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South Africa's Nuclear Future
Transcript of South Africa's Nuclear Future
South African Instit
ute of Inte
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African perspectives. Global insights.
Governance of Africa's Resources Programme
O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 1 5 0
South Africa’s Nuclear Future
J o - A n s i e v a n W y k
J u n e 2 0 1 3
A b o u t S A I I A
The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record
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and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the
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A b o u t t h e G o v e r n A n c e o f A f r I c A ’ S r e S o u r c e S P r o G r A m m e
The Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme (GARP) of the South African Institute
of International Affairs (SAIIA) is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
programme contributes to policy governing the exploitation and extraction of Africa’s
natural resources by assessing existing governance regimes and suggesting alternatives
to targeted stakeholders. GARP examines the governance of a number of resource-rich
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© SAIIA June 2013
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Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.
A b S t r A c t
The South African government has embarked on a programme to develop the country’s
nuclear energy capability in order to meet increasing national energy demand. In order
to achieve its nuclear ambitions, government has appointed a cabinet-level committee
to oversee the process, while key institutions are restructuring in line with government’s
ambitions. The nuclear plans have prompted questions within and outside South Africa
due to their opacity and their reliance on institutions of dubious managerial competence
and financial integrity. The questionable quality of this management also raises issues
concerning the country’s readiness to manage broader socio-economic issues arising
from its nuclear planning. The nuclear programme should be seen against the backdrop
of increased resource nationalism evident in South Africa’s diplomacy, especially in respect
of uranium. All these questions must be addressed by government if the integrity of the
nuclear planning process is to be protected.
A b o u t t h e A u t h o r
Dr Jo-Ansie van Wyk is a lecturer in International Politics in the Department of Political
Sciences at the University of South Africa (Unisa), Pretoria. She has completed a doctorate
on South Africa’s post-apartheid nuclear diplomacy. She is a Fulbright Alumna and
a member of the South African Academy for Science and Art. She has completed
consultancies for the World Bank, Unesco, the Institute for Security Studies, and Consultancy
Africa Intelligence. In June 2010, she was appointed by the minister of trade and industry
to serve on the South African Council for Space Affairs (Sacsa).
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A b b r e v I A t I o n S A n d A c r o n y m S
AEMFC AfricanExplorationMiningandFinancingCompany
Afcone AfricanCommissiononNuclearEnergy
EIA EnvironmentalImpactAssessment
GHG GreenhouseGas
GWe Gigawattelectrical
HEU HighEnrichedUranium
IAEA InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency
INIR IntegratedNuclearInfrastructureReview
IPP IndependentPowerProducer
IRP IntegratedResourcesPlan
IUEC InternationalUraniumEnrichmentCentre
LEU LowEnrichedUranium
MW Megawatt
Necsa NuclearEnergyCorporationofSouthAfrica
NIP NationalInfrastructurePlan
NNEECC NationalNuclearEnergyExecutiveCoordinationCommittee
NNR NationalNuclearRegulator
NPC SouthAfricanCouncilfortheNon-ProliferationofWeaponsof
MassDestruction
NPT TreatyfortheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons
PBMR PebbleBedModularReactor
PWR PressurisedWaterReactor
Safari-1 SouthAfricanFundamentalAtomicInstallation
tU tonnesUranium
TWh TerraWattHours
ZAR SouthAfricanRand
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I n t r o d u c t I o n
Thenuclearpowerplantaccidentof11March2011atFukushimainJapancaused
questions to be raised around the world about the future of nuclear power.
Internationalsupportfornuclearpowerseemstohavewanedintheaftermathofthat
event,despitethe‘nuclearrenaissance’ofrenewedinterestinnuclearpowerthathadbeen
evidentforsometimepriortoit.Anumberofcountries,includingGermany,Switzerland
andBelgium,havenowexpressedtheirintentiontophaseoutnuclearpowerprogrammes
intheshorttomediumterm,infavourofformsofrenewableenergysuchaswindand
solar,whichareregardedinsomequartersasviablealternatives.1
Notwithstandingsuchresponses,thedevelopmentofnuclearenergycapabilityand
outputcontinuesasdemandforpowerincreases.Inearly2013therewere437nuclear
powerreactorsinoperationworldwide,while67wereunderconstructionandonlyone
wasinlong-termshutdown.2AsFigure1shows,themajorityofactivereactorsarein
NorthAmericaandWesternEurope,understandablysointhelightofthosecontinents’
historicalleadershipinscientificdevelopment.Incomingdecades,however,growthin
nuclearinstallationsisexpectedtotakeplacemainlyinChinaandIndia,accordingtothe
directorgeneraloftheInternationalAtomicEnergyAuthority(IAEA)YukiyaAmano.3
Chinacurrentlyhasthelargestexpansionplans;apartfrom18operationalplants,ithasa
further28reactorsunderconstruction.BycontrasttheUS,whichhasthelargestnumber
(103)ofoperationalnuclearpowerstations,hasonlyoneunderconstruction,while
Russiahas33operationaland11underconstruction.4
Figure 1: Regional distribution of nuclear power plants
Africa
America – Latin
America – Northern
Asia – far East
Asia – Middle East and South
Europe – Central and Eastern
Europe – Western
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Operational Long-term shutdown Under construction
Source:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA),PowerReactorInformationSystem(PRIS).The
DatabaseonNuclearPowerReactors,2013,http://www.iaea.org/pris/.
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SouthAfrica isnot immuneto these international trends.Severeelectricalpower
outagesexperiencedsinceearly2008haveledtoanurgentneedtofocusonmeeting
energydemandsifthecountryistoachieveitssocio-economicdevelopmentalgoalsat
thesametimeasmeetingglobalgreenhousegas(GHG)emissiontargets.Atpresentmore
than90%ofthecountry’selectricityisproducedbycoal-firedpowerstations:SouthAfrica
isthereforeamajoremitterofGHGandhasindicatedits intentiontooptfor ‘green’
energysourcesinthequesttoreduceemissions.5SouthAfricapresentlygenerates6%
ofitselectricityfromnuclearenergy6andspeakingattheAfricaEnergyIndabaheldin
JohannesburginFebruary2013,EnergyMinisterDipuoPetersreaffirmedthatthecountry
plannedtoreduceitscarbonfootprintthroughtheuseofnewnuclearinstallations.7
Eskom, thestate-ownedpowerutility,canno longer fullymeetgrowingnational
energydemandsthroughitsageingnuclearandconventionalinfrastructure,hencethe
SouthAfricangovernment’sannouncementofitsintentiontoexpandnuclearenergyas
partofthecountry’stotalenergymix.8Itproposestobuilda‘fleet’ofsixnewnuclear
powerstations,togetherexpectedtoadd9600MWtoSouthAfrica’spowergeneration
capacity,by2020.9
Perhapscolouredby thepastmilitaryconnotationsof itsnuclearcapacity,South
Africa’scurrentintentionsinthefieldofenergygenerationmightbeexpectedtoraise
domesticandinternationalpoliticalconcerns.Inaddition,thedevelopmentofnuclear
energyisanexpensiveundertaking,whichinadevelopingeconomysuchasSouthAfrica’s
mightdivertresourcesfromcheaperenergysources,andfromurgentlyneededsocial
projects.Unquestionablyalso,somecountrieshaveusedthepursuitofnuclearenergy,and
inparticularitsmilitaryovertones,asapoliticaltooltoenhanceinternationalstatusand
prestige(asIranhasdone,forexample),whichmightalsoaccountforsomemisgivingsas
tothegovernment’smotivation.
This paper aims to address some of the main issues in respect of South Africa’s
nuclearfuture,includingthecountry’sgrowingenergydemands,itsnuclearagenciesand
structures,itsnucleardiplomacywithAfricaandtherestoftheworld,theroleofpublic
opinion,andsomemoregeneralconcernsaboutitsnuclearfuture.
G r o W I n G e n e r G y n e e d S
SouthAfrica’sgrowingenergyneedsaredrivenbyfourmainissues:rapidpopulation
growth, an ageing energy infrastructure, and an energy-intensive socio-economic
developmentagendathatdemandsmajorinfrastructuraldevelopmentandindustrialisation
programmes.Asregardsthefirstofthese,thepopulationincreasedfrom40.5millionin
1996to51.7millionin201110andatleast4.3millionhouseholdshavenoaccessto
electricity.11Onthismeasurealone,thepresentlevelofelectrificationinSouthAfrica,at
73%,istoolowbutevenso,agapofabout90TWhexistsbetweensupplyanddemand.12
ThesecondproblemisthatofEskom’sageingcoal-firedandnuclearpowerstations,
whicharenotclosingthatgap.Someconventionalpowerplantswereconstructedinthe
1950s,13andnuclearpowerhasbeengeneratedforalmost30yearsfromthesamefacility–
Eskom’ssinglenuclearpowerstationatKoeberg,approximately30kmnorthwestofCape
Town(seeTable1).
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Table 1: South Africa’s nuclear power reactors
Reactor: code ZA-1 ZA-2
Reactor: name Koeberg-1 Koeberg-2
Type PWR PWR
Model CPI CPI
Capacity: Thermal 2 775 2 775
Gross 970 940
Nett 930 900
NSSS Supplier framatome framatome
Construction start July 1976 July 1976
Grid connection April 1984 July 1985
Commercial operation July 1984 November 1985
Source:IAEA,NuclearPowerReactorsintheWorld,Vienna,IAEA,2012,p.41.
Figure 2: South Africa’s nuclear electricity production and share, 1980–2011
2
4
6
8
12
14
10
Shar
e (%
)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011
TW(e) 0 5.39 8.47 11.29 13 12.24 12 12.94
Share (%) 0 4.2 5.6 6.5 6.6 5.5 5.2 5.2
0
Source:IAEA,NuclearPowerReactorsintheWorld,Vienna:IAEA,2012,p.18.
Eskomistheowner-operatorofKoebergandasindicatedinFigure2hasincreasedboth
itsproductionofnuclearelectricityandnuclear’sshareoftotalpowergeneration.The
KoebergIand2pressurisedwaterreactors(PWRs)haveacombinedinstalledcapacity
of1 840MWbutincreasingdemandshavestrainedKoeberg’sunits,resultinginregular
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shutdownsforinspection,maintenanceorrefuelling,andunforeseentripping14dueto
rapidlyageingplant(itsreactorshavebeingoperationalsince1984and1985respectively).
Therefuellingcycleofeachunittakesapproximately18monthsandhastobecarriedout
mainlyinsummerwhenpowerdemandislower;15in2012Koeberg1wasofflinefrom
7Septemberto25Novemberduetoafaultinoneofitsgenerators.16Aspartofitsattempt
tocurboutages,Eskomin2011adoptedtheKoebergBusinessPlan,whichcontainsa
newoutagestrategy.17AprojectisnowunderwaytoextendKoeberg’soriginalprojected
life spanof30 to40years,18 forwhichEskomhasissuedanexpressionofinterest
tenderforthedesign,manufactureandinstallationofsixnewsteamgeneratorsatKoeberg
in2016–2017.19KoebergsuppliesmostofWesternCapeProvince’spowerneedsand
contributes6%oftotalcapacitytothenationalpowergrid.20
In2007Eskomsolicitedbidsforafleetofupto12nuclearpowerreactors,butthe
processstalledinthewakeofthe2008globalfinancialcrisisandrenewedappreciation
ofthevalueofSouthAfrica’slargedepositsofcoalasasourceforcarbon-intensivepower
production.21Widespreadpoweroutagesand ‘load-shedding’ in2008galvanised the
SouthAfricangovernmentintoadoptingitsNuclearEnergyPolicy,publishedinJuneof
thatyear.Thispolicy,however,becamesomethingofaside-issueinpoliticalturmoilthat
followedtheSeptember2008nationalconferenceoftheAfricanNationalCongress(ANC)
atPolokwane,whenincumbentPresidentThaboMbekiwasdeposed.Mbeki’ssuccessor,
KgalemaMotlanthe,didnotremainpresidentlongenoughtoimplementthepolicy.22
FollowingtheinaugurationofPresidentJacobZumain2009,however,nuclearenergy
receivedsomewhatmoreattention;Zuma’saccessiontoofficehappenedatalmostthe
sametimeastheAfricanNuclearWeaponsFreeZoneTreaty(thePelindabaTreaty)came
intoforceon15July2009,whichinturnraisedawarenessoftheadvantagesofnuclear
energyforthecontinent.
ClimatechangeissuesareathirddeterminantinSouthAfrica’senergychoices.South
Africaistheworld’ssixthlargestproducerofcoalandits fifthbiggestexporter.Asa
majoremitterofGHG,largelygeneratedbyitscoal-firedpowerstations,SouthAfricahas
undertakentoreduceitscarbonemissionsby34%in2020and42%by2025.23Despiteits
environmentalimpactandthenationalcommitmenttomeetingemissiontargets,however,
coal-basedpowergeneration24willremainthe’mainstay’ofSouthAfrica’spowersupply
fortheforeseeablefuture’accordingtoDeputyPresidentKgalemaMotlanthe.25
The fourthdriverof SouthAfrica’s growingenergydemands is thegovernment’s
ambitiouseconomicdevelopmentplans.TheseareoutlinedforexampleinVision 2030,
theNationalDevelopmentPlan(NDP)oftheNationalPlanningCommission;according
towhichthegovernmentintendstospendaboutSouthAfricanRand(ZAR)4trillion
duringthenext15yearsoninfrastructuredevelopment.26Realisingdevelopmentgoals
ofthisorderwouldfurtherstrainscarceenergyresources,notleastbecauseEskom’snew
4800MWcoal-firedpowerstation,KusileinMpumalangaProvince,willcomeonline
onlyin2018.27
In2011thegovernmentapprovedtheIntegratedResourcesPlan(IRP)2010–2030.
Thistakesa20-yearprojectionofSouthAfrica’selectricitysupplyanddemandwhich
forecaststhatin20years’timeabout42%ofelectricitygeneratedinSouthAfricawillhave
tocomefromrenewableresources;itthereforeprovidesfortheincorporationof9.6GW
ofnuclearpowerand17.8GWofotherrenewableenergyby2030.Theplanoptedfora
nuclearfleet,insteadofoneortwonuclearunits,withatotaloutputof9.6GW.28
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The adoption of the IRP coincided with the establishment of the Presidential
InfrastructureCoordinationCommission(PICC)inJuly2011.InFebruary2012,the
PICCadoptedtheNationalInfrastructurePlan(NIP)whichprioritised300projects,
consolidatedinto18StrategicIntegratedProjects(SIPs).Threeofthe18SIPsconcern
energy:theyarefirst,thedevelopmentofagreeneconomy(SIP8),secondelectricity
generation(SIP9),andthirdelectricitytransmissionanddistribution(SIP10).29These
SIPs,amongothers,pavedthewayforthegovernmenttosignthefirst28renewable
energyprojectagreementswithindependentpowerproducers(IPPs)inNovember2012.
Thesewillresultintheprocurementofabout7800MWofbaseloadcapacityfromIPPs
by2025,aswellasafurther3200MWofrenewablesby2020;andareinadditiontothe
3725MWcurrentlyprocuredfromIPPs.30IntermsofitsRenewableEnergyIndependent
PowerProducerProgrammethegovernmentisanticipatinginvestmentsofZAR47billion
fromIPPsintherenewableenergyprogramme.31Thereisafurtherconsiderationthat
thesedevelopmentswillcreatealargenumberofjobs.32
n u c L e A r d e c I S I o n m A K e r S
TheSouthAfricangovernment‘seffortstoaddressgrowingenergydemanddateback
someyears.In2008itadoptedtheNuclearEnergyPolicy,33atwhichtimethecabinetalso
approvedthereviewedNationalEnergyEfficiencyStrategy(NEES)andthegazettingof
adraftNEESsecondreviewdocumentforpubliccomment.Thereviewprocessanalysed
energyusagepatternsofvariouseconomicsectorsandexaminedthepotentialforadopting
modernenergymanagementpracticesandtechnologies,basedonadviceandopinionfrom
internationalexperts.Italsosetthesceneforfutureenergyreductiontargetsandtheusage
ofenergyresources.34
Thestrongestrecentindicationofthegovernment’sintentiontopursuenuclearenergy
activelywastheNovember2011cabinetapprovaloftheestablishmentoftheNational
NuclearEnergyExecutiveCoordinationCommittee (NNEECC)as theauthority for
decision-making,monitoring,andgeneraloversightof thenuclearenergyexpansion
programme.35AnexecutivebodyledbyDeputyPresidentMotlanthe,italsoincludesat
leasteightcabinetministers(seeTable2).
Table 2: National Nuclear Energy Executive Co-ordinating Committee as of May 2013
Deputy PresidentKgalema Motlanthe
(Chair)
Minister in the Presidencytrevor Manuel
(also head of the National Planning Commission)
Energy ministerDipuo Peters (Deputy chair)
Trade and industry minister
Rob Davies
Finance ministerPravin Gordhan
Public enterprises ministerMalusi Gigaba
Science and technology minister
Naledi Pandor
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High education and training ministerBlade Nzimande
Economic development minister
Ebrahim Patel
Water and environmental affairs ministerEdna Molewa
Eskom NNR Necsa
NNEECC supported byNuclear Energy technical Committee
(Departmental Directors-general (of ministers represented in the NNEECC)
Source:DOE,IAEA,http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/pr/2012/Media%20Statement%20-%20
INIR%20IAEA%20Mission%201-%2017%20Oct%202012%20(2)[1].pdf.
Another indication of government interest is its initiation of an Integrated Nuclear
InfrastructureReview(INIR).The INIR isapeer-reviewedassessmentconductedby
internationalexpertsonnuclearenergy,coordinatedbytheIAEA,tosupportcountries
indevelopingtheirnuclearcapacitybydeterminingtheirinfrastructurestatusandneeds.
ThefirststepforcountriesundergoinganINIRisaself-assessmentbasedontheapproach
outlinedintheIAEAMilestonesandEvaluationpublications;thisrequiresadetailedself-
assessmentof19nuclearinfrastructureissues,specifictotheconditionsoftheparticular
country.36TheIAEArequiresall19tobeassessedwhendeterminingacountry’sreadiness
fornuclearenergyexpansion.Thecriteriaaddressissuesrespectivelyof:
• nationalpositiononnuclearpower(sic);
• nuclearsafety;
• management;
• legislation;
• fundingandfinancing;
• safeguards;
• regulatoryframework;
• radiationprotection;
• electricalgrid;
• resourcedevelopment;
• stakeholderinvolvement;
• sitingandsupportfacilities;
• environmentalprotection;
• emergencyplanning;
• securityandphysicalprotection;
• nuclearfuelcycle;
• radioactivewaste;
• industrialinvolvement;and
• procurementstructures.37
TheSouthAfricangovernmentadoptedtheMilestoneapproachandbyJune2012the
NNEECChaddevelopedtheself-evaluationreport.AnINIRmissionvisitedthecountry
from30Januaryto8February2013followingapre-missionworkshopwithrelevant
SouthAfricanstakeholderson15–17October2012,designedtoprovidecommentonthe
self-evaluationreport,andtodefinethescope,workplan,andlogisticalarrangements
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forthe2013INIRMission.38ThedirectorgeneraloftheIAEAvisitedthecountryduring
themission;accordingtohimtheIAEAcarriedouta ‘thoroughreviewofallareasof
SouthAfrica’snuclearinfrastructure’.39Themissionalsoidentified‘strengthsinseveral
areassupportingboththeexistingandnewbuildprogramme,includingregulatoryself-
assessment,environmentalimpactassessment,electricitypowergriddevelopment,and
stakeholderinvolvement’.40Italsoresultedinrecommendationstofurtherstrengthenthe
country’snuclearinfrastructure.
S t A t e - o W n e d n u c L e A r e n t e r P r I S e S
EskomandtheNuclearEnergyCorporationofSouthAfrica(Necsa)arethetwomajor
state-ownednuclearenterprises(SOEs).Necsawasestablishedasasuccessor to the
nuclearcorporationsoftheNationalPartygovernment,whichleftofficein1994.The
SOEscontrolthreemajornuclearfacilities:Koeberg,ownedandoperatedbyEskom,and
twoNecsafacilities,respectivelyatPelindaba,westofPretoria,andVaalputs,southeastof
SpringbokintheNorthernCapeProvince,whichisthesiteoftheNationalRadioactive
WasteDisposalplant.Necsamanagesandoperatesboththelatterfacilitiesonbehalfof
theNationalRadioactiveWasteDisposalInstitute.
IntermsoftheNuclearEnergyActof1999Necsaundertakesandpromotesresearch
anddevelopmentinthefieldofnuclearenergyandradiationsciencesandtechnology.
It isalso responsible forprocessingsourcematerial, includinguraniumenrichment.
Necsaisalsoacommercialoperationwithseveralsubsidiaries(seeFigure3).Oneof
these,NTPRadioisotopes,istheNecsagroup’smainsourceofrevenuewithexportsof
ZAR842millionto60countriesin2012;Pelindaba-basedPelchem,whichhandlesNecsa’s
fluorochemicalinterests,achievedZAR186.1millioninsalesforthesameperiod,4.9%
higherthanin2011.41Necsaisalsotheowner-operatoroftheSouthAfricanFundamental
AtomicInstallation(Safari-1)reactor,commissionedin1965.
Figure 3: The Necsa group of companies
Necsa
NPt Logistics
Gammatec NDt plus five subidiaries
Cyclotope
AEC Amersham (with subsidiary Pharmatopes)
Limited Electronics South Africa
Subsidiariesfluoro Pack, fluorochem, fluoropharm
Pelchem operating activities such as various plants and contracts
NtP Radioisotopes Pelchem
Source:Necsa,Annual Report 2012.
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Necsa isexpectedtoplaya leadingrole inthenuclear fuelcycleandinuranium
enrichment.Concernshavebeenexpressedinparliament,however,overaZAR31million
cutinthegovernment’sgranttoNecsafor2012–2013,toZAR455fromZAR486million
thepreviousyear,areductionthatpresumablyincreasestheriskthatNecsawillbeunable
tomeetitslegislativeandpolicymandates.42
r e G u L A t o r y e n v I r o n m e n t
SouthAfrica’snuclearactivities for themostpart fallunder theNuclearEnergyand
NationalNuclearRegulator(NNR)actsof1999,andthe2008NationalRadioactiveWaste
DisposalInstituteAct.Againstthisexistinglegislationandregulatoryframework,South
Africaisconsideringstrengtheningthelegislativeandregulatorystructurebyimproving
regulatoryoversightandthefunctioningoftheNNR.43
TheNNRreplacedtheCouncilforNuclearSafety(CNS).Itoverseesandenforces
nuclearsafetystandardsattendingtheoperationofnuclearfacilities,thepreventionof
nuclearaccidentsandthemitigationoftheresultsofanysuchevents.TheNNRregulates
thefollowingareasandfacilities:
• thecompletenuclearfuelcycle;
• uraniumexploration;
• uraniumminingandmilling;
• uraniumenrichment;
• fuelfabrication;
• Koebergnuclearpowerplant;
• wastemanagement(Vaalputs);
• theSafari-1researchreactor;
• decommissioningofnuclearvessels;and
• minesandscrapmetaldealers.44
Suchactivitiesembrace,amongothers,thelicensingofvisitingnuclearsubmarinesand
surfacevessels,includingsomefromtheUS(USSGeorge Washington,USSEnterprise,USS
Theodore Roosevelt),theUK(HMSTurbulent,HMSSceptre,HMSTalent)andRussia(the
battlecruiserPetr Velikiy);andtheissuingof42nuclearinstallationauthorisationsand
147certificatesofregistration.45
Inanticipationof itsextendedroleinoverseeingtheforthcomingfleetofnuclear
installations,theNNR’sbudgetallocationhasrisenfromZAR30.9millionfor2012–2013
toZAR31.6millionfor2013–2014,andtheregulatorhasrestructureditsorganisation.46
TheNNRhasalsoproposedamendmentstoitsenablingNNRAct47andinadditionis
developingacomprehensiveregulatoryframeworkwhilereviewingcapacityrequirements
inlinewithitsstrategyandstructure.48
SouthAfrica’sdual-usecapabilitiesareregulatedandcontrolledbytheSouthAfrican
Council for theNon-ProliferationofWeaponsofMassDestruction(NPC).Dual-use
capabilities are thosenational capacities in technology, expertise, services,material,
equipmentand facilities thatcancontribute to theproliferationofweaponsofmass
destructionbutcouldalsobeusedforconventionalmilitaryorcommercialpurposes.
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Dual-useitemsandtechnologiesaresubjecttotheMissileTechnologyControlRegime,an
informalpartnershipof34countriesaimedatcontrollingtheproliferationofsignificant
aerialmilitarynucleartechnology,andtheNuclearSupplier’sGroup(NSG)ofnations,
ofwhichSouthAfricaisamember.49In2011MinisterofStateSecuritySiyabongaCwele
indicatedthatprogresshadbeenmadeonaNationalSecurityStrategyandthatdual-use
technologyhasbeenidentifiedasa‘strategicsector’.AdepartmentaltaskteamfromSouth
Africa’sStateSecurityAgencyisconductinganassessmentofresourcesandactivities
relatedtonuclear,biological,chemical,aerospaceandmissiletechnologies,andisexpected
to develop a national strategy for promoting research, technological development,
innovation,co-ordination,integrationandoversightindual-usetechnologies.50
r e S o u r c e n A t I o n A L I S m
Oneofthecharacteristicsofglobalenergyacquisitionoverthepastfewdecadeshasbeen
thegrowthof‘resourcenationalism’–thetendencyofnations,especiallyinthedeveloping
world,toassertaggressivelytheirsovereigntyoverthenaturalresourceswithintheir
boundaries.Sincetheearly1990sSouthAfricahasshownincreasingevidenceoffollowing
thesamepath.Accordingtoindustrysourcesgovernmentpoliciesareaimedatsecuring
SouthAfrica’ssupplyofuraniumfor40–60years.51
ThevalueofSouthAfrica’stotalmineralreservesisestimatedatZAR18trillion52
andminingandrelatedindustriesemployapproximatelyonemillionpeople,contribute
18%togrossdomesticproductandpaynearly20%ofallcorporatetaxes.53SouthAfrica
accountsfor8%ofworlduraniumreservesandisthetenthlargesturaniumproducer,54
althoughitsoutputhasfallenoverthepastfewyears(seeFigure4).
Figure 4: South Africa’s uranium production (1 000kg)
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
3 000
3 500
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Source:DepartmentofMineralResources,http://www.dmr.gov.za.
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G O v E R N A N C E O f A f R I C A ’ S R E S O U R C E S P R O G R A M M E
ThesectorinSouthAfricaisprivatelyownedandin2011domesticminingcompanies
produced 656 tonnes of uranium (tU).55 More than 30 domestic uranium mining
companiesareactiveinSouthAfrica,56whileforeign-ownedand-registeredenterprises
operatinginthesectorincludeAreva(France),FirstUraniumCorporation(Canada),
LeopardResources(Australia),ShivaUranium(IndianandSouthAfricaninvestors)and
UK-basedUraMinIncorporated,nowabsorbedbyAreva.
ThedeclineinSouthAfrica’suraniumproductionamongotherreasonsisassociated
with a fall in the uranium spot price (see Figure 5), continuing global economic
difficulties,anda lackof investorconfidence inSouthAfrica’sminingsector.Global
demandforuranium,however,isincreasing:China,forexample,hasambitiousnuclear
powerexpansionplanswhichwillrequire10000tonnesofuraniumoxide(U3O8)by
2020.57Tohelpmeetthisdemand,ChinesefirmsareprospectingforuraniuminNamibia,
NigerandZimbabwe.58
Figure 5: Uranium spot price, 2008–2012
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
80
85
90
95
75
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source:MiningInvestor.net,‘5yearuraniumspotchart’,5December2012,http://www.mininginves-
tor.net/uranium-spot-price-chart/?qm_page=32590.
Annualdemandfromtheworld’snuclearreactors,whichpresentlyhaveacombined
generatingcapacityof375gigawattelectrical(GWe),is68000tU59andaccordingtothe
annualjointIAEA-OECD(OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment)
publication,Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand(theso-called‘RedBook’),this
isexpectedtorise.TheRedBookestimatesthatglobaluraniumdemandwillincreaseto
between97645tUand136385tUby2035,anamountrequiredtofeednuclearreactors
whichbythenwillprobablyhaveacombinedcapacityof540–746GWe.60
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SouthAfricadoesnotitselfenrichuraniumforitspowergeneration.Insteadthese
servicesareprovidedbyinternationalcorporationssuchasAreva(France),Westinghouse
ElectricCompany(Japan/US),Tenex(Russia)andUrenco(Germany,TheNetherlands
andUK).61TheGermanfirmNukemplayedapartinthedevelopmentoftheinnovative
PebbleBedModularReactor(PBMR)andtheRussianNuclearEnergyStateCorporation
(Rosatom) was involved in the isotope sector in South Africa. Areva and Toshiba’s
Westinghouse at present supply Koeberg’s two reactors with 30 tonnes of enriched
uraniumannually.62
In2007PublicEnterprisesMinisterAlexErwinannouncedthattheSouthAfrican
governmenthasdeclareduraniuma‘strategicmineral’.63Atthesametimetheministerof
mineralsandenergyannouncedthatdeclaringuraniumastrategicmineral‘wouldlead
tomorecontrolsoveritsproductionandexportationtoensurethatSouthAfricahas
adequatereservesofthemineralinyearstocome’.64Againstthisbackground,inJune
2011thegovernmentreleaseda‘beneficiationstrategy’forthemineralsindustrywhich
definedbeneficiationasthe‘transformationofamineral(oracombinationofminerals)
toahighervalueproduct,whichcaneitherbeconsumedlocallyorexported’andisa
termusedinterchangeablywith‘valueaddition’.65Thestrategyidentifiesten‘strategic
mineralcommodities’ includinguraniumandthorium,whichareusedas fuel inthe
nuclearindustry.66SouthAfrica’suraniumenrichment(thatis,beneficiation)facilities
(theso-calledY-andZ-Plants)werecloseddownafterSouthAfricajoinedtheTreaty
fortheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons(NPT)in1991;hencethecountrynow
exportsonlyU3O8material from the firstphaseofbeneficiation, and imports all its
enricheduranium.67Inordertoaccomplishthebeneficiationofuraniumthe2011strategy
proposesinterventionssuchasquantificationofSouthAfrica’suraniumand/orthorium
reservesandresources; investigations into theeconomic feasibilityof re-establishing
uraniumenrichment;planningfornuclearwastetreatmentandminerehabilitation;and
thefinalisationofthenationaluraniumpolicywithrelevantstakeholders.68
SouthAfrica’sgrowingresourcenationalismwasfurtherillustratedwhenPresident
Zuma,whileattendingtheMarch2012NuclearSecuritySummit(NSS)inSeoul,South
Korea,insistedthatSouthAfricareservedtherighttoenrichuraniumto‘anylevel’despite
globalattemptstocurbtheuseofhighly-enricheduranium(HEU),nowconsideredto
beanationalstrategicasset.69ZumaalsostatedthatdespitepressurefromtheUS,South
AfricawouldretaincontroloftheHEUderivedfromthenuclearweaponsprogrammeit
abandonedinthe1990s,seeminglyresentfulofthe2011repatriationtotheUSof6.3kg
oftheseveralhundredkgofHEUitholdsinstore.70Anotherillustrationofincreasing
resourcenationalismisastatementbytheministerofenergythatSouthAfrica’snuclear
programmeisalsoconcernedwiththebeneficiationofmineralresources,inparticularof
uranium;togetherwithpresumptionsoftheintenttowhichthenuclearpowerindustry
wouldcreateadditionalemploymentthroughtheuraniumminingandfuelmanufacturing
sector.71
Feasibilitystudiesrelatingtothere-establishmentofnuclearfuelcycleprogrammes
inSouthAfricawerecompletedin2011.72Necsa’spre-feasibilitystudies,incollaboration
withpotentialpartnersintheestablishmentofauraniumenrichmentfacility,aregoing
aheadandithasbeenagreedthatthestudywouldbereviewedeverytwoyears.73South
Africa’sproposednuclear installationsareexpected toconsumeabout465tonnesof
enricheduraniumannuallyby2030(seeFigure6).Necsa’sstudieshaveconcludedthatit
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G O v E R N A N C E O f A f R I C A ’ S R E S O U R C E S P R O G R A M M E
isthereforecommerciallyviabletorevivethenuclearvaluechain,includingenrichment,
conversionandnuclear fuelmanufacturing, to reduceSouthAfrica’sdependenceon
foreignsources,74andthecompanyhasexpresseditsintenttoestablishacapacityto
producenuclearfuelsandfuelfabricationfacilitiesforPWRs‘toensureeventualsecurity
offuelsupplyforSouthAfrica’.75
Figure 6: South Africa’s annual reactor-related uranium requirements, 2010–2035
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
Tonn
es u
rani
um
2010 2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Low demand (tU) 290 290 290 290 595 875 1155
High demand (tU) 290 290 290 290 1155 1715 2275
0
Source:OECDNuclearEnergyAgency(NEA)andIAEAhttp://wwweth.cern.ch/~dittmar/thoiry/
U2011.pdf.
In 2011 President Zuma reactivated the African Exploration Mining and Financing
Company(AEMFC),apreviouslydormantstate-ownedminingcorporationestablished
in1944andcurrently a subsidiaryof the state-ownedCentralEnergyFund (CEF).
TheAEMFCwillconsolidategovernment’sminingassetsandinterestsandconcentrate
ondeclaredstrategicmineralssuchasuraniumandcoal.76Itsprincipalactivitiesare
toacquireandholdprospectingandminingrightsforthestate,toperformgeological
explorationandfeasibilitystudies,todevelopmines,andtoengageinminingoperations.77
Inthe2011–2012financialyear,however,thecompanyincurredanetlossofZAR48.8
million;almostdoubleits2011losses,indicatingthatlikeotherSOEstheAEMFCis
notaviableoperation.78Thisperceptionnotwithstanding,inOctober2012theminister
ofmineralresources,calledforgreaterinvolvementoftheAEMFCintheSouthAfrican
miningindustry,79echoinganearlierstatementbyPresidentZumathatthestate’must
activelyparticipateintheminingindustrytoensurethatournationalinterestisprotected
andadvanced’.80
InDecember2012,thecabinetapprovedtheDraftMineralandPetroleumResources
DevelopmentAmendmentBill.Amongotherthingsthisaimstoregulatetheexploitation
ofassociatedminerals,andprovidesfortheimplementationofanapprovedbeneficiation
strategythroughwhichstrategicmineralscanbeprocesseddomestically.81Thegovernment
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isalsodevelopinganuclearfuelcyclestrategyforthebeneficiationofuraniumresources
andtoestablishauraniumconversionplant,auraniumenrichmentplant,andafuel
fabricationplant.82SouthAfrica’sintentionsinthisrespectarealsoevidentinthe2012
DefenceReview,whichstatesthatitisintheSouthAfricannationalinteresttosecure
‘fundamentalresources,minerals(and)energy’.83
Resourcenationalismisalsoevident inSouthAfrica’sopposition to international
nuclearfuelbanksandenrichmentfacilities(seeTable3).84In2007Russiaestablished
theInternationalUraniumEnrichmentCentre(IUEC)thefirstinternationalenrichment
facility,withaviewtoallowingallcountriespursuingpeacefulnuclearenergyunimpeded
accesstothenuclearfuelcycle.ItscurrentmembersareRussia,Kazakhstan,Armeniaand
Ukraine.Rosatomholds70%ofitsshares.IntermsofanagreementwiththeIAEAthe
IUEChastomakematerialavailabletoanycountrydesignatedbythedirector-generalof
theIAEA.85TheUS,GermanyandtheUKarealsoconsideringestablishingnuclearfuel
facilities.86
Table 3: International uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel centres
International Uranium
Enrichment Centre
IAEA LEU bank American Assured Fuel Supply (AFS)
Location Russia to be determined; Kazakhstan has offered to host
US
Date of operation, authorisation or announcement
Operational since 17 December 2010
IAEA Board authorised, established 3 December 2010
Announced in August 2011
Owner Russian government through majority share in Rosatom
IAEA US government
Uranium enrichment levels
2–4.95% 2–4.95% 2–4.95%
LEU reserve (tonnes) 120 to be determined 230
Cost valued at $300 million
Donors pledged $125 million and EUR 25 million to cover establishment and initial operational expenses
Not available
Source:OECDNuclearEnergyAgency(NEA)andIAEA,Uranium2011:resources,productionand
demand,Paris,OECDNEA&IAEA,2012,pp.120–121;http://wwweth.cern.ch/~dittmar/thoiry/
U2011.pdf.
S o u t h A f r I c A ’ S n u c L e A r d I P L o m A c y
SouthAfrica isoneofvery fewcountries–othersbeingBrazil andLibya– tohave
voluntarilyterminateditsnuclearweaponsprogramme;theprocessbeganin1989and
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G O v E R N A N C E O f A f R I C A ’ S R E S O U R C E S P R O G R A M M E
endedin1993.87FollowingverificationoftheterminationoftheprogrammebytheIAEA
inthelatteryear,SouthAfrica’snucleardiplomacychangedfromadefenceorientation
tooneoffocusonthepeacefulusesofnuclearenergy,nuclearnon-proliferationand
nucleardisarmament.Ithasbeenlaudedespeciallyforitsbridge-buildingroleatvarious
conferencesoftheNPT.
Leavingasidethedismantlingofitsnuclearweaponsprogramme,thepost-1990period
hasbeenadynamictimeintermsofSouthAfrica’sinternationalrelationsanddiplomacy.
Between1990and2010itestablishednumerousbilateralrelations,accededtotheNPT(in
1991)andjoinedorre-joinedseveralnuclear-relatedorganisations,includingtheIAEA,
theWassenaarArrangementonExportControlsforConventionalArmsandDual-Use
GoodsandTechnologies,theNuclearSuppliersGroup,theZanggerCommitteeofnuclear
exporters,theNetworkofRegulatorsofCountrieswithSmallNuclearProgrammes,the
AfricanNuclearRegulators’GroupandtheGenerationIVInternationalForum.
SouthAfricahasreiteratedthata‘primarygoal’ofitsforeignpolicyisto‘reinforce
andpromote[itself]asaresponsibleproducer,possessorandtraderofdefence-related
productsandadvanced technologies in thenuclear,biological, chemicalandmissile
fields’.88ThegovernmentarguesthatSouthAfricainthisway‘promotesthebenefitswhich
non-proliferation,disarmamentandarmscontrolholdforinternationalpeaceandsecurity,
particularlytocountriesinAfricaandtheNon-AlignedMovement’.89
SouthAfricawasa founder-memberof the IAEAin1957.Today, it serveson the
IAEAboardofgovernorsandhassignedseveralmultilateralnuclear-relatedagreements;
respectivelythe:
• AgreementonthePrivilegesandImmunitiesoftheIAEA;
• ConventiononthePhysicalProtectionofNuclearMaterial;
• ConventiononEarlyNotificationofaNuclearAccident;
• ConventiononAssistanceintheCaseofaNuclearAccidentorRadiological
Emergency;
• ConventiononNuclearSafety;
• JointConventionontheSafetyofSpentFuelManagementandontheSafetyof
RadioactiveWasteManagement;
• RevisedSupplementaryAgreementConcerningtheProvisionofTechnicalAssistance
bytheIAEA(RSA);and
• AfricanRegionalCo-operativeAgreementforResearch,DevelopmentandTraining
RelatedtoNuclearScienceandTechnology(AFRA).
IthasalsosignedasafeguardsagreementandanadditionalprotocolwiththeIAEA.90
Ratificationoftheseagreementsisindicativeofashiftfromasecretiveapproachtonuclear
issuestoapolicysomewhatlessopaqueandmorecompliantwithinternationally-accepted
norms.Severalissuesrelatingtothecountry’snucleardiplomacyarepertinentinthis
respect.AmongotherstheyincludeSouthAfrica’snucleardiplomacywithotherAfrican
countriesandwithIran,anditsresponsestocountriescultivatingSouthAfricaaspotential
contractorsforthenewnuclearfleet.
S O U t h A f R I C A ' S N U C L E A R f U t U R E
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Africa
InDecember2012thecabinetapprovedanamendedwhitepaperonSouthAfrica’sforeign
policyforsubmissiontoparliament.Thedraftwhitepaperusestheframeworkofthe
‘Diplomacyof“Ubuntu”’toexplainSouthAfrica’sforeignpolicy,andcitesAfricaasone
ofthepillarsuponwhichspecialstressisplaced.91InthelightofSouthAfrica’snuclear
diplomacywiththerestofthecontinentitisespeciallyimportantthat13otherAfrican
countries(Algeria,Egypt,Ghana,Kenya,Libya,Morocco,Namibia,Nigeria,Senegal,
Sudan,Tanzania,Tunisia andUganda), are considering thedevelopmentofnuclear
energy.92Apartfromitsbilateralandmultilateralco-operationonnuclearissuesonthe
continent,SouthAfricahostsand leads theAfricanCommissiononNuclearEnergy
(Afcone), thecompliancemechanismof thePelindabaTreaty,whichcameinto force
15July2009.SouthAfricaisintheprocessoffinalisingahostagreementwithAfcone;
AtnatiwosZelekeMeshesha,anAfconecommissioner,summarisedthemainelements
ofthePelindabaTreatyastherenunciationofnuclearexplosivedevices;theprevention
ofstationingnuclearexplosivedevices;prohibitionontestingnuclearexplosivedevices;
declaration,dismantling,destructionorconversionofnuclearexplosivedevicesand
thefacilitiesfortheirmanufacture;theconductofpeacefulnuclearactivities;physical
protectionofnuclearmaterialsandfacilities;prohibitionofarmedattacksonnuclear
installations;andexchangeofinformation.93
SouthAfricahassignedaZAR15millionagreementwiththeIAEAtopromotehuman
capitaldevelopmentandknowledge-sharing in technology inAfrica. In termsof the
agreementSouthAfricaandtheIAEAwillfocusonagricultureandlivestockproduction,
humanhealth,waterresourcedevelopment,environmentalmanagementandintegrated
pollutioncontrol, energy,humancapital fornuclear scienceand technology,andon
capacitybuildinginAfrica.94
Iran
SouthAfricahasconsistentlyexpresseditssupportforthe‘inalienableright’ofallstates,
especiallydevelopingcountries,todevelopnuclearenergyforpeacefulpurposeswithin
theframeworkoftheNPT.95ThishasresultedinstrongsupportforIran,althoughitis
suspectedofdevelopinganuclearweaponsprogramme.96Inthisregard,inJuly2012
SouthAfricasuspendeditsambassadortoIran,YusufSaloojee,followingaccusations
bytheSouthAfricanmobiletelephoneoperatorMTNthattheenvoyhadtakenbribes
toinfluenceSouthAfrica’svotingbehaviourintheIAEAandUNtowardsupportfor
Iran.97DuringOctober2012,however,whenSouthAfricawasservingasanon-permanent
memberoftheUNSecurityCouncil,thecountrysuspendedallimportsofcrudeoilfrom
IranforafifthconsecutivemonthincompliancewithSecurityCouncilsanctionsagainst
Iran.WhereasSouthAfricapreviouslyimported25%ofitscrudeoilfromIran,ithas
nowdiversifieditssuppliersincompliancewiththeUNsanctionstoalternativesources
includingAngola,EquatorialGuinea,Nigeria,SaudiArabia,andtheUnitedArabEmirates.
TheUSgrantedexemptionstoSouthAfricatoimportIranianoil,butsuchimportsare
stillsubjecttoEUsanctionsthatpreventinsurancecompaniesunderwritingoilshipments
fromIran.SouthAfricanlobbyingfortheEUtograntwaivershasbeenunsuccessful.This
placesadditionalstrainonSouthAfrica’sgrowingenergydemandsassomeofthecountry’s
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G O v E R N A N C E O f A f R I C A ’ S R E S O U R C E S P R O G R A M M E
refineriesaredesignedtotreatonlyIranian-typecrude.ReplacingIranasasourcewould
becostlyandmightresultinarepeatofdisruptionsinfuelsuppliesexperiencedin2011,
whentheIranianproblemfirstsurfaced.98
Foreign ‘courtiers’
Since the SouthAfricangovernment’s announcementof its proposednuclearpower
programme it has been courted by major global nuclear corporations such as the
FrenchandRussianstate-ownednuclearutilitiesArevaandRosatom.InOctober2012
a delegation representing some 40 French business enterprises, including nuclear
contractors, visited South Africa for a conference on business ties between the two
countries.99Inthereversedirection,agovernment-leddelegationincludingSouthAfrican
nuclearcompaniesandrepresentativesoftheNuclearIndustryAssociationofSouthAfrica
visitedRussiainNovember2012.MeetingswereheldwithRosatomsubsidiariesNizhny
NovgorodEngineeringCompanyAtomenergoproekt,whichoffersengineeringservices
innuclearpowerplantprojects(NPPs),andAtomstroyexport,whichspecialisesinthe
constructionofNPPsoutsideRussia.Thevisittookplaceinthecontextofamemorandum
ofunderstandingsignedbetweenNecsaandtheRosatomaffiliateRosatomOverseas.South
Africa’sNationalNuclearRegulator(NNR)hasalsosignedaco-operationagreementwith
theRussiannuclearregulator,Rostekhnadzor,coveringradiationandnuclearsafetyand
security.100NuclearissuesalsocameunderconsiderationinNovember2012atthe11th
sessionoftheSouthAfrica–RussiaInter-governmentalCommitteeonTradeandEconomic
Cooperation,agroupthatmeetsannuallytodiscussandstrengthensocial,economic,and
commercialrelationsaswellastechnicalco-operationbetweenthetwocountries.101
One of the main preoccupations concerning South Africa’s nuclear future is the
developmentofaskillspooluniquetothenuclearsector.Inthisconnection,Necsaand
AlstomSouthAfrica,asubsidiaryoftheFrenchpowergenerationandtransmissionand
rail infrastructuregroupAlstom,signedanagreementinNovember2012intermsof
whichAlstomSouthAfricaundertooktoinvestZAR8millioninequipmentforanew
codedweldingcentrelaunchedatNecsa’sNuclearSkillsDevelopmentCentre(NSD)in
February2013.102
P u b L I c o P I n I o n o n t h e n u c L e A r f u t u r e
SouthAfricanpublicopiniononthenuclearfutureisinfluencedbyfactorsmainlyrelated
toconcernsabout thecostandsafetyofnuclearenergy,andgovernment’sunilateral
decision-makingandsecrecyinrespectofnucleardecisions.Parallelshavealsobeen
drawnbetweenallegedseriousmalpracticesattendingthestrategicarmsprocurement
package(the‘armsdeal’)anddubiouslevelsoftransparencysurroundingtheproposed
nuclearprogrammeandtheterminationofoperationsatthePBMRproject.
What South Africans know
In2011Necsacommissionedoneofthefewpublicopinionsurveystohavebeenconducted
ontheSouthAfricanpublic’sattitudestonuclearenergy.Thesurvey,undertakenbythe
S O U t h A f R I C A ' S N U C L E A R f U t U R E
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HumanSciencesResearchCouncil, concluded thatSouthAfricansknow littleabout
nuclearenergyanditsassociatedtechnology;40%ofrespondentscouldnot indicate
whetherornot theywere in favourofnuclearenergyandonly23%approvedof it.
Respondentswereaskedtoidentifythebenefitsanddisadvantagesofnuclearenergyasa
sourceofelectricity.ThesurveyshowedthatmostSouthAfricanswereinclinedtoperceive
nuclearenergyasameansofensuringareliablesupplyofelectricity,andasanenergy
sourcethatwouldhelpcombatclimatechange(citedby23%and16%respectively).A
smallerproportion(14%)considerednucleargenerationascompetitiveincostandas
offeringanunlimitedsupplyofpower.Safetyrisks,nuclearwastedisposalandriskof
radiationwereregardedas itsmaindisadvantages.One-third(34%)believednuclear
accidents tobearisk,while the long-termdisposalofnuclearwasteandtheriskof
radiationorcontaminationwereissuescitedby20%ofrespondents.Despitesomesafety
concerns,40%‘agreed’or‘stronglyagreed’thatthenuclearreactorsatKoebergshould
continuetooperate(44%didnotknow);38%thoughtthatSouthAfricashouldconstruct
newnuclearreactorstogenerateelectricity(42%didnotknow).103
Theanti-nuclearlobbyinSouthAfricaissmall,butvocal:organisationssuchasSave
Bantamsklip,GreenpeaceSouthAfrica,theCoalitionagainstNuclearEnergy,andEarthlife
Africaarenotableinthisrespect.Theirwide-rangingactivitiesincludepublicprotest
actionsandparticipationinpublichearingsonnuclearissues.
Government’s efforts to influence public opinion
InthewakeoftheFukushimaincidenttheSouthAfricangovernmentiswaryoftheeffect
ofpublicopiniononnuclearpolicy.Accordingtotheministerofenergy‘[T]hesuccess
anddeploymentofnuclearpowerrequirespublicacceptance,andpubliceducationand
radioactivewastemanagementissuesarethemostimportanttopicsurroundingnuclear
energy.Wewillbeinvestingresourcesandgreatereffortinthisregard.’104InOctober2012
thegovernmentparticipatedinanIAEAtechnicalmeetingonnuclearcommunication
andstakeholders;105similarinitiativesweremountedbytheNNR,whichiscurrently
implementinganewcommunicationstrategy.106TheNNR’spublichearingsonNecsa’s
applicationforanuclearinstallationlicencetoconstructasmelter,however,resultedin
widespreadcriticismfromcivilsocietyandbusinessentitiesinthevicinityofPelindaba,
wherethesmelteristobesituated.Theproposedsmelterisexpectedtoprocess14000
tonnesofuranium-contaminatedscrapmetal,presentlystoredonNecsa’sPelindabasite.107
Governmenthas introducedseveralpublic information initiatives.These include
openingaNecsaVisitorCentreatPelindabaandlaunchingNecsa’snuclearawareness
advertisingcampaignin2011.The12-monthcampaignwaspromotedthroughradio,
print,theatre,websites,socialmediaandotherappropriatecommunicationschannels
andwassaidtohavereachedfourmillionpeople(Necsacontinuestoemploytheleading
advertisingagencySaatchi&Saatchitopromotethebenefitsofnuclearenergy).108In
2008thegovernmentspentZAR4millioninabidtoreworktheimageofnuclearpower
inSouthAfrica;Johannesburg-basedbrandconsultancyFreedthinkerswasappointedto
surveypublicopiniononnuclearenergy,inparallelwiththedevelopmentofanuclear
vocabularyinallSouthAfrica’s11officiallanguages.109
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G O v E R N A N C E O f A f R I C A ’ S R E S O U R C E S P R O G R A M M E
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs)
Governmenthasidentifiedthreepossiblesitesfortheconstructionofnewnuclearpower
stations.TheyareBantamsklip(nearHermanus in theWesternCape),Duinefontein
(nexttoKoeberg)andThyspunt(betweenOysterBayandStFrancisBayinEasternCape
Province),allofthemareasofimportantbiodiversitythatmaybedisruptedifconstruction
goesahead.EskomhasconductedEIAsonallthesites.110Accordingtotheministerof
energy28studieshavebeencompletedintheEIA,whichassesstheimpactonbiodiversity
issuesaroundvulnerablefaunaandflora;wetlandsanddunemorphology;transport;
heritageandconflictwithothersocio-economicactivity(includinginparticularfishing
forchokka,aspeciesofsmallsquid,andotherfishing,tourismandagriculturalinterests).
A reviseddraft environmental impact reportwas released forpubliccomment in
2011;thecommentswillbeincludedinthefinalEIAreport.Inaddition,anumberof
revisedspecialists’reportshadbeenanticipatedforreleasetothepublicinmid-2012
butneverappeared.111AccordingtothepressuregroupThyspuntAlliance,Eskomand
itsconsultantshavenotpublishedthethirddraftoftheenvironmentalimpactreport
inrespectofThyspuntandinfacthavedelayeditspublicationforayear.112Hencethe
processoutlinedbytheministerinparliamentinApril2012hasbeensocompromised
thatthefinalenvironmental impactreportcouldnotbecompletedandsubmittedto
thedepartmentofenvironmentalaffairstowardstheendof2012,intimeforadecision
onenvironmentalauthorisation,adecisionnowexpectedin2013.113Inresponse,anti-
nuclear interest groups Earthlife Africa, Greenpeace Africa, Justice and Peace, and
Ceasefireformedanallianceaimedatraisingconcernsaboutthecostofthenewbuild
project,thesafetyofnuclearpowerandthelackoftransparencyandaccountabilityinthe
nuclearsector.
c o n c e r n S A b o u t S o u t h A f r I c A ’ S n u c L e A r P r o G r A m m e
Thegovernment’s2011assessmentofSouthAfrica’sreadinesstoprocureanuclearfleet
identifiedanumberofcriticalareas,suchasfinance,safety,radioactivewastemanagement,
humanresourcesandthelackofnuclearskills.114Theseissues,however,arefarfromthe
onlyones:severalotherconcernsaffectingtheviabilityoftheprogrammeneedtobe
addressedurgently.Theyinclude,inparticular,doubtsabouttheintegrityofpolitical
processesandcontrols,andreservationsastotheadequacyofEskom’sfinancialresources
andmanagement.
Turf wars
Thefirstoftheseissuesconcernsgovernment’sdepartmentalresponsibilitiesandpotential
conflicts.Thecabinet’sdecisiontogoaheadwithitsnuclearplansisinclearcontradiction
totheNationalPlanningCommission’sNDPwhich,locatedasitisinthepresidency,
laiddowna requirement for further feasibility studiesandwarned thatan ‘in-depth
investigationintothefinancialviabilityofnuclearenergywasvital’;itrecommendedthat
governmentreassessthedesirabilityofsuchaprogramme.115Thisisinstarkcontrastto
thepositionofamongotherstheDepartmentofEnergy,whichthroughitsministerisa
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vocaladvocateofthenuclearplans.Suchinter-departmentaldifferencesmaybedueto
varyingperceptionswithingovernmentcirclesofnuclearenergyasawholeandinthat
waymayhaveanimpactonthecountry’sfuturenuclearplanning,especiallyitsfunding,
tenderproceduresandpowerdeliveryprocesses.
Cost
Oneofthecausesoftheturfwarsisdifferentviewsonthecostofthenuclearenergy
expansionplansandthefinancialburdenthismayplaceonthegovernment.Concerns
expressed by the National Planning Commission and civil society about the large
(ZAR300billion)capitalcostofnuclearpowerhavebeendismissedbytheminister
ofenergy,astrongsupporterofnuclearenergyandthegovernment’snuclearplans,as
‘typicalscaretacticsusedbypeoplewhodonothavethebestinterestofourpeopleat
heart’.116SimilarviewshavebeenexpressedbyANCleadersinthepastwhencriticisedor
opposed.117Suchstatementsoverlookthestarkfactthegovernment’scostestimatesfor
generatingnuclearenergy,at$3,000–4,000/kW,differmarkedlyfromgenerallyaccepted
informedestimatesof$7,000/kW.118Governmentestimates that totalpowercapacity
extensionundertheIRPwillcostapproximatelyZAR4trillionby2030,includingnew
powerplantsandtransmissionanddistributioninfrastructure.119Thislevelofexpenditure
willclearlyhaveanimpactonthefuturecostofelectricalpower,whichinSouthAfricais
alreadyhigh–evenafterNecsarejectedEskom’sapplicationofNovember2012fora16%
increaseinitsutilitytariffinfavourofan8%annualincreaseoverthenextfiveyears.120
Tender process
The South African government already stands accused of permitting irregularities
in respectof theawardof tenders to individualsandcompaniesclose to,orwithin,
governmentstructures.Expandingthecountry’snuclearpowergenerationanddistribution
willrequiretheawardofverylargegovernmenttenders,andconcernshavebeenraised
aboutthetransparencyofanyfuturenucleartenderprocess.Evenat thisearlystage
energy-relatedtendershavebeenawardedto,forexample,theANC’sinvestmentarm,
ChancellorHouseHoldings,whichisinturna25%shareholderinHitachiPowerAfrica,
oneofthecontractorstoEskom’sMedupiandKusilepowerstations.AtZAR38.5billion
thisisthelargestcontractinEskom’shistory.121Theprojectisalready20monthsbehind
scheduleandcostshaveincreasedtoZAR60billion–asituationwhichclearlyraises
questionsabouttheintegrityofthecostingandtenderingprocess–butnopenaltieshave
beenleviedonthepoliticallyconnectedHitachidespitesuchanapparentperformance
shortfall.122Suchasituationraisesobviousquestionsaboutthelikelyconductofthemuch
largertenderandcostingprocessfortheprocurementofthecountry’snuclearfleet.
Concernshavealsobeenexpressedaboutthenumberofhigh-profilenucleardecision-
makerswhohave takenupposts inother areasof thenuclear sector, giving rise to
speculationaboutconflictsofinterest,‘revolvingdoors’andpossibleconsequentialtender
irregularities.123MoveshaveincludedtheresignationofNecsa’sCEO,RobAdam,tojoin
theAvengGroup,aconstructionfirminthenuclearindustryrunbyaformercolleague,
Roger Jardine, when Adam was director-general of the department of science and
technology.124Adam’ssuccessoratNecsaisPhumzileTshelane,actinggeneralmanager
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inEskom’snuclearnewbuilddivision.125InadditiontothesechangesDeputyPresident
MotlanthewasappointedtoleadtheNNEECCandtheNNRCEOBoyceMkhizehas
resignedto‘pursuebusinessinterests’.126
Eskom’s finances, management and resources
EskomisacriticalinstitutionfortherealisationoftheSouthAfricangovernment’snuclear
ambitions.It isgenerallyaccepted,however,that likemostSouthAfricanSOEs, it is
poorlymanaged.127InanefforttoassesstheperformanceofsuchorganisationsPresident
Zumain2010establishedthePresidentialState-ownedEnterprisesReviewCommittee.
Thecommittee’sreporton700nationalSOEsandpublicentitieswaspresentedtocabinet
inSeptember2012buthasnotyetbeenreleasedtothepublic.128Bymid-March2013,the
statusofthereportwasstillunclearandis‘stillbeingdiscussedbyCabinet’.129
Cabinet’sendorsementin2012ofEskomastheowner-operatorofthefuturenuclear
powerstationsreaffirmsthatutility’spositionintermsofthe2008nationalnuclearpolicy.
LikethoseofmanySouthAfricanSOEs,however,Eskom’sfinancesandmanagementarein
apoorstate,totheextentthatinOctober2012creditratingagencyMoody’sdowngraded
Eskom’sunsecuredbondrating.130One implicationof thisaction is thatEskomwill
experiencedifficultiesinsecuringinternationalfinancetosupportitsexpansionplans.
ItsTransmissionTen-YearDevelopmentPlan:2013–2022setsoutplannedinvestment
onpowertransmissioninfrastructureprojectsofalmostZAR150millionoverthenext
decade.131Eskom’s2012applicationfora16%tariffincrease,haditbeensuccessful,would
haveraisedZAR1trillion,butstillwouldnothavegeneratedsufficientcapitaltofinance
thenuclearfleet.132
Eskomisthestate-ownedentityresponsibleforpowergenerationanddistributionand
assuchisakeyplayerinrealisinggovernment’ssocio-developmentobjectives.Thefact
thatitfallsundertheDepartmentofPublicEnterprisesandnottheministerofenergy,
exacerbatesgovernmentturfwars.Furthermore,despitethefactthatitispoorlymanaged
andfinanciallystruggling,itsclosetiestopoliticalandbusinesselitesmayhugelyinflate
thetenderpriceofnuclearexpansionprojects,whichinturnwilladdtothecostof
expansionplans,powergenerationanddistribution.
Lessons from the PMBR debacle
MisgivingsaboutthecompetenceofEskomhavebeenreinforcedbyfinancialfailures
inrespectofthePBMR,whichstill loomlargeandwill furtherconstraintheutility’s
future financing.PebbleBedModularReactor (Pty)Ltdwas established in1999 to
developandmarketsmall-scale,high-temperaturereactorsinSouthAfricaandabroad,
withan800-memberprojectteambasedinPretoria.In2010,however,PublicEnterprises
MinisterBarbaraHogan announced that the governmentwouldno longer invest in
thePBMR,whichhad already accounted forZAR10billion and forwhich another
ZAR30billionwasrequiredfromgovernment,giventhatthecompanyhadbeenunable
toattractfurtherprivateinvestors.Government’sfinancialcontributionhadamounted
to80.3%,whileEskomhad contributed8.8%andWestinghouse and the Industrial
DevelopmentCorporation4.9%each.133
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Againstthisbackgroundthegovernmentcommissionedanindependenthigh-level
reviewoftheprojectandestablishedaninter-departmentaltaskteamtoconsiderthe
fateofthePMBR.Thecompanywassignificantlydown-sizedinaprocessthatinvolved
staffretrenchment,decommissioningof itsFuelDevelopmentLaboratory(FDL)and
mothballingoftheHeliumTestFacility.CabinetdecidedtoputthePBMRontoacareand
maintenancebasistoprotectitsintellectualpropertyandotherassets.134
EskomhasmanagedthePBMRsince1April2012andwillcontinuetodosountil
theendofthecareandmaintenancephasein2013,whenthegovernmentwillmakea
finaldecisiononthecompany.Thegovernmenthas,however,promisedto‘protectand
preserve’PBMR’sintellectualpropertyandassets,aprocessthatincludes‘packaging’more
than86%oftheintellectualpropertyforpreservation.Governmentisalsopursuingan
intellectualpropertyauditofthePBMR‘toprotectitsfuturevalue’andhasconducteda
skillsaudittodeterminehowthestockofacquiredexpertisecouldbeutilised.135Callsby
oppositionpoliticalpartiesandnon-governmentalorganisationsforafinancialauditofthe
PBMRtodeterminehowtaxpayers’moneyhadbeenspent,fellondeafears.136
Post-Fukushima nuclear safety and security
Nuclear safetyandsecurity inSouthAfrica remainaconcern,as recenteventshave
illustrated.On28April2012asecuritybreachoccurredatNecsa’sPelindabafacility.The
occurrencewasnotreportedtotheNNRinatimelymanner;infact,Necsaonlysubmitted
itsreportontheincidenton7July2012.Earlier,inApril2012,theNNRhadsuspended
Necsa’s acceptanceofnuclearwaste fromKoeberg followingnon-complianceby the
corporationatitsVaalputsnuclearwastestoragefacility.137InNovemberthesameyear
policediscoveredradioactivematerialonthesiteofthescrapmetalrecyclingcompany
SAMetalintheCapeTownsuburbofEpping:theoriginofthematerialisstillunclear138
althoughaccordingtoNecsa,in2011theIAEAhadfoundnoindicationofdiversion
ofdeclarednuclearmaterial frompeacefulpurposesandnoindicationofundeclared
nuclearmaterialoractivitiesinSouthAfrica.AlthoughtheIAEAalsoconcludedthat
allSouthAfrica’snuclearmaterialisdirectedtonon-militaryactivities,suchbreachesin
nuclearsecurityunderminethecountry’sinternationalstandingandposeariskofnuclear
proliferation.139
InJune2011,followingontheseincidentsandinthewakeoftheFukushimaleakage,
thegovernmentconcludedanagreementwiththeIAEAtoassistwithastresstestof
theKoebergpowerstationintheeventoffloodorearthquake.140Thesafetyassessment
wasdesignedtoevaluatethebehaviourof theKoebergplant inahypotheticalsetof
extremeconditionsthatcouldcausealossofpowerorcooling;theexercisesupports
theimplementationoftheIAEA’sinternationalsafetystandardsthatprotecthealthand
minimisedangertolifeandproperty.Koebergiscurrentlyundergoingitssecond10-year
safetyreview.141
TheNNRalsodirectedEskomandNecsatoconductreassessmentsoftheirreactors
todeterminewhether theplantscanwithstandmajorexternalevents.Its reviewof
thereassessmentsconcludedthattheinstallationswereadequatelydesignedandare
maintainedandoperatedtowithstandalltheexternaleventsconsideredintheoriginal
design protocols. The NNR has, however, identified five areas for improvement in
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regulatorystandardsandpractices,whichwillbeaddressedaspartofacurrentreview
oftheregulatoryframework.142
AccordingtoaKoebergexecutivetheplantcanwithstandanearthquakeofsevenon
theRichterscale.143TheKoebergemergencyplan,conductedbytheNNR,isreviewed
every twoyears; the latestof theseexercises tookplaceon5September2012,when
thestation’semergencypreparednesswas testedsuccessfully.144 InadditiontheNNR
conductedaninspectionofSafari-1whichconfirmeditssafetyandoperationalintegrity.145
Despite considerable goodwill towards South Africa as a state that dismantled
itsnuclearweaponsprogramme,someinternationalconcernsremaininrespectofits
nuclearaffairs.TheNuclearMaterialSecurityIndexissuedin2012bytheWashington-
based Nuclear Threat Initiative indicated that although South Africa scores high in
termsoffivemeasures–anindependentnuclearregulatoryagency,safeguardsadoption
andcompliance,domesticnuclear-relatedsecuritylegislation,controlandaccounting
procedures,andinternationalcompliance–itrateslowerinpoliticalstability,corruption,
failure to specify quantities of nuclear materials, and poor physical security during
transport.146
Transparency
AlthoughtheSouthAfricanconstitutionguaranteestherightofSouthAfricancitizensto
accessanyinformationheldbythestate,therearesignificantconcernsaboutgovernment’s
transparencyinrespectofitsnuclearambitions.147TheSouthAfricagovernmenthas
beencriticisedforthesecrecyattendingthenewnuclearbuildingplans.Twopiecesof
legislation,theNationalKeyPointsAct(NKPA)of1980,andthePromotionofAccess
toInformationAct(PAIA),Actof2000,poseparticularconcerns.Draftedin1980,the
NKPAisahangoverfromthePWBotharegimeofthe1980sandgivesarbitrarypowers
totheministerofpolicetodeclareanybuildingorinstallationakeypointvitaltostate
security;underitsprovisionsthestateisundernoobligationtobeinanywayaccountable
inrespectofsuchakeypoint.148
In consequence the current SouthAfricangovernment’s secrecy about its energy
infrastructureprogrammeandpolicyisacausefordisquiet.InAugust2012,theofficial
oppositioninparliament,theDemocraticAlliance(DA)accusedtheministerofenergyof
beingeitherignorantor‘purposefullysecretive’aboutthesematters.Theministerrefused
toanswerquestionspertaining to thevolumeofSouthAfrica’suraniumstockpileat
Pelindaba,andpaymentsmadebyNecsatoKlydonLtd,auraniumenrichmentcompany,
duetotheir‘classified’and‘commerciallysensitive’nature.149Similarly,NGOssuchas
GreenpeaceAfricaandtheSouthAfricaHistoryArchiveshavelodgedaformalcomplaint
withthepublicprotectorandtheSouthAfricanHumanRightsCommissioninresponseto
theenergyminister’ssecondrefusaltopublicisetheINIR150compiledbyherdepartment
todeterminethecountry’spreparednesstobuildnuclearpowerstations,anddiscussedin
aclosedmeetingwiththeIAEAinOctober2012.151
The Mangaung legacy
TheANC’s53rdnationalconferenceheldinMangaung(Bloemfonteinmunicipality)in
December2012resultedinthere-electionofPresidentZumaasANCpresident,despite
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challenges from Deputy President Motlanthe, among others. Several ANC officials
opposingZuma’scandidaturefailedintheirbidforre-electiontoseniorpartypositions:
they includedNNEECCmembersMotlanthe, the formerminister of financeTrevor
Manuel,DipuoPeters andEbrahimPatel.152Although these individuals retain their
cabinetmembership theyareno longermembersof therulingparty’s innercircleof
influenceanddecision-making,asituationthatmightbringwithitmarkeddifferenceson
nuclearissuesandagendas.
TheANCregardsenergysecurityasanimportantaspectofthecountry’seconomic
‘transformation’.AfurtheroutcomeoftheMangaungconferencewastheadoptionof
policydocuments(suchastheNDP)andresolutionsinrespectof,forexample,energy
securityandstrategicmineralresources.SuchANCconferenceresolutionsareoftena
precursortoanappearanceonthegovernment’sownagenda.TheANCalsoadopted
aresolutiononthecountry’smineralsector,thedevelopmentofwhichitbelieveswill
contributetoeconomictransformation.Theresolutiondistinguishesbetweenseveral
typesofmineralsthatrequiredevelopment,namelythoseformanufacturing(ironore,
basemetalsandtheplatinumgroup),energy(coal,gas,shaleanduranium),agriculture
(phosphates,sulphurandlimestone),andinfrastructure(steel,cementandcopper).The
resolutionstatesthat‘thosestrategicmineralsthatrequirespecialpublicpolicymeasures
willbeindentified’andcallsforthe‘strengtheningofthestateminingcompany[African
ExplorationMiningandFinanceCorporation]’.153
S u m m A r y A n d c o n c L u S I o n
SouthAfrica’sprogresstowardsitslargestnuclearprocurementprogrammeistakingplace
inthecontextofchangeswithintheANCrulingparty,anincreaseinglobaldemandfor
uranium,andgrowingenergyneedswithinSouthAfrica.Thereisanationalshortageof
electricitysupply,arisingfromanagingenergyinfrastructure,arisingpopulationandan
ambitioussocio-economicdevelopmentprogramme.Tohelpachieveitsenergyobjectives
thegovernmenthasestablishedacommitteetodriveitsnuclearexpansionplans,anaction
thatonthefaceofitcontradictstherecommendationsoftheNPCthatfurtherfeasibility
studiesonnuclearenergyshouldbeconductedbeforeadecisiononanewnuclearfleet
istaken;nonethelessvariousgovernmentandregulatoryinstitutions,suchastheNPC,
theNNRandNecsaarebeingrestructuredinpreparationfornuclearpowerexpansion.
AfailuretocompleteEIAsfortheproposedsitesforthenewpowerstations,taken
withthepoorfinancialpositionofEskom,andgovernment’ssecrecyaboutvariousissues
inrespectofitsnuclearplans,constitutesamajorconcernandhasresultedinsomepublic
protest.Inadditiontothesefactors,resourcenationalismisontheriseinSouthAfrica,
whichisaimingtosecureitsfutureuraniumsupplies.Finally,persistentconcernsabout
SouthAfrica’snuclearfutureincludethehighcostoftheprogramme,itspreferenceover
alternativeenergysources,anopaquetenderprocess,safetyandsecurityissues,ageneral
lackoftransparency,andthequalityofleadershipintherulingparty.
Likemanydevelopingcountries,SouthAfricaseemstoregardnuclearenergyasa
panaceaforitsdevelopmentchallengesandenergyrequirements.Inaddition,nuclear
powergenerationcapabilitycarrieswithitsomeinternationalstatusandprestige.Inthe
wakeoftheIAEAINIRmissiontoSouthAfricanofFebruary2013,theSouthAfrican
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governmentindicatedthatitwillmakeanannouncementinrespectofthecountry’sfuture
nuclearexpansionplansinJuly2013.Itremainsunclear,however,whethergovernment’s
nuclearagendaisalignedwiththeSouthAfricancitizenry’sideals.Thecostlyandsecretive
natureofgovernment’snuclearplansraisesseriousquestionsofprobity,especiallywhen
viewedagainstthebackdropofwideruneaseoverfailuresingovernanceandtransparency
standards.Public-privatesectorcollusiononsomemega-constructionprojects,conflictsof
interestarisingfromtheANC’sbusinessinterestsintheenergysectorthroughitseffective
shareholdinginHitachi,andthehigh-profilecorruptionrevealedinthearmsprocurement
saga,allfallintothiscategory.
UnlessSouthAfrica’snuclearplannersmeetsuchconcernshead-on,theirprogrammes
willfailtoinspireconfidence,athomeorabroad.
e n d n o t e S
1 IEA(InternationalEnergyAgency),World Energy Outlook 2012.Paris:IAEA,2012,p.6.
2 IAEA(InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency),The Database on Nuclear Power Reactors, 2013,
http://www.iaea.org/pris/.
3 AmanoY,Nuclear power after Fukushima, statementbyIAEAdirectorgeneral,Johannesburg,
8February2013,http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2013/amsp2013n02.html.
4 IAEA,Power Reactor Information System (PRIS): Country Statistics. Vienna:IAEA, 2013,http://
www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=JP.
5 Eskom,RSABriefing toTWG-LWR(TechnicalWorkingGroup–LightWaterReactors),
17thMeetingoftheTechnicalWorkingGrouponAdvancedTechnologiesforLWRs(TWG-
LWR), 18–20 June 2012, http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/Technology/
meetings/2012-06-18-20-TWG-LWR-HWR/5.SouthAfrica-LWR.pdf.
6 IAEA,Nuclear Power Reactors in the World. Vienna:IAEA,2012,p.76.
7 Engineering News, ‘Nuclear, shale gas shouldbepart of SA’s futurepowermix–Peters’,
19February2013,http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/nuclear-shale-gas-should-be-part-
of-sas-future-power-mix-peters-2013-02-19.
8 Government of South Africa, Statement to 56th Regular Session of the IAEA General
Conference, Vienna, 20 September 2012, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/
Statements/southafrica.pdf.
9 MotlantheK,video message by Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe,NationalNuclearEnergy
Conference,Sandton(Johannesburg),29May2012,http://www.presidency.gov.za/pebble.
asp?relid=6128.
10 Statistics South Africa, Census 2011: Statistical release. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa,
30October2012,p.14,http://www.statssa.gov.za/Publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf.
11 DBSA (Development Bank of Southern Africa), The State of South Africa’s Economic
Infrastructure 2012: Opportunities and Challenges.Midrand:DBSA,2012,p.61.
12 Engineering News, ‘SA needs bold, immediate decisions on energy plan implementation
– Eskom’, 6 November 2012, http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sa-needs-bold-
immediate-decisions-on-energy-plan-implementation-eskom-2012-11-06.
13 DBSA,op. cit.,p.70.
14 ESI-Africa.com,‘KoebergtripputspressureonSApowersystem’,21February2013,http://
www.esi-africa.com/node/16032.
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15 Eskom,2012,op. cit.
16 ESI-Africa.com,‘Koebergunit2backonthegrid’,3December2012,http://www.esi-africa.com/
node/15769.
17 Eskom,2012,op. cit.
18 South Africa, National Assembly, Portfolio Committee on Energy, Report of the Portfolio
Committee on Energy on the Strategic Plan of the 2012/13 – 2015/16 period and Budget Vote
No. 29 of the Department of Energy, 15May2012,http://www.pmg.org.za/files/doc/2012/
comreports/120516pcenergyreport.htm.
19 Nuclear Engineering International,‘News’,September2012,p.10;Eskom,mediastatement,
‘Koebergpowerunit2shutdown’,7September2012,http://www.eskom.co.za.
20 Eskom,Koeberg Power Station,2013,http://www.eskom.co.za/c/article/12/koeberg/.
21 NEA(OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment[OECD]NuclearEnergy
Agency)andIAEA,Uranium 2011: Resources, Production and Demand.Paris,OECDNEA&
IAEA,2012,p.91.
22 MotlantheservedaspresidentfromSeptember2008untilMay2009.
23 PetersD,Keynote Address by the Minister of Energy,tomeetinghostedbyMECforEconomic
Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, East London, 28 November 2012a,
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/speeches/2012/Address%20by%20the%20Minister%20
EC-EU%20Renewable%20Energy%20Conference%20-%2028%20Nov%202012.pdf.
24 IAEA,Country Nuclear Power Profiles.Vienna:IAEA,2012,http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/
Publications/PDF/CNPP2012_CD/countryprofiles/SouthAfrica/SouthAfrica.htm.
25 MotlantheK,op. cit.
26 Polity.org.za, ‘SAplansR4-trillioninfrastructureroll-outover15years’,19October2012,
http://www.polity.org.za.
27 Mail & Guardian, ‘EskomtoownSouthAfrica’snuclearenergydream’,8November2012,
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-08-eskom-to-own-south-africas-nuclear-energy-dream.
28 South Africa DOE, (Department of Energy), Integrated Resources Plan for Electricity
2010–2030,Pretoria,2011,p.11,http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/irp%20files/IRP2010_2030_
Final_Report_20110325.pdf.
29 SouthAfrica,DinP(DepartmentinthePresidency),Replies by President Jacob Zuma to questions
asked in the National Assembly, Question No 2911,19October2012,ThePresidency,Pretoria,
8November2012.
30 Engineering News, ‘Eskomwelcomesnuclearmovement,but saysguidance stillneeded’,
8 November 2012, http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/eskom-welcomes-nuclear-
movement-but-says-guidance-still-needed-2012-11-08.
31 PetersD,2012a,op. cit.
32 PetersD,Mediabriefingonrequestforproposalfortherenewableenergyindependentpower
producersprocurementprogramme,Pretoria,29October2012b,http://www.energy.gov.za/IPP/
Minister%20Remarks%20-%20IPP%20W1%20Announcement%20-%2029Oct2012.pdf.
33 SouthAfrica,DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy),Nuclear Energy Policy for the Republic
of South Africa, Pretoria, 2008,http://www.energy.gov.za.
34 SouthAfrica,CGIS(GovernmentCommunicationsandInformationService),Phased decision
making model for nuclear build approved, 8 November 2012, http://www.sanews.gov.za/
news/12/12110812351002.
35 PetersD,addressbytheministerofenergytoNationalUnionofMineworkers(NUM)Nuclear
Energy Workshop, Johannesburg, 23 April 2012c, http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/
30
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speeches/2012/RemarksByMinister_NUM_WorkshopOnNuclearEnergy_23April2012.pdf.
36 IAEA, INIR: Integrated infrastructure review mission. Guidance on preparing and conducting
INIR missions.Vienna:IAEA,2011,p.3.
37 SouthAfrica,DOE,IAEA-Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review Pre-Mission to SA,media
statement, 17 October 2012, http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/pr/2012/Media%20
Statement%20-%20INIR%20IAEA%20Mission%201-%2017%20Oct%202012%20(2)[1].pdf.
38 Ibid.
39 IAEA,IAEAreviewsSouthAfrica’snuclearinfrastructureforexpansion,statement,8February
2013,http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2013/sainfrastructure.html.
40 Ibid.
41 Necsa(NuclearEnergyCorporationofSouthAfrica),Annual Report 2012.Pretoria:Necsa,
pp.16&44.
42 PortfolioCommitteeonEnergy,op. cit.
43 SouthAfrica,DME,op. cit.
44 Engineering News, ‘Russian-SouthAfricannuclearcooperationstrengthened’,9November
2012, http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/bilateral-russian-south-african-nuclear-
cooperation-strengthened-2012-11-09.
45 NNR(NationalNuclearRegulator),Annual Report 2012,pp.36–41,http://www.nnr.co.za/
wp-content/uploads/2011/07/NNR-AR-2012.pdf.
46 Business Day Live,‘NuclearregulatorCEO’sresignation“willnotaffectplan”’,7November
2012a,http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/energy/2012/11/07/nuclear-regulator-ceos-resignation-
will-not-affect-plan.
47 SouthAfrica,DOE,Amendments to National Nuclear Regulator Act in pipeline,Parliamentary
reply,CapeTown,29November2011,http://www.sabinetlaw.co.za/mining-and-energy/articles/
amendments-national-nuclear-regulator-act-pipeline.
48 PortfolioCommitteeonEnergy,op. cit.
49 SouthAfrica,DOD(DepartmentofDefence),South African Defence Review 2012,p.210,
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=163572.
50 Addresstoparliamentbytheministerofstatesecurity, CapeTown,2June2011,http://www.
ssa.gov.za/Portals/0/SSA%20docs/Speeches/2011/Minister_Budget%20Vote%202011%20
Revised.pdf.
51 Ibid.,p.386.
52 ZumaJ,AddressatlaunchofAfricanExplorationMiningandFinanceCompany,26February
2011,http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=16569&tid=28970.
53 ChamberofMines,Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources, Johannesburg,
25March2011,www.bullion.org.za/documents/Parliament-presentation-2011.ppt.
54 South Africa, DMR (Department of Mineral Resources), South Africa’s Minerals Industry
2009/2010,27thedition.Pretoria:DMR,2010,p.7.
55 Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Facts and figures 2012, Johannesburg, 2012, p. 40,
http://www.bullion.org.za/documents/F_F_2012_Final_Web.pdf.
56 Ibid.,p.41.
57 HechtG,‘Anelementalforce:uraniumproductioninAfrica,andwhatitmeanstobenuclear’,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,68,2,p.26.
58 Ibid.
59 WNA(WorldNuclearAssociation),Supply of uranium,updated,London,August2012,http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf75.html.
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60 OECDNEAandIAEA,op. cit.,p.12.
61 Ministerofenergy,Reply to National Council of Provinces Question 493,29November2011,
http://discover.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/policydocuments/policies11/DK113758.pdf;Kalinin
A,Rosatom Global Development, International Cooperation Perspective,RosatomSeminaron
RussianNuclearEnergyTechnologiesandSolutions,Sandton,2–3April2012,http://www.
niasa.co.za.
62 Reuters,‘SouthAfricaconsidersnuclearfuelcyclefacilities’,2April2012,http://www.reuters.
com/article/2012/04/02/safrica-nuclear-idUSL6E8F21AU20120402.
63 SouthAfrica,BuaNews (GCIS), ‘Govt identifiesuraniumas “strategicmineral” to secure
nuclearenergysupply’,12February2007,http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/govt-
identifies-uranium-as-strategic-mineral-to-secure-nuclear-energy-supply-2007-02-12.
64 Ibid.
65 SouthAfrica,DMR,A benefication strategy for the minerals industry of South Africa,June2011,
p.ii,http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=147564.
66 Thesemineralscomprisechromium,coalanduranium,diamonds,gold,iron-ore,manganese,
nickel,platinum,titaniumandvanadium.
67 SouthAfrica,DMR, op. cit.,p.ii,http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=147564.
68 Ibid.,p.15.
69 Independent Online,‘SAplayingbothsidesofthenuclearcoin’,30March2012,http://www.iol.
co.za.
70 Ibid.
71 PetersD,2012b,op. cit.
72 PortfolioCommitteeonEnergy,op. cit.
73 Necsa,op. cit.,p.16.
74 Reuters,op. cit.
75 Necsa,op. cit.,p.16.
76 ZumaJ,op. cit.
77 CentralEnergyFundLtd,annualfinancialstatementsforyearended31March2012,2012,
pp.16&18,http://www.cefgroup.co.za//pdf/CEF%202012%20VOLUME%201.pdf.
78 Ibid.,p.18.
79 The Wall Street Journal,‘SouthAfricapusheswiderstateminingrole’,23October2012,http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203406404578074491566675444.html.
80 ZumaJ,op. cit.
81 SouthAfrica,DinP,statementonthecabinetmeetingof5December2012,6December2012,
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=33060&tid=93594.
82 SouthAfrica,GCIS,South Africa Yearbook 2011/2012.Pretoria:GCIS,2011,p.179.
83 SouthAfrica,DOD,op. cit.
84 Engineering News, ‘Internationaluraniumenrichment facility attracts interest as it starts
delivering’, 16 November 2012, http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/international-
uranium-enrichment-facility-attracting-growing-interest-as-it-starts-delivering-2012-11-16.
85 Ibid.
86 OECDNEAandIAEA,op. cit.,pp.120–121.
87 Formoreonthisprocess,refertoVanWykJK,South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy, 1990–2010:
Securing a niche role through norm construction and state identity, unpublishedDPhilthesis,
UniversityofPretoria,Pretoria,2013,http://www.academia.edu/2604774/South_Africas_nuclear_
diplomacy_1990-2010_Securing_a_niche_role_through_norm_construction_and_state_identity.
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88 SouthAfrica,DFA(DepartmentofForeignAffairs),EU-Multilateral,2009,http://www.dfa.gov.
za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/treaties/.
89 Ibid.
90 NNR,op. cit.,p.3.
91 SouthAfrica,DinP,statementontheCabinetmeetingof5December2012,6December2012,
op. cit.
92 ElegbaSB, ‘NuclearpowerprogrammesinAfrica:nuclearsecurityandnon-proliferation’,
presentationtoInstituteforSecurityStudies(ISS)workshoponProgressonSecuringAfrica’s
NuclearResources,Johannesburg,8–9February2012.
93 MesheshaAZ,‘AfricanNuclearWeapon-FreeZoneTreaty(PelindabaTreaty):overview,status
&itsmajormilestones’,PresentationtoISSworkshoponProgressonSecuringAfrica’sNuclear
Resources,Johannesburg,8–9February2012.
94 Business Day Live, ‘SAsignsagreementonsharingnuclearknowledge’,6November2012,
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/science/2012/11/06/sa-signs-agreement-on-sharing-nuclear-
knowledge.
95 SeeVanWykJK,‘Nucleardiplomacyasnichediplomacy:SouthAfrica’spost-apartheidrelations
withtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency’,South African Journal of International Affairs,
19,2,2012.pp.179–200;and‘SouthAfricaandtheglobalnuclearbazaar:normsandstate
identityinthenuclearexportcontrolregime’,Strategic Review for Southern Africa, XXXIV,1,
2012,pp.45–69.
96 Reuters,‘SouthAfricathrowsUNnuclearmeetingonIranintodisarray’,13September2012,
http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCABRE88C0I620120913.
97 SouthAfrica,DIRCO(DepartmentofInternationalRelationsandCooperation),updateon
investigationintoSA’sAmbassadortoOman,pressstatement,Pretoria,23October2012.
98 Reuters, ‘SAsuspendsIrancrudeimportsagain’,30November2012,http://www.iol.co.za/
business/markets/commodities/sa-suspends-iran-crude-imports-again-1.1433848.
99 Business Day Live, ‘Statekeeps independentpowerproducerswaiting’,16October2012,
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/energy/2012/10/16/state-keeps-independent-power-
producers-waiting.
100 Engineering News,‘Russian–SouthAfricannuclearcooperationstrengthened’,op. cit.
101 SouthAfrica,DIRCO,statementbydeputyministerofinternationalrelationsandcooperation,
Pretoria,13November2012.
102 Engineering News,‘Alstom,Necsasignagreementonestablishmentofcodedweldingcentre’,
9November2012,http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/alstom-necsa-agreement-on-the-
establishment-of-coded-welding-centre-2012-11-09.
103 StruwigJ&BRoberts,‘HeartoftheMatter:NuclearAttitudesinSouthAfrica’,Human Sciences
Research Council (HSRC) Review,10,2, June2012,http://www.hsrc.ac.za/HSRC_Review_
Article-315.phtml.
104 Ministerofenergy,BudgetVote2012,NationalCouncilofProvinces,CapeTown,24May2012,
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/speeches/2012/Combined%20Minister’s%20NCOP%20
Speech%202012%20Final%20Distribution%20copy.pdf.
105 SouthAfrica,DOE, ‘NuclearCommunicationandStakeholderEngagement’, presentation
totechnicalmeeting organisedbyIAEAandEuropeanAtomicForum(Foratom),Vienna,
9–11October2012,http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2012/2012-10-
09-10-11-TM-NPE/SouthAfrica-Maimane.pdf.
106 SouthAfrica,PortfolioCommitteeonEnergy,ReportontheStrategicPlanofthe2012/13–
S O U t h A f R I C A ' S N U C L E A R f U t U R E
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2015/16periodandBudgetVoteNo.29oftheDOE,15May2012,http://www.pmg.org.za/files/
doc/2012/comreports/120516pcenergyreport.htm.
107 Engineering News,‘ConcernsraisedoverproposedNecsaPelindabasmelter’,11October2012,
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/concerns-raised-over-proposed-necsa-pelindaba-
smelter-2012-10-11.
108 Necsa,op. cit.,p.34.
109 Engineering News,‘R4mforgovtnuclear“research”project’,2September2008,http://www.
engineeringnews.co.za/article/r4m-for-govt-nuclear-research-project-2008-09-02.
110 SouthAfrica,DME,op. cit.
111 Ministerofenergy,ReplytoNationalAssemblyQuestion797,11April2012,http://discover.
sabinet.co.za/webx/access/policydocuments/policies12/DL040839.pdf.
112 ElectroniccommunicationwithThyspuntAlliance,13November2012.
113 SouthAfrica,DME,op. cit.
114 Mail & Guardian Business,‘SAnotfitfornuclearexpansion’,23November2012,p.2.
115 SouthAfrica,NationalPlanningCommission(NPC),National Development Plan (NDP): Vision
2030,Pretoria,2011,p.172,http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=172300;
Mail & Guardian, ‘EskomtoownSouthAfrica’snuclearenergydream’,8November2012,
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-08-eskom-to-own-south-africas-nuclear-energy-dream.
116 PetersD,2012b,op. cit.
117 See,forexample,mediastatementsbyGwedeMantashe,ANCGeneralSecretary.
118 Business Report, ‘Nuclear programme could burden future generations, committee told’,
31October2012,http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/nuclear-programme-could-
aburden-future-generations-committee-told-1.1414434.
119 Ministerofenergy,BudgetVote2012,CapeTown,17May2012,http://www.energy.gov.za/files/
media/speeches/2012/BudgetVoteSpeech_17May2012.pdf.
120 Business Report, ‘WhyNecsacutEskom’spricehike’,2March2013,http://www.iol.co.za/
business/business-news/why-nersa-cut-eskom-price-hike-1.1479562#.UTksK9a2bf8.
121 HitachiPowerAfrica,statementontheEskomboilercontractatMedupiandKusile,20April
2010,http://www.polity.org.za/article/statement-by-hitachi-power-africa-on-the-eskom-boiler-
contract-at-medupi-and-kusile-20042010-2010-04-20.
122 DA(DemocraticAlliance)mediastatement,‘PoliticallyconnectedHitachimustpaypenalties
fordelays’,24August2012,http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/pag
e71654?oid=321885&sn=Detail&pid=71654.
123 Mail & Guardian, ‘Govtnukebossgoesprivate’,9December2011,http://mg.co.za/article/2011-
12-09-govt-nuke-boss-goes-private.
124 Aveng Group, ‘Prominent physicist Rob Adam joins Aveng Group’, Media Release,
30November2011,http://www.aveng.co.za/news-room/press-releases/prominent-physicist-
rob-adam-joins-aveng-group.
125 Necsa,‘AppointmentofnewNecsaCEO’,mediastatement,16August2012,http://www.necsa.
co.za/Article/d817ec06-2286-4026-b8b8-f212426aede2/6/Appointment-of-new-necsa-ceo--
august-.aspx.
126 Business Day Live,2012a,op. cit.
127 South Africa, Parliament, Extended public committee, debate on Vote No 11 – Public
Enterprises,16May2012,http://www.parliament.gov.za.
128 Business Report, ‘CabinetwelcomesSOE’sreport’,7September2012,http://www.iol.co.za/
business/business-news/cabinet-welcomes-soes-report-1.1378142.
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129 The New Age, ‘Stateownedentitiesreviewcontinues’,23January2013,http://www.thenewage.
co.za/mobi/Detail.aspx?NewsID=79717&CatID=1007.
130 Fin24 (CapeTown),‘Moody’scutsEskom,Telkomratings’,2October2012,http://www.fin24.
com/Economy/Moodys-cuts-Eskom-Telkom-ratings-20121002.
131 Engineering News,‘EskomoutlinesR149bntransmissionexpansionplanto2022’,23October
2012, http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/eskom-outlines-r149bn-transmission-
expansion-plan-to-2022-2012-10-23.
132 Mail & Guardian Business,‘Eskominpoweratallcosts’,9November2012,p.2.
133 BuaNews,‘GovthaltsPebbleBedModularReactorproject’,16September2010,http://www.
buanews.gov.za/rss/10/10091616351001.
134 Ibid.
135 Engineering News,‘FinalfateofPBMRtobedecidedduring2013’,17May2012,http://www.
engineeringnews.co.za/article/final-fate-of-pbmr-to-be-decided-during-2013-2012-05-17.
136 CANE(CoalitionagainstNuclearEnergy),‘SAofficiallyendssupporttoPBMRasactivists
rejoice&callforprobes’,29September2010,http://www.cane.org.za/pebble-bed-modular-
nuclear-reactor/sa-officially-ends-support-to-pbmr-as-activists-rejoice-call-for-probes/.
137 Business Day Live,‘SAnuclearcorporationinhotwaterover“breachofsecurity”’,9July2012,
http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2012/07/09/sa-nuclear-corporation-in-hot-water-over-breach-
of-security.
138 Die Burger, ‘Radioaktiewe materiaal in Epping gevind’, 8 November 2012, http://www.
dieburger.com/Suid-Afrika/Nuus/Radioaktiewe-materiaal-in-Epping-gevind-20121108#.
139 Necsa,op. cit.,p.28.
140 IAEA,IAEAandSouthAfricaworktogetheronstresstest,mediastatement,IAEA,Vienna,
23June2011,http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/koeberg.html.
141 SouthAfrica,DME,op. cit.
142 Ministerofenergy,BudgetVote2012,CapeTown,17May2012,http://www.energy.gov.za/files/
media/speeches/2012/BudgetVoteSpeech_17May2012.pdf.
143 Eskom, Koeberg Public Safety Information Forum(PSIF), minutes, 27 September 2012,
http://www.nnr.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/PSIF-held-on-27-September-2012-at-Bulk-
Stores-6.pdf.
144 Ibid.
145 Necsa,op. cit.,p.7.
146 NTI(NuclearThreatInitiative),NTI Nuclear Material Security Index: building a framework for
assurance, accountability, and action.Washington:NTI,2012,p.109.
147 Section32oftheConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica,Act108of1996.
148 Mail & Guardian,‘Statewieldsapartheid’sbigstick’,16November2012,p.35.
149 DA,‘DAQuestionsEnergyMinister’sVeilofSecrecy’,pressrelease,24August2012,http://
allafrica.com/stories/201208250212.html.
150 GreenpeaceAfrica, ‘Greenpeace lodges complaintwithpublicprotector and thenation’s
HumanRightsCommission’,pressrelease,Johannesburg,19November2012,http://allafrica.
com/stories/201211200292.html.
151 Eyewitness News, ‘Greenpeace goes to Public Protector’, 18 November 2012, http://ewn.
co.za/2012/11/18/Greenpeace-goes-to-Public-Protector.
152 ANC,NationalExecutiveCommittee,2012,http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=9999.
153 ANC,53rd National Conference Resolutions, 2012,p.20and23,http://www.anc.org.za/docs/
res/2013/resolutions53r.pdf.
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