Negotiating South Africa's Future Roger Fisher

D u r i n g a recent visit of mine to Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Pre- toria, a number of South Africans ex- pressed interest in what a specialist in negotiation might think about South Africa's negotiating problem. Who, ff anyone, should be negotiating with whom, about what, and how?

As one who has for some years been devoting his primary attention to the theory and practice of negotiation--to the question of how those with shared and cotlflicting interests best deal with their differences--let me try to answer those questions. I recognize that it is risky these days for an American to offer any ideas about South Africa, even on technical questions of process. But having been asked for my views, mad confident that no one will be tempted to heed them unless they appear to make sense, I will rastdy venture on.

There is no one right way to deal with differences. "lhe Mnd of interactive communication, that will be most help- ful depends upon a diagnosis of the situation.

Today, black and white leaders alike are responding to their currently per- ceived choice.

State President P. W. Botha, for in- stance, hears himself being asked to take a big step to end apartheid, to release Nelson Mandela, and to negoti- ate with him about South Africa's future.

What consequences would he fore- see ffhe should say ')~es" to that request? He could reasonably anticipate: losing right wing support; starting down a slippery road with no end in sight; appearing to reward both black vio- lence and foreign sanctions and, thus encouraging more of both without solving any significant problem. For him to say "no" to such requests must appear: to buy time; to involve no major costs; and to leave his options open. If this is his perception, Mr. Botha is reacting rationally to the choice he is being asked to make.

But so are black leaders, who hear themselves being asked to "collaborate" with the Government in ways that would cost them constituents, under- cut the momentum for change, solve no significant problem, and leave them in a weaker political position.

No wonder that they, too, say "no." In South Africa today, as in so many

conflicts, successful negotiation does not consist of persuading people to act against their perceived interest. Rather, it consists of inventing options that are in the perceived interest of most people.

Pain, whether the result of township violence, foreign sanctions, or political opposition, is not pressure unless there is a way out.

What South Africa's decision mak- ers, both black and white, need are

Roger Fisher is Williston Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Director of the Harvard Negotiation Project, 523 Pound Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass, 02138. Among other publications, he is the co-author (with William Ury) of Getting to YkS Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981).

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some better choices---choices that have been well crafted to meet their own legitimate interests as well as the inter- ests of others.

There appear to be no plans on the table that would meet both black inter- ests in equali W, social justice, an end to racial discrimination, and a full role in political decision-making, and white interests in avoiding disorder, economic collapse, loss of communityvalues, and reverse domination. In today's South Africa, no one wants to be dominated.

Yet with today's limited understand- ing of the perceptions, concerns, and walues of others, and with today's anger, suspicion, and distrust, God Himself could not draft a const i tut ion that would commend itself to a majority of the whims now holding political power and a majority of the blacks who insist on a fair share of that power.

In this context, how do parties "nego- tiate?" What kind of process is most likely to meet the needs of the situation?

One vision of negotiation, widely held by both those who want it mad by those who reject it, is a formal, summit-style meeting. In this vision, P. W. Botha or his successor meets with Nelson Mandela or some other authorized rep- resentative of the black peoples of South Africa. Each side advances and defends a wel l -prepared position, makes demands and then concessions, and agreement is reached on a new constitution which is submitted to the peoples of South Africa for l~atification.

Such a formal confrontation is one way to negotiate. At this stage it holds little promise for South Africa. In the near future, South Africans will not want to rely on such a process. No leader, btack or white, can be expected to come with a mandate to make bind- ing commitments on behalf of others. Even Mr. Botha could do no more than recommend a document for approval. Any positions adopted in advance by

the Government or by the African National Congress or other black organi- zations would ahnost certainlypreclude agreement.

The kind of negotiations South Africa needs now are "pre-negotiations." At this stage, the goal in not a comprehen- sive master agreement however desir- able that might be - -bu t a process o f working together--a process that will tend to develop:

• mutual understanding of each oth- er's perceptions, and values;

• some personal confidence and trust among individual blacks, coloureds, whites, and government officials; and

• a wider recognition that the task of moving rapidly toward a fair non- racial society is a shared responsibil- it T requiring the best efforts of each, even if others seem to be less than eager.

Wllat is needed now is not one big meeting, but many small sessions under different auspices, invohdng blacks, whites, private citizens, leaders, and potential future leaders. The goal of" such a session should not be commit- ments of any kind, but rather some specMic ideas on who might do wffiat t omor row to move things forward. Among those ideas might be worMng drafts of a long-term vision for South Africa, and suggestions about who might do what now to keep that vision in view

The devising of many such practical, operational steps is not a substitute for drastic change but rather a realistic way to bring about the major changes that all recognize are needed.

Such groups could identify individu- als in government, business, t rade unions, the clergy, universffies, founda- tions, and community affairs, each of whom might be able to make a differ- ence. Then, ffeach such person would generate a "yesable propos i t ion"- -a

232 Roger Fisher South Africa's Future

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proposal to which the word "yes" would be a sufficient answe~ a feasible answer (perhaps a 20% or bet ter prob- ability), and an operational answer - - something would happen. The direct products of such pre-negotiation ses- sions would be a stream of specific choices to which decision makers might respond affirmativel}~ and some joint recommendations that they do so, The indirect products of such sessions would be increased mutual under- standing, bet ter cormnunication, the

development of some trust, and the identification of some new potential leaders.

As important as is a future constitu- tion for South Africa, more important is the process that will lead to it. If South Africans are unable to develop ways of working together side by side, no paper constitution is likely to work°

And ff blacks and whites are able to work together to develop their future, their future will be happening every day

N O T E

An earlier version of this co lumn appeared i~. the March 22, 1987Johannesburg Sunday Times.

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