe the new Middlesbrough ground will enable the club to compete with the

best in Europe and will provide superb facilities for supporters”92 The Cellnet Riverside Stadium opened on 26 August 1995 and Middlesbrough

beat Chelsea 2-0 in the Premiership. Its construction was dependent upon a number of

factors and the contribution of a number of agencies, none more so than the Teesside

Development Corporation (TDC). Middlesbrough’s relocation was precipitated by

processes at work not only within football but also in society overall. These are what

Bale describes as ‘Pushes’ from traditional sites and ‘Pulls’ to exurban locations.93

The major catalyst in the overall development was the publication of the

Taylor Report in 1990 in response to the Hillsborough disaster of 1989 when 96

Liverpool supporters died. In fact Hillsborough was part of a long tradition of

spectator tragedies at British football, three of which concerned Middlesbrough in

1980. A combination of an aggressive passion for the game among fans, inadequate

facilities and poor crowd management have claimed the lives of at least 281 fans since

1900 in 27 separate incidents. A further 3500 fans have been injured.94 The Taylor

Report identified over-crowding as the principal cause of the disaster.95 Its main

conclusion was that:

“the physical upgrading of facilities at football stadia would result in an improvement of both safety conditions and in crowd behaviour at football matches. It advocated the provision of all-seated accommodation at football grounds, the building of new football

91 Interview with Mike Clark, Press Information Officer, Middlesbrough Borough Council, 10.7.96 92 Ron Norman, Chairman of Teesside Development Corporation, Evening Gazette, 22.12.93, p. 1 93 Bale, J., Sport, Space and the City, London, Routledge, 1993, p. 141 94 Williams, 1994, op. cit. p. 2 95 Black et al, 1994, op. cit. p. 1

Page 31: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

31

stadia or the upgrading of existing facilities and encouraged the possibility of groundshare arrangements.”96

What made the Taylor Report an important landmark in football was that the

government accepted its broad recommendations and “made the necessary

administrative arrangements to ensure compliance with the new standards for the

accommodation of spectators at football stadia in Britain”.97 The significance of this

is that it “represents a significant extension of public control over the game”.98 This

manifested itself in the form of the Football Trust which administers public sector

funds. It was set up in 1990 as an amalgamation of the former Football Trust and

Football Grounds Improvement Trust and “is now the responsible body for providing

financial resources to enable clubs to comply with ... the Taylor Report”.99 These

financial resources are directed to the Football Trust by the government via a 2.5%

reduction in the pools betting levy allowing £100 million over 5 years to be redirected

from the Treasury into funds for the redevelopment of stadia. The government also

promised a further £100 million from the same source from 1995 onwards. Top clubs

were eligible for grants of up to £2 million100 and it is one of these grants that

Middlesbrough took advantage of when funding their relocation.101

Initially, Middlesbrough’s response to the Taylor Report was to redevelop

Ayresome Park. Under Colin Henderson’s chairmanship plans had been unveiled to a

Supporters Club meeting in 1990 demonstrating how Ayresome Park was to become

an all-seater stadium. The proposed redevelopment was to be gradual with the main

entrance and club shop formerly at Warwick Street moving to the car parks on the

corner of Ayresome Park Road and Ayresome Street. The objective of this phase in

96 ibid., p. 5 97 ibid., p. 1 98 ibid., p. 2 99 ibid., p. 5 100 Williams, 1994, op. cit. p. 11

Page 32: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

32

the development was to increase the club’s commercial activity. The Holgate’s (West

End) line of terracing was to continue to the point where it was in line with the

stadium’s back wall, and seats would have been put in there. The South Stand’s step

between the lower terrace and the seats was to be knocked out making a continuous

line, and then the North Stand was to be redeveloped.102 The capacity was to be

approximately 30,000.103 However, feasibility studies commissioned into Ayresome

Park’s redevelopment concluded there would be major problems.104 Another ‘push’ of

an internal nature that the club received was the proposed cost of this redevelopment -

£12 million.105 The club also had to take into account the potential of more structural

problems and the possibility of costs rising during building. It was only marginally

more for Middlesbrough to sell up and build a new stadium.

There were additional problems. Attempting to redevelop Ayresome Park to

comply with the Taylor Report created the potential for conflict between the club and

the local authority i.e. Middlesbrough Borough Council, and their policies, plans and

priorities. It had been Middlesbrough Council policy for sometime to relocate the club

as it would ease the burden on people living near Ayresome Park produced by

congestion and damage to local properties on match days.106 Alison Ferst lived near

the ground and remembers there being trouble at one game and a Boro fan seeing

their front door ajar ran into the house and through the back door to escape. He was

then followed by the two youths chasing him!107

Planning permission would have been required to proceed with building work

and because Ayresome Park is situated within a labyrinth of Victorian, grid-iron

101 Interview with Terry Tasker 102 See Appendix 1 and 2 103 Interview with Rob Nichols 104 Evening Gazette, 19.10.93, p. 26 105 Evening Gazette, 22.12.93, p. 1 106 Middlesbrough Borough Council Meeting, Minute 123, May-June 1994

Page 33: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

33

terraced streets it would undoubtedly have brought protests from local residents over

the environmental pollution it caused. Adjacent to Ayresome Park was a Primary

school, and the Holgate was adjoined to the grounds of the local hospital. Thus, urban

expansion had overtaken Ayresome Park and locked it into a contemporary built

environment which made change difficult to manage.108 Furthermore, these cramped

urban locations with incompatible land uses surrounding stadia in general made

expansion for development impossible. This demonstrated that there were ‘pulls’

away from inner-urban locations to ‘exurban’ ones.109

Steve Gibson was able to foresee these and other advantages in moving and it

was he who initiated the project. As has already been mentioned Gibson joined the

board in November 1984 and played the leading role in saving and reforming the club

after 1986. However, he gradually became frustrated at the club’s lack of progress

towards meeting the requirements of the Taylor Report. He favoured a complete

relocation. On the day the official announcement was made that Middlesbrough was

to relocate Gibson commented that “It reflects the club’s ambition for the future”, and

proclaimed the move a “reawakening”.110 When interviewed on Match of the Day

before the Chelsea game he said the building of the stadium was symbolic of the

club’s intent to “break the mould of mediocrity” that the club and its fans had suffered

for 120 years. Gibson’s position was clear he wanted to transform Middlesbrough into

an elite club and by moving to a new stadium he felt this could be achieved.

Gibson also possesses a sharp business acumen and a ruthless streak. He has

been described as a “very smooth operator”. His personal fortune has been estimated

at £70 million ranking him joint 212th in a prosperity list of the nation’s richest

107 Evening Gazette (Farewell Ayresome: Hello Premiership), 8.5.96, p. 46 108 See Appendix 1 and 2 109 Bale, 1993, op. cit. p. 143 110 Evening Gazette, 22.12.93. p. 16

Page 34: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

34

people.111 and he was placed 14th in the Premier League table of richest club

patrons.112 He owns 80% of Bulkhaul, a chemical haulage business that is worth £60

million. In 1994 it amassed £3.5 million in profits and £29.3 million in sales.113

Therefore, Gibson is able to pursue his personal interest in the club that he has

supported all his life, from a high capital base. However, it should be pointed out that

the extent of Gibson’s personal contribution towards the club’s latest ventures is

unclear, although he has been the driving force behind them.

His position as club patron is an example of a pattern developing throughout

football as a whole. Benefactors of club’s are underwriting financial funds for their

managers to undertake team building programmes. Jack Walker at Blackburn Rovers

and Sir John Hall at Newcastle United have both written off large deficits that their

clubs have incurred through buying players.114 The advent of these benefactors

illustrates the changes in the structures of football clubs in general as more clubs are

becoming dependent on one person. Previously power was spread amongst board

members, but an increasing corporatist approach within football has shifted the power

of a few rich clubs into the hands of a few rich men.

Once Gibson took over the chair he wanted to put his future plans for the club

into action. Rob Nichols editor of the Boro fanzine ‘Fly Me To The Moon’

(FMTTM), remembers interviewing Keith Lamb during this period and whilst in his

office they were interrupted by a telephone call lasting 25 minutes. The conversation

mentioned possible sites and decontaminated ground but he was unsure of the actual

location. Peter Warren, liaison for Teesside Football Supporters Association (FSA),

111 The Sunday Times (Britain’s Richest 500), 14.4.96, p. 34 112 Evening Gazette, 15.4.96, p. 5 113 The Sunday Times (Britain’s Richest 500), 14.4.96, p. 34 114 Deloitte and Touché, Annual Review of Football Finance, London, Deloitte and Touché, 1996, p. 35

Page 35: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

35

recalls that Gibson was actively looking at sites at this time and he had told him the

situation was delicate as he was having talks with a number of people.115

These people included the TDC and their contribution to the project was

critical. The TDC was set up in 1987 under the 1980 Local Government, Planning and

Land Act following the establishment of other Urban Development Corporations.116

They were part of a Thatcherite intention to stimulate inner-city urban regeneration by

utilising the resources of the private sector. As “powerful, undemocratic enabling

quangos”117 they have the “power of assembling land, reclaiming it, servicing it and

developing the land itself or disposing of it to private developers”.118Moreover, “they

can provide the necessary infrastructure for development, especially roads, and can

improve the local environment”.119

Their main purpose was to create jobs in areas of chronic unemployment such

as Teesside. Their record of employment creation is highly debatable,120 but another

part of their strategy is to “enhance the area and make it attractive to inward

investors”.121 For example, a barrage scheme for the Tees was built on Teesdale at a

cost of £18 million. It also incorporated a water sports facility and meant the

previously unattractive mud banks of the Tees were now permanently covered, thus

transforming an area of disused industrialised land into a more pleasant environment.

In effect they (UDCs) are “their own planning authorities and have the coercive

weapon of the compulsory purchase order”.122 In 1989 Duncan Hall, the TDC’s Chief

115 Interview with Peter Warren, Teesside Football Supporters Association (FSA), 11.7.96 116 Dunleavy, P. (ed), Developments in British Politics 4, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1993, p. 207 117 Robinson, F. et al ‘Urban Development Corporations and the Creation of Employment: An Evaluation of Tyne and Wear, and Teesside Development Corporations, Local Economy, 8, 4: 1994, p. 326 118 Thornley, A., Urban Planning under Thatcherism: The Challenge of the Market, London, Routledge, 1993, pp 167-168 119 ibid., p. 154 120 Regarding the TDC ,the highest estimate is 6000 jobs created at a cost of £200 million 121 Financial Times, 21.3.89, p. 38 122 Financial Times (Survey on Teesside), 26.2.88, p. 2

Page 36: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

36

Executive, spoke of the totality of TDC schemes coming together at the same time, “I

see a fundamental, cultural and social revolution taking place in this area”.123 Thus

Gibson and the TDC shared similar aims and also shared similar methods in achieving

them - utilising the capitalist climate of the day.

Simon Evans confirmed that the possibility of Middlesbrough moving stadium

occurred initially through conversations between Gibson and Duncan Hall.124 The

opportunity arose through the TDC’s remit of regenerating areas of urban and

industrial decay within the Teesside area. One of these areas was Middlehaven Dock

where the Riverside Stadium was to be built.125 The TDC policy concerning their

projects depended upon developers seeing opportunities that stemmed from what

Simon Evans describes as “positive expressions of demand”. The TDC’s task was to

seize these commercial opportunities for developers by providing infrastructure in the

form of roads. Middlehaven, however, was “fraught with difficulties for regeneration”

due to certain infrastructural problems and thus not as enticing for prospective

developers.

Firstly, the Docks were cut off from the A66, the major traffic outlet by the

railway line that dissected the area. The Dock area was on the north side, Cargo Fleet

on the south and it was intended to utilise both areas. Secondly, the land near the

Dock was contaminated because it had previously been used for chemical storage

tanks, and there was not much land around the Dock to be developed.126 The TDC

was looking for a private developer to act as a catalyst for the regeneration of

123 Financial Times, 21.3.89, p. 38 124 Interview with Simon Evans Chief Planning Officer of Teesside Development Corporation, 5.7.96 125 Middlehaven Docks closed in 1980 and efforts by the TDC to redevelop the 200 acre site had run into problems. Middlesbrough Council had had plans to redevelop the area but these were put into abeyance when the TDC was established. In 1989 it was announced British Urban Development (BUD) was to undertake plans to redevelop the area. However, BUD pulled out after failing to agree funding details with the TDC. BUD wanted a large input of public money before committing themselves, but a crucial part of TDC policy was for there to be a commitment from the private sector before large public funds could be released to initiate the project.

Page 37: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

37

Middlehaven and Cargo Fleet as a whole, and Middlesbrough Football Club was the

catalyst the TDC was seeking. The TDC was able to harness the use of the Dock area

by offering the football club an area of land where it could build a new stadium.

Within this scenario Middlesbrough Council played an overseeing, if minor

role. They and the Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority owned most of the land

relating to the project127 but the Council only agreed to sell their share of land after

approving the TDC’s proposals for the Dock redevelopment.128 It had been long

standing Middlesbrough Council policy to attempt “to reintegrate the Dock area” into

the town area. It was also convenient as the Council had no choice but to rubber-

stamp the TDC’s proposals as only they had the financial clout to pursue projects of

enormous cost.

The proposals for the overall project apart from Middlesbrough’s new stadium

were to be a recreational and retail complex to be built on an incremental basis. At

Middlehaven they included facilities for a permanent home for the Tall Ships, a

location of the Imperial War Museum’s exhibit of modern warfare, the building of

120 residential units and a hotel development, an exhibition centre describing

Teesside’s Technological Heritage. At Cargo Fleet there was to be a retail park

including a retail food store, club warehousing, a drive-in food facility, petrol and a

leisure (bingo) provision.129 The aim of the TDC having a football stadium within the

development was for it to act as a focus and a catalyst in attracting private sector

developers. They then would produce the high capital receipts from rental charges

that could release public sector funding to provide the infrastructure such as roads.130

126 See Appendix 3 127 Financial Times, 24.6.89, p. 4 128 Middlesbrough Borough Council Meeting, Minute 1028, 14.10.93. A leak to the Press concerning Middlesbrough moving to the Riverside occurred a few days later, 19.10.93. 129 See Appendix 4 130 Interview with Simon Evans

Page 38: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

38

The TDC were also involved in the remediation of the site as they placed a

contract to get rid of the contamination left behind by the chemical plant. They then

placed a capping layer over the whole site. The TDC contributed to the cost of driven

piles, pile caps, ground beams and drainage that was a part of the substructure. A

bridge, Shepherdson’s Way, was built to allow access for cars across the railway from

Cargo Fleet, and there are plans for a footbridge to replace a swing bridge over the

Dock itself.131 The final cost of the TDC’s total outlay has been estimated at £15

million; £6 million by 1995, with a further £9 million by 1998, and at no cost to the

club.132

In addition, the actual site of the Riverside Stadium is dependent on the

developer and demand-led nature of the TDC’s urban regeneration schemes. The

stadium is situated on the north side of the railway line on the former site of the

chemical storage plant. However, it is the south side of the railway track, Cargo Fleet,

that has been designated the prime commercial site by developers as it is nearest to

the A66, the major communication link around the Dock area.133 Thus, the north side

was deemed a “Brownfield site”,134 that needed utilising to enable the Middlehaven

scheme to proceed. With the football stadium in place the TDC was in a position to

attract offers from prospective developers who wanted sites on Cargo Fleet. The

football stadium was the focal point for Middlehaven’s rejuvenation for an

entrepreneurial and retail complex, but its situation was entirely determined by the

TDC’s ideology of attempting to reinvigorate derelict areas through a “market-led

131 Interview with Peter Dracup 132 Inglis, 1996, op. cit. p. 249 133 Interview with Simon Evans 134 An area of industrial degeneration

Page 39: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

39

culture”.135 In establishing high-profile projects the TDC felt it would stimulate

further private investment.

For all parties concerned Middlesbrough’s move was subject to “rational

locational factors for football stadia”,136 where everyone could see the benefits. Like

the majority of grounds Ayresome Park was a traditional city football stadium with a

single purpose facility, that being football. However, due to the buoyancy of local

conditions determined by the TDC’s agenda of urban regeneration the football club

was helped in its quest to find a suitable site for a new ground. In short,

Middlesbrough found a partner who would die for it in helping it to relocate. As we

have seen, the locational characteristics of Ayresome Park meant that it would be an

unsuitable site to meet the requirements of the Taylor Report. The outcome was to be

the Riverside Stadium located within a planned leisure complex containing a large

retail element and a variety of other leisure activities, plus massive car parking

provision. The stadium itself has 1250 car park spaces and the modernistic stadium

has become part of the “futurescape of fun”.137

An advantage of this type of development is that it is less of an economic risk

to owners of capital as the entrepreneurial risk is spread among all elements of the

development. Thus, the investment by the TDC into the Riverside Stadium was felt to

be economically viable. This is because high capital receipts would be received from

the private sector outlets who were attracted to Middlehaven because of the

construction of the stadium on the previously economically unattractive north site.

Middlesbrough Council policy was also fulfilled by Middlesbrough moving as it

eradicated the nuisances created on match days at Ayresome Park for local residents.

135 Financial Times (Survey on Teesside), 26.2.88, p. 2 136 Bale, 1993, op. cit. p. 46 137 ibid., p. 144

Page 40: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

40

The new site was “distanced from residences to allow negative externalities to be

neutralised”.138

Middlesbrough’s relocation has been fortuitous in comparison to attempts

made by other clubs such as Southampton and Brighton. Unquestionably the presence

of a powerful, red tape cutting body such as the TDC allowed the club to find a

suitable site. In addition, Middlesbrough were able to exploit the needs and trends

within football, most notably the requirements of the Taylor Report and the

commercial surge the game is currently experiencing as a result of the money from

BSkyB television.

Overall ,the trend of clubs wanting to relocate has exhibited a decline in the

1990’s. A Royal Town Planning Institute survey in 1990 found 42 League clubs

considered moving or to have moved; by 1991 the figure was 34; by August 1994 just

6 English and Scottish clubs were in new stadiums. It is predicted there will be 15

new venues in Britain by 2000 and only Middlesbrough and Sunderland are likely to

be of international standard.139 Problems have arisen over clubs wanting to relocate to

green belt areas. This has prompted opposition from local authorities and local

residents through the NIMBY effect.140 Middlesbrough’s relocation is only part of a

trickle as many clubs have decided to refurbish stadia rather than relocate. Therefore,

Middlesbrough have become a “lead club in the post-Hillsborough transformation”.141

138 ibid., p. 146 139 Williams, 1994, op. cit. p. 17 140 ‘Not In My Back Yard’ 141 Williams, 1994, op. cit. p. 17

Page 41: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

41

APPENDIX 1 Map of Central Middlesbrough (Source: St. Michael AA Road Atlas of Britain, Norwich, AA, 1984) Ayresome Park is to the south of Middlesbrough town centre and to the left of Albert Park (Reference: B1). Due to the age of the atlas a number of changes are not shown The A66 now extends around the northern perimeter of the town centre extending eastwards in the direction of Cargo Fleet Road. The engineering works at Middlehaven have disappeared altogether.

Page 42: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

42

APPENDIX 2 Picture of Ayresome Park and surrounding area. (Source: Evening Gazette (Farewell, Ayresome: Hello Premiership), 8.5.95, p. 46) The North Stand is on the right with the Sports Hall, (white roof ) behind to the left and the Primary School to the right. The Holgate is the far end, and behind it is Middlesbrough General Hospital. Overall, Ayresome Park is ‘locked into’ its environment.

Page 43: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

43

APPENDIX 3 Picture of Middlehaven Dock circa 1980-90. The white chemical storage tanks at the bottom is the site of the Riverside Stadium, note the close proximity to the town centre, despite being cut off by the railway line and the A66 (centre right).

Page 44: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

44

APPENDIX 4 Plan of Middlesbrough Dock Redevelopment Scheme (Source: Teesside Development Corporation) The Riverside Stadium is on the north side of the redevelopment area, Cargo Fleet is on the south. They are separated by the railway line, except for the road bridge, Shepherdson’s Way. The A66 runs along the southern perimeter of the area.

Page 45: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

45

Chapter 5

Who wants to go to a ‘dehumanised landscape’? We do!

“Sentiment aside, Ayresome Park ... is now a crumbling relic of a bygone era and the time is right to look for a new home however hard a wrench it may be”.142

“The Middlesbrough Dock super stadium is something we can all get extremely excited

about. It really will take the club forward into a new age and give us, the supporters, something to be proud of”.143

When a club moves stadium the possibility of a conflict between opposing

forces arises. John Bale has suggested that the future of British football will be an

outcome of “contested scenarios between the forces of mass cultural conservatism

who wish to see football in its long-cherished locations and advocates of modernist

football in peri-urban leisure complexes”.144 The extent to which this perspective is

correct is questionable with regard to the Middlesbrough example and its importance

in British footballs’ future. There was a real possibility that certain sections of the

Boro fans would have raised objections to the club’s relocation. This stems from the

belief that football teams and stadia are incontrovertibly linked in forming the club’s

identity.145 Fans identify with a sense of permanency that the ground creates. But,

perhaps surprisingly in the case of Middlesbrough, there was no active opposition to

the move from fans at a political level and minimal opposition on the ground. The

reasons behind this are complex especially when account is taken of the strength of

affection some fans hold for their team’s ground.

142 The Northern Echo (Sport) 30.10.93, p. 2 143 Fly Me To The Moon, 3.1.94, p. 2 144 Bale, 1993, op. cit. p. 7 145 ibid., p. 87

Page 46: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

46

Bale describes this as ‘Topophilia’146 which means a person’s affective ties

with a material environment and in football the sentiment that fans attach to their

club’s ground. Certain areas of the ground become sacred spaces for different groups

of fans. This was the case with the terraced Holgate End for some Middlesbrough

fans. It was able to foster a collective unity amongst Holgate Enders and enhance their

quality of life. Other fans who stood or sat elsewhere in the ground would also have

had feelings of attachment towards Ayresome Park whether weak, vague or strong.

Although Ayresome Park may have appeared ‘placeless’ to others, to Boro fans its

interior may be “closely differentiated into places of personalisation of particular

areas”.147 Football establishes rituals and symbols that relate to people, places and

procedures. Ayresome Park developed a character that transcended the behaviour of

fans outside the ground. It came to represent a symbolism and possessed an “authentic

sense of place”. Thus the fans felt they ‘belonged’ there as a member of a community

in a manner that exhibited religious overtones.148

However, the depth of ‘topophilic sentiment’ that was attached to Ayresome

Park is problematic. The initial reaction amongst fans on the proposed ground move

was mixed. Some fans did express what may be called topophilic sentiments when

declaring their reluctance to leave. One fan, Ray Trowsdale, declared “I loved

Ayresome Park, it was my second home”,149 supporting Bale’s suggestion that fans

possess bonds with stadiums that can be likened to ties with home. Other fans stated

they did not like the idea of change and were happy where they were - a case of

familiarity breeding affection rather than contempt.150 Another fan Pete Hodgson

146 ibid., p. 64 147 ibid., p. 69, Relph 148 ibid., p. 71 149 Middlesbrough Internet Mailing List, 30.4.96 150 Bale, 1993, op. cit. p. 69, Tuan

Page 47: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

47

remarked that he enjoyed walking to a game down the cobbled streets that surrounded

Ayresome Park.151

This sentimentality and nostalgia was engendered by its tradition and history.

FMTTM editor Rob Nichols initial reaction was against moving as he said he “liked

the history ... I didn’t even want to change the North Stand!”. Some felt Ayresome

Park could have been redeveloped in the way other grounds had been, and some fans

even today are stern ‘traditionalists’. One “die hard Holgate Ender” still wants to

move back to Ayresome Park. However, the extent of this feeling was very isolated

compared to a general feeling favourable to change. There was only one contribution

to the fanzine, by Bob Fischer, that spoke against the move. His views were eagerly

sought by local television because he was one of the few who openly dissented over

relocating to the Riverside Stadium. The mood of the fans was summed up by a straw

poll that was conducted by the Evening Gazette on the day the relocation was

declared. Middlesbrough was playing Brescia at Ayresome Park in the Anglo-Italian

Cup on a cold December night, reflected in the attendance of 1633, a game fit for die-

hards. Even then it was reported more than 75% of those fans responded favourably to

the move.152

Bale suggests that topophilic sentiment can be converted into activism when a

club decides to move but, this type of affection was not strong enough to prevent

Middlesbrough’s relocation occurring. One area that challenges the concept of

topophilia is that Middlesbrough fans may not have actually liked the stadium. Rob

Nichols commented that he,

“... always noticed in groups of people talking that it was more young people who were nostalgic for the ground than old people ... There’s the idea that people equated Ayresome Park with failure and disappointments, and I think that was a big factor in the

151 Middlesbrough Internet Mailing List, 30.4.96 152 Evening Gazette, 23.12.93. pp 10-11

Page 48: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

48

new stadium. I found older people especially wanted to rip down Ayresome Park because they’d had tens of years of standing having a miserable time. There was a real feeling of that. This (the Riverside) was a new beginning”.

The conventional view was that the older section of the fan base would dislike the

idea of moving grounds more than younger fans. It suggests that football fans on

Teesside may put success above tradition.

It was a common belief that Middlesbrough and Ayresome Park were

associated with bad luck. Peter Warren of Teesside FSA estimated 95% of his

members were right behind the move on the basis of newsletters and meetings, and

one of the reasons was that Ayresome Park was never a lucky ground. George

Hardwick said “Boro were an unlucky club”, and Wilf Mannion has given the Gypsy

Curse as a reason for Boro’s lack of honours, and both of these famous players

welcomed the idea of a fresh start.153 Rob Nichols continued to point out that, “People

were so optimistic.. The idea of a new beginning got fans starting to watch them

(Middlesbrough) again who wouldn’t have watched them for years because there’s

this perception that this is something different now”.

Furthermore, fans were not ignorant of the decaying condition of Ayresome

Park, and that it required constant work to maintain its Safety Certificate. Its last

major work cost £250,000 to prevent further corrosion in the North Stand’s steel

columns.154 Nor were they unaware of the changes that football was undergoing

arising initially from clubs’ need to fulfil the requirements of the Taylor Report. This

applied particularly to Newcastle who at the time were beginning to redevelop St.

James’ Park, and Middlesbrough fans were mindful of these developments through

the local media. A reoccurring theme amongst Boro fans when questioned about their

attitude to the prospect of moving was that ‘They had to move with the times’. They

153 Evening Gazette (Farewell Ayresome: Hello Premiership), 8.5.95, p. 4 154 Paylor et al, 1995, op. cit. p. 182

Page 49: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

49

distinguished between dilapidated and antiquated Ayresome Park and the rise of new

modern stadia being built elsewhere. In general, the fans felt the only sensible,

rational way forward was to relocate. One fan expressed the view that the club could

not go on living in the past and must move forward and Pete Hodgson, again summed

up the general feeling about Ayresome Park, “We needed to move into the future.

Ayresome Park was rooted in pre-history”.155

At the time of announcing they were going to move there was also an

“apathy” amongst some sections of the fans because of the club’s position in the

League. They were struggling in Division One at the time and getting very poor

crowds. This contributed to a muted reaction overall. Many fans had noticed the

problems Sunderland had encountered in trying to build a new stadium near the

Nissan factory on the A19. When they knew of Middlesbrough’s new plans a cynical

reaction was, ‘What do we need this for’, ‘How are we going to fill it with the crowds

we’re getting’.156

The club attempted to counter any opposition that may have surfaced with a

carefully constructed public relations strategy. This began before the club, in

conjunction with the TDC, officially announced it was to relocate to Middlehaven

with a deliberate leak to the local press on 19 October 1993. The obvious reason for

this was to minimise any knee jerk reaction when the official announcement came. It

also dampened the speculation that had been circulating on Teesside months

beforehand.157 When the official announcement did come it was just before

Christmas, 22 December, a time when people would have had the festive period very

much at the forefront of their minds. Thus, any large-scale criticism directed towards

the club would have been deflected.

155 Middlesbrough Internet Mailing List, 30.4.96

Page 50: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

50

The PR exercise included repeated references to the actual location. To allay

fan apprehension emphasis was placed on how close it was to the town centre. Fiona

Blackwell, a spokesperson for the TDC emphasised this saying, “The fact the site is

so close to the town centre will have big spin-off effects. Its almost an extension of

the town centre ... It won’t be an isolated site because it will be closely linked to the

town centre”.158 People were unsure on how they were to get to the ground because,

despite this proximity to the town centre, the stadium was to be situated in an area that

for many years was inaccessible and virtually out of bounds to the vast majority of

Middlesbrough people. The Dock area of Middlesbrough was circulated by a wall,

and this meant most people were unable to walk around the Docks.159 People had a

map of the area in their minds in which the Docks were forgotten. In addition, there

was the physical and mental barrier of ‘Over The Border’. Over the Border relates to

‘Old’ Middlesbrough and the area known as St. Hildas. It gained a reputation for

being a run down Red Light district. The railway line constitutes a physical and

mental barrier, with anywhere north of it Over The Border, and Middlehaven was to

the north. It was surrounded by industry, but because of the eighties’ recession the

area became vacant land without the general Middlesbrough public realising its

proximity to the town centre.160

When the new stadium’s construction was underway the club opened a

visitors' centre on the site. Its main purpose was to display a 3D computer model of

the stadium to allow fans to view it and appraise the view from the different stands.161

However, it also meant an opportunity for fans to drive to the site and they then

156 Interview with Peter Warren. Crowds at the time had dropped as low as 6000 157 The Northern Echo, 19.10.93, p. 1 158 The Northern Echo (New Teesside Edition), 11.5.95, p. 1 159 See Chapter 4, Appendix 3. The Dock wall ends near the Dock Clock (centre right).The A66 and railway line cut the Dock area from the town centre (centre left). 160 See Chapter 4, Appendix 1

Page 51: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

51

realised it was not the distant out of town location some feared and that one could still

see the town centre from the stadium. Stadium Manager Terry Tasker described it as

“... the best thing we ever did. On a weekend we were getting 20,000 people through

there in a day ... It helped ease worries and people were able to see what they were

getting”. The club had attempted to allay the fears of the fans through this initiative

and by releasing press statements that stressed the site’s purpose, where it was and the

significance it was to have for the club and Middlesbrough as a whole.

The club had wanted to have a new stadium within the Middlesbrough area,

“because Middlesbrough’s predominant number of fans come from the

Middlesbrough area and (they) didn’t want to lose their identity”.162 This confirms

Bale’s belief that topophilia is most likely to be retained if relocation occurs over the

shortest possible distance from the previous stadium,163 a fact certainly true of

Middlesbrough.

Again, from the outset Gibson incorporated supporters' groups into the

stadium construction process. He gave an audience to the Teesside FSA the day

before proclaiming Middlesbrough was going to move. He told them that he was

going to announce that the football club was to relocate the next day, showed them the

plans and explained the rationale behind it.164 Moreover, in the New Year (1994),

Gibson told the FSA of his plans to form a working group on the stadium and his

intention to include supporters' representatives. The FSA’s reaction was positive,

indeed fully supporting the idea and believing they could make a contribution. The

161 Financial Times, 17.2.95, p. 14 162 Interview with Terry Tasker 163 Bale, 1993, op. cit. p. 149 164 Interview with Peter Warren

Page 52: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

52

aim was that the Stadium Project Group, as it became known, would visit other stadia

and incorporate the best ideas from these into Middlesbrough’s new ground.165

However, it did not work out quite as it was meant to do. The Group originally

met once a month but it became less frequent towards the end of the stadium’s

construction. It later became more of a talking shop rather than a deciding shop as far

as the supporters were concerned. All decisions were actually made by the club in

conjunction with the contractors, which meant that the fans were being informed

about what was happening rather being actively involved in the planning and

decision-making process.166 Eventually a representative from the FSA and a

representative of the Middlesbrough Supporters Club were given a progress report at a

monthly meeting and told about the next stage. There was disappointment at the

reduction of input by the supporters, but overall the FSA was content that they had

been kept up to date with what was happening.167 This possibly stems from the fact

that Gibson had approached them in the first place and considering the frosty relations

fan groups sometimes experience with football club boards Gibson’s move can be

seen as progressive in this context. It can also be seen as astute because he was setting

the agenda not the fans, and by providing the fans with a voice, albeit a minimal one,

throughout the construction process it did not leave the club open to the criticism that

fans views were being neglected.

Despite the political manoeuvres of the club in all probability their effect on fan

opposition to the move to Middlehaven was probably slight. The team at the time was

not performing well and induced an apathy amongst the general fan base causing

165 ibid. 166 Middlesbrough actually had a dispute with the original contractors Tilbury Douglas, who pulled out of the project in October 1994. Tilbury Douglas used the Miller Partnership as architects and Thorburn Colqhoun as engineers. Taylor Woodrow Northern Construction Ltd. were the new contractors and they took on the original design, starting work on 7 November 1994. The stadium was designed by Duncan McLean, the project architect of the Miller Partnership.

Page 53: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

53

attendances to drop. This combined with the growing realisation that Ayresome Park

was a decaying stadium and would have been difficult to bring up to Taylor Report

requirements. Moreover, topophilic sentiment among the fans was mixed. The club

was able to deliver “the new beginning” that some sections wanted and this was

accepted by the vast majority because they felt they ‘had to move with the times’.

167Interview with Peter Warren

Page 54: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

54

Chapter 6

The Emasculation of Football

“Its in there all the time”168 “You don’t stand up in the pictures”169

The lack of organised opposition to Middlesbrough’s move from Ayresome

Park was because people did not hold enough affection for it and was an important

contribution to the relocation proceeding virtually uncontested. There was also the

realisation that ‘Taylor’ had to be implemented. It meant fans knew if a new stadium

was to be built it may as well be built to the standards they wanted. The Stadium

Group, prompted by supporters’ representatives recommended changes that increased

the comfort of fans, with both the width and leg room of the seats increased. It is

within this area of fans’ changing perceptions of stadia where evidence of Bale’s

contested scenarios between the modernising, commercialising forces of football and

the ‘traditional’ fan materialises. These modernising forces were represented in ‘The

Blueprint for the Future of Football’ that was published by the FA in 1991. The

results of research undertaken in this report are reflected in the progress of

Middlesbrough’s relocation. However, it has created a culture clash for elements of

the Boro fandom. This is due to the institution of the club’s new policy and ethos as it

attempts to exploit the consumption and social patterns portrayed in the ‘Blueprint’.

The primary feature uncovered by the Blueprint’s research was that average

spending power would keep on increasing into the future. A consequence of this

would be an increase in the competition that football would face as a leisure pursuit.

168 Hornby, 1992, op. cit. p. 1 169 Interview with Terry Tasker

Page 55: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

55

Consumers would become more affluent and accordingly raise their expectations

about the range of services and quality provided. With reference to football grounds,

such as Ayresome Park, these areas had to change; the consumer was willing to pay

for satisfying leisure experiences “but not unless the standards of the ‘total offer’

match the standards to which they are becoming accustomed in other areas of their

life”.170

In addition, structural changes in the nature of UK society would continue,

with an ongoing “middle-classification” of society as employment patterns accelerate

towards the service industries. The Blueprint’s forecast suggested that the 1990’s

would not see an end to the growing disparity between rich and poor and “the mass

dynamic will be toward a more affluent consumer possessing more ... ‘middle class’

aspirations and values”.171 It was predicted that this fragmentation of circumstances

combined with the changing patterns of affluence would mean any leisure activity

will have great difficulty in becoming a true mass market. Thus, football had to decide

which consumer segment it was to target. The recommendation was that it followed

other leisure sectors and moved upmarket “so as to follow the affluent ‘middle class’

consumer in his or her pursuits and aspirations”.172 It was noted that this should be

particularly taken into account for the stadia design of the future.

In addition, football was to be affected by the growth of leisure spending and

the expansion of leisure opportunities. The growth of the leisure economy has meant

the “average consumer will be increasingly empowered to indulge in his or her leisure

preferences”.173 Thus, football would have to face up to this expansion of leisure

activities that would continue throughout the 1990’s. Competition would come from

170 Football Association, The Blueprint for the Future of Football, London, Football Association, 1991 171 ibid., p. 8 172 ibid., p. 9 173 ibid.

Page 56: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

56

the emergence of the home as a leisure centre. The reason for this is that technology

has “served to provide in-home ‘varieties’ of a range of out-of-home leisure

activities”,174 such as the video replacing the cinema. It was felt that this would be a

danger to football as a spectator sport. In order to counter this threat it was

recommended football should formulate out-of-home attractions in the form of

“integrated leisure experiences”. The central aim is that the motivation for consumers

coming to the stadia would derive from the fact that the experience is not routinely

reproducible at home. Leisure venues such as football stadia would also have to take

into account the presence of children, as the number of young families is growing

significantly. Football is an activity that relies on the progression of children playing

the game and carrying their enthusiasm forward into adult life as spectators. Football

should aim to capture “the youthful imagination”.175

Middlesbrough Football Club, from the outset of its relocation endeavoured to

follow the Blueprint’s recommendations. New facilities were incorporated into the

new stadium due to the new club policy aimed at attracting a different clientele. Terry

Tasker outlined the effect of the club’s policy in attempting to entice a new audience

when he said, “The new facilities have attracted a different kind of clientele. Its

captured the imagination of families; its safe; its attractive; its pleasant; good

facilities. And it’s a pleasant experience coming to the Cellnet”.

The facilities referred inducing this “pleasant experience” included the design

of the stadium itself. The most obvious feature of the Riverside is that it is an all-

seater stadium. At Ayresome Park terraces still existed until its closure, in particular

the Holgate End. One aspect of the design is that everyone is able to see all of the

pitch . This emanates from the recommendations outlined in The Green Report that

174 ibid., p. 11

Page 57: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

57

gave specific angles for the rake of new stands to allow them to be unobstructive.176

On the Ayresome Park terraces this was virtually impossible due to the shallow rake

and the possibility of a tall person standing in front of you. New standards of leg and

shoulder room, also from The Green Report were met at the Riverside. The fans, from

their involvement with the Stadium Project Group, had wanted these

recommendations to be included to increase their comfort during the game.177

Teesside’s occasionally severe climate was also taken into account when the

stadium was designed. All parts of the ground have a roof and the horseshoe design

evolved because of the bitingly cold North Easterly winds that come in off the North

Sea.178 In the original design there was to be four stands with the corners filled in at a

later date but with the cold winds the fans were concerned this would have caused

discomfort. Ayresome Park did have roofs on four parts of the ground but the corners

were exposed to the elements. In addition, the Riverside Stadium contains a concourse

that runs inside the perimeter of the horseshoe accommodating all the stadium’s

amenities. At both ends of Ayresome Park, the East End and Holgate, the toilets were

outside. More often than not they would not be used as the back wall of the Holgate

End was just as convenient for male fans to relieve themselves of the results of their

pre-match visit to the pub. On other famous terrace ends such as the Kop at Anfield

fans were unable to get to the toilets and these places had a heavy urine stench.

Other amenities on offer at the Riverside are refreshment bars that serve fast-

food type snacks such as Hamburgers and alcohol bars and places to put food and

drink, along with betting booths and television screens showing previous Boro

175 ibid., p. 12. In this respect Middlesbrough’s mascot Roary the Lion has proved a great success. Apparently it gets more mail than Bryan Robson, and the club offers Roary Children’s’ Parties. 176 Interview with Peter Dracup. The Green Report was a result of the Taylor Inquiry and it set minimum standards such as leg room for the design of grounds. 177 Interview with Terry Tasker 178 See Appendix 1

Page 58: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

58

matches, all undercover.179 Ayresome Park offered the archetypal pie and cup of

Bovril as its refreshments, and behind the goals there were only a couple of places

where they could be bought, both outside. The Riverside Stadium also provides 1250

car parking spaces whereas before a game at Ayresome Park cars would attempt to

find a space amongst the gridiron pattern of cobbled streets in its vicinity.

All these facilities were aimed at attracting the new clientele that the FA’s

Blueprint had recommended. As we have seen this clientele was supposed to be

composed of people who possessed middle-class aspirations and therefore demanded

a corresponding increase in the quality and services that football could offer. The

Riverside Stadium had been designed to cater for these demands whereas Ayresome

Park was unable to.

The actual effect on the social matrix of Middlesbrough’s fan base compared

to what it was at Ayresome Park is problematic. As there is no hard evidence on the

subject currently available it has produced differing opinions.180 Eric Paylor

estimated that out of the 26,500 people who held season tickets less than 10,000 were

going to Ayresome Park 3 or 4 years ago.181 Peter Warren is unable to produce figures

but believes, “Its just a feeling ... The impression that most people have is most of the

new fans tend to be people that in the past haven’t gone to football at all ...”.

However, the issue is open to debate due to the subjective question of ‘What

constitutes a fan?’. For example, some of these so-called new fans may be people who

stopped going to see Middlesbrough play at Ayresome Park years ago. This may have

been because of the threat of hooliganism at Ayresome Park and the new stadium

gave the perception of a safer environment. Some people may have always supported

179 See Appendix 2 180 The Sir Norman Chester Centre for Football Research at Leicester University did undertake research on this subject but its published results were unavailable for this thesis. 181 Interview with Eric Paylor

Page 59: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

59

Middlesbrough without actually attending games through a sense of local pride and

followed the team’s results through the media. One mother who was a season ticket

holder at the Riverside stressed she would never go to Ayresome Park or let her

children attend either due to its poor image. She believed her family and herself

would be safe at the Riverside.182

Other fans were perhaps waiting for the opportunity of a “new beginning”

given by the Riverside Stadium after watching years of failure at Ayresome Park. In

addition, there may have been fans at Ayresome Park who also held middle-class

aspirations - perhaps the ‘silent majority’. Therefore, the concept of the traditional fan

is a vague one as it usually refers to male fans who stand on the terraces. Ayresome

Park was not an all-terraced stadium and since 1966 had a high proportion of seats,

and other fans who may have sat at Ayresome Park are perhaps equally as committed

in their support .

Inside the Riverside Stadium however, there is evidence that Bale’s

prescription for a contested scenario between the forces of mass cultural

conservatism, represented by ‘traditional’ fans and the advocates of modernisation

within football is being played out amongst the fans themselves, despite

Middlesbrough’s relocation. Firstly, there has been a dissipation of fans who

spectated from a specific area of Ayresome Park to all parts of the Riverside Stadium.

Fans who previously congregated behind the goal at the Holgate End now have to sit

and a proportion of these fans have taken up seats in the North Stand of the Riverside.

This has been described as the new Holgate and fans have attempted to transfer their

traditional supporting behaviour there. Other fans who stood at Ayresome Park have

moved to other parts of the Riverside Stadium. In terms of singing there are “pockets

182 Interview conducted outside Riverside Stadium, 5.4.96

Page 60: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

60

of intensity” all around the ground.183 Thus, the standing ‘hard core’ fans from

Ayresome Park have now mixed with ‘new’ fans or fans who sat at the old ground. At

Ayresome Park different sections became part of a ‘territorialisation’ process whereby

each section had its own specific culture and social matrix, but at the Riverside an

homogenisation process has taken place creating a culture clash.

Problems have arisen as some fans have objected to some of the behaviour of

hard core fans from Ayresome Park sitting next to them or within their vicinity. This

may take the form of shouting, swearing or standing up during the game. Subsequent

events have shown that this behaviour has been clamped down on by stewards who

have been instructed by the club to do so. This was justified by Terry Tasker as he

stressed that the club was attempting to reverse football’s previous masculine culture

by incorporating more women and children into the club’ fan base.184 To achieve this

aim, stewards were instructed to ‘manage’ crowds in a manner that contributed

towards the enjoyment of the projected new fan base as opposed to the hard core

element that represented football’s traditional masculine image.

The Teesside FSA had predicted that this would be a problem. They had

suggested to the club that certain sections of the ground be colour-coded, allowing

certain groups of fans to congregate in an area with others whose culture they could

sympathise with. For example, hard core, Holgate Enders would have been in a Red

section, deemed the ‘singing section’; the ‘moaners’ would form another section; and

the family section another.185 However, the club claimed it raised serious safety

issues. They had investigated the use of colour-coding on the Kop at Liverpool but

felt it caused too many problems.186

183 Interview with Peter Warren 184 See transcript of extract of interview with Terry Tasker, Appendix 3 185 Interview with Peter Warren 186 Interview with Terry Tasker

Page 61: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

61

The rejection of this compromise by the club signifies an attempt to break

completely from the cultural roots established at Ayresome Park. Instead they have

been replaced at the Riverside by ‘green shoots’ of modernisation. Terry Tasker

rejected the idea that fans who stood up during games did so from the excitement

generated by the football and not through an act of selfishness. Instead he described

football as “entertainment”, and the football experience was compared to watching

television or going to the cinema, there was no need to stand up there. He added that

by curtailing behaviour that was associated with Ayresome Park, the club was able to

cater for a wider audience, or more specifically one that had higher consumer

spending power than the old Ayresome Park fan base. This scenario was further

cemented when the club sold out its season ticket allocation. Areas previously

designated as family enclosures were opened up to fans in general. It meant the

stadium had been completely homogenised and could be classed as one whole family

enclosure as there could now be no distinction to the stewarding approach in different

sections of the stadium.

A ramification of the club’s endeavours to exploit middle-class aspirations has

been its effect on the ‘atmosphere’. The general consensus has been that it’s very

good and better than at Ayresome Park. This has to be qualified with the fact that

virtually every game at the Riverside has been sold out. The debate has arisen when

games have not been sold out, and ‘atmosphere’ has been more difficult to generate.

This has transpired because the change to an all-seater stadium has increased the size

of the stadium and subsequently the atmosphere has changed from a standing to a

seated atmosphere. Thus, there have been comments that a half-full Ayresome Park

generated a better atmosphere than a half-full Riverside. What constitutes an

‘atmosphere’ is highly subjective, but if the previous statement is correct than the

Page 62: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

62

perceived new fan base at the Riverside, in conjunction with the club’s strategy to

make all fans in a certain image has contributed towards this phenomenon.

Furthermore, the club has attempted to appeal to a younger audience with the

introduction of American-style efforts to create an atmosphere. When Middlesbrough

score a goal the words of Queen’s “Another One Bites the Dust” are played.

Apparently, the manager Bryan Robson was keen on this development. He has been

quoted as being in favour of attracting families to football through American

marketing methods, “We are coming round to taking our sports the way the

Americans take theirs. You see stadiums full of kids with their mums and dads and

you don’t fear for their safety”.187 This approach has created a difference in response

between supporters as some like it, others don’t. Traditional fans dislike it because

when a goal is scored the spontaneity of the fans’ reaction creates a celebration itself

and no artificial additive is required. Alternatively, other fans enjoy this form of

celebration and sing along to the lyrics. These could be identified as the new fans but

it ignores the possibility that fans from Ayresome Park may also enjoy it.

In addition, in the opinion of some traditional fans the club committed a

further act of sacrilege. When the teams ran out at Ayresome Park it was to the strains

of “The Power Game”; at the Riverside it has been replaced by Thin Lizzy’s “The

Boys are Back in Town”. Many fans looked forward to The Power Game as it

represented a familiarity and affection for Ayresome Park. The club though says it

represents the failure associated with Ayresome Park and the new song is in keeping

with the new beginning the club has undertaken by relocating to the Riverside.188

Thus, regarding Bale’s future contested scenarios the modernising forces are

in the ascendancy. They have faced some opposition from traditional fans but this has

187 The Big Issue North East, 9.2.96, p. 21

Page 63: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

63

been easily overcome as Middlesbrough have wilfully marketed the club in an attempt

to exploit society’s increasing ‘middle classification’. The tendencies of economic

rationalism have supplanted a compulsion for affection amongst fans as

Middlesbrough’s new commercially-oriented ethos has overridden the attitudes and

cultures of traditional fans. This confrontation has been most evident at

Middlesbrough due to its relocation, but it has also taken place at other clubs such as

Newcastle United and Manchester United. These clubs have also attempted to

implement recommendations from the Blueprint for Football to attract a more middle-

class fan base. Culture clashes have occurred here between fans and manifested itself

in stewards taking action in keeping with that club’s new marketing policy.

In football as a whole the extent of the penetration of economic rationalising

forces into the culture of traditional fans varies within the stadium. This intrusion is

greatest at Middlesbrough because a new stadium has meant that cultures have not

developed in the manner that territorialisation occurred at Ayresome Park. Other

clubs, such as Aston Villa, Liverpool and Everton, have redeveloped their grounds so

sections such as the ends will resist this penetration greater because fans who stood in

the ends are more likely to sit in them and therefore carry traditional fan behavioural

cultures with them.

Moreover, all-seater stadiums have witnessed an increase in “panopticism”189

because surveillance has been made easier allied to the use of Closed Circuit

Television (CCTV).190 Terry Tasker outlined this development, “There’s no

anonymity in an all-seater crowd, everybody is in an individual seat”. This has

resulted in violence in football grounds being virtually eradicated, but CCTV is also

used to identify fans whose behaviour is considered anti-social or what the club

188 Interview with Rob Nichols

Page 64: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

64

considers to not be appropriate to its idea how a fan should behave. In

Middlesbrough’s case this can refer to traditional fans who stand up at the prospect of

a goal, but in their excitement block the view of new fans unable to comprehend why

this is necessary.

The Riverside Stadium has profoundly illustrated modernising processes

within football and its ramifications for supporters. Football has utilised the current

economic climate and its rationalistic tendencies to attract a ‘new’ type of football

supporter. The definition however, of this new fan as well as that for a traditional fan

has been used very loosely. There will have been overlapping by fans in each

category in terms of their social background and the extent to which they support

Middlesbrough, and also the extent of this overlapping is unclear. If one clear

conclusion could be made it is that people from a low income bracket who never

supported the Boro when they played at Ayresome Park probably do not attend games

at the Riverside Stadium. Culture clashes have arisen amongst fans within the new

ground as the club aims to sanitise crowds by preventing what it deems ‘unacceptable

behaviour’. But beneath this veneer their motive is to portray an image of the club that

will be attractive to potential fans and sponsors. The image of a freezing cold

Ayresome Park overflowing with testosterone has been consigned to history.

189 Bale, 1993, op. cit. p. 27 190 Middlesbrough have 21 CCTV cameras. See Appendix 2

Page 65: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

65

APPENDIX 1 Sketch of Riverside Stadium - looking towards the north east corner of the ground. (Source: Teesside Tomorrow Ltd Annual Report, 1994, p. 2) The West Stand is on the left hand side isolated from the horseshoe by the vacant south west and north west (out of view) corners.

Page 66: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

66

APPENDIX 2 Cellnet Riverside Stadium Information (Source: Middlesbrough Football Club, July 1996) CAPACITY 30,304 PITCH DIMENSIONS 105m x 68m CAR PARKING 1250 spaces FIRST AID STATIONS West Stand

East Stand

FLOODLIGHTING On front East/West stand roofs CCTV 21 Cameras SEATING DECK ANGLES West Lower Deck (Degrees) 17 and 20 West Upper Deck 28 and 30 Horseshoe 22 and 28 HEIGHT OF WEST STAND Top of Mast 29m Front of Roof 22m To highest seat 17m HEIGHT OF HORSESHOE Top of Mast 23m Front of Roof 18m To highest seat 12m EAST STAND (INC. CORNERS) Capacity 11,000 No. of turnstiles 22 No. of refreshment bars 6 No. of betting kiosks 3 No. of ticket office pay points 10 Disabled Access Yes Low Level Positions 40 High Level Positions 24 Lift Provision Yes SOUTH STAND Capacity 4,900 No. of turnstiles 10 No. of refreshment bars 3 No. of betting kiosks 1 No. of ticket office pay points 4 Disabled Access Yes Low Level Positions 20 High Level Positions 28 Lift Provision Yes NORTH STAND Capacity 5,300 No. of turnstiles 10 No. of refreshment bars 3 No. of betting kiosks 1 No. of ticket office pay points 4 Disabled Access Yes Low Level Positions 20

Page 67: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

67

High Level Positions None Lift Provision No WEST STAND Capacity 8,800 No. of turnstiles 16 No. of refreshment bars 8 No. of betting kiosks 4 No. of ticket office pay points 5 Disabled Access Yes Low Level Positions 40 High Level Positions 12 Lift Provision Yes WEST STAND ACCOMMODATION Players changing Club Accommodation Club Shop Lottery Office Restaurant Executive Lounges 19 Hospitality boxes Boardroom Directors box Press Lounge - commentary TV Gantry

Page 68: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

68

APPENDIX 3 Extract of interview with Terry Tasker, 17.7.96 Neil Carter: What about fans who stand up? Personally I’m one of the fans who is up and down when the ball is near the penalty area. Is there a different way you steward that type of behaviour? Terry Tasker: There’s no need to stand up. For a start you can see all the activity from the seat. As far as we’re concerned it is a learning process. You’re never going to eradicate it, but you hope that in time people will realise that if you sit down you can still enjoy the excitement and the experience and the thrill without standing-up. Because every time you stand up it means everyone else has got to stand up. Its ... educational, the transition, and in time people will learn not to stand up unless its really something outrageous. NC: But ... its a natural reaction in a lot of respects, you just naturally want to stand up. TT: You don’t stand up when you watch the telly ... You don’t stand up in the pictures. NC: No, but football is different. TT: No its not. Its no different at all ... Its entertainment. No matter what you do at the pictures ... you wouldn’t dream of standing up would you? NC: No, but its the way that the football culture is different. TT: But it needn’t be, shouldn’t be. It’s an excuse. NC: No, but its a natural reaction. TT: It might be natural, it’s also unacceptable to some extent when everybody else around you has paid money to sit down and they want to see and then you get the people who stand up. Really its just thoughtlessness. If everybody sat down you could still enjoy it, in fact, you would probably enjoy it more because you wouldn’t be antagonising people around you. It only happens in certain areas, it doesn’t happen all over the stadium. NC: I think this raises the issues, although I think it goes a bit further than that, how football is changing from what it used to be a traditional, masculine dominated sport? TT: Thank God. There’s some research done at De Montfort University they’ve got a football department there. I’ve been to seminars there. One of the most important aspects of the football industry that had to change in their view and I agree with them, is that it had to lose its male domination. If it was going to survive even, because at one stage football was tearing itself apart through hooligans. They felt and found, and identified and stated that the introduction of women and families had a calming influence on the way football supporters behaved, and for football to survive it had to attract a family audience. NC: But if you jump up and down it doesn’t mean you’re a hooligan does it? TT: I’m not saying it does but all I’m saying is to survive as a spectator sport you’ve got to cater for a wider audience, you’ve got to become attractive to a wider audience and people have got to be tolerant and not intolerant. You’ve got to behave in a way that others will accept and appreciate that everybody has a right to see the match.

Page 69: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

69

Chapter 7

Financing the Riverside Revolution

“As a matter of commerce, ten young recruits at £100 apiece might have paid better, and as a matter of sport, the Second Division would be more honourable than retention of place by purchase”191 “There’s No Turning Back!”192

The construction of the Riverside Stadium fulfilled a number of the club’s

objectives. It satisfied the requirements of the Taylor Report, and provided

Middlesbrough and the surrounding area with a landmark. It also provided

Middlesbrough with a platform to challenge the elite Premier League clubs. Another

important phase in the club’s development was to appoint a high-profile manager.

Gibson persuaded former England captain Bryan Robson that Middlesbrough had

major ambitions and he accepted the challenge in May 1994. An important factor in

him accepting the job was the new stadium, then still in an embryonic stage. In

Robson’s first season, ‘94-95 (the last at Ayresome Park) Middlesbrough was

promoted to the Premier League and then moved into the new stadium.

Robson reputedly accepted a lucrative three year deal worth £750,000, but for

that “Middlesbrough got instant identity”.193 This meant he was able to persuade , at

first good players and then top internationals to join Middlesbrough. The first

indication of this was England international Nick Barmby moving from Tottenham

for a club record £5.25 million in August 1995 (the previous record was £1.3 million

for Jan Age Fjortoft earlier in the year). This signalled that Boro was no longer a

‘selling’ club, they intended to buy the best players available and hold on to them.

191 ‘Athletic News’ in Rippon, 1981, op. cit. p. 85, commenting on Alf Common’s transfer from Sunderland to Middlesbrough for a record £1000 in 1905. 192 Slogan for Sky Sports Premiership football coverage

Page 70: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

70

The club was determined not to repeat the example of 1981 when the team that lost to

Wolves broke up.

The fact that Barmby joined Middlesbrough from Tottenham Hotspur, one of

the original ‘Big Five’ was a statement in itself, and helped to change the club’s

image to a more positive one. The Barmby transfer was eclipsed later that year in

October when Juninho, the then current Brazilian Footballer of the Year signed for the

club. Robson described him as “the most sought after player in the world”,194 and he

joined Middlesbrough instead of clubs such as Inter Milan and Arsenal who were

more famous and richer than Middlesbrough. Juninho admitted that it was Robson’s

personal intervention, allied to his playing reputation that swung the decision in

Middlesbrough’s favour.195

Therefore, a nexus developed, between Gibson, the stadium and Robson

culminating in the signing of Juninho. Without Gibson’s foresight there would not

have been a new stadium and without the stadium Robson could not have been lured

into his first management position. With Robson at the helm the club was able to send

out a signal to the football world that it was ambitious. This compares with its

previous existence as an archetypal middle-of-the-road club that sold its best players

when the right offer came along. The club’s new stature was further enhanced during

the summer of 1996 with the signings of a third Brazilian, Emerson from FC Porto for

£4 million (Branco a World Cup winner was the second), and Fabrizio Ravanelli an

Italian international from Juventus for another new record fee of £7 million. Both

gave up the prospect of European Cup football for the following season.

However, it would be naive to think these world class players came to

Middlesbrough only because of Robson’s record and personality. The wages offered

193 The Sunday Times (Sport), 20.8.95, p. 14

Page 71: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

71

to these players was a major factor. According to various reports Juninho earns

£13,000 a week,196 Branco £20,000197 and Ravanelli anything from £20,000 to

£42,000. In order to meet these demands the club has had to maximise its income.

This has occurred to such an extent that according to Keith Lamb, “Since we earned

promotion our costs have risen by 50% but our income has gone up 200%”.198 The

Riverside Stadium has been at the centre of this increase in revenue.

One of Gibson’s prophecies when announcing Middlesbrough’s relocation

was that it would be a magnet for businesses who would want to associate themselves

with the club and this has proved to be correct. Firstly, the stadium itself is sponsored

by Cellnet, whose name also appears on the club’s shirts. They signed a deal with the

club for 3 years for the shirt sponsorship, with a one year option, and 10 years for

Cellnet to be the prefix to the Riverside Stadium. The publicly quoted value of the

sponsorship is £3 million.199 The club has another two major sponsors, Carlsberg-

Tetley and Comcast. McDonald’s are also a sponsor but are not as high-profile as the

others concerning the club.200

The Cellnet package was created through the endeavours of a sponsorship

group formed by the club during its last season at Ayresome Park. The deal itself was

conducted by Gibson, Keith Lamb, the Chief Executive, George Cooke,

Middlesbrough’s other director and ICI’s representative, and also Alan Timothy, a

194 The Independent, 9.10.95, p. 27 195 The Guardian, 18.10.95, p. 28 196 ibid. 197 The Sunday Times (Sport), 15.2.96, p. 29 198 Financial Times, 15.2.96, p. 29 199 Information supplied by ‘Cellnet’ 200 Interview with Terry Tasker

Page 72: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

72

marketing consultant. Their remit was to develop a strategy to target companies, meet

with them and create a sponsorship deal between the club and company.201

Initially, this group visited companies such as Lucozade, Nike, Coca Cola and

motor vehicle firms.202 Cellnet wanted to develop their business in the North East and

wanted to associate themselves with a high-profile organisation, “We were ... seeking

an opportunity to raise our profile in this area and generate positive brand preference

to potential purchasers”.203 The new stadium provided the opportunity for Cellnet to

raise its profile as this had become a landmark within the North East. In addition, the

media exposure that football generates makes the sport an attractive proposition for

sponsors. The deal was announced on 18 May 1995 and included other financial

details apart from Cellnet being part of the stadium’s title, as the club gains a financial

benefit from every new sale of a Cellnet phone It interlinked the two parties, as it is in

the club’s interest to promote Cellnet because the more they sell the greater the

revenue the club receives.204

Middlesbrough’s sponsorship deal with Cellnet demonstrates the club’s new

image within the business community. Previously the club had to scramble around for

sponsorship from local businesses. The club’s shirt sponsor before Cellnet was local

DIY company Dickens,205 whereas Cellnet was involved with sports sponsorship that

have an ABC1 profile, such as the England Rugby Union team.206 Middlesbrough is

able to command this national profile because its marketing strategy is aimed at

201 Initially, Cellnet had a relationship with PR/sponsorship company Brian Hewitt Associates, and this company was approached by Middlesbrough Football Club to seek sponsors. BHA then drew this initial opportunity to Cellnet’s attention. Information supplied by ‘Cellnet’ 202 Interview with Terry Tasker 203 Information supplied by ‘Cellnet’ 204 Interview with Terry Tasker. Cellnet also have a permanent site in the club shop that is used for the sale of telephones, and they have marketing consultants who work from the offices within the stadium. 205 Middlesbrough are currently involved in a legal dispute with Dickens over the details of their last shirt sponsorship contract. 206 Information supplied by ‘Cellnet’

Page 73: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

73

national and global companies as these would generate more funds for a team

building programme.

The catalyst for the increase in sponsorship and money in football overall has

been the Premiership’s television deal with BSyB, owned by Rupert Murdoch. It

begun in 1992 and was worth £304 million over 5 years,207 a deal worth six times

more than the previous arrangement with terrestrial television. Although ‘Sky’ is only

available to a subscription paying audience, sponsors believe that its cumulative

audiences, estimated at 100 million, plus those for the BBC’s Match of the Day, make

their investment worthwhile.208 The Sky money, added to the increase in sponsorship

money has produced profound changes within football. Firstly, it has contributed to

the upgrading of stadiums in light of the Taylor Report, and it has also help raise

playing standards through the importation of foreign stars such as Juninho. In

addition, it has helped to transform the game into one that is now high-profile,

socially acceptable, and attractive to consumers with more spending power than

traditional football fans and major firms who want to sponsor clubs.

Another area where income has increased is merchandising, and in particular

the selling of replica football shirts. The escalation in sales of shirts has meant clubs

such as Middlesbrough earn as much from this section of their incoming revenue as

they do from ticket sales. It is estimated that Middlesbrough have sold £10 million of

merchandise since moving stadium. By February 1996 Boro had sold 39,000 Cellnet

replica shirts in five months, £23,000 of other merchandise was sold in one week.209

This included scarves, pens, rulers and the Boro handbook. To fully maximise their

income the club sell exclusively through their own shop, and also aim to start a

catalogue. If they allowed Boro shirts to be sold in the town that shop would take a

207 The Times (Football 96-97), 12.8.96, p. 8

Page 74: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

74

percentage of the sale. That percentage now stays with the club. Plans are being made

to open a shop in Middlesbrough town centre before Christmas 1996 to capitalise on

the shopping frenzy of the festive season. In December 1995 the club took £500,000

in its stadium shop. These figures compare favourably with Tottenham who during

the first five months of the season sold 25,000 shirts at their shop and £10,000 a week

worth of merchandise.

This further demonstrates how the club has changed in status and has provided

Robson with the finance to embark on a squad building programme that is designed to

challenge for honours. On 1 August 1996 Middlesbrough launched their new home

and away kits.210 This was the third change of both strips in three seasons. It caused

hundreds of fans to queue up before the shop was opened to be one of the first to buy

the new tops. The cost of these tops were £37.50 each.211 It may seem a prohibitive

price but people now buy these in the knowledge that the product gives value for

money as they can be worn and washed many times and still look new. Football tops

are highly sort after leisurewear items, compounding football’s integration within this

retail area. By changing strips annually Middlesbrough has exploited this commercial

phenomenon to further its own ambitions.

The traditional method for raising finance has been for clubs to raise ticket

prices, Middlesbrough being no exception. For the season 1996-97 the club

announced a 20% increase across the board in season ticket prices.212 This has been

part of a national trend resulting in unprecedented increases in prices. To induce

Middlesbrough fans to renew their season tickets early a discount of one game was

offered if renewal took place before the end of May, together with a promise that it

208 Information supplied by ‘Cellnet’ 209 Evening Gazette, 9.2.96, p. 7 210 Evening Gazette (Sports Special), 27.7.96, p.12 211 The Times (Football 96-97), 12.8.96, p. 4

Page 75: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

75

would facilitate Robson’s summer signings. Supporters who bought early also

received the Boro Red Book giving them privileges and offers from companies such

as McDonalds. This was a deliberate move by the club to draw in the bulk of their

season tickets early; they achieved their aim and sold out their 26,500 allocation for

the second successive season.213 The club recognised that some fans may have been

unable to pay a lump sum for their season ticket so they introduced a HP scheme. The

interest spread over the season amounted to the cost of one game and has been

considered very favourable.214

The club has thus far rejected other avenues of raising capital from fans which

have been employed by other clubs. One of these, the Platinum Club at Newcastle

costs a fan £1500 for a seat as well as the price of a season ticket.215 Arsenal used a

Bond scheme that invited 12,120 fans to commit either £1500 or £1100 to the club. In

return a bond holder was guaranteed a ten year option to buy a season ticket.216

Middlesbrough claim schemes of this kind are ‘immoral’ and would alienate fans and

drive some sections away. This may sound hypocritical given their new

commercially-driven approach to increasing revenue, but perhaps there is a realisation

that the economic base of Middlesbrough fans may not be as prosperous as other

clubs. This also may be the reason why, according to club sources, a new share issue

has been ruled out.

212 Evening Gazette, 22.4.96, p. 1 213 Only Manchester United and Newcastle United can also claim to have achieved this. An unemployed Boro fan, Ian Muter, collected 3000 signatures for a petition requesting that the club made available some tickets on a match-by-match basis. He was going to present it at a press conference in conjunction with the FSA but he was apparently talked out of this by Gibson. He apparently assured Muter that fans from a low income group would be able to afford a season ticket via the HP scheme. The club said it did not have an all-season ticket policy , instead everyone had the opportunity of buying one. 214 Interview with Rob Nichols. In the end of season FMTTM poll 77% of fans said it was fair that the ground was all season ticket. 215 The Times (Football 96-97), 12.8.96, p. 6 216 Williams, 1994, op. cit. p. 13

Page 76: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

76

The stadium itself is generating income for the club in the form of corporate

hospitality. In the West Stand there are 19 hospitality boxes taken up by local

businesses, each is booked for 3 years, many of whom were not connected with the

club when it was at Ayresome Park.217 There were also 4 executive lounges, built

during the stadium’s design development process after Terry Tasker and Development

Manager Reg Corbidge had visited other grounds such as St. James’ Park and Old

Trafford, to inspect their hospitality facilities.218 Initially, those areas were to be

developed at a later date, but when the club realised there was a realistic chance of

gaining promotion, plans were drawn up for those executive lounges to be built. The

club believed there was a lucrative corporate market and it now earns more from the

hospitality catering than it does from the alcohol and fast food bars in the horseshoe

concourse.219 In addition, the stadium has also become a popular venue on non-match

days. Local companies hire the restaurants and hospitality areas for seminars, displays

and sales exhibitions. These companies estimate there is an increase in the number of

clients attending these functions, partly because they want to see the new stadium.220

The stadium is to be further developed when the club is ready to proceed. For

the 1997-98 season Middlesbrough aim to make the Riverside a complete structure by

filling the North West and South West corners that are currently vacant. This will add

approximately 4500 to the stadium’s capacity generating more money from the

expected season ticket sell-out.221 It also gives the club more scope to increase its

hospitality facilities in terms of lounges, hospitality boxes and ground floor catering

facilities. These would be located underneath the stadium adjacent to the West Stand.

217 Interview with Terry Tasker 218 Interview with Peter Dracup. The Ayresome, Mannion, Fenton and Camsell lounges 219 ibid. 220 Interview with Terry Tasker. Rooms are also for hire within the stadium for private functions such as retirement parties 221 ibid.

Page 77: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

77

Taylor Woodrow Northern Construction Ltd built in a suspended ceiling during

construction underneath the North and East Stands to accommodate these future

facilities.222

The club’s new commercial success has meant staffing levels have increased

quite considerably overall. Total staff numbered 86 at Ayresome Park in July 1994,223

in July 1996 the number had risen to 160.224 A consequence of this is that commercial

staff are having to work from hospitality areas during the week.225 This is another

reason for the stadium’s imminent expansion, as the North Stand will provide offices,

probably for more commercial employees in the future.226

The significance of the ‘corporate fan’ is something that Middlesbrough is just

beginning to realise, whereas clubs such as Manchester United and Tottenham

Hotspur have been placing an increasing importance on this aspect of income for over

a decade.227 At Ayresome Park, Middlesbrough did have a corporate side to its

income but the image of Ayresome Park was not conducive to attracting major

clientele. The situation has been completely transformed at the Riverside Stadium as

companies, local, national and global want to be associated with the club.

Football’s new commercial activities such as sponsorship, merchandising plus

Sky’s TV deal now form the bulk of its income. For the 1994-95 season gate receipts

and season ticket income accounted for only 42% of football’s total revenue.228 This

was needed to offset the rise in transfer fees and players salaries. In 1994-95 English

222 Interview with Peter Dracup. The design of the stadium had already been changed to accommodate the building of the large fast food and alcohol bars placed around the concourse at regular intervals. Originally, the main circular columns were to be separate from the back wall of the stadium. The idea being that people would be able to walk around them - a supposedly pleasing architectural feature. However, due to the club wanting to maximise its income the back wall was moved into line with the columns. 223 Deloitte et, 1996, op cit. p. 50 224 Interview with Terry Tasker. There are approximately 600 additional staff employed on match days. 225 Interview with Eric Paylor 226 Interview with Peter Dracup 227 Manchester United’s turnover for the 1994-95 season was £60 million. See Deloitte et al

Page 78: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

78

football spent a record total of £110 million on transfers between English clubs and

another £31 million went to clubs outside England.229 The total salaries bill for clubs

during this season rose by 14% to £243 million, absorbing 52% of their total income,

with Premier League players’ wages increasing by 22%.230

Middlesbrough’s turnover for 1995-95 has been estimated at £15 million by

Steve Gibson231 - in 1993-94 it was £3.67 million.232 Middlesbrough have willingly

entered English football’s commercial revolution, embarking on a course that is hoped

will bring success on the pitch, but in the process the club has accepted the financial

risks that this involves. To build the stadium the club has had to take out a substantial

loan and to buy players its overdraft at the bank has increased.233 Gibson’s presence

plus, financial input is vital because banks very rarely lose money on football clubs

today.234 This is a complete turnaround from 1986 after the club was reformed. Then

the board adopted a ‘Safety First’ business approach, determined not to slip back into

heavy debt. Gibson has now been able to write off the investments made in new

players through his wealth. The Riverside Revolution is just that; a radical

transformation that has swept through the club, launched from a rapidly expanding

financial base.

228 Deloitte et al, 1996, op. cit. p. 4 229 ibid., p. 5 230 ibid. 231 The Guardian, 18.10.95, p.28 232 Deloitte et al, 1996, op. cit. p. 50 233 Interview with Eric Paylor 234 Deloitte et al, 1996, op. cit. p. 37

Page 79: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

79

Chapter 8

Our Friends in the North East

“After a century of ignoring Middlesbrough, suddenly the whole country is taking notice and what’s more (the odd sneer apart) wishing the place well. That makes the Juninho deal - at £4.75m or roughly 1p per column inch - a masterstroke.”235 “ ... In the North, but not of the North” 236

In Britain a football club, arguably, provides a community with its major focal

point for collective identity. The results of the club are able to unite a town’s residents

unlike any other medium. “Collective identification, especially when coupled with

success makes people feel better and engenders a sense of place”.237 Jack Hatfield was

vice-chairman at the time Middlesbrough faced liquidation and possible extinction.

He poignantly remembers the possible consequences,

“I came home one night ... and got the map of England out ... thinking Middlesbrough without a football team ... I was thinking Lincoln have got theirs, Scarborough, all these little places, Yeovil ... what is Middlesbrough going to be like without a football team”.

Its survival and recent prosperity has further highlighted the importance of a football

club’s link with the identity of the region that surrounds it.

The construction of a community’s identity is a complex thing. It is an attempt

to define “the subjective feelings and valuations of any population which possesses

common experiences and many shared cultural characteristics”.238 However, an

identity is not fixed nor is it singular but plural, “identities are multiple and fluid or

‘negotiable’ and that the same individual or group may privilege one identity over

another according to the situation and the moment”.239 Yet, “... there is still something

235 The Observer (Sport), 22.10.95, p. 5 236 Benyon et al, 1994, op. cit. p. 1 237 Bale, 1993, op. cit. p. 57 238 Jarvie, G., ‘Sport, Nationalism and Cultural Identity’ in Allison, L. (ed), The Changing Politics of Sport, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993, p.61 239 Lash, S. and Friedman, J. (eds), Modernity and Identity, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, p. 305

Page 80: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

80

down there, something deep rooted which helps individuals ... ethnics ... make sense

of themselves”.240 In the quest for the identity/identities of the communities of

Middlesbrough and Teesside, its people and football fans, there are various

interlinking relationships that cover broad areas. This concerns its present, as well as

its political, economic and social history, its geographical situation plus its culture.

Teesside becomes “... imagined as a community ... (because it is) ... conceived as a

deep, horizontal comradeship.”241

Teesside’s and, in particular, Middlesbrough’s identity was formed from 19th

century industrialisation and urbanisation. Throughout the 19th century

Middlesbrough was a boom town, taking on the appearance of an ‘urban frontier’ with

a ‘melting pot’ community. The town represented an example of how inhabitants of

urban communities faced problems of identity because of the rate and scale of

urbanisation. Football clubs were a new focus for collective urban leisure experiences

in industrial towns and cities, providing “a cultural expression”242 and “... a sense of

civic pride and identity”243 for its residents.

An exceptionally strong masculine culture also developed because of the

region’s industrial heritage. Heavy, primary industries were the area’s major

economic feature during this early period, and they still are an important part of

Teesside’s industrial landscape. By 1850 coal was exported through the port via a

railway link and there was also iron manufacturing, shipbuilding and pottery works.244

By the 20th century the chemicals giant, ICI was a major employer on Teesside. A

distinct gender division emerged as the original population was predominantly male

because of the hard manual labour required for these industries, and continuing into

240 Jarvie, 1993, op. cit. p. 61 241 Anderson, B., Imagined Communities, London, Verso, 1983, p. 7 242 Holt, R., Sport and the British: A Modern History, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 167 243 ibid., p, 166

Page 81: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

81

the next century. The pub emerged as the traditional centre of male social activity,

with football a popular leisure activity. When Middlesbrough Football Club was

founded in 1876 therefore, a strong link already existed between masculinity, football

and a sense of provincial pride, and identification with the club reinforced this bond.

Another feature of Teesside’s identity is its geographical situation within the

North East as a whole. To the north Middlesbrough is separated from Newcastle by

approximately 35 miles, and from Sunderland by 20 miles, divided by the Tees, Wear

and Tyne. To the south Leeds is the nearest conurbation 70 miles away. In football

terms, Middlesbrough are able to build up a strong, local following, if only latent, due

to the lack of other local league clubs. In addition, Middlesbrough was traditionally

part of Yorkshire as it was south of the River Tees,245 but due to Middlesbrough’s

remoteness from the major Yorkshire metropolitan areas, such as Leeds and Bradford,

and boundary changes for the purposes of local government, a distinctive area of has

Teesside emerged. Under the local government reorganisation of 1968, Teesside

Borough was created, then replaced by Cleveland County Council in 1974.246

Teesside’s identity crisis was compounded by the traditional allegiances to Yorkshire

to the south and Durham, concerning Stockton, to the north.

Within the Teesside area there are various identities that constitute the area

and these are as complex as Teesside’s itself.247 Middlesbrough has always had a

rivalry with Stockton that stretches back to when Middlesbrough took over from

Stockton as the port for shipping coal to London and the South. Stockton actually

received its charter in 1310 and was a bustling port and market town centuries before

244 Carson, 1977, op. cit. p. 21 245 Yorkshire County Cricket Club did play at least one match a season at Middlesbrough, but this arrangement was terminated from the start of the 1997 season. 246 Financial Times, 21.3.89, p. 37 247 For example, South Bank was pioneered by Bernhard Samuelson who built furnaces there in 1854 and created a community of his own. Briggs, 1963, op. cit. p. 257

Page 82: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

82

Middlesbrough even existed as a town.248 However, Stockton has never had a

professional football club in the Football League, unlike Middlesbrough, and it is this

that has provided Teesside’s major focal point for sporting identity. Teessiders and

Middlesbrough fans are able to use the football club as one way to establish an

identity distinguishable from other areas of the North East on a regional and

especially a national basis.

The Middlesbrough fan’s overall identity is also formed from the personality

of the club, produced from “artefacts” - perspectives, values and assumptions that

are aspects of the culture shared by supporters of the club.249 These maybe stories

about past matches, or common agreement on particular chants for particular clubs.

Middlesbrough fans for instance are able to ‘objectively’ claim that the ‘Gypsy Curse’

is a reason for the club’s lack of success. This prompts a sense of humour bordering

on sarcasm mixed with fatalism. It was summed up by Harry Pearson when he was

asked why he supported Middlesbrough he replied, “ ... because I’m a glory

seeker”,250 reflecting Middlesbrough’s lack of major honours and acknowledging he

is stuck with this unsuccessful team for life, so much so that “Years of following Boro

have left me with a deeply ingrained pessimism”.251

Another aspect of the Boro fans’ culture is their rivalry with Newcastle and

Sunderland, although Newcastle has engendered the most feeling recently. This stems

from numerous sources and is not solely centred on football. In economic terms

Newcastle has always been the region’s epicentre. Even in the 1800’s

Middlesbrough’s exporting coal exporting industry was phased out because it was felt

248 Financial Times, 23.8.94, p. 8 249 Canter et al, Football in its Place: An Environmental Psychology of Football Grounds, London, Routledge, 1989, p. 81 250 Pearson, H., In the Far Corner: A Mazy Dribble Through North East Football, London, Little, Brown and Company, 1994, p. 1 251 ibid., p. 34

Page 83: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

83

it was cheaper to use Newcastle instead. Teesside people as a whole have always felt

that there was a regional imbalance that favoured Newcastle and this particularly

applies to a perceived local and national media bias. The most heinous manifestation

of this in the eyes of Teessiders is a national perception that they are Geordies. At

football matches opposing fans chant to Boro supporters, “We hate Geordies and we

hate Geordies”. The Boro fans’ riposte is “We hate Geordies and we hate Geordies”,

followed by “Tees-, Tees-, Teessiders”. This states their objections to being

categorised as Geordies, and at the same time signifying that Teesside has a

distinctive identity and culture of its own.

A particular stereotype of the North East originates from the cartoon sketch

character, Andy Capp, satirising, to the present day, the North East’s traditional male

working-class culture that was located in heavy industrial areas.252 It also contributed

to the image that all people from the North East are Geordies. A consequence of this

is that some Boro fans place Middlesbrough in Teesside in a geographical context as

opposed to the North East. A reason for this is that if they say to people outside of the

region they are from the North East, most automatically think of them as Geordies.

Furthermore, the comparison of Newcastle and Sunderland’s rich football

history with Middlesbrough’s dearth of honours represents another situation that does

not promote Teesside’s self-esteem. Newcastle’s recent success has added to

Teesside’s overall sensibility and contributed to a further increase in the perception

that the media prefers Newcastle. Harry Pearson noted in 1992 “ ... Newcastle

avoided the drop. On the same day Middlesbrough secured promotion to the Premier

League, their fans noting bitterly which of the two events drew the bigger

252 Hobsbawm, E., ‘Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1814’ in Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (eds), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 287

Page 84: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

84

headline”.253 Thus, Boro fans firmly believe that the local media is partial in its

coverage towards Newcastle. One Boro fan, Dave Smith, described it as “...the hype

and sickening sight of Black and White (Newcastle’s colours) all over ‘Tyne Wear’

TV”.254 Ron Hale believed ‘Tyne Wear’ TV would make life even worse for Boro

fans if Newcastle won the League. 255

Boro fans also become irritated at Newcastle and Sunderland’s ambivalent

attitude towards Middlesbrough. Newcastle fans only categorised Middlesbrough as a

‘Derby’ game in the 1995-96 season because Sunderland was not in the Premier

League as they regarded Sunderland as the quintessential North East ‘Derby’ and

vice-versa. Although Middlesbrough is regarded as a ‘Derby’ it is of secondary

importance. This stems from their own view of what constitutes the North East’s

identity. Most people from Newcastle would regard Middlesbrough as part of the

North East, albeit with a qualified reluctance. A sizeable minority would argue it is

not in the North East at all. A Newcastle fanzine seller was definite in his opinion of

Middlesbrough, in geographical and football terms. He believed Middlesbrough was

part of North Yorkshire, not the North East, and Sunderland was Newcastle’s only

local rival. He linked Middlesbrough’s geographical and football isolation by

declaring that Middlesbrough fans were “in limbo”, and because they did not have

any local ‘Derbies’ Boro fans “...try to latch on to teams such as Newcastle,

Sunderland and Leeds”.

Another fan did consider Middlesbrough versus Newcastle as a ‘Derby’, but in

geographical terms Middlesbrough was in “No Mans’ Land”, neither part of the North

East nor North Yorkshire. Other fans said Middlesbrough was ‘just’ in the North East,

whilst some said only Newcastle or the Tyne and Wear area represented the true

253 Pearson, 1994, op. cit. p. 21

Page 85: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

85

North East. Some Newcastle fans believed people from Middlesbrough were Geordies

or nearly Geordies because they shared a similar industrial and economic heritage.

The diversity of these views illustrate how there are differing ideas to what constitutes

the North East within the North East itself, and that the region’s identity is not the

monolithic entity perceived nationally. In addition, some Newcastle fans from the

Yorkshire region held firm to the view that Middlesbrough is regarded as part of the

North East and definitely not in Yorkshire.

With reference to football, the polyglot nature within the North East has

produced a distinctive anti-Newcastle sensibility amongst Boro fans, but it is not

reciprocated by Newcastle supporters. Boro fans have sung tastelessly about

Newcastle’s manager Kevin Keegan being hit over a head with a baseball bat,

referring to an incident just before he became manager of Newcastle in 1992. This

contrasted with an unconfirmed report in the 1994-95 season that Newcastle fans

cheered on hearing Middlesbrough had won, but would boo if they lost - probably the

worst insult for Boro fans.256

The final game of the 1995-96 season produced a huge dilemma for Boro fans

as they played Manchester United, and if Middlesbrough won it may have meant

Newcastle would win the title. Thus, the question arose whether Boro fans would

want Middlesbrough to lose that game in order to prevent Newcastle from winning

the Premiership. This produced a whole spectrum of opinions and petty hates from

Boro fans; Anthony Middleton proclaimed, “At the moment I want Newcastle to lose

more than anything in the world”,257 and Brian Casson described the dilemma as “a

nightmare...I really, really badly don’t want the Geordies to win the league. Like an

254 Middlesbrough Internet Mailing List, 30.4.96 255 ibid. the League being the 1995-96 Premiership title. 256 Independent On Sunday (Sport), 15.10.95, p. 25 257 Middlesbrough Internet Mailing List, 30.4.96

Page 86: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

86

awful lot”.258 The overall feeling however, was that the fans wanted Middlesbrough to

beat Manchester United, and if it meant Newcastle winning the league so be it,

although with reservations. Helen Brown’s attitude was that “ ... I’d always prefer to

see the Boro beat anyone...but wouldn’t it be a bastard if it gave the title to the

honeymonsters, the smug gets”.259 Tim Lloyd encapsulated Boro fans’ attitudes

towards this dilemma by stating that, “I’d like Newcastle to win it ... if only because

at the end of the day we are the ONLY people who can win it for them. They’d

forever be in our debt, and we’d be able to remind them of this at every turn. Their

whole title aspirations rest in our hands ...oh God the power. Lets make them

squirm”.260

Overall, one can say Middlesbrough need Newcastle more in a footballing and

identity sense than Newcastle need Middlesbrough. Middlesbrough supporters feed

off this enmity that has been constructed from various phenomena in order to

construct an identity for themselves. Peter Warren from Teesside FSA is an

‘immigrant’ from North London and is able to gauge Middlesbrough fans’ attitudes

from a relatively neutral perspective. He feels,

“...Teessiders do sometimes have a bit of a chip on their shoulder and feel that they’ve got to defend and protect the name of their town and region ... I do feel that Teessiders feel they have an inferiority complex ... Perhaps its one of the traits of the fact that over a long period of years, not just talking football wise, they’ve felt themselves the poor relations in the North East”.

Middlesbrough itself, has occasionally taken on the form of a fallen city,

derided by strangers. This was certainly true during the 1980’s when mass

unemployment afflicted the area and the ‘Child Abuse’ scandal occurred. This has

culminated in a certain paranoia that consumes Teessiders who become very sensitive

about anything they believe denigrates the area. A common cause for complaint is the

258 ibid.

Page 87: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

87

mis-spelling of Teesside and Middlesbrough, sometimes spelt ‘Teeside’ and

‘Middlesborough’.261 On a news item on BBC’s national news in July 1996 a map of

the North East also showed Newcastle positioned on Teesside. Furthermore, in the

Deloitte and Touché Annual Review of Football Finance (August 1996) mention was

made of the influx of benefactors into the game and it named Middlesbrough’s

benefactor as “Stan Gibson”.262

A type of conspiracy theory, designed to give the region a bad image has

evolved on Teesside and was compounded by two press reports in consecutive days in

the Evening Gazette. Firstly, there was an article in a new Rough Guide to England

that was uncomplimentary about Teesside, southern bias was blamed and

spokespeople from local organisations were invited to reject it and defend Teesside.263

Next there was an article headlined, “There they go again”, about a national survey

that claimed Teessiders were the ugliest people in Britain. It was reported, “it is sure

to cause a storm of protest and will add to the area’s stereotype Andy Capp image”.264

Therefore, the Riverside Stadium has become an important cultural reference

point for Teesside. It has produced an increase in interest in the area on a local and

even a national level and has almost reinvented the identity of the area and football

club. A more positive representation of the area has transpired through the media, and

in conjunction with a PR strategy (by both the club and TDC) that consistently

emphasised the club’s new beginning - its new tradition - Middlesbrough’s identity

has been wilfully reinvented, and the stadium has become a symbol of the town’s

rejuvenation as a whole.

259 ibid. Honeymonsters refers to the fact that Kevin Keegan and Newcastle United featured in an advert for ‘Sugar Puffs’. 260 ibid. 261 Middlesbrough is even spelt incorrectly on Microsoft Word’s Spellchecker! 262 Deloitte et al, 1996, op. cit. p. 36 263 Evening Gazette, 5.4.96, p. 1

Page 88: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

88

The regeneration of Teesside was also highlighted by the TDC’s remit of

urban renewal for areas that were formerly occupied by heavy industry, representing

the area’s history. One of the TDC’s main aims on its inception was to boost the

confidence of potential private investment through an expensive advertising and

marketing campaign.265 The TDC’s Chief Executive Duncan Hall outlined the reason

for this, “our initial research found that spontaneous awareness of Teesside among

businessmen was almost zilch. People did not realise that Cleveland and Teesside

were the same place”.266 He claimed confidence was the biggest development in the

TDC’s first one and half years. This would then attract sufficient investment to

provide jobs that had been lost due to Teesside’s industrial decay. High capital

expenditure projects have not directly provided many jobs, “... but it is part of a

strategy which the TDC hopes will make the area more attractive to investors”.267

Middlesbrough Football Club’s need to relocate was an ideal opportunity for the TDC

to help promote the town. The impact of the new stadium was greater in terms of

promoting the region’s image in national terms than the TDC’s other projects due to

football’s greater media exposure.

However, the event that had most impact on promoting the region’s image was

Middlesbrough’s signing of Juninho in October 1995. It was “... symbolic proof of the

power of attachment of an unjustly despised city - challenging contempt via fame”,268

and was evidence of “... a profound shift in the representation of its destiny”.269 It not

only attracted major coverage from the national press and television networks, but it

was reported widely around the world such was the significance of the transfer, “This

264 Evening Gazette, 6.4.96, p. 3 265 Financial Times, 21.3.89, p. 38 266 ibid. 267 Robinson et al, 1994, p. 333 268Bromberger et al, Fireworks and the Ass, in Redhead, S. (ed), The Passion and the Fashion: Football Fandom in the New Europe, Aldershot, Avebury, 1993 p. 98

Page 89: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

89

is the big one, the transfer that finally signifies a shift in power from Serie A (Italy’s

Premier division) to the Premiership”.270

As Middlesbrough is a relatively new community it has encountered a difficult

transition through modernity. During this process Teesside, and Middlesbrough in

particular, has been unable to recreate a suitable past because “... Middlesbrough as a

Victorian ‘new town’ ... lacks a clear identity. Teesside is ... a cluster of towns with

no obvious centre ...”.271 For Middlesbrough to perceive itself as modern (or

postmodern) it needs a new identity and to obtain that its residents must re-imagine

their community as being (and always having been) worthy of the change.272

Although football is one of many cultural characteristics that forms identity,

Middlesbrough’s move to the Riverside has contributed towards a reinvention of the

region’s identity, with the signing of Juninho further accelerating this process.

Juninho and the signing of the other foreign players “... represent a vision of a free

and optimistic response to the city’s destiny”.273 These and other events have had a

concomitant effect on the town and club, reflected by the rocketing sale of Boro

replica shirts. A “sense of pride” has developed and as the football club is the

community’s major focal point it is reaping the benefits.

269 ibid. 270 The Independent, 9.10.95, p. 27 One alleged outcome of Juninho’s transfer to Middlesbrough is that Middlesbrough is now the most well-known British town in Brazil. 271 Financial Times (Survey on Teesside), 26.2.88, p. 1 272 Nairn, T., ‘Nationalism is not the enemy’ in The Observer (Review), 12.11.95, p. 4 273 Bromberger et al, 1993, op. cit. p. 99

Page 90: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

90

CONCLUSION

“The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there”.274

The Riverside Stadium is perhaps the clearest example of the rapid

modernising changes that British football has experienced in recent years. The

Hillsborough Disaster forced the game, primarily, to upgrade its stadiums, and

consequently this has underpinned a commercial revolution within football, and

Middlesbrough’s relocation has epitomised this transformation. The new stadium was

built to fulfil the requirements of the Taylor Report, but it also became a focal point

for the area by attracting ‘new’ fans and new businesses to finance the club’s new

ambitions. These ambitions contradicted the club’s mediocre history and, in this

respect alone, makes the Riverside Stadium a pioneering example of a football club

moving grounds. The momentum it generated has imbued the town and supporters

with a sense of rejuvenation, but its most obvious benefits have been commercial. The

Riverside may evoke images of Middlesbrough’s nautical and industrial past275 but

this veneer hides a well-oiled modern, commercial machine.

The consequences for the game overall are more problematic. One nightmare

scenario that has been envisaged concerns the influx of so-called ‘new’ fans and the

increasing power of television combining to reduce the football ‘experience’ as a

whole. Football has become a part of the age of television sponsorship, and this

relationship will be further consummated with the introduction of multi-channel,

digital television in 1997,276 enabling every Premiership game to be screened live on a

pay-per-view basis. Football is certain to embrace this development and exploit its

274 Hartley, L., The Go-Between, London, Penguin, 1953 275 Interview with Peter Dracup 276 Evening Gazette, (Sports Special), 24.8.96, p. 5

Page 91: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

91

commercial potential. In addition, football’s recent efforts to attract supporters from a

higher social class and income bracket has caused fears that they may not hold the

same ‘propertial’ attachments for their team as more ‘traditional’ fans.

Digital television will allow clubs to show every Premiership game live and

these ‘new’ fans may opt to watch home and away games on pay-per-view instead of

attending games, thus resulting in a decline in ‘atmosphere’. A domino syndrome may

then emerge as the reduction in the overall spectacle will not be attractive to

television, sponsors or fans, with a resultant fall in football’s income. A stop-gap to

this problem would be to cut admission prices, further diminishing ‘propertial’

attachments as football fans become more transient in nature. Therefore, instead of

watching a boring 0-0 draw ‘live’, fans with pay-per-view would have the option of

just turning the television off.

This nightmare scenario may not materialise. For a variety of reasons, it is

perhaps presumptuous and too easy to draw a distinctive line between ‘new’ and

‘traditional’ fans. Firstly, these ‘new’ fans may acquire an attachment with their team

that is as strong as ‘traditional’ fans’. With reference to Middlesbrough, the

‘traditional’ fans themselves may be in favour of the modernising changes that

football has undergone, exemplified by the dramatic increase in attendances and

interest in the sport since football shook off its ‘slum’ image from the 1980’s.

However, ‘modernisers’ need to realise that the cultural conservatism

engendered by supporters serves as football foremost promoter. Football is a

commodity that can not and will not conform to the forces of economic rationalism

precisely because its marketability stems from its consumers irrationalism. If this is

Page 92: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

92

not realised then football may find on entering its brave new world that it has become

divorced from its roots.

Page 93: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

93

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

Interviews

Rob Nichols, Editor of Fly Me To The Moon, 4.7.96

Simon Evans, Chief Planning Officer of Teesside Development Corporation, 5.7.96

(Untaped)

Mike Clark, Information Press Officer for Middlesbrough Borough Council. 10.7.96

(Untaped)

Peter Warren, Liaison Officer for Teesside Football Supporters Association, 11.7.96

Terry Tasker, Stadium Manager of Cellnet Riverside Stadium, 17.7.96 & 31.7.96

Jack Hatfield, Former Vice-Chairman of Middlesbrough Football Club, 1.8.96

Eric Paylor, Chief Sports Writer of Evening Gazette, 2.8.96

Peter Dracup, Contracts Manager of Taylor Woodrow Northern Construction Ltd,

29.8.96

Surveys

Attitudes of Newcastle fans to Riverside Stadium, 10.2.96

Attitudes of Middlesbrough fans to Riverside Stadium, 5.4.96

Attitudes of Newcastle fans to Riverside Stadium, 6.4.96

Internet

Questionnaire mailed to Middlesbrough Internet Mailing List, 30.4.96

Page 94: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

94

Answers to questionnaire followed up

Other opinions extracted from Middlesbrough Internet Mailing List

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

Books and Publications

Anderson, B., Imagined Communities, London, Verso, 1983

Bale, J., Landscapes of Modern Sport, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1994

Bale, J., Sport, Space and the City, London, Routledge, 1993

Benyon, H. et. al., A Place Called Teesside: A Locality in a Global Economy,

Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1994

Briggs, A., Victorian Cities, London, Oldham Books, 1963

Bromberger, C. et. al., ‘Fireworks and the Ass’ in Redhead, S. (ed.), The Passion and

the Fashion: Football Fandom in the New Europe, Aldershot, Avebury, 1993

Canter et. al., Football in its Place: An Environmental Psychology of Football

Grounds, London, Routledge, 1989

Carson, R., A Short History of Middlesbrough, Middlesbrough Borough Council,

1977

Deakin, N. and Edwards, J., The Enterprise Culture and the Inner City, London,

Routledge, 1991

Deloitte and Touché, Annual Review of Football Finance, London, Deloitte and

Touché, 1996

Featherstone, M et. al. (eds.), Global Modernities, London, Sage, 1995

Football Association, The Blueprint for the Future of Football, London, FA, 1991

Page 95: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

95

Giulianotti, R. and Williams, J. (eds.), Game Without Frontiers: Football, Identity

and Modernity, Aldershot, Arena, 1994

Glasper, H., Middlesbrough: A Complete Record, 1876-1989, Derby, Breedon, 1989

Hall, P., Urban and Regional Planning, London, Routledge, 1992

Hobsbawn, E., ‘Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914’ in Hobsbawn, E. and

Ranger, T., The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, Cambridge University

Press, 1983

Hobsbawn, E., The Age of Empire, 1875-1914, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson,

1987

Holt, R., Sport and the British: A Modern History, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989

Hornby, N., Fever Pitch, London, Victor Gollancz, 1992

Inglis, S., Football Grounds of Britain, London, Collins Willow, 1996

Jarvie, G. and Maguire, J., Sport and Leisure in Social Thought, London, Routledge,

1994

Jarvie, G., ‘Sport, Nationalism and Cultural Identity’ in Allison, L. (ed.), The

Changing Politics of Sport, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993

Lash, S. and Friedman, J. (eds), Modernity and Identity, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992

Mason, T., Association Football and English Society, 1863-1915, Brighton,

Harvester, 1980

Middlesbrough Football Club Official Handbook, 1995-96, Leicester, Polar, 1995

Paylor, E. and Wilson, J., Ayresome Park Memories, Derby, Breedon, 1995

Paylor, E., Middlesbrough Football Club, Manchester, Archive, 1989

Pearson, H., ‘A Season of Mellow Fruitlessness’ in Hornby, N. (ed.), My Favourite

Year, London, H.F. and G. Witherby, 1993

Page 96: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

96

Pearson, H., The Far Corner: A Mazy Dribble Through North East Football, London,

Little Brown and Company, 1994

Rippon, A., Great Soccer Clubs of the North East, Ashbourne, Moorland, 1981

Stevenson, J. and Cook, C., The Slump: Society and Politics During the Depression,

London, Quartet, 1997

Thompson, E., The Making of the English Working Class, London, Pelican, 1968

Thornley, A., Urban Planning Under Thatcherism: The Challenge of the Inner City,

London, Routledge, 1991

Williams, J., English Football Stadia After Hillsborough, University of Leicester, Sir

Norman Chester Centre for Football Research, 1994

Articles

Black, J. and Lloyd, M., ‘Football Stadia Developments’ Town Planning Review, 65,

1: pp 1-8, 1994

Nairn, T., ‘Nationalism is not the Enemy’ in The Observer (Review), 12 November

1995, p. 4

Robinson, F. et. al., ‘Urban Development Corporations and the Creation of

Employment: An Evaluation of Tyne and Wear and Teesside Development

Corporations’, Local Economy, 8, 4: pp 326-337, 1994

Williams, J., ‘The Local and the Global in English Soccer and the Rise of Satellite

Television’, Sociology of Sports Journal, 11, 4: pp 376-397, 1994a

Theses

Carter, N., The Modernisation of Football: A Case Study of Middlesbrough Football

Club, 1876-1914, Polytechnic of North London, Unpublished, 1989

Page 97: Neil Carter, The Move to the Riverside: A case study of Local Identity and the Commercialisation Process in Football (1996) MA , University of Warwick

97

Contemporary Newspapers

Evening Gazette

The Financial Times

The Guardian

The Independent

The Independent on Sunday

The Northern Echo

The Sunday Times

The Times