NATO UNCLASSIFIED 1 Secure GSM: Introduction and NC3A Experiences CIS Division NATO Command, Control...

1NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Secure GSM:Introduction and

NC3A Experiences

CIS Division

NATO Command, Control & Consultation Agency

[email protected]

2 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Why GSM ?Why GSM ?Why GSM ?Why GSM ?

• GSM is globalGSM is global–Networks in 140+ countriesNetworks in 140+ countries

• GSM is a standardGSM is a standard–Should be interoperableShould be interoperable

• GSM supports data servicesGSM supports data services–Many data servicesMany data services–Can be used for any type of Can be used for any type of

communicationscommunications

• GSM is globalGSM is global–Networks in 140+ countriesNetworks in 140+ countries

• GSM is a standardGSM is a standard–Should be interoperableShould be interoperable

• GSM supports data servicesGSM supports data services–Many data servicesMany data services–Can be used for any type of Can be used for any type of

communicationscommunications

Some GSM data services:

Data Synch. 9600bps - MO

Data Synch. 9600bps - MT

SMS Cell Broadcast

Transparent Data

Automatic Facsimile Grp 3 - MO

SMS - MT

SMS - MO

Data Asynch. 9600bps - MT

Data Asynch. 9600bps - MO

Automatic Facsimile Grp 3 - MT

PAD Access 9600 bps - MO

PAD Access 9600 bps - MT

3 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

GSM “Piconode”GSM “Piconode”• Deployable - 20 kg, 0.6 mDeployable - 20 kg, 0.6 m33

• Standalone GSM infrastructureStandalone GSM infrastructure• BTS, BSC, MSC, NMSBTS, BSC, MSC, NMS

• Can be connected to other Can be connected to other networks networks • GSM, PSTN, PABX GSM, PSTN, PABX • Satellite backhaulSatellite backhaul• Tactical MilitaryTactical Military

GSM “Piconode”GSM “Piconode”• Deployable - 20 kg, 0.6 mDeployable - 20 kg, 0.6 m33

• Standalone GSM infrastructureStandalone GSM infrastructure• BTS, BSC, MSC, NMSBTS, BSC, MSC, NMS

• Can be connected to other Can be connected to other networks networks • GSM, PSTN, PABX GSM, PSTN, PABX • Satellite backhaulSatellite backhaul• Tactical MilitaryTactical Military

GSM services for Military UsersGSM services for Military UsersGSM services for Military UsersGSM services for Military Users

GSM is useful, but no securityGSM is useful, but no security

But not just GSM, any digital But not just GSM, any digital mobile radiomobile radio

GSM is useful, but no securityGSM is useful, but no security

But not just GSM, any digital But not just GSM, any digital mobile radiomobile radio

GSM & GPS GSM & GPS • GSM data services GSM data services

support useful services for support useful services for Emergency Operations Emergency Operations• Position reportingPosition reporting• Status monitoring via SMSStatus monitoring via SMS

GSM & GPS GSM & GPS • GSM data services GSM data services

support useful services for support useful services for Emergency Operations Emergency Operations• Position reportingPosition reporting• Status monitoring via SMSStatus monitoring via SMS

4 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Pictures courtesy of DERA / Qinetiq (UK)

Deployable GSMDeployable GSMDeployable GSMDeployable GSM

5 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

… … GSM deployed for the military in the USGSM deployed for the military in the US… … GSM deployed for the military in the USGSM deployed for the military in the US

Picture courtesy of Charley McMurray, REDCOM Labs

6 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Reasons against “deployed” GSM Reasons against “deployed” GSM Reasons against “deployed” GSM Reasons against “deployed” GSM

• Frequency allocationFrequency allocation• GSM bands usually licensed to commercial operatorsGSM bands usually licensed to commercial operators

• Services don’t always match requirementsServices don’t always match requirements

• GSM not designed for Command & Control useGSM not designed for Command & Control use• but other Professional Mobile Radio systems werebut other Professional Mobile Radio systems were

• So, GSM is not necessarily the best choice if deploying own So, GSM is not necessarily the best choice if deploying own infrastructure. infrastructure.

• But it is But it is VERY VERY good if you want to use existing infrastructuregood if you want to use existing infrastructure

• Frequency allocationFrequency allocation• GSM bands usually licensed to commercial operatorsGSM bands usually licensed to commercial operators

• Services don’t always match requirementsServices don’t always match requirements

• GSM not designed for Command & Control useGSM not designed for Command & Control use• but other Professional Mobile Radio systems werebut other Professional Mobile Radio systems were

• So, GSM is not necessarily the best choice if deploying own So, GSM is not necessarily the best choice if deploying own infrastructure. infrastructure.

• But it is But it is VERY VERY good if you want to use existing infrastructuregood if you want to use existing infrastructure

NATO UNCLASSIFIED7

Secure GSM:Secure GSM:End-to-end encryptionEnd-to-end encryption

Secure GSM:Secure GSM:End-to-end encryptionEnd-to-end encryption

How Secure GSM equipment works How Secure GSM equipment works - and why it has to be this way- and why it has to be this way

How Secure GSM equipment works How Secure GSM equipment works - and why it has to be this way- and why it has to be this way

8 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Overview - Standard GSM SecurityOverview - Standard GSM SecurityOverview - Standard GSM SecurityOverview - Standard GSM Security

Security within GSM Standards (network is trusted)

protected protectedvulnerableAir interface encryption

Figure courtesy of D Parkinson, BT Exact (UK)

AIE

A5

AIE

A5

Traffic at the air interface is protected by encrypting with the A5 algorithm,

GSMGSM

9 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Concerns over GSM AIEConcerns over GSM AIE(but don’t believe what you read on the web)(but don’t believe what you read on the web)

Concerns over GSM AIEConcerns over GSM AIE(but don’t believe what you read on the web)(but don’t believe what you read on the web)

A5 - The GSM Encryption Algorithm

From sci.crypt Fri Jun 17 17:11:49 1994From: [email protected] (Ross Anderson)Date: 17 Jun 1994 13:43:28 GMTNewsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,uk.telecomSubject: A5 (Was: HACKING DIGITAL PHONES)

The GSM encryption algorithm, A5,

is not much good. Its effective key length is at most five bytes; and anyone with the time and energy to look for faster attacks can find source code for it at the bottom of this post.

EUROCRYPT '97

May 11-15, 1997, Konstanz, Germany

Session 8: Stream Ciphers

12:00-12:30 Cryptanalysis of Alleged A5 Stream Cipher

Jovan Dj. Goli (Queensland University of Technology, Australia)

The Eurocrypt '97 page

The information at this site is Copyright by the International Association for Cryptologic

Research. http://www.chem.leeds.ac.uk/ICAMS/people/jon/a5.html http://www.iacr.org/conferences/ec97/programf.html

(and yes I do appreciate the irony of that statement in a web based presentation)(and yes I do appreciate the irony of that statement in a web based presentation)

http://www.iacr.org/conferences/ec97/

http://www.iacr.org/conferences/ec97/ec97.html



http://www.iacr.org/copyright.html

http://www.iacr.org/



10 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Should we worry about strength of A5 ?Should we worry about strength of A5 ?Should we worry about strength of A5 ?Should we worry about strength of A5 ?

• GSM was developed by ETSIGSM was developed by ETSI• European Telecommunications Standards InstituteEuropean Telecommunications Standards Institute

• GSM algorithms developed by ETSI SAGEGSM algorithms developed by ETSI SAGE• Security Algorithms Group of ExpertsSecurity Algorithms Group of Experts

• ETSI SAGEETSI SAGE• Developed Algorithms for many civil telecom standards e.g. Developed Algorithms for many civil telecom standards e.g.

GSM, TETRA, DECT, 3G etcGSM, TETRA, DECT, 3G etc

• SAGE developed the A5 algorithm for GSM Air Interface SAGE developed the A5 algorithm for GSM Air Interface EncryptionEncryption• A5 provides greater protection than analogue cellular mobiles A5 provides greater protection than analogue cellular mobiles • A5 fit for purposeA5 fit for purpose

• GSM was developed by ETSIGSM was developed by ETSI• European Telecommunications Standards InstituteEuropean Telecommunications Standards Institute

• GSM algorithms developed by ETSI SAGEGSM algorithms developed by ETSI SAGE• Security Algorithms Group of ExpertsSecurity Algorithms Group of Experts

• ETSI SAGEETSI SAGE• Developed Algorithms for many civil telecom standards e.g. Developed Algorithms for many civil telecom standards e.g.

GSM, TETRA, DECT, 3G etcGSM, TETRA, DECT, 3G etc

• SAGE developed the A5 algorithm for GSM Air Interface SAGE developed the A5 algorithm for GSM Air Interface EncryptionEncryption• A5 provides greater protection than analogue cellular mobiles A5 provides greater protection than analogue cellular mobiles • A5 fit for purposeA5 fit for purpose


Air Interface Encryption is optionalAir Interface Encryption is optionalAir Interface Encryption is optionalAir Interface Encryption is optional



Security within GSM Standards (transmitting OTA in clear)

vulnerable vulnerablevulnerableAir interface encryption is optional

AIE is optional. Users have no control and usually no knowledge of whether AIE is being used Some phones will indicate if AIE is in use - most do not

GSMGSM


End to End EncryptionEnd to End EncryptionEnd to End EncryptionEnd to End Encryption



Security within GSM Standards (transmitting OTA in clear)

vulnerable vulnerablevulnerableAir interface encryption is optional

End to End Encryption over GSM (network is untrusted)

protectedEnd-to-endencryption

GSMGSM


Standard GSM SecurityStandard GSM SecurityStandard GSM SecurityStandard GSM Security

• Standard GSM encryption (A5)Standard GSM encryption (A5)• optionaloptional• over air-interface only (clear within network)over air-interface only (clear within network)

• There is a need for end to end encryptionThere is a need for end to end encryption

• Voice calls in GSM can be transcoded within the Voice calls in GSM can be transcoded within the networknetwork• Transcoding errors are small Transcoding errors are small

–have a negligible effect on quality of analogue voice have a negligible effect on quality of analogue voice • Cannot encrypt ordinary GSM voice calls as Cannot encrypt ordinary GSM voice calls as transcoding errors would prevent decryptiontranscoding errors would prevent decryption

• Standard GSM encryption (A5)Standard GSM encryption (A5)• optionaloptional• over air-interface only (clear within network)over air-interface only (clear within network)

• There is a need for end to end encryptionThere is a need for end to end encryption

• Voice calls in GSM can be transcoded within the Voice calls in GSM can be transcoded within the networknetwork• Transcoding errors are small Transcoding errors are small

–have a negligible effect on quality of analogue voice have a negligible effect on quality of analogue voice • Cannot encrypt ordinary GSM voice calls as Cannot encrypt ordinary GSM voice calls as transcoding errors would prevent decryptiontranscoding errors would prevent decryption


Secure GSMSecure GSMSecure GSMSecure GSM• Secure GSM send encrypted voice over a GSM data Secure GSM send encrypted voice over a GSM data

connectionconnection• GSM data connections are not transcodedGSM data connections are not transcoded

–Separate phone number for data connections tells the GSM Separate phone number for data connections tells the GSM network not to transcodenetwork not to transcode

• Secure GSM uses the transparent data serviceSecure GSM uses the transparent data service• Bearer service 26 (9.6 kbps) or 25 (4.8 kbps) Bearer service 26 (9.6 kbps) or 25 (4.8 kbps) • Circuit switched data connectionCircuit switched data connection

–Fixed delays (required for speech)Fixed delays (required for speech)–No error correction No error correction

• Initially:Initially:• GSM used a 13 kbps voice coder (RPE-LPC)GSM used a 13 kbps voice coder (RPE-LPC)• Data services limited to 9.6 kbpsData services limited to 9.6 kbps

• So using the data service to send encrypted speech So using the data service to send encrypted speech required the use of a different voice coderrequired the use of a different voice coder

• Secure GSM send encrypted voice over a GSM data Secure GSM send encrypted voice over a GSM data connectionconnection• GSM data connections are not transcodedGSM data connections are not transcoded

–Separate phone number for data connections tells the GSM Separate phone number for data connections tells the GSM network not to transcodenetwork not to transcode

• Secure GSM uses the transparent data serviceSecure GSM uses the transparent data service• Bearer service 26 (9.6 kbps) or 25 (4.8 kbps) Bearer service 26 (9.6 kbps) or 25 (4.8 kbps) • Circuit switched data connectionCircuit switched data connection

–Fixed delays (required for speech)Fixed delays (required for speech)–No error correction No error correction

• Initially:Initially:• GSM used a 13 kbps voice coder (RPE-LPC)GSM used a 13 kbps voice coder (RPE-LPC)• Data services limited to 9.6 kbpsData services limited to 9.6 kbps

• So using the data service to send encrypted speech So using the data service to send encrypted speech required the use of a different voice coderrequired the use of a different voice coder


End to end secure GSMEnd to end secure GSMEnd to end secure GSMEnd to end secure GSM

Voice Coder Speech must be encoded (digitised)Speech must be encoded (digitised)Speech must be encoded (digitised)Speech must be encoded (digitised)

Crypto Encoded speech is encryptedEncoded speech is encryptedEncoded speech is encryptedEncoded speech is encrypted

GSM dataEncrypted speech is transmitted Encrypted speech is transmitted over GSM data connectionover GSM data connectionEncrypted speech is transmitted Encrypted speech is transmitted over GSM data connectionover GSM data connection

Error Protection

Transparent data service Transparent data service provides no error correctionprovides no error correctionTransparent data service Transparent data service provides no error correctionprovides no error correction

Voice Coder

Error Protection

GSM data

Crypto

End to end End to end encrypted GSM encrypted GSM

• Uses the GSMUses the GSM• data connectiondata connection

• Provides its own Provides its own • Voice CoderVoice Coder• Error ProtectionError Protection

End to end End to end encrypted GSM encrypted GSM

• Uses the GSMUses the GSM• data connectiondata connection

• Provides its own Provides its own • Voice CoderVoice Coder• Error ProtectionError Protection


Voice CodersVoice CodersVoice CodersVoice CodersIntroduction to STANAG 4591Introduction to STANAG 4591

The new NATO Voice CoderThe new NATO Voice Coder

Introduction to STANAG 4591Introduction to STANAG 4591 The new NATO Voice CoderThe new NATO Voice Coder

NC3A WorkshopOctober 18th 2002

At TNO-FEL, The Hague, The Netherlands

Organised by the NATO C3 Agency and the NATO Ad-Hoc Working Group on Narrow

Band Voice Coding

For more details please email: [email protected]

Topics Include: Need for a new NATO voice coderTests to select Stanag 4591Language independence testingSource Code & IPR

Performance VoIP with S4591Stanag 4591 in civil telecom standards

• End to end secure GSM doesn’t End to end secure GSM doesn’t use ‘standard’ GSM voice coderuse ‘standard’ GSM voice coder

• For Secure GSM the choice of For Secure GSM the choice of voice coder is independentvoice coder is independent

• NATO Post-2000 Narrow Band NATO Post-2000 Narrow Band Voice Coder (2400& 1200 bps)Voice Coder (2400& 1200 bps)• Outperforms Outperforms

–CELP - 4.8kCELP - 4.8k–CVSD - 16kCVSD - 16k–LPC10e - 2.4kLPC10e - 2.4k

• Widely used by other secure Widely used by other secure usersusers

• Can be used over GSM data Can be used over GSM data servicesservices

• End to end secure GSM doesn’t End to end secure GSM doesn’t use ‘standard’ GSM voice coderuse ‘standard’ GSM voice coder

• For Secure GSM the choice of For Secure GSM the choice of voice coder is independentvoice coder is independent

• NATO Post-2000 Narrow Band NATO Post-2000 Narrow Band Voice Coder (2400& 1200 bps)Voice Coder (2400& 1200 bps)• Outperforms Outperforms

–CELP - 4.8kCELP - 4.8k–CVSD - 16kCVSD - 16k–LPC10e - 2.4kLPC10e - 2.4k

• Widely used by other secure Widely used by other secure usersusers

• Can be used over GSM data Can be used over GSM data servicesservices


Plain and secure speech in GSMPlain and secure speech in GSMPlain and secure speech in GSMPlain and secure speech in GSM

GSM

GSM

GSM Network

Inter-network connection

GSM Network

GSM

• Secure speech sent between GSM Secure speech sent between GSM networksnetworks• Relies on inter-network connection Relies on inter-network connection

supporting GSM transparent data supporting GSM transparent data service correctlyservice correctly

• Secure speech sent between GSM Secure speech sent between GSM networksnetworks• Relies on inter-network connection Relies on inter-network connection

supporting GSM transparent data supporting GSM transparent data service correctlyservice correctly

Voice Number

Speech

• Normal voice call sent through networkNormal voice call sent through network• User calls GSM voice numberUser calls GSM voice number

• Normal voice call sent through networkNormal voice call sent through network• User calls GSM voice numberUser calls GSM voice number

Data Number

Secure Speech

• Secure speech sent as data call Secure speech sent as data call through networkthrough network• User calls GSM data numberUser calls GSM data number• No transcodingNo transcoding

• Secure speech sent as data call Secure speech sent as data call through networkthrough network• User calls GSM data numberUser calls GSM data number• No transcodingNo transcoding

Transcoder

GSM/\

PCM

GSM \/

PCM

• Transcoding in network is possible• Transcoding in network is possible


Secure GSM / PSTN interworkingSecure GSM / PSTN interworkingSecure GSM / PSTN interworkingSecure GSM / PSTN interworking

PSTN

Interworking Unit

The interworking unit provides the interface for data calls betweenGSM and PSTN

Data Number

V.32Modem

V.110 likeProtocol

GSM Network Analogue mode

GSM

PSTNPSTN

Deskset Crypto Unit

Standard PSTN ‘phone

NATO UNCLASSIFIED19

NC3A ExperiencesNC3A ExperiencesNC3A ExperiencesNC3A Experiences

Results with existing Secure GSM Results with existing Secure GSM equipmentequipment1999 - 20021999 - 2002

Results with existing Secure GSM Results with existing Secure GSM equipmentequipment1999 - 20021999 - 2002


Crypto AG Secure GSMCrypto AG Secure GSM(NC3A Trials 1999)(NC3A Trials 1999)

Crypto AG Secure GSMCrypto AG Secure GSM(NC3A Trials 1999)(NC3A Trials 1999)

• GSM - PSTN interworking via desksetGSM - PSTN interworking via deskset• Manual key managementManual key management• Crypto applique on conventional GSMCrypto applique on conventional GSM

• Call set up time approx 40 secondsCall set up time approx 40 seconds• Encrypted speech onlyEncrypted speech only

• Reliability Reliability –good on home networkgood on home network–variable when roamedvariable when roamed–variable between GSM and PSTNvariable between GSM and PSTN

• Voice qualityVoice quality–good when strong signal good when strong signal –deteriorated when GSM signal was weakdeteriorated when GSM signal was weak

• GSM - PSTN interworking via desksetGSM - PSTN interworking via deskset• Manual key managementManual key management• Crypto applique on conventional GSMCrypto applique on conventional GSM

• Call set up time approx 40 secondsCall set up time approx 40 seconds• Encrypted speech onlyEncrypted speech only


• Voice qualityVoice quality–good when strong signal good when strong signal –deteriorated when GSM signal was weakdeteriorated when GSM signal was weak


Sagem Secure GSMSagem Secure GSM(NC3A Trials 2000)(NC3A Trials 2000)

Sagem Secure GSMSagem Secure GSM(NC3A Trials 2000)(NC3A Trials 2000)

• Crypto applique on conventional GSM Crypto applique on conventional GSM • Approved to FR ConfidentialApproved to FR Confidential• GSM - PSTN interworking via desksetGSM - PSTN interworking via deskset• Key Management SystemKey Management System

• Encrypted speech onlyEncrypted speech only• Call set up time approx 20 secondsCall set up time approx 20 seconds


• Voice qualityVoice quality–Generally good Generally good –Deteriorated when GSM signal was weakDeteriorated when GSM signal was weak

• Crypto applique on conventional GSM Crypto applique on conventional GSM • Approved to FR ConfidentialApproved to FR Confidential• GSM - PSTN interworking via desksetGSM - PSTN interworking via deskset• Key Management SystemKey Management System

• Encrypted speech onlyEncrypted speech only• Call set up time approx 20 secondsCall set up time approx 20 seconds


• Voice qualityVoice quality–Generally good Generally good –Deteriorated when GSM signal was weakDeteriorated when GSM signal was weak


More Secure GSMsMore Secure GSMsMore Secure GSMsMore Secure GSMs

Rhode & Schwarz “TopSec”

Half rate GSM Voice coder

GE RESTRICTED

Released to NATO

General Dynamics “Sectera”

Includes STANAG 4591 2.4k voice coder

US TYPE 1

Being released to NATO

Tests of both requested by NC3A during 2000-2


Sectra Secure GSMSectra Secure GSM(NC3A Trials 2000-2001)(NC3A Trials 2000-2001)

Sectra Secure GSMSectra Secure GSM(NC3A Trials 2000-2001)(NC3A Trials 2000-2001)

• Military development Military development • Swedish/Norwegian ProjectSwedish/Norwegian Project• Crypto integral to terminalCrypto integral to terminal

• Integrated GSM / DECT unitIntegrated GSM / DECT unit• DECT gives PSTN connectionDECT gives PSTN connection

• Encrypted Voice Encrypted Voice + Data+ Data• Key Management SystemKey Management System

• Good voice quality Good voice quality • Improved reliability Improved reliability

• when roamed when roamed • when GSM signal was lowwhen GSM signal was low

• Military development Military development • Swedish/Norwegian ProjectSwedish/Norwegian Project• Crypto integral to terminalCrypto integral to terminal

• Integrated GSM / DECT unitIntegrated GSM / DECT unit• DECT gives PSTN connectionDECT gives PSTN connection

• Encrypted Voice Encrypted Voice + Data+ Data• Key Management SystemKey Management System

• Good voice quality Good voice quality • Improved reliability Improved reliability

• when roamed when roamed • when GSM signal was lowwhen GSM signal was low


NSK 200 Secure GSMNSK 200 Secure GSM(NC3A Trials 2001-2002)(NC3A Trials 2001-2002)

NSK 200 Secure GSMNSK 200 Secure GSM(NC3A Trials 2001-2002)(NC3A Trials 2001-2002)

• Norwegian military developmentNorwegian military development• Crypto integral to terminalCrypto integral to terminal• Authentication requiredAuthentication required• Approved to NATO SECRETApproved to NATO SECRET

• Tested over GSM, DECT and via Tested over GSM, DECT and via InmarsatInmarsat

• Features and operation described in Features and operation described in other presentationsother presentations

• Norwegian military developmentNorwegian military development• Crypto integral to terminalCrypto integral to terminal• Authentication requiredAuthentication required• Approved to NATO SECRETApproved to NATO SECRET

• Tested over GSM, DECT and via Tested over GSM, DECT and via InmarsatInmarsat

• Features and operation described in Features and operation described in other presentationsother presentations


Summary of TrialsSummary of Trials(Things to think about)(Things to think about)Summary of TrialsSummary of Trials

(Things to think about)(Things to think about)

• Support for data calls Support for data calls • requires transparent data bearer services 25 & 26requires transparent data bearer services 25 & 26• varies with network operatorvaries with network operator

• Inter-network connectivityInter-network connectivity• Secure calls between some countries never succeededSecure calls between some countries never succeeded

• Roaming agreementsRoaming agreements• Not always in place in some areasNot always in place in some areas

• Support for data calls Support for data calls • requires transparent data bearer services 25 & 26requires transparent data bearer services 25 & 26• varies with network operatorvaries with network operator

• Inter-network connectivityInter-network connectivity• Secure calls between some countries never succeededSecure calls between some countries never succeeded

• Roaming agreementsRoaming agreements• Not always in place in some areasNot always in place in some areas


More on Secure GSM More on Secure GSM and Secure 3G and Secure 3G

More on Secure GSM More on Secure GSM and Secure 3G and Secure 3G

• Interested ?Interested ?• When ? When ? • Where ?Where ?• Just GSM or 3G ?Just GSM or 3G ?

• Interested ?Interested ?• When ? When ? • Where ?Where ?• Just GSM or 3G ?Just GSM or 3G ?

Symposium on Symposium on End to End Security in End to End Security in

Mobile Cellular NetworksMobile Cellular NetworksLondon, December 2002London, December 2002

Symposium on Symposium on End to End Security in End to End Security in

Mobile Cellular NetworksMobile Cellular NetworksLondon, December 2002London, December 2002

Call for papers

Contributions are invited on the subjects of:

Secure GSM

3G security

End to end security via satellite services

Network operators viewpoints

Interoperability issues for end to end security

Market differences: Commercial vs military users

For details and submission of abstract (200 words) please contact:ACT Branch, NC3A, The Hague, The Netherlands.

Tel: +31 70 374 3444 or Email. [email protected]

This event will be unclassified and attendance open to all

NATO UNCLASSIFIED 1 Secure GSM: Introduction and NC3A Experiences CIS Division NATO Command, Control...

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