Nancy Jean Luc Being Singular Plural 2000

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BEING SINGULAR PLURAL



M E R I D I A N

Crossing Aesthetics

W e r n e r H a r n a c h e r

& D a v i d E . W e l l b e r y

Editors



BEING SINGULAR PLURAL

T r a n s l a t e d b y

R o b e r t D . R i c h a r d s o n

a n d A n n e E . O ' B y r n e

Jean-Luc Nancy

Stanford

University

Press

Stanford

California

2000



Contents

S ta n fo r d U n iv er s i ty Pr es s

S t a n f o r d , C a l i f o r n i a

© 2 0 00 b y th e Bo a r d o f Tr us tees

o f t h e L e l a n d S t a n f o r d J u n i o r U n i v e r s i r y

Being Singular Plural 'was originally published as Etre singulier pluriel

© 1 9 9 6 , É di t io n s G a l i l ée .

As si st an ce fo r th e tr an sl at io n wa s p r ov id e d by th e F re nc h M i n i s t r y of C u l t u r e .

Pr i n te d in th e U n ite d S ta tes o f A m er ic a o n a c id- fr ee , a r c h iv a l - q ua l i ty p ap er .

L i b r a r y o f C o n g r e s s C a t a l o g i n g - i n - P u b l i c a t i o n D a t a

N a n c y , J e a n - L u c .

[ E tr e s in g ul a r p l ur ie l . E n g l is h ]

Bei n g s in g ul a r p l ur a l / Jea n - L uc Na n c y ; t r a n s l a ted b y R o b er t D . R ic h a r d s o n

a n d A n n e E . O ' B y r n e

p . c m . — ( M er id ia n , c r o s s in g a es th et ic s )

In c l udes b ib l io g r a p h ic a l r e fer en c es a n d in dex .

I S B N 0 - 8 0 4 7 - 3 9 7 4 - 9 ( a 'k - p a p er ) — I S B N 0 - 8 0 4 7 - 3 9 7 5 - 7 (pbk. : alk. p a p er )

I. O n t o l o g y . 2 . P h i l o s o p h i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g y . I . T i t l e . I I . M e r i d a n

( S ta n fo r d, Ca l i f . )

B2 4 30. N36 3 E 8 71 3 2 00 0

1 9 4 — d c 2 i 0 0 - 0 5 7 3 2 6

O r i g i n a l p r i n t i n g 2 0 0 0

L a s t f ig ur e b e l o w in dic a tes y ea r o f th is p r in t in g :

09 08 0 7 06 05 04 03 02 01 00

Ty p es et b y Ja m es P . Br o m m e r

in 1 0. 9 / 1 3 G a r a m o n d a n d L i th o s d is p l a y

Preface XV

§ Of Bein g Singular P lural 1

Wa r, Ri g h t, S ov e re i gn ty — Te c hn ê IOI

§ Eulogy for the Mêlée 145

Th e Surprise o f the Event 159

H u ma n Ex c ess 177

§ Cos mos Basel ius 185

Notes 193



Lead, as I do, the flown-away virtue back to earth—

yes, bac k to bo dy an d lif e; that it ma y give the ear th its

meaning, a human meaning! May your spirit and your

vi rt ue serve the me an in g of th e ear th. . . . M a n an d

man's earth are still unexhausted and undiscovered.—Nietzsche



Th is epig raph is chosen qu ite deliberately. I ru n the risk of its

seem ing to lend itself to a certain Ch ris t ia n, idealist , and huma nist

tone, a tone in which it is easy to recognize those well-meaning

vi rt ue s a n d va lu es th at ha ve lo os e d u p o n th e w o r l d al l th e th in gs

that have driv en the h um ani ty of our centu ry to despair over itself, w he re th es e va lu es are b o th b l i n d to a n d c o m p l i c i t in th is le tt in g

l o o se . I n h is o wn wa y, N iet z sc he h im sel f wo u l d ha v e u n d o u bt e d l y

part icipated in this dubious, moraliz ing piety. At any rate, the word

"meaning" rarely appears in his work, and st il l more rarely in any

posit ive sense. One would do well , therefore, not to give any hasty

interpretat ion s of it here. The above excerpt appeals to a "h um an

mea n in g ," bu t i t d o es so by a f f i rmin g t ha t t he hu ma n [l'homme]

remains to be discovered. 1 In order for the human to be discovered,

a n d in o rd er fo r t he phra se "hu ma n mea n in g " t o a c qu ire so me

meaning, everything that has ever laid claim to the truth about the

nature, essence, or end of "m an" must be undo ne. In other words,

not hi ng must rem ain of what, unde r the t it le of me ani ng, related

the earth [la terre] and the human to a specifiable horizon. Again, it

is Nietzsc he who said that we are now "o n the hori zon of the infi

nite"; that is, we are at that point where "there is no more ' land, '"

and where "there is nothing more terrible than the infinite." 2

A r e w e fi na ll y g o i n g to le ar n th is le ss on ? A r e w e p er ha p s fi na ll y

able to hear it , or is it now impossible for us to learn anything



l l Xlll

else? Can we think an earth and a human such that they would be

only what they are—nothing but e a r t h a n d h u m a n — a n d s u ch

that they wo ul d be non e of the various hor izons often ha rbore d

unde r these names, none of the "perspectives" o r "views" in view

of whi ch we have disf igured hu mans [les hommes] and driven them

to despair?

"Th e horiz on of the inf init e" is no longer the hor izo n of the

whole, but the "whole" (all that is) as put on hold everywhere,

pus h ed to the outs ide just as much as it is pushed back inside the

"self." It is no longer a line that is drawn, or a line that will bedra wn , whi ch orie nts or gathers the mea nin g of a course of progress

or navigation. It is the opening [la brèche] or distancing [lecarte-

ment] of hori zon itself , and in the open ing: us. We happen as the

ope nin g itself , the dangerous fault l ine of a ruptu re.

I want to emphasize the date on which I am writing this. It is

the summ er of 1995, an d as far as specif ying the situ ation of the

earth and h umans is concerned, noth ing is more pres s ing ( h ow

co uld i t really be avoided?) than a l ist of prop er name s such as

these, presented here in no particular order: Bosnia-Herzogovina,

Ch ec h ny a , Rw and a, Bos nia n S erbs , T uts is , H utus , T am il T igers ,

Kra jina Serbs, Casama nce, Chia pas, Is lamic Jiha d, Bangla desh, the

S ecret Ar my f or th e Lib erat io n of Arm eni a, H amas , Kazakh s tan,

K h m e r s Ro u g es , E T A m i l i t i a , K u rd s ( U P K / P D K ) , M o n t a t a i r e, t heM ovement f or S el f - determinat ion, S omal ia , Ch icanos , S h i i tes ,

F N L C - C a n a l H i s t o r i q u e , L i b e r i a , G i v a t H a g a d a n , N i g e r i a , t h e

League of th e No rt h , Af gh anis tan , Indones ia , S ikh s , H ai t i , R om a

gy psies of S lovenia , T aiw an , Bur ma, P L O , Iraq, Is lamic Front S al

v a ti on , S h i n i n g P a th , V a u lx -e n -V e l in s, N e u h o f . . . . Of co ur se , it

w o u l d be di ff ic ul t to b r i n g th is li st to an en d if the a i m wa s to i n

clude all the places, groups, or authorities that constitute the the

ater of blo ody conflicts am ong id entities, as well as wha t is at stake

in these conflicts. These days it is not always possible to say with

any assurance whether these identities are intranational, infrana-

t ional , or t rans nat ional ; w h eth er th ey are " cul tural ," " rel ig ious ,"

"ethnic," or "historical"; whether they are legitimate or not—not

to mention the question about which law would provide such le

gitimation; whether they are real, mythical, or imaginary; whether

they are independent or "instrumentalized" by other groups who

w i e ld p ol it i ca l, e co no m ic , a n d id eo lo gi ca l po we r. . . .

This is the "earth" we are supposed to "inhabit" today, the earth

for which the name Sarajevo will become the martyr-name, the

testimonial-name: this is us, we who are supposed to say we as if

we k n o w wh at we ar e sa yi ng a n d who we are talking about. This

earth is anythi ng but a sharing of huma nity. It is a wo rld that doesnot even manage to constitute a world; it is a world lacking in

w o r l d , a n d la ck i n g in th e m e a n in g of w o r l d . I t is an en um er at i on

that brings to light the sheer num ber an d proli fera tion of these var

ious poles of attrac tion and r epul sion. It is an endless l ist , and

everything happens in such a way that one is reduced to keeping

accounts but never taking the f inal toll . It is a l itany, a prayer of

pure sorrow and pure loss, the plea that falls fro m the lips of mi l

lion s of refugees every day: wh ethe r they be deportees, peop le be

sieged, those who are mutilated, people who starve, who are raped,

ostracized, excluded, exiled, expelled.

W h a t I am ta lk in g ab ou t her e is co mp as si on , bu t no t co mp as si on

as a pity that feels sorry for itsel f an d feeds on itself. Com -p ass io n

is the cont agi on, the contact of bei ng with one anothe r in this tur

moil. Compassion is not altruism, nor is it identif ication; it is the

distur bance o f viol ent relatedness.

W h a t do es the ab ov e- na m ed pr ol if er at io n re qu ir e of us, th is pr o

liferation that seems to have no other meaning than the indetermi

nate multipli catio n of centripetal mean ings, mean ings closed in on

themselves and supersaturated with signif icance—that is , meanings

that are no longer meaningful because they have come to refer only

to their ow n closure, to their hori zon of appr opr iati on, and have

be gu n to sp re ad n ot h i n g bu t d es tr uc ti on , ha tr ed , an d the d en ia l of

existence?

W h a t if th is au ti st ic m u lt i p l i c i ty , w h i c h tea rs o p e n a n d is to r n



XIV

open, lets us know that we have not even begun to discover what it

is to be many, even though "la terre des hommes" 3 is exactly this?

W h a t if it let s us k n o w th at it is it se lf th e fi rs t la y i n g ba re [mise à

nu] o f a wo r l d t ha t i s o n l y the wo r l d , bu t whi c h i s t he wo r l d a b

so l u t e l y a n d u n reserv ed l y , wi t h n o mea n in g beyo n d t h is v ery B e

in g o f t he wo r l d : s in g u l a r l y pl u ra l a n d pl u r a l l y s in g u la r?

Preface

Th e first and pr inc ipa l essay of this book, w hi ch gives it its t it le,

wa s no t c om p os e d in an al to ge th er se qu en ti al m an ne r, b u t ra th er

in a discontinuous way, repeatedly taking up several themes. To a

certain extent , then, the sect ions can be read in any order, since

there are repe tition s here and there. B ut this is the result of a fun

dame ntal difficu lty. Thi s text does not disguise its am bi t io n of re

d o in g t he who l e o f " f i rst phi l o so p hy" by g iv in g t he "s in g u l a r

pl u ra l " o f B e in g 1 as its foundation. This, however, is not my a m b i

t ion , bu t rather the necessity of the th ing itself and of our history.

At th e ve ry le as t, I h op e to m a k e th is ne ce ss it y fe lt . At th e sa m e

time, apart from the fact that I do not have the strength to deliver

the treatise "of the singular p lura l essence of Bei ng, " the for m of

the ontological treat ise ceases to be appropriate as soon as the sin

gular of Bei ng itself, and therefore also of ontolog y, is in qu estion .

This is nothing new. At least since Nietzsche, and for al l sorts of

reasons that no doubt come together in the reason I invoke, phi

losophy is at odds with its "form," that is, with its "style," which is

to say, finally, wi th its address. H o w does thin ki ng address itself to

i t se l f , t o t h in k in g (whic h a l so mea n s: ho w d o es t h in k in g a d d ress

itself to everyone, wit hou t its bein g a matter of a "com preh ensi on"

o r "u n d e rst a n d i n g " t ha t mig ht be c a l l ed "c o mmo n ")? H o w is

t h in k in g a d d ressed ? (The phi l o so phic a l t rea t ise , a n d "phi l o so phy"

as such, is the neu tral izat ion of address, the subjectless disco urse of



X V I Preface

Being- S ub ject [l'Etre-Sujet] itself.) Put another way, what is the "di

alogue of the soul wi th itself" that Plato talks about, whic h dem on

strates that this qu esti on, or this wor ry, has always been part of ou r

history? If thi nk ing is addressed, then it is because there is mea ning

in this addre ss, and no t in disc ourse ( but it is in the address of dis

cours e) . T h is ob eys th e pr im ordi al , ontological c ondi t ion of b eing-

w i t h or be in g- to ge th er , w h i c h is w ha t I w o u l d li ke to ta lk ab ou t. A

treatise, therefore, is not suff iciently discursive. Nor is it enough to

dress discourse in the f orm of an address ( for me to address you

w i t h th e fa m il ia r "y o u " [tu] the whole way through). The address

mean s that thi nk in g itself addresses itself to "me" a nd to "us" at thesame time; that is , thi nki ng addresses itself to the wo rld , to history,

to people, to things: to "us." Another ambition springs from this

or, better yet, another, more restricted, attempt: to allow thinking's

address to be perceived, an address that comes to us from every

wh er e si m ul ta ne ou sl y, m u l t i p l i e d , re pe at ed , in si st en t, a n d va ri ab le ,

ges turing only tow ard " us " and tow ard our curious " b eing- w ith -

one- anoth er ," [être-les-uns-avec-les-autres], tow ard our addres s ing-

one- anoth er . 2

(By the way, the logic of "wi th" often requires heavy-handed syn

tax in order to say "being-with-one-another." You may suffer from

it as you read these pages. But perhaps it is not an accident that

language does not easily lend itself to showi ng the "wit h" as such,

for it is itself the address an d not what mu st be addresse d.)

In this , there is an il lu sion that l ies in wait, the il lu sion of wi ll i ng

th e adequat ion of " f orm" and " content ," o f w i l l in g t ruth i t s el f intopresence: as if I co ul d write to every addressee a seismo grap hical

account of our ups ets , our agitat ions , our t roub les , an d our ad

dresses without addressees. My only response is no: no will , "on

my life I did not know what it was to will" (Nietzsche). Or I might

say the following: will ing (or desire) is not a thinking; it is a dis

turbance, an echo, a reverberating shock.

The latter essays were chosen because their subjects converge

w i t h th at of th e p r i m a r y essay. As y ou w i l l see, th e fi rs t tw o are c on

necte d to the exact circ umsta nces of the most viole nt events of

these last years.



§ Of Being Singular Plur al

I t i s g o o d t o r e l y u p o n o t h e r s . Fo r no o ne c a n be a r t h i s l i f e a l o ne .

— H ô l d e r l i n

S i n c e h u m a n n a t u r e i s t h e t r u e c o m m u n i t y o f m e n , t h o s e w h o

p r o d u c e t h e r e b y a f f i r m t h e i r n a t u r e , h u m a n c o m m u n i t y , a n d s o c i a l

b e i n g w h i c h , ra th er th a n an ab st ra ct , ge ne ra l po w e r in o p p o s i t i o n

t o t h e i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l , i s t h e b e i n g o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l , h i s o w n

a c t i v i t y , h i s o w n l i f e , h i s o w n j o y , h i s o w n r i c h ne s s . T o s a y t h a t a

m a n i s a l i e na t e d f r o m h i m s e l f i s t o s a y t h a t t h e s o c i e t y o f t h i s

a l i e n a t e d m a n i s t h e c a r i c a t u r e o f h i s r e a l c o m m u n i t y .

— M a r x

W e A r e M e a n i n g

It is often said today that we have lost meaning, that we lack it

and , as a result , are in need of and wa it i ng for it . Th e "one" wh o

speaks in this way forgets that the very propag ation o f this discours e

is i t se l f mea n in g f u l . R eg ret t in g t he a bsenc e o f me a n in g i t se l f ha s

meaning. But such regret does not have meaning only in this nega

t ive mode; d eny ing the presence of mea ning affirms that one knows

w ha t m e a n i n g w o u l d be , w er e it th er e, a nd ke ep s th e m as te ry a n d

truth of me ani ng in place (whi ch is the pretension of the human ist

discourses that propose to "rediscover" meaning.) Whether it is

aware of it or not , the con tem por ary discourse on m ean ing goesmuch further and in a completely different direct ion: it brings to

light the fact that "meaning," used in this absolute way, has become

the bared [dénudé] name of our being-with-one-another. We do not

"ha v e" mea n in g a n ymo re , bec a u se we o u rse l v es a re mea n in g —en

tirely, without reserve, infinitely, with no meaning other than "us."

Th is does not mea n that we are the content of me ani ng, nor are

w e its f u lf i l lm e n t or it s re su lt , as if to sa y th at h u m a n s w er e th e

mea ning (end , substance, or value) of Bein g, nature, or history. The

mea ning of this mea ni ng —t ha t is, the significat ion to wh ich a state

of affairs corresponds an d com pa re s— is precisely what we say we



2 Being Singular Plural

have lost. But we are meaning in the sense that we are the element

in which signif ications can be produced and circulate. The least s ig

nif ica tion just as mu ch as the most elevated (the me ani ng of "na il"

as well as the meani ng of "G od ") has no mea nin g in itself and , as a

result , is what it is and does what it does only insofar as it is com

municated, even w h ere th is communicat ion takes p lace only b e

tw een " me" and " my s el f ." M eaning is i t s ow n communicat ion or

i ts ow n c irculat ion . T h e " me aning of Bein g" is not s ome property

that will come to qualify, f il l in, or f inalize the brute givenness of

"Being" pure and simple.' Instead, it is the fact that there is no"brute givenne ss" of Bei ng, that there is no desperately poor there

is presented when one says that "there is a nail catchi ng. . . . " Bu t

the givenness of Bei ng , the givenness in here nt to the very fact that

we u n d e r st a n d so m e t h i n g w h e n we say "t o be " (w ha te ve r it m a y

be a n d ho w ev er co n fu se d it m i g h t be ), a lo n g w i t h th e (sa me )

givenness that is given with this fact—cosubstantial with the given

ness of Bei ng and the unde rstan ding of Bei ng, that we unde rstand

one another (however confusedly) when we say it, is a gift that can

be sum mar iz ed as fo llows : Being itself is given to us as meaning. Be

ing does not have meaning . Be ing i t s el f , the ph eno men on of Be

i n g , i s m e a n i n g t h a t i s , i n t u r n , i t s o w n c i r c u l a t i o n — a n d we are

th is c irculat ion.

T h ere is no mea ning i f mean ing is not s h ared,2 and not because

there would be an ultimate or f irst s ignif ication that all beings have

in co mm on, but because meaning is itselfthe sharing of Being. Mean

ing begins where presence is not pure presence but where presence

comes apart [se disjoint] in order to be itself a s such. This "as" pre

supposes the distancing , spacing, a nd divi sion of presence. O nl y the

concept of "presence" contai ns the necessity of this divi sion . P ure

uns h ared pres ence—pres ence to noth ing, of noth ing, f or no th in g—

is neither present nor absent. It is the simple imp losi on of a being

that could never have been—an implosion without any trace.

Th is is why what is called "the creation of the worl d" i s not the

p r o d u c t i o n o f a p u r e so m e t h i n g f r o m n o t h i n g — w h i c h w o u l d n o t ,

at the same time, im plo de into the not hin g out of whi ch it coul d

never have com e— bu t is the explosion of presence in the origina l

Being Singular Plural 3

mul t ip l ic i t y of i t s d iv i s ion. I t is the exp los ion of nothing, in fact,

it is the spacing of me ani ng, sp acing as m e a n i n g a n d c i r c u l a t i o n .

T h e nihil of creatio n i s the truth o f mean ing, b ut mea ning is th e

orig inar y sharing of this truth. It coul d be expressed in the follo w

ing w ay : Being cannot b e any th ing b ut b eing- w ith - one- anoth er ,

c irculat ing in th e with and as the with o f th is s ingular ly p lural

coexistence.

If one can put it l ike this , there is no other mea nin g than the

mean ing of c ircula t ion. But th is c irculat io n goes in a l l d irect ions

at once, in all the directions of all the space-times [les espace-temps]

opened by presence to presence: all things, all beings, all entities,

everything past and future, alive, dead, inanimate, stones, plants,

nails , gods—and "humans," that is , those who expose sharing and

circ ulati on as such by saying "we," by saying we to themselves in all

possible senses of that expre ssion, an d by saying we for the total ity

of all being.

(Let us say we for all being, that is, for every being, for all beings

one by one, each time in the singular of their essential plural. Lan

guage speaks for all and of all: for all, in their place, in their name,

including those who may not have a name. Language says what there

is of the world, nature, history and humanity, and it also speaks for

them as well as in vie w of them, in order to lead the one who speaks,

the one through who m language comes to be and happens ("man"), toall of being, which does not speak but which is nevertheless—stone,

fish, f iber, dough, crack, block, an d b reath . The speaker speaks for

the world, which means the speaker speaks to it, on behalf of it, in or

der to make it a "world. "As such, the speaker is "in its place" and "ac

cording to its measure"; the speaker occurs as its representative but also,

at the same time (and this has all the values of pro in Latin), in an

ticipation of it, before it, exposed to it as to its own most intimate con

sideration. Language says the world; that is, it loses itself in it and ex

poses how "in itself" it is a question of losing oneself in order to be of it,

with it, to be its meaning—which is all meaning)




Circulat ion goes in al l direct ions: this is the Nietzschean thought

of the "eternal return," the affirmation of me anin g as the repetit ion

of the instant, noth ing but this repetit i on, and as a result, noth ing

(since it is a ma tter of the repe tit ion of wha t essential ly does not

return). But it is a repetit ion already comprised in the affirmation

of the instant, in this affirm ation/reque st {re-petitid) seized in the

lett ing go of the instant, affir ming the passing of presence and itself

passing with it , affirmation abandoned in its very movement. It is

a n impo ss ib l e t ho u g ht , a t h in k in g t ha t d o es n o t ho l d i t se l f ba c k

fro m t he c i rc u l a t io n i t t h in k s , a t h in k in g o f me a n in g r ig ht a t [à

même] 3 m eani ng, whe re its eternity occurs as the truth of its pass

in g . (F o r in st a n c e , a t t he mo men t a t whic h I a m wr i t in g , a bro wn -

and-white cat is crossing the garden, sl ipping mockingly away, tak

ing my thoughts with it .)

It is in this way that the thi nk in g of the eternal return is the in

a u g u ra l t ho u g ht o f o u r c o n t empo r a ry h ist o ry , a t h in k in g we mu st

repeat (even if it means ca l l ing i t some thin g else). We must reap-

propriate what already made us who "we" are today, here and now,

the "we" of a wor ld wh o no longer struggle to have me ani ng but to

be m e a n i ng its elf . T h i s is we as the beginning and end of the world,

in ex ha u st ib l e in t he c i rc u msc r ipt io n t ha t n o t hin g c i rc u msc r ibes ,

that "the" nothing circumscribes. We make sense [nous faisons sens],

not by sett ing a price or value, but by exposing the absolute value

that the world is by itself. "World" does not mean anything other

than this "nothing" that no one can "mean" [vouloir dire], but thatis said in every saying: in other words, Bei ng itself as the absolute

val ue in it sel f of all that is, but this absolute value as the being-with of

all that is i tself bare and im possi ble to evaluate. It is neither mean

ing [vouloir-dire] nor the givi ng of value [dire-valoir] , but value as

such, that is, "mean ing" w hic h is the me anin g of Bein g only because

it is Being itself, its existence, its truth. Existence is with: otherwise

nothing exists.

C i r c u l a t i o n — o r e t e r n i t y — g o e s i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s , b u t i t m o v e s

only insofar as it goes from one point to another; spacing is its ab

so l u t e c o n d i t io n . F ro m pl a c e t o pl a c e , a n d fro m mo men t t o mo

ment, without any progression or l inear path, bit by bit and case by

Being Singular P lural 5

case, essential ly accidental , it is singular and plural in its very prin

ciple. It does not have a final fulfi l lment any more than it has a

poi nt of orig in. I t is the origi nary pl ural ity of origins an d the cre

at ion of the wo rld in each singularity, cr eation cont inue d in the dis

cont inu ity of its discrete occurrences. F ro m now on , we, we others4

a re c ha rg ed wi t h t h is t ru t h—it i s mo re ours t ha n ev er—t he t ru t h o f

this paradoxical "first-person plura l" wh ich makes sense of the worl d

a s t he spa c in g a n d in t e r t wi n in g o f so ma n y wo r l d s (ea r t hs , sk ies ,

histories) that there is a tak ing place of me ani ng, or the crossing -

through [passages] of presence. "W e" says (and "we say") the uniq ue

event whose uniqueness and unity consist in mult iplicity.

People Are Strange

Everything, then, passes between us.'' This "between," as its name

impli es, has neither a consistency nor contin uity of its own. It does

not lead from one to the other; it constitutes no connective t issue,

no cement, no bridg e. Per haps it is not even fair to speak of a "co n

nection" to its subject; it is neither connected nor unconnected; it

falls short of bo th; even better, it is tha t whi ch is at the heart of a

connection, the interlacing [Yemrecroisment] of strands whose ex

tremities rem ain separate even at the very center of the knot. T he

"between" is the stretching out [distension] and distance opened by

t he s in g u l a r a s su c h, a s i t s spa c in g o f mea n in g . T ha t whic h d o es

n o t ma in t a in i t s d ist a n c e fro m t he "bet ween " i s o n l y imma n en c ecollapsed in on itself and dep rived of me anin g.

From one singular to another, there is contiguity but not conti

nuity. There is proximity, but only to the extent that extreme close

ness emphasizes the distanci ng it opens up. A ll of being is in tou ch

w i t h al l of b e in g , b u t th e la w of to u c h i n g is se p ar at io n; m or eo ve r,

it is the hetero gene ity of surfaces that to uc h each other. Contact is

b e y on d fu ll ne ss a n d e m p ti ne ss , b e y on d c o n n e c t i o n a n d d i s c o n

nection. If "to come i nto contact" is to begi n to mak e sense of one

another, then this "coming" penetrates nothing; there is no inter

med ia t e a n d med ia t in g "mi l ieu ." Mea n in g i s n o t a mi l ieu in whic h

we are im m e rs e d. T h e r e is no mi-lieu [between place]. It is a mat-



6 Being Singul ar Plural Being Singula r Plural 7

ter of one or the other, one an d the other, one wi th the other, but

by no m ea ns th e on e in th e ot he r, w h i c h w o u l d be s om e th i ng ot he r

than one or the other (another essence, another nature, a diffuse or

infuse generality). From one to the other is the syncopated repeti

t ion of origi ns-o f-the -wor ld, wh ich are each t ime one or the other.

Th e o r ig in i s a f f i rma t io n ; rep et i t io n i s t he c o n d i t io n o f a f f i rma

tion. I say "that is, that it is." It is not a "fact" and has nothing to

do wit h any sort of evalua tion. It is a singula rity taki ng refuge inits affirmati on of Bei ng, a touc h of me anin g. It is not an other Be

ing; it is the singular of Bei ng by whi ch the being is, or it is of Be

i n g , w h i c h is being in a tran sitiv e sense of the verb (a n un he ard of,

in a u d ibl e sen se—t he v ery mea n in g o f B e in g ) . Th e t o u c h o f mea n

in g br in g s in t o pl a y [engager] i t s o wn s in g u l a r i t y , i t s d ist in c t io n ,

and br ings int o play the plura lity of the "each t ime " of every touch

of me ani ng, "m ine " as well as al l the others, each one of wh ich is

" m i n e " in turn, a c c o rd in g t o t he s in g u l a r t u rn o f i t s a f f i rma t io n .

Rig ht away, then, there is the repetit io n of the touches of me an

in g , whic h mea n in g d ema n d s. This in c o mmen su ra bl e , a bso l u t e l y

heterogeneous repetit ion opens up an irreducible strangeness of

each one of these touches to the other. Th e other origin is i nc om

parable or inassimilable, not because it is simply "other" but be

cause it is an ori gin an d touch o f mea ning . Or rather, the alterity of

t he o t her i s i t s o r ig in a ry c o n t ig u i t y wi t h t he "pro per" o r ig in . 6 Yo u

are absolutely strange because the world begins its turn with you.

W e say "p eo pl e are st ra ng e. " 7 Thi s phrase is one of our most co n

stant and rudimentary ontological attestat ions. In fact , it says a

great deal . "People" indicates everyone else, designated as the in

determinate ensemble of populations, lineages, or races [gentes]

f ro m whic h t he spea k er remo v es h imsel f . (N ev ert he l ess , he re

moves h im sel f in a very part icula r sort of way, because the desig

n a t io n i s so g en era l —a n d t h is i s ex a c t l y t he po in t —t ha t i t in

evitably turns back around on the speaker. Since I say that "people

are strange," I in clud e my self in a certain w ay in this strangeness.)

The word "people" does not say exact ly the same thing as the

H e i d e g g e r i a n 8 " o n e , " 9 even if it is part l y a mo de of it . W i t h the

w o r d "o ne ," it is n ot al wa ys ce rt ai n w h et h er or no t th e sp ea ke r i n

cludes him sel f in the ano ny mi ty of the "one." For examp le, I can

say "someone said to me" ["on m'a dit"] or else "it is said that" ["on

dit que"] or else "that is how it is done" ["c 'est comme ça qu'on

fait"] or else "one is born; one dies" ["on naît , on meurt"]. These

uses are not equivalent and, moreover, it is not certain that it is al

wa ys th e cas e th at th e "o ne " sp ea ks of h i m s e l f ( f r o m a n d ab ou t

himsel f ) . H eid eg g er u n d erst o o d t ha t "o n e" wo u l d o n l y be sa id a s a

response to the question "who?" put to the subject of Dasein, but

he does not pose the other inevitable question that must be asked

in order to discover who gives this response and who, in respond

ing l ike this, removes hi ms elf or has a tendency to remove himse lf.

As a re su lt , he ri sk s ne g le ct in g th e fa ct th at th er e is no p ur e a n d

simpl e "o n e ," no "o n e" i n w hic h "pro per l y ex ist in g " ex ist enc e [l'ex

istant "pro prem ent existant"] is, from the start , purely and simp ly

imm ersed . "Peop le" clearly designates the mod e of "one" by whi ch

"I " remov e myself, to the poin t of app earin g to forget or neglect

the fact that I m ysel f am p art of "peop le." In any case, this sett ing

apart [mise à l'écart] does not occur without the recognition of

identity. "People" clearly states that we are al l precisely people, that

is , in d ist in c t l y person s, hu ma n s, a l l o f a c o m mo n "k in d , " bu t o f a

kind that has its existence only as numerous, dispersed, and inde

terminate in its generality. This existence can only be grasped in

t he pa ra d o x ic a l s imu l t a n ei t y o f t o g et hern ess (a n o n y mo u s, c o n

fused, and indeed massive) and disseminated singularity (these or

those "people(s)," or "a guy," "a girl ," "a kid").

"Peo pl e" a re s i l ho u et t es t ha t a re bo t h imprec ise a n d s in g u l a r-

iz ed , fa in t o u t l in es o f v o ic es , pa t t ern s o f c o m po r t me n t , sk et c hes

of affects, not the anonym ous chatter of the "pub lic do ma in ." B ut

w ha t is an af fe ct, if no t ea ch ti m e a sk et ch ? A c o m p o r tm e n t , if no t

each t ime a pattern? A voice, i f not each t ime a faint outl ine? W ha t

is a singularity, i f not each t im e its "own " clearin g, its "ow n" i m

min en c e , t he im min en c e o f a "pro pr ie t y" o r pro pr i e t y i t se l f a s im

min en c e , a l wa ys t o u c hed u po n , a l wa ys l ig ht l y t o u c hed : rev ea l in g

itself beside, always beside. ("Beside himself" ["a côté de ses pom

p e s " 10 ], as the say ing goes. Th e com edy of this expression is no ac

cident, and, whether it masks an anxiety or l iberates the laughter



8 Being Singul ar Plural Being Singular Plural 9

of the ignor ant, it is always a ma tter of an escape, an evasion , an d

an em pty ing out of what is closest , an odd ity presented as the rule

itself.)

"I" take refuge in an exception or dist inct ion when I say "peo

ple," but I also confer this dist inct ion on each and every person,

although in just as obscure a way. This is undoubtedly why people

so often make the judgment "people are strange" or "people are in

cred ible ." It is not only, or even prim ari ly, a quest i on of the ten

dency (however evident) to set up our own habitus as the norm. It

is necessary to uncover a mor e prim it i ve level of this part i cula r j u d g m e n t, on e w he re w h a t is ap p re h en d ed is n o t h i n g ot he r th an

singularity as such. From faces to voices, gestures, att itudes, dress,

a n d c o n d u c t , wha t ev er t he "t ypic a l " t ra i t s a re , ev eryo n e d ist in

g u ishes h im sel f by a sor t o f su d d en a n d he a d l o n g pr ec ip i t a t io n

wh er e th e str an ge ne ss of a si ng u la ri ty is co nc en tr at ed . W i t h o u t th is

prec ipi t a t io n t here wo u l d be , qu i t e s impl y , n o "so meo n e." An d

there would be no more interest or hospital ity, desire or disgust , no

matter who or what it might be for.

"So meo n e" here i s u n d erst o o d in t he wa y a perso n mig ht sa y

"it 's him all r ight" about a photo, expressing by this "al l r ight" the

cover ing over of a gap, mak in g adequate wha t is inadequ ate, capa

bl e of re la ti ng o n l y to th e "i ns ta nt a ne ou s" gr a sp in g of a n in st an t

that is precisely its own gap. The photo—I have in mind an every

d a y, ba n a l pho t o — sim u l t a n eo u sl y revea ls s in g u l a ri t y , ba n a l i ty , a n d

o u r c u r io s i t y a bo u t o n e a n o ther . The pr in c ip l e o f in d isc ern a bi l i t y

here becomes decisive. Not only are al l people different but they

are also al l different from one another. They do not differ from an

archetype or a generality. The typical traits (ethnic, cultural , social ,

generational, and so forth), whose part icular patterns constitute an

other level of singul arity, do not aboli sh singul ar differences; in

stead, they bring them into rel ief. As for singular differences, they

a re n o t o n l y " in d iv id u a l , " bu t in fra in d iv id u a l . I t i s n ev er t he c a se

that I have met Pierre or Marie per se, but I have met him or her in

su c h a n d su c h a " fo rm," in su c h a n d su c h a "st a t e , " in su c h a n d

su c h a "mo o d ," a n d so o n .

Th is very hum ble layer of our everyday experience contains an

other rudimentary ontological attestat ion: what we receive (rather

than what we perceive) with singularit ies is the discreet passage of

other origins o f the world. What occurs there, what bends, leans,

twists, addresses, denies—from the newborn to the corpse—is nei

ther primarily "someone close," nor an "other," nor a "stranger,"

n o r "so meo n e s imi l a r . " I t i s a n o r ig in ; i t i s a n a f f i rm a t io n o f t he

w o r l d , a n d w e k n o w th at th e w o r l d ha s no ot he r o r i g i n th an th is

s in g u l ar mu l t ipl i c i t y o f o r ig in s . Th e wo r l d a l wa ys a ppea rs [surgit] 11

each t ime acco rding to a decid edly local tu rn [of events]. Its unity,

its uniq uenes s, and its total i ty consist in a co mb in ati on of thisret ic u la t ed mu l t ip l ic i t y , w hic h pro d u c es n o resu l t .

W i t h o u t th is at te st at io n, th er e w o u l d b e n o f ir st at te st at io n of

existence as such, that is, of the nonessence and non-subsistenc e-by-

itself that is the basis of being-oneself. T hi s is wh y the Heide gger-

ian "o n e" is in su f f ic ien t as the i n i t i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f existentielle

"everydayness." He ideg ger confuses the everyday with the undi f

ferentiated, the anonymous, and the stat ist ical . These are no less

important, but they can only constitute themselves in relat ion to

the differentiated singularity that the everyday already is by itself:

each day, each t ime, day to day. One cannot affirm that the mean

ing of Be ing m ust express itself start ing fro m everydayness an d

then beg in by neglec t ing the general differen tiat ion of the every

day, its constantly renewed rupture, its int imate discord, its poly-

mo rp hy and its poly pho ny, its rel ief and its variety. A "day" is not

s imp l y a u n i t fo r c o u n t in g ; i t i s t he t u r n in g o f t he wo r l d — ea c h

time singular. An d days, indeed every day, could not be simil ar if

they were not first different , difference itself. Likewise "people," or

rather "peoples," given the irreducible strangeness that constitutes

them as such, are themselves pr im ar ily the exposing of the singu

l a r i t y a c c o rd in g t o whic h ex ist en c e ex ist s , i r red u c ibl y a n d pr ima r

i l y— a n d a n ex po si t io n o f s in g u l a r i t y t ha t ex per ien c e c l a ims t o

c o mm u n ic a t e wi t h , in t he sen se o f " t o " a n d "a l o n g wi t h , " t he t o

tal ity of beings. " Nat ure " is also "strange," an d we exist there; we

exist in i t in the mode of a constantly renewed sing ularity, wheth er

the singula rity of the divers ity and disp arity of our senses or that

of the disco nce rt in g prof usi on of nature's species or its various



10 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 11

metamorphoses into "technology." Then again, we say "strange,"

"o d d ," "c u r io u s ," "d isc o n c ert in g " about al l of being .

Them es o f "wo n d er" a n d t he "ma rv e l o f B e in g " a re suspec t i f

they refer to an ecstatic mysticism that pretends to escape the world.

Th e theme of scientific curi osity is n o less suspect if it boils d ow n

to a collector's preoccupation with rarities. In both cases, desire for

the exception presupposes disdain for the ordinary. Hegel was un

doubtedly the first to have this properly modern consciousness of

t he v io l en t pa ra d o x o f a t h i n k in g who se o w n v a l u e i s a s yet u n

heard of, and whose dom ai n is the grayness of the wo rld . Thi s or

d in a r y g rayn ess , t he in s ig n i f ic a n c e o f t he ev e ryd a y— wh ic h t he

H eid eg g er ia n "o n e" s t i l l bea rs t he ma rk o f—a ssu mes a n a bsen t ,

lost , or far away "gran deur." Yet , tr uth can b e not hi ng if not the

truth of being i n totality, that is, the totality of its "ordinarin ess,"

ju st as m e a n i n g ca n o n l y be ri gh t at [à même] existence and no

w he re els e. T h e m o d e r n w o r l d ask s th at th is tr ut h be th ou gh t: th at

me ani ng is right at. It is in the indefin ite plur ality of origins and

t he ir c o ex ist en c e . The "o rd in a ry" i s a l wa ys ex c ept io n a l , ho wev er

lit t le we understand its character as origin. What we receive most

c o m mu n a l l y a s "st ra ng e" i s t ha t t he o rd in a r y i t se l f i s o r ig in a ry.

W i t h ex is te nc e la i d op en i n th is w ay a nd th e m e a n i ng of th e w o r l d

b ei ng w ha t it is , th e ex ce pt io n is th e ru le . (Is th is no t th e te st im on y

of the arts and literature? I s not the first and on ly pur pos e of thei r

strange existence the prese ntati on of this strangeness? Aft er all , in

the etymo logy of the word bizarre)1 whether the word comes from

Basque or Arabi c, there is a sense of valor, co mm an di ng presence,and elegance.)

Gaining Access to the Origin

A s a co ns eq ue nc e, g a in i n g acc ess to th e o r i g i n , 1 3 en t er in g in t o

mea ning , comes dow n to exposing oneself to this tru th.

W h a t th is me an s is th at we do no t ga in acc ess to th e o r ig in : ac

cess is refused by the origin's conc eali ng itself in its multi pli cit y. We

do not gain access; that is, we do not penetrate the origin; we do

not identify with it . More precisely, we do not identify ourselves in

it or as it, but with it, in a sense that must be elucidated here and is

noth ing other than the mean ing of origi nary coexistence.

Th e alterity of the other is its being-o rigin . Conve rsely, the orig-

inarity of the origin is its being-other, but it is a being-o ther than

every being for a nd in crossing through [à travers] all being. Thus,

the originarity of the origin is not a property that would dist inguish

a being from all others, because this being would then have to be

som ethi ng other than itself in order to have its ori gin in its own

turn . Thi s is the most classic of God's aporias, an d the pr oof of his

nonexistence. In fact , this is the most immediate importance of

Kant 's destruction of the ontological argu ment, wh ic h can be de

ciphe red in a quas i-l ite ral m anne r; the necessity of existence is

given right at the existing of all existences [l'exister de tout l'exis

tant], in its very diversity and contingency. In no way does this

constitute a supplementary Being. The world has no supplement. It

is supplem ented in itself and, as such, is indef initely suppl emen ted

by the or ig in .

Th is fol low s as an essential consequence: the being-other of the

orig in is not the alterity of an "oth er-th an-th e-w orld. " It is not a

question of an Othe r (the inevitab ly "capital ized Othe r" ) 1 4 than the

w o r l d ; it is a q ue st io n of th e al te ri ty or al te ra ti on of the worl d. In

other words, it is not a ques tio n of an aliud or an alius, or an

alienus, or an other in general as the essential stranger who is op

posed to what is proper, but of an alter, that is, "one of the two."

This "other," this "lowercase other," is "one" among many insofar

as they are ma ny ; it is each one, an d it is each time one, one among

them, one among all and one among us all. In the same way, and

reciprocally, "we" is always inevitab ly "us al l , " where no one of us

can be "a ll " and each on e of us is, in tu rn (wh ere all our turns are

simultaneous as well as successive, in every sense), the other origin

of the same wor ld.

Th e "o u ts id e" o f t he o r ig in i s " i n s id e" —i n a n in s id e mo re in t e

rior than the extreme interior, that is, more interior than the inti

macy of the worl d and the int i mac y that belongs to each "m e." If

int im acy must be defined as the extremity of coinciden ce with one

self, then what exceeds int imacy in inferiority is the distancing of



12 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Pl ural 13

coin cide nce itself . It is a coexistence of the origi n "i n" itself , a co

existence of orig ins; it is no accide nt that we use the wor d "i nt i

macy" to designate a relation between several people more often

than a relation to oneself . Our being-with, as a being-many, is not

at all accidental, and it is in no way the secondary and random dis

persio n of a prim ord ial essence. It forms the proper an d necessary

status and c onsistency of orig inar y alterity as such. The plurality of

beings i s at the foundation [fondment] of Being.

A si ng le b ei ng is a co n tr a d i c ti on in te rm s. S u c h a b ei n g , w h i c h

w o u l d be its o w n fo u n d a ti o n , o r i g i n , a n d in ti m ac y, w o u l d be in c a pable of Being, in every sense that this expression can have here.

"Being" is neither a state nor a quality, but rather the action ac

cordin g to w h ich w h at Ka nt cal ls " th e [ mere] pos it in g of a th i ng " 1 5

takes place ("is") . The very simplicity of "position" implies no more,

although no less, than its being discrete, in the mathematical sense,

or i t s dis t inct ion from, in the sense of with, other (at least possible)

positions, or its distinction among, in the sense of between, other

positions. In other words, every position is also dis-position, and,

consi der ing the appea ring that takes the place of and takes place in

the position, all appearance is co-appearance [com-parution]. T h i s

is why the mean ing of Bei ng is given as existence, being-in-oneself-

outside-oneself , which w e make exp l ic i t, w e " h uma ns ," b ut w h ich

we m ak e ex p li ci t, as I ha ve sa id , for the to tality of beings.

I f th e or ig in is i rred ucib ly p lur al , i f i t i s th e indef in ite ly unf ol d

ing and var ious ly mult ip l ied in t imac y of th e w or ld, th en not gaining access to the origin takes on another meaning. Its negativity is

neither that of the abyss, no r of the forb idd en, nor of the veiled or

the concea led, nor of the secret, nor that of the unprese ntable. It

need not operate, then, in the dialectical mode where the subject

must reta in in itse lf its own n egation (since it is the negation of its

own origin). Nor does it have to operate in a mystical mode, which

is the reverse of the dialec tical m ode , where the subject mus t rejoice

in its negation . In bot h of these, negati vity is give n as the aliud,

wh er e al ie n at io n is th e pr oc es s th at m u st be re ve rs ed in te rm s of a

reapprop riat ion. A l l f orms of th e " capita l ized Oth er" pre s ume th is

alienation from the proper as their own; this is exactly what con

stitutes the "capi taliza tion" of the "Othe r," its unif ie d and br oke n

transcendence. But, in this way, all forms of the capitalized "O the r"

represent precisely the exalted and overexalted mode of the propri

ety of what is prop er, w hi ch persists an d consists in the "some

wh er e" of a "n ow he re " a n d in th e "s om e ti m e " of a "n o ti m e , " th at

is, in the punctum aeternum outside the world.

Th e outside is insi de; i t is the spaci ng of the dis-p osit ion of the

w o r ld ; it is ou r d is p os i ti o n a n d o u r co -a pp ea ra nc e. Its "n eg a ti vi ty "

ch anges meaning; i t is not converted into pos it iv i ty , b ut ins tead

corres ponds to the mo de of Being w h i ch is th at of d is pos it ion/ co -appearance and w h ich , s t r ic t ly s peaking, is neith er negat ive nor

pos it ive , b ut ins tead th e mode of b eing- togeth e r or b ein g- with.

T h e or ig in is togeth er w ith oth er or ig ins , or ig inal ly div ided. As a

matt er of fact, we do have access to it. W e have access exactly in

the mode of hav ing access; we get there; we are on the br ink , clos

est, at the threshold; we touch th e or i g i n . " ( T ruly ) w e h ave access

(to the truth). . . . " , 6 ["À la vérité, nous accédons . . . "] is Ba

tai l les ph ras e, 17 the ambi gui ty of wh ic h I repeat even thou gh I use

it in another way ( in Bata ille, it precedes the aff irm ation of an i m

mediate loss of access) . Pe rhaps ever ythin g happens betw een loss

and appropriat ion: neith er one nor th e oth er , nor one and th e

other, nor one in the other, but much more strangely than that,

much more s imply .

" T o reach 18 [toucher] the end" is again to risk missing it , because

the orig in is not an end. E n d, l ike Pr inci ple , is a form of the Other.To reach the origin is not to miss it ; it is to be properly exposed to

it . Since it is not another thing (an aliud), the origin is neither

"missable" nor appropriable (penetrable, absorbable) . It does not

obey this logic. It is the plural s ingularity of the Being of being. We

reach it to the extent that we are in touch with ourselves and in

touch w ith the rest of beings. We are in touc h wit h ourselves inso

far as we exist. Being in touch with ourselves is what makes us "us,"

and there is no other secret to discover buried behind this very

touch ing , b e h ind th e " w it h " of coexis tence.

We ha ve acc ess to th e tr u th of th e o r i g in as m a n y ti m es as we are

in one ano ther's presenc e an d in the presen ce of the rest of bein gs.

,



'4 Being Singula r Plural Being Singular Plural 15

Ac ce ss is " c o m i n g to p re se nc e, " b ut pr es en ce it se lf is d is - p os it io n,

the spacing of singu larit ies. Prese nce is nowhere other than in

"coming to presence." We do not have access to a thing or a state,

b u t o n l y to a c o m i n g . We ha ve acc ess to an acc ess .

"Strangeness" refers to the fact that each singularity is another

access to the world. At the point where we would expect "some

thing," a substance or a procedure, a principle or an end, a signifi

cat io n, there is noth ing but the mann er, the tur n of the other ac

cess, w hi ch conceals itse lf in the very gesture wherein it offers itself

t o u s — a n d w h o s e c o n c e a l i n g is the turning itself. In the singularity that he exposes, each child that is born has already concealed

t he a c c ess t ha t he i s " fo r h imsel f" a n d in whic h he wi l l c o n c ea l

him sel f "wi t hi n h imsel f , " ju st a s he wi l l o n e d a y h id e u n d er the f i

nal exp ression of a dead face. Thi s is w hy we scruti nize these faces

w i th su ch cu ri os it y, in se ar ch of id en ti fi ca ti on , l o o k i n g to see w h o m

the chil d looks l ike, and to see if death looks l i ke itself. Wh at we

are looking for there, l ike in the photographs, is not an image; it is

an access.

Is this not what interests us or touches us in "l iterature" and in

"the arts"? Wh at else interests us about the dis junc tion of the arts

among themselves, by wh ich they are what they are as arts: plu ral

singulars? Wh at else are they but the expo sit ion of an access con

cealed in its own opening, an access that is, then, "inimitable," un-

t ra n spo rt a bl e , u n t ra n sl a t a bl e because i t forms, each t i me , an ab

solute poin t of translat i on, trans miss ion, or transit io n of the origininto origin. What counts in art , what makes art art (and what

makes h um ans the art ists of the wo rl d, that is, those who expose

t he wo r l d fo r t he wo r l d ) , i s n e i t her t he "bea u t i fu l " n o r t he "su b

l ime"; i t i s n e i t her "pu rpo siv en ess wi t ho u t a pu rpo se" n o r t he

"ju dgm ent of taste"; it is neither "sensible man ifest at ion" nor the

"pu t t i n g in t o wo rk o f t ru t h ." Un d o u bt e d l y , i t i s a l l t ha t , bu t in a n

other way: it is access to the scattered origin in its very scattering; it

i s t he pl u ra l t o u c hi n g o f t he s in g u l a r o r ig in . Th is i s wha t "t he imi

tat ion of nature" has always mean t. Ar t always has to do wit h cos

mogony, but it exposes cosmogony for what it is: necessarily plural ,

diffracted, discreet , a touc h of color or tone, an agile tu rn of phrase

or folded mass, a radiance, a scent, a song, or a suspended move

ment , exact ly because it is the birth of a world (and not the co n

struction of a system). A wor ld is always as m any worl ds as it takes

to make a world.

W e o n l y ha ve acc ess to o u r s e l v e s — a n d to th e w o r l d . It is o n ly

ever a ques tio n of the fol low in g: f ull access is there, access to the

w ho le of th e o r ig i n . T h i s is ca ll ed "f in it ud e" in H ei de gg er ia n te r m i

nology. But it has become clear since then that "finitude" signifies

the infinite sing ularity of mea ning , the inf inite sing ularity of access

t o t ru t h . F in i t u d e is the orig in; that is, it is an infin ity of origin s."O r ig in " d o es n o t s ig n i fy t ha t f ro m whic h t he wo r l d c o mes, bu t

rather the com ing of each presence of the worl d, each t ime singular.

The Creatio n of the Wo rl d and Curiosi ty

Th e concept of the "creation of the wor ld " 1 9 represents the origin

as originarily shared, spaced between us and between al l beings.

Thi s, in turn , contributes to rend ering the concept of the "author"

of the wo rld un tenable. In fact , one cou ld show ho w the mot if of

creation is one of those that leads direct ly to the death of G o d un

derstood as author, first cause, and supreme being. Furthermore, if

one looks at metaphysics carefully, there is not a G o d who sim ply

and easily conform s to the idea of a producer. W het her in Au gus

t in e, Aqu in a s , Desc a r tes , Ma l ebra n c h e , Spin o z a , o r L e ib n iz , o n e a l

wa ys fi nd s th at th e th em e of cr ea ti on is b ur d en ed w i th an d m is re p resented as a prob lem of pr odu cti on, rig ht up un til the decisive

mom ent of the ontological argument 's downf all . (Hegel 's restoration

of the argumen t, the one to wh ich S chell i ng assigned significant im

portance, is n oth ing but a n elabora tion of the concept of creation.)

Th e dist in ct ive char acterist ic of the concep t of crea tion is no t

that it posits a creator, but that, on the contrary, it renders the "cre

ator" indistinct from its "creation." (It has to be said, here, in a gen

eral way, that the dist inct iv e characterist ic of Wes tern mon othe ism

is not the posit i ng of a single god, but rather the effacing of the di

vi ne as su ch in th e tr an sc en de nc e of th e w o r l d . W i t h re sp ec t to th e

question of ori gin , this is surely the precise poi nt at wh ich the l ink



i 6 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 17

is forged that makes us unfail in gly Jew-G reek in every respect. An d ,

w i t h re sp ec t to th e q ue st io n of d es ti na ti on , th is is th e p o i nt f r o m

w h i c h w e are se nt in to the "g lo ba l" sp ac e as su ch . 20 ) I n myt ho l o g i

cal cosmogonies, a god or demiurge makes a world start ing from a

situation that is already there, whatever this situation may be. 21 In

crea tion, how ever, it is the being-alr eady- there of the already-there

that is of con cer n. In fact, if crea tion is ex nihilo, this does not sig

nify that a creator operates "start ing from nothing." As a rich and

complex tradit ion demonstrates, this fact instead signifies two

thin gs: on the one hand , it signif ies that the "creator" itse lf is thenihil', on the other, it signifies that this nihil is not , logical ly speak

in g , so met hin g " fro m whic h" ["d 'o ù"] wha t i s c rea t ed wo u l d c o me

[provenir], but the very origin [provenance], and destination, of

some thi ng in general and of everything. No t only is the nihil n o t h

ing prior but there is also no longer a "nothing" that preexists cre

ation ; it is the act of app earin g [surgissement], i t i s t he v ery o r ig in —

insofar as this is understood only as what is designated by the verb

"to originate." If the nothin g is not anything prior, th en only the ex

re ma in s —i f o n e c an t a l k a bo u t i t l ik e t h i s— t o qu a l i fy c rea t io n - in

a c t io n , t ha t is, the a ppea r in g or a r r iv a l [venue] in nothing (in the

sense that we talk about someone appearing "in person").

Th e nothin g, then, is no thin g other than the dis-p osit ion of the

appearing. The origin is a distancing. It is a distancing that imme

diately has the mag nitu de of all space-time an d is also not hin g other

than the interst ice of the int i ma cy of the world : the among-being[l 'entre-étant] of al l beings. Th is am ong-b eing itself is no thin g but

[a] being, and has no other consistency, movement, or configura

t ion th an that of the being-a-being [l'etre-étant] of all beings. Be ing ,

or the am ong , shares the singularit ies of al l appearings. Cr eat ion

takes place everywhere and always—but it is this unique event, or

advent, on ly on the con dit ion of bei ng each time what it is, or being

w h at it is o nl y "at ea ch ti m e , " ea ch ti m e ap p ea ri ng si ng ul ar ly .

On e can understa nd how the creation, as it appears in any Jew ish-

Chr ist ia n -I s l a mic t heo l o g ic o -myst ic c o n f ig u ra t io n , t est i f ies l ess

(a n d c er t a in l y n ev er ex c lu s iv e l y) t o a pro d u c t iv e p o wer o f G o d

than to his goodness and glory. In relat ion to such power, then,

creatures are onl y effects, whi le the love and glo ry of G o d are de

posited right at [à même] the level of wh at is created; th at is, crea

tures are the very bril l iance [éclat] 11 of God's c om in g to presence.

It is necessary, then, to u nder stan d the theme of the "ima ge of

Go d" a nd/or the "trace of G od " not acco rding to the logic of a sec

ondary imitat ion, but according to this other logic where "God" is

itself the singular appearance of the image or trace, or the disposi

t ion of its exposi t ion: place as divine place, the divine as strict ly lo

cal. As a consequence, this is no longer "divine," but is the dis

l o c a t io n a n d d is-p o si t io n o f the wo r l d (wha t Spin o z a c a l ls " t hedivine extension") as that opening and possibil ity [ressource] w h i c h

comes from further away and goes farther, infinitely farther, than

any god.

If "creation" is i ndeed this singu lar ex-posi t ion of bein g, then its

real name is existence. Existence is creation, our cre atio n; it is the

b eg in ni ng an d e n d th at tw ar e. T h i s is th e th ou gh t th at is th e m os t

necessary for us to think. If we do not succeed in thin ki ng it , th en

w e w i l l ne ve r ga in acc ess to w h o we are , we w h o are no m or e th an

u s in a wo r l d , whi c h i s i t se l f n o mo re t ha n t he wo r l d — bu t we wh o

have reached this point precisely because we have thought logos (the

self-presentation of presence) as creation (as singular co mi ng) .

This t h in k in g i s in n o wa y a n t hro po c en t r ic ; i t d o es n o t pu t hu

man ity at the center of "cre ation "; on the contrary , it transgresses

[traverse] humanity in the excess of the appearing that appears on

the scale of the tota lity of bei ng, but w hi ch also app ears as that excess [démesure] which is impossible to totalize. It is being's infinite

original singularity. In humanity, or rather right at [à même] h u

manity, existence is exposed and exposing. The simplest way to put

this into language would be to say that humanity speaks existence,

bu t w ha t sp ea ks th ro ug h its sp ee ch say s th e w h o le of be in g . W h a t

Heidegger cal ls "the ontico-ontological privilege" of Dasein is nei

ther its prerogative nor its privilege [apanage]: it gets Being on its

way [// engage l'être], but the Being of Dasein is nothing other than

the Bein g of being .

If existence is exposed as such by hu ma ns, wh at is exposed there

also holds for the rest of being s. The re is n ot, on the one sid e, an




originary singularity and then, on the other, a simple being-there of

things, more or less given for our use. On the contrary, in exposing

itself as singularity , existence exposes the singula rity of Bei ng as s uch

in al l being . Th e difference between hum ani ty and the rest of be

ing ( whi ch is not a concer n to be deni ed, b ut the nature of wh ich is,

nevertheless, not a given), wh ile itself being inseparable fr om other

differences within being (since man is "also" animal, "also" l iv ing,

"also" physio-chemical), does not dist inguish true existence from a

sort of subexistence. Instead, this difference forms the concrete con

dit i on of singularity. We wou ld not be "hu mans " if there were not

"dogs" an d "stones." A stone is the exteriority of singu larity in w hat

w o u l d ha ve to be ca ll ed its m in e ra l or m ec ha ni ca l ac tu al it y [litter-

alité}. B ut I wou ld no longer be a "h um an" if I di d not have this

exteriority "i n me, " in the form of the quasi-mi nerality of bone: I

w o u l d no lo ng er be a h u m a n if I were not a body, a spac ing of all

other bodies and a sp acing of "me" in "m e." A singularity is always

a body, and all bodies are singularities (the bodies, their states, their

movements, their transformations).

Existence, therefore, is not a property of Dasein; it is the origi

n a l s in g u l a r i t y o f B e in g , whi c h Dasein exposes for al l being. This

is why hu ma n it y i s n o t " in t he wo r l d " a s i t wo u l d be in a mi l ieu

(why would the milieu be necessary?); it is in the world insofar as

the wo rl d is its ow n exteriority, the pro per space of its being- out-

in-the-world. But it is necessary to go farther than this in order to

avoid giving the impression that the world, despite everything, re

main s essential ly "the wo rl d of hum ans ." It is not so muc h the

w or l d of h u m an it y as it is the w or l d of the n on h u m a n to w h i ch h u

ma n it y i s ex po sed a n d whic h hu ma n it y , in t u rn , ex po ses . O n e

could try to formulate it in the fol lowing way: humanity is the ex

posing of the world; it i s neither the end nor the ground of the world;

the world is the exposure of humanity; it is neither the environment

nor the representation of humanity.

Therefo re, howev er far hu ma nit y is fro m bein g the end of na

ture or nature the end of hum ani ty (we have already tried al l the

va ri at io ns of th is f or m u la ), th e en d is al wa ys b e i ng - i n- th e - w or ld

and the bein g-w orld of al l being.

Being Singul ar Plural 19

Even supposing one st il l wished to take the world as the repre

sentation of human ity, this woul d not necessarily imp ly a solipsism

of hu ma nit y: because, if that is the case, then it is the representa

tion itse lf that instructs me abou t what it necessarily represents to

me, an irrefutable exteriority as my exteriority. The representation

of a spacin g is i tself a spaci ng. An intuitus originarius, whic h wo u l d

not be a representation but rather an immersion in the thing-itself,

w ou ld ex is t al on e an d w o u l d be fo r it se lf th e or ig i n a nd th e th i ng :

this was shown above to be contradictory. Descartes him sel f test i

fies to the exterio rity of the wor ld as the exter iority of his body. Because he hardl y doubts his body, he mak es a fiction of do ub tin g it,

and this pretension as such attests to the truth of res extensa. It is

also not surp risi ng that for Descartes the reality of this wor ld,

about wh ich G od coul d not deceive me, is mai ntain ed in Being by

the continuous creation on the part of this very God. Reality is al

wa ys in ea ch in st an t, f r om pl ac e to pl ac e, ea ch ti m e in tu r n , w h i c h

is exactly how the reality of res cogitans attests to itself in each "ego

sum, " whi ch is each t im e the "I am" of each one in turn [chaque

fois de chacun à son tour].

Once again, this is the way in which there is no Other. "Cre

ation" signifies precisely that there is no Other and that the "there

is" is not an Other. Being is not the Other, but the origin is the

punct ual and discrete spacing between us, as between us and the rest

of the world, as between all beings.25

W e fi nd th is al te ri ty p r i m a r i l y a nd es se nt ia ll y i n tr i g u in g . I t i n

trigues us because it exposes the always-other origin, always inap

propriate and always there, each and every t ime present as inim

itable. This is why we are primarily and essential ly curious about

the world and about ourselves (where "the world" is the generic

name of the object of this ontolog ical curiosity ). Th e correlate of

creation, understood as existence itself, is a curiosity that must be

understood in a completely different sense than the one given by

Heidegger. For h im , curiosity is the frantic act ivity of passing from

be in g to be in g in an in sa ti ab le sor t of wa y, w i th ou t eve r b ei ng ab le

to stop and think. Without a doubt, this does test ify to being-with-

one-another, but it testifies to it without being able to gain access to



2 0 Being Singular Plural Being Singula r Plural 21

the existent opening that characterizes Dasein in t he " in st a n t . " 2 4 It

is necessary, then, to disc onnect the mo st prim it iv e layer of curio s

ity, the level on which we are primarily interested by what is inter

est ing par excellence (the origin), from this inconsistent curiosity

an d also from the attent ion that takes care of others (Fiirsorge). At

this level , we are interested in the sense of bein g intri gue d by the

ever-r enew ed alteri ty of the orig in a nd , if I ma y say so, in the sense

of hav ing an affair wi th it . (It is no acciden t that sexual curiosi ty is

an exem plary figure of curios ity and is, in fact , more th an just a fig

ure of it.)

As E n g li s h [a nd Fr en ch ] al lo ws us to say, ot he r be in gs are curious

(o r bizarre) to me because they give me access to the origin; they

allow me to touch it ; they leave me before it , leave me before its

turning, which is concealed each t ime. Whether an other is another

person, animal, plant , or star, it is above al l the glaring presence of

a place and m om ent of absolute orig in, irre futable, offered as such

and van ish ing in its passing. Thi s occurs in the face of a new bor n

child, a face encountered by chance on the street, an insect, a shark,

a pebb le . . . but if one really wants to u nder stan d it , it is not a

matter of ma ki ng al l these curious presences equal.

If we do not have access to the other in the mo de just describ ed,

bu t see k to ap pr op ri at e th e o r i g i n — w h i c h is s om et h in g w e al wa ys

do — th en this same curiosity transforms itself into appropria t ive or

destructiv e rage. We no longer look for a singularity of the orig in

in the other; we look for the unique and exclusive origin, in order to

either adopt it or reject it . The other becomes the Other according

to the mod e of desire or hatred. M ak in g the other divine (together

w i t h o u r v o l u n ta r y se rv it ud e) o r m a k i n g it e vi l (t og et he r w i t h it s

exclu sion or exter min ation) is that part of curio sity no longer in

terested in dis-posit ion and co-appearance, but rather has become

the desire for the Position itself. This desire is the desire to fix the

or i g i n , or to give th e origin to itself, once and for al l , an d in one place

for al l , that is, always outside the world. This is why such desire is a

desire for murder, and not only murder but also for an increase of

cruelty and horror, which is l ike the tendency toward the intensifi

cat ion of mur der; it is mu tila t ion , carvin g up, relentlessness, metic

ulous execu tion, the joy of agony. Or it is the m assacre, the mass

grave, massive and technolog ical execu tion, the boo kke epi ng of the

camps. It is always a matter of exp edit i ng the transform ation of the

other into the Other or making the Other appear in the place of

the other, and, therefore, a matter of iden tify ing the Oth er and the

origin itself.

Th e Oth er is noth ing mo re than a correlate of this ma d desire,

bu t ot he rs , in fa ct, are ou r originary interests. It is true, however, that

the possi bil ity of this ma d desire is containe d in the very disp osi

t ion of orig ina ry interests: the dis sem inat ion of the origi n upsets [affole] the origin in "me" to exact ly the same extent that it makes

me curious about it, makes "me" a "me" (or a "subject," someone

in any case). (It fol lows, then, that no ethics would be independent

from an ontology. Only ontology, in fact , may be ethical in a con

sistent manner. It will be necessary to return to this elsewhere.)

Between Us: First Philosophy

W h e n ad dr es si ng th e fa ct th at p h i lo s o p h y is co n te m p or an eo us

w i th th e G r e e k ci ty , on e en ds u p l o s i n g si gh t of w h a t i s in qu es

t io n —a n d r ig ht l y so . As i s o n l y f i t t in g , ho wev er , l o s in g s ig ht o f

w ha t is in q ue st io n re tu rn s us to th e p r o b l e m in al l its ac u it y af ter

these twenty-eight centuries.

It returns us to the que stion of the origin of our history. The re is

no sense of reconstituting a teleology here, and it is not a matter of

retracing a process directed toward an end. To the contrary, history

clearly appears here as the movement sparked by a singular cir

cumstance, a movement that does not reabsorb this singularity in

a universality (or "universal history," as Marx and Nietzsche under

stood it), b ut instead reflects the imp act of this singu lari ty in re

newed singular events. Thus, we have a "future" [avenir] and a "to

c o me" [à venir]; we have this "future" as a "past ," which is not past

in the sense of bei ng the start i ng poi nt of a directe d process, but

past in the sense of bei ng a "cur iosi ty" ["bizarrerie"] (the "Gr eek

mira c l e") t ha t i s i t se l f in t r ig u i n g a n d , a s su c h , rema in s st i l l " t o

come." Th is dis-p osit ion of histor y indee d makes there be a h is t o ry



2 2 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 2 3

and not a processus (here as elsewhere, the Hegelian model reveals

itself as un coverin g the truth by way of its exact opposite). O ne can

unders tand, then, Heidegger's "history of Bei ng, " and understand

that our relati on to this h istor y is necessarily that of its Destruktion,

or deconstruction . In other words, it is a matter of brin ging to l igh t

this history's singulari ty as the disassem bling law of its unity an d

under stand ing that this law itself is the law of mea ning .

This clearly supposes that such a task is as demanding and ur

gent as it is impossible to measure. The task is to understand how

hist o ry—a s a s in g u l a r , W est ern a c c id en t —"bec a me" wha t o n emig ht c a l l "g l o ba l " o r "pl a n et a ry" wi t ho u t , a t t he sa me t ime, en

gend ering itself as "unive rsal ." C onseq uently , it is the task of un

d erst a n d in g ho w t he W est d isa ppea red , n o t by rec i t in g t he fo r

mu l a s o f i t s g en era liz ed u n i fo r mit y , bu t by u n d erst a n d in g t he

expansion, by and through this "uni form ity," of a plur al singularity

that is and is not , at the same t ime, "proper" to this "o/accident."

A n d on e m us t un d er s ta n d th at th is f o rm id a b le q u es ti on is no ne

other than the que stion of "ca pita l" (or of "cap ital is m") . If one

w an ts to gi ve a f u ll a cc ou nt of " c a p i t a l " — s t a r t i n g f r o m th e ve ry

first mome nts of history that began in the merchant cit ie s— the n it

is necessary to remove it , far more radically than Marx could have,

fro m i t s o wn represen t a t io n in l in ea r a n d c u mu l a t iv e h ist o ry , as

well as from the representation of a teleological history of its over

c o min g o r re jec t io n . This wo u l d a ppea r t o be t he—pro bl ema t ic —

lesson of history. Bu t we cann ot under stan d this task unless we first

understand what is most at stake in our history, that is, what is

most at stake in philosophy.

A c c o r d i n g to di ff er en t ve rs io ns , b ut in a p r e d om in a nt l y u n i f o r m

ma n n er , t he t ra d i t io n pu t fo rwa rd a represen t a t io n a c c o rd in g t o

w h i c h p h i l os o p h y a n d th e ci ty w o u l d b e ( w ou ld ha ve be en , m us t

have been) related to one another as subjects. Accordingly, philos

ophy, as the art iculat ion of logos, i s the subject of the city, w here

the city is the space of this art icu lat io n. L ikew ise, the city, as the

gathering of the logikoi, is the subject of philo soph y, where ph ilos

o ph y i s t he pro d u c t io n o f t he ir c o mm o n logos. Logos i tself, then,

contains the essence or mea nin g of this recipro city: it is the com

mo n fo u n d a t io n o f c o mm u n it y , where c o mm u n it y , in t u rn , i s t he

foundation of Being.

It is within this uniform horizon, according to different versions

(whether strong or weak, h appy or unhapp y) of this pred omi nan t

mode of inqu iry, that we st il l understand the famous "pol it ica l an

i m a l " o f Ari stot le: it is to pres ume that logos i s t he c o n d i t io n o f

comm unity, wh ich , in turn , is the cond it io n of hum anity ; and/or it

is to presume that each of these three terms draws its u nit y and

consistency from [its sharing] a com mu nica tion of essence wi th the

other two (where the world as such remains relat ively exterior tothe whole affair, presuming that nature or physis accomplishes itself

in humanity understood as logos politikos, whereas technë subordi

nates itself to both).

B u t t h is ho r i z o n —t ha t o f po l i t i c a l phi l o so ph y in the fu l lest

sense (not as the "ph iloso phy of poli t ics," b ut philo sop hy as po li

t i c s)—mig ht v ery wel l be wha t po in t s t o t he s in g u l a r s i t u a t io n

wh er e ou r hi st or y gets un de r w ay a nd , at th e sa me ti m e, bl oc k s ac

cess to this situation. Or instead, this horizon might be that which,

in the course of its history, gives an ind ica t ion of its ow n dec on

struction and exposes this situation anew in another way. 25 " P h i

losophy and polit ics" is the exposit ion [énoncé] of this situati on.

But it is a disjunc tive expos it ion, because the situation itself is dis

ju nc ti ve . T h e ci ty is no t p r i m a r i l y " c o m m u n i t y , " an y m or e th a n it

is primarily "public space." The city is at least as much the bringing

t o l ig ht o f be in g - in -c o m mo n as the dis-position (dispersal and dis

parity) of the com mu nit y represented as found ed in interio riry or

t ra n sc en d en c e . I t i s "c o mmu n it y" wi t ho u t c o mmo n o r ig in . Tha t

be in g the cas e, a nd as l on g as p h il os op h y is an ap pe al to th e or i g in ,

the city, far from being philosophy's subject or space, is its prob

lem. Or else, it is its subject or space in the mod e of bei ng its pro b

lem, its aporia. Philosophy, for its part , can appeal to the origin

only on the condit ion of the dis-posit ion of logos (that is, of the o r i

gin as just ified and set into discourse): logos is the spacing at the

ve ry pl ac e of the or ig in . C on se q ue nt ly , p h i lo so p h y is th e p r o b l e m

of the city; p hil oso phy covers over the subject that is expected as

"c o mmu n it y ."



2 4 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural *5

This i s why phi l o so phic a l po l i t i c s a n d po l i t i c a l phi l o so phy reg u

l a r l y ru n a g ro u n d o n t he essenc e o f c o m mu n it y o r c o m mu n it y a s

o r ig in . R o u ssea u a n d Ma rx a re ex empl a ry in t he ir s t ru g g l e wi t h

these obstacles. Rousse au revealed the aporia of a com mu ni ty that

w o u l d ha ve to pr ec ed e it se lf in or de r to co ns ti tu te it se lf : in its ve ry

concep t, the "social contr act" is the den ial or foreclosure of the orig-

i n a r y d i v i s i o n [déliaison] between those singularit ies that would

have to agree to the contr act and, thereby, "d raw it to a close." Al

though assuredly more radical in his demand for the dissolution of

polit ics in al l spheres of existence (which is the "realizat ion of ph ilosophy"), Marx ignores that the separation between singularit ies

overcome and suppressed in this way is not , in fact , an accidental

separation imposed by "polit ical" authority, but rather the consti

tut ive separation of dis-p osit ion . Ho wev er powerfu l it is for thi nk

in g t he "rea l re l a t io n " a n d wha t we c a l l t he " in d iv id u a l , " "c o mmu

nism" was st il l not able to think being-in-common as dist inct from

c o m m u n i t y .

In this sense, philosophical polit ics regularly proceeds according

to the surrep tit ious appe al to a metaphysics of the one-or igi n,

where , at t he sam e t im e, it nevert heless exposes , volens nolens, the

situatio n of the dis-po sit ion of origins. Oft en the result is that the

d is-po si t io n i s t u rn ed i n t o a ma t t er o f ex c l u s io n , in c l u d ed a s ex

clud ed, an d that al l philo sop hica l polit ics is a polit ic s of exclusiv

ity and the correlat ive ex clu si on —o f a class, of an order, of a "c om

mu n it y" —t he po in t o f whi c h i s t o en d u p wi t h a "peo pl e , " in t he"base" sense of the term . Th e dem and for equality, t hen , is the nec

essary, ult imate, and absolute gesture; in fact , it is almost indica

t ive of dis-p osit ion as such . H oweve r, as long as this continues to

be a m at te r of an "e ga li ta ri an d e m a n d f ou n de d u p o n so m e ge ne ri c

i d e n t i t y , " 26 equ a l i t y w i l l never do justice [ne fait encore pas droit] to

singula rity or even recognize the considerable difficult ies of want

in g to do so. It is here that the criti que of abstract rights com es to

the fore. However, the "concrete" that must oppose such abstrac

t io n i s n o t ma d e u p pr ima r i l y o f empir ic a l d et ermin a t io n s , whic h,

in the capital ist regime, exhaust even the most egalitarian wil l :

rather, concrete hete. pr ima ril y signifies the real object of a thin kin g

0 f be ing -in -co mm on, an d this real object is, in turn , the singula r

pl u ra l o f t he o r ig in , t he s in g u l a r pl u ra l o f t he o r ig in o f "c o m mu

nity" itself (if one st il l wants to cal l this "com mun ity" ). A ll of this is

undoubtedly what is indicated by the word that fol lows "equality"

in the French republican slogan: "fraternity" is supposed to be the

solution to equality (or to "equil iberty" ["égaliberté"]) 27 by evok

ing or invoking a "generic identity." What is lacking there is exact ly

t he c o mm o n o r ig in o f t he c o m mo n . 2 8

It is "lack ing" insofar as one attempts to take account of it with in

t he ho r iz o n o f phi l o so p hic a l po l i t i c s . O n c e t h is ho r iz o n is d ec o n structed, however, the necessity of the plu ral sing ular of the orig in

comes into play—and this is already under way. But I do not plan

to propose an "other polit ics" under this heading. I am no longer

sure that this term (or the term "polit ical philosophy") can con

t inue to have any consistency beyond this op eni ng up of the hori

zon whi ch come s to us bo th at the end of the long histor y of our

We st er n si tu a ti on and as the reope ning of this situat ion. I o nly

wa nt to he lp to b r in g ou t th at the c om b in a ti on p hi lo so p h y- p ol it ic s,

in al l the force of its being joined together, simultaneously exposes

and hides the dis-position of the origin and co-appearance, which is

its correlate.

The phi l o so phic o -po l i t i c a l ho r iz o n is wha t l in k s t he d is-po si t io n

to a contin uity and to a com mu ni ty of essence. In order to be ef

fect ive, such a relat ion requires an essential iz ing procedure: sacri

fice . If one look s carefully, one ca n fin d the place of sacrifice in a llpolit i cal ph ilos oph y (or rather, one wi l l fin d the challenge of the

abstract, w hic h makes a sacrifice of concrete singularity). B ut as sin

gular origin, existence is unsacrificable. 29

In this respect , then, the urgent demand named above is not an

other politic al abstrac tion. Instea d, it is a recons idera tion of the very

mea n in g o f "po l i t i c s "—a n d , t herefo re , o f "ph i l o s o ph y"— in l ig ht o f

the origina ry situation: the bare exposit io n of singular origins. T hi s

is the necessary "first ph ilo sop hy " (i n the canoni cal sense of the ex

pression). It is an ontology. Philosophy needs to recommence, to

restart itself from itself against itself, against polit ic al p hil oso phy

and philosophical polit ics. In order to do this, philosophy needs to




think in principle about how we are "us" among us, that is, how the

consistency of our Being is in bei ng- in-c omm on, and how this con

sists precisely in the "i n " or in the "betw een" of its spac ing.

Th e last "first philo soph y," if one dare say any thin g about it , is

given to us in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. It is that which

has put us on the way [chemin] to where we are, together, whether

we k n o w it or no t. Bu t it is als o w h y its au th or wa s ab le to , in a so rt

of retur n of Destruktion i tself, com pro mi se himse lf, in an unpa r- i

donable way, with his involvement in a philosophical polit ics that

be ca m e c r i m i n a l . T h i s ve ry p o i nt , th en , in di ca te s to us th at pl ac efro m whic h f i rst phi l o so phy mu st rec o mmen c e: i t i s n ec essa ry t o

refigure fundamental ontology (as well as the existential analyt ic ,

the histor y of Bein g, and the th ink ing of Ereignis that goes along

wi t h it) wi th a t hor oug h resolve that starts from the plural singular

of origins, from being-with.

I wan t to return to the issue of "first philo sop hy" in order to push

it even further, but without claiming to be the one who can fully ac

complish such an undertaking. By definit ion and in essence, the

above "first philosophy" needs "to be made by al l , not by one," l ike

the poetry of Mal doror . For the momen t, I o nly want to indicate the

pri nci ple of its necessity. Heid egger clearly states that bein g-w ith

#1 {Mitsein, Miteinandersein, and Mitdasein) is essential to the consti

tut ion of Dasein i tself. Given this, it needs to be made absolutely

clear that Dasein, far from being either "man" or "subject ," is not

even an isolated and unique "one," but is instead always the one,each one, with one another [l'un-avec-l autre]. If this determination

is essential, then it needs to attain to the co-originary dimension and

expose it without reservation. But as it has often been said, despite

this affirm ative assertion of co-ori ginari ry, h e gives up on the step to

the consideration of Dasein itself. It is appropriate, then, to examine

the possibil ity of an explicit an d endless exposit ion of co-origin arity

and the p ossibil ity of takin g account of what is at stake in the to

getherness of the ontolog ica l enterprise (and , in this way, tak ing ac

count of what is at stake in its polit ic al consequen ces.) 30

It is necessary to add here that there is a reason for this exami

nation which is far more profound than what first appears to be a

simple "readjus tment" of the Heideg geri an discourse. The reason

obviously goes much farther than that, since at its fullest, it is about

nothing less than the possib il ity of speaking " of Dasein'' in general,

or of saying "the exist ing" or "existence." Wh at wo ul d happe n to

philosop hy if speaking about Be ing in other ways than saying "we,"

"you," and "I" became excluded? Where is Being spoken, and who

speaks Being?

The reason that is foreshadowed has to do precisely with speak

ing (of) Bein g. Th e themes of being -wi th and co-origin arity need

to be renewed and need to "reinit ial ize" the existential analyt ic , exactly because these are mea nt to resp ond to the que sti on of the

meanin g of Bein g, or to Being as mea ning . Bu t if the mean ing of

Being indicates itself pri ncip ally by the putt i ng into play of Bei ng

in Dasein and as Dasein, then, precisely as meaning, this putting

into play (the "there wi ll be" of Bei ng) can on ly attest to itself or

expose itself in the mod e of bei ng- wit h: because as relates to me an

ing, it is never for just one, but always for one another, always be

tween one another. The me aning of Bein g is never in what is s ai d—

never said in significat ions. But it is assuredly in them that "it is

spok en," i n the absolute sense of the expressi on. " On e speaks," "i t

speaks," means "Being is spoken"; it is meaning (but does not con

struct meaning). But "one" or "it" is never other than we.

In other words, i n reveal ing itself as what is at stake in the me an

in g o f B e in g , Dasein has already revealed itself as bei ng- wit h and

reveals itself as such before any other expl icat ion. T he me ani ng ofBeing is not in play in Dasein in o rd er t o be "c o mmu n ic a t ed " t o

others; its putt ing into play is identically being-with. Or again: Be

ing is put into play as the "with" that is absolutely indisputable.

From now on, this is the minimal ontological premise. Being is put

into play among us; it does not have any other meaning except the

dis-p osit ion of this "betwee n."

H eid eg g er wr i t es , "Dasein's. . . u n d erst a n d i n g o f B e in g a l rea d y

implies the under standi ng of others. " 31 But this surely does not say

en o u g h. The u n d erst a n d in g o f B e in g i s n o t hin g o t her t ha n a n u n

derstanding of others, whic h means, in every sense, unde rstan ding

others through "me" and understanding "me" through others, the



2 8 Being Singula r Plural Being Singul ar Plural 2 9

u n d er st a n d in g o f o n e a n o t her [des uns des autres}. One could say-

ev en mo re s impl y t ha t B e in g i s c o mmu n ic a t io n . B u t i t rema in s t o

be k n o w n w h at " c o m m u n i c a t i o n " is.

For the moment, it is less important to respond to the question

o f t he me a n in g o f B e in g ( i f i t i s a qu est io n , a n d i f we d o n o t a l

ready basical ly respond every day and each t ime . . . ) than it is to

pay attention to the fact of its exh ibit ion. If "com mu nic atio n" is for

u s , t o d a y, su c h a n a f f a i r— in ev ery sen se o f t he wo rd . . . — i f i t s

theories are flouris hing , if its technologies are being prolifera ted, if

t he "med ia t iz a t io n " o f t he "med ia " br in g s a l o n g wi t h i t a n a u t o -

c o m mu n ic a t io n a l v er t ig o , i f o n e pl a ys a ro u n d wit h t he t heme o f

the indist inctness between the "message" and the "medium" out of

e i t her a d isen c ha n t ed o r ju bi l a n t fa sc in a t io n , t hen i t i s bec a u se

something is exposed or laid bare. In fact , [what is exposed] is the

ba re a n d "c on te nt "- le ss w eb of " c o m m u n i c a ti o n . " O n e c o u ld say it

is the b are web of the com- (of the telecom-, sa id wi t h a n a c k n o wl

edgm ent of its indepen dence ); that is, it is our web or "us" as web

or network, an us that is ret iculated and spread out , with its exten

sion for an essence and its spacing for a structure. We are "our

se l v es" t o o in c l in ed t o see in t h is t he o v erwhel min g d est in y o f

modernity. Contrary to such meager evidence, it might be that we

have understood nothing about the situation, and rightly so, and

that we have to start again to understand ourselves—our existence

and that of the worl d, ou r being dispos ed in this way.

B ein g S in gu lar Plu ral

Being singular plural: these three apposite words, which do not

have any determined syntax ("being" is a verb or noun; "singular"

and "plural" are nouns or adject ives; al l can be rearranged in dif

ferent combinations), mark an absolute equivalence, both in an in

dist inct t fWdist inct way. Being is singularly plural and plurally sin

gular. Yet , this in itself does not constitute a part icul ar pred icat io n

of Bein g, a s if Bei ng is or has a certain n um be r of attributes, on e

o f wh ic h i s t ha t o f be in g s in g u l a r-pl u ra l —h o wev e r d o u bl e , c o n t ra

dictory, or chiasmatic this may be. On the contrary, the singular-

plura l constitutes the essence of Bei ng, a con stitu t ion that undoe s

or dislocates every single, substantial essence of Being itself. This

is not just a way of spea king , because there is no pr ior substance

that would be dissolved. Being does not preexist its singular plural .

To be more precise, Being absolutely does not preexist; n o t h i n g

preexists; on ly what exists exists. E ver since Parme nides, one of ph i

losophy's peculiarit ies has been that it has been unfolding this

uniq ue prop osit ion, in al l of its senses. Th is prop osit ion proposes

n o t hin g bu t t he pl a c emen t [la position] a n d d is-p o si t io n o f ex is

tence. It is its plural singularity. Unfolding this proposit ion, then, is

t he o n l y t h in g phi l o so phy ha s t o d o . ' 2

That which exists, whatever this might be, coexists because it ex

is ts . Th e c o - im pl ic a t io n o f ex ist in g [l'exister] is the shari ng of the

w o r ld . A w o r l d is no t s o m e th i ng ex te rn al to ex is te nc e; it is no t an

extrinsic addit ion to other existences; the world is the coexistence

that puts these existences together. But one could object that there

exists something [which does not first coexist]. Kant established

that there exists someth ing, exact ly because I can th ink of a possi

bl e ex is te nc e: b u t th e po ss ib le co m es se co nd in re la ti on to th e re al ,

be cau se th er e al re ad y ex is ts s o m e th in g r e a l. 33

It would also be worth adding that the above inference actually

leads to a concl usi on abou t an element of existence's plu rali ty [un

pluriel d'existence}: there exists something ("me") and another t hing

(this other "me" that represents the possible) to which I relate my

self in ord er for m e to ask m yse lf i f there exists som eth ing o f the

sort that I thi nk of as possible. T hi s som ethi ng coexists at least as

much as "me." But this needs to be drawn out in the fol lowing way:

there does not exist just these "me's," understood as subjects-of-

representation, because along with the real difference between two

"me's" is given the difference between things in general, the differ

ence between my body and many bodies. This variat ion on an older

style of ph ilo so ph izi ng is only meant to poi nt out that there has

never been, nor wi l l there ever be, any [real] philo sophi cal solip sism.

In a certain way, there never has been, and never wil l be, a philos

op hy "o f the subject" in the sense of the fin al [infinie] closure in it

self of a for-itself.



30 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 3 i

H o wev er , t here i s fo r t he who l e o f phi l o s o phy wha t i s ex em pl i

fied in Hegel's statement "the I is in essence and act the universal:

a n d su c h pa rt n ership (Gemeinschafilichkeit) is a form, though an

ex t ern a l fo rm, o f u n iv ersa l i t y . " 34 It is well known that dialect ical

logic requires the passage through exteriority as essential to inferi

ority itself. Nevertheless, within this logic, it is the "interior" and

subject ive for m of the "M e" th at is needed in order to finish the

project of findi ng itself and p osin g itself as the truth of the univer

sal and its community. As a consequence, what is left for us to hold

onto is the m om en t of "exterio rity" as b eing of almos t essential

va lu e, so es se nt ia l th at it w o u l d no lo ng er be a m at te r of re la ti ngthis exteriority to any individual or collect ive "me" without also un

failingly attaining [maintenir] to exteriority itself and as such.

Being singular plural means the essence of Being is only as co-

essence. In turn, coessence, or being-with (be in g -wit h-ma n y) , d es

ignates the essence of the co-, or even more so, the co- (the cum) it

self in the po sit i on or guise of an essence. In fact , c oessential i ty

can not consis t in an assemblage of essences, where the essence of

this assemblage as such remains to be determined. In relat ion to

such an assemblage, the assembled essences would become [mere]

accidents. C oessen tial ity signifies the essential sharin g of essential

ity, sharin g in the guise of assem bling, as it were. Thi s cou ld also

be p u t in th e f ol l ow in g w ay : if Be i ng is b ei ng -w it h, th en it is, in its

b ei ng - w i th , th e " w i t h " th at co ns ti tu te s Be i ng ; th e w i t h is no t s i m

ply an a d d i t i o n . T h i s operates in the same way as a col lect ive [col

légial] power: p ower is neith er exterior to the mem bers of the collect ive [collège] nor interi or to each one of the m, b ut rather consists

in the collect ivity [collégialité] as such.

Therefore, it is not the case that the "with" is an addition to some

pri or Being; instead, the "wi th" is at the heart of Bein g. In this re

spect , it is abs olutely necessary to reverse the order of phi loso ph i

cal exp osit i on, for wh ic h it has been a matter of course that the

"wit h"—a n d t he o t her t ha t g o es a l o n g wi t h i t —a l wa ys c o mes sec

ond, even though this succession is contradicted by the underlying

[profonde] logic in question here. Even Heidegger preserves this or

der of succession in a remar kable way, in that he does not introd uce

the co-originarity of Mitsein until after having established the orig

inary character of Dasein. The same remark could be made about

the Husserl i an const itut io n of the alter ego, even though this too is

in its own way contemporaneous (once again, the cum) with the

ego in t he "s in g l e u n iv ersa l c o mmu n it y ." 3 5

To the contrary, it can also be shown that when Hegel begins the

Phenomenology of Spirit Wiû\ the mo men t of "sense certainty," where

it appears that consciousness has not yet entered into relation with

another consciousness, this moment is nonetheless characterized by

the language wit h whi ch consciousness ap propriate s for itself the

truth of what is i mme diatel y sensible (the famous "now it is nig ht").In doing so, the relat ion to another consciousness remains surrepti

tiously presupposed. It would be easy to produce many observations

of this kin d. For example, the evidence for the ego sum c o mes d o wn

to, constitut ively and co-originarily, its possibil ity in each one of

Descartes's readers. The evidence as evidence owes its force, and its

clai m to truth, precisely to this possibil ity in each one of us — on e

could say, the copossibil ity. Ego sum = ego cum.*'

In this way, it can be show n that , for the who le of phil osop hy,

the necessary successivity [la successivité] of any exposition does not

prevent the deeply set [profond] order of reasons from bein g regu

lated by a co-originarity [soit réglé sur une co-originarité]. In fact,

in pro pos ing to reverse the order of ontolo gica l expos it ion , I am

only proposing to bring to l ight a resource that is more or less ob

sc u re l y presen t ed t hro u g ho u t t he en t i re h ist o ry o f ph i l o s o p hy —

and presented as an answer to the situation described above: philosophy begins with and in "civil" ["concitoyenne"] coexistence as

such (which, in its very difference from the "imperial" form, forces

power to emerge as a problem). Or rather, the "city" is not primar

ily a f o r m o f po l i t i c a l in st i t u t io n ; it is p r i m a r i l y b e i n g - w i th as such.

Phi l o so phy i s , in s u m, t he t h in k in g o f be in g -w it h; bec a u se o f t h is ,

i t i s al so t h in k in g -w it h a s su c h.

Th is i s n o t s im pl y a ma t t er o f c l a r i fy in g a s t i l l fa u l t y ex po si

t ion. . . . It is just as mu ch a question o f doi ng just ice to the essen

t ial reasons for why, across the whole hi story of philo soph y, b eing-

w i th is su b or d in at ed to Be in g and, at the same t ime and according



3 2 Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 33

to this very subordination, is always assert ing [de faire valoir] its

prob lem as the very proble m of Bein g. In sum , being-with is Being's

own most problem. The task is to know why and how this is so. 37

Let us take up the matter again, then, not beginning from the

B ei n g o f be in g a n d pro c eed in g t o be in g i t se l f be in g wi t h -o n e-

another [étant l'un-avec-lautre], but starting from being—and all

o f be in g —d et e rm in ed in i ts B e in g a s be in g wi t h-o n e-a n o t her .

[This is the] singular plural in such a way that the singularity of

each is indissociable from its being-with-many and because, in gen

eral , a singularity is indissociable from a plurality. Here again, it is

n o t a qu est io n o f a n y su ppl emen t a ry pro pert y o f B e in g . The c o n

cept of the singular imp lie s its sing ular izat i on and , therefore, its

d ist in c t io n fro m o t her s in g u l a r i t ies (whic h i s d i f feren t f ro m a n y

c o n c ept o f t he in d iv id u a l , s in c e a n imma n en t t o t a l i ty , wi t h o u t a n

other, would be a perfect individual, and is also different from any

conce pt of the part icula r, since this assumes the togetherness of

w h i ch th e pa rt ic ul ar is a pa rt , so th at su ch a pa rt ic ul ar ca n on ly pr e

sent its difference from other part iculars as numerical difference).

I n L a t in , t he t erm singuli already says the plural , because it desig

nates the "one" as belonging to "one by one." The singular is pri

m a r i l y each one and, therefore, also with an d among all the others.

The singular is a plural . It also undoubtedly offers the property of

indivisibil ity, but it is not indivisible the way substance is indivisi

ble . It is, in st ea d , in d iv is ib l e in each instant [au coup par coup],

w i t h i n th e ev en t of its si ng ul ar iz at io n. It is i nd iv is ib le li k e an y i n

stant is indivisible, which is to say that it is infinitely divisible, or punctually indivisible. Moreover, it is not indivisible l ike any par

t ic u l a r is i n d i v i s i b l e , bu t on the c o n d i t i o n of pars pro toto: the s in

gular is each t ime for the whol e, in its place and i n ligh t of it. ( If

h u m a n i t y i s for bei ng in tota lity in the way I have trie d to present

it, th en it is the exp osin g of the singu lar as such an d in general.) A

singularity does not stand out against the background of Being; it

is, whe n it is, Bei ng itself or its orig in.

Once again, it is fairly easy to see to what extent these features

answer to those of the Cartesian ego sum. The singular is an ego that

is not a "s ubject" in the sense of the rel ation of a self to itself. It is

an "ipse ity" that is not the relat ion of a "me" to "itself ." 38 It is nei

ther "me" nor "you"; it is what is dist inguished in the dist inct ion,

w ha t is di sc re et in th e di sc re ti on . It is be in g- a- p ar t of B e i n g it se lf

and in Being itself, Being in each instant [au coup par coup], which

attests to the fact that Being only takes place in each instant.

T he essence of B e i n g is the sho c k of the in st a n t [le coup]. E a c h

time, "Being" is always an instance [un coup] of Bei ng (a lash, blow,

b ea ti ng , sh oc k, k n o c k , an en co un te r, an ac ce ss ). As a re su lt , it is

also always an instance of "w ith ": singular s singu larly together,

w he re th e to ge th er ne ss is ne it he r th e s u m , no r th e in c o r p or a ti o n

[englobant], nor the "society," nor the "community" (where these

wo rd s on ly gi ve ri se to p ro b le m s) . T h e to ge th er ne ss of si ng ul ar s is

singularity "itself." It "assembles" them insofar as it spaces them;

they are "l inked" insofar as they are not unified.

A c c o r d i n g to th es e c o n d i ti on s , B e i n g a s b e i n g - w i th m i g h t no

longer be able to say itself in the thir d perso n, as in "i t is" or "there

is." Because there wou ld no longe r be a poi nt of v iew that is exte

r io r t o be in g -t o g et her f ro m whic h i t c o u l d be a n n o u n c ed t ha t

"there is" be ing and a being -w ith of beings, one wi th the other.

There would be no "it is" and, therefore, no longer the "I am" that

is subjacent to the announ cem ent of the "it is." Rather , it wou ld

be ne ce ss ar y to th i n k th e th ir d- p er so n si ng ul ar in th e fi rs t p er so n.

As su ch , th en , it be co m es th e f ir st - p er so n p lu r a l. B e i n g c o u l d no t

speak of itself except in this u niq ue m anner: "we are." Th e truth

of the ego sum is the nos sumus; this "we" annou nces itself throu gh

humanity for all the beings "we" are with, for existence in the sense

of being-e ssential ly -with, as a Being whose essence is the wi th .

("O ne wil l speak . . . ": Wh ic h one? We wi l l speak: W h o is this

"we"? Ho w can I say "us" for those of you w ho are readi ng this?

H o w can I say "us" for me? Alth ou gh this is what we are in the

process of doi ng , ho w do we th in k together, whethe r we are "i n

accord" or not? Ho w are we wi th one another? Al l of this is to ask:

W h a t is a t p la y in o u r c o m m u n i c a t i o n , in th is b oo k , i n its se n

tences, and in the whole situation that more or less gives them

so me mea n in g ? [T his i s the] qu est io n o f phi l o so p hy a s " l i t era

ture," which is about asking how far it is possible to take the third-



34 Being Singula r Plural Being Singular Plural 35

perso n d isc o u rse o f phi l o so p hy. At wha t po i n t mu st o n t o l o g y be

come . . . what? Become conversation? Become lyricism? . . . The

strict concep tual rigo r of bei ng- wi th exasperates the discourse of

its concept. . . . )

W h a t is k n o w n as "s oc ie ty ," th er ef or e, in th e br oa de st a n d m o st

diffuse sense of the word , is the figure [chiffre] of an ont olo gy yet

to be put into play. Rousseau presented [a gl impse of] it by mak

ing the poorly named "contract" the very event that "made a crea

t u re o f in t e l l ig en c e a n d a ma n . . . f ro m a st u pid , l im it ed a n i ma l , " 3 9

a n d n o t s impl y a n a rra n g emen t bet ween in d iv id u a l s . (N iet z sc he

c o n f i rms t h is presen t a t io n in a pa ra d o x ic a l wa y when Z a ra t hu st ra

says, "h um an society: that is an experi men t . . . a long search . . .

a n d nota, ' c o n t ra c t ' " . 40 ) Ma rx sa w i t when he qu a l i f ied hu ma n it y

a s so c ia l in i t s v ery o r ig in , pro d u c t io n , a n d d est in a t io n , a n d when

t he en t ire mo v em en t a n d po st u re o f h is t h in k in g a ss ig n ed B ein g

itself to this social being . He ideg ger designated it in posit i ng be

ing -w ith as constitut i ve of being-ther e. No one, however, has rad

ical ly them atized the "w ith " as the essential trait of Bei ng and as its

pro per pl u ra l s in g u l a r c o essen c e . B u t t hey ha v e bro u g ht u s , t o

gether and individually, to the point where we can no longer avoid

t hi n k i n g a bo u t t h is in fa v o r o f t ha t t o whic h a l l o f c o n t emp o ra ry

experience test ifies. In other words, what is at stake is no longer

th i n k i n g :

—beginning from the one, or from the other,

—beginning from their togetherness, understood now as the One,

now as the Other,

— b u t thinkin g, absolutely and without reserve, beginning from the

" w i t h , " as the proper essence of one whose Being is nothing other thanwith-one-another [l'un-avec-l'autre].

The one/the other is neither "by," nor "for," nor "in," nor "de

spite," but rather "with." This "with" is at once both more and less

t ha n "re l a t io n " o r "b o n d ," espec ia l l y i f su c h re l a t io n o r bo n d pre

supposes the préexistence of the terms up on wh ic h it rel ies; the

"wi th" is the exact con tem po rar y of its terms; it is, in fact , their

contemp oraneity. " W it h " is the shari ng of t ime-space; it is the at-

the-same-time-in-the-same-place as itself, in itself, shattered. It is

the instant scaling back of the prin cip le of ident ity: Bei ng is at the

same t ime in the same place only on the co ndit ion of the spacing of

an indefinite plu ralit y of singula rit ies. Be ing is with Be ing; it does

not ever recover itself, but it is near to itself, beside itself, in touch

w it h its elf , its ve ry self , in th e pa ra do x of th at p r o x i m i ty w he re di s

t a n c in g [éloignement] and strangeness are revealed. We are each

time an other, each t ime with others. "With" does not indicate the

sha r in g o f a c o m mo n s i t u a t io n a n y mo re t ha n t he ju x t a po si t io n o f

pure exteriorit ies does (for example, a bench with a tree with a dog

w i th a pa ss er -b y) .

Th e question of Bein g and the mea ning of Bein g has become the

question o f bei ng- wit h an d of being-toge ther ( in the sense of the

w or ld ). T h i s is w h at is si gn if ie d by [o ur ] m od e r n sen se of an xi et y,

w h ic h do es no t so m u c h re ve al a "c ri si s of so ci et y" b ut , in st ea d, re

veal s th at th e "s oc ia li ty " or "a ss oc ia ti on " of hu m a ns is an i nj u n ct i on

that humanity places on itself, or that it receives from the world: to

have to be only what it is and to have to, itself, be Being as such.

Th is sort of form ula is pri ma ril y a desperate tautological abstrac

t ion—and this is why we are al l worried. Our task is to break the

hard shell of this tautology. W ha t is the being -wi th of Being?

In one sense, this is the orig inal situ ation of the West that is al

wa ys re p ea ti ng its el f; it is al wa ys th e p r o b l e m of th e ci ty , th e re p et it ion of wh ich , for better or worse, has already punc tuated ou r his

tory. Today, this re petit ion produ ces itself as a situa tion in wh ic h the

two major elements [données] comp ose a sort of anti nom y: on the

one hand, there is the exposure of the worl d and, on the other, the

end of representations of the wor ld. T hi s means noth ing short of a

transformation in the relat ion [that we name] "polit ico-philosophy":

it can no long er be a matter of a single co mm uni ty, of its essence,

closure, and sovereignty; by contrast , it can no longer be a matter

o f o rg a n iz in g c o mm u n it y a c c o rd in g t o t he d ec rees o f a so v ere ig n

O t her , or a c c o rd in g to the telos [ fins] o f a history. It can no longer

be a m at te r of tr ea ti ng so ci ab il it y as a re gr ett ab le a nd in ev it ab le ac -




cident, as a constraint that has to be managed in some way or an

other. Community is bare, but it is imperative.

On the one side, the concep t of co mm un it y or the city is, in

every sense, diffracted. It is that which signifies the chaotic and mul

t iform appearance of the infranational, s upranationa l, para-national

and, moreover, the dis-location o f the "nationa l" in general . On the

other side, the concept of co mm un it y appears to have its own prefix

as its only content: the cum, th e with depri ved of substance and

conne ction, strip ped of inferiority, subject ivity, and personality. Ei

ther way, sovereignty is nothing.4 1

Sovereignty is nothing but thecom-; as such, it is always and indefinitely "to be completed," as in

c o m-mu n ism o r c o m-pa ssio n .

Thi s is not a matter of thi nki ng the annih ilat io n of sovereignty. It

i s a ma t t er o f t h i n k i n g t hro u g h t he fo l l o win g qu est io n : I f so v er

e ig n t y i s t he g ra n d , po l i t i c a l t erm fo r d e f in in g c o mmu n it y ( i t s

leader or its essence) that has nothing beyond itself, with no foun

dation or end b ut itself, wha t becomes of sovereignty when it is re

ve al ed th at it is n ot h in g bu t a si ng ul ar ly p lu ra l sp ac in g? H o w is on e

to thi nk sovereignty as the "noth ing" of the "wi th" that is laid bare?

At the sa me ti m e, if p ol it ic al so ve re ig nt y has al wa ys si gn if ie d the re

fusal of dom ina tio n ( of a state by another or by a chur ch, of a peo

ple by something other than itself), how is one to think the bare

sovereignty of the "wit h" and against do mi na tio n, whether this is

the domin atio n of being-together by some other means or the dom

ina tion of togetherness by itself (by the reg ulation of its "autom atic"control)? In fact, one could begin to describe the present transfor

ma t io n o f "po l i t i c a l spa c e" 42 as a transit ion toward "empire," where

empire s ig n i f ies t wo t h in g s: ( i ) d o min a t io n wi t ho u t so v ere ig n t y

(with out the elaboration of such a concept); and (2) the distancing,

spacin g, and plura lity opposed to the conce ntrat i on of interi ority

required by polit ical sovereignty. The question then becomes: How

is one to th ink the spacin g of emp ire against its dom inati on?

In one way or another, bare sovereignty (which is, in a way, to

transcribe Bata illes n oti on of sovereignty) presup poses that one take

a c er t a in d ist a n c e fro m t he po l i t i c o -phi l o so phic a l o rd er a n d fro m

the realm of "polit ic al phil osoph y." Thi s distance is not taken in or-

der to engage in a depoliticized thinking, but in order to engage in a

thin king , the site of whi ch is the very constitut ion , imag ination , and

significat ion of the polit ical , w hic h al lows this thin kin g to retrace its

path i n its retreat and be gin nin g fro m this retreat. Th e retreat of the

polit ica l does not signify the disappearance of the polit ic al . I t only

signifies the disappearance of the philo soph ical p resup positi on of the

w ho le p ol i ti co - p h i lo s op h ic a l or de r, w h i c h is al wa ys an on to lo g ic a l

presupposit ion. This presupposit ion has various forms; it can con

s ist in t h in k in g B ein g a s c o m mu n it y a n d c o mm u n it y a s d est in a t io n ,

or, on the contrary, thinking Being as anterior and outside the orderof society and, as such, th ink ing B eing as the accidental exteriority

of com mer ce and power. But, in this way, being-together is never

properly [brought to the fore as an explicit] theme and as the onto

logical probl em . Th e retreat of the polit ica l 4 3 is the uncovering, the

ontologica l laying bare of being -with .

B ein g s in g u l a r pl u ra l : in a s in g l e s t ro k e , wi t ho u t pu n c t u a t io n ,

w i th ou t a m a r k of eq ui va le nc e, i m p l i c a ti on , or se qu en ce . A si ng le ,

c o n t in u o u s-d isc o n t in u o u s m a rk t ra c in g o u t t he en t i re t y o f t he

o n t o l o g ic a l d o m a in , be in g -w it h- i t se l f d es ig n a t ed a s the "wi t h " o f

Being , of the singular and plural , an d dealing a blow to on to lo gy —

not only another significat ion but also another syntax. The "mean

in g o f B e in g ": n o t o n l y a s t he "mea n in g o f wi t h ," bu t a l so, a n d

above al l , as the "wi th" of me ani ng. Because none of these threeterms precedes or grounds the other, each designates the coessence

of the others. Thi s coessence puts essence itself in the hy ph en

a t io n — "bei n g -s i n g u l a r-pl u ra l " —wh ic h i s a ma rk o f u n io n a n d a l so

a mar k of div isi on, a ma rk of shar ing that effaces itself, lea ving each

term to its isolat ion andhs be in g -wit h-t he-o t hers .

Fr om this poi nt forward, th en, the unity of an ontolog y must be

sought in this tract ion, in this drawing out , in this distancing and

spacin g whi ch is that of Bei ng and, at the same t ime, that of the

singular and the plural, both in the sense that they are distinct from

one another and indist inct . In such an ontology, which is not an

"ontol ogy of society" in the sense of a "regional on tology," but on -



3 8 Being Singular Plural

tolog y itself as a "social ity" or an "associat ion" m ore origi nary than

all "society," more originary than "individuality" and every "essence

o f B e in g ." B e in g i s with; it is as the with of Being itself (the cobeing

of Being), so that Being does not identify itself as such44 (as Being

of the being), b u t shows itself [se pose], gives itself occurs, dis-poses

itself ' (made event, history, an d world ) as its ow n singul ar plur al

with. In other words, Being is not without Being, which is not an

other miserable tautology as long as one understands it in the co-

o r ig in a ry m o d e o f be in g -wit h-be in g - i t se l f .

A c c o r d i n g to th is m od e , B e i n g is si m u lt a ne ou s. Ju st as, in or de r

to say Being, one must repeat it and say that "Being is," so Being is

onl y simu ltaneou s wi th itself. Th e t ime of Bei ng (the t ime that it

i s ) i s t h is s imu l t a n ei t y , t h is c o in c id en c e t ha t presu ppo ses " in c i

d en c e" in g en era l . I t a ssu mes mo v emen t , d ispl a c emen t , a n d d e

pl o ym en t ; i t a ssu mes t he o r ig in a ry t empo r a l d er iv a t iv e o f B e in g ,

its spacing.

In one sense, this is al l a matter of repeating the Aristo tel ia n ax

iom pollakôs legomenon; Being is said in many ways. But to say it

once more, a ccord ing to the "wit h, " the "also," the "again" of a his

tory that repeats this excavation and drawing out [traction] of Be

in g , t he s in g u l a r i t y o f B e in g i s i ts p l u r a l . B u t t h is pl u ra l i t y i s n o

longer said in mult iple ways that al l begin from a presumed, single

core of mea ning . Th e mu lt ip lici ty of the said (that is, of the sayings)

be lo ng s to B e i n g as it s c on s ti t u ti o n . T h i s oc cu rs w i t h ea ch sa id ,

w h i c h is al wa ys si ng ul ar ; it oc cu rs in ea ch sa id , b e y on d ea ch sa id ,

and as the multi plic ity of the totality of being [l'étant en totalité].

Being, then, does not coincide with i tself unless this coinci dence

imm edia tely and essential ly marks itself out [se remarque] according

to the ^st ruc ture of its occurrence [l'événement] (its incidence, en

counter, angle of dec lina tion , shock, or discord ant accord). Bei ng

c o in c id es wi t h B e in g : i t is the spacing and the unexpected arrival

[survenue] , the unexpe cted spacing , of the singula r plura l co-.

It might be asked why it is st i l l necessary to cal l this "Being,"

since the essence of it is reduc ed to a pre fix of Bei ng, reduc ed to a

co- o u t s id e o f wh ic h t here wo u l d be n o t h in g , n o t hi n g bu t be in g s

or existences [les existants], and where this co- has none of the sub-

Being Si ngular Plural 3 9

stance or consistency proper to "Being" as such. This is, in fact ,

the matter in question. Being consists in nothing other than the

existence of all existences [tous les existants]. However, this consis

tency itself does not vanish in a cl ou d of juxtap osed beings . Wh at

I a m t ryi n g t o in d ic a t e by spea k in g o f "d is-p o si t io n " i s n e i t her a

s impl e po s i t io n n o r a ju x t a po si t io n . I n st ea d , t he co- defines the

uni ty and uniquene ss of wha t is, in general . Wh at is to be under

stood is precisely the cons titu t ion of this uniq ue uni ty as co-: thesingular plural.

(Incidentally, one could show without much trouble that this is

a question that has been taken up and repeated throughout a long

tradit ion: in Leibniz 's monadology, in al l the various considerations

of the "originary di vis ion ," an d, mos t of al l , in al l the various forms

of the difference between the in-its elf and the for-itself. Bu t exact ly

w ha t is i m p o r ta n t is th is re p e ti ti on , th e co nc e n tr at io n on a n d re

peated excavation of the qu es tio n— wh ic h does not necessarily sig

nify some sort of progress or degener ation, but rather a displace

ment, a fit of, or drift toward something else, toward another

phi l o so phic a l po st u re . )

At th e ve ry lea st, an d pr ov is io na ll y , on e c o u l d tr y to sa y it in th e

fo l l o w in g wa y: i t i s n o mo re a ma t t er o f a n o r ig in a ry mu l t ipl ic i t y

and its correlat i on (i n the sense of the On e div id in g itself in an

arch-dialect ical m anner, or in the sense of the atoms' relat ions hip to

the cl inamen ) tha n it is a matter of an origin ary uni ty and its di vi

sion. In either case, one must thin k an anteriority of the origi n ac

cord ing to some event that happens to it u nexpected ly (even if that

event originates within it). It is necessary, then, to think plural unity

originarily. This is indeed the place to think the plural as such.

In L a t i n , plus is c o m p a r a b l e to multus. It is not "n u mero u s"; it is

"mor e." I t is an increase or excess of ori gin in the orig in. To pu t it

in terms of the models just al lud ed to above: the On e is mor e than

one; it is not that "it divides itself," rather it is that one equals more

than one, because "one" cannot be counted without counting more

t ha n o n e . O r , i n the a t o mist mo d e l , t here are a t o ms plus the c l i n a

men. But the cl inamen is not something else, another element out

side of the atoms; it is not in addi t ion to t hem ; it is the "more" of



4 0 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 4 i

th eir expos it ion . Being many , th ey cannot b ut inc l ine or dec l ine;

they are ones in relation to others. Immobility or the parallel fall

[la chute parallel] w o u l d do aw ay w ith th is expos it ion , w ould re-

turn to th e pure pos it ion a nd not dis t inguis h i t s el f f rom th e On e-

purely-one (or, in other words, from the Other). The One as purely

one is less than one; it cannot be, be put in place, or counted. One

as prop erly one is always mor e than o ne. It is an excess of uni ty; it

is one-w ith-on e, where its Bein g in itself is copresent.

T h e co- itself and a s such, the copresence of Bei ng, is not pre

sentable as that Being which "is ," s ince it is only in the distancing.

I t is unpres entab le , not b ecaus e i t occupies th e mos t w ith draw n

and my s ter ious re gion of Bein g, th e region of noth ingnes s , b ut

qui te sim ply because it is not subject to a logic of pres enta tion .

Neither present nor to be presented (nor, as a result , "unpresent

able" in the strict sense), the "with" is the (singular plural) condi

tio n of presence in general [und erstood ] as copresence . Th is co-

presence is neither a presence withdrawn into absence nor a presence

in itself or f or itself.

It is also not pure presence to, to itself to others, or to the world. In

fact, non e of these modes of presence can take place, insofar as

presence takes place, unless copresence f irst takes place. As such,

no single subject could even designate itself ana relate itself to itself

as subject. In the most classical sense of the ter m, a subject no t onl y

assumes its own di stin ctio n fro m the object of its representation or

mastery, it also assumes its own distinction from other subjects. It is

possible, then , to dis ting uish the ipse ity of these other subjects

(which is to say, the aesity) from [d'avec] its ow n source of repre

sentation or mastery. Therefo re, the wi th is the suppo sition of the

"self" in general. But this supposition is no longer subjacent to the

self, in the sense of an in fin ite self-p resup positio n of sub-jective sub

stance. As its syntactic function indicates, "with" is the pre-position

of the positio n in general; thus, it constitutes its dis-pos ition .

Th e "self ," of the "self" in gen eral, takes place wi th before tak

ing p lace as itself and/or as the other. Th is "aseity" of the self is an

terior to the same and to the other and, therefore, anterior to the

distinction between a consciousness and its world. Before phenom-

enologi cal inte ntio nal ity and the cons titu tion of the ego, but also

be fo re th i n g l ik e co ns is te nc y as su ch , th er e is co -o r ig in a ri ty ac co rd

ing to the with. Properly speaking, then, there is no anteriority: co-

origi narity is the most general structure of all con-sistency, all con

stitution, and all con-sciousness.

[ T h is is ] pres ence- w ith : with as th e exc lus ive mode of b eing -

present, such that being present and the present of Being does not

coincide in itself , or with itself , inasmuch as it coincides or "falls

w i t h " [" to m be av ec "] th e ot he r pr es en ce , w h i c h it se lf ob ey s th e

same law. Being-many-together is the originary situation; it is even

wh at de fi ne s a "s i tu a ti o n " in ge ne ra l. Th e re fo r e , an o r i g i n a r y or

transcendental "with" demands, with a palpable urgency, to be dis

entan gled an d articu lated for itself . But one of the greatest dif f i

culties of the concept of the wit h is that there is no "g etting back

to" or "up to" [remonter] th is " or ig inary " or " t rans cendental" pos i

tion; the with is strictly contemporaneous with all existence, as it

is w it h a l l th in king .

Coexistence

It is no acciden t that co mm un is m and socia lism of all sorts are

resp onsibl e for an essentia l par t of the set of expe ctatio ns that be

long to the mod ern w or ld . They are responsible for the hope of a

rupture and innovat ion f rom w h ich th ere is no turning b ack; i t is

th e h ope f or a revolut ion , a re- creat ion of th e w orld . I t b ecomes

clearer to us every day that it is not enough to stigmatize the errors,

lies, and cri mes of "existing versions of social ism" as "na tiona l so

c ia l is ms ." Repres ented pr imari ly in th e as s ured and demanding

cons cious nes s of " h u ma n r igh ts ," mora l and pol i t ica l conde mna

tion always run s the risk of usi ng its inco ntesta ble legi tim acy to

mask anothe r legitima cy, wh ic h was an d stil l is that of an irre

duc ible de ma nd that we be capable of saying "we, " that we be ca

pable of sayi ng we to ourselves (saying it about ourselves to on e an

other) , be gin nin g from the point where no leader or G o d can say

it for us. This demand is in no way secondary, and this is what

gives it its terrible power to unleash, subvert, resist, or sweep away.



42 Being Singul ar Plural Being Singular Plural 43

Because not being able to say "we" is what plunges every "I,"

w h et he r i n d i v i d u a l or co ll ec ti ve , i n to th e in sa ni ty w he re he ca n no t

say "I" either. To want to say "we" is not at al l sentimental , not at

a l l fa mi l ia l o r "c o mmu n it a r ia n ." I t i s ex ist en c e rec l a imin g i t s d u e

o r i t s c o n d i t io n : c o ex ist en c e . 45

If the "social ist" hope as such ha d to be understo od as an i l lus ion

or a trick, then the meaning that carried it along, the meaning which

vi ol en tl y m an if es te d it se lf t h ro u gh it , wa s al l th e be tte r il l u m i na te d .It was not a questi on of sub sti tuti ng the rule of these peopl e for the

rule of those people, su bstitut ing the do mi nati on of the "masses" for

that of their masters. It was a que stio n of sub stit utin g a shared sov

ereignty for domi nat ion in general , a sovereignty of everyone and of

each one, but a sovereig nty unde rst ood not as the exercise of pow er

a n d d o min a t io n bu t a s a praxis o f mea n in g . The t ra d i t io n a l so v er

eignties (the theologico-polit ical order) did not lose power (which

only ever shifts from place to place), b ut lost the possibil ity of mak

ing sense. As a result , meaning itself—that is, the "we"—demanded

its due, if one can talk in these ways. W ha t we must rem emb er is

that what Marx understood by al ienation was both the al ienation of

the proletariat and the al iena tion of the bourgeoisie (indee d, an

alienation of the "we," but one that was asymm etrical , une qual), a nd

that this is prim aril y an al ienation of mea ning. But M ar x st il l left the

question of the approp riat ion or reapp ropria t ion of me anin g in suspen se— for example, by leaving open the question of what must be

understood by "free labor." In t ime, this suspense opened onto the

dem and for another ontolo gy of the "generic being" of hu ma nit y as

"essential ly social": a co-ontology.

Th us , the disenc hantm ent or disarray of our fin de siècle cannot

c o n t en t i t se l f wi t h m o u r n i n g t he pa ss in g o f so c ia l i s t v is io n s , a n y

more tha n it can comf ort itself by replaci ng them wi th a naive col

l e c t i o n o f n e w " c o m m u n i t a r i a n " t h e m e s . T h i s d i s e n c h a n t m e n t

does something else; it designates our major anxiety, the one that

mak es "us" wh at "we" are today ; we exist as the anx iety of "socia l

Being" as such, where "social ity" and "society" are concepts plainly

inadequate to its essence. This is why "social Being" becomes, in a

w ay th at is at fi rs t i n f i n i te l y p o o r a n d p r o b le m a t i c , " b e i n g - i n -

c o mmo n ," "be in g -ma n y," "be in g -wit h-o n e-a n o t her , " ex po sin g t he

"with" as the category that still has no status or use, but from which

we rec ei ve ev er yt hi ng th at m ak es us th i n k a n d ev er y th in g th at gi ve s

"u s" t o t h in k in g .

At th e ve ry m o m e n t w h e n th er e is no lo ng er a " c o m m a n d po st "

from w hi ch a "social ist v isi on" co uld pu t forwar d a subject of his

tory or polit ics, or, in an even broader sense, when there is no

longer a "city" or "society" out of wh ich a regulat ive fig ure co uld b e m o d e le d , at th is m o m e n t b e in g -m a ny , sh ie ld e d f r o m a ll i n t u

i t io n , f ro m a l l represen t a t io n o r ima g in a t io n , present s i t se l f wi t h

all the acuity of its quest ion , wi th al l the sovereignty of its dema nd.

Th is qu est io n a n d d em a n d be l o n g t o t he c o n st i t u t io n o f be in g -

man y as such and, therefore, belong to the const itut io n of plur ality

in Bei ng. It is here that the concept of coexistence is sharpened an d

made more complex. It is remarkable that this term st il l serves to

designate a regime or state more or less imposed by extrinsic cir

cumstances. It is a notion whose tone often oscil lates between in

difference and resignation, or even between cohabitat ion and con

t a min a t io n . Al wa ys su bjec t t o wea k a n d u n pl ea sa n t c o n n o t a t io n s ,

coexistence designates a constraint , or at best an acceptable con

comitance, but not what is at stake in being or essence, unless in

t he fo rm o f a n in su rm o u n t a bl e a po r ia wi t h w hic h o n e c a n o n l y n e

g o t ia t e . I t i s a n "u n so c ia bl e so c ia bi l i t y" t ha t pro ba bl y wo u l d n o t

even sat isfy Kant himself, now that its paradox no longer serves as

a g u id e t o a n y t h in k i n g t hr o u g h o f the per fec t a bi l i t y o f peo pl es ,

b ut ra th er ser ves as a pudendum t o t he c yn ic ism k n o wn a s " l iber

a l i sm ." B u t l ibera l i sm is sho win g a l l the sig n s o f ex h a u s t io n —a t

t he v ery l ea st, ex ha u st io n in t erms o f me a n i n g — sin c e , a t t he c o l

lapse of "socia l ism, " it can only resp ond by designa ting the "social"

and the "sociolo gica l" as relat ively aut onom ous spheres of act io n

a n d k n o wl ed g e . R epa ir in g fra c t u res o r d esc r ib in g st ru c t u res wi l l

never be able to take the place of a thi nk ing of Bein g itself as be ing-

together. The l iberal response to the collapse of co mm un is m, th en,

involves n oth ing mo re than an eager repression of the very ques

t i o n o f b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n ( w h i c h s o - c a l l ed r e al c o m m u n i s m r e

pressed u n d er a c o mmo n B ein g ) . N o w t ha t t h is pa r t ic u l a r qu es-



44 Being Singula r Plural Being Singula r Plural 45

tion is the only one to have come to light, it will not leave us alone;

it wil l not stop cropping up again, since "we" are in question in it .

W h a t co m es to li gh t, th en , is no t a "s oc ia l" or " c o m m u n i t a r i a n

d ime n sio n " a d d ed o n t o a pr i mit iv e in d iv id u a l g iv en , ev en i f i t were

t o o c c u r a s a n essen t ia l a n d d et ermin in g a d d i t io n . (Ju st t h in k o f

the numerou s circumstances of ordin ary discourse in whic h this or

der is imposed on us: first the individual, then the group; first the

one, then the others; first the rights-bearing subject; then real rela

t io n ships; f i r st " in d iv id u a l psyc ho l o g y," t hen "c o l l ec t iv e psyc ho l

o g y"; a n d a bo v e a l l , f i r s t a "su bjec t , " t hen " in t ersu bjec t iv i t y"—a s

they astonish ingly persist in saying.) It is not even a questi on of a

social ity or alterity that would come to cut across, complicate, put

into play, or alter the principle of the subject understood as solus

ipse. It is something else and s t i l l more. It does not so much deter

min e t he pr in c i pl e o f t he ipse, wha t ev er t h is ma y be (" in d iv id u a l "

or "collect ive," insofar as one can speak in these ways), as it code-

t ermin es i t with t he pl u ra l i t y o f ipses, ea c h o n e o f wh ic h i s c o -

o r ig in a ry a n d c o essen t ia l t o t he wo r l d , t o a wo r l d whic h fro m t his

point on defines a coexistence that must be understood in a st i l l-

unh ear d- of sense, exact ly because it does not take place "i n" the

w or ld , bu t in st ea d fo rm s th e ess enc e an d th e st ru ct ur e of th e w o r l d .

It is not a nearness [voisinage] or community of ipses, but a co-

ipseity: this is what comes to l ight , but as an enigma with which

o u r t h in k in g i s c o n fro n t ed .

I n t wen t ie t h-c en t u ry phi l o so phy, t he H eid eg g er ia n o n t o l o g y o f

Mitsein is st i l l no more than a sketch (I wil l come back to this).Husserl ian coexistence or community retains its status as correla

tive to ego, where "so l ips ist ic " eg o l o g y rema in s f i rst phi l o so phy.

Outside philosophy, it is remarkable that it is not social and polit

ical theor y wh ich has mo st closely app roache d the enigm a of a co-

ipseity (and as a result , the enig ma of a hetero-ipseity). Rather what

has come closest to co-ipseity is, on the one hand, an ethnology

t ha t en d s u p be in g mo re en g a g ed wi t h t he phen o men a o f c o m em -

b e rs h ip 4 6 and , on the other, the Fre ud of the second mod el , the triple

d et er min a t io n o f wh ic h i s c o n st i t u t ed a c c o rd in g t o a mec ha n ic a l

coexistence (what are the "i d " and "superego" if not being -wi th, if

not the coconst itut ion of the "ego"?). The same co uld b e said for

the Lacani an theory of "signifi cance," insofar as it does not brin g

a bo u t a re t u rn t o s ig n i f i c a t io n , bu t a mu t u a l l y in st i t u t in g c o rre l a

t ion of "subjects" (to the extent that the Laca nian "O the r" is any

thing but an "Other": such a name is a theologizing residue that

serves to designate "sociation").

However, it is just as remarkable that psychoanalysis st i l l repre

sents the most individual pract ice there is, and, moreover, repre

sents a sort of parado xical p rivat izat ion of someth ing the very law

of wh ich is "r elat ion" i n every sense of the wo rd . Cur iou sly , what

happens here may be the same as what happens in the economy:

"subjects" of exchange are the mos t rigorousl y co-ori gina ry; and

this mutual orig inarity vanishes in the unequ al appr opria t ion of ex

change, such that this coexistence vanishes in a strong sense. It is

no accident, the n, if M ar x and Fre ud represent two different , yet

symmetrical , projects; each puts forth an indissociably theoretical

a n d pra c t ic a l a t t empt t o g et a t "be in g - in -c o mmo n " a s a c r i t i c a l

poin t (of disorder in one, of sickness in the other) o f history or civ

il iza t ion. If a brief sum ma ry is al lowed here, I wou ld say that , be

cause there has been no "social ist economy" (but only state capi

talism), just as there has been no "collective psychoanalysis" (unless

b y m ea ns of a p ro je ct io n of an i n d i v i d u a l m o d e l) , th er e li es be

t ween ec o n o m ic s a n d p syc ho a n a l ys is t he ba re spa c e o f a "be i n g -

t o g et her" who se t heo l o g ic o -po l i t i c a l presu ppo si t io n ha s been ex

hausted, and which reappears only in react ive spurts. This space

has become global, which does not simply mean it has spread outover the entire surface of the planet an d bey ond , bu t that it has

eme rged as the surface of wh at is at play in the depth s: the essence

o f be in g -wit h .

Th is process of globa lizat ion results in a coalescence, a concen

trat ion that seems to be both uniform and anonymous and, at the

same t ime, an atomization, a codispersion that seems to be given

over to idiocy. This is idiocy in the sense of the Greek idiotes, m e a n

ing private or ignorant person, as well as idiocy in the modern sense

o f s t u pid impen e t ra bi l i t y ("pr iv a te pro pert y" a s d epr iv ed o f mea n

ing). It seems, then, that the dialect ic Marx thought he foresaw un-




fold ing appears to be definit ively block ed, the dialect ic of an "i nd i

v i du a l " ap p ro pr ia ti on th at w o u l d me di at e w i th i n it se lf th e m om e nt s

of private prope rty and collect ive property. At the same t ime , this

seems to confirm definit ively the Freudian contrast between a pos

sible cure of the nervous ind ivi du al and the incurab le malaise of

c iv i l i z a t io n . This d ia l ec t ic , t h is c o n t ra st , a n d t he ir u n c o mmu n ic a

t ive and paralyzi ng confro ntati on indicate the knot of quest ions ,

expectat ions, an d anxiet ies of an epoch . H o w can being-together

app ropr iate itse lf as such , wh en it is left up to itself to be what it is,

w h e n it is pr es en te d in a f or m ul at io n th at is st ri pp ed d o w n an d hasno substantial presupposit ion or, in other terms, lacks symbolic

id en t i f i c a t io n ? W h a t bec o mes o f be in g - wit h w hen t he with no

longer appears as a corn-posit ion, but only as a dis-posit ion?

H o w are we to understand the co- as dis-? W h i c h o n e o f these is

the "as such" of Bein g that exposes it as its own sha ring and wh ic h

expresses that , as Bein g, it is between Bein g and Bein g itself? An d

moreover, what is it that brings together in Being that "as" = "as

such" and "as" = "similarly"? Each t ime, Being as such is Being as

the Being of a being, and it is this each t ime, similarly. What is it

that makes Being as such a being-similar which circulates from be

ing to being and which, thereby, implies the disparity, discontinu

ity, and simultaneity required for gauging a "resemblance"? What

is t h is c o m-pl ic a t io n (c o - impl ic a t io n a n d c o mpl ex i t y) by whic h hu

ma n s ex h ibi t — wi t hi n t he d isc o u rse o f t he s imi l a r a n d t he d iss im

ilar, a discourse which is very difficult and puts "humanity" as suchin t o p l a y— a c er t a in (d is)s imi l a r i t y o f B e in g t ha t cro sses t hro u g h

all being? Ho w can Bei ng as such be any thi ng other than the

(dis)s imilar ity of bein g in its simultane ity?

To sa y t ha t t h is qu est io n i s a n o n t o l o g ic a l qu est io n —o r ev en

that it is the o n t o l o g ic a l qu est io n , a bso l u t e l y—d o es n o t mea n we

have to leave the realm of economi cs and sickness, any more than

we ha ve to a b an d on th e or de r of praxis. On the contrary, as I have

already said, this quest ion is sim ply that of what is cal led " capita l ,"

and even the question of "histor y" and "polit ic s." "O nto log y" does

not occur at a level reserved for principles, a level that is with

drawn, speculat ive, and altogether abstract . Its name means the

thi nk ing of existence. A n d today, the situation of ontol ogy signi

fies the follo wi ng : to th in k existence at the heig ht of this challe nge

to thinking that is globalness [mondialité] as such (which is desig

n a t ed a s "c a pi t a l , " "(d e-)W est ern iz a t io n ," " t ec hn o l o g y," "ru pt u re

of history," a nd so for th).

Conditions of Crit ique

Th e retreat of the poli tica l and the religiou s, or of the theol ogico -

pol it ic al , me ans the retreat of every space, fo rm , or screen into w h i c h or on to w h i c h a f ig ur e of c o m m u n i t y c o u ld b e pr oj ec te d. At

the right t ime, then, the question has to be posed as to whether

be in g- to ge th er ca n do w i th o u t a fi gu re a nd , as a re su lt , w i th o u t an

ident ifica t ion, if the whole of its "substance" consists only in its

spacing. But this quest ion cannot be art iculated in a completely ap

prop riate way un til the ful l extent of the wi thd raw al of its figur e

and identity has been grasped. Today, when thinking moves too

quickly, when it is fearful and reactionary, it declares that the most

com mo nly recognized forms of identifi cat ion are indispensable and

claim that the dest inies proper to them are used up or perverted,

w he th er it be : "p e op le ," " n a ti o n , " " c h u r c h , " or " cu lt u re ," no t to

mention the confused "ethnicity" or the tortuous "roots." There is a

w ho le p an or am a of m em b er sh ip a nd pr op er ty , he re , wh os e p ol it ic al

and philosophical history has yet to be written 4 7 : it is the history of

the representation-of-self as the deter min ing element of an orig inary co ncep t of society.

Th e retreat presents itsel f in tw o ways at once: on the one han d,

the theolo gico- polit i cal withdr aws into the realm of law 4 8 ; on the

other, it withdraws into a self-representation that no longer refers

to an origi n, bu t only to the void of its ow n specularity.

Passing int o the realm of law effect ively divid es the "pol it i cal "

in two: there is the formal abstract ion of the law, wh ich u ndo ubt

edly "does right" by every part icularity and every relat ion, but

w i th o u t g i vi n g th is ri gh t an y m e a n in g ot he r th a n it se lf ; a n d th en

the reality of the relat ion of forc es— whe ther econ omic , techn ical ,

o r t he fo rces o f pa ss io n — st a n d s o u t in a pro n o u n c e d a n d a u -



4 8 Being Singula r Plural Being Singula r Plural 4 9

tono mou s fashion , that is, unless law itself undertake s to set itself

up as an origin or found atio n, in the form of an absolute Law [la

Loi}. (It is here that psychoanalysis seeks, in a remarkable way, to

facil itate a substantia l and autho ritar ian visi on of society.) La w as

such is necessarily the Law of an Othe r, or the Law as Oth er. Th e

O t her impl ies i t s n o n represen t a bi l i t y . I n a t heo l o g ic a l rea l m, t h is

can give rise to an "in ter dic t ion of repre sentatio n" that supposes

the sacred nature of the Othe r and, alo ng wit h it , an entire econ

om y of the sacred, sacrificial , hiera rchic al , and heiro pha ntic, even

w he re th e th e o p h a n y a n d th e ol og y are ne ga ti ve . Ac ce ss to Pr es

ence, and even to a "super-presence," is always preserved. But

w i t h i n an at he ol og ic al re al m , th is i nt e r d ic ti on be co m es a de ni a l of

rep rese ntati on; the alteri ty of the law either retrieves, represses, or

denies its ori gin , an d ends in the singula r presence of each one to

the others. In this sense, something "unrepresentable" or "unfig-

urable" runs the risk of revealing itself as com pletel y oppressive and

terrifyi ng, if not terrorist , open to the anguish of an orig inary Lac k.

In contrast , the "fig ure" proves itse lf to be capable of ope nin g onto

the "wi th" as its border, the very l im it of its outl ine.

( Of course, these two "realm s" do not just fol low one another in

a h ist o ry . They a re ea c h a n d bo t h impl ic a t ed in t he in t erd ic t io n

against representation and/or the anxiety about it , that is, in the

question about gaining access to the origin(s), a quest ion about its

possibil ity/impossibil ity.)

So it is not so muc h a questi on of den yin g law itself, it is more a

ques tion of "do ing rig ht" by the singular plura l of the origin . As a

result , it is a matter of que st io ning law abou t what we mig ht cal l

its "origin ary anarch y" or the very ori gin of the law in what is "by

all rights without any right": existence unjust ifiable as such. To be

sure, the deriv at ion or deduct ion of law fro m the unjust ifia bil ity of

existence is not immediate or obvious. In essence, it may even es

cape the process of a "dedu ction" altogether. B ut this remains to be

t ho u g ht ; in t he mea n t ime, l a w wit ho u t o n t o l o g y rea bso rbs B e in g

and its mean ing into the emp ty truth of Law . To assume that po l

it ics is entirely a ques t ion of "h um an rig hts" is also to assume sur

reptit i ously that "ma n" is entirely a quest ion of the Other. Th is is

w h at is m os t of te n at w o r k in an y ca ll to "e th ic s" : a tr an sc en de nt al

unpr esenta bil ity of that most concrete presence.

On the other side of this retreat, however, it is repr esentatio n that

triumphs, absorbing entirely both the transcendental and the con

crete. What does the impoverished word "society" now say when it

is emptie d of al l "sociat ion" or "associat ion," not to me nti on emp

tied of the "comm unit ies" a nd "fraternit ies" that constitute our im

a ges o f pr i mit i v e l i fe ( t he c o n st ru c t io n o f wh ic h ha s , in g en era l ,

sho wn its elf to be fantast ical)? Wh at is left seems to be noth ing

more than this "society" face to face with itself, being-social itself

defined by this game of mir rors , and los ing itself in the scintil lat

ing play of l ight and images. It is not a matter of the Oth er or oth

ers, but of a singular pl ura l that is subs ume d by means of its ow n

curiosity about itself, subsumed within a generalized equivalence of

al l the rep resentations of itself that it gives itself to cons ume .

This is cal led "the spectacular-market society" or "the society of

t he spec t a c l e . " This i s t he po st -Ma rx ist o r met a -Ma rx ist in t u i t io n

o f S i t u a t io n ism. I t t h in k s o f "c o mm o d it y fe t i shism," o r the d o m i

n a t io n o f c a pi t a l , a s be in g a c c o mp l ished by t he g en era l c o m mo d i-

fica t ion of fet ishes, in the pro duc tion an d consu mp tion of materi al

and sym bol ic "goods" that al l have the character of bei ng an im

age, i l lusion, or appearance (and where, in fact , democratic rights

tops the l ist of such "goods "). The " good ," of wh ich the "spectacle"

is the general i l lu sio n, is onl y the real self-ap prop riat io n of social

Being . An order structured acc ording to a visible divi sion of society,

the just ificat ion for which is found only in an invisible beyond (re

l ig io n , id ea l ) , i s su c c eeded by a n imma n en t o rd er t ha t, l ik e v is ib i l

ity itself, imitates its self-appropriat ion at every point . The society

of the spectacle is that society wh ic h achieves al i enat ion by an

ima g in a r y a ppro pr i a t io n o f rea l a ppro pr ia t io n . Th e secret o f t he i l

lusion consists in the fact that real appropriat ion must consist only

in a f ree , se l f -c rea t in g ima g in a t io n t ha t i s in d isso c ia bl y in d iv id u a l

and collect ive: the spectacular commodity in al l its forms consists

essential ly in the imagery [imaginaire} that it sells as a replacement

fo r a u t hen t ic ima g in a t io n . As su c h, t hen , u n iv ersa l c o mmerc e i s

c o n st i t u t ed by a represen t a t io n where in ex ist en c e i s bo t h a n in -



5 0 Being Singular P lural Being Singular Plural 5 '

ve n ti on a n d a se lf -a pp ro pr ia ti ng ev en t. A su bj ec t of re pr es en ta ti on ,

that is , a subject reduce d to the sum or f lu x of represe ntations

w h i c h it pu rc ha se s, is the pl ac eh ol de r th at fu nc ti on s as a su bj ec t of

Being and history. (This is why the reply to the spectacle is for

mula ted as th e f ree creat ion of th e " s i tuat ion" : th e appr opri at ing

event abrup tly rem oved f rom the logic of the spectacle. This i s also

w h y S i t u a t i o n i s m , th e of f sp r in g o f se ve ra l ar ti st ic m o v e m e n ts ,

refers to a par ad igm of artisti c creatio n that is nonaesthet ic or

maybe even antiaesthetic.)

In this way, Situationism (which I do not really want to go into

here, but want to treat as a symptom 4 9 ), and some of its offshoots

int o various sorts of analyses con ce rni ng the self-si mul ation an d self-

contro l of our s oc iety , unders tands th at M a rx is m mis s ed th e mo

ment of s y mb ol i c approp riat ion b y conf us ing i t w it h th at of pro

duct ive appropriat ion , or even b y th inking th at s uch product ive

appropriation must be self-producing and, thereby, move beyond it

self into s ymbol ic app ropriati on: the self-suppression of capital as the

integral reappropria t ion of Bein g as com mu nal ex is tence. M or e

specifically, they und erst and that it is this sort of self-surpassing that

does indeed take place. But it does not take place by bringing about

an appropriat ion of b eing- in - commo n unders tood as s y mb ol ic Being

( tak ing symbol in the strong sense of being a bon d of recognition , an

ontological ins tance of th e " incom mo n," l ike M arx 's b ond of " free

labor" w here everyone pr oduces him self or herself as a subject with

others and as a subject o/^being-with-one-another). Instead, this self-

surpassin g takes place as the sym boli zat ion of pro du cti on itself ,

w h i c h al lo ws fo r co ex is te nc e o n ly in the fo rm of the te ch ni ca l or ec o

nom ic co- ordina t ion of th e var ious comm odi ty netw orks .

Situationism thus understands that the "human sciences" have

com e to constitute this self-symb oliza tion of society, wh ic h is not,

in f act , a s y mb ol izat ion b ut only a repres entat ion and, more pre

cisely, the representation of a subject that has no subjectivity othe r

than this representation itself . In fact, it turns out to be quite clear

that the "human sciences" (even in their various crit ical capacities,

w he re th es e ca pa ci ti es d o no t t u r n i n to a n i ns i d io u s fo r m of "s u

per- repres entat ion" ) are th e real s t rength b eh ind w h at is know n

as the gene ralize d "spectacle." He re , the grav ity of the qu esti on

concerning th e " media" comes to th e f ore. " M ediat izat ion" does

not depend on overblown hype, which is nothing new in itself ; nor

does i t depend on tech nological or economic pow er as s uch . I t

depends p rim ar ily on the fact that a society gives itself its repre

sentation in the guise of sym bol ism . Thi s is also wh y it has such a

capacity f or ab s orb ing i t s ow n cr i t ique and i t s ow n reb el l ious ,

iron ic, or distance d presentations. A sort of general psych osoci ol-

ogy takes the place of the presu pposi tion o f a f igure or i den tity of be in g- so ci al .

In this respect, Situationism is not wrong to discern misery at the

ve ry he ar t of ab u nd an c e, a sy m b ol i c m is er y th at do es no t ex cl ud e

sustained material misery and certain people's deprivation, in par

ticular the miser y of mu ch of the southern h emis pher e. . . . The

mise ry of the "spectacle" n ame s that coexistence wher e the co- ends

up ref err ing to noth ing b y w h ich ex is tence could s y mb ol ize i t s el f

according to itself . That is , at the very moment when it exposes it

self and proves to be the entire prope rty of Bei ng, it is noth ing by

w h i c h ex is te nc e says it se lf a s su ch , n o th i n g by w h i c h it m ak es sen se

of Being . At th at very mom ent w h e n th e only oth er th ing th at is

given along with existence is existence-with as the space for de

p loy ment and appropriat ion , th e co- is no thin g that can make sense.

Being-together is def ined by being-together-at-the-spectacle, and

this being-together und erstands itself as an in versio n of the repre

sentation of itself, w hic h it believes to be capable of givin g itself as

originary (and lost): the Greek city assembled in community at the

theater of its own myths. An ex ample o f today's response mi ght b e

the fol low ing advertisem ent, wh ic h itself constitutes a spectacular

and dis turb ing recuperat ion of th e S i tuat ionis t cr i t ique: " Footb al l

makes a l l oth er art f orms ins igni f ican t ." 50

In any case, it is precisely this indefinite capacity for recuperating

th e S i tuat ionis t cr i t ique th at demands at tent ion. T h e de nuncia t ion

of mere appearance effortlessly moves with in mere appearance, be

cause it has no other way of desig natin g what is pr op er —t ha t is,

non app ear anc e— exc ept as the obscure opposite of the spectacle.

Sin ce the spectacle occup ies all of space, its opposite can on ly make



5 2 Being Singular Plural Being Singul ar Plural 53

i t se l f k n o wn a s t he in a ppro pr ia bl e sec ret o f a n o r ig in a r y pro pert y

hid den be neath appearances. Thi s is why the opposite of deceit ful

" ima g ery" i s c rea t iv e " ima g in a t io n ," t he mo d el fo r whic h i s s t i l l

so met hin g l ik e t he R o ma n t ic g en iu s . Ac c o rd in g t o su c h a mo d el ,

the art ist plays the part of the productiv e-subj ect , bu t st i l l accord

ing to the structure of an ontolo gica l presup posi t ion that involves

n o spec if i c in t erro g a t io n o f t he "c o mm o n " o r " i n -c o m mo n " o f B e

ing , nor of the mean ing of Bei ng that is in question.

W e m u st , th er ef or e, un d er st an d h ow th is ve rs io n of M a r x i s t c r i

t ique, an d al l the versions of crit ical th ink ing inaug urated by Ma rx(whether they be the more "left ist" versions or the more "sociologi

cal" ones, those of Batail le or the Fran kfur t School , and so on), in

some way obscured, in statu nascendi, the correctness of its own i n

tuit i on. Th is was the intui t ion of society exposed to itself, establish

ing its being-social under no other horizon than itself—that is, with

out a hor izon of Me an in g in whic h to relate being-together as such,

w it h ou t an in st an ce of co rn -p os it io n as soc iet y's di s- po si ti on sp la ye d

open and laid bare. But this very intuit ion is interpreted only as the

reign of appearance, as the substitu t ion of the spectacle for auth en

t ic presence; appearance is understood, here, in the most classical

wa y, na m el y, as "m er e ap pe ar an ce " (s ur fa ce , se co nd ar y ex te ri or it y,

inessential shadow), and even as "false appearance" (semblance, de

ceptive imitat ion). In this respect , crit ique remains obedient to the

most trenchant and "metap hysical" trad it ion of philos ophy , "meta

physical" in the Nietzschean sense: the refusal to consider an orderof "appearances," preferring, instead, authentic reality (deep, l iv in g,

o r i g in a ry —a n d a l wa ys o n t he ord er o f t he O t her) .

W i t h i n th is tr ad i ti on , it is ov er a n d ag ai ns t th e d e m a n d of i n te l -

l igible reality that sensible appearance has been constituted and dis

regarded al l in the same gesture, just as plurality has been consti

tute d and disreg arded for the sake of the req uire men t of unity.

Likewise, public appearance has been constituted and disregarded

in favor of an int erior an d theoretical reality (t hin k of Plato's Tha ïes,

w h o wa s in ep t in th e af fai rs of th e ci ty ), a nd w h e n au th en ti c re al it y

wa s d e m a nd e d in th e p ol it ic a l or c om m u n i ta r i a n or de r, it ha p pe ne d

at the cost of relegating the polit ic al or the comm uni tar ian to inte-

r io r i t y , a n d a t t he c o st o f s im pl y d is reg a rd in g "so c i a l " ex t er io r i t y

(the sphere of the exter iori ty of needs and e xchange s, the sphe re of

w o r l d l y ap p ea ra nc e, a n d s o fo rt h ) . T h e S i tu a ti on is t c r it i q u e c o n

t inued to refer essential ly to something l ike an internal truth (des

ignated, for example, by the name "desire" or "imagination"), the

w ho le co nc ep t of w h i c h is th at of a su bj ec ti ve ap p ro p ri at io n of "t ru e

life," itself thought of as origi n proper, as self- deploym ent and self-

sat isfact ion. In this, Situationism demonstrates the nearly constant

characterist ic of the mo der n crit iq ue of exteriority, appearance, an d

social al ienation—at least , since Rousseau.I certainly do not want to suggest by this that the crit ique of

a l ien a t io n , i l l u s io n , o r id eo l o g y i s in e f fec t u a l . B u t we d o ha v e t o

w on de r to w h a t ex te nt th e c ri ti q u e of al ie na ti on is it se lf in da ng er

of rem ain ing subject to another, symm etric al al ie nation of the sort

that I am try in g to poin t out by referring to diffe rent species of the

Othe r, wh ic h is st i l l to say the Same or the On es elf of a uniq ue,

ex c l u s iv e , a n d eg o ist ic a ppro pr ia t io n , ho wev er ego is to be under

s t o o d ( w h e t h e r g e n e r i c , c o m m u n i t a r i a n , o r i n d i v i d u a l ) . O n a n

other level , one could say that this is a more or less explicit refer

ence to "nature": universal nature, human nature, natural to each

person or natural to a people. Th e idea of nature retains wi th in it

se l f t he d o mi n a n t t hem e o f se lf -su f f ic ien c y, o f se l f -o rg a n iz a t io n ,

and of a process orien ted tow ard an e nd state. Th is sort of nature is

a t a remo v e fro m ex t er io r i t y a n d c o n t in g en c y, whic h, in o t her

places, are mark s of a "natur e" that is "outsi de" us, to wh ic h we are

ex po sed a n d wi t ho u t whic h o u r ex po si t io n wo u l d n o t t a k e place.

Simi l a r l y , t he ego is from the very start removed from that exteri

o r i t y a n d c o n t in g en c y wi t ho u t whic h i t i s impo ssib l e t o ex po se i t

as ego.

B o t h t he t heo ry a n d pra x is o f c r i t iqu e d em o n st ra t e t ha t , f ro m

now on, crit ique absolutely needs to rest on some principle other

than that of the ontolo gy of the Oth er an d the Same: it needs an

o n t o l o g y o f be in g -wit h-o n e-a n o t her , a n d t h is o n t o l o g y mu st su p

port bot h the sphere of "nature" a nd sphere of "histo ry," as we ll as

b ot h th e " h u m a n " a n d th e " n o n h u m a n " ; it m us t b e an o n t o l o g y

for the worl d, for ever yo ne —a nd if I can be so bo ld, it has to be




an ontology for each and every one and for the world "as a total

ity," and n oth ing short of the whole wor ld, s ince this is all there is

(but, in this way, there is all).

As th e la st gr ea t f o r m of ra di ca l cr i ti q u e , S i t u a ti o n i sm wa s no

stranger to this necessity. Despite everything, its crit ique worked

itself out while giv ing litt le play to [the practice of] referring soci

ety to a mod el of some sort. Thi s is undo ubte dly where its ruptur e

w i t h va ri ou s M a r x i s m s wa s m os t de ci si ve a n d wh er e, w i t h so me

others and par tly in Mar x's nam e, it offered one of the f irst and

most virule nt crit ique s of what was unti l just recently called "rea l"

socialism and also social-democracies. As a result , Situationism has

br ou gh t to li gh t ra th er w e ll , a lt ho ug h no t to its fu ll es t ex te nt , th e

them e of refe rrin g society back to itself. Th e "society of the spec

tacle" is both a denu ncia tion (of the generalized spectacle-market)

and an aff irm ation of society facing itself and , mayb e even more

so, the aff i rmation of society as exposed to itse lf an d onl y to itself.

We mu st , the re for e, pos e the fo ll ow i ng tw o qu es ti on s at the sam e

time:

1 . H o w can one know in w h at w ay and jus t h ow far cr i t i qu e—

bo th r ev ol u ti on a ry cr it iq u e , i n c l u d i n g its m os t re ce nt m an if es ta

tions, and also so-called reformist crit ique—remains paradoxically

and unconsciously subject to a classical model in which reality is

opposed to appearance and unity is opposed to plurality? (This

model assumes that a certain Nietzschean lesson is constantly mis

understood or avoided within the crit ical tradition and, at the same

time, that the whole que stion of what can be called "art" fr om the

poi nt of view of social crit i que rem ains more or less untouched. )

In other words, to what extent do "critical" thinking and the "crit

ical " attitude as such entail this subjection ( i f "crit iq ue" always pre

supposes the possibil ity of unv eili ng the inte llig ibil ity of the real) ,

an d what other attitud e is necessary, where an at titud e of resigna

tio n is out of the question ?

2. Ho w can one kn ow if the "spectacle" is, in one way or another,

a constitutive di men sion of society? Tha t is , how can one kno w if

w ha t is ca ll ed "s oc ia l re la ti on " c an be th ou g h t of a c co r d i n g to

some thin g other than the symbo lic order, and if the symboli c or

der can, in tur n, be thou ght of in some way other than accor ding

to the order of " ima gina tion" or "f igura tion," all of whi ch indicates

the necessity of th in ki ng all these terms in a new way? Onc e again,

"art" would come into play, but only according to a thinking that is

quite dif ferent from asking the trivial question about "art and so

ciety" and, at the same time, according to a wholly dif ferent think

ing of "art" itself , and of what we mi ght in clud e unde r the head

ing "critical art."

These questio ns serve as the progr amm ati c headin g of some

fuller inquiry. I will not take them both on at once, because each

one is too enormous in itself . I will only attempt to open some dif

ferent ways of appr oachi ng the m.

At th e ve ry he ar t of th e tr a d it i on , it m us t be sa id th at "i n t e l li g i

bl e re al it y" ca n on ly be th e re al it y of the sensible as s uch —a nd th at

the "intellig ible reality" of the comm un it y can only be the reality

of being-in-common as such. This is why reduction to or subsump-

tion in intelligibility (Idea, Concept, Subject) regularly comes into

tens ion w ith its own requirement th at i t prov ide an intel l ig ib i l i ty

of the sensible that occurs with in sensibility, for it an d right at [à

même] it; this is often so forceful an opposition that it leads to a

rupture, where sensible intelligibility either breaks apart or dissolves

itself altogether.

W h a t co me s to us to da y is th e d e m a n d to gi ve th e m e a n i n g of

b e i n g -i n -c om m on ac co rd in g to wh at it is — in - c o m m o n o r with—

and not acco rdin g to a Be ing or an essence of the com mo n. As

such, it is the dem and to give the meani ng of bein g-w ith right at

the with, and in a "making sense with" ["faire-sans-avec"] (a praxis

o f m e a n i n g - w i t h [sens-avec]) w h ere th e oppos it ion of a M ea ni ng

(horizon, history, community) and a simple "with" (spacing, exte

riority, disparity) would dissolve or break apart. In short, it is be

com in g a matter of urgency to kn ow whether social crit iqu e is to

be ma de by vi r tu e of a p re su p po si ti on th at is no t at a ll so ci al (a n

ontology of Being- tout-court, as it were) or by virtue of an on tol

ogy of bei ng- in- com mon , that is , of the plural s ing ular essence of

Bei ng. Th is is w hy the subject of "ontolo gy" f irst of all entails the

critical e xami natio n of the conditio ns of crit iq ue in general.




Co -appearin g

It mig ht be, then, that the current situation of "social Bein g" has

to be understood in some other way than by start ing from the

sc hema o f a n imm en se , spec t a c u l a r se l f -c o n su m pt io n , a sc hema

wh er e th e tr u th of c o m m u n i t y is di ss ol ve d a nd e ng ul f e d— w h e th e r

community [is understood] as subject or as occurring between sub

je ct s. If o n l y we m a de th e ef fo rt to de ci p h er it in a n e w wa y, it

mi ght be that the ph en om en on of the generalize d "spectacle,"

a l o n g wi t h wha t we c a l l t he "t e l e -g l o ba l d imen sio n ," whic h a c companies it and is cosubstantial with it , would reveal something

else altogether. Wh at is of pr im ary im port ance in this is to avoid

pre supp osin g that the subject of "social B ei ng " or the subject of Be

in g tout court is already establis hed.

Bu t this cannot si mp ly be a matter of the classic gesture of

w a n ti n g to b eg in w i th ou t p re su p po si ti on s (w h ic h al wa ys as su me s

that this desire [volonté] i tself is not already the whole pres uppo si

t io n ) . I t i s a ma t t er of r ig o ro u sl y t h in k in g wha t B e in g -wi t ho u t -

presup posit ions -about- itself means, wh ic h is, once again, the "cre

at ion of the wo rl d. " In a general way, indee d in an absolutely

g en era l wa y, t he pr im o rd ia l requ iremen t o f o n t o l o g y o r f i rst phi

losophy must now be that Being not be presupposed in any way or

in any respect, and, more precisely, that every presupposition of Be

ing must consist in its nonpresupposition.

Being cannot be pre-sup-posed [pré-sup-posé] if it is only the Bein g of wha t exists, and is not itsel f some oth er existence that is pre

vi ou s or su bj ac en t to ex is te nc e by w h i c h ex is te nc e ex ist s. F or ex is

tence exists in the plural , singularly plural . As a result , the most

formal and funda menta l requireme nt [of ontology ] is that "Be ing "

cannot even be assumed to be the simple singular that the name

seems to indicate. Its being singular is plural in its very Being. It

follows, then, that not only must being-with-one-another not be un

derstood starting from the presupposition of being-one, but on the con

trary, being-one (Being as such, complet e Being or ens realissimum)

can only be understood by starting from being-with-one-another. T ha t

quest ion whi ch we st il l cal l a "question of social Bei ng" m ust , in

fact , constitute the o n t o l o g ic a l qu est io n .

If one really un derstan ds the necessity of this ground less pre

supp osit ion, one wou ld also have to try to say the fol low ing: if the

situation of being-socia l is not that of a spectacular self-al ienation

that presupposes a lost or dissimulated "real presence," neither is it

t ha t o f a g en era l c o mmu n ic a t io n a l a rra n g emen t , whic h presu p

poses a "rat ional subject" of com mu nic ati on. Thi s does not mea n

that there is nothin g to the i l lusio ns of spectacular self-al ienation

o r t o t he ra t io n a l i t y o f a g en eral c o m mu n ic a t io n a l a rra n g emen t ,

b ut it do es m ea n th at "r ea l pr es en ce " an d "r at io na li ty " ca n o n ly be

thought or evaluated by beginning from something else; and they

cannot themselves constitute the groundless presup posit i on. If left

to itself, as a sort of grand , her meneuti cal a ntin omy of the mode rn

w o r l d (a nd on e th at is cl ea rl y at w o r k ev er yw he re ), th is co nt r ar y

double form of the "[il lusory] spectacle" and "[rat ional] co mm un i

cation" could even switch their predicates around, such that the

"spectacle" would be nothing other than "communication" and vice

ve rs a. T h i s ch ia sm a or ci rc le w or ri es us in ou r co nf us ed a n d a n xi

ety-ridden awareness that society just "turns round and around,"

w i th o u t su bs ta nc e, w i th o u t f ou n da ti on , w i th o u t en d .

In fact , it might be that what is happening to us is just another

so rt o f "Co p ern i c a n rev o l u t i o n ," n o t o f t he c o smo l o g ic a l syst em,

or of the relati on of subject and obj ect, bu t rather of "social Be ing "

rev o l v in g [tournant] a rou nd itself or turn ing on itself, and no

longer revolving around something else (Subject , Other, or Same).

W h a t ha pp en s to us, th en , is th e s tr ip p in g ba re [mis à nu] of so

cial reality, the very reality of being-s ocial i n , by, a nd as the sym-

b ol ic i ty th at co ns ti tu te s it , w he re "s pe ct ac le ," " c o m m u n i c a t i o n , "

"com mod ity, " and "techno logy" wo ul d be different figures of this

symbolicity. These are, however, perverse figures that st i l l have to

be th ou gh t.

It is st i l l necessary to understand what this word "symbolic"

mea n s. Th e pro per v a lu e o f symb o l ism is in ma k in g a symbol, that

is , in ma k in g a c o n n ec t io n o r a jo in in g , 5 1 and in giving a face [ fig-




ure] to this l iaison by making an image. Insofar as the relation is

i m a g i n e d [se représente], and because the relation as such is noth

ing other than its own representation, the symbolic is what is real

in such a relation. By no means, however, is such a relation the rep

resenta tion of som eth ing that is real ( in the secondary, m im eti c

sense of represe ntation), b ut the relation is , and is n oth ing other

than, what is real in the representation—its ef fectiveness and its

eff icacy. (The paradigm for this is "I love you" or, perhaps more

origina lly, "I am addr essing myself to you.")

In this respect, it is important to emphasize that the symbolic

and the imaginary are far from opposites. But the way in which

they are not opposites is even contrary to how the common way of

s peaking [vulgate] conflates the image (understood as manifesta

t ion and recognit ion) w ith th e s imulacrum ( unders tood as a capt i

v a ti n g a n d m y st i fy i n g hy po st as is ). T h e si m p l e , o r si m p l i st ic , c r i

tique of "the image" (and of the "civi lizatio n of images") , wh ich has

be co m e a sor t of id eo lo gi ca l tr op e in th eo ri es of th e "sp ec ta cl e" a n d

in th eories of " com mu nic at i on, " is noth in g b ut th e my th ic and

mys tify ing effect of the franti c desire for a "pure" sym bol iza tio n

(and a sympt oma tic mani festatio n of the weakness of "crit ique " in

general) . The sole criterion of symb oliza tion is not the exclusion or

debasement of the image, but instead the capacity for allowing a

certain play, in and by the image-symbol, with the joining, the dis

tancing, the opened interval that articulates it as sym-bol: this word

s imply means " put w ith " ( th e Greek sun equals the Latin cum), so

that the di me nsi on, space, an d nature of the "wit h" are in play here.

Therefo re, the "sym bolic " is not simpl y an aspect of being-so cial:

on the one hand, it is this Being itself ; on the other hand, the sym

bo li c do es n ot ta ke pl ac e w i th o u t (r e) pr es en ta ti on , the (r e p r e se n

tation of one anothe r [des uns aux autres] according to w h ich th ey

are with one another [les-uns-avec-les-autres].

If I speak of "social" reality 's being strip ped bare as its symbo lic-

ity, then I am talking about "society" uncovered, society no longer

be i ng th e ap pe ar an ce of o n ly its el f, so ci et y no lo ng er re d uc ed to a

sort of bac kgr oun d "symbo lizi ng" ( in the ord inar y sense) not hin g

( no community , no my s t ical b ody ) . I am ta lk ing ab out s oc iety

Being Si ngular Plural 59

ma ki ng a symbo l of itself , society mak in g its appearance by facing

[ face à] itself in order to be all tha t it is an d all that it has to be. In

this way, being-so cial is not reduce d to any assumpti on of an inte

rior or superior unity. Its unity is wholly symbolic; it is wholly of

the with. Being-social is Being that is by appearing in the face of

itself, faced with itself: it is co-appearing [ com- parut ion] .

Co-appearing does not simply signify that subjects appear to

gether. In that case (which is the "social contract") , it would stil l

need to be asked from where it is that they "appear," from which

remote depth do they come into being-social as such, from what

origin. We must also wonder why they appear "together" ["ensem

bl e" ] a n d fo r wh at ot he r d e pt h th ey are de st in ed , de st in ed "a ll to

gether" or "further-on [outre] together." Either the predicate "to

gether" is only a qualif ication that is extrinsic to subjects, which

does not belon g to the appearance of each one as su ch, b ut desig

nates a pure, indif ferent juxtaposition, or it adds a particular qual

ity, one granted a me ani ng of its own that must be work ed out for

all subjects "together" and as "together." These two questions lead

s traigh t to th e dead ends of a meta ph y s ics —a nd i ts pol i t ic s — in

w h i c h (1) so ci al co -a pp ea ra nc e is o n l y ev er th ou g ht of as a tr an si

tory epip hen ome non , an d (2) society itself is thoug ht of as a step

in a process that always leads either to the hyp ostasis of togethe r

nes s or th e common ( community , communion) , or to th e h y

postasis of the indi vid ua l.

In either case, one comes to a dead end because being-social as

s uch —or again , w h at migh t b e cal led th e association [sociation] of

Being—is instrumentalized, related to something other than itself .

On this acc oun t, the essence of the "soci al" is no t itself "soci al. " As

a result , it is never presentable unde r the headin g of the "social, "

bu t o n ly u nd e r th e he ad i ng of ei th er a si m pl e , ex tr in si c, a n d tr a n

sitory "association," or of a transsocial presupp ositio n, the unit ary

entelech y of com mo n Be in g— w h ic h are b oth w ay s to repress and

foreclose the pro ble m of "association."

Th e very me ani ng of the word "together," just l ike the mea nin g



6 o Being Singula r Plural

o f t he wo rd " wi t h , " seems t o osc i l l a t e in d ef in i t e l y bet ween t wo

mea n in g s , wi t ho u t ev er c o mi n g t o a po in t o f equ i l ib r iu m : i t i s e i

ther the "together" of jux tapos iti on partes extra partes, isolated and

unrelated parts, or the "together" of gathering totum intra totum, a

u n i f ied t o t a l i t y [unitotalité] where the rela t ion surpasses itself in

b e in g p ur e. B u t it is cl ea r f r o m th is th at th e re so ur ce s f o u n d in th e

term are situated precisely on the poin t of equ il i bri um between the

two meanings: "together" is neither extra no r intra. In fact, the pureoutside , l ike the pure ins ide, renders al l sorts of togetherness im

possible. They both suppose a unique and isolated pure substance,

b u t p ur e in su ch a w ay th at on e ca nn ot ev en say "i so la te d, " ex ac tl y

be ca use on e w o u l d be de p ri ve d of al l re la ti on w i t h it . A s su ch , th en ,

G o d is n o t to g et her wi t h a n y t hin g o r a n yo n e , bu t i s —a t lea st in

Spin o z a a n d L e ibn iz , a l t ho u g h in d i f feren t , bu t equ a l l y ex empl a ry ,

w a y s — t h e to ge th er ne ss or be in g- to ge th er of al l th at is: G o d is no t

" G o d . " 5 2

Togetherness and being-together are not equivalent . (On the con

trary, the equ ivoc atio n between the two makes the status of the

g o d s of o n t o -t heo l o g y u n c er t a in . [W het h er i t i s a ma t t er o f] pa n

t h e i s m , p a n e n t h e i s m , p o l y t h e i s m , m o n o t h e i s m , a t h e i s m , d e i s m ,

and so on, [are such gods] representable or unrepresentable? [Do

they] ground representation or remove it? Or [might they] even be

repre sentation itself?) Togetherness , in the sense of bei ng a sub

stantive entity, is a coll ecti on (as in the theory of togethernesses [en

sembles]). Collect ion assumes a regrouping that is exterior and in

different to the being-together ("in c om mo n") of the objects of the

colle ct ion . In a general way, the themes and pract ices of the "col

lect ive" or of "coll ect iv ism" move in this register. It coul d be said,

then, that the ontological togetherness whic h we mu st t h in k t hro u g h

is never substantive; it is always the adverb of a being-together. But

this adverb is not a predicate of "Be ing "; it bring s to it no part icu

lar and supplementary qualificat ion. Like al l adverbs, it modifies or

moda lizes the verb, b ut here modal izat ion is of the essence and of

the origin. Being is together, and it is not a togetherness.

"To g et her" mea n s s imu l t a n ei t y {in, simul), "at the same t ime."

Being together is being at the same t ime (and in the same place,


w h i c h is it se lf th e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of " t im e " as " c o n te m p o r a r y

t ime") . "Sa me t ime/sa me pl a c e" a ssu mes t ha t "su bjec t s , " t o c a l l

them that , share this space-t ime, but not in the extrinsic sense of

"sharing"; they must share it between themselves; t hey mu st t hem

selves "symbolize" it as the "same space-t ime" without which there

w o u l d no t be ti m e or sp ac e. T h e sp ac e- ti m e it se lf is fi rs t of al l th e

possib il ity of the "w ith ." Very lon g analyses are cal led for here. C ut

t ing them far too short , let me say that t ime cannot be the purem o m e n t [instant], o r pu re su c c ess io n , wi t ho u t be in g s imu l t a n ei t y

"at the same t im e." Tim e itself imp lies "at the same t ime ." Si mu l

taneity imm edia tely opens space as the spacing of t ime itself. Start

ing fr om the sim ultane ity of "subjects," t ime is possible, b ut above

all , it is necessary. For in order to be together and to communicate,

a correla t ion of places and a. tran sit ion of passages from one place

to another is necessary. Sharing [partage] and passage control each

other reciprocally. Husserl writes, "It is essential ly necessary that

the togetherness of monads, their mere co-existence, be a temporal

In fact , simul tanei ty is not a matter of indi s-co-existence. "53

tin ct io n; on the contrary, it is the dist inctnes s of places taken to

gether. The passage f r o m one place to another needs time [D'un lieu

à l'autre, il faut le temps]. A n d mov in g in place [du lieu à lui-

même] as such also needs time: the time for the place to open itself

as place, the t ime to space itself. Reciprocally, originary t ime, ap

pea r in g as su c h, needs space [il lui faut l'espace], the space of i ts own

dis -ten sion , the space of the passage that divides [partage] i t . N o t h

in g a n d n o bo d y c a n be bo rn wi t ho u t be in g bo rn t o a n d wi t h o t h

ers who come into this encounter, who are born in their own turn.

The "together," therefore, is an absolutely originary structure. What

is not together is in the no-t i me- no-p lace of non -Be ing .

Co -a ppea ra n c e , t hen , mu st s ig n i fy—bec a u se t h is i s wha t i s n o w

a t s t a k e—t ha t "a ppea r in g " (c o min g in t o t he wo r l d a n d be in g in

the world, or existence as such) is strict ly inseparable, indiscernable

fro m t he cum or the with, which is not only its place and its taking

pl a c e , bu t a l so —a n d t h is i s t he sa me t h in g —it s fu n d a men t a l o n

tological structure.

That Being is being-with, absolutely, this is what we must think. 5 4




T h e with is the most basic feature of Bei ng , the mar k [trait] of the

singular plu rality of the origin o r origins in it .

Un d o u bt ed l y , t he with as such is not prese ntable. I have already

said so, but I have to insist upon it. The with is not "unpresentable"

l ike some remote or withd raw n presence, or l ike an Other. If there

is a subject only with other subjects, the "w ith " itself is not a sub

je ct . T h e " w i th " is or co ns ti tu te s th e m a rk of un it y/ di su ni ty , w h i c h

in itself does not designate uni ty or dis uni ty as that fixed substa nce

w h i c h w o u l d u n de r g ir d it ; th e " w i t h " is no t th e si gn of a re al it y, or

ev en o f a n " in t ersu bjec t iv e d im en s io n . " I t rea l l y i s , " i n t ru t h ," a

mark drawn out over the void, which crosses over it and underlines

it at the same t ime, thereby constitut ing the drawing apart [trac

tion] and drawing together [tension] o f the vo id . As such, i t also

c o n st i t u t es the t ra c t io n a n d t en sio n , repu l s io n /a t t ra c t io n , o f t he

"between"-us. The "with" stays between us, and we stay between

us: just us, but only [as] the interval between us.

In fact , one should not say the "with"; one should only say

"wi t h , " wh ic h wo u l d be a prepo s i t io n t ha t ha s n o po si t io n o f i ts

ow n and is available for every posit ion . Bu t if the unprese ntabil i ty

of "w ith" is not that of a hidd en presence, then it is because "wi th"

is the unpres enta bil i ty of this pre-p osit ion, that is, the unpre

sentabil ity of presentation itself. "W i th " does not add itself to Be

ing, b ut rather creates the imman ent and i ntrinsic co ndit ion of pre

sentation in general .

Presence is imp ossi ble except as copresence. If I say that the

Unique is present, I have already given it presence as a companion

(even if such presence constit utes the Un iq ue , and I have split it in

t wo ) . The co- of copresence is the unpre sentab le par excellence, but

i t i s n o t hin g o t her t ha n —a n d n o t t he O t her o f—presen t a t io n , t he

existence which co-appears.

If we no w have to thin k about social Bei ng in some other way

than according to its spectacular-market self-mockery or its com-

mun icati onal self-assurance, both of wh ich take place on the basis

of an unl ike ly and nostalgic inauthentic ity, it is quite like ly that there

w o u l d be n o th i n g else fo r us to m ed it at e o n , n ot h i n g to r um in at e

about or mull over between us. What is proper to community is nei-

Being Si ngular P lural 63

ther a creativity nor a rat ionality laid down l ike some fundamental

internal resource, readily available to be put into pract ice through

criti que. In this respect, we are definit ely no longer in the age of E n

l ig ht en men t o r R o ma n t ic ism. W e a re e l sewhere , whic h d o es n o t

mean we are opposed to them or beyond them , as if we had dialec-

t ical ly surpassed them . We are in a sort of simultaneou s draw ing to

gether [tension] of these two epochs; they are contemporaries of ours

and we see them wea ring thi n. O ne is wor n thin to the poi nt of be

ing an extremely dull platitude; the other is stretched out toward the

nigh t of exte rmi natio n. We are thus in a suspe nsion of histor y where

an enig ma is gathe ring anew; we are contempora ries of ourselves,

c o n t empo ra r ies o f t he st r ippin g ba re o f be in g - in -c o mm o n .

W h a t is p ro pe r to c om m u ni ty , th en , is gi ve n to us in th e f ol lo w

ing way: it has no other resource to appropriate except the "with"

that constitutes it, the cum o f "c o m mu n it y , " i ts in fer io r i t y wi t ho u t

an interior, and maybe even its interior intimo sui. As a result, this

cum is the cum of a co-appearance, wher ein we do not hin g but ap

pear together with one another, co-appearing before no other au

t ho r i t y [l'instance]^ than this "w ith " itself, the me ani ng of wh ich

seems to us to instantly dissolve into insignificance, into exteriority,

in t o t he in o rg a n ic , empir ic a l , a n d ra n d o ml y c o n t in g en t [aléatoire]

inconsistency of the pure and simple "w ith ."

So it appears to us that what is proper to community is nothing

more than the generalized impr opr iety of banality, of anony mity ,

of the lonely crowd an d gregarious isolat ion. Th e simplest solidar

it ies, the most elementary proximit ies seem to be dislocated. As

such, then , "com mu nica tion " is only the laborious negotia t ion of a

reasonable and disinte rested image of co m mu ni ty devoted to its

o wn ma in t en a n c e , wh ic h c o n st a n t l y revea ls i t se l f a s n o t h in g bu t

the maintenan ce of the spectacular-market m achin e.

It must be said, however, that co-appearance might only be an

other name for capital . At the same t ime, it might be a name that

runs the risk of once again ma ski ng what is at-issue, pro vid ing a

cons olin g way of th ink in g that is secret ly resigned. But this dan

ger is not a sufficient reason to be sat isfied with a cr it iqu e of capi

tal that is st i l l held p risoner to the presup posit ion of an "other sub-



6 4 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 65

je ct " o f h is to ry , e co no m ic s, a n d th e a p p ro p r ia ti on of th e p ro pe r in

general . In point ing to " capita l , " M arx des ignated a general de-

p r o p r i a t i o n [dépropriation] that does not allow for the presupposi

tion or preservation of the other, or the Other, wh ich wo ul d be the

subject of the general rea ppro pria tion.

Or more precisely, the presupposition cannot take the form of

pres upp osin g a "subject"; rather, it must take the form of bein g-

w i th -o ne -a n o th e r , a n d m u st do so in a w a y th at is m u c h m or e

problematic, but far more radical, than Marx could have suspected.

It must also be said, t hen, that the classic cri tiqu e of capi tal, even in

its latest post-Marxist forms, is not suff icient for taking hold of

wh at ca pi ta l ex po se s. At th e ve ry le ast , a t h i n k i n g of co -a pp ea ra nc e

must awaken this anxiety.

T h e intuit ion b uried in M arx 's w ork is undoub tedly located in

the following ambivalence: at one and the same time, capital ex

poses the general aliena tion of the pr op er —w hi ch is the general

ized disap propr iation , or the appropri ation of misery in every sense

of the wor d— and it exposes the strip pin g bare of the with as a mark

of Being , or as a mark of mean ing. Ou r thin kin g is not yet adequate

to th is amb ivalence. T h is is w h y , s ince M arx and up th rough H ei

degger, such ambivalence constantly revives a great, undefined hes

i tat ion on th e s ub ject of " tech nology ," th e l im it - o b je ct— and per

haps the screen [l'objet-écran] —of a thi nki ng whi ch projects onto

it either the pro mis e of a self-o verc omin g of capit al or the assurance

of th e implacab le ch aracter of i t s mach ine ry carry in g on un con

trolled—and, thereby, controlling everything thanks to this absence

of control .

Th is is also why the trut h of our t im e can onl y be expressed in

M a rxi s t or pos t - M a rxis t terms . T h i s w h y i t is a ques t i on of th e

mark et, of misery, of socia l-dem ocrat ic ideolo gy, or the substan

t ia l reappropriat ions th at g ive a rep ly to i t ( nat ional is m, f unda

mentalism, and fascism in all their various forms). But this truth

its el f dema nds th at i t b e th ough t s tart ing f rom th e with of co-

appearance, so long as bringing it to l ife and stripping it bare sig

nif ies at least this—to put it in a formulaic way: what is at stake is

not a reappr opria tion of the with (of the essence of a co mm on Be

ing), but rather a with of reap prop riat ion (where the proper does

not return, or returns only with).

(Th is is why we do not make an ec onom y out of an ontol ogy,

but it is also wh y this ontology must be b o t h an ethos and a praxis,

ident ical ly . T h is w i l l h ave to b e developed later . 56 Let us hold the

follo wing in reserve: an on tolog y of being -with can o nly be located

w i t h i n the d i st i n ct i on of the se te rm s: to be , to ac t, ev en t, m e a n i n g ,

end, conduct, just as much as, and because, it must be located

w i t h i n th e d i s t i n c t i o n o f t he "s in g u la r " a n d th e " p l u r a l , " th e " i n

oneself" ["à soi"] and the "in several" ["à plusieurs"].)

The Spectacle of Society

If bein g-w ith is the sharing of a s imultaneo us space-time, th en

it involves a prese ntati on of this space-tim e as suc h. In orde r to say

"we," one mu st present the "here and no w" of this "we." Or rather,

saying "we" br ings abou t the prese ntati on of a "here and now, "

however it is dete rmi ned : as a ro om , a region, a group of friends,

an association, a "people." We can never simply be "the we," un

derstood as a unique subject, or understood as an indistinct "we"

that is l ike a dif fuse generality. "We" always expresses a plurality,

expresses "our" being divided and entangled: "one" is not "with" in

some general sort of way, but each time acc ordi ng to deter min ed

modes that are themselves multiple and simultaneous (people, cul

ture, language, l ineage, network, group, couple, band, and so on).

W h a t is pr es en te d in th is wa y, ea ch ti m e , is a stag e [scène] on which

several [people] can say "I," each on his own account, each in turn.

But a "we" is no t the addin g together or juxtap osition of these "Is ."

A "w e, " ev en on e th at is n ot ar ti c u la te d , is th e c o n d i t i o n fo r th e

possibility of each "I ." N o "I " can designate itself wit hou t there be

ing a space-time of "self-referentiality" in general. T hi s "generality,"

however, does not have a "general" consistency; it only has the con

sistency of the singula r at "each time" o f each "I ." " Eac h time " im

plies at one and the same time the discreteness of "one by one" and

the simult ane ity of "each one. " After all, an "each on e" that was not

in any way simultaneous, that was not at-the-same-time-and-along-



6 6 Being Singula r Plural Being Singula r Plural 6?

side-other "each ones," would be isolated in a way that would no

l o n g er ev en c o u n t a s i so l a t io n . R a t her , i t wo u l d be t he pu re a n d

sim ple im pos sib il ity of desig nating oneself and, therefore, of bein g

a "sel f . " Th e pu re c o n d i t i o n o f be in g d ist t ibu t e d [distributive] w o u l d b e tr an sf or m ed im m e d ia te ly in to ab so lu te a ut is m . ( B u t th is

is not to say that the "gr oup ," wha teve r it is, is of a high er order; it

is a stage [that serves as] a place of iden tific at ion . M or e generally,

the question of the "w ith " can never be expressed in terms of iden

t ity, but rather always in terms of identificat ions.) A s I ha ve al re ad y p oi n te d ou t, no t ev en D es ca rt es ca n c l a i m to

be al on e a n d w or ld le ss , pr ec is el y be ca us e he is no t al on e an d w or ld -

less. Rather, his pretense makes it clear that anyone who feigns soli

tude thereby attests to the "self-referential ity" of anyone [d e qu i

c o n q u e ] . T h e ego sum c o u n t s a s "ev id en t , " a s a f i r st t ru t h , o n l y

be ca us e its ce rt ai nt y ca n be re co gn iz ed by anyone. So, to art iculate

it comple tely wou ld be to say: / say that we, all of us and each one of

us, say "ego sum, ego existo." One is not obliged to read Descartes as

Heidegger does, which is as someone who, in staying at the point

of substance or res cogitans, does not go back as far as the absolutely

pr im o rd i a l c o n d i t io n . I n fa c t , o n e mu st rea d Desc a r t es li t era l ly , a s

he him sel f invites us to: engaging with him and l ike him in the ex

per ien c e o f t he pret en se [ to so l i t u d e] . O n l y t h is t h in k in g with

achieves the status of evidence , wh ich is not a pr oof [une démon

stration}. From its very first moment, the methodological pretenseis neith er substantial ist nor solipsist ic: it uncovers the stage of the

"at each ti me " as our stage, the stage of the "we ."

Th is s t a g e —t hi s "t heat er o f t he wo r l d ," a s Desc a r t es a l so l ik ed

to cal l it , using the persistent image of his t i m e— is not a stage in

the sense of an art if icial space of mi me tic re prese ntation. It is a

stage in the sense of the ope nin g of a space-t im e for the distr ibu

t ion of singularit ie s, each of w ho m singula rly plays the uniq ue and

plu ral role of the "self" or the "being-self." " Self " does not me an

in itself, or by itself, or for itself, but rath er "one of us": on e that is

each t ime at a remove from immanence or from the collect ive, but

is also each ti me coes sendal to the coex istence of each one , of "each

and every one. " Th e stage is the space of a co-app eari ng with out

w h i c h th er e w o u l d b e n o t h i n g b ut B e i n g p ur e a n d s im p le , w h i c h

is to say, al l and nothing, al l as nothing.

Bei ng gives itself as singular pl ura l and, in this way, organizes it

self as its own stage. We present the " I" to ourselves, to one an

other, just as "I," each t ime, present the "we" to us, to one another.

In this sense, there is no society without spectacle; or more pre

cisely, there is no society wi tho ut the spectacle of society. Al th oug h

a l rea d y a po pu l a r e t hn o l o g ic a l c l a im o r , in t he W est ern t ra d i t io n ,

a claim about the theater, this proposit ion must be understood asontological ly radical . There is no society without the spectacle be

cause society is the spec tacle of itself.

But in a certai n sense, this itself must be unde rstoo d as a play of

mirrors (at least insofar as "play" and "mirror" simply designate ar

t i f i ce a n d u n rea l i t y) . As a c o n c ept o f be in g -t o g et her [être-ensem

ble], co-appearance consists in its appearing, that is, in its appear

ing to itself and to one another, al l at once. Th ere is no ap peari ng

to oneself except as app eari ng to one another. If this were put in

classical terms, terms that presuppose a sphere of prop er and iso

l a t ed in d iv id u a l i t y a s t he st a r t in g po in t , t hen i t wo u l d be ren d ered

in the fol low in g way : one appears to ones elf insofa r as one is al

ready an other for oneself. 57 But it is immediately clear that one

cou ld not even beg in to be an other for onese lf i f one ha d not al

r e a dy s ta r t ed f r o m t h e a lt e r i ty w i t h — o r o f t h e w i t h — o t h e r s i n

general . Others "in general" are neither other "mes" (since there isno "me " and " you " except on the basis of alterity in general), nor

the non-me (for the same reason). Others "in general" are neither

the Same nor the Other. They are one-another, or of-one-another,

a pr im o rd ia l p l u ra l i t y t hat c o -a ppea rs . There fo re , "a ppea r in g ," a n d

appe aring to onese lf as wel l as to one another, is not on the order

of appearance, manifes tat ion, phe nom ena , revealing, or some other

concept of beco ming -visib le. Thi s is because of what that order in

evitably entails regardi ng the invi sibl e orig in of such app earance,

and wha t it entails regard ing the relat ion of appearance to this or i

gin as either an expression or an i l lusion, as resemblance or sem

b la nc e . 58 So co-appearing is not "appearing"; it is not a quest ion of

com in g out from a being- in-i tself in order to approach others, nor




is i t a ques t ion of co mi ng into th e w orl d. I t is to b e in th e s imu l

taneity of bei ng- wit h, where there is no "i n itself" that is not al

ready immediately " w ith ."

But " immediately w ith " does not ref er to an immediacy in th e

sense of an absence of exteriority. On the contrar y, i t is the ins tan

taneous exte riori ty of space- time (the instan t itself as exterio rity:

th e s imultaneous ) . And th is is h ow co- appearance f orms a s tage

that is not a play of mi rr or s— or rather, how the trut h of the playof mir ror s must be unde rsto od as the truth of the "wit h. " In this

sense, "society" is "spectacular."

Looking at it closely, one will f ind that the various crit iques of

"spectacular" alienation are, in the end, grounded on the distinc

tion between a good spectacle and a bad spectacle—[this is true]

w he th e r th ey li ke it or no t. W i t h i n th e g oo d sp ec ta cl e, th e so ci al or

communitarian being presents its proper inferiority to itself , its ori

gin (whi ch is itself invi sible ) , the found ati on of its rights, the life

of its body, a nd the splendor of its fulf il lm ent. (For the Situa tion -

ists, the n, a certa in ide a of "art" al mos t always plays the role of the

good spectacle, and it is no accident that the [bad] "spectacle" for

them is f irst and foremost the falsif ication of art.) In the bad spec

tacle, the social being imagines [se représente] the exteriority of in

terests an d app etites, o f egoti stic passions a nd the false glor y of os

tentation. At the most basic level, this Manichean division not only

supposes a distinction between the represented objects, but it also

supposes an opposi tion w it hi n the status of the representation: it

is what is now in inter ior ity (as manif esta tion , expression of the

proper), now in exteriority (as image, reproduction). As such, the

fact that these are intertwined is ignored: there is no "expression"

that is not [already] given in an "image," no "presentation" not al

ready [given] in "representation"; there is no "presence" that is not

presence to one another.

It is , of course, wel l kno wn that the dis tin cti on betwee n these

spectacles is drawn out explicit ly by Rousseau, who stipulates that

the best spectacle, and the only one that is necessary, is the specta

cle of the peopl e itself, assembled in orde r to dan ce aro un d the tree

they have planted as their own proper symbol. What Rousseau thus

makes clear, even despite himself , 5 9 is the nec essity of the specta

cle. In m oder nity, society know s itself as that wh ic h takes place in

the immanent nonpresence to oneself . That is , it takes place as a

subject, not so much the "subject of representation" as representa

tion as subject it is presentat ion-to [ la présentation-à], or what one

could cal l a- pres entat ion [lapprésentation], th e realm of co mi nginto pres ence as coming conjoined, coincidental and concurrent ,

simult aneou s and mut ual . Thi s a-presentation is that of a "we" that

possesses neither t h e n a t ur e o f a c o m m o n " I " nor that of a geo

met ric place, i n the sense of an ensem ble in whi ch all the "I's"

w o u l d be e q u id i st a n t f r o m on e an ot he r. Ra th er , it is w ha t op en s

the spacin g of co-appear ance on this s ide of every I-subject. "Asso

cia tion " ["Socia tion"] does not disclose itself as a bein g, bu t rather

as an act that, by def inition, exposes itself : it is in exposing itself

that it is what it is , or that it does what it does. Being-social must

testify before itsel f to the act of assoc iati on, the act that br ings it to

b e — n o t in th e sen se th at it pr od u ce s it (as a re su lt ), bu t ra th er in

the sense that "Being" remains wholly within the act and in the ex

pos iti on of the act. In this sense, one co ul d say that Rousseau's "so

cial contr act" is not in essence the concl usio n of an agreemen t; it

is the stage, the theater for the agreement.

Even if being-social is not im med iatel y "spectacular" in any of the

accepted senses of the wor d, it is essentially a ma tter of bein g-

exposed. It is as being-exposed; that is, it does not follow from the

imm ane nt consistency of a being-in-itself . T he being-in -itself of "so

ciety" is the network and cross-referencing [le renvoi mutuel] of co

existence, that is, o/coexistences. This is why every society gives itself

its spectacle and gives itself as spectacle, in one f orm or an other . 60

To this extent, every society know s itself to be constit uted in the

non im man enc e of co-appearance, a lthoug h society does not expose

this as a "knowledge." It exposes what it knows as its own stage and

through its own praxis oi staging [praxis scénographique]; and what



•jo Being Singular Plural

it knows is that , hidden behind being-together, there is not some

o t her B e in g whic h wo u l d n o l o n g er o r n o t yet be be in g -t o g et her ;

that is, what it know s is that there is not togetherness itself hid den

b e h i n d b e i n g - t o g e t h e r — i n p re se nc e, i n p e rs o n, i n b od y, o r i n

essence. Therefore, it knows that "togetherness" is not a predicate

of Be in g and that "togetherness" i s the trace of Be in g itself. In oth er

wor ds, the togetherness of Be in g [l'ensemble de l'être] is not a be

ing; it shares Being.

Th us , the spontaneous knowledge of soci ety— its "preontologi cal

c o mp rehen sio n " o f i t se l f—i s k n o wl ed g e a bo u t B e in g i t sel f , a bso lutely, and not about the part icu lar and subord inate region of be

in g s , wh ic h wo u l d be t he "so c ia l " reg io n o f B e in g . B e i n g -w it h i s

constitut ive of Being, and it is [constitut ive] for the totality of be

ings (I wi l l retu rn to this below); "s ocial" co-appearance is itself the

exposi ng of the general co-appearance of beings. Th is insight makes

its way from Rousseau to Batail le, or from Marx to Heidegger, and

it requires that we find a language that is ours.

Un d o u bt ed l y , we a re s t i l l s t u t t er in g : phi l o so phy a l wa ys c o mes

too late, and as a result , also too soon. B ut the stuttering itself be

trays the form of the prob lem : we, "we," h ow are we to say "we"?

Or rather, who is it that says "we," and what are we told about our

selves in the technolo gical p rolif erat io n of the social spectacle and

the social as spectacular, as well as in the prolif erat i on of self-me

d ia t iz ed g l o ba l iz a t io n a n d g l o ba l iz ed med ia t iz a t io n ? W e a re in c a

pa bl e o f a ppr o pr ia t in g t h is pro l i fera t io n bec a u se we d o n o t k n o w

how to think this "spectacular" nature, which at best gets reduced

to a discourse abou t the uncerta in signs of the "screen" and of "cu l

ture." The same applies to "technological" nature, which we regard

a s a n a u t o n o mo u s in st ru men t . W e d o so wi t ho u t ev er a sk in g o u r

selves if it mig ht not be "our " com pre hen sion of "our-selves" that

c o mes u p wi t h t hese t ec hn iqu es a n d in v en t s i t se l f in t hem , a n d

w i th o u t w o n d e r i n g if te ch n ol og y is in fa ct es se nt ia ll y in co m p le te

a g reemen t wi t h t he "wi t h ." 6 1 W e are not up to the level of the "we":

we co ns ta nt ly ref er ou rs el ve s ba ck to a "s oc io lo gy " th at is it se lf on l y

the learned for m of the "spectacular-mar ket ." We have not even be

gun to think "ourselves" as "we."


This i s n o t t o sa y t ha t su c h t h in k in g c a n o n l y o c c u r t o u s t o

mo rr ow or at some later poin t , as if it dep end ed on progress or

some revelat ion. It may not be a m atter of a new object of th in ki ng

that could be identified, defined, and exhibited as such. We do not

have to identify ourselves as "we," as a "we." Rather, we have to dis-

identify ourselves from every sort of "we" that wou ld be the subject

of its own representation, a nd we have to do this insofar as "we" co-

a ppea r . An t er io r t o a l l t ho u g ht —a n d , in fa c t , t he v ery c o n d i t io n o f

t h in k i n g —t he "t ho u g ht " o f "u s" i s n o t a represen t a tio n a l t ho u g ht

(not an idea, or notion, or concept). It is, instead, a praxis and an

ethos: the staging of co-appearance, the staging whi ch is co-appear

ing. We are always already there at each instant. This is not an in

n o v a t io n —bu t t he st a g e mu st be re in v en t ed ; we must reinvent it

ea c h t ime, ea c h t ime ma k in g o u r en t ra n c e a n ew.

A m aj or si gn of th e di f fi cu lt y w e ha ve re ga rd in g th e sp ec ta cl e is

indicated by the paradigmatic character that the Athenian theater

has for us. There is certainly nothing accidental in the fact that our

mo d ern wa y o f g ro u n d in g t he so -c al l ed W est ern t ra d i t i o n in v o l v es

a triple reference: to philosophy as the shared exercise of logos, to

polit ic s as the ope nin g of the city, an d to the theater as the place of

t he symbo l ic - ima g in a ry a pp ro pr ia t io n o f c o l l ec t iv e ex isten c e . The

A t h e n i a n the ate r, b ot h th e i ns ti tu ti on it se lf an d its co nt en t, ap pe ar s

to us as the polit i cal (civil) pr esenta tion of the ph ilos oph ica l (the

self-knowledge of the logical anima l) and , reciprocally, as the ph ilo

sophical presentation of the polit i cal . T ha t is, it appears to us as the

"one" pr esentati on of being-tog ether, yet as a presenta tion where

the condit ion for its possibil ity is the irreducible and inst itut ive dis

tance [l'écart] of representation. More over, this distance defines the

theater, insofar as it is neither po l i t i c a l nor phi losop hica l at the same

t i m e— a n d n e i t her o f t hese in a ra t her spec i f i c wa y. Th e At hen i a n

theater appears to us as the conjunction of logos an d mimesis, but

w h e n we see it in th is wa y, w e sy st em at ic al ly eff ace th e m o m e n t of

mimesis in favor of the mom ent of logos.

W e eff ace it in o u r i m a g i n i n g [représentant] that there could be



7^ Being Singul ar Plural Being Singula r Plural 73

— a n d espec ia l l y t ha t t here wa s , o n c e u po n a t i m e— a "g o o d " mi

mesis (the sort Plato wanted ), a mimesis of logos, and a "bad " mime

sis (that of the "sophist , " the prototyp e of the spectacular merch ant

w h o sel ls th e si m ul ac r a of logos). But we never pursue this logic to

its end, for doing so would require that we recognize the fol lowing:

if there is a necessity to mimesis, then it is because logos does not

presen t i t se l f o f i t s o wn a c c o rd —a n d ma ybe bec a u se i t d o es n o t

present itself at al l , because its logic is not the logic of prese nce. 62

This a mo u n t s t o rec o g n iz in g t ha t "so c ia l logos," the log ic of "as

soci ation, " and "association" itself as the logos all require mimesis.Has there ever been a logos that was not "social"? Whatever logos

mea n s—whet her a wo rd o r n u mber , a g a t her in g o r wel c o min g in

w h i c h B e i n g is m an if es t, re as on th at is re nd er ed or c o n s t r u c t e d — i t

always impl ies sharin g, and it always imp lies itself as sharing.

By effacing the intrinsic moment or dimension of mimesis, we ef

face this sharin g. We give ourselves the repres entatio n of a presence

that is immanent and enclosed, self-constitut ive and self-sufficient ,

the integrall y self-referential order of what we cal l a "logi c" in the

most general and basic sense. In this sense, "logic" represents self-

re feren t ia l i t y he l d t o i t s o n t o l o g ic a l c o n d i t io n , whic h i s t he o r ig i

n a ry—a n d , a s su c h, ex ist en t ia l —pl u ra l i t y o r sha r in g o f logos itself.

A ga in st th is go od c on j un ct io n of th e lo gi ca l an d th e m i m e ti c , w e

n o w o ppo se t he "ba d " o n e: t ha t where l o g ic rema in s wi t hin i t s im

manent order, cold and faceless (which today, for us, is the "logic of

c a pi t a l ") , a l l t he whi l e o u t wa rd l y pro d u c in g a mimesis t ha t d iss im

u l a t es i t a c c o rd in g t o i t s in v er t ed s imu l a c ru m, t he se l f -c o n su min g

"spectacle." The self-referential ity of the "imag e" stands in opp osi

tio n to the self-r eferen tiality of the process or the force, as its pr od

uct and truth. As over and against the "Greek" paradigm, this is

the way in which our tradit ion has for a long t ime set up the "Ro

ma n" p arad igm : the site of circus games, burle sque theater, and the

t hea ter o f c ru e l t y; wi t h o u t "c i v i l " id en t i f i c a t i o n ; t he Em pi re a n d

the reason for Empire [raison d'Empire}; t he fo ru m emp t ied o f i t s

mea n in g . . . . 63

A es ch y lu s or N e r o . . . ou r re fe rr in g to th in gs in th is wa y, w h i c h

sets the Greek stage in such violent contrast to the Roman circus

( a n d w h i c h a l s o d i v i d e s — t h i s i s a r e m a r k a b l e e x a m p l e — t h e

Ch r ist i a n t ra d i t io n s o f Pro t est a n t ism a n d Ca t h o l ic ism , o r d iv id es

the several different forms of the profane thea trical tra dit io n), re

ve als a co ns ci ou sn es s th at is it se lf co nf li ct ed , as is d em on st ra te d by

its unease with regard to the spectacle: "good" (re)presentation is

represented as lost; "bad" (re)presentation is represented as both

pop ular and generalize d. Bu t, in fact , both of them are our repre

sentations; they compose the double spectacle that we give to our

selves, the d ouble spectacle of the doubl e unp resent abil ity of social

Bei ng and its truth . Ther e is one unpres entabi l ity because of a certain retreat , and another unp rese ntabi l ity on account of a certain

vu lg ar it y . M a y b e w e ha ve to b e gi n b y ta k i n g so m e di st an ce f r o m

this double spectacle, by no longer wishing to be Greeks, by no

l o n g er fea r in g t ha t we a re R o ma n s, a n d by s impl y u n d erst a n d in g

o u rse l v es a s mo d ern s, where be in g mo d ern mea n s t he fo l l o win g :

t a k in g n o t e o f a n ex po sed "u n presen t a bi l i t y" a s su c h, bu t whi c h i s

n o t h in g o t her t ha n t he v ery presen t a t io n o f o u r c o -a ppea r in g , o f

"us" co-ap pearin g, a nd whose "secret" exposes itself and exposes us

t o o u rse l v es wi t ho u t o u r ev en beg in n in g t o pen et ra t e i t — i f i t i s a

matter of "pen etrat ing " it at al l .

The M easu re o f the "W i th "

Th e ba re ex po si t io n o f c o -a ppea ra nc e i s t he ex po s i t io n 6 4 of cap

ital . C api tal is so met hing l ike the reverse side of co-appearance and

that which reveals co-appearance. Capital 's v iolent inhumanity dis

pl a ys [étale] n o t h in g o t her t ha n t he s imu l t a n ei t y o f t he s in g u l a r

(but the singular posing as the indifferent and interchangeable par

t ic u l a r i t y o f t he u n i t o f pro d u c t io n ) a n d t he pl u ra l ( i t se l f po sin g a s

t he syst em o f c o m mo d it y c i rc u l a t io n ) . Th e "ex t o r t io n o f su rpl u s-

va lu e" p re su pp os es th is c o n co m it a nc e be tw ee n th e " a to m iz a ti on "

o f pro d u c ers (o f "su bject s" red u c ed t o be in g -p ro d u c t iv e) a n d a

"ret icul at ion" of profit (not as an equal redis tribu tion, bu t as a con

c en t ra t io n t ha t i s i t se l f mo re a n d mo re c o mpl e x a n d d e l o c a l iz ed ) .

On e coul d say that capita l is the al ien ation of bein g singular

plural as such. This would be quite accurate so long as one did not




understand being singular plural as a primit ive, authentic subject , a

subject to which capital happened as its other and purely by acci

d en t . (N o t hin g c o u l d be mo re fo re ig n t o Ma rx 's t h in k in g . ) Ca pi t a l

is the "al iena tion" of Bein g in its being- social to the extent that it

puts this being in play as such. It is not the negative dialect ic of

so me pr io r c o mmu n it y t ha t o c c u rs wi t hin a c o n t in u o u s h ist o r ic a l

process; instead, it exposes a singular-plural constitut ion or config

u ra t io n t ha t i s n e i t her t he "c o mmu n it y" n o r t he " in d iv id u a l . " I n

c a l c u l a bl e "su rpl u s-v a l u e"—"v a l u e" a s in d ef in i t e , c i rc u l a t o ry , a n d

autotelic grow th— exp oses the inaccessibil ity of a prim ordi al or final

"value." In a paradoxical and violent way, it immediately poses the

qu est io n o f a n "o u t s id e-v a l u e" o r "a bso l u t e v a l u e" —w hic h wo u l d

be im m ea su ra b le , pr ic el es s (w ha t K a n t ca ll ed a " d ig ni ty " ) . T h e re is ,

then, a certain concom itanc e between the globa lizat ion of the mar

ket and that of "h um an rights": these rights represent the supposed

absolute value that capital claims to exchange for . . . itself.

However, this is also why there is the stripping bare [mise à nu] of

b ei ng -s oc ia l a n d , at th e sa me ti m e , its b e in g b ro ug ht to li fe [mise à

vif], exact ly because the "rights-bearing" "human" is "valuable" in

itself. In fact, he is no th in g othe r than the idea of a "value in itse lf"

o r a "d ig n i t y . " I f "hu m a n it y " mu st be wo rt h so m et hin g , o r i f B e in g

in g en era l mu st "be wo rt h so met hin g " u n d er t he hea d in g "hu ma n

ity," this can only be by "being valuable" singularly a n d , s imu l t a n e

ously, in "being valuable" by and for and with the plural thai such

singu larity i mp lies , just as it impl ies the fact of the "value" itself.

I n d eed , w ho c o u l d be [mo re] v a l u a bl e fo r o n ese l f t ha n o n ese l f?

"B ei n g v a l u a ble" i s wo r t h so m et hin g o n l y wi t h i n t he c o n tex t o f be

ing-with, that is, only insofar as it concerns commerce In every sense

o f t he wo rd . B u t i t i s prec ise l y t he sha r in g o f t hese sen ses —t h e

c o mme rc e o f g o o d s/t he c o mme rc e o f be in g -t o g et her— t ha t c a pi t a l

exposes: the sharing of the senses of exchange, the sharing of the

sharing itself. Capital exposes it as a certain violence, where being-

together becomes being-of-market-value [letre-marchand] and hag

gled over [marchandé]. The be in g -wit h t ha t i s t hu s ex po sed v a n

ishes at the same time that it is exposed, stripped bare.

To say that this v iolence exposes being singular plural as an ab-


solute of existence is not to justify it. F or this violen ce violates what

it exposes. This, however, does not amount to declaring that the "se

cret" of capital has been revealed, a long wi th the means of conv erti ng

it into its opposite . Instead , the viole nce of capit al gives the measure

of wh at is exposed , of wha t comes to "us" to expose itself: sing ular

plura l bein g-w ith is the onl y absolute measure of Bein g itself, or of

existence. But this is an incom men sura ble measure if it is equal to

the "at each t ime" of each "one" an d, at the same time, to the indefi

nite p lural ity of coexistences against wh ic h ea c h o n e is measured m

t u r n — a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i n d e f i ni t e c o m m e n s u r a t i o n o f t h e c o i n c i

d en ces o f c o mmerc e , c o mba t , c o mp et i t io n , c o mp a r iso n , c o m mu n i

c a t io n , c o n c u rren c e , c o n c u pisc en c e , c o mpa ssio n , co-jouissance. . . .

There i s a c o mmo n mea su re , whic h i s n o t so me o n e u n iqu e

st a n d a rd a ppl ied t o ev eryo n e a n d ev eryt hin g . I t i s t he c o mmen su -

ra bi l i t y o f in c o m men su ra bl e s in g u l a r i t ies , t he equ a l i t y o f a l l t he

origins-ofthe-world, which, as origins, are strict ly unexchangeable

[insubsti tuable]. In this sense, they are perfect ly unequal, but they

a re u n ex c ha n g ea bl e o n l y in so fa r a s t hey a re equ a l l y wi t h o n e a n

other. Su ch is the sort of mea surem ent that it is left up to us to take.

" S o c ie t y " i s n e i th e r G r e e k no r R o m a n — n o r J u d e o - C h r i s t i a n , t o

w h i c h w e w i l l r et u rn la te r. S oc ie ty k no w s it se lf a n d sees it se lf as

ba re d, ex po se d to th is c o m m o n exc ess [démesure]. At one and the

same t ime , it sees itself as som eth ing quite evide nt and transpar

ent, wh ose nece ssity eclipses tha t of every ego sum, and as an opac

i t y t ha t d en ies i t se l f ev ery su bject iv e a ppr o pr ia t io n . At t ha t mo

ment when we clearly come [to stand] before ourselves, as the lone

addresser(s) facing the lone addressee(s), we cannot truly say "we."

But it is through this that we now have to attain to a knowledge

o f t he "w e"— a t t a in t o a k n o wl ed g e a n d /o r a pra x is o f t he "we ."

Th e "we" is not a subject in the sense of egoist ic self-iden tificat ion

and self -gro undi ng (even if this itself never takes place outside of

a "we"); n eithe r is the "we" " com pos ed " of subjects (the law of such

c o mp o si t io n i s t he a po r ia o f a l l " in t ersu bjec t iv i t y") . H o w ev er , t he

"we" is not nothing; it is "someone" each t ime, just as "each one" is



j 6 Being Singula r Plural

someone. Moreover, this is why there is no universal "we": on the

one hand , "we" is said each t ime of some config urati on, group , or

network, however small or large; on the other hand, "we" say "we"

for "everyone," for the coexistence of the entire universe of things,

a n ima l s , a n d peo pl e t ha t i s mu t e a n d wi t ho u t "u s ." "W e" n e i t her

says the "O ne " no r does it say the ad din g together of "ones" an d

"others"; rather, "we" says "one" in a way that is singular plural, one

b y on e a n d on e w i t h on e.

N o t hin g c a n rea l l y be t ho u g ht a bo u t t h is s i t u a t io n u n l ess t he

one, in general , i s first thought in terms of with-one- another. Yet , it

is here that our ontology fails, since we are "amongst us" ["entre

nous"] a n d s in c e "B ei n g " c o m es d o w n t o ju st t ha t — if I c a n sa y it

l ike this.

(It is as if Be ing has come ba ck to this "betwee n," wh ic h is its

true place, as tho ugh it ha d been a matter of a "forgett ing the be

tween" rather than "forg ett ing Bei ng. " Or rather, it is as if the in

v e n ti o n of B e i n g , th r o u g h o u t th e w h o l e tr a d i ti o n , w er e n o t h i n g

b ut th e i n v e n ti o n of ou r ex is te nc e as s u c h — a s th e ex is te nc e of us

a n d as us, u s in t he wo r l d , we-t he-wo r l d . "W e" wo u l d be , t hen , t he

most remote , absolute pri ori ty of every onto logy ; as a result , "we"

w o u l d al so b e th e m os t be la te d, m os t d if fi cu lt , a n d lea st a p p r o p r i

able effect of the ontolog ical d ema nd.)

T h e with constitutes a sort of per man ent end p oin t of the tradi

t ion. It is a minor category; in fact , even up until today, including

Heidegger in certain regards, it is barely a category at al l insofar as

"Being" has been represented as being alone with itself, and as hav

ing no coexistence or coincidence. So, when Husserl declares "the

intrinsical ly first being, the being that precedes and bears every

w o r l d l y Ob je ct iv it y , is tr an sc en de nt al in te rs ub je ct iv it y: th e un iv er se

o f mo n a d s, w hic h e ffec ts i ts c o m mu n io n in v ar io u s fo rms ," 6 5 this

B ein g c o n st i t u t es fo r h im n o t hin g l ess t ha n a n u l t ima t e ho r iz o n ,

freed from co nting ency an d the exteriority of coexistents. It corre

spo n d s t o a t ra n sc en d en t a l so l id a r i t y ra t her t ha n a n empir ic o -

t ra n sc en d en t a l s imu l t a n ei t y . As a resu l t , i t a g a in bec o mes so me

t hin g l ik e a su bst ra t u m ra t her t ha n so met hin g o pen o r d is-po sed

in i t se l f t hro u g h i t s c o c o n st i t u t io n . G e n era l l y spea k in g , t he n , t he

Being Singular Plural yj

B ein g o f phi l o so p hic a l o n t o l o g y c a n n o t ha v e co essen c e , s in c e i t

onl y has non- Be ing as its correlate. But what if Bei ng itself is the

coess entia lity of existence?

Since being-social appears to us to l ie beyond our reach, whether

a s c o mmu n it y (su bsu mpt io n u n d er t he Su bjec t , pu re B e in g wi t h

out relat ions) or as associat ion (a cco mm oda tion of subjects, rela

t io n with ou t essenti al ity), it is the category of the "other" th at

c ro sses t hro u g h mu c h c o n t empo ra ry t h in k in g . I t wo u l d be n ec es

sary to show how this category, and the obsession [la hantise] that

i t en ds u p c o n st i t u t in g fo r a g o o d po rt io n o f o u r t h i n k i n g , bo t h

represen ts t he in c o mm en su r a bi l i t y o f B e in g a s be in g -wit h-o n e-a n -

o t her and runs the r isk of cove ring over or defer ring this Being's

rea lm, insof ar as it is the realm of the with, that is, insofar as it is

t he mea su re o f t h is in c o mm en su ra b i l i t y .

The other is presented as the alter ego or as the other of the ego,

as the othe r outside of the self or as the other w it hi n the self, as

"others" or the "Oth er" ; al l these ways of loo ki ng at it , al l these as

pects, al l these faces, and al l of "those whom we cannot look in the

face" ["ces indévisageables"]—whose necessity is, in every case, in

conte stab le— alw ays br ing us back to the very heart of the matter,

to an alterity or alterat ion where the "self" is at stake. The other is

t h in k a bl e , a n d mu st be t ho u g ht , beg in n in g fro m t ha t mo men t

w h e n th e se lf ap pe ar s a n d ap pe ar s to it se lf as a "s el f. "

Ye t, th is id en ti fi c at io n of th e se lf as s u c h — i t s su bj ec ti vi za ti on in

the deepest an d richest ph ilo sop hi cal sense of the term , the one

that reaches its extreme l imit in Hegel—can only take place once

the subject finds its elf or poses itself orig inar ily as othe r than itself,

doi ng so in the infini te presu ppo sit io n of the self that constitutes

it as a subject and accor ding to the necessary law of such p resup

po si t io n . Th is wo u l d be a se l f t ha t i s o l d er a n d mo re o r ig i n a ry t ha n

itself, a self in itsel f that is other th an the self for itself. Th is is really

n o t mu c h mo re t ha n a t ra n sc r ip t io n o f H eg e l .

There fo re , t he se l f k n o ws i t se l f pr i n c ip a l l y a s o t her t h a n i t se l f :

such is the constit ut io n of "self-consciousness." An d yet , the logic

of this constitu t ion is paradox ical , since it involves simu ltane ously

the ope nin g of the self to the other and its closure. In fact, the al -




teri ty of the other is such th at to recogn ize it is to be den ied access

to it ; there can be access only on the co nd it i on of a radical alter

at ion or, m ore precisely, a radical al iena tion. A dialect ic of the same

and the other, of the same in the other, of the same as other, u n

does this aporia, b ut this und oi ng comes at a price, the price of the

dialect i c in general . It reveals that the power of the negative wh ic h

holds the self to the other, the dis-al i enati ng and reapp ropri at ive

powe r of al iena tion its elf as the al ien ation of the same, w il l always

be p re su p p os ed as th e p ow er of th e se lf, or th e S e lf as th is ve ry

power. T he Self remain s alone in itself even as it emerges out of it

self. What is properly lacking or passed over in this false emergence

is the moment of the with.

Op en to the other and occu rri ng as other, the self has its origi -

nari ty in the loss of self. Bi rt h an d death bec ome the m arks of a

p o i n t o f o r i g i n [provenance] a n d d est in a t io n wi t hin t he o t her : a n

o r ig in /d est in a t io n a s a l oss , a s t he memo ri a l mo u rn in g o f t he im

mem o ria l , a n d a s t he rec o n qu er in g o r rea ppro pr ia t io n o f a n in a p

pro pr ia t e a se i t y in a l l i t s i r red u c ibl e a l t er i t y . This o t her i s n o t

"with"; it is no longer and not yet "with"; it is nearer and further

away than every being-together. It does not accompany identity; it

crosses thr oug h it , and transgresses it ; it transfixes it . W i th i n the

discourse about alterity, a general mode of trans- (transport , trans

act ion, transcript ion, transfer, transmission, transformation, trans

parency, transubstantiat ion, transcendence) continually runs along

side the mode of cum-, but it wil l never be able to ecl ipse it or

replace it.

In a nd of itself transcendent, the subject is bo rn i nto its intimacy

(" in t er io r in t im o n eo ") , a n d i t s in t im a c y wa n d ers awa y fro m i t in

statu nascendi ("interfeces et urinam nascimur"). "To exist" is no

longer "to be" (for itself, in itself), to-already-no-longer-be and to-

n o t -yet -be , o r ev en t o -be- l a c k in g , t ha t i s , t o -bein -d ebt -t o -be in g .

To exist is a matter of goi ng into exile. Th e fact that the int im ate,

the absolutely proper, consists in the absolutely other is what alters

the origi n in itself, in a relat ion to itself that is "origin aril y plu nge d

i n t o m o u r n i n g . " 6 6 The o t her i s in a n o r ig in a ry re l a t io n t o d ea t h

and in a relat ion to originary death.

Being Singula r Plu ral 79

In this way, then, "solitude" appears. This is the Christ ian event,

w h i c h do es no t m e an th at it wa s no t p re pa re d fo r w e ll in ad va nc e,

or that it was not , in its own way, contemporary to our whole tra

dit ion . So litud e par excellence is solitude of the self insofar as it re

lates to itself, outsi de of itself in extremis a n d in principis, outside of

the worl d, exist ing existence. Consc iousness of self is solitude. Th e

other is this very solitude exposed as such: as a self-consciousness

t ha t i s in f in i t e l y wi t h d ra wn in i t sel f , in t o i t se l f —i n i t se l f a s in t o

itself.

A s s u c h , th e c o e x i s t e n t — th e ot h er p er so n, b u t al so th e ot h er

creature in general—appe ars as that wh ich is in itself infinite ly with

drawn. It appears inaccessible to "me" because it is withdrawn from

the "self" in general, and because it is as the self-outside-itself: it is

the other in general, the othe r that has its mom en t of ide ntit y in the

d iv in e O t her , w hic h i s a l so t he mo m en t o f t he id en t i t y o f ev ery

thin g, of the universal corpus mysticum. The Other is the place of

community as communion, t hat is, the place of a being-self -in-other

[être-soi-en-1'a utre] that would no longer be altered or where such al

t era tio n wo u l d be id en t i f i c a t io n . I n t h is wo r l d , t he myst ery o f c o m

mu ni on annou nces itself in the form of the nearby [pro c ha in e] .

Proximity is the correlate of intimacy: it is the "nearest," the "clos

est ," which is also to say "the most approximate" or "infinitely ap

proximate" to me, but it is not me because it is withdrawn in it

self, in to the self in general . T he p ro xi mi ty of the nearest is a

minute, int imate distance and, therefore, an infinite distance whose

resolution is in the Other. The nearest is that which is utterly re

moved, and this is why the relat ion to it presents itself (1) as an im

perative, (2) as the imper ative of a love, and (3) as a love that is

"l ik e the love of mys elf. " 67 Th e love of self, here, is not eg oism in

the sense of pref erring onese lf over others (whi ch wo ul d contrad ict

the comm and me nt) ; it is an egoism in the sense of pri vileg ing one

self, one's own-self [le soi-propre], a s a mo d el , t he imit a t io n o f whi c h

w o u l d p ro vi d e th e lo ve of ot he rs . It is ne ce ss ar y to lo ve one 's o w n -

self in the other, bu t reciprocally , one's own-s elf in m e is the other

of the ego. It is its hidd en int i macy .

Th is is wh y it is a matter of "love": this love is n ot some possible



8o Being Singular Plural

mo de of relat ion; it designates rela tion itse lf at the heart of Be

i n g — i n l ieu of and in th e p lace of Be in g 6 8 —and designates this

relati on, of one to another, as the inf inite relation of the same to

the same as ori gin ari ly other than itself. " Lo ve " is the abyss of the

self in itself; it is the "delec tation " ["dil ection"] or "ta kin g care" of

wh at or ig i na r il y esc ape s or is l ac ki n g ; it co ns is ts in ta k in g car e of

this retreat and in this retreat. As a result, this love is "charity": it is

the consideration of the caritas, of the cost or the extreme, absolute,

an d, therefor e, ine stim able value of the other as other, that is, the

other as the self-with drawn- in-itself . Th is love speaks of the inf i

nite cost of what is inf ini tely wit hdr awn : the inc omm ensu rabi lity

of the other. As a result , the com ma nd me nt of this love lays out

this incommensurability for what it is : access to the inaccessible.

Ye t, it is no t su ff ic ie nt to di sc re di t su ch lo ve as be lo ng in g to so m e

intemperate idealism or religious hypocrisy. Rather, it is a matter

of decons truct ing th e Ch ri s t ianity a nd s ent imental i ty of an imper

ative the open ly excessive and clea rly exorbit ant character of wh ic h

must be read as a warning to us; I would even go so far as to say

that it just is a wa rni ng to us. It is a matter of wo nde rin g about the

"me anin g" (or "desire") of a th ink ing or cul ture that gives itself a

found ation the very expression of whi ch denotes impossibility, and

of won de rin g how and t o what extent the "madness" of this love

cou ld expos e the inco mme ns ura b i l i ty of th e very cons t i tut ion of

the "self" an d the "other," of the "self" in the "oth er."

W i t h re ga rd to th is co ns ti tu ti on , th en , a nd at the he ar t of J ud eo -

Chr isti ani ty and its exact opposite, it wou ld be a matter of under

stand ing how the dime nsio n of the with both appears and disap

pears all at once. On the one hand , the prox im it y of what is nearby

[prochain] point s to the "nearby" [ Taup rès" ] of the "wi th" (the

apud hoc of its etymolo gy). On e cou ld even add that it encircles

this "nearby" and makes it stand out on its own, as a contiguity

and sim ultane ity of being-near-to as such, w itho ut any further de

termination. That is , what is "nearby" is no longer the "nearness"

of the family or the tribe, whic h may be what the primar y mean ing

of the B i b l i c a l prec ept refers to; it is not the nearn ess of the people

or the philia, or the brotherhood; it is what underlies every logic of

Being Singular Plural 8]

the group or ensemble, every logic of co mm un it y that is based on

nature, b lood, s ource, pr incip le , and or ig in . 6 9 The measure of such

"nearness" is no longer given, and the "nearby," the "very near" is

exhibited as stripped bare, without measure. As such, everyday

m i l l i n g a r o u n d [le côtoiement] , the crowd, the mass all become pos

s ib le— rig h t up unt i l th e p i l i ng- up of b odies in th e anony mous

mass grave or the pulve rizati on of collective ashes. Th e prox im ity

of what is nearby, as pure dis-tance, as pure dis-po sition , can con

tract and expand this dis-position to its extreme limit, both at the

same time. In universal being-with-one-another, the in of the in-

common is made purely extensive and distributive.

On the othe r ha nd , this is why the "ne arby" of the with, the si

multa neity of distance and close contact, the most proper consti

tuti on of the cum-, exposes itself as inde term inan tness an d as a

problem. According to this logic, there is no measure that is proper

to the with, and the other holds it there, wit hi n the dialectic o f the

incommens urab le and common int imacy , or w ith in an a l ternat ive

to it. In an extreme paradox, the other turns out to be the other of

the with.

As a re su lt , the re are tw o di ff er en t me as ur es of th e i n c o m m e n

surable to be foun d wi th in the very depths of our tra dit ion , two

measures that are superimposed, intertwined, and contrasted. One

is calibrated according to the Other; the other is calibrated accord

ing to the with. Because the intimate and the proximate, the same

and the other, refer to one another, they designate a "not being

w i th " a n d , in th is wa y, a "n ot be i ng in so ci et y. " T h e y de si gn at e an

Oth er of the social where the socia l itself— th e c o m m o n a s Being

or as a common subject —would be in itself, by itself, and for itself:

it wou ld be the very sameness of the other and sameness as Ot her .

In contrast, being-with designates the other that never comes back

to the same, the pl ural ity of origins. T he just measure of the with

or, more exactly, the with or being-with as just measure, as justness

and justice, is the measure of dis-p osition as such: the measure of

the distance from one origin to another.



Being Singular Plural 8 38 2 Being Singular Plural

In his analyt ic of Mitsein, Heidegger does not do this measure

ju st ic e. On th e on e h a n d , h e de al s w i t h th e in di ff er en ce of a n " u n

ci rcumspective ta rryin g alongside" and , on the other, an "authentic

u n d erst a n d in g o f o t hers" 70 —t he status of wh ich re mains indeter

minate as long as what is in question is anything other than the

negative unders tanding of the i nappr opria bil ity of the death of oth

ers or the codestinati on of a people. Between this indifference an d

this understan ding, the theme of existential "distan tial ity" 71 i m m e

d ia t e l y rev er t s ba c k t o c o mpet i t io n a n d d o min a t io n , in o rd er t o

o pen o n t o t he in d ist in c t d o m in a t io n o f t he "on e" ["Das Man"].The "one" is produced as nothing other than that conversion which

levels out the general attempt by everyone to outdistance everyone

else, wh ich ends in the dom ina tio n of medioc rity, of the co mm on

and average measure, common as average. It ends with the "com

mo n -med io c re" c o n c ea l in g t he essen t ia l "c o mmo n -wit h ." B u t , a s

such, it remains to be said just how being-with is essential , seeing

as it codet erm ines the essence of existence.

H eid eg g er h imsel f wr i t es tha t : . . . a s B e in g -wit h , Da se in " is" es

sentially for the sake of [umwillen] O t hers . . . . I n be in g - wit h , a s

the existe ntial "for -the- sake- of " of Oth ers , these have already been

disclosed [erschlossen] in their Dasein." 72 T he with, therefore, des

ignates being-with-regard-to-one-another, such that each one is

"d isc l o sed " ["o u v ert "] 73 then and there, that is, constituted as ex

ist in g : be in g t he there, that is, the disclosure of Bei ng, b eing an

"each t im e" of this disclosur e, in suc h a way that no disclosure

w o u l d ta ke pl ac e (n o Be in g ) if th e on e "d is cl os ed " d i d no t di sc lo se

itself wi th regard to an other "d isclosed. " Di sclosu re itself consists

only in the coincidence of disclosures. To-be-the-there is not to dis

close a place to Being as Other: it is to disclose/be disclosed to/

throu gh the plu ralit y of singular disclosures.

Since it is neither "love," nor even "relation" in general, nor the

juxta-position of in-differences, the "with" is the proper realm of the

plurality of origins insofar as they originate, not from one another or

for one another, but in view of one another or with regard to one an

other. A n orig in is not an orig in for itself; nor is it an ori gin i n order

to retain itself in itself (that wo ul d be the origi n of noth ing) ; nor

is it an origin in order to hover over some derivative succession in

w h i c h its b e in g a s o r i g i n w o u l d be lo st . A n or i g i n i s s o m e t h i n g

other than a start ing point; it is both a principle and an appearing;

as such , it repeats itself at each mo me nt of wha t it origi nates . It is

"c o n t in u a l c rea t io n ."

If the wor ld does not "have" a n ori gin "outside of itself," i f the

w o r l d is its o w n o r i g i n or th e or i g i n "i ts el f, " th en th e o ri g i n of th e

w o r l d oc cu rs at ea ch m o m e n t o f th e w o r l d . It is th e each time o f

Being, and its realm is the being-with of each t i me w it h every

[other] t ime. Th e origin is for and by way of the singular plura l ofevery possible origin. T he " wit h" is the measure of an origin-of -the-

w o r l d as such, o r even o f a n o r ig in -o f-m ea n in g a s su c h. To -be -wit h

is t o ma k e sen se mu t u a l l y , a n d o n l y mu t u a l l y . Mea n in g i s t he

fu l lest mea su re o f t he in c o mmen su r a bl e " wi t h ." The "w i t h" i s t he

fullest measure of (the) i ncom men sura ble mea nin g (of Bein g).

Body, Language

Th e plur ality of origins essential ly disseminates the Ori gi n of the

w o r l d . T h e w o r l d sp ri ng s f o r t h 7 4 everywhere and in each instant,

simultaneously. This is how it comes to appear out of nothing a n d

"is created." From now on, however, this being created must be un

derstood diffe rently: it is not an effect of some par t icular opera tion

of pr odu cti on; ins tead, it is, insofar as it is, as created, as hav ing

arisen, come, or grown (cresco, creo); it has always already sprungfro m all sides, or more exact ly, it is itself the sprin gin g forth an d

the com ing of the "always already" and the "everywhere." As su ch,

each being belongs to the (authentic) origin, each is originary (the

spr ingi ng forth of the spr ingi ng forth itself), an d each is original

(incom para ble, underiva ble). Nevertheless, al l of them share orig i-

nariry and originality; this sharing is itself the origin.

W h a t is sh ar ed is n o th i n g li ke a u ni q ue su bs ta nc e in w h i c h ea ch

b ei ng w o u l d pa rt ic ip at e; w h at is sh ar ed is al so w ha t sha re s, w h at is

structurally constituted by sharing, and what we cal l "matter." The

ontolo gy of bein g-wi th can only be "mater ial ist ," in the sense that

"matter" does not designate a substance or a subject (or an antisub-




je ct ), bu t li te ra ll y de sig na te s wh at is d iv id e d of its elf , wh at is on ly as

distinc t from itself , partes extra partes, origina ri ly impene trable to the

com b in ing and s ub l ima t ing penetrat ion of a " s p ir i t " [ or " mi nd" ] ,

understood as a dimensionless, indivisible point beyond the world.

The ontol ogy of being- with is an o ntolog y of bodies, o f every body,

wh et he r th ey be in an im at e, an im at e, se nt ie nt , sp ea ki ng , t h i n k i n g ,

having weight, and so on. Above all else, "body" really means what

is outside, insofar as it is outside, next to, against, nearby, with a(n)(other) body, from body to body, in the dis-position. Not only does

a body go from one "self" to an "other," it is as itself 'from the very

first; it goes fro m itself to itself; whether mad e of stone, wo od , plas

tic, or flesh , a body is the sharin g of and the dep arture fr om self, the

departure to ward self, the near by-to-self wit hou t which the "self"

w o u l d no t ev en be "o n its o w n " ["à pa rt soi "] P

Language is the incorporeal (as the Stoics said). Either as an au

dible voice or a visible mark, saying is corporeal, but what is said

is incorporeal; it is everything that is incorporeal about the world.

Language is not in the world or inside the world, as though the

w o r l d we re its bo dy : it is the ou ts id e of th e w o r l d in th e w o r l d . It is

the whole of the outside of the world ; i t is not the eru ption of an

Oth er , w h ich w ould c lear aw ay or s ub l imate th e w orld, w h ich

w o u l d tr an sc ri be it i nt o so m e th in g else ; in st ea d, it is the e xp os it io n

of the world-of-bodies as such, that is , as originarily s ingular plural.The incorporeal exposes bodies according to their being-with-one-

another; they are neither isolated nor mixed together. They are

amongst themselves [entre eux], as origins. The relation of singular

origins among themselves, then, is the relation of meaning. ( T h at

relation in which one unique Origin would be related to everything

else as havin g been origin ated wo ul d be a relati on of saturated

meaning: not really a relation, then, but a pure consistency; not re

ally a meaning, but its sealing off, the annulment o f meaning and

the end of the orig in.)

Lang uage is the exposi ng of plu ral singu larity. In it, the all of be

ing is exposed as its meaning, which is to say, as the originary shar

ing according to which a being relates to a being, the circulation of

a mean ing of the wo rl d that has no beg inni ng or end. Thi s is the


me ani ng of the wo rld as be ing -wit h, the simulta neity of all pres

ences that are wi th reg ard to one another, where no one is for one

self wi tho ut bei ng for others. Th is is also why the essential dialogue

or polylogu e of language is bo th the one in wh ic h we speak to one

another and, identically, the one in which I speak to "myself," being

an entire "society" onto myself—being, in fact, in and as language,

always simultaneously "us" and "me" and "me" as "us," as well as "us"

as "me" F or I wo ul d say not hin g about mysel f if I were not wi thmy s el f a s I am wi th nu merous others, if this with were not "i n" me ,

right at me, at the same time as "me," and, more precisely, as the

at-the-same-time according to which, solely, I am.

At th is ex ac t p o in t, th en , on e be co me s mo st aw are of the esse nce

of s ingular ity: it is not indiv idu ali ty; it is, each time, the pu nct u

ality of a "wi th" that establishes a certain ori gin of me ani ng and

connects it to an in f ini ty of other possible origins. Therefore, it is ,

at one and th e s ame t ime, in f ra- / intraindiv idual and t rans indiv id-

ual, and always the two together. The individual is an intersection

of singularities, the discrete exposition of their s imultaneity, an ex

position that is both discrete and transitory.

This is why there is no ultimate language, but instead languages,

w or ds , vo ic es , a n or i g i n a r i ly si ng u la r sh ar in g of vo ic es w i t h o u t

w h i c h the re w o u l d be no vo ic e. In the in co rp or ea l ex po si ti on of l a n

guages, all beings pass through humanity.76

But this exposition exposes hum ani ty itself to what is outside the huma n, to the mea n

ing of the wor ld, to the meani ng of Bei ng as the being-m eani ng of

the wo rld . Wi th in language, " hum ani ty" is not the subject of the

w o r l d ; it do es no t re pr es en t the w o r l d ; it is no t its or i g in or e nd . It

is not its meaning; it does not give it meaning. It is the exponent,

bu t wh at it th us ex po ses is no t its el f, is no t "h u m a n i t y" ; ra the r, it

exposes the world and its proper being-with-all-beings in the world,

exposes it as the world. Moreover, this is why it is also what is ex

posed by meaning; exposed as "gifted" with language, humanity is ,

above all, essentially ex-posed in its Being. It is ex-posed to and as

this inco rpore al outsid e of the wor ld that is at the heart of the

w o r l d , th at w h i c h ma ke s the w o r l d " h o l d " or "c on si st " in its p ro pe r

singular plurality.



86 Being Singula r Plural Being Singular Plural 8 7

It is not enough to say that the "rose grows without reason." For

if the rose were alone, its grow th wit hou t reason wo ul d enclose

w i t h i n it se lf , by it se lf , a ll th e re as on of th e w o r l d . B u t th e ro se

grows without reason because it grows along with the reseda, the

eglantine, and the thist le—as well as with crystals, seahorses, hu

ma n s, a n d t he ir in v en t io n s. A n d t he who l e o f be in g , n a t u re , a n d

histor y do not constitute an ensemb le the totality of wh ich w ou ld

or wou ld not be wi tho ut reason. Th e whole of bein g is its own rea

son; it has no other reason, whi ch does not m ean that it itself is itsown principle and end, exact ly because it is not "itself." It wits own

d is-p o si t io n in t he pl u ra l i t y o f s in g u l a r i t ies . Thi s Being ex-poses

itself, then, as the between and the with of singular s. Being between,

an d with say the same thing; they say exactly what can only be said

(whic h i s c a l l ed t he " in ef fa bl e" e l sewhere) , wha t c a n n o t be pre

sented as a being among [parmi] others, since it is the "among" of

al l beings {among: inside, in the middle of, with), which are each

and every t ime among one another. Being says noth in g else; as a re

sult , i f saying always says Be ing in on e way or another, then Be ing

is exposed onl y in the incorpore ality of the saying.

This does not signify that Being "is only a word," but rather that

Being is al l that is and al l that goes into making a word: being-with

in every regard. For a word is what it is only among al l words, and

a spok en word is what it is only in the "wit h" of al l speakin g. La n

g u a g e i s essen t ia l l y in t he wi t h . Ev ery spo k en wo rd i s t he s imu l taneity of at least two diff erent mo des of that spoke n wo rd; even

w h e n I am by m ys el f, th er e is th e on e th at is sa id an d" t he on e th at

is heard, that is, the one that is resaid. As soon as a word is spoken,

it is resaid. As such, meaning does not consist in the transmission

from a speaker to a receiver, but in the simultaneity of (at least) two

origins of mea ning : that of the saying a nd that of its resaying.

As far as m e a n i n g is c on ce rn e d, w h at I say is no t s i m p ly "s ai d, "

for meaning must return to me resaid in order to be said. But in

returning to me in this way, that is, from the other, what comes

b ac k al so be co m es an ot he r or ig i n of m e a n in g . M e a n i n g is th e pa ss

in g ba c k a n d fo r t h [passage] and shar ing of the orig in at the orig in,

s in g u l a r pl u ra l . Me a n i n g i s t he ex hibi t io n o f t he fo u n d a t io n wi t h

out foundation, which is not an abyss but simply the with of things

that are, insofar as they are. Logos is dialogue, but the end [or pur

pose] of dialog ue is not to ove rcom e itself in "consensus"; its rea

son is to offer, and only to offer (giving it tone and intensity), the

cum-, th e with o f mea n in g , t he pl u ra l i t y o f it s spr in g in g fo r t h .

It is not enough, then, to set idle chatter in opposit ion to the au

t hen t ic i t y o f t he spo k en wo rd , u n d erst o o d a s b e in g repl e t e wi t h

meaning. On the contrary, it is necessary to discern the conversa

t ion (a nd sustaining) of bei ng- wit h as such wit hi n chatter: it is in"conve rsing, " in the sense of discus sion, that bei ng- with "sustains

itself," in the sense of the perseverance in Bein g. Spe akin g-w ith ex

poses the conatus of being-with, or better, it exposes being-with as

conatus, exposes it as the effort and desire to m ain tai n onese lf as

"wit h" a n d , a s a c o n sequ en c e , t o ma in t a in so met hin g whic h, in i t

self, is not a stable and permanent substance, but rather a sharing

and a crossing through . In this conversation (a nd sustaining) of be

in g -wit h , o n e mu st d isc ern ho w l a n g u a g e , a t ea c h mo men t , wi t h

ea c h s ig n i f i c a t io n , f ro m t he h ig hest t o t he l o west —rig ht d o wn t o

t ho se "pha n t ic , " in s ig n i f ic a n t rema rk s ("he l l o , " "h i , " "g o o d " . . . )

w h i c h o n l y su st ai n th e co nv er sa ti on i ts el f — e x p os e s th e w i t h , ex

poses itself as the with , inscribes an d ex-scribes i tself in the wit h un

t il it is exhausted, emp tied of signi ficat i on.

"E mp t ie d o f s ig n i f i c a t io n ": t ha t i s, re t u rn in g a l l s ig n i f i c a t io n t o

the circulat io n of mea ning , into the carrying over [transport] that isnot a "transla t ion" in the sense of the conservati on of one sig nifi

c a t io n (h o wev er mo d i f ied ) , bu t " t ra n s- l a t io n " in t he sen se o f a

st ret c hin g o r sprea d in g o u t [tension] f r o m o n e o r i g i n - o f - m e a n i n g

t o a n o ther . This i s w hy t h is a l ways im min en t ex ha u st io n o f s ig n i f i

c a t io n —a l wa ys immin en t a n d a l wa ys imma n en t t o mea n in g i t se l f ,

its tru th— goe s in two direct ions: that of co mm on chatter and that

o f a bso l u t e po et ic d ist in c t io n . I t i s ex ha u st ed t hro u g h t he in ex

haustibl e excha ngeabi l ity of "ph antic " insignific ance, or exhausted

b y th e p ur e " a p o p h a n ti c " si gn if ic an ce , d e cl a ra ti on , or m an i fe st a

t ion ("apophansis") of this very thing as an unexchange able spoken

w o r d , un al te ra bl e as th is ve ry th i n g , b ut th er e as th e t h i n g as such.

From one to the other, it is the same conatus: t he "wi t h" a c c o rd in g




to which we expose ourselves to one another, as "ones" and as " o t h

ers ," expos ing the w or ld as w o r l d .

Langu age constitu tes itself and articulates itself fro m out of the

"as." No matte r what is said , to say is to present the "as" of wha t

ever is said. F ro m the poin t of view of s igni f icati on, it is to present

one thing as another thing (for example, its essence, principle, ori

gin, or its end, its value, its s ignif ication), but from the point of

vi e w of m e a n i n g a n d t r uth ; it is to present the "as" as such. T h a t is,

it is to present the exterior ity of the thin g, its being-be fore, its be-

ing- w ith - al l - th ings ( and not i t s b eing- w ith in or b eing- els ew h ere) .Mallarmé 's phrase "I say a f lower' . . . " expresses [the fact] that

the word says "the f lower" as "f lower" and as nothing else, a

"flower" that is "absent from all bouquets" only because its "as" is

also the presence as such of every f lower in every bouq uet. G ior gi o

A g a m b e n wr it e s, " T h e t h i n k i n g th at tr ie s to gr as p be in g as beings

retreats toward the entity without adding to it any further deter

minat ion . . . compreh ending i t in i t s b eing- s uch , in th e mids t of

its as, it grasps its pure non-latency, its pure exteriority. It no longer

says some thing as some thing but brings to speech this as itself." 7

Every spoken word brings to speech this "as itself ," that is , the mu

tual expo sitio n and dispos itio n of the singula rities of the wo rl d (of

a w or ld of s ingular i t ies , of s ingular w orlds , of w orld- s ingular i t ies ) .

Language is the element of the with as such: it is the space of its de

claration. In turn, this declaration as such refers to everyone and to

no one, refers to the world and to its coexistence.

A l t h o u g h he wa s c er ta in ly no t th e fi r st to do so , L a Br uy èr e p u t

i t in th e f o l low ing w ay : " E very th ing is s a id, and one comes to i t

too late . . . . " Certain ly , eve ry th ing is s a id, f or every th ing h as a l

wa ys al re ad y be en sa id ; ye t, ev e ry th in g re m ai ns to be sa id , fo r th e

w h o le as su ch is al wa ys to be sa id an ew . D e a t h pr es en ts th e in te r

ru pti on of a saying of the whole a nd of a totali ty of saying: it pre

sents the fact that the saying-of-everything is at each time an

"everything is said," a discrete and transitory completeness. This is

w h y d e a th do es no t ta ke pl ac e "f or th e su bj e ct ," b u t o n l y fo r it s


representation. But this is also why "my death" is not swallowed up

w i t h "m e " in p ur e di sa pp ea ra nc e. As H e id e g g e r say s, in so fa r a s it

is the utm ost possi bili ty of existence, it exposes existence as such.

Death takes place essentially as language; reciprocally, language al

wa ys says d e at h: it al wa ys say s th e i n te r r u p ti o n of m e a n i n g as it s

truth. Death as such, [ l ike] birth as such, takes place as language: it

takes p lace in and th rough b eing- w ith - one- anoth er . D eath is th e

ve ry si gn at ur e of th e " w i t h " : th e de ad are th os e w h o are no lo ng er

"with" and are, at the same time, those who take their places ac

cord ing to a n exact meas ure, th e appropriate meas ure, of th e in

commens urab le " w ith ." D eath is th e " as " w ith out qual i ty , w ith out

complement: it is the incorporeal as such and, therefore, the expo

sition of the body. On e is born; one d ie s— no t as this one or that

one, but as an absolute "as suc h," that is , as an orig in of me ani ng

that is both absolute and, as is necessary, absolutely cut off (and

cons equent ly , immortal ) .

It follows that one is never born alone, and one never dies alone;

or rather, it follows that the solitude of bir th/d eat h, this solitu de

w h i c h is no lo ng e r ev en so li tu d e, is th e ex ac t re ve rse of its sh a ri n g .

If it is true, a s Heid egg er says, that I ca nnot die in place of the

other, then it is also true, and true in the same way, that the other

dies insofar as the other is with me and that we are born and die

to one another, exposing ourselves to one another and, each time,

exposin g the inexposable singularity of the origin . We say in Fr ench

" mou rir à" [ " dead to" ] — to th e w or ld, to l i f e— as w el l as " naî tre à"

["born to"] . Death is to l i f e , w h ich is s ometh ing oth er th an b eing

the negativity through which life would pass in order to be resus

citated. To put it very precisely: death as fertile negativity is that of

a s ingle s ub ject ( e i th er indiv idual or generic) . D eath to l ife, ex

p o s i t i o n as such (the expos ed as expos ed = th at w h ich turns to-

w a rd th e w o r l d , in th e w o r l d , the ve ry nihil of its creation) can o nl y

be b e i n g -w i th , si n gu la r p lu r a l.

In this sense, language is exactly what Bataille calls "the practice

of joy before deat h." La nguag e is not a diversi on, no t an arrange

men t with the intole rabi lity of death. In one sense, it is the tragic

itself . But it is joy as the destitution of mea ning , whi ch lays bare the



9 0 Being Singula r Plural Being Singula r Plural 9 i

origin: the singular plural as such. It is the with a s su c h, whic h i s

a l so t o sa y t he be in g -su c h a s su c h: per fec t l y a n d s impl y—a n d im

mo rta lly —e qu al to itself and to every other, equal to itself because

a n d as i t is equal to every other; it is, therefore, essential ly with

every other equally. As is often said, this is a "common fate": we

have nothing in common except our tel l ing ourselves so (and I have

noth ing in com mo n with m yself except in tel l ing myself so); we ex

change, and we do not exchange; we un-exchange [in-échangons]

this extreme l imit of the saying in every spoken word, as speaking

itself. Language exposes death: it neither denies it nor affirms it; it

br in gs it to la ng ua ge , a n d de at h is n o th i n g b ut th at , th at w h i c h is

essen t ia l l y bro u g ht t o l a n g u a g e—a n d t ha t whic h br in g s i t t here .

"Death speaks in me. My speech is a warning that at this very

moment death is loose in the world, that it has suddenly appeared

be tw ee n m e, as I sp ea k, a n d th e b ei n g I ad dr es s: it is th er e be tw ee n

us at the distance that separates us, but this distance is also what

prevents us from being separated, because it contains the condit ion

f o r a l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " 7 8 As su c h, t hen , " l i t era t u re" i s l a n g u a g e

stretched out [en tension] toward birth and death, exact ly because it

is, and insofar as i t is, striving toward address, understanding [en

tente], and c o n v ersa t ion . A n d it is stretched l ike this since it occurs

as recitat ion , discourse, or sing ing. ( Ea ch of these, in turn , forms

the dis-p osit io n of language itself, language's exteriority to/i n itself;

each form s language's shar ing, not only the shar ing of languages,

bu t th at of v oi ce s, ge nr es , or to ne s; it is a m u l ti p l e sh ar in g w i th o u t

w h i c h th er e w o u l d b e no "as " in ge ne ra l. ) " L it e r at u r e " m ea ns th e

b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n of w h at has n o c o m m o n o r i g i n , b ut is or ig in ar -

i l y i n - c o m m o n o r w i t h .

If, as Heidegger says, this is why the relat ion to one's own death

consists in "taking over from [one]self [one's] ownmost Being," this

t a k in g o v er d o es n o t impl y , c o n t ra ry t o wha t H eid eg g er h imsel f

sa ys , t ha t "a l l B e in g -wit h O t hers , wi l l fa i l u s when o u r o wn mo st

po t en t ia l i t y- fo r-B ein g i s t he i ssu e ." 79 I f be in g -w it h i s in d eed c o -

essential to Being tout court, or rather is to Being itself, this own-

most poss ibil ity is coessential ly a possib il ity of the wit h and as the

w i t h . M y de at h i s on e " o w n m o s t" co - p os si b il it y of th e ot he r ex is -

fences' own possibil ity. It is, or it "wil l be," my death that says "he

is dead" in their speaking; in this way, my death is not , it wil l not

be , an yw he re els e. It is " m y " p os si b il it y in so fa r as it w it h d r a w s th e

po ssi bi l i t y o f t he "min e " in t o i t sel f : that is to say, insofar as this

"min eness" is retu rned to the singu lar plura l of the always- other-

mineness. In "he is d ea d ," i t i s in d eed B ein g t ha t i s in qu est io n —

a n d a s be in g -wit h .

"Death," therefore, is not negativity, and language does not

know or pract ice negativity (or logic). Negativity is the operation

that wants to depose Being in order to make it be: the sacrifice, the

absent object of desire, the ecl ipse of consciousness, a l i en at io n—

and, as a result , it is never death or birth, but only the assumption

o f a n in f in i t e su pp o si t io n . As su c h, t hen , B e i n g i s in f in i t e l y pre

supposed by itself, and its process is the reapprop riat ion of this pre

supp osit ion , always on this side of itself and always b eyon d itself; it

is negativity at work. But things work out completely differently if

B e in g i s s in g u l a r pl u ra l d is-po si t io n . The d ist a n c in g o f d ispo si t io n

is nothing; this " noth ing ," however, is not the negative of anyth ing.

I t i s t he in c o rpo rea l by whic h, a c c o rd in g t o whic h, bo d ies a re wi t h

one another, c lose to one another, side by side, in contact and

(therefore) distanced from one another. This nothing is the res ipsa,

the thing itself: the thing as being-itself, that is, the being-such of

every being, the mu tua l expos it ion of beings that exist onl y in an d

t hro u g h t h is ex po si t io n . Such is a demonstrat ive; being-such is the

demo nstrat ive essence of Bei ng, the being wh o shows itself to an

other bein g and in the mid st of beings.

Mor eove r, wh ether they are aware of it or not , al l the different

wa ys of t h i n k i n g ne ga ti vi ty le ad to th e sa me p o i n t (t he y at le as t

pass thro ug h it, even if they refuse to stop there ). It is that po in t

w h er e th e ne ga ti ve it se lf , in or de r to be th e ne ga ti ve (i n or d er to

be the nihil negativum and not just the nihil privatum) must avoid

its own operation and be affirmed in itself, with no remainder; or

else, on the contrary, it must be affirmed as the absolute remain

der that cannot be captured in a conca tenation of procedu re or op

eration. (It is the crit ical , suspended, inoperative point at the heart

of the dialect ic). Sel f-presu pposit ion interrup ts itself; there is a syn-




copation in the process and in its thinking, a syncopation and in

st a n t c o n v ers io n o f su ppo si t io n in t o d is-po si t io n . Dis- po si t io n i s

the same thing as supposit ion: in one sense, it is absolute an

tecedence, where the "with" is always already given; in another

sense, it does not "underlie" or preexist the different positions; it is

their simultaneity.

Th e non-Be ing of Bein g, its mea ning , is its dis-p osit ion. The ni

hil negativum is the quidpositivum as singular plural , where no

quid, no being, is posed without with. It is without (at a distance)

precisely to the extent that it is with,

i t is shown and demonstrated

in bein g-w ith, [whi ch is] the evidence of existence.

In addit ion, evil is only ever [found] in an operation that fulfi l ls

th e with. One can fulfi l l the with either by fi l l ing it up or by emp

tyi ng it out; it can be given a foun dati on of plen itude and co nti

nu ity or an abyss of intra nsit ivity . In the first case, the sing ular be

comes a part icular within a totality, where it is no longer either

singular or plural; in the second case, the singular exists only on its

own and, therefore, as a totality—and there too it is neither singu

lar nor plural . In either case, murder is on the horizon, that is,

death as the operative negativity of the One , death as the work of

the One-All or the One-Me. This is exact ly why death is [actually]

the opposite of mur der: it is the inopera tive, but exist ing , "w ith "

(such that murder inevitably lacks death).

The "wi t h" i s n e i t her a fo u n d a t io n n o r i s i t wi t ho u t fo u n d a t io n .

It is nothing except for being-with, the incorporeal with of the be

i n g - b o d y as such. Before being spoken, before being a part icular

language or significat ion, before being verbal , "language" is the fol

low ing: the extension and simultane ity of the "wit h" insofar as it is

the ownmostpower of a body, the propriety of its touching another

b o d y (o r of to u c h i n g itself), whic h i s n o t hin g o t her t ha n i t s d e

finition as body. It finishe s itsel f there, wher e it is- wi th; that is, it

comes to a stop an d accomp lishes itself in a single gesture.

In this sense, "to speak with" is not so much speaking to oneself

or to one another, nor is it "saying" (declaring, naming), nor is it

pro f fer in g (br in g in g fo r t h mea n in g o r br in g in g mea n in g t o l ig ht ) .

Rather, "to speak with" is the conversation (and sustaining) and


conatus of a being-exposed, which exposes only the secret of its own

exposit ion. Saying "to speak with" is l ike saying "to sleep with," "to

g o o u t wi t h" (co-ire), or "to l ive with": it is a (eu)phemism for (not)

saying nothing less than what "wanting to say" means [le "v o u l o ir -

d ire" veut dire] in many different ways; that is to say, it says B e in g

i t se l f as c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d t h i n k i n g : t he co-agitatio o f B e in g .

"L a n g u a g e" i s n o t a n in st ru men t o f c o mm u n ic a t io n , a n d c o m mu

n ic a t io n i s n o t a n in st ru me n t o f B e in g ; c o m mu n ic a t io n is B e in g ,

a n d B e i n g is, as a consequence, nothing but the incorporeal by

whi ch bodi es express themselv es t o one anot her as such.

Coexistential Analytic

The existential analytic of Being and Time is the project from

w h i c h al l su bs eq ue nt t h i n k i n g fo ll ow s, w he th er th is is He id eg ge r' s

ow n latter thi nk ing or our various ways of thi nk ing against or be

y o n d H ei de gg er hi m se lf . T h i s a f f ir m a ti on 80 is in no way an admis

sion of "Heid egge riani sm"; it comple tely escapes the impove rishe d

proclamations of "schools." It does not signify that this analyt ic is

definit ive, only that it is responsible for registering the seismic

tremor of a more decisive ruptur e in the constitut ion or considera

tion of me ani ng (analogous, for exam ple, to those of the "cogito" or

"Cr i t iqu e") . This i s why t he ex ist en t ia l a n a l yt ic i s n o t c o mpl et e ,

and why we continue to feel its shock waves.

The analyt ic of Mitsein that appears within the existential ana

lyt ic remains nothing more than a sketch; that is, even though Mit

sein is coessential wi th Dasein, i t remains in a subordinate posit ion.

As su ch , th e w h ol e ex is te nt ia l an al yt ic st il l ha rb or s so me p ri n ci p l e

by w h i c h w h a t it op en s up is im m e d i a te ly cl os ed off . It is ne ce s

sary, then, to forcibly reopen a passage somewhere beyond that ob

structi on whic h decided the terms of being-with's fulfi l lme nt, and

i t s wi t hd ra wa l , by repl a c in g i t wi t h t he "peo pl e" a n d t he ir "d es

t iny. " Thi s is not a matter of saying that it is necessary "to com

plete" the merely sketched-out analysis of Mitsein, nor is it a matter

of setting up Mitsein as a "principle" l ike it deserves. "In principle,"

b e i n g - w it h es cap es c o m p l e ti o n a n d al wa ys ev ad es o c c u p y i n g th e



T

9 4 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 95

place of a prin cip le. W ha t is necessary is that we retrace the out

l ine of its analysis and p ush it to the poi nt where it becomes ap

parent that the coessential ity of bei ng- with is not hin g less than a

ma t t er o f t he c o -o r ig in a r i t y o f me a n in g — a n d t ha t t he "mea n in g

of Bei ng" is onl y what it is (either "meani ng" or, prim arily , its ow n

"prec o m prehen sio n " a s t he c o n st i t u t io n o f ex isten c e) when i t i s

given as with.

Ther e is no "m eani ng" except by virtue of a "self," of some fo rm

or another. ( The subject ive formu la of the ideality of meani ng says

that "meaning" takes place for and through a "self") But there is

no "self" except by virtue of a "wi th, " whi ch , in fact , structures it .

Th is wo uld have to be the axiom of any analyt ic that is to be cal led

coexistential .

"Se lf" is not the relat ion of a "me" to "it self. " 81 "Self" is more

o r ig in a ry t ha n "me" a n d "yo u ." "Se l f" i s pr ima r i l y n o t hin g o t her

than the "as such " of Be in g in general. Bei ng is only its own "as Be

ing ." Th e "as" does not happen to Be ing; it does not add itself to

Being; it does not intensify Being: it is Being, constitut ively. There

fore, Being is d i rec t l y a nd immed ia t e l y med ia t ed by itself; it is it

se l f med i a t io n ; i t i s med i a t io n wi t h o u t a n y in st ru m en t , a n d i t i s

n o n d ia l ec t ic : d ia - l ec t ic wi t ho u t d ia l ec t ic . I t i s n eg a t iv i t y wi t ho u t

use, the nothing of the with and the nothing a s t he wi t h . Th e wi t h

as wi th is not hin g but the exposit ion of Being-as-s uch, each t im e

singularly such and, therefore, always plurally such.

Prior to "me" and "you," the "self" is like a "we" that is neither a

collect ive subject nor "intersubject ivity," but rather the immediate

med iati on of Bei ng in "(it)self," the plura l fold of the origin.

(Is medi at ion itself the "with"? Certa inly, it is. Th e "wit h" is the

per muta tion of what rem ains in its place, each one and each t im e.

The "wit h" i s t he permu t a t io n wi t ho u t a n O t her . An O t her i s a l

wa ys th e M e di a to r ; its pr ot ot yp e is C h r i s t. H e r e , on the co nt ra ry , it

is a matter of med iat i on with out a mediator, tha t is, with out the

"powe r of the negative" and its rema rkable pow er to retain wit hi n

i t se l f i t s o wn c o n t r a d ic t io n , w hic h a l wa ys d ef in es a n d f i l l s in

[plombe] the subject . Mediat ion without a mediator mediates noth

in g : i t i s t he mid -po in t [mi-lieu], the place of sharin g and crossing

th rou gh [ passage] ; that is, it is place tout court and absolutely. Not

Chr ist , bu t o n l y su c h a mi d -po in t ; a n d t h is i t se lf wo u l d n o l o n g er

even be the cross, but only the coming across [I'croisement] and the

passing though, the intersect ion and the dispersal [lecartement],82

ra d ia t in g o u t [étoilment] f ro m wi t hi n t he v ery d i -men si o n o f t he

w o r l d . T h i s w o u l d b e b ot h the s u m m i t a n d th e ab yss of a d e co n -

struct ion of Chr ist i ani ty: the dis-locatio n of the West .)

"Self" defines the element in which "me" and "you," and "we,"

an d "they," can take place. " Sel f" deter min es the "as" of Bei ng: if it

is, it is as [en tant que] it is. It is "in itself" prior to any "ego," priorto any presentab le "pro pert y." It is the "as" of all that is. Th is is n ot

a presentable property, since it is presentation itself. Presentation is

neither a propriety nor a state, but rather an event, the coming of

so met hin g : o f i ts c o m in g into the world where the "w orl d" itself is

the plane [la géométral] or the exposing of every comi ng.

In its coming, that which exists appropriates itself; that is, it is

n o t a ppro pr ia t ed , n e i t her by n o r in t o a "se l f" (whic h c o u l d o n l y

preexist what exists by removing and neutraliz ing the coming in it

self). What is born has its "self" before self: it has it there (which is

the meaning of Heidegger's "Dasein"). There means over-there, the

distance of space-tim e (it is the body, the wo rl d of bodie s, the bod y-

w or ld ) . Its ap p ro pr ia ti on is its m o v i n g [transport] a n d be in g -mo v ed

t hro u g h [transpropriation] this dispersal of the there; such is the ap-

pro pr ia t in g -ev en t ("Ere ig n is") . B u t i t s be in g d et ermin ed a s su c h

does not signify that there is some event in which the "proper self"

w o u l d sp r in g f or th , li k e a ja ck -i n- th e- b ox , bu t th at th e c o m i n g is

in itself and by itself appropriat ive as such. (As a result , differencing

[différant] is in itself the proprie ty that it opens.) Th is is wh y "self"

does not preexist (itself). "Self" equals what ex-ists as such.

Thus, insofar as "self," or "ipseity," means "by itself," relation to

itself, r etur nin g into itself, presence to itself as presence to the

"same" (to the sameness of the "as such") , ips eity occurs or happe ns

t o i t se l f a s c o mi n g ; a n d su c h c o min g i s a n t ic ipa t io n , whi c h i s n e i

ther préexistence nor providence, but instead the unexpected arrival

[sur-venance] , the surprise and the being-placed back [remise] into

the "to com e" as such, back into what is to come. "S elf " is neither a




past given nor a future given; it is the present of the coming, the

presenting present, the coming-to-be and, in this way, coming into

Being. But there where it comes is not "into itself," as though into

the interior of an determ ined dom ain ; it is "beside itself."83 Beside

itself 'means into the dispersal of the dis-p osit io n, into the general

element of pr oxi mit y and distance, where such pr oxi mi ty and dis

tance are measured against nothing, since there is nothing that is

given as a fixed p oint of ipseity (before, after, outside the wor ld) .

Therefore, they are measured according to the dis-posit ion itself.

Fr om the very start, the structure of the "Self," even consi dered asa kin d of uniq ue and solitary "self," is the structure of the "wi th. "

Solip sism , if one wants to use this category, is singular plural . Eac h

one is besid e-hi mse lf insofar as and because he is beside-others.

From the very beginning, then, "we" are with one another, not as

points gathered together, or as a togetherness that is divided up, but

as a being-with-one-another. Being-with is exact ly this: that Being,

or rather that to be neither gathers itself as a resultan t commune of

be in gs no r sh ar es it se lf ou t as th ei r c o m m o n su bs ta nc e. To be is

n o t hin g t ha t i s in -c o mmo n , bu t nothing as the dispersal where what

is in -c o mmo n is d is-po sed a n d mea su red , t he in -c o mmo n a s t he

w i t h , th e be si de -i ts el f of to be as such, to be transfixed by its own

t ra n si t iv i t y : to be being al l beings, not as their individual and/or

co mm on "self," but as the proximity that disperses [écarte] them.

Beings touch; they are in con-tact with one another; they arrange

themselves and dist inguish themselves in this way. Any being that

o n e mig ht l ik e t o ima g in e a s n o t d ist in g u ished , n o t d is-po sed ,

w o u l d re al ly be in de te rm in at e an d un av ai la bl e: an ab so lu te va ca nc y

of Bein g. Thi s is why the ontologica l mo me nt or the very order of

ont olo gy is necessary. "To be" is not the noun of consistency; it is the

verb o f dis-position. Nothing consists, neither "matter" nor "subject."

In fact, "matter" and "subject" are nothing but two names that are

correlates of one another; i n their m ode of consistency, they in di

cate the origina ry spacing of the general ontolo gica l disposi t ion.

As s uc h , th e n, "b ei ng -t he re " {Dasein) is to ^ a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s

transit ive verbal value of the dis-pos it ion. Being-ther e is [the] dis

posing [of] B eing itself as distance/ proxim ity; it is "to make" or "to

let" be the coming of all with all as such. Dasein (that is, humanity

as the index of Being) thus exposes Being-as-to-be.

Som eone enters a roo m; before being the eventual subject of a

representation of this roo m, he disposes him self in it and to it . In

crossing through it , l iv ing in it , v isit ing it , and so forth, he thereby

ex po ses t he d ispo si t io n —t he c o rre l a t io n , c o mbin a t io n , c o n t a c t ,

d ist a n c e , re l a t i o n —o f a l l t ha t i s ( in ) t he ro o m a n d , t here fo re , o f

the room itself. He exposes the simultaneity in which he himself

part icipates at that instant, the simultaneity in which he exposes

him self just as muc h as he exposes it and as mu ch as he is exposedin it. He exposes himself. It is in this way that he is [a] "self," that

he is it, or that he becomes it as many times as he enters into the

disposit ion and each t ime that he does. This "at each t ime" is not

the rene wal of the experie nces or occur rence s of one self-same sub

je ct: so l on g as " I " am "t he sa me ," th er e w i l l st il l al wa ys ne ed to be

an otherùme where I dis-pose mysel f accordi ng to this "sameness."

This, in turn, implies that another t ime in general—that is, other

t imes, indefinitely—are not only possible, they are real: the "each"

of the "each time," the taking place of the there and as there, does

not involve pri mar ily the succession of the identical; it involves the

simu ltaneity of the different. Eve n when I am alone, the room is at

the same time the room where I am close to, next to, alongside of

al l its other disposit ions (the way it is occupied, how it is passed-

through, and so on). One is not in the disposit ion without being

w i t h th e ot h er - d is p o si ti on , w h i c h is th e ve ry ess en ce of di s- p os i

t io n . These "t imes" a re d isc o n t in u o u s, bu t t hey a re t he ir be in g -

w it h- on e- an ot he r in th is d is co nt in ui ty . " E a c h ti m e" is th e si ng ul ar -

pl u ra l s t ru c t u re o f t he d ispo si t io n . There f o re , "ea c h t ime m in e "

signifies primarily "each time his or hers," that is, "each time with":

"mineness" is itself only a possibility that occurs in the concurrent re

ality of being-each-time-with.

The world, however, is not a room into which one enters. It is

also impossi ble to start from the fict ion of someo ne who is alone

and finds h im - or herself in the wo rld : in bo th cases, the very con

cept of the world is destroyed. Th is conce pt is that of bein g-w ith

a s o r ig in a ry. Tha t i s , i f t he mea n in g (o f B e in g ) i s d is -po si t io n a s



9 8 Being Singul ar Plural Being Singula r Plural 99

such, then this is being-with as meaning: the structure of with is

the structure of the there. B e in g -wit h i s n o t a d d ed o n t o be in g -

there; instead, to be there is to be with, and to be with makes

sen se— by i t se l f, wi t h n o t hin g mo re , wi t h n o su bsu m pt io n o f t h is

me ani ng under any other truth than that of the wi th .

I n be in g -wit h a n d a s be in g -wit h , we have always already begun

to understand meaning, to understand ourselves and the world as

meaning. And this understanding is always already completed, ful l ,

w h ol e , a nd in f in it e. W e un d er st an d ou rs el ve s in f i ni te ly — ou r s e lv e s

a n d t he wo r l d —a n d n o t hin g e l se .

"W it h" i s n e i t her med ia t e n o r immed ia t e . The mea n in g t ha t we

und erst and , insofar as we und ers tand it , is not the pr odu ct of a

negation of Being, a negation de st ined to represent itself to us as

me ani ng, n or is it the pure and simp le ecstat ic affi rma tion of its

presence. "W it h" neith er goes from the same to the other, nor from

the same to the same, nor from the other to the other. In a certain

sense, the "with" does not "go" anywhere; it does not constitute a

process. But it is the closeness, the brushing up against or the com

ing across, the almost-there [l'à-peu-près] o f d ist a n c ed pro x im it y .

W h e n w e tr y to ev al ua te th is clo se ne ss (as if in a m ar k et p la ce or

railway station, or in a cemetery, we were to ask what are the mean

ings and value s of these hund reds of peop le, of their rest lessness

and passivity), it comes out as frantic or distraught. But the mean

in g o f t he "wi t h ," o r t he "wi t h" o f mea n in g , c a n b e ev a l u a ted o n l y

in a n d by t he "wi t h " i t se l f, a n ex per ien c e fro m wh ic h — in i ts p l u ra l

s in g u l a r i t y—n o t hin g c a n be t a k en a wa y.

In understanding ourselves, we understand that there is nothing

to understand; more precisely, this means that there is no appro

pr ia t io n o f mea n in g , bec a u se "mea n in g " i s t he sha r in g o f B e in g .

There is no appropriat ion; therefore, there is no meaning. This is

i t se l f o u r u n d er st a n d in g . Thi s i s n o t a d ia l ec t ic a l o pera t io n (a c

cording to which "to understand nothing" would be "to understand

everyth ing"), nor is it a matter of tur nin g it into the abyss (to un

dersta nd the noth ing of this same unde rsta ndi ng) , nor is it a re-

flexivity (to understand, for al l understanding, that we understand

ourselves); instead, it is al l these replayed together in another way:

as ethos an d praxis.

To pu t i t in K a n t ia n t erm s, i f pu re rea so n is pra c t ic a l by itself

(and not by reference to and according to any reverence for some

transcendental norm), this is because it is essential ly "common rea

so n ," whic h mea n s t he "wi t h" as reason, as foundation. There is no

difference between the ethical and the ontological: the "ethical" ex

poses what the "ontological" disposes.

O u r u n d erst a n d in g (o f t he mea n in g o f B e in g ) i s a n u n d erst a n d

in g that we share understanding between us and, at the same time,

because v/t share understanding between us: between us a l l , s i m u l

t a n eo u sl y—a l l t he d ea d a n d t he l iv in g , a n d a l l be in g s .



§ War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

W h a t fo ll ow s is a re sp on se to a re qu es t th at ca m e f r o m th e

U nited S tates f or s ome ref lect ions on " w ar and tech nology ." 1 I n

the midst of war ( it is wo rth n oti ng that I am beg inn ing to write

on 26 February 1991; the ground attack has begun; its future is stil l

uncertain) unde rtak i ng th is s ort of ref lect ion migh t b e incon gru

ous, even indecent. On the one hand, what counts today is what is

no w at stake, the deaths, the suffer ing of all sorts, an d the great

sym pat hy that acc omp ani es all wars. (I ho pe some of it adheres

here, stuck to these lines.) On the other hand, what also counts

are th e pol i t ica l determinat ions , th e approb at ion an d cr i t ic is m , th e

mot ives an d reasons that can still , if possi ble, engage everyone's re

sponsibility. Yet, we are already responsible in stil l another way:

we ha ve th e r e sp on si b il it y to t h i n k . As far as m o r a l , p o li ti c a l, a n d

affective considerations are concerned, "war," as it reappears today,

is a wh ole ne w reality in virtu e of its very arch aism . In other

w or d s, th e r et u rn of "w ar ," no t as th e re al it y of m i l i t a r y op er at io ns

b u t as a fi gu re (W a r) in ou r sy m b o li c sp ac e, is u n d e n i a b l y a n e w

and s ingular ph e nom eno n, b ecaus e i t produces i t s el f in a w o rld

wh er e th is s y m b o l se em s to ha ve be en al l b u t ef fa ce d. T h i s is ce r

ta in ly w orth th i nkin g. An d i t mig h t b e th at th inki ng ab out th is is

urgent. It is perhaps no longer a quest ion of the degree to whi ch

wa r is a m or e or les s ne ce ss ar y e v il , or a m o re or les s tr o u bl e so m e

good. I t is a que s t io n—a nd i t is a ques t ion for th e w o rl d— of know -

101



I02 War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne 103

in g t o whic h symbo l ic spa c e we c a n en t ru st wha t i s k n o wn a s l ib

erty, humanity.

W ar, in Sp it e o f I t A l l

Of course, wha t appeared to b e the effacing of sy mb olic Wa r

concern ed only the gro up of nations that mak e up the planet 's core

of "order," "law ," 2 a n d "d ev e l o pmen t ." The "t h ird " wo r l d ha s n ev er

stopped being ravaged by armed confl icts: they al l did happen, even

if they di d not fi t into the strict category of war, o r even if their lo

c a l c ha ra c t er prev en t ed t hem fro m rea c hin g fu l l symbo l ic d ig n i t y .

Since 1914, it has seemed that , in one way or another, "War" de

ma n d ed a "g l o ba l " d imen sio n . I wi l l c o me ba c k t o wha t t h is a d jec

t ive implies. First , let us take up the point that this "globalizat ion"

is de ter mi ned less by the spre adin g-ou t of the areas of confl ict

(again, there are confl icts throughout the world) than by the global

ro l e— ec o n o m ic , t ec hn ic a l , a n d sy mb o l ic —o f c er t a in sta tes who se

sovereignty is involved in the war. For war is necessarily the war of

sovereigns; that is, there is no war without Warlords: this is what I

w a n t to de al w i t h he re .

It might seem that this is hardly the way to open the question of

"war and technology." It will soon become clear, however, that rather

t ha n c o n c ern in g mi l i t a ry t ec hn o l o g y (a bo u t whic h t here i s n o t hin g

special to be thought), attention devoted to the sovereign of and in

w ar rev eal s w ar as technê, as art, the execution or putt ing to work of

sovereignty itself. Yet , war is also an impe rious, decisive interru ption

{ponctuation}, ex empl a ry o f a l l o u r W est ern sym bo l ism .

Th e war of States an d coalit i ons of States, the "great war" (the

w ar w h i c h is , by al l ri gh ts , o n l y a p a r t — b u t an i m p or ta n t, ex em

plary p ar t— of the exercise of the state/national sovereignties it pre

supposes, war properly speaking as it has been defined since the be

ginnin gs of our his tor y— I wil l come back to this), that war, insofar

as it is easily dist inguishable from others, is the [sort of] war we

t ho u g ht ha d been c i rc u msc r i bed , i f n o t su spen d ed , in t he f ig u re o f

the "cold" war and nuclear deterrence.

Th is war m akes its retu rn, or at least al l of its signs are return

ing. Or rather, what is happening, whatever its exact name should

be , w i l l ha ve to be a c co m p a n ie d , su st ai ne d, il lu st ra te d, a n d de co

ra t ed wi t h t he s ign s , s ig n i f i c a t io n s , a n d in s ig n ia o f wa r . Thi s wi l l

have been irresist ible, and it wi l l not have been the result of a sim

ple neglige nce in the use of words .

As fa r as th e las t fo rt y- fi ve ye ar s ar e co nc er ne d , a n d in or de r to

ho ld up the most identifiable figur es of war (fr om a formal po int of

vi ew ), th os e in th e M a l v i n a s a n d G r e n a d a ha ve m os t cl ea rl y pr ef ig

u red su c h a re t u rn . ( I a m in d ebt ed t o R o bert F ra isse fo r po in t in g

out the decisive indi cat i on of this "retur n" and , as he put it , of the

"wi l d c o n t en t men t " t ha t ca me a l o n g wi t h t he Ma l v in a s W a r . ) O t her

a rmed o pera t io n s o ff i c ia l l y c o n c ern ed o u r "wo r l d " o n l y a s po l ic e in

terven tions in conflicts that oper ated on the order of revolt, sub ver

s i on , or " c i v i l war" (a name that , l ike t he G reek stasis o r the R o m a n

seditio, indicates that it is not a war between sovereigns, a "warriors'

w a r ") , or ev en an i n te r v e n ti o n in th e c o nf ro n ta ti o n of so ve re ig ns

w h o are fa r aw ay f r o m us , a n d of te n m or e or les s q ue s ti on ab le .

(Eve ry detail of the uses, c laim s, ma nip ula t ion s, aporias of sover

eignty in the postcolonial world ought to be exposed, as they are be

ing exposed today in the post-Soviet world. And the details of our

relat ions to al l this sovereignty, the concept of wh ic h is ours, sh ould

also be added.)

But now there is war, "global" war in this new sense, in which

ma n y o f the So v ere i g n s—w ho se t i t l es we in t erpret in c o m pl ex a n d

c o n t ra d ic t o ry wa ys —a re imp l ic a t e d . Ev e n i f t he c o n f l i c t i s n o t a

qu est io n o f N o rt h v ersus So u t h, t he ir presen c e g l o ba l iz es g l o ba l w ar ag ai n ( i f w e ca n sa y su ch a th in g ) . T he re f or e, th er e is w ar ; fo r

three months, the world has had nothing but this word on its l ips.

B u t what is War , real ly? Wh at is it today'*. This i s a qu est io n wo rt h

posing. What is most surprising is not that there is {if indeed there

is) this war. It is not that there is this combat, or that batt le, what

ever their origin and their modalit ies. What is surprising is that in

our eyes the very idea of wa r has again take n ho ld of us as the rig ht

of the city (there is no better way of pu tt i ng it). In other word s, it

is hig hly rem arkable that the idea of legit im ate state/national v io

lence, for so long regarded as suspect and suffering a tendentious



IO4 War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

delegit imation, could have regained (or almost regained) its ful l le

git imacy, w hic h means the legit i macy of the sovereign, absolutely.

A c c o r d i n g to g o o d p o li t i c o- j u r i d i c a l se m an ti cs , it is sa id a n d

w r i tt e n th at it is ne it h er co rr ec t n or le gi ti m a te to use th e w o r d

"war" for the present situation. I wil l come back to this. But this

remark is st i l l quite rare, confined as it is to juridical purism and

the good, moral soul; general discourse, quite to the contrary, has

thr ow n itself into the semantics, logic, and sym bol ism of war.

These , of course, have never really been annulle d. But st i l l , war

appeared to be held within the shadows into which it had been

plunged by the two previous "world" wars. In contrast to earlier cen

turies, the spirit of the time has not clai me d the right to wage war

above all the other prerogatives of the State; for examp le, on ly up un

til the First World War was it common to refer to States as "Powers."

On the other h an d, th e favor enjoyed by the idea of a "State of

law" drew attention to that element in sovereignty regarded as ex

empt from violence and its force. It drew attention to the point

wh er e su ch vi ol en ce , w h i c h w o u l d ha ve p re si de d in th e i ns ti tu ti o n

of power, ha d to be effaced, sublima ted, or curb ed. Wa r seemed to

be at res t in th e pe ac e of no w - de fu nc t or ob so le te fe ud al is m s a n d

nationalis ms. A n d the aura of sovereignty grew dim there as well .

More over, there was no more talk of "ideolog ies" an d the "wither

ing of the State." In decli ne wit h regard to the global com plex of

techno-economics, the State seems to have entered into the age of

self-control by offering itself as a counter poin t in the barely sover

eign role of regulat ive, juridi cal , an d social adm inis trat i on.

But now one finds that there is nationalism springing up on al l

sides (and sometimes feudalism as well). These figures are heroic

or ridiculous, pathetic or arrogant, dignified or questionable, but

they are always shadowy either by vocation or according to their

intend ed purpose. C ertain ly, a globalized recogn it ion of "value" or

of the democ ratic no rm tends to regulate these affirm ations of

identi ty (and) of sovereignty. As such, these state/national figures

are not marked [tracée] by a violent gesture, [which is] both somber

and glorious; they are spontaneously modeled from within a wholly

available, general legit imacy.

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne 105

It is well known, however, that there is (st i l l?) no such thing as

supran ational or prena tional la w— bu t, of course, it is exact ly this

w ar th at re viv es th e de ba te on th e su bj ec t. T h e re is no re ad y- m ad e

"democracy," no foundation for a law that is above nations or peo

ples. There is real ly only a supposed law that borders nation-states,

a law that is onl y vaguely sure of bei ng foun ded on universa lity, a nd

fairly certain of being dev oid of sovereignty. So-calle d inter national

law, where this "inter," this "between," causes al l the problems, isonly graspable as that co mm on space devoi d of law, devoi d of every

so rt o f "set tin g in c o m mo n " ["mise en c o mmu n " ] (wi t ho u t whic h

there is no law), and is structured by the techno-economic network

and the supervi sion of Sovereigns.

W i t h i n th is co nt e xt , w ar m ak es its l o o m i n g [grande] f ig u re

known. In a certain sense, whether it is "war" or "police act ion,"

w he th er it tak es pl ac e as "w ar " or no t, is u n i m p or t a n t. It ha s be en

gran ted and even "r eq uir ed" (as is said of it) that this not be war.

Given this, we would have, while we even had a claim to the al le

gories of Ma rs or B ellone , al legories of need temp ered by a bea uti

fu l —t ha t i s , a rro g a n t —d ema n d fo r " ju st ic e" a n d "mo ra l i t y . "

Of course (I a dd this on ret urn ing to this text after the cease

fire), we are told about victory parades, after which the entire world

w i l l en th us ia st ic al ly ad op t th e p r o u d f or m u la " T h e M o t h e r of al l

Batt les," wh ich w il l even be the sovereign motto of those wh o were

va nq u is h ed . B u t in or de r to u n f o l d w ha t an ot he r so ve re ig n w ay of

speaking [une autre parole souverain] has nam ed "the logic of war,"

the possible return of this figure h ad to be percep tible, i f onl y in a

furt ive (indeed fleet ing) way. The States concerned knew how to

t a p in t o t he v i r t u a l i t ies t ha t f l o u r ished in "pu bl ic o pin io n ": wa r

could again be required or desired. Pacificism was now only rou

t ine or accidental , disregarded by the rest for having failed to rec

ognize the fascist threat not so long ago, and for representing, since

the begin nin g of this century, not hin g but the exact and im pot ent

[impuissant] reverse of the very "glob alizat io n" of war.

But, in this way, just as pacifi cism tod ay l imits itself to a habitus

w i t h o u t su bs ta nc e, th e m o r a l of w h i c h is ar ti cu la te d ne it h er in

terms of law nor in term s of polit ic s (the onl y respectable dime n-



i o 6 War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

sion is pi ty; an d althou gh the tragedy of the warrio r is not the onl y

one in this world, it alone seems to have grandeur . . . ) so, on quite

a dif ferent level, the reaff irm ation of war springs fort h from a re

discovered habitus, redeployed in a new context. A habitus is a way

of b e i n g , a d i s p o s i t i o n of mores , an ethos.

W h i c h w a y o f b e in g i s it? W h a t i s it m a de u p of ? M y fi r st r ep ly

w i l l be s i m p l e : it is the ethos of war itself; it is th is dis pos it ion o f

mores , c iv i l izat ion , and th inking th at af f i rms w ar not only as th emeans of a polit ic s but also as an end cosubsta ntial wi th the exer

cise of sovereignty, wh ic h alone holds the except iona l right to it .

Th is response presupposes the con ven tio n of cal ling the use of

State force, with respect to its own right, "a police action" and call

ing the exercise of a sovereign ri ght to de cide to attack another sov

ereign State a "war." It is precisely this convention that has just

be en re ac ti va te d, wh e th er w e w a n t to re co gn iz e it or no t. (F o r ex

ample, in terms of i ts cons t i tut i on , France is not at w a r— a nd re

al ly , w h o is , and according to w h i ch cons t i tut ion? )

Noth ing is s uperior to a s overeign r igh t (superaneus means that

above which there is nothing). The right to wage war is the most

sovereign of all rights because it allows a sovereign to de cide that

another sovereign is its enemy and to try to subjugate it , indeed to

destro y it , that is , to relieve it of its sovereignty (here, l ife co mes

into the bargain [la vie vient par-dessus le marché]). It is the sovereign's right to confront his alter ego ad mortem; this is not only an

ef fect of s overeignty b ut a ls o i ts s upreme m ani f es t at i on— jus t as

our w h ole t radit ion h as w anted i t .

W i t h i n th e so ve re ig n co nt ex t of w ar , n o t h i n g is va li d if no t so m e

s uppos ed convent ions uph eld in order to keep i t w ith in a certain

moral ( in former times, sacred) order. But this order is not exactly

superi or to war; it is the very order of wh ic h war is a sovereign ex

tremity, the sharpest edge [le fer de lance] an d the poi nt of excep

t ion. ( T h is is w h y Rous s eau, agains t th e w h ole t radit ion , did not

w a n t to see a sp ec ia l ac t of s ov er ei gn ty in th e ri gh t to wa r, bu t "o n ly

an appl icati on of the law"; Rousseau's sovereignty is an intim ate de-

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê 107

ba te w i t h th e ex ce pt io n, a n d w i t h th e fo rc e w h i c h ca nn ot no t h au n t

it. .. . )

W a r, th e n , is it se lf su sc e pt ib le to cr e a ti ng a ne w la w, a n e w d is

t r ib u t ion o f s overeignt ies . A n d s uch i s th e or ig in of the majori ty of

our national and state sovereignties, or legitimacies. This is also the

point th rough w h ich revolut ionary w ar w as ab le to inh eri t w h at is

essential to the con cept of State war, alth oug h at the cost of certain

dis p lacemen ts . ( T h is b egan w ith th e w ars of th e French Re volu

tio n, a mi xtu re of State wars and wars waged in the nam e of a uni

ve rs al p r i n c i p l e , ag ai ns t en em ie s of a h u m a n so rt . F r o m th at m o

ment on , th e ques t ion of know ing i f one could pres ent a univers al

sovereignty was put forward. . . . )

The right to wage war excepts itself from law at the very point

w he re it be lo ng s to it b o t h as an o r i g i n a n d as an e n d ; th is p o i n t is

a poin t of f oun dat i on, ins of ar as w e are incapab le of th i nk in g of

f oun dat i on w i th o ut s overeignty, or of s overeignty i t s el f w it h ou t

th in ki ng in terms of exce ption and excess. Th e right to wage war

excepts itself fro m law at a poin t replete wi th sovereign bri l l ia nce

[un éclat so uverain]. Law does not possess this brilliance, but it

needs its l ight, and its founding event. (This is why War is also the

Even t par excellence; it is not an event in some "h istor y of events"

that consists in recit ing , one by one, the dates of wars, vic torie s,

and treaties, but the Event that suspends and reopens the course of

history, the sovereign-event. Ou r kings , generals , and philosoph ers

have only ever thought of it in this way.)

T h i s mod e of ins t i tut i ng law b ecomes unacceptab le , h ow ever , in

a wo rl d that represents law itself as its ow n "or igi n" or its own

" f ou nda t ion ," w h eth er th is f a ll s under th e h eading of a " natural

r igh t" of h uma nit y or under th e h eading of an irrevers ib le s edi

m e n t a t i o n of the experiences [les acquis] o f a positive law w h i c h , l i t

tle by littl e, has be com e the law of all (wh ereas the soldie rs of the

ye ar II [l'An II] could stil l represent this foundation as a conquest

ye t to be m ad e or re m ad e) . T h i s is wh er e th e an xi e ty a n d c on fu si o n

that seize us whe n faced with the idea of war comes fro m, p arti cu

larly as regards "just war," an expression which might, at one and

the same time, subject war to law and law to war. (For all that, and



i o8 War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

f or th e ent ire t radit ion—I w i l l come b ack to th is —th is expres s ion

is redundant, as redundant as the expression "dirty war". . . . )

Our anxiety testif ies to the fact that our world, the world of

" glob a l izat i on ," dis p laces th e concept of w ar , a long w i th a l l th e

pol i t ico- jur i dica l concepts of s overeignty . In f act , th e " return" of

w ar o n l y ap pe ar s at th e he ar t of the se di sp la ce m e nt s. T h i s is w h y

some have dared to say that it does not appear at all . But our anx

iety also testif ies (and occasionally in the same people as above),

not to a regret, or to a nostalgia (although . . . ), but rather to a dif

f icu l ty in doing w ith out s overeign auth ority [l'instance souveraine],

even down to its most terrible bril l iance (seeing as it is also the

mos t b r i l l ian t ) . T h i s pers is tence of s overeignty in us is w h at I

w o u l d li ke to ex am in e be fo re tr y i n g to un d er st a n d wh er e we c o u l d

go or towar d whi ch "othe r" of sovereignty. We wi ll see ho w that

h appens th rough " tech nology ."

I am not unaware of the precautions one mu st take to avoid hav

ing this very simple project fall into the trap of s im plif icat ion, that

is, the coarseness [la grossièreté] of thi nki ng. I take these precautions

to be the following:

First, m y inten tio n is not to reduce the histor y of the Gu lf Wa r

to a pure and si mple sovereign decision for war, the action of one or

more actors. In a general context involving [mêlé] endemic war, the

prolife ration of seditions, contested sovereignties, and mu ltip le and

conf l ic t ing pol ice f orces ( economic , re l ig ious , and internat ional

rights an d interests, as well as those of the state, of min orit ies, and

so forth), a process is prod uce d that is a mi xtu re of war an d police

action, in which the one constantly comes down to the other. I do

not claim, here, to completely disentangle the role that each plays;

in fact, that would be impossible. Yet again, everything is displaced

and th e pair —t h a t is, w ar/ pol ice act ion —n o longer a llow s i ts el f to

be ea si ly m a n i p u la te d , as if t ha t ha d ev er be en po ss ib le . B u t in th is

pair, I do wan t to interrogate wha t seems, at the li mi t of law itself,

to obstinately, or even f iercely, maintain the demand for war that

carries the sovereign exception w it hi n itself and also exposes it .

Because of this logi c of the exce ptio n, the logi c of the "sovereig n"

as being "without law," it is not immediately obvious that any of

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne 109

the lines of thinking available to us will suit our purposes. The style

of neo- K ant ia n h uma nis m domin ant today does no more th an re

new the promise of mor aliz ing polit ics, all the while offering law the

we ap on s of a po li ti cs th at has yet to be m or a li ze d. T h e re vo lu ti on ar y

style faded out al ong wi th all the pretensions of designatin g the sub

ject by mea ns of ano the r law, and appear ance [le surgissement] by

means of anot her history . As for the "deci sion ist" style, it has been

relegated to the heart of the "totalitaria n" style. No ne of the m yie ld

a possibility either for thinking sovereignty hic et nunc or f or th ink

ing beyond it . Ever since the f irst global conflict gave ample testi

mo ny to this general dif f icu lty, ours has been a histor y of the doc

trines and prob lems of inte rnati onal law, sovereignty, and war.

For the moment, we can only draw out the strict consequences

of this l ist [of the available l ines of thi nki ng ]. I am not inte rpret

ing the G u lf Wa r accordi ng to any of these schemes. I am o nly sug

gesting that an empty space stretches between the always weak and

trou ble d schema of the "war of law (po lice acti on)" a nd a reacti

va te d ( w a r m e d ov er ?) sc he m a of "s ov er ei gn w a r. " M o r e o v e r , th is

space is not the space of a "people s' war " ["guerre des peuples"] : for

the mom ent , the people are in the museu ms of the Revol uti on, or

in the folklore museums. Indeed, this space is a desert. It is not

only pitted with oil wells and bomb craters; it is also the desert of

our th i nki ng, as w el l as th at of " E ur ope ," an d th at of th e des ola

tion that crosses throu gh rights and war in the Gu lf and elsewhere;

i t is th at increas ingly w ors e des olat ion def ined b y economic and

cultural injustice. In the end, then, it is true that the desert is grow

ing. I have long detested the morose relish with which some have

rehashed this sentence. But I do admit that the desert is growing.

A n d , a lt ho u g h n o lo ng er m il i ta n t, th e st er il it y o f the d o m i n a n t h u

ma nism , arrogant wi th the arrogance of the weak, reveals its glaring

irres pons ib i l i ty in th e end.

I am not claiming to have invented another [way of] thinking; I

only want to situate its demand, its extreme urgency. For we are

already at another [way of] thinking; it precedes us, and the war

shows us that we must catch up with it .

Sec ond , if it is clear that my preference (which , at this poin t, I



n o War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê i n

hold in reserve) was not, in this war, for war, I am nonetheless

keen ly aware that the great majo rity of those who su ppor ted the

wa r w a n te d to be pa rt is an s of a la w su pe ri or or ex te ri or to stat e sov

ereignties. What is more, many have testif ied to a ref ined sense of

the responsibili t ies of all the parties involve d in the conflict ; I am

setting aside all notion s of inte ntio n here; I am not cla im in g that

the war was only passed off under the guise [manteau] o f law. So me

did as much, but that is so clear as to be no longer interesting.

W h a t is in te re st in g is tha t it wa s po ss ib le to af fi rm th e wa r, a n d the

manner in which this was possible was more or less simple or war

l ike, res t rained or compl icated.

But at the same time , it is not a que stion of em bar kin g on an

other ro un d of the sort of s im pli f ica tion so fashio nable today,

thereby suspend ing the consider ation of the interests and calcula

tions that set the econ om ic stakes of the war on an Eas t-W est axis,

as well as a No rth -S ou th one. Besides, the deni al of this was trans

parent; everyone knows what was going on, and it is no longer nec

essary to be a mem be r of the Party in ord er to share, despite on e

self , certain truths that come from Marx. It is not a question of

s imple " ec onomic de term inat i on." Ins tead, i t is a ques t ion of th e

following: although there may be casualties, the economy is in the

process of exha usting perspectives, hop es, an d ends. Wh ate ver is

not governed by economics belongs to a t imid, juridical projection

(where it is no longer a question of creating or fou ndi ng a new law)

or to the real m of fantastical compe nsati ons (that is, religion s, some

times art, and also, fro m now on, po lit ics) . Th e return of the f igure

of Wa r corresponds to an exasperated desire for legi tima tion and/or

f inality, at exactly a t ime when no one can believe that economics

has its own, universally legitimated f inality anym ore. (In this regard,

w ha t re ma in s o f t he d i st in c ti on be tw ee n li be r al a n d p l a n ne d e co n

omies is hardly important.) In fact, at the very moment when the

supposed "death" of M a r x was being celebrated, his political econ

omy (it could also be called economic war) cordoned off [verrouille]

our whole horizon. It is not sovereign, but it is dominant, and this

is a dif ferent thing. All at once, polit ics commits suicide in that ju-

r idical - m oral is m th at is w ith out s over eign ty —or rath er , in order to

be tt er ser ve d o m i n a t i o n , it tr ie s to re gi ld its so ve re ig n sh ie ld : th us

w e ha ve W a r , th e a m b i g u o u s so ve re ig n- sl av e of e c on o m i c s. I w i l l

came b ack to a cons iderat ion of w or ld w it h out end . I t s cr i t ique,

however, must be no less radical than Marx's . But there is no doubt

that radicality no longer involves the foun din g of a new En d, or the

restora tion of Sover eignty in general. O n the contra ry, this logic

seems to be the one in which economic war constantly radiates sov

ereign War, and vice versa.

Third, it is true that in interpreting facts and discourses under

the headin g of the return of a dim ensi on of war, or of a warlike pose

or postulation, which one might have believed to be completely for

gotten (or repressed), I seem to jettison [ faire fi des] the reserve and

prudence that has been used in dealing with a war that has been

thoug ht of as "well- temp ere d." It is true that there has been litt le

discourse that is properly or directly warmongering; ( instead, talk

of "goi ng to war" re ignit ed the polemic s of the pacif ists , wh ile at

the same time, some remarkable figures [of speech] came up in p r i

va te di sc ou rs e; I w i l l c e r ta i nl y n ot be th e o n l y on e to ha ve he ar d

"how good it will be for the West to have rediscovered its balls .")

Taking up this text again after the cease-f ire, I would like to add

the following: given that the contest was so unequal, how can we

avoid t h in kin g th at w e needed a dis cours e of w ar , w ith o ut quite

w a n t i n g a w a r — b u t , al l th e w hi le , w a n t i n g its re su lt? T h e "f ou rt h

army in th e w or ld" c ould not and di d not w ant to f igh t . An d th e

"f irst" fought principally in order to smother the very possibility of

ba ttl e u nd er the w ei gh t of its bo m bs , r u n n i n g the ri sk of re st ra in in g

its hero ism by lim it in g its ow n losses. Thi s, of course, di d not pre

ve nt the re be i n g d ea th a n d de st ru c ti o n; mo re ov er , i t d i d no t pr e

ve nt th e e n or m ou s di ff er en ce in th e a m o u n t of su ff er in g on ea ch

side. Bu t these amounts cou nt for nothi ng (f irst of all . . . ) in the

s y mb ol ic dim ens i on of w ar; th is dime ns io n is expres s ed only in

terms of vict ory or defeat, of sovereignty aff irm ed, co nqu ered , or

reconquered. (Even according to this very standard, this war—both

certain and uncertain—h ad a certain and uncertain res ul t . At th e

mom ent , Iraq is mint i ng coins carry ing th e c la im " V icto ry is ours ,"

w h i l e m i l i t a r y pa ra de s are b e i n g o rg a ni ze d in th e U n i t e d St at es ,



112 War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê 113

En gl an d, an d France. I t is true that al l of this is pure facade and

that, for the most part, the period after the war has propagated civil

wa r, at lea st in Ir aq a n d K u w a i t, a n d set e co no m i c w ar in m o t i o n

again. It remains the case, however, that "the facade" plays a role in

the constructio ns of the polit i cal an d collect i vity in general .)

It is true, in fact , that I am pr esup posi ng the interpreta t ion of a

num be r of details, fro m the approval of the war by national p arl ia

ments (which is a supererogatory measure in a police operation, as

w el l as in g e nu i ne ly ex ce p ti on al cas es of di s ti n ct m i li ta r y ur ge nc y)

to al l the indices provided by the semantics, style, and emphases of

ma ny of the discourses devoted to urgency, p eril , sacrifice, national

d u t y , mi l i t a ry v i r i l i t y , t he su bl im it y o f g reat c o mma n d ers , t he u n

leashi ng of pr im al force, and so on . (F or instance, I read the fol

l o win g in a pro min en t F ren c h n ewspa per : "bu t ho w c a n o n e f ig ht

efficiently without freeing one's primit ive inst incts?"; to stay with

this point for a moment, this sentence, taken as such and in the or

d in a r y c o n t ex t o f o u r c u l t u re , i s u n d o u bt ed l y i r repro a c ha bl e ; a l

tho ugh it does test ify to the "ordi nar y" conte xt of a state wh ic h

tends toward the vulgar.) To those l isted above, one must add the

d isc o u rse o f t he ho l y miss i o n : b o t h s id es ha d G o d o n t he ir s id e

{monotheos versus monotheos), as well as calls for the "foundation"

of a new order or re gime.

I ha v e n o in t erest in c o l l ec t in g pu bl ic a n d pr iv a t e d o c u men t s .

The re a re a g rea t ma n y o f t hem . I n t erpret iv e v io l en c e i s ha rd l y

called for in order to deciphe r in them the presence of a sym bol

ism a n d wa r l ik e fa n t a sy t ha t i s mo re o r l ess u n o bt ru siv e l y mix edtogether with reasons that have to do with law and the need for po

l ice act ions. This does not mean the latter are disqualified, but the

former must be brought to l ight .

In addition, it is impossible to forget the role played on both sides

by th e p ol it ic al de si re a n d ne ed to re cu pe ra te m i li ta r y def eat s ( V i e t

n a m o n t he Amer ic a n s id e , a n d S in a i o n t he Ara bic , ev en t ho u g h

the two cases are very differe nt). In the case of the U ni te d States,

the most pow erf ul of today's adversaries, wh at needed to be was hed

away was not only the humiliat ion that attaches to al l defeats, but

also a war that had made war shameful.

Inde ed, the taste for the spectacle of epic bea uty and he roic

vi rt ue , w h i c h wa s so cl ea rl y la id ou t d u r i n g th e b u i l d u p to w ar a n d

in its first phases, wi l l not be easily forgotten. After al l , these im

ages are not the slightest bit different fr om those of war fi lms. H ow

ever, I do not so muc h wan t to join forces wi th the crit ics of the

"spectacular society" who have made a p oint of qual ifyi ng this as a

"spec t a c u l a r" wa r ( t he d en ia l o f wh ic h i s d i rec t l y symm et r ic a l t o

w ha t is at w o r k in th e di sc ou rs e of la w ). Ye t, th e im ag es of w a r d i d

for m a part of the wa r— a nd perhap s war itself is l ike a fi lm, even

be fo re a fi lm im it at es wa r. In th e fac e of ho r ro r a n d p it y, w h i c h is

wh er e it ne ce ss ar il y en ds up , th er e w o u l d be no w ar w i th ou t a w ar

l ike mo me nt um of the imaginary. Its spectacle is inextricably bou nd

u p wit h t he so met imes st u pefyin g , mec ha n ic a l c o n st ra in t t ha t

ma k es t he so l d ier ma rc h o n . The psyc ho l o g ist s o f t he Am er i c a n

army took pleasure in explaining (on television) that the boys do not

march for a cause, for right or democracy, but only so as not to give

u p in fro n t o f t he ir c o mpa n io n s. Th a t i s , wha t d r iv es ho n o r a n d

glory already belongs to the order of the "spectacle," and it cannot

be d i s m a n tl e d b y th e s im p l e d e n u n c i a t i o n of a m o d e r n age in

w h i c h s i m u l a ti o n is ge ne ra li ze d a n d c o m m o d i f i e d . (I n a d d i t i o n ,

and as always happ ens wit h this sort of discourse, there were good

reasons for wo nde rin g, on rea ding certain crit i ques of the "war-

spectacle," about the nostalgia revealed there, nostalgia for the good

ol d wars of yesteryear.) W ha t is at play in the "sp ectacle" of war

goes much further back than that , extending out to the very l imits

o f a w h o l e c u l t ur e ( o f w h i c h I s l a m i s a p a r t ) — a n d u n d o u b t e d l yeven beyond that .

I am not claiming that the epic is on its way back—neither the

Homeric epic, nor the Napoleonic, nor even those that can st il l be

a sso c ia t ed wi t h t he bat t les o f R o m me l , M o n t g o m ery , L ec l erc , o r

Gu de ri an , for exam ple. (A ll the same, there was talk of the "leg

endary past" of various units or vehicles of war that ha d carried the

aura of their deeds from the last world war into the Gulf.) A great

deal is needed for the epic to make a comeback, but this "great deal"

is not enou gh to ensure that no aspect of the affi rma tion or celebra

t ion of war wou ld r ema in. At the very least , the facets of a bri l l ian t



114 War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne 115

[éclat] sovereignty wo ul d remain . In war, a bril l ian t , incandescent,

fascinating sovereignty is celebrated (for an instant, for a split sec

on d, in a flash of l ight) . But is this not an essential part of what we

thi nk we are deprived of in general: the bril l iant flash, the figures of

the Sun? Even now, our wo rld does not represent itself as lack ing in

power or intel l igence, or even completely lacking in grace. But the

lack of Sovereignty surely structures an essential p art of our world's

rep resen tation o f itself, an d therefore of its desire.

Sovereign Ends

W h a t ha s re tu rn e d w i t h wa r, or re m ai ns of it , has n o th i n g o b v i

ously to do with military technologies. For these technologies have

never stopped bei ng used dur ing the course of al l quasi-wars, guer

ril l a wars of l ibe ratio n and their repression, or in al l the pol it ic al ,

ec o n o mic , o r ju d ic ia l po l ic e o pera t io ns. W h a t i s a c hiev ed pr im a r i l y

by th e te ch no lo gi es re ga rd ed as p ro p er ly m il it ar y ca n be ju st as w el l,

i f not better, achieved b y the use of so-called ci vil technologies put

to military purposes. In fact , it is almost impossible to dist inguish

be tw ee n the se tw o. F or ex am p le , p sy ch ol og y is als o a w ea p on , a n d ,

in t u rn , t he pro g ress whic h mi l i t a ry resea rc h ha s ma d e reg a rd in g

civ il technologies (for example, in the field of sleeping med ication)

is not often taken into account. Perhaps a specific difference be

tween them only truly begins to emerge, on the one hand, at thelevel of the finalit ies of massive des truc tion (bu t one wonders to

w ha t ex te nt ev en th is c ri te ri on ca n be us ed w i t h de li ca cy , at lea st as

regards material destruction that can interfere with civil act ivit ies)

and , on the other hand an d above al l , on the order of sym bol ic

marks (for instance, the unifor ms and i nsigni a of armies). The re are

unifo rms outside of the army, but where there are uniform s, there is

also an army, as a principle or a more or less latent model. Short of

[elaborating upon] this dividing l ine, al l the technologies in play,

fro m the m anufa cture a nd use of a rifle or dagger to the logist ical

a n d st ra teg ic ma n ipu l a t io n o f who l e a rmies , pro v id e n o mea n s o f

ma ki ng the idea of war as such dist inct .

In one sense, this is why there is no specific quest ion concerning

the technologies of war, except technical quest ions, w hi ch here, as

e l sewhere , d o n o t a l l o w fo r t he qu est io n i n g o r t h i n k in g o f " tec h

n o l o g y"—bu t t h is i s t he c a se wi t h a l l t ec hn ic a l f ie l d s . Du r in g t he

first days of this war, the way certai n technol ogies were al locat ed

starring roles [la mise en vedette] made it possible to observe how

discourses that were favorable and unfavorable to technology had

n o t hin g t o d o wi t h t h in k in g t hro u g h [ t he qu est io n o f] t ec hn o l o g y;

instead, they espoused al l the established prejudices, problems, or

a po r ia s o f t he wa r it se lf . ( The E n g l i sh wo rd "t ec hn o l o g y" i s we l lplaced to suggest a logic proper to [the Ftench word] la technique,

w i th w h i c h th e di sc ou rs es ab ou t " m e a n in g" or "v al ue " al m os t ne ve r

engage.) Technological fire power was celebrated, that is, the power

of the electronic, chem ical , and mech anical com plex that pro duce d

the missiles (among other things), a new addit ion to the series of

w a rl ik e e m bl em s th at st re tc he s to ti m e i m m e m o r i a l , i n c l u d i n g th e

sword, helmet, or cannon. There was self-congratulat ion on the self-

l im it i n g po ssib i l i t ies o f t h is v ery po wer , a n d i t emerg ed in a d is

course of "surg ical" w ar that corre spon ded to the thesis of law:

flaunting l imits that are stricter than the l imits set by international

convention serves to make more credible an interpretat ion that op

erates accordin g to the notion of "police act i on." Th e terrible possi

bi li ti es of fe re d by ne w te ch no lo gi es we re de p lo re d (f or ex am p le , th e

poss ibil i ty of "vit rifi cat io n" offered by these new bom bs, whereas

t he po ssib i li t ies o f shra pn el bo mb s, o r bo m bs wi t h pho spho ru s o rn a pa l m, were a l rea d y wel l k n o wn by t h is po in t . . . ) . I n t he en d ,

there was a fear that recourse would be made to technologies

b a nn ed by th os e co nv en ti on s th at set th e ru le s of wa r; th e ef fe cti ve

u se o f t ha t n o w-fo r bid d en g ro u p o f b io c h emic a l wea po n s in t he

past , with al l their catastrophic potential , obviously plays a strate

gic role. In this regard, conve ntions re gardin g the means of war con

stantly demonstrate the fragil ity of the law that uphold s them : not

only is it infinitely difficult to legit imate the dist inct ion between dif

ferent sorts of weapons on the basis of hum anita rian princ iples , bu t

i t a l so rema in s t he c a se t ha t t he c o l l i s io n —in d eed , t he c o n t ra d ic

t io n —bet ween su c h hu ma n it a r ia n pr in c ipl es a n d t he pr in c ipl es o f

w ar is co ns ta nt ly p er ce p ti bl e a n d co ns is te nt ly b ri ng s th e "r ig ht to



n 6 War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

w a r " b ac k d o w n to its f ou n d a ti on in th e so ve re ig n ex ce p ti on . F o r

ex a mpl e , i t i s c l ea r l y n o t f ro m t he r ig ht t o —o r l o g ic o f—wa r t ha t

one can infer the interdict ion against including genetic patrimonies

w i t h i n th e a m b it of w a rl ik e de st ru ct io n. B u t th is is al so w hy , up to

a certain point in this war, one could see a part icular progress be

ing ma de by the idea of dep loyi ng tact ical nuclear weapons in re

sponse to the chemical threat posed by Iraq. (It could very well be

that the nuclear weapon was, far more than admitted, a major stake

in this confl ict : this part icular weapon, its possession, and its use

in the next war. . . . ) One could develop parallel considerations

regar ding the pro tect i on of civil ians. B ut al l this is already wel l

k n o wn , whic h rea l l y mea n s, a n d r ig ht l y so , t ha t n o o n e wa n t s t o

k n o w a n yt hin g a bo u t i t .

Th us , there is no "question of tech nolo gy" pro per to war, any

more th an there is a "question of technol ogy" in general , that is, a

question put to technology or its subject and involving the applica

t ion of criteria that do not belong to it . War -wit h-m issile s is neither

be tte r no r wo rs e th an w ar -w it h- ca ta pu lt s; it is st il l a qu es ti on of w ar .

A n d c o m m u n i c a ti o n is ne it h er be tt er no r wo rs e w h e n it is ca rr ie d

by fi be r- op ti cs , in st ea d of me ss en ge rs on fo ot : it is ra th er a q ue st io n

o f k n o w in g wha t "c o m mu n ic a t io n " mea n s. I f " t ec hn ic a l" c iv i l i z a t io n

displaces the concepts of war or comm uni cat ion (or health, or l ife,

and so on) , then it must be a questio n of the concepts themselves, of

their "becoming-technology" ["devenir-technique"] in a generalized

space of the world's becoming- technology . Bu t this is not a quest ion

of evaluatin g new instr umen ts for the unch ange d ends of a wo rl d

that is still the world as it used to be.

W a r is u n d o u b te d l y a p ri v il e ge d te rr ai n fo r b r i n g i n g to li g h t th e

inaneness of al l the conside rations of tech nolog y that do not pro

c eed fro m t his pre l imin a ry c o n sid era t io n (a n d i t mu st be a d mit t ed

that these forme r sorts of discourse are, in fact , mor e num erou s).

It is c lear that technologies are not responsible for war, any more

than war is responsible for the technologies that are not proper to

i t —ev en t ho u g h t ec hn o l o g ies g iv e wa r i t s mea n s, a n d wa r g en er

ates technical progress. The ethical , juridical , and cultural problems

posed by civil technology (nuclear or biological , for example) are


no less acute than those posed by certain armaments. It is quite

l ike ly that the disparity betw een the two sets of prob lem s has been

ve ry m u c h r e du ce d , fo r ex am p le , si nc e th e i n v e n t i o n of a rt i ll e r y

(whic h t est if ies t o t h is "bec o m in g -t ec hn o l o g y " o f the wo r l d , wh ic h

is what we have to take into account). In the end, the interminable

celeb ratory or execratory discourses on technolog y, al l of the m

founded on "values" that are obstinately foreign to this becoming-

technology , can onl y mask what there is of "war," as we ll as what

there is now of "me dici ne" or "the fam ily," an d so forth.

The re is no such thi ng as the "question of technology," p rope rlyspeaking, so long as technology is considered as a means to an end.

Except for technical problems as such, all such "questions," are posed

accord ing to the order of ends: pract ical , ethical , p olit ic al , aesthetic,

and so o n. Insofar as war is itself considered as a means to an e nd

(whether polit ical , econo mic, jurid ical , rel igious, and so forth), it fal ls

under this logic. This is what is real ly at stake in Clausewitz 's for

mul ation that "war is the continu ation of polit ics by other means." It

in d ic a t es a mo d ern m u t a t io n o f t he t h in k in g o f wa r , a mu t a t i o n

w h i c h im p li e s th at th e "c la ss ic al " w ay of t h i n k i n g ab ou t w ar as th e

exercise, setting to wor k, or extreme expressio n of sovereignty is no w

set at a distance and denied in a more or less confused manner. As I

have already said, such thinking is st i l l the only rigorous thinking of

wa r. T h e di sp la ce m en t th at to ok h o l d w i t h C la u se w it z st il l re m ai ns

to be broug ht to term : it m ay be the end of war.

For that thi nk in g of war wh ic h is st i l l ours, wa r is sovereignty's

technology par excellence; it is its sett ing to work and its supreme

execution (end). In this sense, a "technology" is not a means; in

stead, it is a mode of execu tion, m anife stat ion , and effectuation in

general . To be more precise, it is the mode of acco mp lish me nt that

dist inguis hes itself fro m the "natura l" mo de as that mode's double ,

and its riva l in perf ect io n. Wh en one has recourse to the Greek

terms physis a nd technê, which in their contemporary use refer to

Heid egge r (and more discretely to Nietzsch e, if not to the Ger ma n

Romantics), it is in order to give specific names to these "modes of

a c c o mpl ishmen t , " t a k in g c a re t o d ist in g u ish t hem, o n t he o n e

ha n d , f r o m "n a t u re" a s a c o l l ec t io n o f ma t er ia l s a n d fo rc es , po s-



ni War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

sessed of its own laws an d, on the other, from "techn ology " as an

" art i f ic ia l" m eans of reach in g i t s ends. Phusis a n d technê—one

cou ld say "bi rth " ["éclosion"] and "art" —a re two modes of acco m

plishment and are, in this respect, the same (but not identical) in

their dif ference: the same as concerns accomplishment in general,

as put t ing to w ork or carry ing out [l'exécution]. As a result, they are

doubly the "same" with regard to the end; they are not two dif fer

ent finalities, but two finishes [deux finitions] ( l ike a " h a n d " finish

and a "machin e" f inish—a com par ison that also serves to recall the

hierarchy which we "quite naturally" set up between these two sorts

of f inishes . . . ) . Furthermore, ever since Plato and Aristotle, these

two modes have constantly referred to one another in a double re

lationship that has come to be known as mimesis: it is not that one

"copies" the other ("copying" is quite impossible in this case), but

that each rep lays the pla y of the en d or ends [o f the othe r], [as] the

art or bir th of the finish.

The finish consists in executing {ex-sequor means to follow though

to the end), in car ryin g out som ethi ng to the li mi t of its ow n logic

and its own goo d, that is , to the extremity of its ow n Bei ng. I n our

th inking, Being in general , or rath er , Being proper or p la in ly Be

ing [l'être propre ou l'être en propre], in each of its singula r effect ua

t ions or existences, has its substance, end, and truth in the f inish

of its Bein g. For us, it is so evident that this trait belongs to "Be

ing" in general (or to "reality," or to "effectivity") that it seems odd

to insist on expressing such a redundancy.

W e t h i n k th at to be is no t to ha lf -b e [être-à-demi], but to be

fully present, perfect, complete, f inished, and, every single t ime, f i

nal , t er mina l , done. T h e w h ole prob l em, i f th ere is a prob lem , is

of kno w in g i f th e execut ion, th e f in is h , is f in i te or in f in ite , and in

w h a t sen se of the se w or ds . As w e w i l l see, qu es ti on s of te c hn o lo g y

and war come down to this troublesome articulation in every last

instance.

Physis a n d technê are, in this way, the Be ing of Bei ng, the same

that plays itself out twice, wi th a dif ference to wh ic h I wil l have to

return. For the moment, let me just add that history is that general

realm of twi stin g or displacem ent that af fects this dif ference.


If there is a "questi on of techno logy, " the n it onl y begins at that

mo me nt when tec hnolog y is taken into account as the f inish of Be

ing, and not as a means to some other end (science, mastery, hap

p ines s , and s o on) . I t only b egins w h en tech nology is taken into

account as an end in itself , sui generis. T ech nology is th e " f inal i ty

w i t h o u t e n d " (= w i th o u t an ex tr in si c en d) of a ge nr e th at pe rh ap s

remains to be discovered. It is to such a discovery that we expose

our history, as a tech nolo gica l-be com ing of Be ing or its f inish. W h a t , i n p r i n c i p l e , fa ls if ie s s o m a n y c on si d e ra ti on s o f te c h

nol ogy is the desire to locate its prin cipl es and ends outsi de of it

sel f—f or examp le, in a "nature" that itself consta ntly enters int o a

be c om in g- te ch n ol og y. . . . Ju st as, in th e pa st, we ne ve r st op pe d re

lat ing " nature" to s ome s overeign P ow er—as th e creat ion and

g l o r y o f a P o w e r n a m e d G o d , A t o m , L i f e , C h a n c e , o r H u m a n i t y

— s o w e h ave never s topped s ecuring f rom tech n ology , and f or

technology, a Deus ex machina, which is yet another sovereign

Power that the most hab itua l tende ncies of our ways of represent

ing leads us to designate as a Diabolus ex machina (this is the story

of Faust) . W i t h regard to the ex machina, the Deus b ecomes dia-

bolicus because it is no longe r the "tech nic ian of natu re" or the

Natural Technician, that is , the one who relates all things to one

End, or to one absolute, transcendental, transcendent, and sover

eign F in ish . For we den y "technol ogy" access to the real m of ends

and , to an even greater extent, to the rea lm of the Infinite E n d , in

this sense.

As a re su lt , L e i b n i z m a y ha ve be en th e cl os es t to ex pr es si ng th e

first clear consciousn ess of tech nol ogy in his look in g to pu t the

machina ex Deo into pl ay —w e can say as mu ch unless, of course, it

is not also advisable to com bin e this form ulat ion wi th that of Sp in

oza's, the Deus sive natura sive machina: after which the "death of

G o d " signif ies the rigorous carry ing out of the prog ram for mula ted

as the machina ex machina (ex natura), that which does not f inish

finishing [celle qui n'en finit pas de finir] and ab out w h i ch it remains

for us to think its law and to discover just what is at stake in it.

It is necessary, here, to inclu de a consid erat ion of the extremely

pronounced pos it ion in w h ich our th inking puts w ar , b etw een " na-



I20 War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

ture" and "technology." (Also note the "wholly natural" ambiguity

of our und ersta ndin g of such a sentence: i s it a matter of war co n

s idered as an intermediary pos it ion b etw een nature and tech nol

ogy, or is it a matter of war whi ch takes place between n ature and

technology? Precisely speaking, we are ready to think these two

things together.) War is what there is that is most and/or least "nat

ural." It arises from the most brutal instincts and/or from the cold

est calculation, and so on. This position is not without certain con

nections to that place between "art" and "nature" that we give to

" b e a u t y . " T h i s p o s i t i o n , w h i c h i s b o t h p r o b l e m a t i c a n d p r i v i le ge d— an d is itself replayed twice between tw o orders, that of art

and w ar, cons idered in s ome w ay to b e oppos ed to one anoth er—

is not without importance. We will return to this below.

Every consideration about ends leads back to sovereignty. The

pow er of ends, a s the power of the ulti ma te or extre me, resides in a

sovereignty. A n d every end, as such , is necessarily ordered by a sov

ereign end (a "sovereign good"). F or the whol e of our thi nki ng , the

End is in Sovereignty, and Sovereignty is in the End. The absolute

transc ende nce, o r the abyss, or the myst ery of supr eme ends tha t is

f ound al l th rough out th e t radit ion—f or example, th e impos s ib i l

i ty of deter mini ng th e " content" of th e P latonic G oo d or th e Kant

ian La w — is held f irmly with in this circle: that whi ch is sovereign is

f inal, that which is f inal is sovereign.

Sove reig nty is the power of exe cutio n or the power of finishing as

such, absolutely so and without any further subordination to some

thing else (to another end). Divine creation and the royal decision

compose its double image: to make or unmake a world, to submit

to a will , to designate an enemy. Although anticipated by the leg

islative power and controlled by the judicial power, this is why the

executive powe r attains to an excep tional state [of power] in war;

in spite of ever ything , however, this occurrenc e touches upon (de

ju re a n d d e fa ct o) the ve ry e xt re m it y of d ec is io n m a k i n g a n d po w er

(powerful decision and decisive power) where it accomplishes its

"executive" essence most properly, the sovereign essence of B e i n g —


wh er e th is is "p ow er " (as th e p ri nc e , St at e, n a ti o n , pe op le , fa th er

land, and so on).

T h i s is w h y accus ing a s overeign pow er of w ant ing w ar s o ob vi

ously falls short of the mar k. Th e exec ution of this desire [vouloir]

for war is not onl y one of the prop er ends of the executiv e organ ; it

also represents the extreme m od e of these ends. So that it is no

longer an organ w i th regard to th e execut ion of s uch des ire; in

stead, it is sovereig nty itself in its f inishing—insofar as we thin k

sovereignty according to the only concept that is at our disposal.

In w ar , th ere is s ometh ing th at immediately goes b ey ond al l th e

possible goals of war, wh ethe r they be defensive or offensive: the

acc omp lish men t of the Sovereign as such in a relatio n of absolute

oppos it ion w ith anoth er S overeign . War is indis s ociab ly th e physis

and technê of sovereignty. Its law, the exception of its law, has as its

cou nte rpo int the law of grace: but wit h the latter, the Sove reign

never id enti fies itse lf nor executes its elf vis-à-vis the other.

If it were necessary, one co ul d f ind a cert ain con fir ma tio n [of

this] in the very peculiar symb olic or fantastical weight of the in

strume nts and m ach ine ry of war. It is dif f icu lt to deny that even if

the Gu lf Wa r gave rise to an explic it discourse of sovereignty onl y

in an awkw ard and c ursory manne r, that is , in the form of a denial ,

i t certain ly arous ed an except iona l dep loy me nt of th e images of

tanks, jets , missiles, and helmeted soldiers, images saturated with

s y mb ol ic w eigh t . I t even deploy e d images of s y mb o l ic s aturat ion

itself, wh ich c oul d well con stitute a trait of sovereign f inishing.

Objects lose their symbolic character to the extent that their

techn icity grows, at least that technic ity posited in terms of func

tion ality ( in terms of means); b ut this does not prevent the object

f rom b e ing s y mb ol ical ly ( or f antas t ical ly ) inves ted again . W it h re

gard to this , thi nk of a s ickle, a ham mer , a set of gears, an d even a

circuit board. But today (and in the past, for that matter) , there is

no better place for such symbolism to adhere to function in such

an im med iate ly obvious man ner as in the images of the weap ons

of war. Su ch adherence un dou bte dly comes fr om the fact that this

image does not present a tool of destr ucti on, bu t rather the aff ir

ma tio n of the sovereign rig ht of the sovereign powe r to execute a



122 War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne 123

s overeign des truc t ion , or to execute i t s el f in des tru ct ion , as D e

struc tion ( of the other sovereign). Th is is not really a funct ion; it is

a destination: to give and receive collective death, death sublimated

into th e des t iny of th e com mun ity , th e com mu nit y ident i f ied in a

sovereign exposition to death. (Is Death the true Sovereign in this

w h o le aff ai r? W e w i l l c om e ba ck to th is .)

Thus, war borders on art. This is not to say that it borders on the

art of war, the tec hno log y of the strategist; it is to say, rather, that it

bo rd er s on ar t u nd e rs to od ab so lu te ly in its m o d e r n sen se, technê asa mod e of the executi on of Bei ng, as its mod e of f inishi ng in the

explos ive b r i l l iance [éclat] o f th e b eaut i f u l and s ub l ime, th at dou

bl ed ri va lr y fo r so ve re ig nt y th at oc cu rs w i t h i n th e bl os so m i n g [éclo-

sion] of physis. (Moreover, physis no longer takes place except as me

diated th rough technê, or one could say that it never takes place "in

itself," or in a ny other way, excep t as the imag e of the sovereig nty of

techne.) U ndo ubt edl y, the aestheticiza tion of the war like spectacle

also comes from denial [dénégation] or dis s imulat ion. But th is ma

nipulation does not exhaust an aesthetic (a sensible presentation)

of th e des t iny of com mun ity : th e death of indiv id uals is im me di

ately recuperated w ith in th e f igure of th e S overeign Leader or Na

t ion w h ere th e community f inds i t s f in is h ing. War is th e monu

men t, the festival, the sombe r and pure sign of the co mm un it y in

its sovereignty.

In essence, war is collective, and the collectivity that is endowed

w i t h so ve re ig nt y (th e K i n g d o m , St at e, or E m p i r e ) is by d e fi n i ti on

endowed with the right to war (as Thomas Aquinas writes, "bellum

particulare non proprie dicitur"). Th e entire hist ory of the concept

of w ar demons trates th at i ts determ inat ion is located w i th i n th e

cons tant p lay b etw een i t s re lat ion w ith th e res publica ( th e com

m o n w e a l t h as good and e nd in itself) and its re lat ion w ith the Prin-

ceps (the p r i n c i p l e an d pr inc ipate of sovereign authority ) . No t on ly

is the latter in charge of the former, n ot onl y is the Prin ce in pos

session of the arm ed forces necessa ry to the [ma inte nan ce of the]

Repub l ic , b ut th e commonw eal th as s uch mus t a ls o pres ent and

represent his absolute and f inal character, his sovereignty, and its

arm ed forces must ca rry the f lag of his glory.

I t is at th is very point th at th e law of th e rep ub l i c— of any k in d

of repub l ic , even today 's rep ub l ics — ine vita b ly comes up agains t

[touche] the exception of the prince , whatever the form of gove rn

ment migh t b e. E ven today , democracy h as not prof oundly dis

placed this schema; it has only suppressed or repressed it, back into

the shadow of its ow n uncerta inties (that is , the uncert aint y con

cerning i t s ow n s overeignty , an uncertainty th at even today remains cos ub s tant ia l w ith i t ) . L ike w h at is repres s ed, th en, th e

schema of the sovereign exception never stops retur ning , and i t re

turns as the perversion of democ racy, whe ther this retur n happens

in the innu mer abl e coups d'etat of its histor y or in bec om ing to

talitar ian (where the excep tion transforms itself int o a do ub li ng of

the structure of the State by another [structure] w hi ch inca rnates

true sovereignty).

S ince World War I , h ow ever , i t i s democracy as s uch —s uch as i t

has ende d up presenting itself as the general prin cip le of hu ma n

ity , i f not h umanity 's E n d — th a t has been s uppos edly end ow e d

w i t h th e ri g ht to wa r, th er eb y tr a n sf or m i n g wa r i n to th e de fe ns e of

th e res publica o f h uman ity . T h i s pres uppos es th at a neutral coun

try ( th e U nited S tates —w h en one th inks ab out i t , as long as th ere

are several sovereigns, n eutr ality is a strange fo rm of sovereignty)

decides to take leave of its neutral p osit ion in the name o f hu ma n

rights, and that it explicit ly designate as its enemy, not a people or

a nation, but governments judged to be dangerous to the good of

all peoples ("civilized" . . . ) . In world war, democracy does not go

to war against a sovereign (G erm an y and the countr ies of the A l

liance), but against bad leaders.

(N ote add ed 6 Ap ri l 1991: today, in the face of the suppression

of the Kur ds by the same sovereign leader on who m was inf licte d

the "police a ction " of law, the Powers hesitate between respect for

his sovereignty within his own borders and an aff irmation by the

"int erna tion al com mu ni ty " of a right to interfere in the matters of

certain countries. . . . Today, there is no better way to il lusttate the

inconsi stencies and aporias that belo ng to the cou pli ng of " inte r-



124 War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê 125

national law" and "sovereignty." This said, however, it is evidently

not these conceptual dif f iculties that motivate the various dif ferent

ju dg m en ts an d he si ta ti on s. . . . Th e se di ff ic ul ti es do ex pr ess the ac

tual state of a wor ld enc umb ere d by sovereignty, but it is a wo rl d

that does not know how to displace or go beyond sovereignty.)

In order for the decision to go to war—against Germany, against

Ir aq — in the name of hu ma n rights to become a decisio n (and not

a wish), it was necessary that this decision take form and force in

and b y way of the sovereignty of a Sta te— an d/o r an allian ce of

States. Wh e n one or several States speak in the nam e of the rights

of ma n, an d, u nde r this name , put to use the prerogative s of the jus

belli, this continues to operate as a sovereign decision (or an alliance

of such d ecisio ns). In a sense, this is even an increase of soverei gnty

in comp arison w ith that of the prince. This is why, in the Gu lf War,

the tug of war [le va-et-vient] between the authority of the Uni te d

Na tio ns and the Uni te d States (and, if one considers it carefully, the

aut hor ity of some other States as well) has been so com ple x and so

simple at the same time, so delicate and so indelicate. The legiti

macy wit hou t sovereignty of " inter nation al law" needed a sovereign

technê—and not just a means of exe cuti on, as we have been m ade

to believe. But this sovereign, in tu rn, needed the legitimacy of hu

man rights in order to establish its decisions and pretensions, which

cou ld only b e of g lob al dime ns ions , jus t l ike th e pr inci p les and

promise s of the law (which itself stil l remains wi thou t founda tion ,that is , without sovereignty and without "f inishing").

He re, as everywhe re else, it is solely a questio n of the pub lic

Go od and of P eace. Fr om P lato and Aris tot le to Ch ri s t ian an d Re

pub l ican doc tr ines , th e w h ole h is tory of our th i nki ng ab out w ar

testif ies to this . Not that long ago, Henry Kissinger declared "the

goal of all wars is to ensure a durabl e peace," an d his judg men t of

fered there was upheld (or weakened?) by twenty-f ive centuries of

ph i los oph ical , th eological , eth ical , and jur idical repet i t ion . Wes t

ern [occidentale] war always has peace as its end, even to such a ex

tent that it is necessary to "battle peacefully," as was put forth from

A u g u st i n e to Bo n if ac e . Sp ar ta wa s th at sta te w h i c h ga ve it se lf wa r

as the end of its structure and f orm atio n, an d Plato subjected it to

a severe crit ique. What constitutes the principle of f inal peace has

undoub tedly s h i f ted more th an once, not only in f act—w h ich is

more than evid ent, but in theory itself ( for example, by m ix in g the

logic of "peace" together with a logi c of religious co nver sion , or

w i t h a lo g ic of the o cc u p a ti o n of a te rr it or y cl ai m e d as an i n h e r i

tance). None theless, the general theoretical regulati on of Wes tern

w a r re m ai n s th at of pa c if ic a to ry w a r (a m o t i f th at ha s be en ex

tend ed so far as to inclu de the exp orta tion of cert ain colon iali st

forms of "peace") . Western w ar denies itself as sovereign en d, a nd

its denial, of course, constitutes its admi ssion.

It would be necessary here to take the time to analyze the com

plex play between the three great monoth eism s "of the Book ,"

w h i c h are al so th e th re e m on o th e is m s " o f c o m m u n i t y " an d , th er e

fore, of sovereignty. Al tho ug h each of them has its own particu lar

complexity, both Israelite (at least until the destruction the Tem

ple) and Islam ic mon othe ism reserve a place for a prin cipl e of war

that does go together [se confond] wi th the peace of the peoples.

Ch ris t ian monoth eis m pres ents anoth er complexity , w h ich mixes

the mo del of the pax romana together wi th the m ode l of the war

against the Infidels . Eve n as a religi on of love, it does not sim ply

go togethe r wit h a pri nc ipl e of peace: for there are enemies of love,

w he re d i v i n e lo ve is of an ot he r ess en ce th an h u m a n lo ve . I n th eprocess of its becom ing -mo der n, a process it has been engaged in

fro m the very start, Chr ist ia n love recuperates wi th in itsel f the

irenic prin cipl e of Gree k philoso phy (whi ch presupposes the break

do wn of the Ep ic and imitate s this break dow n in the install ation

of logos) and becom es entirely a princ ipl e of peace, and peace in

terms of univ ersal h um an ri ghts. I t is here that the god of love loses

his divinity l itt le by l itt le, and love in peace loses its sovereignty.

Th e peace of hu ma nis m is wit hou t force or grandeur; it is nothi ng

other than the enervati on of war.

Dep riv ed of the Templ e an d of any place for sovereignty, State,

and soil , Jewish monotheism needs to be annihilated, somewhere

beyo nd war it sel f [dans un au-delà de la guerre même], precisely be-




cause of this lack of sovereign ty. On the oth er side, tak en up i n the

s erv ice of Wes te rn s tat is m and na t iona l is m , th e Is lamic jihad

reigni tes the flame o f the Crus ade s in the face of peace an d the rule

[police] of law. In each instance, however, Jewi sh mon oth eis m can

i d e n t i f y a n d s u m m o n [assigner] anew th e s ub l ime S overeignty i t

puts into play; while at every moment, Is lam can take the absolute

S overeignty th at s eals i t s community and p lunge into contempla

t ion and ab and onment . I n th is w ay , th en, t r ip le monoth eis m is po

s i t ioned w ith in a doub le regime th at is cons t i tuted, on th e onehan d, b y the war of Sovereignties a nd, o n the other, by the tension

be tw ee n its ex ec ut io n a n d its r e t r e a t — a te ns io n th at oc cu rs in ea ch

one of them , and between th em .

Bu t as such, the symbi osis of this triple mon oth eis m, and its

other/same phil osop hica l mono log ism , presents itself und er a sign

of the war of prin cipl es: sovereign wa r (that of three gods at war w it h

the triple god) versus pacif icatory wa r — o r again, the confr ontati on

be tw ee n so ve re ig n w a r a n d so ve re ig n pe ac e. T h i s c on fr on ta ti on is

present in philosophy itself , between an absolute appeal for peace

(that dema nded by the logos) and incessantly resorting to the schema

of the polemos (also demanded by the logos, th rough w h ich i t medi

ates itself) . But the sovereignty of peace remains a pro mise d and/or

idea l sovereignty, while the sovereig nty of war is already give n. I t

leaves intact the trace of divi ne refulgence fou nd wi thi n the polemos,

the trace of the epic song, and of royal privilege. It is in this way thateven today, in phi losop hy and in all the nerve centers of our cultur e,

w ar u nd e r ta ke n fo r pe ac e ca n ne ve r st op b ei n g w ar fo r wa r' s sa ke ,

and against peace. This is true no matter what course such war may

take. Techno log y in the service of peace cannot avoid be ing taken

up again into the technê of sovereignty, that is, int o Sove reig nty as

technê, th e execut ion and f in is hing of th e commun ity , w h ere com

munity allegedly has nothing to do with physis and does not desire

its "nature" from technêpolitike. (In this regard, it would be neces

sary to show how, with the Greeks, technê politike in principle splits

itself into sovereign technê and the technê of justice or law , the reby

ma kin g the project of sutu ring the m together impossi ble) .

It follows from this that, when a claim to it is made, the sover

eignty of peace is not perfectly symm etric al wi th the sovereignty of

w ar . I ns te a d, pe ac e w o u l d be th e "s u p re m e " g o o d , w he re its su

prem acy cou ld not manife st itself as such, either in glory, power,

or col lect ive ident i f icat ion. T h e w h ite dove remains . . . . P eace

w o u l d be th e su pr em ac y of th e ab se nc e of an y su pr em e d i st i n c ti on ,

the absence of exce ption a t the heart of any rule , everyw here i n

definitely and equally closed in on itself . But, in this way, peace

cannot fai l to have, for the who le of our cul ture, some aspect of re

nunciat ion w ith in i t . T h is is b ecaus e, in th e end, any th ing th at isprope rly to be called Sovere ignty requires the incandesce nce of the

excep tion and the identif ia ble dist inc tion of its f inishing. (In fact,

do we ever identify a peace, presented in person, except under the

name and ins igni a of an empir e— pa x romana, pax americanaî)

Th e sovereignty of law, wh ic h wou ld necessarily structure peace,

is inevitably, and to however small an extent, sovereignty by de

fault—whereas true sovereignty takes place not only in plenitude

b u t in ex ce ss a n d a s ex ce ss. E v e n no w, th is fu n d a m e n ta l d i sp os i

t ion prevents w ar f rom ever s imply b ec omin g a tech nique des t ined

to enlist force into the service of right, w ith ou t it also always bein g

th e technê of sovereign aff irmation.

It is not suff icient, therefore, to keep returning to the f inal exi

gency of peace, any more than it is suff icient to denounc e the il l usion o f such an a im a nd rely on the real ism of force. I n essence,

these two dif fere nt faces of the same attitud e have reg ulated ou r

com por tme nt to the recent war, by means of the total or partia l re

pression of what I have attempted to lay out here. To remai n at this

point, however, is to prepare the way for the wars to come—and

w i t h o u t ev en b o t h e r i n g to k n o w if th e re st ra in t th at ha s be en

show n in cert ain aspects of con duc tin g this war (to such an extent

that there was not "truly" a war, although there has been all the de

sirable destruction) does not, in fact, represent a small step toward

a complet e "rele gitim ation " of war, where the condit ions of such a

possibility would not be as far away as one would have liked to be

lieve or been led to believe.




At th is p oi n t, on e m ig h t ob je ct th at th e em ph as is p la ce d on th e

sy mb oli c order of sovereign ty denies, either at the same time or in

turn , the auth enticity of the need for law and the play of econom ic

forces. Not at al l , as we wil l see. Rather, a symbolic order so widely

and deeply woven into the whole culture produces all its effects in

the real (and thus, for example, in economy and law; in truth, how

ever, none of these "orders" sim pl y comes fro m the symb oli c or the

real. . . ). It is important not to misunderstand these effects. Just as

much as art , anything that is properly to be cal led war is absolutely

archaic in its symbolic character, which indicates that it escapes from b e in g a pa rt of " hi st or y" u n de r st oo d as th e pr og re ss of a li ne ar

and/or cumulative t ime. But it returns to this when it is a matter of

open ing anew a certain space with in this t i me: the space of the pre

sentation of Sovereignty. Thi s "archais m" (again, like that of art) thus

obeys laws that are more deeply set within our civil izat ion, in such

a way as to indicate that it is something more than a regrettable

holdover [ fâcheuse survivance]. But it is precisely because it is not

consistent to treat war like a regrettable holdover from a bygone age,

always tend entio usly effaced in the progress and project of a global

humanity, that it is al l the more important and urgent to think what

is at stake in its "archaism," and to think this for ourselves today.

(A tho rou gh ex am inat ion of this space of sovereignty and war

o bv io u sl y wo u l d requ ire so met hin g qu i t e d i f feren t f ro m wha t I

have just outl ined above. This would be an enormous project , in

part icula r as regards offeri ng different analyses of the "sacred." So v

ereignty has always been mixed up with the "sacred" through the

mec hani sm of exception a nd excess, but the im plic at ions o f sover

eign ty have still not been as clea rly thou ght out as those of the "sa

cre d" itself (as thou gh this is the effect of an obscur e interest in not

knowing too much about the sovereignty that is always at work).

Bu t there wo ul d also need to be a lot of wo rk done wi th regard to

a psychoanalysis that could manage, in a way different from what

has always been done, to treat collect ivity or community as such

(which Freud always seems to submit, volens nolens, to the schema

of the Sovereign), n ot to ment ion the sexual difference that is al

wa ys p u t in to p la y v i a w ar . . . ).

Ecotechnics [Écotechnie]

A l l th at sa id , it s t i l l remains that the persistence [rémanence] or

rein vent ion of war does not occur outside history , even if our ep och

appears to be the great suspension of the historic ity by wh ic h we

have been carried along. The confl ict between the police and the

bellum proprie dictum is also the effect of a histor ical d ispl acem ent

of great importa nce, and of great consequence, for war.

Th e f i rst "wo r l d wi d e" wa r c o rrespo n d s t o t he emerg en c e o f a

schema of wor ldw ide pro portio ns, wh ich im poses itself on the sov

ereigns themselves. Thus, war/police act ion [la guerre-police] is de-

loca lize d; for exam ple, it has less to do wi th the borders of the sov

ereign States themselves than wi th the mul t ip le forms of the

"presen ce" of these States that span the wor ld ( interests, zones of

influence, and so on). As such, war/police act ion also becomes a

confro ntation of "worldv iews": a "wo rldvi ew" is never the attribute

of sovereignty; by defin it ion, sovereignty is higher than any "view,"

and the "wo rld " is the imp rin t of its decisio n. The powers have the

w o r l d as th e sp ac e gi ve n fo r th e p la y of th ei r so ve re ig nt ie s. B u t

w h e n th is sp ac e is sa tu ra te d a nd th e p la y cl os ed off , th e w o r l d as

such becomes a problem. It is no longer certain that the finish of

this wor ld can be envisaged in the same way that the wor ld of sov

ereigns was. The world, that is, man or global humanity, is not the

sum total of hum ani ty or the instal lat ion of a new sovereignty (con

trary to what humanism sought and desired, even to the point of

ex ha u st io n ) . Th e wa r/po l ic e a c t io n o f g l o ba l h u m a n it y pu t s t he

ends of "m an" dire ctly into play, whereas sovere ign war exposes the

en d i t se l f . An d ju st a s wa r—a n d a r t —c o mpo sed t he technai of sov

ereignty, so global humanity has no techne of its own: however

thoroughly "technological" our culture may be, it is only technê in

suspension. It is not surprising that war haunts us. . . .

As a co ro ll ar y to th e de ve lo p m en t of a w o r l d m ar ke t, on e ca n see

in the in venti on of wo rl d war the result of al l the wars that accom

pani ed the creation of the contemp orary wor ld: o n the one hand ,

t here a re t he Amer ic a n R ev o l u t io n a ry W a r a n d Civ i l W a r , wa rs in

the tradi t ion of sovereign war and b earing the self-affir mation of a




new and dist inct Sovereignty (during the nineteenth century, these

served as the mode l for the wars and/or foun din g of nations, p ri n

cipally the new Germany; even later, this model was inherited by

va ri ou s co lo ni es ) ; on th e ot he r h a n d , th er e is th e w ar of li b er at io n

in the name of hu ma nk in d, in the name of its "natural" rights and

fraternity, such as it was invented in the French Revolution. It is

this second model that no longer corresponds strict ly to the sover

eign schema: it oscillates between a general revolt against the very

order of sovereigns (wh o are cal led tyrants, a term that makes an

appeal for a possible legit imac y of rebel l ion wi th in the ethico-ju -

r id ic a l t ra d i t io n ) a n d a po l ic e d a d m in ist r a t io n o f hu ma n k in d ,

w h i c h re st ra in s it se lf f r o m ab us in g its go ve rn an ce .

As su ch , th en , th e gl ob al sta te of w ar ex pr ess es a s im p le ne ed , as

either its cause or its effect: it needs an authority that goes beyond

that of Sovereigns endo wed wi th the righ t to war. Strict ly speak

ing, there is no place for this need within the space and logic of

sovereignty. M or e precisely, it can be analy zed in one of the fol

lowing ways: either this authority would have to be a global sover

eignty, whi ch co uld not be in a state of war wi th anyon e on earth

(bu t o n l y w i t h a l l t he g a l a c tic empires o f sc ien c e f i c t io n , whi c h

demonstrates that we really only have one model at our disposal

fro m wh ich to extrapolate. . . . ); or this authori ty is of another na

ture, an d of another orig in (and end), than that of sovereignty.

F r o m t he L ea g u e o f N a t io n s t o t he Un i t ed N a t io n s , t here ha s

be en an in ce ss an t p u tt i n g in to p la y of th e ap or ia s of su ch "s up ra -

sovereignty," bo th fro m the standpo int of its legit imate founda tion

and fr om the stan dpoi nt of its capacity to endow itself wi th an ef

fect ive force. To different degrees, analogous problems are posed

b y th e va ri ou s tr a ns na ti on al or ga ni za ti on s of A f r i c a n or A s i a n

States. In yet another way, Eur ope itself is co mi ng up against the

problem of inter-, trans-, or supranational sovereignty; in this case,

it is not principally a problem that pertains to war, except as re

gards the transf orma tions of the two great mi lit ar y alliances already

underway.

One can see that the problem is radical. It is not solely a matter of

co mb in in g the needs of coor dina tion, that is, to see how inte rna

tional cooperation goes together with the respect for the sovereign

rights of States. It is also not solely a matter of inven ting n ew

pol itico -jur idic al forms (w hether one goes in the dire ction of the de

l iberative Assemb ly or in the direct ion of a global Feder ation, there

is no leaving these aporias behind). Such forms hold fast to the

grou nd, an d to groun ding per se. Moreover , it is one of the tasks of

law and its formali sm to br ing to l igh t the wo rk of gro und ing that

goes on in the pu rif yi ng of concep ts. B ut clearly, law itsel f does not

have a form for what would need to be its own sovereignty.

The problem is put forward clearly, and in a decisive manner, at

the very place of sove reig nty— or of the En d.

The problem is not a matter of fixing up [aménager] sovereignty:

in essence, sovereignty is untreatable, but the untreatable essence

of sovereignty, in fact , no lon ger belongs to a wor ld that is

"g l o ba l . " Thu s, t he pro bl em is in d eed o n e o f g ro u n d i n g so met hin g

in an entirely new way, something for which there are neither rea

sons (why? for what? for whom is there or must there be a global

w or ld ?) no r an y ap p li ca bl e m od el s. G l o b a l h u m a ni ty , or m a n af ter

hu ma nis m, is exposed to a l i mi t or an abyss of gro und ing , of end

and exemplarity.

However relat ive it may be, however mixed up it is with the rise

a n d fa l l o f ma n y u n c o n v in c in g a n d pa rt ic u l a r ist c l a ims t o "so v er

eignty," the "retur n of war" expresses essential ly a need or impu lsefor sovereignty. Not only do we have nothing other than models

of sovereignty, but Soverei gnty in itself is also a pr inc ip al mo de l

o r sc hema o f "c iv i l i z a t io n " w here "g l o ba l iz a t io n " i s a t wo rk . I t i s

on the mod el or schema of "that whic h has noth ing above itself,"

of the unsurpassable, the uncon dit ion al, or the nons ubor dina ble.

It is the mod el of al l this quo magis non dici potest w h e r e or i g i n ,

pr in c ipl e , en d , f in ishin g , l ea d er , a n d br i l l ia n c e [éclat] c o me t o

gether again for us. . . . But glob al hum an ity is another sort of ex

t remit y , a n o t her quo magis. . . , t o whic h t h is mo d el n o l o n g er

pertains.

A l t h o u g h th e d o m i n i o n of th is m o d e l is m a in ta i n e d b y de fa ul t,




only law appears to elude it. This is because, right away, law sets it

self up betw een first princ iple s and final ends (the sovereign space

is the figure; the juridical space is the interval). Law consents to let

principles and ends fal l under an authority other than its own, and

this consent belongs to its structure. It thus escapes from the model

only in order to designate anew the places where the model applies:

a t ea c h o f t he t wo ex t remit ies , p r in c ip l es a n d en d s. So v ere ig n t y

cannot stop haunting us, since it is at these extremities that law, of

its own accord, locates authority [l'instance] as the exception and

the excess, whi ch is also the authori ty of exemp larity.

W i t h i n su ch ex em p la ri ty , th er e is al wa ys an ex ce p ti on th at p ro

vi de s, or gi ve s, th e ru le . ( T h u s , th e so ve re ig n w a r ri or wa s ab le to

provide a model that did not simply lead to batt le. In the end, how

ever, the histo ry of sovereignties is a histor y of devastati on. . . . ) B ut

w i t h i n th e di ss ol u ti on of ex em p la ri ty the re are tw o el em en ts : on th e

one hand, the exception into which the rule is reabsorbed; on the

other, a rule without example (the law), that is, without finish.

Ever since the inven tion of "nat ural " ma n (an expression where

"natural" really signifies "technological"), we have insisted on clos

ing our eyes to the absence of the founda tion of la w — an d, al ong

w i t h th is , w e ha ve in si st ed on ig n or i n g th e f ou n d at io n al ro le so v

ereignty plays in the schema of the exception (d ivine creation, o rig

inary violence, the founding hero, the royal race, imperial glory, the

soldier's sacrifi ce, the geniu s at wo rk , the subject of one's ow n law,

the subject without faith or law . . . ). In this way, we have ignored

w h at is tr u ly at st ak e in w ar . By w a y of th e j u d g m e n t th at w ar is"evil ," even as an evil which is sometimes "necessary," we repress

the truth that war is the mod el of executive and finit ive [ finitrice]

technê, as long as the end is thought as sovereign end; in a parallel

manner, beneath the judgment that the law is a "good," but a for

mal good without any force, we repress the truth that the law

w h i c h is w h o l l y w i th o u t an y m o d e l or f o u nd a ti on , w h e n it is no t

governed by sovereignty, represents a technê wi t h o u t en d . Thi s i s

w ha t ou r t h i n k i n g do es no t k n o w h o w to de al w i t h (e xc ep t to c o n

fine it in "art ," for better or worse) and what in every technology

creates fear in our thinking. We wil l not have responded to the

ques tion of war, except by means of ever more war, u nti l we have

crossed through this problematic field.

H o w [ is o n e] t o t h in k wi t ho u t en d , wi t ho u t f in ishin g , wi t ho u t

so v ere ig n t y— a n d , in t h is , wi t h o u t res ig n in g o n ese lf t o a wea k , in

st ru m en t a l , a n d s l a v ishl y hu ma n ist t h in k i n g o f t he la w (a n d /o r

" c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " " j u s t i c e , " t h e " i n d i v i d u a l , " t h e " c o m m u n i t y " —

all of wh ic h are concepts that are deb il ita ted insof ar as there has

be en no re sp on se to th is qu es ti on )?

It is not sufficient, however, to ask the question in this way. Even

it if is wit ho ut reaso n, end , or figure, it is clear ly the case that the

"glob al (di s)order" has beh in d it all the effectiveness of wh at we call

"planetary techno logy" an d "wo rld econo my" : the doub le sign of a

single ne twork of the re ciproc ity of causes an d effects, of the cir cu

larity of ends and m eans. In fact , this netw ork or order is what is

w i th ou t- e n d [sans-fin], bu t wi t ho u t -en d in t erms o f mi l l io n s o f d o l

l a rs a n d yen , in t erms o f mi l l io n s o f t herms, k i l o wa t t s , o p t ic a l

fibers, megabytes. If the wo rld is a worl d today, then it is prim ari ly

a world according to this double sign. Let us cal l this ecotechnics.

It is remarkable that the country which has thus far been the

sym bo l o f t r iu mp ha n t ec ot ec hn ic s a lso c o n c en t ra t es wi t h i n i t se l f

the figure of the sovereign State (sup ported b y the arche-law of its

foun datio n and by the hegemo ny of its dom ina tion ) and the figure

of the law (present in its foun dation , and th ought to structure "ci vil

society"). The Soviet world was supposed to have represented therevolution that both reverses and goes beyond this triple determi

n a t io n , rest o r in g a so c ia l -hu ma n whole in itse lf as en d. In fact, this

w o r l d wa s no t th e w o r l d of th e St at e, or la w, or ec ot ec hn ic s, bu t a

pa in f u l l y c o n t o rt ed imi t a t io n o f t he three a n d t he ir v a r io u s rel a

t ions, pu t to the service of the pure app rop riat i on of power. But it

is no less remarkable that these two entit ies shared, in their differ

en c e a n d o pp o si t io n ( in t he "C o l d W a r" o f t wo So v ere ig n s f ix ed o r

frozen in different ways), as a ki nd of asymptote or com mo n l ine of

fl ight , something that one would have to cal l sovereignty without

sovereignty, to the extent that this word and its schema remain in-




evitab le: th at is , the s upreme dom ina t io n of w h at w ou ld neith er

have the bril l iance [éclat] of orig in nor the glory of acco mpl ishme nt

in a sovereign presence; although there was no God, no hero, no

geniu s, there rem ain ed the logic of the subject of exce ptio n, the

subject wi tho ut the law of its ow n law, and there rem ain ed an exe

cut ion , an indef in ite and une ndin g f in is h ing of th is logic . E cotech -

nics mig ht be the last f igure wit hou t f igure of the world's s low drift

into s overeignty w ith out s overeignty , into f in is h ing w ith out end.

In this way, then, the recent war might have been a powerful

resurgence of sovereignty (while perhaps wa rn ing us to expect oth

ers) and , at the same ti me , the ope ni ng of a passage that leads tothe regim e (or reign?) of sover eign ty wi th ou t sovereignty, a passage

that opens up from inside war itself. But just as there has been an

attem pt to skirt the issue of war by mak in g it into a police act ion,

there has been an attem pt to avoid the necessary coup lin g of vic

tory and defeat by maki ng it a matter of negoti ation, wher e what is

at stake is " intern atio nal la w" as the guar antor of ecotechni cs. At

the same time, all s ides have refused to count the dead in a clear

w ay (to sa y n o t h i n g of th e d i st i n c t i o n be tw ee n d e ad so ld ie rs a n d

dead civ ilian s): give n the plausible rep ort of at least one dead ( in

the North, in the West . . . ) for every f ive hundred dead ( in the

South, in the East. . . ) , it seems that victory and defeat are grow

ing closer together, terms which themselves are as untenable as they

are insignif icant. Finally, as everyone knows perfectly well , the true

realm of this war has revealed itself to be that of ecotec hnical war,

or conf rontat ion , a des truct ive and appropriat ive maneuvering

w i t h o u t so ve re ig n br i ll i a n c e . S u c h w a r yi e ld s n o t h i n g to re al w a r

as far as power and the technolog ies of rui nat ion an d conquest are

concerned.

Th e class struggle was suppose d to be the other of bo th sovereign

wa r a n d ec ot ec hn ic al wa r. If o ne cl ai ms th at th is str ug gl e is no lo ng er

taking place, or that it no longer has a place in which to take place,

then on e is also saying that there is no confli ct outside of sovereig n

w ar (c al le d a "p ol ic e [a ct io n] ," in or de r to be d e n ie d at th e ve r y

poi nt of its return) and ecotec hnical war (whic h is called "com peti

tion"). Nowhere, then, is there war, and everywhere there is tearing

apart , t rampl ing dow n, c iv i l ized v iolence, and th e b rutal i t ies th at

are mere caricatures of ancient, sacred violence. Wa r is nowhere a nd

everywhere, related to any end without any longer being related to

itself as suprem e end. In a sense, then, ec otechnics is also pure

techne, the pure technê of nonsovereignty: but because the empty

place of sovereignty remai ns occup ied , enc umb ere d by this very

v o i d , ec ot ec hn ic s do es no t at ta in to wa rd an ot he r t h i n ki n g of the e nd

w i th ou t e n d . B y w ay of the a d m in is tr a ti on a n d c o n tr o l of "c om p e

tit ion," ecotechnics substitutes crushing blows for sovereignty.

Fr om no w on, th en, ecotech nics is the name f or " pol i t ica l econ

omy ," because accor ding to our thi nk in g, if there is no sovereignty,

then there can be no polit ics. There is no longer any polis since the

oikos is everywhe re: the hou seke epi ng of the wor ld as a s ingle

household, with "humanity" for a mother, " law" for a father.

But it is clearly the case that this big family does not have a fa

ther or a mother, and that, in the end, it is no more oikos th an po

lis, (ecology: What semantics, what space, what world can it offer?)

T h is s i tuat ion can b e s ummarized in th ree points :

1. It imp lies a trip le div isio n that is in no way a sharin g of sover

eignties: the div isio n of the rich fr om the poor; the divis ion of the

integrated f rom th e exc luded; and th e div is ion of th e Nor th f rom

the South. These three dimensions do not overlap as easily as is

sometimes presented, but this is not the place to speak to that. It is

s olely a matter , h ere, of emph as iz in g th at thes e div is ions im ply

struggles and conflicts of great violen ce, whe re every conside ratio nof sovereignty is in vain and always borro wed . In ad dit ion , if the

sche ma of "class struggl e" hides itse lf (and un dou bted ly, it is no

longer even admissible, at least in a certain historical dimension),

th en noth ing remains to prevent v io lence f rom b eing camouf laged

as ecotechnical competition. Or rather, nothing remains except for

ba re ju st ic e: Bu t w h a t is a jus t ice th at w ould not be the telos o f a

history, or the priv ilege of a sovereignty? It is necessary, the n, to

learn how to think this empty place. . . .

2. Ecotechnics damages, weakens, and upsets the functioning of




all sovereignties, except for those that in reality coincide with

ecotech nical pow er. Na t iona l is ms , w h eth er th ey b e of an ancient

lineage or of recent extraction , delive r themselves up to the painfu l

imitat ion s of a m um mi f ie d s overeignty . T h e current s pace of s ov

ereignty , w h ich cannot b e recuperated b y any cos mopol i tanis m

(because cos mop oli tan ism is always the dre aml ike opposite of the

sovereign order) , w hi ch is also the space of the f inishing of identity

in general, is solely a diste nded space full of holes, where no thi ng

can come to presence.

3. By way of hypo crisy and den ial, bu t not wit hou t signif icanc e

for all that, ecotechnics gives value to a prim acy of the com bin a

tory over th e dis cr im inat i ng, of the contractual over th e h ierarch i

cal, o f the netwo rk over the organi sm, a nd mo re generally, of the

spatial over the historical. An d wi th in the spatial, it gives pri ori ty

to a mult ip le and delocal ized s pat ia l i ty over a unitary and concen

trated spatiality. These motifs compose an epochal necessity (the

effects of this mod e are secondary, a nd do not in a ny way inva li

date this necessity) . Today, thought passes through these motifs ,

insofar as such th in kin g is of this world , that is , of this global wor ld

w i t h o u t so ve re ig nt y. B u t th is is in d e e d w h y th e en ti re d i ff i c u lt y of

th is th inking is concentrated h ere. One migh t g ive a general f or

mu lat ion of it in the fol low ing way: H o w [do we] not confuse this

spacin g of the worl d wit h either the spreadin g out of s ignif ication s

or a gaping open of mea ning [ OT ] ?

Either signif ications are spread out and diluted to the point of

ins igni f icance in th e ideologies of cons ensus , d ia logue, co mm un i

cation, or values (where sovereignty is thought to be nothing but a

useless memory), or a surgery without sutures holds open the gap

ing w o un d of mean ing, in th e s ty le of a n ih i l is m or aes th et ic iz ing

mi nim al i s m ( w h ere th e gaping w o un d i t s el f emits a b lack g low of

los t s overeignty ) —th is not any les s ideological . T h ere are no im

provements made either with regard to justice or identity.

In order to think the spacing of the world (of ecotechnics) , the

end of sovereignty must be faced head-on, w itho ut reserve, instead

of ma kin g it seem as thoug h it has been disposed of or sublim ated .

This spacing of the world is itself the empty place of sovereignty

Th at is , it is the em pty place of the end, the emp ty place of the

com mo n good, a nd th e emp ty p lace of th e co mm on as a good. Or

if you l ike, it is the empty place of justice (at the f o u n d a t i o n o f the

law). W h e n the place of sovereignty is emp ty, neith er the essence

of the "good, " nor that of the "co mm on ," no r the com mo n essence

of the good can be assigned any longer. Mo reov er, no essence at all

can be assigned any longer, no finishing at all: only existences are fi

nite [or f inished]; this is also what the spacin g of the wor ld me ans.

H o w to thi nk witho ut a sovereign End? Thi s is the challenge of

ecotechnics, a challenge that up until now has not been taken up,

bu t w h i c h th is wa r is pe rh ap s fi na ll y b e g i n n i n g to m ak e ab so lu te ly

urgent. In order to begin to respond, it is necessary to begin again

w i t h the fo l lo w i n g : ec ot ec hn ic s wa sh es ou t or di ss ol ve s so ve re ig nt y

( or rath er , th e lat ter implodes in th e f ormer) . T h e prob lem con

cerns the empty place as such, and is not about waiting for some re

turn or substitution. There will be no more sovereignty; this is what

history means today. The war, along with ecotechnics, lets us see

the place of the sovereign State as emp ty fro m no w on.

Th is is also why ecotechnics itself can su mm on the f igure of sov

ereignty into this emp ty place. Th us the gaping open of the foun

datio n of law, and all the questions revolving aro und excepti on and

excess, can be forgotten in the sovereign bril l iance that the power

properly without power, which polices the world order and watches

over the price of pri ma ry resources, borrows in the tim e of war. O relse, to pu t it in another way, the e mp ty place of the one who re

cites an epic tale is now occ up ied b y the sovereign f ig ure of the

proph et of th e moral La w ( w h o can, at th e s ame t ime, make h i m

self into the narrator of smaller, m ore fam ilia r epics, l ike "ou r boys

from Texas") . Over and against this , another f igure attempted to

reign ite the Ar ab epic, w it h the sole aim of tak ing part in the

ecotechnical p ower of the masters of the wor ld. . . . I n bot h cases, it

wa s ne ce ssa ry th at the m od el s, th e id en ti fi ab le ex am pl es of th e sov

ereign allur e, guarantee the best presu mp tio n of justice, or of peo

ple [ou de peuple].




Th e emp ty place of Sovereign ty wi ll give rise to more or less suc

cessful substitutions o f this type, that is, u n t i l this place as such is

submitted to questioning and deconstruction, that is , until we have

as ked th e ques t ion ab out th e end w ith out res erve, th e ques t ion

ab out th e extrem e- l im it of f in is h ing and ident i f y , w h i ch is f rom

now on the quest ion of a nonsovereign meaning as the very sense of

the humanity of humans and the globalness of the world.

T h e relat ion of a nons overeign meani ng, w h ich we are to invent,

to th e arch ais m of S overeignty is undou b tedly s t i l l mo re comple xthan this. Th e very spacing of the wo rld , the openi ng of the discon

tinuous, polymorphous, dispersed, dislocated spado-temporality pre

sents some thi ng of itsel f in So vere ignty : just this side of its figures

and th eir urgent [impérieuses], eager presences. It has also always,

an d maybe fr om the very start, expos ed itself as spacing , that is, as

the ampli tud e (of a bril l ian ce), as the elevation (of a power), as the

distan cing (o f an example), a s the place (of an appear ing). In tu rn,

this is why these same motifs can serve the ardent and nostalgic re

calli ng of sovereign f igur es, war prim ary am ong the m, or access, to

the spaciousness of the spaci ng, to the (dis) local ity of the place, an

access we must invent. (For example, and to be quite brief: the same

process calls on Ame ri ca an d Ara bia , an d exposes the pieces of a

diverse and mix ed- u p real ity , none of w h i ch is s im ply " Arab " or

" American," and w h ich compos e an errant , s t range " g lob alnes s ." )

W i t h a ce rt ai n o bs c u r i ty a n d a m bi v al en c e, th e g l ob a l w o r l d ofecotech nics i t s el f def in it ively propos es th e th or ough going execu

tion of sovereignty. "Thor ou ghg oin g" here means: goi ng to the ex

t reme, of i t s logic and movem ent . U n t i l our ow n t imes ( b ut th is

co ul d con tin ue . . . ) , this extreme lim it always f inished itself by

means of war, in on e way or another. Bu t from no w on, it appears

— th is is our h is t ory —th at th e extreme point of s overeignty s i tu

ates itself stil l further out, and that the disr upt ion of the worl d sig

nifies for us that it is not possible not to go any further. War itself,

w h i c h su pp os es th at we ca n de ta ch th e a pp ro pr ia ti on of w e al th a n d

power fr om it , does not go any further than the bril l ian ce of death

and destruction (and after everything else, the voracious appropri

at ion th at w ar is —alw ay s a l ready —may not b e s o extr ins ic to th e

sovere ign wo rk of dea th as it appears). (O r else, if it is necessary to

go f urth er w ith th e s ame logic , in cont inuing w ar b ey ond i t s el f ,

and death be yond dea th, there is the night and fog of exte rmi na

tion.) Death, or identif ication in a f igure of (the) death (which is

the entir ety of wha t we call sacrifice, o f w h ich w ar is a s uprem e

form ), provid es the aim of sovereignty, whic h appropriate s itself in

order to come to an end.

In doing this, however, it has not gone far enough. Being-exposed-

to-death, if this is indeed the "hu ma n con diti on" (f inite existence), isnot a "being-yôr-death" as destiny, decision, and supreme f inishing

off . The f inishing of f inite existence is an unfinishing [infinition],

w h i c h ev er yw he re ov er fl ow s th e de a th th at co nt ai ns it . T h e i n - f i

n ite mean ing of f in i te ex is tence impl ies an expos it ion w ith out b r i l

l iance: discreet, reserved, discontinuous, and spacious, accordingly

suc h existence does not even reach the point of the sovereign extremity.

"Sovereignty is NOTHING": Batai l le exh aus ted h ims el f in t ry i ng

to say this , but anyone would exhaust themselves in (not) saying

this. W ha t this sentence "means" cuts of f one's breath (I do not re

ally want to go into it further here), but it most certainly does not

mean that sovereignty is death—quite to the contrary.

I w i l l only s ay th e f o l low ing: th e s overeign extremity s igni f ies

that there is nothing to "attain"; there is no "accomplishment" or

"achievement"; there is no "f inishing"; or rather, for a finite finish

ing, the execution is without end. The global world is also the f inite w o r l d , th e w o r l d o f fi ni tu d e . F i n i t u d e i s sp ac in g . S p a c i n g "e xe

cutes " i t s el f in f in ite ly . N ot th at th is means endles s ly b eg inni ng

again, but that meaning no longer occurs in a totali zation a nd pre

s entat ion ( of a f in i te and accom pl is h ed in f in ite) . M ea ni ng is in not

f i n i s h i n g w i t h m e a n i n g .

W i t h i n th is " n o t h i n g , " th er e is n o re pr es si on or s u b l i m a t i o n o f

the violent burst of sovereignty: never to be f inished wi th , there is

an explosion and violence [that comes] from beyond war, the light

nin g of peace. ( J ea n- Ch ri s toph e B ai l ly s ugges ted to me th at I f i

nall y rend er the eagles of war a s peaceful.)

In a sense, this is technology itself . What is called "technology,"

or again what I have called ecotechnics ( in itself , which would be




liberated from capital), is the technê of f initude or spacing. This is

no longer the technical means to an End, but technê itself as i n - f i

n it e en d , technê as the existence of finite existence in all its b r i l

l iance and violence. It is "technology" itself, but it is a technology

that , of itself, raises the necessity of app rop riat ing its me ani ng

against the app rop riati ve logic of capi tal and against the sovereign

logic of war.

In the end, the question is not whether war is "bad." War is

"bad," and it is absolutely so, especial ly when the space where itdeploys itself no longer permits the glorious and pow erful presen

tatio n of its figur e (as the fig ure of the death of all figur es). W h en

this space . . . constitut es spacin g, the intersec tion of sing ulari ties,

and no t the con fro ntat ion of faces or masks.

It is here that our history comes upon its greatest danger and its

greatest opportunity. It is here in the st il l poorly perceived impera

t ive of a wor ld that is in the process of creating its glob al co ndi

tions, in order to render untenable and catastrophic the sharing of

riches and poverty, of integr ation an d exclusio n, of every Nor th

and Sou th. Because this worl d is the wor ld of spacing, not of fin

ishi ng; because it is the w orl d of the intersect ion o f singulari t ies,

not of the ide ntifi catio n of figu res (of ind ivid ual s or of masses) ; be

cause it is the world in which, in short , sovereignty is exhaustingitself (and, at the same t ime, resist ing this with gestures that are

b o th te r ri fy in g a n d p a t h e t i c ) — f o r al l of th ese re as on s, an d f r o m

w i t h i n th e ve ry he ar t of th e ap p ro p ri at iv e po w er of ca p it al ( w hi ch

itself started sovereignty's decl ine) , ecotechni cs obscure ly indicates

the technê of a world where sovereignty is nothing . Thi s wo uld be a

w o r l d wh er e sp ac in g c ou l d no t be co nf us ed w i t h sp re ad in g ou t or

w i t h ga p in g op e n, b ut on l y w i t h "i nt er se ct io n. "

This is not given as a destiny; it is offered as a history. As technê,

ecotechnics is st i l l to be l iberated from "technology," "economy,"

and "sovereignty." At least we are beginning to learn what the com

b i ne d le ss on of w ar , law , an d "t ec hn ol og ic al ci vi li za ti on " is aft er al l;

we ha ve le ar ne d th at the or ie nt at io n, th em e, a nd m ot iv e of th is l i b

erat ion are al l contained in the fol lowing (provisional) statement:

sovereignty is not hin g. As a consequence of hav ing learned this

mu ch , the mul t ip lici ty of "peoples" mi ght be able to avoid being

engulfed in the hegemony of one sole people, or i n the turbulence

of the desire to cla im the sovereign di st in ct io n for everyone. As

such, it might become possible to think what has not been think

able to this point: a polit ic al art icu lat ion of the worl d that escapes

from these two dangers (and for wh ich the mo del of the "Federa

t ion " is not available). Therefore , law coul d expose itself to thenoth ing of its ow n founda tion.

It wo ul d be a matter, therefore, of goi ng to the extreme wit ho ut

an example, wh ich belongs to the "nothi ng" of sovereignty. H o w to

think, how to act , how to do without a model? This is the question

that is avoided, a nd yet posed, by the entire traditio n of sovereig nty

Once "revolution" has also been exposed to the nothing of sover

eignty, one has to take seriously how the execution without model

or end m ay be the essence of technê as a revolutionary essence.

W h a t if ea ch people (this would be the revolutionary word), each

singular intersection (this would be the ecotechnical word), substi

tuted a who lly other logi c for the logic of the sovereign (a nd always

sacrificial) mod el, not the inve ntion or the mult ip lica t ion of mo d

e l s — f r o m w h i c h w a r s w o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w — b u t a l o g i c

wh er e si ng ul ar it y wa s ab so lu te an d w it h ou t an ex am pl e at th e sa me

time? Where each one would be "one" only in not being identifiablein a figure, but in-finitely dist inct through spacing, and in - f in i t e l y

substitutable through the intersection that doubles spacing. To par

ody Hegel , this could be cal led global [or world] singularity, which

w o u l d ha ve th e ri gh t w i t h o u t ri gh t to say th e la w of th e w o r l d .

Peace comes at the price of abandoned sovereignty, the price of that

w h i c h goe s b ey on d wa r, in st ea d of al wa ys re m ai ni n g w i t h i n it .

I am w ell aware of the fact that all o f this does not let itse lf be

concei ved of easily. It is not for us, not for our thi nk ing , mo del ed as

it is on the sovereign model; it is not for our warlike thinking. But

this is certain: there is nothing on the horizon except for an un

heard-of, inconceivable task—or war. All thinking that st i l l wants

to conceive of an "order," a "w orld ," a "c omm unic atio n," a "peace"




is ab s olutely naive—w h en i t is not s imply h y pocri t ica l . T o appro

priate one's own time has always been unheard of . But everyone can

clearly see that it is t ime : the disaster of sovereignty is su ff icien tly

spread out, and suff iciently common, to steal anyone's innocence.

Postscrip t, M a y 1991

In th e mid s t of th e general c l imate of " h um anit ar ia n a id " s et up

as the perverse game that is being played by war's protagonists,"sovereignty" is more present than ever. (Does Saddam have the

righ t to i t? Wh o grants i t to h im? Wh at is h e doing w i th i t? A n d

w ha t ab ou t th e K ur d s? A n d the Tu rk s? A n d w h a t is a bo rd er ? W h a t

is police force? Or else, a l itt le further away, what about nuclear ca

pacity as Algeria's sovereign concern? Or the accord between the

U S S R and th e e igh t repub l ics to regulate th e tens e p lay of th eir

sovereignties, in spite of ever ything else? Or what about K uw ai t re

tur ned to sove reignty for purposes of a brut al settl ing of accoun ts

and f or th e sh ameles s recruitmen t of F i l ip i no and E g y pt ian m an

power? W ha t is the character of Bangladesh's sovereignty, where a

cyclone has just made f ive million people homeless? and so forth.)

T h e prol i f erat i on of th ese amb i gu it i es — w h ic h are, in f act, th ose

of the end o f s o v e r e i g n t y — m a k e s m e a f r a i d o f b e i n g m i s u n d e r

stood if I say that we sho uld go (or that we already are) be yon d its

model and its order. By saying this , I do not mean for a instant todemand th at a Kurd, an Alger ian , a Georgian , or , f or th at matter ,

a n A m e r i c a n s h o u l d a b a n d o n t h e i d e n t i t y a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e f o r

w h i c h the se p r op e r na m es fu n c ti o n a s a si g n . B u t w ha t w i l l al wa ys

cause a prob lem is th e ques t ion of exact ly w h ich sign is of con cer n

here. If sovere ignty has exhau sted its mea nin g, a nd if it is every

w he re a c kn o w le d g e d th at it is i n d o u bt , u n d e r h a n d e d — o r e m p ty

— th e n it is necessary to reconsider the nature and fun ctio n of such

a sign. For example, what is a people} T h e Iraqui " people ," th e Cor-

s ican " people ," th e Ch icano " people ," th e Zulu " people ," th e S er

b i a n "p eo pl e, " th e J ap an es e "p eo pl e" : Is it al wa ys th e sa me co nc ep t?

If there is a "concep t," then does it im pl y "sovereignty"? A n d wha t

ab out th e " people" o f H a rl em , or th os e of th e s h anty tow ns in

M e x i c o , or th e populat ions of India or Ch ina ? Wh at is an " eth nic

i ty "? Wh at is a re l ig ious commu nity ? Ar e th e S h i i tes a people? A n d

th e H eb re w s and/ or Is raelis and/ or J ew s ? A n d th e " ex- E as t Ger

mans"? Wh at are the relations of a "sovereign" peop le to a "popu

lar" people? Wh er e to place tribes, clans, brotherhoo ds? A n d I have

to insist on this , where to place classes, levels , margins, milieus, so

c ia l netw orks ? T h e a lmos t - mons trous m ult ip l ica t ion of th ese ques

t ions is th e mark of th e prob le m ab out w h ich I am s pea king. N ei

ther the sovereign mo de l, no r the auth ori ty of the law addressesthis pr obl em ; they on ly deny it . Instead, what is of con cer n here is

globalness a s a p r o li f e r a t i o n o f " i d e n t i t y " w i t h o u t e n d o r m o d e l —

and it may even be a matter of "technology" as the techne of a new

horizon of unheard-of identities.



§ Eu log y for the Mêlée

(For Sarajevo, March ipps)

"Sarajevo" has become the expression of a comp lete system for

th e reduct ion to ident i ty . 1 It is no longer a sign on the way, or a

sign in history; it is no longer a possible destination for business

trips or il l icit rendezvous, or the uncertain space for a fortuitous

meeting or distracted wandering. It is a dimension-less point on a

diagr am of sovereignty, an orth o-nor mati ve gauge on a ballistic and

political computer, a target frozen in a telescopic sight, and it is the

ve ry fi g u r e o f t he ex ac ti tu de o f t a ki n g a i m , th e pu re t a k i n g a i m o f

an essence. Somewhere, a pure Subject declares that it is the Peo

ple, the Law, the State, the Identity in the name of wh ic h "Sara

je vo " m us t be id e nt if ie d p ur el y a n d s i m p l y as a ta rg et .

Sarajevo is s imply a name or a s ign that grabs our attention

[même plus un nom, un écriteau qu'on nous cloue sur les yeux] , so that

there will no longer be a Sarajevan landscape, or trips to Sarajevo,

bu t o n l y a pu re a n d n a ke d id en ti ty . It is su ch so th at n o t h i n g els e w i l l ge t m i x e d in w i t h it , a n d so th at w e d o no t ge t m i x e d u p i n it ,

th at is , w e oth er cos mopol i tan E uropeans .

A ci ty do es n ot ha ve to be i d e n ti fi e d by a n y t h i n g ot he r th a n a

name , whi ch indic ates a place, the place of a mêlée1, a crossing and

a stop, a knot and an exchange, a gathering, a disjunction, a circu

lat ion , a radiat ing [un étoilement]. Th e na me of a city, li ke that of a

145



146 Eulogy for th e Mêlée Eulogy for th e Mêlée 147

country, l ike that of a people an d a person, m ust always be the name

of no one; it mu st never be the name of anyone wh o mi ght be pre

sented in person or in her own right [ en propre] . T h e " proper name"

has no signif icance [signification], or what there is to it is nothing

more th an a sketch of a descri ption that is , by all rights an d in fact,

inde finite . Inchoate and stochastic mea nin g: it is a mixtu re of syl

lables stirred on the bri nk of a semantic id enti ty that is bot h gently

and obstinately deferred. As soon as the proper name points to [ar

raisonne] a presence in person, a sovereign Subject, this sovereign is

threatened; it is encircled, besieged. In order to l ive in Sarajevo,

there was no need to identify Sarajevo. But now, those who die in

Sarajevo di e f r o m the death o f Sarajevo itself; they die f r o m the pos

s i b i l i t y — i m p o s e d b y g u n f i r e — o f i d e n t i f y i n g s o m e s u b st a n ce o r

presence by this nam e, a presence me asured by the yardstick of the

"national" or the "state," a body-symbol set up precisely in order to

create body and symbol where there had only been place and pas

sage. Those who are exiled from Sarajevo are exiled from this place,

expelled by this body. They are exiled from the mix, from the that

mêlée that made up Sarajevo, but which, as a result , made n o t h i n g ,

engendered no ego. The "proper" name must always serve to dissolve

th e ego: the latter opens up a me an ing , a pure source of me ani ng;

the former indicates a mêlée, raises up a melody: Sarajevo.

I have been asked for a "eulogy of the méla nge ." 3 A n d I w o u l d

like to give a eulo gy that is itself "m ix ed " [mélangé]. This is not to

say that it wi ll be a mixt ure of eulo gy and bla me, so as to end in a

b a la n c e d a c c ou n t o f p ro fi ts a n d lo sse s. N o r is th e id ea to d e li ve r

a " mit ig ated " eulogy th at w o ul d evoke an extreme f orm of h al f -

heartedness, which is a curious concept. In the end, it is a matter

(everyone understands that it is there; it is right there before our

eyes; for the moment, it is will suff ice to know how to gather what

it is a que stion of and h ow to welco me it) of co mi ng up against all

s orts of w in ds and t i de s — an d i t is quite c lear in w h at direct i on

these are moving. It is solely a matter of not giving anything away,

ei th er regarding ident i ty or regarding w h at mixes ident i ty up i n , or

entangles i t w ith , i t s ow n orig in and princip le . Wh at is ca l led f or ,

then, is a eulogy mixed with reserve, a reserve that is appropriate

if one wants to avo id gi vin g a eulog y that itself goes so far as to be

t ray i t s ob ject b y ident i f y ing i t too w el l . T h is is w h at mus t b e

avoided.

In fact, it has to be said right away that the most just and beauti

ful eu log y of the mélange would be to not have to give it, exactly be

cause the not ion [of the mélange] itself cou ld not even be discerned

or identif ied. Th is very notio n presupposes the isolation of pure sub

stances, and the work of mi xin g them. It is an idea that is at hom e inthe laboratory. Bu t does this same way of thi nk in g do justice to the

idea of a pai ntin g as a eulogy for a mélange oi colors? Pa inti ng never

has anyth ing to do wi th the spectr um of colors; it on ly has to do

w i t h th e i n fi n i ty m i x e d in w i t h a n d d er iv e d fr o m th ei r nu an ce s.

It is exactly because it was possible for there to be the ignoble

talk of "ethnic cleansing" that it is necessary to respond. But this

res pons e w i l l not b e jus t anoth er , s y mmetric al w ay of ta lk in g. T h i s

is w h y conf err ing too much ident i ty on th e mélange itself must be

avoided; in order to ensure this , the emphasis will be displaced, and

an a t t e m p t w i l l be m a d e to m o v e f r o m the mélange to the mêlée.

T h e w h ole tas k , h ere, is to do r igh t b y ident i t ies , b ut w ith out

ceding any th ing to th eir f renzy , to th eir pres uming to b e s ub s tan

tial identities ("subjects," in this sense). This task is enormous, and

it is very sim ple. It is the task of a cultur e re mak ing itself , or the re

cas t ing of th in kin g s uch th at i t w o ul d not b e crude or ob s cene l ike

every th ough t of puri ty . I t means mi xi ng togeth er again th e var i

ous lines, trails , and skins, while at the same time describing their

heterogeneous trajectories and their webs, both those that are tan

gled a nd those that are distin ct. It is the task of never belie ving in

th e s imple, h omogenous , pres ent " man." Or w oman. Or Croat or

S erb or Bos n ian . I t is th e tas k of kn ow in g ( b ut of w h at kn ow l

edge?) that the subject of know ledg e is now on ly someonf, a nd lik e

every someowf, som eone of mixed blood.



148 Eulogy for the Mêlée Eulogy for the Mêlée 149

A mélange is a delicate and fragile thing, both subtle and volatile,

w h i c h is of te n m a d e th i c k [épaisse] and obscure these days. In fact,

th ere does ex is t—and I am not th e f i rs t one to point i t out—a eu

logy for the mélange that resonates with a conv entio nal sort of po

lit ica l correctness, that is, wi th the nor mative stif fen ing of the most

w e l l- f o u n d e d d e m a n d s. S u c h a e u lo g y w h ol e he a r te d ly ce le br at es

general ized mult icu l tu ral is m, h y b ridizat io n , exch ange, s h aring, and

a sort of transcendental variegation.

A l t h o u g h w e k n o w th in g s ar e n ot so s i m p l e , w e n o w fe el th at

h aving s uch w h ir lw inds , mixtures , w anderings , and interf erences

are not enough , th at is , as they are. O r rather, a nd first of all: weknow that they do not allow themselves to be thought as they are.

T h is is th e w h ole ques t ion.

But we also know, only too well , that there stil l remains a dis

course that takes advanta ge of the simpl ific atio ns of the other in or

der to go one better than distinction, identity, property, or purity,

and in order to be able to use the word "cosmopolitan," for exam

ple, wi th an obviou s overtone of mistrust, even disgust (sometimes

clear ly ass ociated w ith ant i- S em it is m) .

In the end, and rightly so, there are those who place these two

correctnesses b ack to b ack , and w h o rec i te an interminab le cate

ch is m of uni ty in divers i ty , complemen tari ty , and w el l - tem pered

dif f erences . T h is w el l - intent ioned dis cours e, s omet imes w elcome

in mor al and pol i t ica l emergencies , remains a dis cours e of inten

tions and exhortations. It does not reach as far as the very things

w i t h w h i c h it de al s.

obtuse, a nd fearful. I always hol d my peace in the face of lon g dis

courses and great coll oq ui a on the subject of raci sm. I t seems to me

that too much honor is paid to this trash. For similar reasons, this

is wh y I am embarrassed by the id ea of a "eulo gy for the mélange":

as if the mélang e wou ld have to be some sort of value or authentic

ity to be uncover ed, even th oug h it is only a piece of evidence , or,

if one loo ks at it mor e closely, even th oug h it does not exist if there

is never anything "pure" that can be and must be "mixed" together

[mélang er] w ith s ome oth er " purity ."

Therefore, what is at question, here, is in no way a matter of

s t i c k i n g to a f a ir mean [ juste milieu] h eld b etw een tw o o p p o s i n gtheses, exactly because there are these two theses only to the extent

that there is , f irst of all , the simpli f ica tion a nd dist orti on of what is

at stake.

By def in it ion , th e mélange is not a s imple substance to which

place and nature could be assigned, to which one could lay claim as

such, and which, as a result , one could plainly eulogize. Identity is

by d e fi ni ti o n no t an ab so lu te d i st i n c ti o n , r em ov e d fr o m ev e ry th in g

and , therefore, distinct fro m no thin g: it is always the other of an

oth er ident i ty . " H e is di f f erent—l ike every one" ( Bertolucc i ' s Last

Tango in Paris). Difference as such is indisc ernible. Neithe r mélange

nor identity can be pinned down. They have always already taken

place, are always already gone, or always already stil l to co me. A n d

they are in common, shared by all , between all , through one another.

First of all , let us be clear: the sim plis tic eu logy of the mélange

has and is capable of pro du cin g errors, but the simplis tic eulog y of

purity has supported and stil l supports crimes. As such, there is no

s y mmetry in th is regard, no equi l ib r ium to h old to , no f a ir me

di um . There is noth ing to be discussed. Th e least bit of discussio n,

the smallest deferral to racism or to purif ication, in whatever form,

already participates in such crime. Moreover, this crime is always

a doub le cr ime, b oth moral and intel lectual . A l l rac is m is s tupid,

Precisely because the mélange is mixe d (it is mixed [mêlé], and it

is a mêlée), it is not a substance. N or is it possible to replace the

nons ub s ta nt ia l i ty of i t s contents w ith a s uppos e d cons is tency of

th at in w h i ch i t is contained. T h is is exact ly the prob le m w it h ide

ologies of the melting pot, where the pot is supposed to contain, in

all senses of the word, the enigmas of the mélange, as well as its dis

rupt ive forces, all by virtue of its own id entity.

H y b r i d i z a t i o n i s n o t " so m e t h i n g . " A n d i f t h e h y b r i d , w h i c h



Eulogy for the Mêlée Eulogy for the Mêlée

each one of us is in his or her own way, is someone, it is not by

v ir tu e o f a n y ess en ce of h y b r i d i za t io n (a co nt ra d ic to ry n ot io n ), bu t

rather insofar as it provides a punctuation, or a s ingular configura

tio n, for the essencelessness of hyb rid iza tio n. To essentialize the

mélange is to have already dissolved it , melted it down into some

thing other than itself . Therefore, one must not say "the" mélange

and, above all , one must not deliver its eulogy.

T h e mélangeas such can take on, or seem to take on, two dif fer

ent identiti es: that of a fusion or a thorou ghg oin g osmosis, or that

of an accomplished state of disorder [mise en désorder achevée].

T h es e tw o f antas t ical extremit ies are a lch emy and entropy , extremities that, in the end, come together and identify with one an

other in an apocalypse or a black hole. But the mélange is, in fact,

neither the one nor the other, nor is it the fair mean between the

two. It is something else, or again, it " is" in another way, in quite

another way.

It would be better, then, to speak of mêlée: an action rather than

a substance. There are at least two sorts of mêlée, even though there

may never be a mêlée "pure and simple." There is the mêlée of a

fight, and the mêlée of love. The mêlée of Ares, and the mêlée o f

A p h r o d i t e . T h e y ar e m i x e d w i t h on e an ot he r, no t i d e nt if i ed . I t is

not a matte r of entr opy or alchemy. It is a contest that can never

take place witho ut desire and wi tho ut attacks of jealousy, with out

the appeal to the other as always other.(But the mêlée of Ares is not mo der n war, whic h, mo re often than

ever before, involves no mêlée at all: modern war begins by extermi

nat ing h and- to- h and comb at ; i t a ims to crus h and s uppres s com

ba t, ra th er th an a tt e m pt in g to set it as id e; in fa ct, it has no spa ce for

combat. Instead, it spreads everywhere and kills , violates, irradiates,

gasses, and infects the whole "civil" space. Today, war is an unlim

ited and pure mélange. It is not the mêlée. W i t h regard to orgies and

por n f ilms, the same can be said of the mêlée o f Aph rodite . )

T h e mélange, therefore, is not. It happens; it takes place. There is

mêlée, crisscrossing, weaving, exchange, sharing, and it is never a

single thing, nor is it ever the same. On the one hand, the mélange

is an "it happens," rather than an "it is": displacements, chances,

migrat ions , c l inamens , meet ings , luck , and r is ks . On th e oth er

hand, it is not "one": in a mêlée there are meetings and encounters;

there are those who come together and those who spread out,

those who come into contact and those who enter into contracts,

th os e w h o concentrate and th os e w h o dis s eminate, th os e w h o

ident i f y and th os e w h o modif y —jus t l ike th e tw o s exes in each

on e of us.

T h e mélange i s not s im ply " r i ch " in th e divers i ty i t mixes to

gether. In fact, this diversity constantly escapes it , as long as it isn o t h i n g itself. T h e r e is a q uant i tat ive dis cours e o f " m u t u a l e n r i c h

ment," a discourse that is at bottom capitalist and profiteering. But

this is not a que stion of wea lth or poverty. Cul tur es, or what are

kno w n as cu l tures , do not mix . T h ey encounter each anoth er, m in

gle, modify each other, reconfigure each other. They cultivate one

another; they irrigate or drain each other; they work over and

plough through each other, or graft one onto the other.

T o b e g i n w i t h — b u t w h e r e i s t h e r e a n a b s o l u t e b e g i n n i n g ? —

each one of them is a conf igu ratio n, already a mêlée. T h e f i rs t cu l

ture constitute d a mêlée of races or specie s, erectus, faber, sapiens.

T h e Wes t , w h ic h is s o pro ud of th e " Greek mira c le" of i t s f ound

ing, should always meditate on the ethnic and cultural diversity, on

the movem ent s of people s, the transfers an d transfor mati ons of

practices, the twists and turns of language or mores, w hi ch went to

make up or conf igure th e " H e l le nic s ." T h e h is tor y of th is mêléeshould be reread:

Thus, at the beginning of the second millennium, a phenomenon of

extraordinary novelty was created; a cosmopolitan culture was put into

place in which one could recognize the contributions of those diverse

civilizations that were built on the edge of the sea, or in the middle of

it. Some of these civilizations were those that became empires: Egypt,

Mesopo tamia, Asia Mi no r of the Hitt ites; still others of these set to sea

and were supported by certain cities: the Syro-Lebanese coast, Crete,

and much later, Myceanea. But they all communicated with one an

other. Al l of them, even Egyp t, ordina rily so closed in on itself, turned



Eulogy for the Mêl ée Eulogy for the Mêlée 153

toward the outside with a passionate curiosity. This is the epoch of

voya ges , of exc han ges of pre sen ts, di p lo m at ic cor re sp ond en ce, an d

princesses who were given as spouses to foreign kings as proof of new

"international" relations. It is the epoch where, in Egyptian tomb

paintin gs, there appeared, in their native dress, all the peoples of the

Near East and the Aegean: Cretans, Myceans, Palestinians, Nubians,

Canaanites. . . . 4

Every culture is in itself "mu lt ic ultu ral , " not only because there

has always been a previous acculturation, and because there is nopu re a n d s impl e o r ig in [provenance], but at a deeper level, because

the gesture of cult ure is itse lf a mix ed gesture: it is to affront, c on

front, transform, divert , develop, recompose, combine, rechannel.

It is not that there is no "identity." A culture is single and

uniq ue. (If this is what one must sett le for in the word " culture, "

w h i c h see ms to id e nt if y al re ad y th at w i t h w h i c h it is c on c er ne d.

But this word identifies precisely nothing. It is to sett le for short-

cir cui tin g all the diffi culties that bear dow n en masse if one tries to

say "people," "nation," "civil izat ion," "spirit ," "personality.") A "cul

ture" is a certain "one." Th e fact and law of this "one" cannot be

neglec ted; even less can it be den ied in the nam e of an essential-

izat ion of the "méla nge."

But the more this "one" is clearly dist inct and dist inguished, theless it may be its own or pure foundation. Undoubtedly, the task

is whol ly a matter of not confusing dist i nct io n and found ation; in

fact , this point contains everything that is at stake philosophically,

e t h ic a l l y , a n d po l i t i c a l l y in wha t i s brewin g [se trame] a ro u n d

"identi t ies" a nd "subjects" of al l sorts. Thu s, the absolute dist inc

t io n o f the ego existo, pro v id ed b y Descartes, must not be confused

w i t h f ou n d a ti on in th e p u r i t y of a res cogitans, wi t h whic h i t i s

j o i n e d to ge th er . F o r ex am p le , th e " F r e n c h " i de n ti ty to da y no

longer needs to fou nd itself in Vercingé torix or Joa n of Ar c in order

to exist.

The unity and uniqueness of a culture are unique precisely on ac

count of a mélange, or a mêlée. It is a "mêlée" that defines the style or

tone of a "cultu re," as we ll as the various different voices and apti

tudes [portées] for interpret ing this tone. There is such a thing as a

Fre nch cultu re, bu t it itself has various voices, and now here is it pre

sented in person—except for those who confuse it with the coq

sportif or with Dupo nd-la -Joi e. Voltaire's voice is not that of Proust ,

w h i c h is no t Pa ste ur 's, w h i c h is no t R i t a M i ts ou k o' s. It is pe rh ap s

never purely and simply French. What is French, and what is not,

in St en d ha l , H u g o , P ic a sso , L é v in a s , G o d a rd , Jo hn n y H a l l yd a y,

Kat 'Onoma, Chamoiseau, Dib? Once again, however, this does notmean that there is no "French identity": it means that this sort of

identity is never simply identical in the sense that a pencil is identi

cally the same yesterday and today (assuming that this is not mate

rially in ex a c t . . . ). The id en t i t y o f the pen c i l leaves this pen c i l far

less identifiable as "this one here," which, up to certain point , re

mains any pencil at al l . This is exact ly not the case with the identity

of a culture or a person. To indi cate the difference, this latter id en

t ity can be cal led an ipseity, a "being-its-self" ["être-soi-même"].

An ip se it y is no t [f ou nd ed on ] th e p ur e in e rt ia of th e sa me ,

w h i c h w o u l d re m ai n qu it e p la in ly th e sa me in th e sen se of b ei ng

the self-same [posé çà même soi-même]: one could imagine this as

fo rm in g the being of a stone or a Go d. An ip seity leaves off exactly

wh er e it is id en ti fi ed . Be ca us e of th is , a ne tw or k of ex ch an ge s is re

quir ed, a network of recognit ion, of references fro m one ip seity to

another, from difference to difference. An ipseity is valued by the

other and for the other, in consi dera tion of the other, these others

to whom it gives and from whom it takes a certain identifiable

tone—all by way of its singular touch. That is to say, insofar as it is

unidentifiable, i t is both inimitable and impossible to assign iden

tity to any one. In a very precise way, ipseity names what, for an

identity, is always and necessarily impossible to identify.

In fact, a pure identity would not only be inert, empty, colorless,

and flavorless (as those who lay claim to a pure identity so often

are), it wo ul d be an absurd ity. A pure ident ity cancels itself out; it

can no longer identify itself. O nl y what is identical to itself is iden

tical to itself. As such, it turns in a circle and never makes it into

existence.



154 Eulogy for th e Mêlée Eulogy for the M êlée

W i t h a ll d ue ri go r, w h o wa s ev er pure en o u g h t o be a n Ar ya n

w or th y of th e na me ? We k n o w th at th is qu es ti on c o u ld dr iv e a tr ue

N a z i , a N a z i a bso l u t e l y id en t i f ied wi t h h is c a u se o r wi t h h is o wn

concerns, to steril izat ion or even suicide.

Purity is a crystal l ine chasm where the identical , the proper, the

authentic is engulfed by itself; it is nothing at al l , and it drags the

other along in order to carry it into the abyss. The absolute and

ve rt ig in ou s la w of th e proper is that in appro pria t ing its ow n puri ty

[<î'appropriant sa propre pureté] , it alienates its elf purely and simpl y. An ot her fo rm of the mélange is the mélange-with-itself self-mixing,

a u t ism, a u t o -ero t ic ism.

A language is always a mêlée of languages, some thing half-way

in-be tween Ba bel as the form of total confus ion and glossolal ia [or

spea k in g in t o n g u es] a s t he fo rm o f imm ed ia t e t ra n spa ren c y. A

style is always a crisscrossing of tones, bo rrow ed elements, disper

sions, and developments, to which it gives a new twist or turn. Of

course, each style seems to tend toward making an ult imate or sov

ereign turn, the turn toward an absolutely proper language, an ab

solute idiolect . But an absolute idiolect or idiom would no longer

b e a la ng ua ge , a n d c o u l d no lo ng er m i x w i t h ot he rs in or de r to b e

the language that it is: being no longer translatable exactly in order

to be the untranslatable that it is. A pure idiolect would be idiotic,u t t er l y deprived oi relat ions and, therefore, of identity. A pure c ul

ture, a pure property, would be idiot ic.

W h a t is a c o m m u n i ty ? It is no t a m ac r oo r g a ni sm , or a b i g f am

ily (which is to assume that we know what an organism or a family

is . . . ). The common, having-in-common or being-in-common, ex

cludes interior unity, subsistence, and presence in and for itself. Be

ing with, being together and even being "united" are precisely not

a ma t t er o f be in g "o n e ." W i t h in unitary c o m m u n i t y [communauté

une] there is not hin g but death, and not the sort of death fo und in

the cemetery, whi ch is a place of spac ing or dist inctne ss, bu t the

death fou nd in the ashes of cre ma tori um ovens or in the accum u

lat ions of charnel-h ouses.

To put it another way: in a paradigmatic manner, the systematic

ra pe o f B o sn ia n wo me n d epl o ye d a l l t he v a r io u s f ig u re s o f t h is

delirious affirmation of "unitary " com mu nit y: rape in order to beget

"bastards" regarded as unacceptable, excluded a priori from the as

sumed unity; rape in order, therefore, to make obligatory the abor

tio n of these bastards; rape in order to then ki ll these bastards and,

thus, to destroy the pos sibil i ty of there being a bastard; a nd rape sothat this repe ated act assigns its vic tim s to the fantasy uni ty of their

"community." In the end, it is rape in order to show in every possi

ble way t hat there do not have to be relations between commu nities.

Rap e is the zero act; it is the n egatio n of sex itself, the n egatio n of all

relat io n, the negation of the chil d, the negatio n of the wo ma n. I t is

t he pu re a f f i rma t io n o f t he ra pist in wh o m a "pu re id e n t i t y" (a

"racial" identity . . . ) finds nothing better than the submission to

the ignoble mi mi cr y of what it denies: relat ion and being-together.

(In a general sort of way, what is un doub tedl y paradig matic in rape

is that it operates by wa y of that relation of wh ic h it is also the nega

t ion. It sinks its teeth into relat ion, into the mêlée.)

W h a t w e ha ve in c o m m o n is als o w h at al wa ys di st in gu is he s a n d

differentiates us. What I have in common with another Frenchman

is the fact of not be in g t he sa me F re n c hm a n a s h i m, a n d t he fa ct

that our "Frenchness" is never, nowhere, in no essence, in no figure, b r ou g h t to c o m p l e ti o n . T h i s is no t th e ab se nc e of a fi gu re , b u t a

plan always being sketched out , a fict ion always being invented, a

mêlée of traits. An d it is not that ide ntit y is always "on the way," pr o

je ct ed on to th e h o ri zo n li k e a fr ie n dl y sta r, li ke a va lu e or a re gu la

tive idea. It never comes to be; it never identifies itself, even as an

in f in i t e pro jec t io n , because it is already there, because it is the mêlée.

/a l rea d y a m when my mo t her a n d fa t her c o me t o g et her [se mê

lent] ; I br in g t hem t o g et her [qui les mêle] ; I am t he ir mêlée, and

thus I do not br ing m ysel f to be.

W h a t is a pe op le ? C e r ta i n ly th er e are su ch th in gs as et h ni c tr ai ts .

A S i ci li a n c o u l d ra re ly be m is ta k e n fo r a N o r w e g i a n (e ve n th ou g h

t he N o rma n s d id , in t he pa st , fo rc ib l y mix t hemsel v es in t o S ic -



156 Eulogy for the Mêlée Eulogy for the Mêlée 157

ily . . . ) . B ut what about a Sici l ian "o f the people " and a Sicil i an of

the upper echelons of society? Co ul d they be confused? It wou ld ,

in fact, be more likely that, in Chicago, one would confuse a Sicil

ian " of the people" a nd a Pole "o f the people, " or that elsewhere,

one would confuse someone from the Palermo upper class and

someone f rom the upper class of Ly on. Un de r the pressure of want

ing to have nothing more to do with classes, one ends up denying

the most common, everyday evidence. Undoubtedly a class cannot

be th ou gh t of as an id en ti ty , an d , in de e d, ce rt ai n va ri et ie s of to ta litarianism (perhaps all) were made possible by configuring classes

according to identity and not according to their conditions. But it is

precisely not a questio n of pla ying one iden tity off another. It is a

ques tion of prac ticin g singularitie s, that is , that wh ic h gives itself

and shows itself only in the plura l. The L ati n singuli means "one by

one," and is a word that exists only in the plural. Ipseity exists only

as singularly distributed. Insofar as one can speak in the following

wa y, ip se it y is "i ts el f" d i st r i b u ti o n , d i ss e m i n a ti o n , th e o r i g in a r y

sharing of that whic h never is—ipse itself-—and is nowhere present

as s uch , " in pers on." Ipse"ls" its own dispersion.

It is not noth ing—indeed, i t is every th ing—b ut i t remains f or

us to thi nk this totality of disper sion, of this all-one [tout-un] that

is all mixed up.

The mélange does not exist any more than pu rity exists . Ther e is

no pure mélange, nor is there any purity that is intact. Not only is

there no such thing, this is the very law of there is not: if there were

something that was pure and intact, there would be nothing. Noth

ing exists that is "pure," that does not come into contact with the

other, no t because it has to border on som eth in g, as if this were a

simple accidental condition, but because touch alone exposes the

limits at which identities or ipseities can distinguish themselves [se

démêler] from one another, with one another, between one another,

from among one another.

T h e mêlée is not accidental; it is originary. It is not contingent;

it is necessary. It is not; it happens constantly.

This is the mêlée of Ares and the mêlée of Aphrodite, the mêlée of

the one and the other: whether this comes to blows and intertwin-

ings, assaults and cease-f ires, rivalry and desire, supplication and

def iance, d ia logue and content ion [différend], fear and pity, and

laughter too. And, on the f l ip side, it is the mêlée o f H ermes , a

mêlée of messages and paths, bifurc ations, s ubstitu tions, c onc ur

rences of codes, co nfigu ratio ns of space, frontiers ma de to be

passed through, so that there can be passages, but ones that are

shared—because there is never any identity that is not shared: thatis , d iv ided, mixed up , dis t inguis h ed, entrench ed, common, s ub s t i -

tutab le, ins ub s t i tutab le , w ith d raw n , expos ed.

W h y is it th at an "i d e n ti f i c a ti o n p h o t o " is m os t of te n po or er ,

dulle r, and less "lifeli ke" tha n any other photo? A n d even mor e,

w h y are te n i d e nt it y ph ot os of th e sa me pe rs on so di ff er en t fr o m

one another? When does someone resemble himself [in a pho to] ?

On ly w h en th e ph oto s h ow s s ometh ing of h i m, o r h er , s ometh in g

more than what is identical, more than the "face," the "image," the

"traits" or the "portra it ," som ethi ng more than a copy of the dia

criti cal s igns of an "id ent ity" ("black hair, blue eyes, snub nose, "

and so on). It is only when it evokes an unending mêlée of peoples,

parents, works, pains, pleasures, refusals, forgettings, transgressions,

expectations, dreams, stories, and all that trembles within and

struggles against the confines of the image. Th is is not som ethi ng

imaginary; it is nothing but what is real: what is real has to do withth e mêlée. A true ident i f icat ion ph oto w ou ld b e an indeterminan t

mêlée of photos and scribbles [graphies] that resemble nothing, un

der w h ich one w ould ins cr ib e a proper name.

Such an inscription [ légende] would be meant to be read, deci

phered, and recounted, but it would not be a myth: to say it more

precisely, it would not confer an identity on the ipse or on some one

of w h om it w o ul d b e the legendum est, the "this is to be read."

W h a t is to be re ad is w ha t is w ri tt e n. M y t h is no t w r i tt e n , bu t p r o

je ct ed a n d p r o n o u n c e d ; it is b r a n d i sh e d ab ou t or sp ri ng s fo r th

purely, without habituation, without a history. Not only does myth



158 Eulogy for the Mêlée

identify , it identifies itself above all: it is the infini te presup posi tion

of its ow n iden tity and authenticity. If , in mythi c mode , I say the

names "Ares," "Aphrodite," "Hermes" or "France," then I have al

ready said more than all that might be said about them, and noth

ing legitimate could be said about them that would not also already

be au th en ti ca te d by th e m in ad va nc e. T h u s , o n ly the ve ry vo ic e of

France cou ld express what is French . M y th is a meani ng that is its

ow n subject; myt h is where the proper name is the idi om of an i d

iolect [en tant qu'idosémie d'un idiolecte].

But what is written, and what is to be read, is that which has not

preceded its own habituation; it is the mêlée of the traces of a mean

ing that gets lost in loo kin g for itself and in ven tin g itself . I rea d

that Sarajevo is a city divided into at least three cities, both succes

sive and simultaneous, and that Bosna-Saray is there mixed with

M il jacka and I l idza.

§ Th e Surprise of the Even t

Th e tit le of this essay should also be wr itte n or read as: "Th e

Surprise: Of the Event." It concerns not only the "surprise," in the

sense of its being an a ttribu te, qu ality, or prope rty of the event, but

the event itself, its being or essence. What makes the event an event

is not only that it happens, but that it surprises—and maybe even

that it surprises itself (diverting it from its own "happening" ["ar

rivée"] , 1 not allowing it be an event, surprising the being in it , al

low ing i t to be o nly by way of surprise) .

But let us begin at the beginning. We will begin with the fol

lowing sentence, by which something undoubtedly started to dawn

on mod ern t hin kin g; that is , some thing began to surprise itself in

it , something with which we have not yet f inished: "Butphilosophy

is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a cognition of what

is true in them, andfurther, on the basis of this cognition, to compre

h e n d that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere happening [or

pure event —Trans]."2 Th is sentence is fou nd in the second book of

Hegel's Science of Logic, in a text entitled "The Notion [Concept]

in General," which serves as an introduction to "Subjective Logic;

or th e D octr ine of th e Not i on ."

This sentence can be read in two ways. According to the f irst

reading, which is certainly the most obvious because it closely con

forms to what passes for the canonica l inter pretatio n of Heg eli an

thi nk in g, this sentence signif ies that the task of phi loso phy is to

159



i 6 o The Surprise of the Event

conceive that of wh ich the event is only the phenom eno n. L et us be

more precise. For phil osophy , there is f irst of all the trut h that is

con tain ed in what happens, an d then, in l ight of this truth , the

con cept ion of its very pr odu cti on or ef fectuation, whi ch appears

from the outside as an "event, pure and simple (bloss)" exactly be

cause it is not conce ive d. On this acc oun t, the event-ness of the

event [événementalité de l'événement] (its appearance, its coming to

pass, its taking place—das Geschehen) is only the external, appar

ent, an d incon sistent side of the effective presentation of tru th. Th e

advent of the truth as real, whi ch is conta ined in the concept, dis

qualif ies the event as a s imple, narrative representation.Th is f irst reading, however, cannot hol d. Wi th all due rigor, the

logic of the concept 3 in which one is engaged here should not be un

der stood as a lo gic of the category or the idea tho ugh t of as an "ab

stract generality " (as in Kant ); on the contr ary, it is a logic of "the

ide nti ty of the conce pt and the thi ng " (as Hegel's text says a little

further on). According to this logic, the concept conceives (under

stands, puts forth, and founds) all determination, all dif ference,

and a ll exteriority fr om the po int of view of real ef fectivity. This is

w h y the co nc ep t, u nd er st oo d in th is wa y, is the el em en t in w h i c h it

is revealed (again, in the same text) that "the Appearance [or phe

nom eno n], is not devo id of essential being, bu t is a manifestatio n

of essence." 4 In fact, rather than bei ng the opposi te of sim ple , phe

nomenal truth, the concept is that phenomenon which takes hold

of itself as the truth.

It is not obvious, then—staying with the straightforward "canonical" reading—that the expression "event, pure and simple" must be

und erst ood onl y in a unila teral way, as if the predicates coul d deter

mi ne the essence of the subject: as if the event as such was o nly an d

necessarily "pure and simple" (inessential). On the contrary, maybe

it does not remain—and i t s urely mus t not—" pure and s imple," as

that consistency which is proper to the event. In other words, the

conceived event w o u l d r e m a i n the event conceived, w h ich i t s el f

w o u l d en ta il ce rt ai n co ns eq ue nc es .

The Surprise of the Event 161

(N ote that this do uble c onstrai nt on the subject of the event

comes up elsewhere in Hegel, for whom it undoubtedly constitutes

a general law. To give an example, in the introduction to the Phi

losophy of History, He gel writes, "In the pure light of the div ine

idea, which is not a s imple ideal, there disappears that appearance

according to which the world would be an insane event, sheer stu

p i d i t y [ein verrucktes, torictes Geschehen]." Here, too, the question is

put fo rwa rd as to the status of the predicates: Is every event insane

[insensé] ̂ If the world is a sane [sensé] event, then is its meaning

ind epe nde nt of its event-ness?)

It is necessary, therefore, to engage in a second reading, paying

more attention to the dif ference that informs this sentence from

the Logic. It is the difference between, on the one hand, the knowl

edge of the trut h that is fou nd " in " the thin g (reality, the subject)

that occurs and, on the other hand, and "further" ( ferner), the con

cep tion of that wh ic h appears as [a] simpl e event. In other wor ds,

the emphasis is not placed on the thing which happens (the con

tent or the nonphenomenal substratum), but on the fact that it

happe ns, the even t-ness of its event (or else, its event rather than

its advent) . Undoubtedly, this event-ness, insofar as it is conceived

in terms of the truth of the thing , is disti ngui shed fr om the phe

nomenon; in fact, it is its opposite, but only in distinguishing it

self as the nonphenom enal t ruth of the phenomenal itself as such,

that is, distinguished as event, as Geschehen.In this sense, the task of phi loso phy is bro ken d ow n into two

parts: (i) to k no w the tru th of that which takes place; and (2) to con

ceive of taking place as su ch. By means of this dif fe renc e—a dif fer

ence that is certainly not imm edi atel y apparent and is hardly, if ever,

analyzed in itself, but nonetheless remains very clear {ferner), H egel

represents the task of phi loso phy as the task of conc eivi ng the tak ing

place of truth beyond the true [outre le vrai]. In other words, it is to

conceive of the truth of the taking place of the tr ue —o r again, to

conceive of the evenire of the true beyond its eventus, w ith out it f a i l

ing to be its truth. As a result, it is a truth beyond truth itself.



i 6 2 The Surprise of the Event

It is by way of this dif ference or this surplus of tr ut h— no t the

truth above the true, but the truth o f the taking place of the tr u e —

that Heg el opens up moder nity, where the openi ng of mod ern ity is

noth ing other than the open ing of thi nki ng to the event as such, to

the truth of the event beyond every advent of me ani ng. In the open -

ing- up of mod ern ity (or, put another way, in the closure of meta

physics, whi ch is itself noth ing other than the event of the openin g,

the event opening thinking to the surplus that overf lows the origin),

there is this trace poi nted in the dir ectio n of the event as such.

Th is is wha t is at stake: the task of ph il oso ph y is not a matte r of

s ub s t i tut ing f or th e narrat ive Geschehen some substratum or sub

je ct th at do es no t ha pp e n or oc cu r, bu t s i m p l y is (w hi c h, in so fa r as

it is sup-posed [sup-posé], h as a lw ay s a l ready b een—th e " b eing

w ha t it w as ," th e to ti en einai o f Aris tot le) . Bey ond th e t ru th of

w ha t ha pp en s, w ha t is h ap p e ni n g , wh a t is in th e ha p pe n in g , w ha t

has happened, what has always already happened in the happening

itself , it is a matter of thi nk in g that it happens; it is a matter of the

happening or, rather, the happening "it-self ," where "it" is not the

"self" that "it was," since it has not happened. In other words, it is

a matter of th in ki ng sameness itself , as the same as noth in g

[mêmeté même, en tant que même que rien].

Thi s may be why it is , for Hegel , a matter of thi nki ng Geschichte,

not so much in the sense of "history" as we understand it (and as

Heg el him sel f understan ds it) , but rather [as] the entire Bei ng oract, the entelechy of Geschehen. Geschichte, then, would not b e —

that is , not only, or in the f irst place—the productive succession of

the dif ferent states of its subject. Rat her tha n an unf old ing , rather

th an a proces s or proces s ion, th e h appening or th e coming—or,

more to the point, "to happen," "to come," "to take place"—would

be a no ns u bs ta nt iv e ve rb a n d on e th at is no ns ub st an ti fi ab le . T h i s

is why Hegel refuses to allow philosophy to be identif ied with the

story of an un fold ing , that is , identif ie d wit h all its various episodes

[péripétie s]? Wh at he refuses, then, is not the dime nsio n of the "to

h appen" as s uch , w h ich h e w ould l ike to rep lace w ith th e s imple

an d stable identit y of Bei ng and the having- always-al ready-be en.

Looking at it more carefully, it is clear that what he does refuse is

Geschehen—which is the active essence of Geschichte, the historial-

The Surprise of the Event 163

i ty of h is tor y —w h en i t is unde rs tood as a s imple ep is ode {blosses

Geschehen). (In fact, one could reread the pages that precede the

sentence with which we began from this perspective.) The event is

not an episode; it is, if it is at all necessary to say that it is, that it be

[qu'il y ait]—that is , that there be something, something dif ferent

th an th e indeterminancy [indifference] o f Bein g and noth ingnes s ,

to use the language of the nume ric al logic of bec omi ng. Th e event

indica tes what has to be though t at the very heart of be com ing ,

poi nt in g to i t as s ometh ing more deeply w ith dra w n and more decisive than the "passage-into" to which it is ordinarily reduced. In

sofar as it is understood as "passage-into," becoming primarily in

dicates that which is passed into, the having-become [letre-devenu]

of its result. But in order for the passage to take place, in step w i t h

the passing [dans le pas du passer], there must first be the agitated

"unrest" (haltungslose Unruhe),6 whi ch has not yet passed and does

not pass as such—but happens.

This is the way in which Hegel wants to think the essence of

Geschehen as Geschehen. O r, at the very least, his thi nkin g tends to

w a rd th is th ou g ht a s if to w a r d it s o w n v a n is h i ng p oi n t. M o r e pr e

cisely, He ge l wants to th in k the essence of wha t escapes a logi c in

w h i c h ess enc e is un de rs to od as su bs ta nc e, su bj ec t, or g r ou n d , in fa

vo r of a lo g ic of th e "t o ha p p e n , " th e w ho le ess en ce of w h i c h is inthe state of "agi tatio n" that consists in not subsist ing (haltungslos).

More over, the origin of the wo rd Geschehen and its semantic use re

fer to racing along and leaping, to precipitation and suddenness,

far more than to process and what is produced. (In contrast to the

Fre nch wo rd "é véne ment, " this wor d does not have the sense of a

"outstanding or remarkable event," for which there are other words

in German, b eginning w ith th e c los ely re lated term Geschehnis,

w ho se sl ig ht di ff er en ce no ne th el es s br in gs ou t th e ve rb al , ac ti ve ,

and busy [passant] charac ter of Geschehen.)

In coming to this recognition, one certainly touches on the ex

treme li mi t of what it is possible to make He gel say. Such is not a



164 The Surprise of the Event The Surprise of the Event 165

matter of exercising interpre t ive violence, nor is it a matter of mak

ing Hegel , contrary to his own maxim, leap over his own t ime. It is

a matter of realiz in g that he must be mad e to say this, however sur

pri sing that mi ght seem to the "Hege lian s" ( if there are any left),

a n d a ma t t er o f n o t in g t ha t H eg e l ' s o wn t im e in phi l o so phy , t he

t ime o f t he mo d er n c l o su re/o pen in g , in c l u d e s t h is su rpr ise wi t h in

itself—a secret [sourde] anxiety (Unruhe) regarding the event.

Thinking the event in its essence as event surprises Hegelian

th ink ing fro m the inside. Of course, such a thought closes in on it

self just as quick ly as it is opened. In short , He gel lets the Geschehencome and go, happen and leave, without seiz ing it . But he does

state, nonetheless, that it happens to him and that it is what is to

be th ou g ht , al th ou gh it goe s b ey on d hi s o w n di sc ou rs e.

Or rather, one could just as easily say the fol lowing: Hegel seizes

th e Geschehen; he stops it or inspects it in its coming and going; he

fixes its concept (it is Geschichte). But in doing so, he demonstrates

that it is exactly in the seizing that he misses it as such. In this way, he

opens, volens nolens, the qu est ion of the "as such" of the Geschehen.

Th e "as such " of the event wo ul d be its Bein g. B ut then this

w o u l d ha ve to be th e b e in g - h a p p en i ng , or els e th e b ei ng -t h at -

happens, rather than the Bei ng of what hap pen s— tha t is, of what is

ha pp en in g— or even the Bei ng of the "that it happens." Or to put it

another way, it would not be the "there is," but the that there is, the

that without which there would be nothing. The difference between

"it is" and "there is" consists precisely in the fact that the there marksthe proper instance of the taking place of Bein g, wi thou t wh ich Be

ing would not be. That there is = the Being of Being, or the transi

t ive Bei ng of the intransit ive or substantive Bein g, the event of Be

ing that is necessary in order for Being to be; it does not in any

sense equa l the substance, sub ject, or gr ou nd of Bei ng. Th e event of

B ein g , whic h i s in n o wa y B ein g , i s n o n et he l ess B e in g " i t se l f"—t he

same as what has not been, as it were, or, more precisely, the same as

not having been, the same as nothing. . . .

Theref ore, wha t is opened wi th the questio n of the "as such" of

the event is som ethi ng on the order of a negativity of the "as suc h."

H o w is one to thi nk "as suc h" wher e the "as" does not refer to any

one "such"? Here , th in ki ng is surp rised in the strong sense of the

w o r d : it is ca ug ht i n th e ab se nc e o f t h i n k i n g [elle est prise en défaut

de pensée]. This is not to say that it has not identified its object, but

rather that there is no identifiable object if "the event" cannot even

be sa id or se en "as s u c h , " th at is , if on e c an no t ev en ex pr es s "t he

event" without its losing its event-ness.

Let us dwe ll up on this characterist ic of surprise.

There i s , t hen , so met hin g t o be t ho u g ht —t he ev en t —t he v eryn a t ur e o f w h i c h — e v e n t - n e s s — c a n o n l y b e a m a t t e r o f s u r p r is e ,

c a n o n l y t a k e t h in k in g by su rpr ise . W e n eed t o t h in k a bo u t ho w

t ho u g ht c a n a n d mu st be su rpr ised —a n d ho w i t ma y be ex a c t l y

this that makes it think. Or then again, we need to think about

ho w t here wo u l d b e n o t ho u g ht wi t h o u t t he even t o f t h in k in g .

To th ink the surprise of the event must be some thin g other than

qu est io n in g t he u n t hin k a bl e , in wha t ev er mo d e t h is mig ht o c c u r ,

and also, of course, som ethi ng other than win ni ng over surprise in

order to detach it from its (sur)prise by assigning it a place under a

c o n c ept . This u n d o u bt ed l y c o mes d o wn t o t h in k in g t hro u g h t he

leap that is take n at the very core of the Heg eli an Geschehen, the

d ia l ec t ic a l spr in g l o c a t ed a t t ha t po in t where , be fo re be in g t he

means of the [dialect ic 's] dri vin g force, it must be its relaxation or

release, and, therefore, its very [el le-même] negativity. As such, it is

less a mat ter of the conce pt of surpr ise th an of a surpris e of [àmême] the concept, essential to the concept.

In going much farther back than Hegel, as far back as the Pla

tonic and Aristote l ian topos of "wond er," what ma y need to be un

der stoo d is the fact that this task is the task of ph ilo sop hy , and that

phi l o so phy i s surprised thought [la pensée surprise]. We come back

to this top os again a nd ag ain, as if to awak en the id ea of a first

"won der," w hi ch is both a sort of rapture and an adm issio n of ig

norance, and which starts such "wonder" on its way toward its own

self-appropriat ion, that is, its self-resorption.

If we pay close atte ntion to the Metaphysics (spec i f i c a l l y A2 ) ,

w h at A r is to tl e te ll s us is th at " p h i lo s op h y " is th e sc ie nc e w h i c h is



i66 The Surprise of the Event The Surprise of the Event 167

neith er " pract ical" nor " poet ic ," and th e s c ience w h ich proceeds

from wonder— insofar as this is exactly what provides access to that

s c ience w h ich is i t s ow n end. Wonder, th en, does not appear as

some ignorance to be overcome or as an aporia to be surmounted,

w h i c h w o u l d be a si tu a ti on w he r e in on e sc ie nc e c o u l d no t re al ly be

distinguished from the others; instead, wonder appears as a dispo

s i t i o n t o w a r d sophia f or i t s ow n s ake. Wonder, th en, is properly

philo-sophical. One could even appeal to this interpretation in saying that wonder is already, by itself , found within the element of

sophia or, in a parallel manner, that sophia h olds w i th i n i t s el f th e

mo me nt of won der . (In the same passage, Ari stot le declares that

the philomuthos, that lover of myths a nd their astoni shing wonder s,

is also, in some way, a philosophos.) In as much as it is contained

w i t h i n sophia and not s uppres sed, th e mo me nt of w ond er is th at

of a surprise ke pt at the ver y core of sophia and constitutive of it ,

insofar as it is its own end. On the one hand, knowledge that is not

ordered or arranged by anything else is valuable only as its own ap

pear ing; on the other han d, an d reciprocally, the appear ing itself is

the only true object of kn ow le dg e— if it can, in fact, be an object.

Sophia must surprise itself , and the surprise must be "known."

T h u s , th e s urpris e of th e event w oul d not only b e a l imi t - s i tua

tion for the knowled ge of Bei ng , it wou ld also be its essential form

and es s ent ia l end. Fr om th e very b eg inn ing of ph i l os op h y to i t s

end, where its beginning is replayed in new terms, this surprise is

all that is at stake, a stake that is l iterally interminable.

A g a i n , it is ne ce ssa ry to sta y pr ec is el y w i t h i n th e el em en t of w o n

der—th at is , w ith in w h at could never properly b e made into an

"eleme nt," but is instea d an event. H o w is one to stay in the event?

H o w is one to hol d onto it ( if that is even an appropr iate expres

s ion) w ith out turning i t into an " element" or a " moment" ? U nder

w ha t c on d i ti o n s ca n on e ke ep t h i n k i n g w i t h i n th e su rp ri se , w h i c h

is its task to think?

W e w i l l ex a m in e so m e of the se c o n d i ti o n s, a t lea st in a p r e l i m i

nary way.

Let us beg in again w it h this: "the surprise of the event" is a tau

tology. A n d it is precisely this tauto log y that must f irst be ex

pressed. The event surprises or else it is not an event; so it is all a

matter of kno w in g w h at " s urpris e" is .

In a b irth or in a death —examples w h ich are not examples , b ut

more than examples; they are the thing itself—there is the event,

something] awaited, something that might have been able to be. It

can also be formulated like this: what is awaited is never the event;it is the advent, the result; it is what happe ns. At the end of nin e

months, one expects the birth, but that it takes place is what is

s t ructural ly unexpected in th is w ait ing. Or more prec isely , the un -

aw aited—and th e unaw ait^ ^ / f —is not " th e f act th at" th is takes

place, in the sense that this "fact" may itself be cir cu msc rib ed

w i t h i n th e se qu en ce of a pr oc es s a n d be a g iv e n of th e ex pe ri en ce .

It is not "the fact that"; it is the that itself of the "that it happ ens" o r

the "that there is ." Or even better, it is the "it happens" as distinct

f rom al l th at precedes i t and f rom every th ing according to w h ich

it is codeter mined . I t is th e pure pres ent of th e " i t h ap pen s " — and

the surprise has to do with the present as such, in the presence of

the present insofar as it happens.

That it happens is a quidditas, wh ic h is neither that of "what

happen s" no r of the "it happ ens." It is not even that of the succes

sion or sim ulta nei ty of the "that" at the heart of all "that's." As Ka nt

says, in orde r to thi nk of some th in g that occurs in a series, it is

necessary to conceive of it as the change of a substance (w hich [ it

s el f ] remains ident ic al , as in th e " Firs t Ana log y of E xper ience " ) ,

and it is necessary to refer this change back to causality ("Second

A n a l o g y o f E x p e r i e n c e ") . " [ T h e ] co n c e p t o f al te r at io n su pp os es

one and the same subject as existing with two opposite determina

t ions , and th ereb y as ab iding." 7 Ou ts id e th is concept of ch ange,

there is s imp ly no concept of "some thi ng ," for then there wo ul d

b e " c o m i n g in to b e in g a n d pa ss in g aw ay of su bs ta nc e, " w h i c h ca n

not take place "in time," but rather must take place exclusively as

time itself. Yet, " t ime cannot be perceived i n itself ." T h e p u r e o c

curring {das blosse Enstehen)—in other words, the ex nihilo and also



i68 The Surprise of the Event The Surprise of the Event

th e in nihilum—is nothing for which there is a concept; it is t ime

"itself ," its paradoxical identity and permanence as "empty time."

Th e event as such , then , is em pty tim e or the presence of the

present as negativity, that is, insofar as it happens and is, as a re

sult , nonpresent—and in such a way that it is not even "not yet

present" (w hich wo ul d reinscribe everyth ing in a succession of pre

sents already available "in t ime"), but is , on the contrary, the sort

[of thing] that not hin g precedes or succeeds. It is t i me itself in its

appearing, as the appearing that it is . 8

But em pty t ime or th e void of t ime " as s uch ," a void w h ic h is

not an empt ines s inter ior to any f o rm, b ut th e condi t ion of th e

forma tion of every form , is not a "thin g in itself ," beyond reach an d

accessible only to an intuitus originarius. " E mpty t ime," or th e ar

ticu lati on of the nihillquid as nonsuccessive, as the happ eni ng or

co mi ng of som ethi ng in general, i s t ime itself , in that it is not suc-

cessivity, but that which does not succeed and is not permanent

substance. One would have to say it in the following way: it is per

manence without substance, the present without presence; rather

th an the c o m i n g [la venue], it is the unexpected arrival [sur-venueY

of the thi ng itself . It is neither (successive) t im e, n or (distribu tive)

place, no r (extant) thin g, bu t rather the taki ng place of some

thing—the event. To use a word that is heavy with the weight of

an enormous t radit ion , w h ich i t w i l l b e neces s ary to prob lemat ize

later, it is creation.

Em pt y time, or negativi ty as t ime , or the event, makes itself the

"i n itself" of the "thing in itself ." Undo ubte dly , this is exactly what

Ka nt was unable to grasp. I t is also wha t Heg el an d those of us who

come af ter h i m, w i th i n th e ins is tent t radi t ion of pas s ing a long a

th i nki ng of th e event , are cons tant ly addres s ing. " T im e" or " the

event" (b oth of these terms are stil l too f irm ly rooted in a them atic

of conti nuou s-disc ontin uous succession) mar k out, or just are, the

"posi tion of existence" as such: the nihillquid that can not even be

expressed as "from the nihil to the quid." This is the event of Be

ing, neither as an accident nor as a predicate, but as the Being of

Being [l'être de l'être].

A c c o r d i n g to the se co n d it io ns , th e ev en t is n ot "s om et hi n g " be

y o n d th e kn ow a bl e or th e sa y a b l e — a n d , as su ch , re st ri ct ed to th e

be yo nd -s pe ec h a n d be yo nd -k no wl e d g e of a m ys ti ca l ne ga ti vi ty . It

is neith er a category nor a metacategory dis t inct f rom Being. 1 0

Rather, it is right at [à même] Being, the necessary condition for the

categorization of Being : for saying it , addressing it , summ oni ng [in

terpeller] it to the level of the surprise of its unex pec ted arr iva l.

As such— al s Geschehen, als Entschehen, a Is Verschwinden, as tak

ing place, appearing, disappearing—the event is not "presentable."

(In this sense, it exceeds the resources of any phen om eno log y, eve n

th ough th e ph enomenological th eme in general h as never b een

more magnetized by anything else) . But it is not, for all that, "un

presentable" l ike some hidden presence, for it is the unpresentable

or, rather, the unpre sentifi able of the present that is right at the pre

sent itself. The u npre senti fiab le of the present is the difference that

structures the present, as has been kno wn fr om the time of Ari sto

tle right up until the present day, via Husserl and Heidegger. That

this difference of the present is not presentable does no t mea n that

i t is not th inkab le—b ut th is could mean th at th inking, in order to

be th ou g h t, m u st it se lf be co m e so m e th i n g ot he r th a n a se ei ng or

kno wi ng; it must make itself the surprise of/in its "object." In De-

leuzian terms, a becoming-sur prise of thi nk in g must corre spond to

the unexpe cted arriv al of the present (of Bein g).

In this formulation, there is no event "as such." This is becausethe event as event—that is, quo modo or according to its own mode

{evenire quo modo evenit), the event according to the appropriate

ness and me asure of the event itsel f—i s not what is pro duc ed or

could be shown (as the spectacular, as the newborn infant, as the

dead man). Rather, i t is the event as i t comes about [é-vient], as i t

h appens . A lmos t immediately , one can dis cern th at in s imilar c ir

cumstances the modal as is confused with the temporal as (the one

that is used wh en on e says "as it happ ened , there was a flash of ligh t

ning" ["comme il arrivait , i l y eut un éclair"]) . Here, quo modo =

quo tempore.

Th e mod e of the event, its "as such ," is ti me itse lf as the tim e of



I70 The Surprise of the Event The Surprise of the Event 171

the unex pecte d arrival . An d the t im e of the unexpec ted arrival is

"emp ty" t im e. The voi d of t ime , or better st i l l , the voi d as t ime, the

v o i d i n th e m o d e of ti m e , is "n eg at iv it y fo r it se lf " (t he ph ra se by

w h i c h H e g e l de fi ne s ti m e in th e Encyclopedia in §257). But this is

not negativity understood as Hegel understood it , as "abstract ly re

l a t ed t o i t se l f" (whic h, in sho rt , a mo u n t s t o t he K a n t ia n "v o id ") .

In this case, one wou ld rem ain fi rmly rooted in a mode l of the suc

cession of presents, a successio n divi de d up and reconne cted by

this abstract negativity. Rather, the relat ion of negativity to i tse lf—

"bir t h a n d d ea t h ," a s H eg e l sa ys in t he sa me sec t io n —mu st be u n

derstood as the nonabstrac t , itself unde rstoo d as not the result [of

some process]. (This is exact ly what Hegel lets fal l by the wayside,

bu t als o w h at he is ve ry cl os e to w h e n he na m es ti m e "t he ab st ra ct

b ei ng ") . W h a t is ne it he r ab st ra ct io n no r re su lt is th e u ne xp ec te d

arrival; in fact , it is negativity "for itself," bu t for itself onl y insofar

as it is the pos it ion of Bei ng or existence.

Th is posi t ivity of negativity is not its dialect ical fecundity. In or

d er t o a v o id reo p en in g t he who l e i ssu e o f d ec o n st ru c t in g t he d i

alectic, let us just say that this pos iti vit y is the exact reverse of this

fecundity, without going so far as to say that it is its dialect ical

steril ity. It is Being or existence that exists, [which is] neither en

g en d ered n o r u n en g en d ered , bu t whic h a rr iv ed u n ex pec t ed l y , a r

r iv es u n ex pec t ed l y—o r a g a in , i s "c rea t ed ."

Negati vity, here, does no t deny itself and i s not raised up out of

itself. It does something else; its operation, or its in-operation, is

otherwise and obeys another mode. One could say that it becomes

st ra in ed : t en sio n a n d ex t en sio n , t he o n l y mea n s by whic h so me

t hin g c o u l d a ppea r a s "pa ss in g -t hro u g h" a n d "pro c ess , " t he n o n -

temporal and nonlocal extension of the taking-place as such, the

spa c in g t hro u g h wh ic h t im e a ppears , t he t en sio n o f n o t hi n g whic h

opens time. As Heidegger put it: Spanne.

The u n ex pec t ed a rr iv a l : t he n o t hin g st re t c hed t o t he po in t o f

rup ture and to the lea ping- off poi nt of the arrival , wher e presence

is presented [pres-ente].

The re is a ruptu re an d a leap: r uptu re, not in the sense of a break

w i t h th e al re ad y p re su p po se d te m p or a l c o n t i n u u m , b u t r up tu re as

t ime itself, that is, as that which admits nothing presupposed, not

even, or especial ly not , a presupposit ion. To do so would be to ad

mi t an antecedent of t ime [in] to itself. Th e ruptu re of noth ing, the

leap of not hin g into noth ing , is the extension of negativity; or to

be m or e p re ci se , si nc e th e ne ga ti ve is no t s o m e t h i n g th at ca n be

stretched l ike a rubber band, [it is] negativity as tension, a tension

that is not itsel f progr essive, but is all in on e go, in a single strok e,

the tension/extension of Bei ng, "that there is."

If the event of the "that there is" has negati on as its cor olla ry

"and not nothing," it does not have it as its negative—which is to

say, not as just another inverse and symmetrical possibil ity: that

t here be "n o t hin g " in the place 0/something. This is because there

is no place for the takin g place of a "no th ing " in the guise of

"so met hin g ." "An d n o t n o t hin g ," a s i t i s u sed a bo v e , d o es n o t

mean that this is not "nothing" which exists. On the contrary, it

says that nothing exists except for "something," and that "some

thing" exists with no presupposit ion other than its own existence,

the extension of "no thi ng" a s the tension of its becomin g-pr esent,

of its event.

(In this, it must be conc eded that the thi nki ng of existence woul d

prove "n othi ng. " Bu t the proo f of not hin g is not necessarily, or ex

clusively, the anguish of not hi ng ne ss —w hi ch always runs the risk

of project ing this "nothingness" as the abysma l presupp osit ion (and

postsupposit ion) of Bein g. Instead, the experience [preuve] o f n o t h

ing is what we are trying to approach: the thinking-surprise [pensée-

surprise] of the event.)

W h a t , th e n, is th e su rp ri se ?

This is exact ly what can no longer be asked. The surprise is not

any thin g. It is not some newness of Bei ng that wo ul d be surpri s

ing in comparison to the Being that is already given. When there is

the event (whe ther there is the event on ly for the totali ty of being s

o r fo r d iv erse , d ispersed , a n d u n c ert a in be in g s—whic h c o mes

down to the same thing), it is the "already" that leaps up, along

w i t h th e "n ot ye t. " It le ap s [o ve r] ev er y p re se nt e d or p re se nt ab le




present, and this leap is the coming, or the pre-sence or prae-sens

itself wit hou t a present.

W h e n "t he i nf a nt is b o r n , " as H e g e l says in the fa m ou s pas sag e

f rom th e Phenomenology, the event is not that the infant is born,

be ca use th is wa s al re ad y w e ll es ta bl is he d in the or de r of pr oc ess a n d

the modif ica tio n of substance. Instead, the event is the int err up

tion of the process, that leap whi ch He gel represents as the "qu ali

tative le ap" of the "first brea th" (or even, as he says elsewh ere, as

th e " t remb l ing" w h ich cros s es th rough and div ides th e maternal

substance in utero). To use Heidegger's language, to be born or to

die is not "to be," but to be "thrown into Being."

Th in ki ng the leap can only be accomp lished by a leap of though t

— b y thought as a leap, as the leap that it knows and is aware of be

in g, nec essarily. Bu t it kno ws itself an d is aware of itself as surprise

(surprise in its knowledge and awareness, surprise as knowledge and

awareness). The surprise is nothing except the leap right at [à même]

Being, this leap where the event and thinking are "the same." In a

certa in way, the thin ki ng of the surprise repeats the Parm eni dia n

s ameness of Being and th ink ing.

It leaps; but who or what is this "it"? Nothing, no one. "It" only

is in the leap. Tha t is , it ex is ts —i f the ek-sistin g of existence is

mad e of the tension and exten sion between Be ing and the being ,

be tw ee n n o t h i n g a n d so m e th i n g . It le ap s i n to n o th i n g , a n d th is is

how it exists. It is to leap into not hin g. It is itself the articu latio n

of the dif ference between not hin g and somet hing , and this dif fer

ence is also a différend [ein Austrag, d is pute, conf l ic t , d is t r ib ut ion,

s h ar ing —as H e idegger lays out in th e s econd volum e of h is Niet

zsche lectures). There is a disagreement between Being and the be

ing: Being is in disagreement with the present, given, disposed be-

ing-ness [étantité] of the being, a nd the being is in disagreem ent

w i t h th e su bs ta n ti a l, fo u n d i n g es se nt ia li ty of B e in g . T h e di sa gr ee

ment is a dis agreement w ith th at w h ich , by according Being to the

being, would have eased the tensionof ek-sisting. D is agreement , th en,

constitutes the event: the nonpresenc e of the com in g to presence,

and its absolute surprise.

But this is not a surprise for a subject. No one is surprised, just as

no one leapt . T h e s urpris e—th e event—does not b elong to th e or

der of represen tation. The surprise is that the lea p— or better the

"it ," the "someone" who occurs in the leap and, in short, occurs as

the leap "itself"—surprises itself . It is surprised; it is insofar as it is

surprised that it is— a nd it is as surprise, surpri sing itself in the glar

ing absence of being-present. It surprises itself precisely insofar as

it represents neither "itself" nor its surprise. The leap coinc ides wit h

the surprise; it is nothin g but this surprise, wh ich stil l does not even

"belong" to it .

Th e tension or exten sion of the leap, that is, the spacing of tim e,

the discord of Bei ng as its truth: this is the surprise. The Spanne is

not surprising in that it comes to trouble or destabilize a subject that

wa s th er e, bu t in its ta k in g so m eo ne the re where he is not, or insofar

as it overtakes him , seizes hi m, paralyzes him insofar as he is not there.

This "not being there" is exactly the most appropriate mode of

"bei ng there," s ince it is a matter of " leap ing into B ein g," or a mat

ter of exis ting . "N o t to be there" is not to be alread y there, but to

be the the re it se lf (w hi ch is the pr in ci pa l ex is te nt ia l c o n d i ti on of Da-

sein). Th e "there" is the spacin g of the tensi on, of the ex-ten sion. It

is space-time; it is not space, not t ime , not a coup lin g of the two,

not a source-point outside the two, but the originar y division [coupe]

and chiasm that opens them up to one another.

T h e s urpris e is th e leap into th e s pace- t ime of noth i ng, w h ic h

does not come "before" or from "elsewhere"; as such, it is the leap

into the space-time of space-time "itself ." It is the tak ing place of

place, of the there that is not a place "for" B ein g, bu t Bei ng as

place, being-the-there. It is not present Being, but the present of Be

ing insofar as i t happens, and therefore insofar as it is not.

It is in this way that the surprise of the event is neg at ivi ty— bu t

not negativity as a resource, as an available foundation, as noth

ingness or an abyss from the depths of wh ic h the event wo ul d

come; for such an "event" would stil l be a result . The nothing ( in

order to keep this dried-up word and to make it incisive for every

"abyss" and all their various depths), which is "at bottom" ["au

fond"] n oth ing and no more than the nothi ng of a leap into noth

ing, is the negativity that is not a resource but the aff irmation of




ek-sistent tension: its intensity, the intensity or surprising tone of

existence.

A c c o r d i n g to th es e c o n d i ti o n s , if a s ch e m a ti s m of th e su rp ri se

w er e n e c e s s a r y — a n d it is ne ce ss ar y; it is w h at co nc er ns us he re ; it

is necessary to give the a pri ori co ndit i ons of grasp ing the surprise

a s su c h, t he c o n d i t io n s o f a su rpr ise se iz u re o f su r pr ise —i t c o u l d

be sa id th at th e su rp ri se is th e sc he m a ti sm its el f. F o r if th e sc he m atism is the prod uct ion of a "pure vis ion ," anterior to every figure,

and if "pure vision " is itself the ex-p osit ion of t ime as "pur e auto-

affe ct ion ,"" it is in pure auto-affect ion that vision sees itself seeing

and, in this way, sees—(the) nothing. In general, the schematism

i s pr in c i pa l l y t he v is ib i l i t y o f n o t hi n g a s a c o n d i t io n fo r t he po ssi

b il i ty of an y v i si b i li ty of s om e th in g . I n ev er y vi si on o f s o m e th i ng ,

the vision first of al l sees itself as pure vi sion , seeing not hin g, seeing

n o t hi n g t he re —a n d yet , i t i s a l rea d y "v is io n ," a n d a s su c h i s a hea d

of itself or outside itself, not a figur e and the f igure of the not h

in g — t h is su rp r is in g f ig u re wi t ho u t f ig u re t ha t t he ev ent o f B e in g

traces in a flash.

Therefo re , t he sc hema t ism—a n d a l o n g wi t h i t , a l l t ra n sc en d en

t a l ima g in a t i o n — wo u l d n e i t her be so me so rt o f " ima g e" (as i s a l

ready wel l kno wn ) nor some sort of arche-im age, any more th an it

w o u l d b e a so rt of s u b li m e aby ss of th e b r ea ki ng d o w n of the se i m a g es . Mo re s impl y , mo re u n ima g in a bl y , i t wo u l d be t he ev en t -

schem a, the l igh ting of the trace stretched out right at noth ing and

t he pu re a f f i rma t io n o f ex ist en ce . F in a l l y , i t wo u l d n o t ev en be

"birth" or "death," but only what these incisions dissect: the Being

of a bein g, its event.

W i l l it be sa id , th en , th at th is ev en t is u n i q u e — i n th e sen se in

w h i c h H ei de g g e r sp ea ks of th e "f u nd am e n ta l ev en t of D a s e i n " ? 1 2

Certainly. In a certain respect , there is nothing apart from an event,

and there is n oth ing " of the event" that is scattered here and there

w i t h no co nn e ct io n to es se nt ia l ev en t- ne ss . T h e r e is an ev en t, a su r

prise. What exists does not recover; it does not return. It is to exist.

Bu t the unity of the event is not nume rica l . I t does not consist

in bei ng gathered at a poin t of orig in (for ontology , there is no Big

Bang). Because it is or creates surprise, its nature and structure are

such as to be dispersed in the flow [l'aléa] of events, an d, as a re

sult, also in the flow of that whi ch does not consti tute an event an d

w i th d r a w s di sc re et ly i n to th e i m p e rc e p ti b l e c o n t i n u u m , i n to th e

mu rm u r o f " l i fe" fo r wh ic h ex ist en c e i s t he ex c ept io n .

I f t he ev en t were fu n d a men t a l a n d u n iqu e in t he o rd in a r y— o r

"met a ph ysic a l "—se n se o f t hese wo rd s, i t wo u l d be g iv en , a n d t h is

g iv in g wo u l d a l so be t he o r ig in a r y d isso l u t io n o f a l l ev en t -ness .There would be no surprise. Only because it is not given, but in

st ea d ha ppen s, i s t here su rpr ise a n d a n u n pred ic t a bl e [aléatoire]

mu lti pli city of wha t migh t now be cal led the arrivals (or the "arriv-

ings") of the un iqu e event. In this sense, there are only events,

wh ic h me ans that " there is " is ev ent like [événementiel] (Sein, Ereig-

nis). This means they are not only diverse, discrete, and dispersed,

b u t al so ra re . O r , in ot h er w or ds : th e ev en t is s i m u lt a n e o u s ly

u n iqu e , in n u mera bl e , a n d ra re .

I t n ev er s t o ps ha ppen in g —a n d su rpr is in g . Thin k in g n ev er s t o ps

catc hin g itself in the act [se surprendre à] of seeing it co mi ng , its

ope n look turn ed upo n the transparenc y of noth ing . A thoug ht is

an event: what it thinks happens to it there, where it is not . An

event is a thought: the tens ion and leap in to the noth ing of Bei ng.

It is in this sense that "Being and thinking are the same" and that

their sameness takes place according to the incisive ex-tension ofek-sistence.

It is also in this sense that it might be said that the creation of

t he wo r l d i s t he t ho u g ht o f G o d . [W e c o u l d sa y t h is] i f f ro m n o w

o n —g iv en t ha t t he u n c o n d it io n ed is n o l o n g er su bjec t ed t o t he

con dit ion of the suprem e be in g— it were not also necessary for us

to think this wit hou t "G od " and witho ut a "creator": this is what is

mea nt by the dem and to t hi nk of the event as we have inhe rited it

f ro m H eg el .

[S in c e H eg e l ] a t t he v ery l ea st —it mig ht be n ec essa ry t o pa y

so me ren ewed a t t en t io n t o t he wo rk o f Pa rmen id es h imsel f , pa r

t icularly to how ontological truth is inscribed there in the recita

t io n of an event. Afte r al l , the poem i mm edi ate ly opens onto the



i 7 6 The Surprise of the Event

present with "the horses which carry me," where nothing indicates

a stopping point in any formal way. In fact , the speaker's chariot

en t ers t he d o m a i n o f t he g o d d ess , bu t t h is d o m a in i s o n l y pre

sented as the road opened wide by the gaping opening that Dike

a g reed t o o pen . H e , t he "yo u n g ma n ," t he o n e who "k n o ws" o r

"sees" his road "pass through al l the cit ies," does not come down

from his chariot . He is instructed by the goddess along the way,

w i t h ou t st op p in g , in st ru c te d no t ab ou t B e i n g b u t ab ou t th e " i t is ."

Passing through the opening, he sees that there is; that is al l that

ha ppen s t o h im, a n d n o t hin g e l se ev er ha ppen s—when so met hin g

happens.It is precisely this that must be said and thought—there is noth

ing but this to say and to think; al l meaning is there.

W h a t m e a n i n g , th en ? T h e m e a n i n g th at m ak es it th e cas e th at

"there is"; that which dest ines or provokes Being into happening;

t ha t whic h sen d s B e in g o n i t s wa y in t o ha ppen in g —in t o ha ppen

in g /a rr iv in g / l ea v in g . W ha t i s t h is? This c a n n o t be represen t ed a s

an axiom, or as a fact . It wil l be said that it is an "it must ."

W r i t t e n b en ea th th e ti tl e of th e la st m o v e m e n t of Be et ho ve n' s

Q u a rt et , o p. 1 3 5 —"t he d ec is io n ma d e wi t h d i f f i c u l t y"—he a d d ed

t his we l l -k n o wn n o t e : "Muss es sein? Es muss sein." (This c o u l d be

interpreted in the fol lowing way: "Must it (be)? It must (be)" ["Le

fa u t - i l (ê tre)? I l l e fa u t (ê tre)"]) . I f B e in g s imp l y were , n o t hi n g

w o u l d ev er h ap p e n, a n d th er e w o u l d n ot b e an y t h i n k i n g . In a d d i

t ion , the "it mus t" is not the expression of a sim ple, i mm ane nt ne

cessity (of a nature or dest iny) . Nec essity itsel f can on ly be the de

cid ed response of th in ki ng to the suspense of Be ing wher ein it is

surprised: Muss es sein?

§ H u m a n Excess

Measure is the name for the propriety [convenance] of one Bei ng

to another, or to itself. On the one hand, as propriety to another,

measure is that "dimension" for which there is no prescribed pro

pr ie t y ex c ept fo r t ha t o f c o n v e n t io n . Syst ems o f mea su rem en t

[mesure] are al l ground ed, at least in part , on considera tions of use

(wh ich are more or less mixed up wi th various kinds of sym bolis m).

On the other hand, apart from every intention toward some sort

of use, it is alway s possi ble to mea sure the average life of a ma n in

mi ll io nth s of a second, or in definite fract ions of the t ime it takes

for the l ight of a distant star to reach us. Th is is h ow the curi osi

t ies that fi l l almanacs are obtai ned (the heigh t of the col um n

formed by al l the books in the Bibliothèque Nationale . . . ) , facts

d ev o i d o f mea n in g bu t n o t o f t ru t h , a l be i t in f in i t e l y impo v e r ishedtruth . Wi th in this order of tru th, excess is impossib le. Qu ite to the

contrary, it is the perfect dom ai n of large numb ers, shifts in scale,

incommensurables, al l the surpluses with regard to averages, and

so fo r t h . Sev en mi l l io n s ix hu n d red t ho u sa n d po u n d s st er l in g fo r

C a n o v a s The Graces is a commercial truth that is neither measured

nor excessive. Ten bil l ion people on Earth is a prospective demo

graphic truth, which is neither measured nor excessive as such.

In turn, these figures themselves measure something: the engage

men t wi t h c er t a in ev a l u a t io n s wi t hin a ma rk et , t he en g a g emen t

w i t h a ce rt ai n n u m b e r of ri sk s a n d tas ks in a w o r l d ( in a w o r l d th at

177



178 Human Excess Human Excess 179

be co m es w o r l d l y b y th is ve ry en ga ge m en t) . In ot he r w or d s, ea ch

time these figures measure a responsibil ity.

Ta k in g a c c o u n t o f the "ex c ess" o f l a rg e n u mb ers so m et imes

comes down to simply establishing a propriety that has no sense

of "excess" wi th re lat io n to itself (as is the case wit h curio sit ies

fro m a l ma n a c s , rec o rd bo o k s, o r t he pu re l y spec t a c u l a r ex hibi t io n

of the universe's di me ns io ns —a ll of it science and tr uth for fools).

Bu t some time s, it is also a matter of br ing ing a certain res ponsi

b i l i ty to li g h t. E a c h of th es e ge stu re s is th e rev ers e of th e ot he r, so

that the prolifer at ion of large numbe rs in ou r culture, o ur interestsand ou r needs (the size of a comp uter m emo ry, the price of a nu

clear submarine, and so on) also defines the exponential growth of

su c h respo n sibi l i t y .

(Sergio Moravia had this feel ing, albeit in a form that was st il l

imprec ise a n d t o o Ma n ic hea n , when he wro t e : "Ev i l t o d a y i s c a l l ed

'N u mb er ' . . . . N u c l ea r wea po n s, wea po n s o f ma ss ho m ic id e , were

b o r n o f N u m b e r . W i t h o u t N u m b e r , th e ir i n v e n t i o n w o u l d ha ve

be en m ea ni ng le ss . T h u s , th e N u m b e r of th e sp ec ie s is op p os e d to

the Nu m be r of the end of the species."')

It is not without reason that the figures for genocide and other

forms of exte rmi natio n have becom e, if not names prop erly speak

ing, at least the semantemes o f mo d ern i t y . "S ix m i l l i o n " is indisso

ciable from the Shoah. "Six mil l ion" (as well as figures for other ex

terminations and massacres), as it is used, does not mean the same

as bein g "very bi g" or "too high ," excessive or out of pr op ort ion .

W o u l d it b e " w i t h i n m ea su re " to k i l l te n J ew s, or a h u n d r e d A r m e

nians, or twenty-five Tutsis? Is it "within measure" to let two peo

ple die of hung er rather than a mil l ion ? These figure s do not des

ignate a surpassing or going beyond [dépassement] (of wha t norm?

of wha t average?). Th ey in dicate an order, a register appro priate to

engagement and responsibil ity, of wh ich they are themselves a part .

( Of course, one must trace back to M ar x the role large num bers

pl a y in wha t mig ht be c a l l ed mo ra l ex po si t io n . I n o rd er fo r t he

fun ction these num bers serve to jum p out in front of our eyes it is

en o u g h t o g l a n c e t hro u g h a n y n u mb er o f c ha pt ers f ro m Capital,

fo r ex a mpl e , t he c ha pt er o n the "G en e ra l L a w o f Ac c u m u l a t io n ."

Th e figures are there not only as elements of the discourse; they

precede it . In a certain way, they indicate its meaning in advance

of al l its art icula ted significat ions. " Ca pi ta l" itself may also be ab

solutely general exposit ion and exponential ity.)

Just as in the vain exercise of curi osity (or its exact opposite ), here

too, "excess" is its own p ropr iety and form s the measure of an "u n

heard-of" ["inouïe"] measure. It measures itself; that is, it is en

gaged as totality. In today's world, excess [la démesure] is not an ex

cess [un excès], in the sense that it is indeterminant with relat ion to

normative structures; it does not form a monstrous excrescenceand, as such, is not doomed to perish. It constitutes a tendentious,

c o n t in u ed a p pro x im a t io n o f t o t a li t y . I t in d ic a t es n o t so mu c h t he

d eg ree o r qu a n t u m o f i t s ma g n i t u d e [grandeur] (six or ten or forty

mi ll i on , or even 13 or 20 meters square of arable land per person by

the year 2050), bu t magn itud e itself as an absolute wh ic h touches

u p o n a n o t h e r p r o p r i e t y o f B e i n g ( o r th e h u m a n , o r m e a n i n g —

however we want to say it). This can be i l lustrated in the fol low

ing way: the B ig Ban g is not about "very large" quantit i es (of t ime ,

energy, the dimen sion s of the Unive rse, an d so on) , it is abou t a

magnitude (the Universe) that is entirely its own measure, and the

mea sure of no other.

This ma g n i t u d e , whic h i s i t s o wn "ex c ess iv e" mea su re o r mea

sured excess, also provide s the scale of a total resp onsib il ity: w he n

i t i s t ho ro u g hl y a n a l yz ed , t he who l e ma t t er o f t he B ig B a n g c o n

cerns the fact that the true "measure" o f the universe is f ou nd inthe "excessive" responsibil ity that we have for it , or which we take

o n fro m t ha t v ery mo me n t we mea su re in t h is wa y. M a n a s t he

measu re of all thing s has taken on a new, excessive me ani ng: fa r re

mo v ed fro m ev ery re l a t io n t o t he hu ma n a s so me med io c re s t a n

dard, and also far removed from its remnants, this meaning relates

hu ma n s t hemsel v es t o a n imm en si t y o f respo n sibi l i t y .

In an age where hu ma nit y is under stood as the pop ula t io n of a

ve ry la rg e n u m b e r of p eo p le , th e humanitas o f hu ma n it y i t se l f a p

pears as an excess that gives the measure or sets the standard against

w h i c h w e m us t me as ur e ou rs el ve s. As su c h , a m u r d e r is ex ce ss iv e

in relat ion to the ord ina ry mores of a social group . Bu t an exter-



ISO Human Excess

mi nat ion (the name of wh ich indicates al l too well what it is say

ing: to go to term, exhaust the account [épuiser le compte] , to mea

sure a people only against its existence within totality), this itself

measures a social relat ion, or its absence, as it were. The opposite

of an exterm inati on cannot be fou nd [b y loo kin g for some] "just

measure": it must reclaim the same totality. This is also the mean

in g o f d emo g ra phi c ma st ery: hu m a n i t y a s t o t a l i t y c l ea r l y c o mes

d o wn t o be in g hu ma n it y ' s respo n sibi l i t y . This respo n sibi l i t y i s

given without measure, because the question is not how many peo

ple the Earth or the universe can support , but rather which people

i t c a n su ppo rt , whic h ex ist en c es . N u mber , here , immed ia t e l y c o n

ver ts its m ag ni tu de in to m or a l m ag ni tu de : th e siz e of h u m a n i ty be

comes indissociable from its dignity.

But this dignity, this humanitas, is not itse lf give n as a measu re

(to believe that it is const itutes the noto riou s weakness of all dis

courses of "measured" and meas uring hum ani sm) . In a certain way,

all calls to "measure" are in vain, since there is no excess that can

be d e t e r m i n e d w i t h re la ti on to a g iv en m ea su re , n o r m , sc al e, or

mean. Thus, the use and/or rule that gives the measure must itself

be in ve nt ed .

In our culture, a long pe riod of rule was needed in order to recall

how m uc h the ancient wo rl d was a wo rld of measure, an d how it

wa s th at un d er th is h ea d in g, pe rh ap s m or e th an an y ot he r, it h a d

to be a mo del for us (mod el and measure, mod el of measure, and

measure of the mod el: this al l makes up a large part of our history

and metaphysic al constitut ion). It was a world of well-def ined l im it ,

a world of the hori zon, of phronesis, mesotes, a nd metron. Hubris was

the measurable excess par excellence, and one knew, or could know

in pr in c ipl e , i f Aja x , An t ig o n e , o r Cr eo n , Ca esa r o r B ru t u s su r

passed the measure and one could know which measure was ex

ceeded. Thu s, m easure is the propri ety of Bei ng to itself. It is its

mo d e ( i t s t empera men t , i t s rhyt hm, i t s o wn [propre] coherence),

not its dimension.

It is not imp ort ant whethe r this interpr etat i on of the ancient

Human Excess I 8 i

w o r l d is ac cu ra te or no t. W h a t is i m p o rt a n t is th at we ha ve set up

this model—and that it gets exhausted. It is exhausted because it

does not take into account (as the proper mode, as the propriety

of Bei ng to itself) that the measure of the mod er n wor ld is itself

the "excessive" m ode of infini ty.

Its origin [provenance] i s u n d o u bt ed l y Chr ist ia n ; o r ra ther, Chr is

t ianity was only ever the instal lat ion of this infin ite mo de of Bein g.

Proper ly speaking, Ch rist iani ty had long concealed the truth of this

infinite m ode u nder the apparent preservation of a measurable mea

sure, the measure of the created Being [l'être créé]. As a creature, Be

ing had to observe the prop riety of its dependence. But insofar as

the whol e of creation essential ly carries the m ark or vest ige of its

creator as its prope r mode ( man i n the image of G od was noth ing

mor e than the pin nac le of this structu re or process ), it itsel f has as

its proprie ty the immensi ty, the nonm easure, of the creator. To put

it more p recisely, this is the nonm easur e of the act of creatio n

(where the subject creator is nothing other than its act), which has

as its prop erty the lack of measure an d the fact that it operates wit h

out measure, as distinct from all cosmogony. In fact, creation means

t he n o n o r ig in [non-provenance] of existence as such, w ith no other

measure or mode, and it means Being's absolute and exclusive pro

priety to itself.

As fo r " G o d , " he is o nl y th e in te rp re ta ti on of th is exce ss in te rm s

of a process and as the agent of pro du cti on. But this is also why,

ev en wi t h in t he fra m ewo rk o f t h is in t erpret a t io n , c rea t io n ha s

b ro ug h t ab ou t so m a n y c om p le x el ab or at io ns on th e st ru ct ur e a n d

extent of his act : on the "ex ni hi lo ," on Go d's exp ansio n out of

hi ms el f or retreat into hi msel f, on the various themes of love, glory ,

giving, or abandonment. All these considerations gravitate toward

the fol lowing: "creation" is the absolute measure, the Being which

is, unto itself, the pure and s imp le prop riety of its existence.

Th e result is that the formu la for G od , as the measure of al l

things, does not have the same meaning for Plato as it does for

Heg el. For Plato, G od is the measure of a relat ion between each ex

ist in g t h in g [existant] and its ow n mode of being ; as such, G o d is

the absolute measure of the moda liz at i on of beings. F or Heg el ,



182 Human Excess Human Excess 183

G o d is the excessive measu re [(dé)mesure] a c c o rd in g t o whic h B ein g

is modalized as Being, essential ly and in every exist ing thing (which

also implies that his own mode has just as much to do with noth

in g n ess a n d bec o min g ) .

Up to a certain point , Hegel represents this measure—the being-

m o d a l [l'être-mode] of Bei ng itself —as an absolute measure, as an

a bso l u t e l y f in ished o r a c c o mpl ishe d in f in i t y .

This c a n be t ra n sc r ibed in t o a n o t her reg ist er in t he fo l l o win g

w ay : fo r H e g e l , as w e l l as fo r P la to , th er e is an ab so lu te ju st ic e toabsolute measure. In m oda liz ing itself, Being confers on itself the

r ig ht mo d es [justes modes] o f its mod alit ie s (and precisely because

it modalizes itself, or because its structure is subject ivity). In prin

c ipl e , t hen , t h is ju stic e in i t se l f d e f in es t he g o o d . W ha t fo l l o ws

fr om th is is that there is, of itself, a just socia l order an d a just sov

ereignty. For us, in tur n, the mod ali zat i on of Bei ng is that of the

w it h ou t- m ea su r e [sans-mesure] a s su c h. W ha t we s t i l l interpret in

the ancient or Christ ian ways as "excessively large," whether it be

speed , po pu l a t io n , ma ssa c res , po v ert y , t he u n iv erse , o r n u c l ea r

po wer , fo r ex a mpl e , i s o n l y t he mo d a l iz ed t ra n sl a t io n o f t he fo l

lowing: "creation" is now understood as the act of Being which is

wi tho ut measure its own measure [comme l'acte de l'être qui est sans

mesure sa propre mesure].

Perhaps we can also unde rstand the univer sal constants of m od

ern physics i n this way, for example , the speed of l ight or quantumof energy. These d o not me asure themselves against other th ings,

bu t, on th e co nt ra ry , are th e or i g i n of al l p os si bl e m ea su re . Th es e

days, fait lux means that there is a "speed" against which all speed is

mea su red a n d whic h i s n o t mea su red a g a in st a n yt hin g su per io r

(that is, it is fixed merely by convention). It is no longer the word

o f G o d [a c rea t o r] w ho wo u l d ha v e mea su red t h is speed in a d

va nc e. It is no lo ng e r a w o r d at a ll . B u t th e un iv er se th at ha s th is

c o n st a n c y i s "c rea t io n ." B e in g [étant] without a creator is not cre

a t io n ; c rea t io n i s s impl y B e in g . Crea t io n i s t ha t t here i s B e in g in

this way, and not otherwise. Being, then, is finite, in the sense that

there is no "infinite speed," but its finitude has no measure; it is its

ow n total measure of Bei ng. I n this sense, it is infi nite, b ut an in

finitude that consists in being its own excessive measure. The re

sult is not Being as a substance, but Being as responsibil ity.

To be respo n sibl e i s n o t , pr ima r i l y , be in g in d ebt ed t o o r a c

countable before some normative authority. It is to be engaged by

its Bein g to the very end of this Be ing , in suc h a way that this en

gagement or conatus is the very essence of Bei ng. ("En gagem ent"

is, after al l , a good tra nslat ion of "conatus.")

Th e epoch that appears to us as the epoch of very large numbers ,

the one we can describ e as that of "exp onen tial B ein g, " is in factt he epo c h o f B e in g wh ic h i s ex po sed t o a n d a s i ts o wn im men si t y

in the strictest sense: nothing measures it , and it is precisely that

w h i c h m ea su re s th e ex is te nc e w h i c h en ga ge s it , a n d w h i c h it e n

g a ges in t he mo d e o f a respo n sibi l i t y t ha t i s i t se l f imm en se . " H u

ma n it y" a n d "g l o ba l n ess" ["mo n d ia l i t é "] n o w mea n t h is en g a g e

ment without measure [or this measureless engagement].

Eith er the t ime to come wil l kno w to take the measure [of things],

or there wi ll be the loss of all measure, a nd existence along wit h it. In

b o th a d i s tu r b i n g a n d ex h il ar a ti ng w ay , th is is w h a t is im m e n s e l y

grand in what is happening to us today, to the extent [à mesure] that

we are ex po se d to it .



Cosmos Baselius

Nomos basileus. . . .

— P i n d a r

Th e uni ty of a wor ld is not one: i t is made of a diversity, a nd

ev en d ispa r i t y a n d o ppo si t io n . 1 It is in fact, which is to say that it

does not add or subtract anyth ing. Th e unit y of a worl d is noth ing

other than its diversity, an d this, in tu rn, is a diversity of world s. A

w o r l d is a m u l t i p l i c i t y of w or ld s ; th e w o r l d is a m u l t i p l i c i t y of

w or ld s, a n d its u n i ty is th e m u tu a l sh ar in g an d ex po si ti on of al l its

w o r l d s — w i t h i n th is w o r l d .

Th e sharing of the worl d is the law of the world . The wo rld has

nothing other; it is not subject to any authority; it does not have a

sovereign. Cosmos, nomos. Its su preme law is w i t h i n it as the m ul t i

ple an d mo bi le trace of the sharin g that it is. Nomos is the distrib

utio n, ap porti onme nt, an d al location of its parts: a piece of terri

tory, a por tion of food , the deli mi tati on of rights and needs in each,

and at every time, as is fitting [// convient].

But how does it fit? The measure of the suitability [la conve

nance] 2—the law of the law, or absolute just ice —i s onl y in the

shari ng itself and in the exceptio nal singula rity of ea ch — of each

instance [cas], ea c h a c c o rd in g to this sharing. Yet, this sharing is

not given, an d "each" is not given (that wh ich is the unity of each

part , the occurrenc e of its instance, the conf igur ation of each

w or l d) . T h i s is no t an a cc om p li sh e d d is tr i b u ti on . T h e w o r l d is no t

given. It is itself the giving [le don]. The world is its own creation

(this is what "creation" means). Its sharing is put into play at each

i8 5



i 8 6 Cosmos Baselius Cosmos Baselius 187

ins tant : th e univers e in expans ion, th e un- l imi tat i on of in div id u- i s t n e coexistence b y wh ic h it def ines itse lf as existence itself and a

als , the inf ini te need of justice. w o r l d i n g e n e r a l — b o t h , a t o n c e .

"Justice" designates what needs to be rendered (as one says in

English, "to render justice") . What needs to be restored, repaired,

given in return to each existing singular, what needs to be attrib

uted to it again, is the givi ng whi ch it is itself . A n d this also entails

that one not know exactly (that one not know "au juste," as is said

in French) what or who is an "existing singular," neither where it

be gi ns no r w he re it en ds . Be ca us e of th e in ce ss an t g iv in g a n d sh ar ing of the worl d, on e does not kn ow where the shar ing of a stone

starts or finishes, or where th e shari ng of a perso n starts or finishes.

T h e del ineat ion is a lw ay s more ample and, at th e s ame t ime, more

restricte d than o ne believes it to be (or rather, if one is attentiv e,

one know s a l l too w el l h ow much th e contours are t remb l ing, mo

b il e , a n d fl ee ti n g) . E a c h ex is te nc e [existant] appears in more en

sembles, masses, t issues, or complexes than one perceives at f irst ,

and each one is a ls o in f in ite ly more detach ed f rom s uch , and de

tach ed f ro m i ts elf . E a ch opens onto a nd c los es of f more w or lds ,

th os e w i th i n i t s el f jus t as thos e muc h as outs ide of , b r i ngi ng th e

outs ide ins ide, and th e oth er w ay around.

Suitability, therefore, is def ined by the proper measure in each

existence and i n th e i n f in i t e c o m m u n i t y ( or c o m m u n i c a t i o n , c o n

tagion, contact ) , or in th e indef in ite opening, c irculat ion , and

transf ormat ion of all existences [les existences] among themselves.This is not a double suitability. It is the same one, for commu

nity is not added to ex istence. C om mu ni ty is not s ome proper con

sistency and subsistence of existance as it stands apart from it: ex

istence has such on ly as the shar ing of com mu nit y. Thi s (whi ch no

longer has anything to do with subsistence by itself , that is , with

contact, encounter, porousness, osmosis, and rubbing up against,

attraction and repulsion, and so forth) is cosubstantial with exist

ing: in each one and in every one, in each one as in every one, in

each one insofar as in every one. Translating it into a certain lan

guage, it is the "mystical body" o f the world ; in another language, it

is the "recipro cal act ion" of parts of the worl d. B ut in every case, it

Coex istenc e holds itself just as far from jux tapo sitio n as it does

from integration. Coexistence does not happen to existence; it is

not added to it , and one can not subtract it out: it is existence.

Existenc e is not done a lone, if one can p ut it this way. It is Being

that is alone, at least in all the ordinary senses which are given to

Being. But ex is tence is noth ing oth er th an Being expos ed: b egin

nin g f rom i ts s imple ident i ty in i t s el f and f r om i ts pure pos it i on ,exposed in appearing, in creation, and, as such, exposed to the out

s ide, exter ior i ty , mult ip l ic i ty , a l ter i ty , and ch ange. ( And in one

sense, to be sure, this is not anything other than Being exposed to

Being itself , in its own "being," and, as a consequence, Being ex

posed as Bei ng: expo sition as the essence of Being .)

Justice, therefore, is returning to each existence what returns to it

according to its unique, s ingular creation in its coexistence with all

other creations. Th e two standards [les deux mesures] are not sepa

rate: th e s ingular propriety is equal to th e s ingular t race, w h ich

jo in s it to ot he r pr op ri e ti e s. T h a t w h i c h d is ti n gu is he s is al so th at

w h i c h pu ts " w i t h " a n d "t og et he r. "

Justice needs to be ren dere d to the trace of the proper , in the

carv ing up of i t th at is appropriate each t i m e — a carv ing up w h ichdoes not cut up or deduct f rom a f oundat ion, b ut a common carv

ing up that, al l at once [d'un seul coup], cons t i tutes dis tance and

contact , s uch th at th e coexis tence w h ich indef in ite ly intertw ines

w i t h it is th e o n l y "f ou n d a ti o n" u p o n w h i c h th e "f o r m " of ex is te nc e

is [s'enlève]. Therefore, there is no foundation: there is only the

" w i t h " — p r o x i m i t y a n d i t s d i s t a n c i n g — t h e s t r a n g e f a m i l i a r i t y o f

all the worlds in the world.

For each one, its most appropriate horizon is also its encounter

w i t h th e ot he r h o r i z o n : th at o f th e co ex is te nt , of al l th e co ex is -




ins tant : th e univers e in expans ion, th e un- l im itat ion of ind iv i du- [ s t n e coexistence by whi ch i t def ines itself as existence itself and a

als , the inf i nite need of justice. wo rld ; n g e n e r a l — b o t h , a t o n c e .

"Justice" designates what needs to be rendered (as one says in

English, "to render justice") . What needs to be restored, repaired,

given in return to each existing singular, what needs to be attrib

uted to it again, is the giv ing wh ic h it is itself. A n d this also entails

that one not know exactly (that one not know "au juste," as is said

in French) what or who is an "existing singular," neither where it

be gi ns no r w he re it en ds . Be ca us e of th e in ce ss an t g i v i n g a n d sh ar

ing of the wor ld , one does not kn ow where the shari ng of a stone

starts or finishes, or where the sh ari ng of a perso n starts or finishes.

The delineation is always more ample and, at the same time, more

restricted t han o ne believes it to be (or rather, if one is attenti ve,

one know s a l l too w el l h ow much th e contours are t remb l ing, mo

b i le , a n d fl e e ti ng ). E a c h ex is te nc e [existant] appears in more en

sembles, masses, t issues, or complexes than one perceives at f irst ,

and each one is also inf initely more detached from such, and de

tach ed f ro m i ts el f. E a ch opens onto a nd c los es of f more w or lds ,

those wi th in itse lf just as those muc h as outsid e of, bri ng in g the

outside inside, and the other way around.

Suitability, therefore, is def ined by the proper measure in each

existence and i n th e i n f in i t e c o m m u n i t y ( or c o m m u n i c a t i o n , c o n

tagion, contact ) , or in th e indef in ite opening, c irculat ion , and

transf ormat ion of all existences [les existences] among themselves.

This is not a double suitability. It is the same one, for commu

nity is not added to exis tence. Co mm un it y is not s ome proper con

sistency and subsistence of existance as it stands apart fro m it: ex

istence has such onl y as the shari ng of com mu nit y. Thi s (whi ch no

longer has anything to do with subsistence by itself , that is , with

contact, encounter, porousness, osmosis, and rubbing up against,

attraction and repulsion, and so forth) is cosubstantial with exist

ing: in each one and in every one, in each one as in every one, in

each one insofar as in every one. Translating it into a certain lan

guage, it is the "mystical body " of the world ; in another language, it

is the "recipr ocal act ion" of parts of the worl d. Bu t in every case, it

Coex istenc e holds itself just as far from jux tapo sitio n as it does

f rom integrat ion. Coexis tence does not h appen to ex is tence; i t is

not added to it , and one can not subtract it out: it is existence.

Existen ce is not done a lone, if one can p ut it this way. It is Being

that is alone, at least in all the ordinary senses which are given to

Being. But ex is tence is noth ing oth er th an Being expos ed: b egin

nin g f rom i ts s imple iden t i ty in i t s el f and f r om i ts pure pos it ion ,

exposed in appearing, in creation, and, as such, exposed to the out

s ide, exter ior i ty , mult ip l ic i ty , a l ter i ty , and ch ange. ( And in one

sense, to be sure, this is not anything other than Being exposed to

Being itself , in its own "being," and, as a consequence, Being ex

posed as Bei ng: expo sition as the essence of Being .)

Justice, therefore, is returning to each existence what returns to it

according to its unique, s ingular creation in its coexistence with all

other creations. Th e two standards [les deux mesures] are not sepa

rate: th e s ingular propriety is equal to th e s ingular t race, w h ich

j oi n s it to ot he r pr op r ie ti es . T h a t w h i c h d is ti n gu is he s is al so th at

w h i c h pu ts " w i t h " a n d "t og et he r. "

Justice needs to be r ende red to the trace of the proper , in the

carv ing up of i t th at is appropriate each t i m e— a carv ing up w h ic h

does not cut up or deduct f rom a f oundat ion, b ut a common carv

ing up that, al l at once [d'un seul coup], cons t i tutes dis tance and

contact , s uch th at th e coexis tence w h ich indef in ite ly intertw ines

w i t h it is th e o n l y "f ou n d a ti o n" u p o n w h i c h th e "f o r m " of ex is te nc e

is [s'enlève]. Therefore, there is no foundation: there is only the

" w i t h " — p r o x i m i t y a n d i t s d i s t a n c i n g — t h e s t r a n g e f a m i l i a r i t y o f

all the worlds in the world.

For each one, its most appropriate horizon is also its encounter

w i t h th e ot h er h o r i z o n : th at of th e co ex is te nt , of al l th e co ex is -




tences, of the whole of coexi st ing . Bu t "encou nter" i s st i l l to say

too l it t le, esp ecial ly if one does not und erst and that al l the ho ri

zons are sides of the same carvi ng up, o f the same win di ng an d

l ig ht n in g - fa st t ra c e o f t he wo r l d ( i t s "u n i t y") . T hi s t ra c e i s n o t

prop er to any existant , a nd st il l less to an other sort of substance

t ha t ha n g s o v er t he wo r l d : i t i s t he c o mmo n impro pr ie t y , t he n o n -

membership [la non-appartenance], the nondependence, the ab

solute erranc y of the creation o f the wor ld.

Justice, then, needs to be rendered at once to the singular absoluteness of the prope r and to the absolute im pr op ri ety of the

co mm un it y of existences. It needs to be rendered equally [exacte

ment] to both, to the one and the other: such is the play (or the

mea n in g ) o f t he wo r l d .

As a co ns eq ue nc e, i nf i ni te ju st ic e ne ed s to be re nd er ed at on ce

to the proprie ty of each one and to the co mm on im pro pri ety of al l :

t o b ir t h a n d t o d ea t h , whic h ho l d bet ween t hem t he in f in i t y o f

meaning. Or rather: to birth and to death, which are, one with the

other and one in the other (or one through the other), the infinite

o v er f l o win g o f mea n in g a n d , t herefo re, o f ju st ic e. B ir t h a n d d ea t h

about which there is nothing fit t ing to say—since this is the strict

ju st ic e of tr u th , b u t w he re al l tr ue sp ee ch di st ra ct ed ly ai m s at th e

ju st m ea su re .

This infinite just ice is in no way visible. On the contrary, intol

erable injust ice arises everywhere. There are earthquakes, infect ious vi ru se s, a n d p eo p le are cr i m i n a ls , li ar s, a n d to rt ur er s.

Justice cannot be disengaged from the gangue 3 or haze of injus

t ice. Nei the r can it be projected as a supreme conv ersion of injus

t ice. It constitutes part of infinite just ice that it would fail to de

liver a decisive blow to injustice. But there are no reasons that can

be g iv e n fo r h o w a n d w h y th is co ns ti tu te s p ar t of it . It is no t su b

je ct to th os e in te rr og at io ns th at co n ce rn re as on or th e d e m a n d fo r

me ani ng. T hi s constitutes part of the infi nity of just ice, a nd of the

inte rru pted creati on of the wo rld : in such a way that the inf init y is

never anywhere cal led upon to accomplish itself, not even as an in

fini te return of itself in itself. Bir th and dea th, sha ring and coexis

tence, be long to the infin ite. Itself, i f one can say it l ike this, ap

pears and disappears; it divide s itself and coexists: it is the move

men t, the agitat ion an d general diversity of the worl ds that make

u p t he wo r l d (a n d u n ma k e i t a s we l l ) .

This i s a l so why ju st ic e i s a l wa ys—a n d ma ybe pr in c ipa l l y—t he

need for just ice, that is, the object ion to and protest against injus

tice, the call that cries for justic e, the brea th that exhausts itself in

call ing for it . Th e law of just ice is this unappeasable tension wi th re

gard to just ice itself. In a parallel ma nner, the law of the wor ld is an

infinite tension with regard to the world itself. These two laws arenot only hom ologou s, they are also the same and singular law of ab

solute sharing (one cou ld say: the law of the Abs olut e as sharing) .

Justice does not come from the outside (what outside?) to hover

above the world, in order to repair it or bring it to complet ion. It is

g iv en wi t h t he wo r l d , g iv en in t he wo r l d a s t he v ery l a w o f i t s

givenness. Strict ly speaking, there is no sovereignty, or church, or

set of laws that is not also the wo rl d itself, the severed [or carv ed-

up] trace that is both inextricable from its horizon and unaccom-

plishable. One might be tempted to say that there is a just ice for

the world, and there is a world for just ice. But these finalit ies, or

these reciprocal intentions, say rather poorly what such just ice is.

In itself, the worl d is the supre me la w of its just ice: no t the given

w o r l d a n d th e "s uc h th at it is ," b u t th e w o r l d th at sp ri ng s f or th as

a pro per l y in c o n g ru o u s in c o n g ru i t y .



Reference Matter



Notes

[Epigraph]

E P I G R A P H SOURCE: Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus SpakeZarathustra, trans.

R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), 102.

1. In opting for "the human" as a translation of l'homme, we elect a

more gender-neutral translation. At the same time, however, we lend the

text a few connotatio ns that Nanc y himsel f clearly wants to avoid. In

reading "the human," then, one must read it in such a way as to not hear

the same sort of "humanist" tone that is out of the question in all the

texts that follow.—Trans.

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New

Yor k: Vi nta ge Boo ks, 1974), 180.

3. La terre des hommes literal ly means "the earth of men." The French

expression is a common one, referring to the earth in its specific charac

ter as the milieu inhabited by humans.—Trans.

Preface

1. Throu ghou t the work, we translate l'être—which coincides with the

German Sein—as "Being," in keeping with an established, if not entirely

satisfactory, tradition. We do this only when l'être stands alone, however,

and only so as to make Being easily distinguishable from being [l'étant].

The difficulty is that the capital letter has the distracting and often mis

leading effect of making "Being" appear as a proper name, suggesting

that Being is somehow quite independent of beings. This becomes par-

m



194 Notes to Pages 2- 5 Notes to Pages 5—10 195

t i c u l a r l y u n c o m f o r t a b l e w h e n t h e a u t h o r u s e s c o m p o u n d e x p r e s s i o n s

such a s être-avec o r être-ensemble, wh ic h c l ea rl y re fer to the concrete con

di t ions in which b e ing s a l wa ys do f ind themsel ves. Therefore , we ha ve

c h o s e n t o t r a n s l a t e t h o s e c o m p o u n d s a s " b e i n g - w i t h , " " b e i n g - t o g e t h e r , "

a n d s o f o r t h . — T r a n s .

2. I f , a s the a ut hor points out in the fol l ow ing pa ra g r a ph, l a ng ua g e

does not ea si l y a cco mm oda te i tse l f to the l og ic of "w i th ," the n the En g

l i sh l a ng ua g e i s even l ess g iving tha n French in this reg a rd. In order to

ca pture a l l i ts p l ura l i ty , one woul d ha ve to tra nsl a te être-les-uns-avec-les-autres l i tera l l y a s "b e ing - the- ones- with- the- others," b ut we ha ve opted for

t h e s l i g h t l y l e s s p l u r a l , b u t f a r l e s s p a i n f u l , " b e i n g - w i t h - o n e - a n o t h e r . " —

Tra ns.

Of Being Singular Plural

1 . I t i s easy to see the re ference here to §32 of M a r t i n Heideg g er 's Be

in g and Time, t ra ns. J o h n M a c q u a r r i e a n d E d w a r d R o b i n s o n ( N e w Y o r k :

Ha rper, 19 6 2) . In a g enera l wa y, a nd except when i t i s qui te necessa ry, i t

i s l e s s t o d e v e l o p a c o m m e n t a r y o n H e i d e g g e r t h a n t o m o v e o n f r o m

h i m , a n d f r o m s o m e o t h e r s — f r o m us. In this us a nd in the re l a t ion to

H e i d e g g e r , o n e m u s t r e m e m b e r t h e s i n g u l a r r o l e p l a y e d b y H a n n a h

A r e n d t a n d he r re fl ec ti on o n " h u m a n p lu r al it y ."

2. Since the empha sis in this essa y i s on "with," we ha ve a l most in

v ar ia bl y tr an sl at ed partager a s "to sha re ," b ut i t i s impo rta nt to reme m

be r th at it al so m ea ns "t o d iv i d e " or "s ha re o u t ." It is al so w o r t h b ea r in g

i n m i n d tha t the a dject ive partagé i s used to describ e , a m on g othert h i n g s , a r e q u i t e d l o v e , a s h a r e d m e a l , a n d a d i v i d e d c o u n t r y . — T r a n s .

3. À même re fers to a re l a t ion tha t b ecomes cruc ia l a t severa l points in

this b ook, b ut the phra se resists ea sy descript ion in Eng l ish. An under

s h i r t i s w o r n à même th e s k i n ; s o m e o n e s l e e p i n g o u t d o o r s m i g h t s l e e p à

même t h e g r o u n d . N a n c y h i m s e l f h a s w r i t t e n a b o u t a h ea r t h i s b o d y r e

ce ived in a tra nspl a nt opera t ion, b ut l a ter re jected, a s b e ing à même his

bo dy . T h e re la ti on is on e of b ei n g ri gh t ne xt to , ri gh t at, or ev en i n , w i t h

out b e ing whol l y a pa rt of . See a l so B ria n Hol mes's tra nsl a tor 's note in

J e a n - L u c N a n c y ' s The Birth to Presence ( S t a n f o r d , C a l i f . : S t a n f o r d U n i

ve rs it y Pr es s, 19 93 ), 39 6, n 12 .— T r an s .

4 . "B etw een the us a l l ' of a b stra ct unive rsa l ism a n d the 'me, V o f m i s

era b l e ind ivi du a l i sm , there i s the 'we others ' of Niet zsch e , a th in ki ng of

the sing ul a r case tha t thwa rts the opposi t ion of the pa rt icul a r a nd the un i

ve rs al " (F ra nç oi s W a r i n , Nietzsche et Bataille: La parodie à l'infini [Pa ris:

Presses U niversi ta i res de Fra nce , 19 9 4 ] , 256 ) .

5. Se passer i s m o s t c o m m o n l y u s e d t o m e a n " t o h a p p e n , " b u t t r a n s

l a t i ng i t a s we do here ha s the a dva nta g e of emp ha s izi ng wha t ha ppen s

a s re l a t ion, whi l e reta in ing the l ink wi th "pa ssing " a nd "pa ssa g e" in the

p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n . — T r a n s .

6 . We ha ve forsa ken the col l oq uia l tra nsl a t io n of propre—"own" —

f o r t h e m o r e s t i l t e d " p r o p e r " i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n t h e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h

" p r o p e r l y , " " a p p r o p r i a t i o n , " a n d s o o n , w h i c h b e c o m e s s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h e

c o u r s e o f t h e w o r k . — T r a n s .

7. "Les gens s o n t b i z a r r e s . " T h e w o r d bizarre \stra nsl a ted a s "stra ng e"

throug hout the text in order to preserve the idiom. This presents a pa r

t icul a r di f f i cu l ty onl y in the f ina l sentence of the f i rst pa ra g ra ph o f p . 10

w he re N a n c y dr aw s at te nt io n to th e e t y m o lo g y o f th e F r e n c h (a nd al so

t h e E n g l i s h ) w o r d bizarre.—Trans.

8 . Heideg g er 's das Man i s g enera l l y tra nsl a ted into French a s le 'on b ut

ha s g enera l l y a ppea red in Eng l ish a s the "they." We ha ve a voided tha t

ha b i t here b eca use a p l ura l pronoun is unwa rra nted a nd woul d onl y serve

to confuse wha t i s , a f ter a l l , a n a na l ysis of s ing ul a ri ty a n d p l ura l i ty . Tra ns

l a t i ng i t a s the "one" ha s the a dd ed a dva nta g e of pres erv ing echoes of

b o t h th e au th or 's F r e n c h a n d He id eg ge r' s G e r m a n . — T r a n s .

9 . Al thoug h the exerc ise mig ht b e instruct ive , I wi l l not stop here to

exa mine wha t "peopl e" a nd "one" desig na te in va rious l a ng ua g es, or the

hist ory of the word " peopl e" [ "les gens"] (gentes, " G e n t i l e s , " n a t i o n s , a n d

so on) .

1 0 . T h i s argot e x p r e s s i o n m e a n s " h i s h e a d i n t h e c l o u d s " o r " n o tdow n- to - ea r th, " or even "out of his mi nd ," b u t we ha ve used the l i tera l

tra nsl a t ion a s the onl y wa y to preserve the a uthor 's p l a y on "b eside" [à

côté}.—Trans.

11. Al th ou g h rea sona b l y a ccura te , "a ppea rs" i s a som ewh a t pa l e tra ns

l a t i o n o f surgit, s o s o m e a d d i t i o n a l c o n n o t a t i o n s s h o u l d b e b o r n i n m i n d :

a ppea rs suddenl y, a b rupt l y , even viol ent l y , emerg es, wel l s up , surg es

forth. The empha sis , however, here a nd e l sewhere , i s on the moment of

a p p e a r i n g . — T r a n s .

12. Bizarre i s the French word we ha ve tra nsl a ted a s "stra ng e" throug h

out this pa ssa g e .—Tra ns.

13. Ha vi ng , g a in i ng , a n d b e ing a ccess i s wh a t i s a t i ssue here , b ut i t

s h o u l d b e r e m e m b e r e d t h a t accéder also means "to accede to" or "to ac

c o m m o d a t e . " — T r a n s .



196 Notes to Pages 11-15 Notes to Pages 16—25 19 7

14 . Let me b e qui t e c l ea r tha t the a l l us ion to La c a n is de l ib era te .

15. I m m a n u e l K a n t , Critique of Pure Reason, t r a n s . N o r m a n K e m p

Sm ith ( Ne w York: St . Ma rt in s Press, 19 6 5) , 504 . Al so presupposed here i s

M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r ' s Kants These Uber das Sein ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : V i t -

t o r i o K l o s t e r m a n n , 1 9 6 3 ) .

1 6. T h e c o m p l e x a m b i g u i t y N a n c y e m p h a s i z e s h e r e is n o t e a si l y c a p

tured in Eng l ish. It opera tes a l ong two a xes, one ha ving to do with the

expression à la vérité, the other wi t h the verb accéder. Th e phra se cou l d b e

rendered a s "We ha ve a ccess to the truth," or a s "Trul y , we ha ve a ccess," b u t ei th er " W e ac ce de to th e t r u t h " or " T r u ly , w e ac ce de " w o u l d al so be

w ar r an te d . In Ba ta il le s te xt , th e la tt er ax is is d is s ol v ed (i nd ee d , do es no t

a rise) b ut , a s the note b e l ow ma kes c l ea r , Na ncy wi l l not a l l ow the con

n o t a t i o n s o f a c c e s s io n o r a c c o m m o d a t i o n t o d i s a p p e a r . — T r a n s .

17. Georg es B a ta i l l e , Histoire des rats. Oeuvres complètes, / / / ( P a r i s : G a l

l i m a r d , 1971), 114. As a matte r of fact [à la vérité], m y m e m o r y f a i l s m e

a nd B a ta i l l e wri tes "we a tta in" [ "nous a tte ig nons"] : to a tta in , to g a in a c

cess [ to a ccede] : a s the sp l i t t i ng of the "a l mos t there" [Ta - pe u- p res "]

cha ra cter of rea ch ing the orig i n . B ut I m ust c i te the who l e pa ssag e f rom

B a ta i l l e : "W e do not ha ve the mea ns of a t ta in ing a t our dispos a l : we a t

ta in to truth; we suddenl y a tta in to the necessa ry point a nd we spend the

rest of our da ys l oo kin g for a l ost mo me nt: b ut we miss i t onl y a t t imes,

prec ise l y b eca use l ooking for i t diverts us f rom i t , to uni te us i s un

d o u b t e d l y a m e a n s o f . . . f o re v e r m i s s i n g t h e m o m e n t o f r e t u r n . S u d

denl y, in my nig ht , in my sol i tude , a nxiety g ives wa y to convic t ion: i t i s

s l y, n o l o n g e r e v e n d i s t u r b i n g ( b y d i n t o f i t s b e i n g d i s t u r b i n g , i t n o

l o n g e r d i s t u r b s ) , suddenly the heart ofB. is in my heart."

18. In Sect io n 2, we tra nsl a ted toucher à a s "to touch" since the con

text spec i f ied surfa ces tha t touch one a nother. Here , the prima ry sense i s

of rea ch ing or a tta in i ng a n end , b ut i t i s a l so impor ta n t to b ear in mi nd

the ta ct i l e sense , a s wel l a s the mor e co m m on sense of "b e ing in tou ch

w i t h . " — T r a n s .

19 . W h e n the a utho r presented this sect ion (a l ong wi th Sect ions 5 a nd

6 ) a s p a r t o f " O p e n i n g s : T h e S p a c e o f T h i n k i n g , " a c o n f e r e n c e a t V a n -

d e r b i l t U n i v e r s i t y i n J a n u a r y 1 9 9 6 , h e a d d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n

f r o m K a n t a s a n e p i g r a p h : " . . . i f w e w e re e n t i t l e d t o re g a r d m a t e r i al b e

ing s a s thing s in themsel ves . . . the uni ty tha t i s the b a sis on which na t

ura l for ma t ions a re possib l e wou l d b e onl y the un i ty of spa ce , a nd yet

spa ce i s not a b asis [ responsib l e] for rea l i ty of pro duct s b ut i s on l y the ir

forma l condit ion; spa ce mere l y resemb l es the b a sis we a re seeking ina s-

much a s no pa rt in spa ce ca n b e determined except in re l a t ion to the

w h o le (so th at [i n its cas e to o] th e p os si bi li ty of th e pa rt s is ba se d on th e

p r e s e n t a t io n o f t h e w h o l e ) " ( I m m a n u e l K a n t , Critique of Judgment, trans.

W e r n e r S . P l u h a r [ I n d ia n a p o li s , I n d . : H a c k e t t P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y ,

1987], 293).

2 0 . S e e J e a n - L u c N a n c y ' s La deconstruction du christianisme, f o r t h

c o m i n g .

21 . Th e recent b ook b y Serge M a r c e l , Le tombeau du dieu artisan (Paris:

Les Édi t ions de M i n u i t , 19 9 5) i s a n a ma zin g rerea din g of the Timaeus,

w h i c h m a y of fe r s o m e t h i n g q u it e cl os e to th e n o t i o n o f th e P l a t o n i c

dem iurg e of "crea t ion" I a m tr yin g to b ri ng out here .

22 . Eclat i s a di f f i c ul t wor d to tra nsl a te , exa ct l y because i t ha s ma ny

di f ferent mea ning s tha t do not come tog ether ea si l y in one Eng l ish word.

In a l l the essa ys tha t const i tute this b ook, we ha ve tra nsl a ted i t a s "b ri l

l ia nce ," w hi ch o nl y ca ptures pa rt of i ts sense. O the r e l ements of the wor d

sug g est tha t "b ri l l ia nce" coul d b e , a nd ma yb e even shoul d b e , predica ted

w i t h an y of th e fo ll o w i n g ad je ct iv es : s h in i n g , f la sh in g, g la ri ng , ex pl os iv e,

s h a t t e r i n g , a n d s o f o r t h . T h e s e a d j e c t i v e s , i n t u r n , c o u l d b e m a d e i n t o

n o u n s , a n y o f w h i c h w o u l d a l s o s u f f i ce a s a n E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n . T h e

point i s tha t the éclat i s b o t h s u d d e n a n d r a d i a n t . — T r a n s .

23. B eno i t Goet z uses this them e of spa c in g in his "L a disl o ca t io n: Ar

chi tecture e t expé rience" ( thesis , U niversi té de Stra sb ourg , 19 9 6 ) ; he dis

cusses i t in re l a t ion to a discourse a b out g enera l ized "a rchi tecture" a nd

i t s b e c o m i n g " e x i s t e n t i a l . "

24 . See §36 , §37, a nd §6 8c of Heideg g er 's Being and Time. I n l o w e r i n gthe status of curio si ty b y mea sur ing i t a g a inst thin kin g , wh ich is a fa i r l y

t r a d i t i o n a l g e s t u r e , H e i d e g g e r c o m p l e t e l y m i s u n d e r s t a n d s a n d c h e a p e n s

a n e l ement of the mod ern wor l d: sc ience a nd technol o g y. In this wa y, he

cha l l eng es wha t he otherwise pretends to a f f i rm a s b e l ong ing to the

" s e n d i n g " o f B e i n g . I n r e l a t i o n t o t h e r o l e o f c u r i o s i t y w i t h i n m o d e r n i t y ,

see Ha n s B l umenb u rg 's c l a ssic b ook Der Prozess der theoretishen Neugierde( F r a n k f u r t a u M a i n : S u h r k a m p , 1 9 6 6 ).

25. In certa i n reg a rds, wha t fol l ows pursues the dia l og ue propos ed b y

Ja cques Ra ncière in his b ook Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans.

J u l i e R o s e ( M i n n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a P r e s s, 1 9 99 ) .

2 6 . A n d r é T o s e l , Démocratie et libéralismes (Pa ris: K imé , 19 9 5) , 203.

See a l so the cha pter ent i t l ed "L 'é g a l i té , di f f i c i l e e t né cessa rire ."

2 7 . E t i e n n e B a l i b a r , " L a p r o p o s i t i o n d e l ' é ga l i b e r té " ( p a p e r d e l i v e r e d

a t Les confé rences du Perroquet , no. 22, Pa ris , Novemb er 19 89 ) .



198 Notes to Pages 25-31 Notes to Pages 37—48 19 9

28. I a g ree , then, wi th Ja cque s D errida 's cr i t iq ue of f ra ter ni ty in his

Politics of Friendship, t r a n s . G e o r g e C o l l i n s ( L o n d o n : V e r s o , 1997). B u t I

must po int out tha t I ha ve a l so, on occa sion, ra ised the quest ion of Ch ris

t ia n f ra terni ty . Moreover, I ha ve reversed my posi t ion a g a in a nd a g a in on

the possib i l i ty of l oo kin g into wheth er f ra terni ty i s necessa ri l y g eneric or

cong eni ta l . . . .

29. See " L ' i n s a c r i f i a b l e , " i n J e a n - L u c N a n c y , Une pensée finie (Pa ris:

Ga l i l é e , 19 9 0) .

30. Fra nçois Ra f foul 's Heidegger and th e Problem of Subjectivity ( H i g h

l a nds, N . J . : Hu ma nit ies Press, 19 9 7) i s one of the f i rst works tha t eng a g es

i n o p e n i n g up a p a t h f o r a ré é va l ua t ion o f Mitsein, a n d it does so i n a rema rka b l e wa y.

31 . Heideg g er, Being and Time, 161.

32. J e a n - F r a n ç o i s M a r q u e t ' s Singularité et événement ( G r e n o b l e :

J e r o m e M i l l o n , 1 99 5 ) gi v e s a f u l l a c c o u n t o f t h e t r a d i t i o n o f t h i n k i n g

a b out the one , in the sense of ea ch one a n d the sing ul a r , a nd wh a t di f

ferences there a re a mong our va rious perspect ives. B ut even b efore g oing

t h e r e , o n e s h o u l d l o o k a t t h o s e t e x t s w h e r e t h i s p r e o c c u p a t i o n c o m e s

to us in the f i rs t p l a ce: the texts of Gi l l e s D el eu ze a l on g wi th tho se of

J a c q u e s D e r r i d a ( a n d t h i s with w i l l d e m a n d its o w n c o m m e n t a r y s o m e

da y) . B a sica l l y , this preoccupa t ion tra ve l s in the sa me direct ion a s tha t

u n d e r t a k e n b y G i o r g i o A g a m b e n , o n o n e s i d e , a n d A l a i n B a d i o u , o n t h e

other (even i f B a d iou wa nts to put the quest io n in the form of a n opp o

s i t i o n b y p l a y i n g m u l t i p l i c i t y a g a i ns t t h e O n e ) . A l l o f t h i s i s t o m a k e t h e

point tha t we a re onl y thinking a b out the ones with the other [les uns avec

les autres] (b y, a g a inst , in sp i te of , c l ose to, fa r f rom, in touch w i t h , i n

a v o i d i n g i t , i n d i g g i n g t h r o u g h i t ) .

33. See Part 1, §3 of I m m a n u e l K a n t ' s Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund:The One Basis for a Demonstration of th e Existence of God t r a ns . G o r d o n

Trea sh (New York: Ab a ris B ooks, 19 79 ) .

34 . G . W. F. Heg el , Hegel's Logic, t ra ns. W i l l i a m W a l l a c e ( O x f o r d : O x

ford U niversi ty Press, 19 75) , 31 .

3 5 . E d m u n d H u s s e r l , Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, t ra ns. D o r i o n C a i r n s ( T h e H a g u e : M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f, 1977),

140.

36 . D e sca rte s him se l f a t tests to this , tha t we a l l pa rt ic ipa te in the

process a n d discour se of the ego sum: " . . . b y t h a t i n t e r n a l a w a r e n e ss

w h i c h al wa ys pr ec ed es re fl ec ti ve kn o wl ed ge . T h i s in n e r aw ar en es s of one 's

thoug hts a nd existence i s so inna te in a l l men tha t , a l thoug h we ma y pre

t e n d t h a t w e d o n o t h a v e i t . . . w e c a n n o t i n f a ct f a il t o h a v e i t " ( " A u

thor 's Repl ies to the Sixth Set o f O b j e c t i o n s , " Th e Philosophical Writingsof Descartes, Volume II, t ra ns. J o h n C o t t i n g h a m , R o b e r t S t o o th o o f , a n d

D u g a l d M u r d o c h [ C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 4 ] , 2 8 5 ) .

37. In a sense , Lev ina s test i f ies to this pro b l e ma t ic in a n exemp l a ry

ma nner. B ut wha t he understa nds a s "otherwise tha n B eing " i s a ma tter

of und erst a ndi ng "the ow nm ost of B ei ng , " exa ct l y b eca use i t i s a ma tter

o f t h i n k i n g b e i n g - w i t h r a t h e r t h a n t h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e o t h e r a n d

B e i n g .

38 . M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , Beitrâge zur Philosophie ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n :

V i t t o r i o K l o s t e r m a n n , 19 89 ), 319.39. J e a n - J a c q u e s R o u s s e a u , The Social Contract, t r a n s . M a u r i c e

C r a n s t o n ( N e w Y o r k : P e n g u i n B o o k s , 1 9 6 8 ) , 6 5 .

4 0 . F r i e d r i c h N i e t z s c h e , Thus Spake Zarathustra, t rans . R . J. H o l l i n g -

da l e (N ew York: Pe ng u in B ooks , 19 69 ) , 229 .

4 1 . Th is i s , of course , a n expression tha t i s dea r to B a ta i l l e . O ne cou l d

even sa y tha t this const i tuted his expression, a b sol ute l y .

4 2. See An to ni o Neg ri 's "L a cr ise de l 'espa ce pol i t i qu e ," a nd the rest

of t h e a r t i c le s g a t h e r ed i n n u m b e r 2 7 , " E n a t t e n d a n t l ' e m p i r e , " of Futur Antérieur (Pa ris: l ' H a r m a r t a n , Ja n ua ry 19 9 5) .

4 3. See the work g a thered tog ether not l ong a g o in Retreating the Political, e d . S i m o n S p a r k s ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1997), a n d i n Rejouer le

politique (Paris: Galilée, 1983).

4 4 . For a deconstru ct ive rea ding of the "a s such " of B ei ng in fund a

m e n t a l o n t o l o g y , s e e t h e w o r k o f Y v e s D u p e u x ( t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t é d e

Stra sb ourg , 19 9 4 ) .

4 5 . T h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e f o l l o w i n g t h r e e s e c t i o n s , " C o e x i s t e n c e , "

" C o n d i t i o n s o f C r i t i q u e , " a n d " C o - a p p e a r i n g , " b e n e f i t ed f r o m o u r r e

v ie w o f the tra nsl a t ion o f these of fered by Ia i n M a c D o n a l d i n th e Uni

versity of Essex Theoretical Studies Working Papers ( M a r c h 19 9 6 ) .

4 6 . See M a r c A u g é ' s A Sense for the Other: The Timeliness and Rele

vance of Anthropology, t r a n s . A m y J a co b s ( S t a n f o r d , C a l i f : S t a n f o r d U n i

ve rs it y Pr es s, 19 98 ).

4 7. Ma rc Cré p ons recent wor k, "L a prob l èm e de l a diversi té hum a in e .

Enquê te sur l a ca ra cté risa t ion des peupl es e t de l a const i tut ion des g é o

g r a p h i e s d e l ' e s p r i t d e L e i b n i z à H e g e l " ( t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i r é d e P a r i s - X -

Na n terr e , 19 9 5) i s the f i rst wor k of imp orta nce in the f ie l d.

4 8. We ha ve tra nsl a ted droit a s "r ig ht" in this passage, for the sake of

consis tency a nd in order to preserve som eth ing of Na nc y's p l a y on the



2 0 0 Notes to Pages $0—61 Notes to Pages 61-69 201

w o r d . To u n d e r s ta n d th e pa ss ag e, h ow ev er , th e re ad er m u st r e m e m b e r

tha t droit ca rr ies ma ny connota t ions tha t , in Eng l ish , a t ta ch to the wo rd

" l a w . " — T r a n s .

4 9 . I a m just g oi ng to consider i t a sym pt om in i tse l f , wh ich is a st i l l

m o r e r e m a r k a b l e s y m p t o m g i v e n t h e u n e x p e c t e d r e t u r n t o f a v o r i t h a s

ha d since the dea th of G u y D eb or d in 19 9 5. On e wo ul d ha ve to c i te the

a rt ic l es tha t a ppea red a t the t ime to show how the re ference to D eb ord

coul d a ppea r to b e necessa ry a nd importa nt , coul d a ppea r a s the l a st cr i t

i c a l r e s o u r c e o f a w o r l d w i t h o u t c r i t i q u e . O n t h e q u e s t i o n o f f e t i s h i s m

a nd cr i t i que , see Ja cques D e r r i d a , Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, theWork of Mourning, and the New International, t ra ns. Peggy K a m u f ( N e w

Y or k: Ro u tl ed g e, 19 94 ).

50. "Le footb a l l rend insig ni f ia nte toute a utre forme d'a rt ." This wa s

a n a dvert isement for Nike in the Pa ris Metro in Aug ust 19 9 5. I shoul d

p o i n t o u t , w h e t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r n o t , t h e w o r d " i n s i g n i f i c a n t " w a s i n

fa ct wri t ten in the ma scul ine [where a s "a rt form" woul d require the fem

inine; in the a b ove text , Na ncy corrects the mista ke , ma king the footnote

n e c e s s a r y — T r a n s . ] .

51. O f course , the Gr eek sumbolon wa s a pi ec e o f p o tt er y b r o k e n i n

two pieces when fr iends, or a host a nd his g uest , pa rted. Its join ing

w o u l d la te r be a si gn of re co gn it io n .

52. A tr in i ta r ia n G o d represents a B eing - to g ether a s its very div in i ty:

a nd i t i s c l ea r , therefore , tha t he i s no l ong er "G od ," b u t B eing - wi th of

t h e o n t o - t h e o l o g i c a l s p e c i e s . H e r e , a n o t h e r m o t i f o f t h e " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n

o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , " w h i c h I i n v o k e d i n r e l a t i o n t o th e C r e a t i o n , i s t o u c h e d

up on. It i s a lso possib l e to discern here the int im a te conn ect io n of a l l the

g rea t moti f s of Ch ris t ia n dog m a , none of wh ich dec onstr uct io n ca n l ea ve

inta ct .

5 3 . H u s s e r l , Cartesian Meditations, 139 . It i s undoub tedl y here , more

t h a n a n y w h e r e e l s e , t h a t H u s s e r l s h o w s h o w p h e n o m e n o l o g y i t s e l f

reaches its l imit, and exceeds it: it is no longer the egoistic kernel, but the

w o r l d "as a co n st it u te d se ns e" th at sh ow s it se lf to be co n st it u ti v e (13 7).

Th e cons t i tu t ion is i tse l f const i tute d: in these terms, this i s und oub ted l y

t h e u l t i m a t e s t r u c t u r e o f " l a n g u a g e " a n d o f t h e " w i t h , " o f l a n g u a g e a s

"w ith ." The im med ia te context of the pa ssag e shows ho w Husse rl mea ns

to g ive his most direct repl y to Heideg g er a nd to a thinking of Mitseinst i l l insuf f ic ient l y found ed in the "essent ia l necessi ty" of the "g iven Ob

je ct iv e w o r l d " a n d it s "s oc ia li ty of va ri ou s le ve ls " (13 7). A h i gh ly r em ar k

a b l e chia sma is produced, here , b etween two thoug hts tha t provoke a nd

cross throug h one a nother a ccording to wha t ca n onl y b e ca l l ed two styles

of the essentiality of the with. B ro a dl y spea k ing , they mig ht b e describ ed a s

t h e s t y le o f c o b e l o n g i n g ( i n Being as truth, Heideg g er) a nd the styl e of

c o r r e l a t i o n ( i n ego as meaning, H u s s e r l ) . B u t these s o m e w h a t s c h e m a t i c

cha ra cterist ics coul d just a s ea si l y b e reversed. This i s not wha t i s most

i m p o r t a n t . W h a t i s i m p o r t a n t i s i n t h e common t e s t i m o n y o f t h e e r a

(with Freud, wi th B a ta i l l e , wi th . . . ) , a ccording to which ontol og y must ,

f r o m t h a t p o i n t o n , b e t h e o n t o l o g y o f t h e " w i t h , " o r o f n o t h i n g .

54 . As Fra nc is F isher , a l ong t im e comp a ni on in the recog ni t ion of this

dem a nd , sa id, "T he 'wi th' i s a str ic t dete rmi na t i on of the inessence of ex

i s t e n c e . B e i n g - a t i s i m m e d i a t e l y ' w i t h ' because Dasein ha s no essence"( "Heideg g er e t l a quest ion de l 'homme" [ thesis , U niversi té de Stra sb ourg ,

1995])-

55. On e sho ul d keep i n m i n d tha t "coa ppea r" tra nsl a tes com-parution,t h e e x ac t E n g l i s h e q u i v a l e n t o f w h i c h i s " c o m p e a r i n g . " T h i s i t s e l f i s a l e

g a l term tha t i s used to desig na te a ppea ring b efore a judg e tog ether wi th

a n o t h e r p e r s o n . — T r a n s .

5 6 . S e e t h e f o r t h c o m i n g v o l u m e L'éthique originaire (which sta rts wi th

H e i d e g g e r ) .

57. For insta n ce , see the t i t l e of Pa u l Ricoeur 's Oneself as Another,t r a n s . K a t h l e e n B l a r n e y ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r es s , 1 9 92 ) .

58 . A ma jor pa rt of the work of Ph i l ip pe La c oue- La b a rthe i s devot ed

to the decon struc t ive a na l ysis of this or ig in a ry mimesis.

59 . T hi s i s true onl y up to a certa in poin t . Af ter a l l , Roussea u di d ha ve

a keen sense of the necessi ty of the specta c l e he so cond em ned , a n d he

w i s h e d to t h i n k a so rt of se lf -s ur pa ss in g o f sp ec ta cu la r- re pr es en ta ti on al

exteriori ty , b ot h in terms of "c iv i l re l ig ion" a nd i n terms of l i tera ture . In

this wa y, "l i tera ture" (a l ong with "music ," or "a rt" in g enera l ) , a nd "c ivi l

re l ig ion" ( tha t i s , the presenta b l e f ig ure of secul a r soc ia l i ty) a re the terms

t h a t s e r v e a s p r e c u r s o r s t o o u r p r o b l e m c o n c e r n i n g m e a n i n g - w i t h . "To

showa ma n to those l ike himsel f . . . , " on the one ha nd, a nd to ce l eb ra te ,

o n t h e o t h e r — s i n c e w e c o u l d n o t l i v e t h e e v e n t i t s e l f — i s t h e i n s t i t u t i v e

pa ct of hu ma ni ty i tse lf . Th e mod el i s everywhere a nd nowher e , s ing ul a r

pl ura l . This i s a l so why, f rom the very b eg inning , the prob l em is set up a s

a converg ence of and a d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n " a r t " a n d " c i v i l r e l i g i o n " . . . .

6 0. This i s not to sa y tha t a ny specta c l e wha tever woul d b e "g ood on

the whol e ." On the contra ry, a soc iety for which the specta cul a r form is

no l ong er codi f ied poses, a nd must pose for i tse l f , the most di f f i cul t prob

l ems concerning the specta c l e : not onl y must i t confront i ts sub ject wi th

a m u l t i t u d e o f e t h i c a l , p r a c t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , a e s t h et i c , a n d p o l i t i c a l d e c i

sions, b ut i t must a l so, f i rst of a l l , reca pture a nd f oun d a new the thin kin g



2 0 2 Notes to Pages 70-79 Notes to Pages 80-88 203

of the "specta c l e" a s such . Mo re of ten th a n not , the g enera l cr i t iq ue of

t h e " s p e c t a c u l a r " — o f m e d i a t i z a t i o n , t e l e v i s i o n , a n d s o o n — p r o v i d e s a n

a l ib i a nd sta g e for a very poor ideol og y. Whether i t i s b e l l ig erent , whin

ing , or disda inful , i t i s most interested in propa g a t ing the not ion tha t i t

possesses the key to wha t i s a n i l l usion a nd wha t i s not . For exa mpl e , i t

pretends to kn ow tha t "peopl e" a re "fool s" b ecause of "te l evis ion," wh ich

is to sa y, b ecause of "te l e- cra cy." B ut this ide ol o g y know s noth ing a b out

t h e g e n u i n e u se " p e o p l e " m a k e o f T V — a us e t h at i s , p e r h a p s , m u c h

m o r e d i s t a n c e d t h a n t h e c r i t i c s w o u l d l i k e t o a d m i t — o r a n y t h i n g a b o u t

the rea l sta te , som etim es g enuin el y "foo l ish ," of the popul a r cul tures of

ea rl ier t imes. The cr i t ique of the specta cul a r ha s b een perfo rmi ng i ts rou

t i n e f or s o m e t i m e — b u t n o w i t i s b e g i n n i n g t o g et o l d .

61. If physis= wha t presents i tse l f a nd wha t a ccomp l ishe s i tse l f b y i t

se l f, then the "w ith " i s of a di f ferent order. Even " in n a ture , " spec ies pro

l i fera te a nd l ive a l ong side one a nother. Technê w o u l d al wa ys have to do

w i t h w h at ne it h er pr oc ee ds f r o m n o r to its elf , w i t h di sp ar it y, co nt ig ui ty ,

a n d , t h u s , w i t h a n u n a c h i e v e d a n d u n a c h i e v a b l e e ss e n ce o f t h e " w i t h . "

6 2 . A l l t h i s r e f er s , o b v i o u s l y , t o t h e w o r k o f D e r r i d a a n d L a c o u e -

L a b a r t h e o n mimesis, a nd to the work of Et ienne B a l ib a r in The Phibso-

phy of Marx, t r a n s . C h r i s T u r n e r ( L o n d o n a n d N e w Y o r k : V e r s o , 1995),

w h i c h in si st s on th e in tr in si c c on ne ct io ns be tw ee n "t he ne ce ss it y o f ap

pea ra nce" a nd the "soc ia l re l a t ionship ," a nd on the dema nd tha t a n "on

tol o g y of the re l a t ion" b e e l a b ora ted a cc ord ing to these condit ions .

6 3 . T h e [ F r e n c h ] R e v o l u t i o n a n d t h e G e r m a n R o m a n t i c s d i d p r e s e n t

a nother, repub l ica n Rome a s the pol i t ica l thea ter tha t wa s immedia te a nd

w it h o u t th ea te r, w h i c h is to say , th e th ea te r of th e to ga a n d th e Se na te .6 4 . A l t h o u g h t h e F r e n c h w o r d exposition i s more of ten tra nsl a ted a s

"exhib i t ion," we ha ve tra nsl a ted i t here , a nd in the other cha pters, a s "ex

posi t ion." We ha ve done so in order to ma inta in , a s much a s possib l e , the

pl a y b etween i t a nd other words tha t sha re i ts root , inc l uding "pose ,"

" p o s e d , " " p o s i t i o n , " a n d s o o n . — T r a n s .

6 5 . H u s s e r l , Cartesian Meditations, 156.

6 6 . D a n i e l G i o v a n n a n g e l i , La passion de l'origine: recherches sur l'esthé

tique de la phénoménologie (Pa ris: Ga l i l é e , 1995), 133.

6 7 . L e v i t i c u s 1 9: 18 , w h i c h i s t a k e n u p a g a i n i n M a t t h e w 2 2 : 39 a n d

Ja mes 2:8 , "a pa pé se is ton p l é sion sou ôs sea utov," "di l ig es proc imum

t u u m s i c u t t e i p s u m " : l o v e o t h e r s a s y o u l o v e y o u r s e l f — t h e " g o l d e n r u l e , "

o r c o m m a n d m e n t , w h i c h s u m m a r i z e s , t og e th e r w i t h t h e c o m m a n d m e n t

to l ove G od , "a l l the l a ws a nd prop hec ie s."

6 8. I wi l l not stop to conside r here the intr ica c ies of idea s tha t inc l ude

"love " at the core: ros, agap, caritas. N o r w i l l I c o n s i d e r t h e J u d e o - C h r i s t i a n

intr ica c y of the re l a t ion b etween l ove a n d l a w. It i s ob viou s wha t a n enor

mous f ie l d of invest ig a t ion this represents. One invi tes pu nish men t in try

ing to think a b out i t in conceptua l terms, espec ia l l y where there i s l i t t l e to

s ay w h e n t h e w h o l e o f o u r t r a d i t i o n — a l l o u r t h i n k i n g a b ou t " u s " — w i l l

ha ve to revol ve a ro und i t . Th e ta sk i s this: the decons truct ion of theol o g

ica l a nd/or sent imen ta l Chris t ia ni ty , of the "l ove one a nother."

6 9 . Th is a l so underl ies the l og ic of the "pol i t ics of f r ie ndsh ip" of the

f o r m D e r r i d a p r o p o s e s t o d e c o n s t r u c t .

7 0 . H e i d e g g e r , Being and Time, 1^6-6^.

71 . Ib id . , 16 4 - 6 5.

72 . I b i d . , 16 0. Umwillen ma y b e tra nsl a ted a s "with reg a rd to," "for ,"

"in view of , " "a ccording to," "in fa vor of , " "for the l ove of" (um Gottes

Willen!).73. In a l mos t every ca se, the va ria t ions of "to disc l ose" fo un d in this

pa ra g r a ph a re tra nsl a t ions of some va ria t ion of ouvrir, w h i c h m e a n s " t o

open." We ha ve sta yed with "disc l ose" b eca use i t i s more consistent wi th

the exta nt tra nsl a t ions of Heideg g er 's w ork, a nd b eca use Na n cy i s c l ea rl y

interested in ma rking a certa in re l a t ion to the Heideg g eria n text .—Tra ns.

74 . In most of the othe r essays, w e have t r a n s l a t e d surgir as "to ap

pea r," doing so in order to ma inta in a certa in consistency wi th the con

text . In this pa rt icul a r essa y, we switch b a ck a nd forth b etween "to a p

pea r" a nd "to spring forth"; we chose the l a ter in those ca ses where i ts

r e l a t i o n t o g r o w t h a n d s u r p r i s e i s i m p o r t a n t . — T r a n s .

7 5 . J e a n - L u c N a n c y , Corpus ( P a r i s : A n n e - M a r i e M é t a i l i é , 1 9 9 2 ) , 3 2 .

76 . "Language, w h e t h e r spoken or silent, is the first and most extensive

hum a ni za t ion of the b e ing . O r so i t a ppea rs. B ut this is precisely the most

o r i g i n a r y d e h u m a n i z a t i o n o f m a n a s being living present-there a nd 'sub

je ct ,' a n d al so th e w h o le of w h at ha s o c cu r r ed to th is p o i n t " [" Sp ra ch e,

ob g e s p r o c h e n o d e r g e s c h w i e g e n , die erste und weiteste Vermenschung des

Seienden. So scheint es. Aber sie gerade die ursprung lichste Entmenschung

des Menschen als V o r h a n d e n e s L e b e n w e s e n und 'Subjekt' und ailes Bish-erigen"] ( M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , Beitrage zur Philosophie [ F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n :

V i t t o r i o K lo s t e r m a n n , 19 89 ], 510 ).

7 7 . G i o r g i o A g a m b e n , The Coming Community, t r a n s. M i c h a e l H a r d t

( M i n n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a P r e s s, 19 9 3 ), 9 8 - 1 0 0 .

7 8 . M a u r i c e B l a n c h o t , " L i t e r a t u r e a n d t h e R i g h t t o D e a t h , " i n The

Work of Fire, t r a n s . C h a r l o t t e M a n d e l ( S t a nf o r d , C a l i f . : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r -



2 0 4 Notes to Pages ço—102 Notes to Pages 102—i$ç 2 05

si ty Press, 19 9 5) . B u t this i s the wh ol e of B l a nch ot 's wor k, wh ich never

stops ta l k ing a b out this ta l k of dea th , tha t i s , the "uniq ue b ir th " of the

l a n g u ag e o f w o r k , w h e r e w o r k u n w o r k s i t s e l f. S e e h i s " C o m m u n i c a t i o n

a n d t h e W o r k , " The Space of Literature, t r a ns . A n n S m o c k ( L i n c o l n : U n i

ve rs it y of N e b r a s k a Pr es s, 19 82 ).

7 9 . H e i d e g g e r , Being and Time, 308.

8 0 . I t w o u l d b e e a s y , b u t t e d i o u s , t o f u r n i s h t h e o v e r a b u n d a n t e v i

dence for this.

81. I have in m i n d , here , the indica t ions f rom Heideg g er 's Beitrdge zur

Philosophie f r o m page 319 to the end, in order to, then, take up again the

e n s e m b l e o f k n o w n i n d i c a t i o n s f r o m Being and Time, w i t h t h e a i m o f

s u g g e s t i n g a r e c o m p o s i t i o n i n w h i c h Mitsein w o u l d b e actually coessen-t ia l a nd orig ina ry. I t i s necessa ry to rewri te Being and Time: this is not a

r id icul ous pr etens ion, a n d i t i s not "min e"; i t i s the necessi ty of a l l the

ma jor works, insofa r a s they a re ours. O n e c a n guess w i t h o u t m u c h t r o u

bl e th at th is ne ce ss it y al so be lo ng s to th e st ak es of a p o li ti ca l r ew ri t in g .

82. In using the wo rd l'écartement, N a n c y i s l a y i n g o u t e x p l i c i t l y t h e

connect ion to his ea rl ier use of the word écart. So, a l thoug h we ha ve con

sistent l y tra nsl a ted l'écartement a s "the dispersa l , " so a s to ma in ta in a cer

t a i n f l u i d i t y w i t h h i s u s e o f " d i s p e r s i o n , " o n e s h o u l d k e e p i n m i n d t h a t

wh at is co nt ai n ed th er ei n is th e re fe re nc e to s o m et h i ng li ke "a di sp er sa l of

e x p lo s i v e b r i l l i a n c e . " — T r a n s .

83 . Bei sich: one woul d ha ve to respond, ever s ince Heg el a t l ea st , to

the consta nt crossing over , the mutua l intr ica t ion a nd dista nc ing , in the

fun da m enta l structure o f the "se l f ," of the "i n i tse l f , " of the "nea r to i t

self," and of the "ri ght at itself." Th e "for itself," since it occu rs and if it

occurs, i s onl y the resul t .

War, Right, Sovereignty-Technê

1. P u b l i s h e d i n Les Temps Modernes no. 539 (Pa ris , June 1991). G i v e n

the fact that this text is firmly b ou nd up w it h the events of the day, I have

not a l l owed my sel f to mod i fy i t , a pa rt f rom some t in y edi to ria l deta i l s .

It hol ds a s wel l for wha t ensued.

S i n c e p u b l i s h e d a s " W a r , L a w , S o v e r e i g n t y — T e c h n ê , " Rethinking Tech

nologies, e d . V e r e n a A n d e r m a t t C o n l e y ( M i n n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n

nesota Press, 19 9 3). O u r tra nsl a t ion b enef i ted g rea t l y f rom a review of the

tra nsl a t ion of fered b y Jef frey S. Lib ret t in the a b ove tex t .— Tra ns.

2. I t a l most certa in l y g oes wi thout sa ying tha t tra nsl a t ing the French

w o r d le droit i s a di f f i cul t ta sk, exa ct l y because i t mea ns b oth "r ig ht" a nd

"l a w." W it h in this text , i t i s a l most inva r ia b l y the ca se tha t when e i ther

the word "l a w" or the word "r ig ht" a ppea rs i t i s a s the tra nsl a t ion of droit.

W e ha ve d o ne o u r be st to r e m a in at tu ne d to th e co ur se of th e te xt a n d

t o c h o o s e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t r a n s l a t i o n i n e a c h i n s t a n c e . — T r a n s .

Eulogy for the Mêlée

1 . T h i s essay a p p e a r e d i n G e r m a n i n Lettrelnternationale no. 21

( B e r l i n , 19 9 3) , a nd in Serb ia n in Mostovi ( B e l g r a d e , M a r c h 1 9 9 3 ); t h e

Fren ch text a ppea red in Transeuropéennes no. 1 (Genev a : Centr e europé en

de l a cul ture , 19 9 3) a nd wa s reprinted in Mlmensuel, Marxisme, mouve

ment no. 71 (Paris, J u l y 19 9 4 ) . The request for the p iece orig ina l l y ca mef r o m G h i s l a i n e G l a s s o n - D e s c h a u m e s , d i r e c t o r o f Transeuropéennes.

2. T h e F r e n c h w o r d mêlée ha s entered the Eng l ish l a ng ua g e in a n im

p o v e r i s h e d f o r m . T h r o u g h o u t t h i s p i e c e , i t s h o u l d n o t b e r e a d a s m e a n

ing onl y a confused f ig ht , a f ra y, scra p, skirmish, or scuf f l e , tha t i s , a s a

w o r d i n E n g l i s h . Ra th er , it re m ai ns a n u nt ra n sl at ed F r e n c h w o r d m e a n

ing a f ig ht , b u t a lso a ming l in g of a more sexua l na ture . In a d di t i on, a s i ts

connect ion to the verb s mêler a n d se mêler ("to mix") make clear, the ideas

o f m i x t u r e , m i x i n g , m o t l e y , a n d v a r i e g a t i o n a r e a l s o i m p l i e d . — T r a n s .

3. A g a i n , we lea ve the wo rd mélange untra nsl a ted, b ut one shoul d rea d

here i ts connec t ion to the a b ove- c i ted mêlée, a s wel l a s i ts sa ying somethi ng

l ike "mixture" or "muddl e ." It i s this l a t ter def in i t ion tha t seems to in form

t h e t r a n s i t i o n N a n c y w a n t s t o m a k e f r o m mélange t o mêlée.—Trans.

4 . F e r n a n d B r a u d e l , The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean Worldin the Age of Philip II, t ra ns. Siân Reynol ds (B erkel ey a nd Los Ang el es:

U n ive rsi ty of Ca l i f or nia Press, 19 9 5) . Na n cy's essay, a s i t a ppea rs in the

orig ina l Fr enc h edi t i on, does not give the pa g e num b er of this quota t ion

fro m B ra ude l . See in g a s the wh ol e of B ra udel 's b oo k is mor e tha n 1 ,500

pa g es, the tra nsl a t ion of fered of the quot a t io n is ours, a nd not f r om the

a b o ve E n g l i s h e d i t i o n . — T r a n s .

The Surprise of the Event

1 . In a l most every ca se, wha t we tra nsl ate here a s "ha pp en," " ha p pen

i n g , " a n d " h a p p e n e d , " i s s o m e v e r s io n o f t h e F r e n c h w o r d arriver. O n e

sho ul d a l so keep in mi nd the va rious other tra nsl a t ions tha t mi g h t b e of

fered of the sa me word , tra nsl a t ions whi ch sug g est other imp ort a nt con

nota t ions: "to occur," "to a rr ive ," "to come," "to b e on the wa y," a nd so

f o r t h .

II



2 0 6 Notes to Pages 159—168 Notes to Pages 168-188 2 0 7

2. G . W . F . H e g e l , Hegel's Science of Logic, t r a n s . A . V . M i l l e r ( A t l a n t i c

H i g h l a n d s , N . J . : H u m a n i r i e s P r es s I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 1 9 8 9) , 58 8. T h e tr a n s

lation offered by Miller, the one we have used in this essay, has a different

emph a sis tha n the one g iven in the Fre nch tra nsl a t ion of the sa me sen

t e n c e . T h e F r e n c h t r a n s l a t i o n s a y s s o m e t h i n g m o r e l i k e t h e f o l l o w i n g :

" P h i l o s o p h y m u s t n o t b e a s t o r y o f w h a t h a p p e n s , b u t a k n o w l e d g e o f

w h at , in su ch h ap p en in g, is tr ue , an d be gi n n in g f ro m th e tr ue ir m us t als o

conceive of wha t in the na rra t ive a ppea rs a s a pure event ." Th e sig ni f ica nt

di f ference comes in the l a st phra se , which in Mi l l er 's tra nsl a t ion sa ys

"mere ha ppening " a nd in the French tra nsl a t ion sa ys "pure event ." [ "Ab erdie Phi l osophie sol i ke ine Erzà hl ung dessen se in , wa s g esehiet , sondern

eine Erkenntis dessen, wa s wahr d a r i n i s t, u n d a u s d e m W a h r e n s oi l sie

ferner da s b eg re i fen , wa s in der Erzà hl ung a l s e in b l of tes Geschehen er-

s c h e i n t . " ] ( G . W . F . H e g e l , WissenschaftderLogic [ F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n :

S u h r k a m p V e r l a g , 19 6 9 ] , 2 6 0 ) . — T r a n s .

3. I n the French ed i t io n, "L og i qu e du conce pt" i s the t i t l e of the sec

o n d v o l u m e o f H e g e l ' s Science of Logic, which is tra nsl a ted b y "Sub jec

t i v e L o g i c ; o r t h e D o c t r i n e o f t h e N o t i o n " i n t h e a b o v e E n g l i s h e d i

t i o n . — T r a n s .

4. Ibid., 591.

5 . T h e m o s t c o m m o n t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e w o r d la péripétie w o u l d b e

"the event ," b ut we ha ve chosen the word "episode" to reserve the spec i

ficity o f the te rm "event" for tra nsl a t ing l'événement. B ut one shoul d a l so

keep in m in d Aristot l e 's use of peripeteia.—Trans.

6. H e g e l , Hegel's Science of Logic, 91.7 . I m m a n u e l K a n t ,

Critique of Pure Reason, t r a n s . N o r m a n K e m p

Sm it h (N ew York: St . Ma rt i n 's Press, 196 5) , 218 .

8 . The refore , i t i s a ma tter of "ori g ina r y tempora l i ty ," the ma jor con

cept o f Being and Time. Is such a concept i tse l f a g a in sub ordin a ted to the

conce pt of the t ime of presence (a l rea dy present a nd hom og e nou s wi t h

i tse l f ) , or does i t exc l ude i tse l f f rom i t? Th is i s the most im porta nt thi ng a t

sta ke in a deb a te ent i re l y interna l to Heideg g er, a nd then opened b etween

D errida a nd Heideg g er, a nd indeed b etween D errida a nd himsel f . For ex

a m p l e , c o m p a r e "Ousia and Gramme: A N o t e o n a N o t e f r o m Being andTime," Margins of Philosophy, t ra ns. A l a n B a s s ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f

Chica g o Press, 19 82) , a nd port ions of Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money,

tra ns. Peg g y K a m uf (Chi ca g o: U nive rsi ty of Ch ica g o Press, 19 9 2) . Perha ps

i t i s necessa ry to think tha t i t i s presence which precedes i rse l f—tha t pres

ents i tse l f—h eterog e neous to i tse l f , a nd tha t the event (of B eing ) i s here .

9. Survenir, which we tra nsl a ted ea rl ier a s "to occur," a l so ha s the con

n o t a t i o n o f o c c u r r i n g u n e x p e c t e d l y , a n d t h e n o u n le survenuemea ns "a

s u d d e n o r u n e x p e c t e d a r r i v a l . " — T r a n s .

10. Ev en a nd espec ia l l y i f i t "revea l s the tha t- wh ich- i s- no t- b ei ng - a s -

b ei n g ." A l a i n B a d i o u , L'être et l'événement (Pa ris: Edi t io ns du Seui l , 19 88) ,

211 . I t i s "not- B eing - a s- b ei ng ," th en, tha t i s the condi t io n of B ei ng , or to

be m o r e pr ec is e, th e ex is te nt c o n d i t i o n of B e i n g (o r th e "e x is te nt ia l" of

B ei ng i tse l f ) . N o doub t a l l pa rt ies to the disputatio w o u l d agree on this as

a n ( e s s en t i al ) m i n i m u m — a t l e as t i n so f a r a s t h i s i s o n l y t h e b e g i n n i n g o f

e x p r es s i ng s u c h a m i n i m u m .11. See §22 and §35 of M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r ' s Kant and the Problem of

Metaphysics, t r a n s . R i c h a r d T a f t ( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s,

1990).

12. M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , The Fundamental Concepts of 'Metaphysics, trans.

W i l l i a m M c N e i l l a n d N i c h o l a s W a l k e r ( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d ia n a U n i v e r

sity Press, 1995), 501 ff.

Human Excess

1. S e r g i o M o r a v i a , Journal européen, t ra ns. D enis Ferna ndez- Ré ca ta l a

a n d G i a n n i B u r a t t o n i ( P a r i s : E c r i t u r e , 1 9 8 4 ) , 4 8 . T h e t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o

E n g l i s h i s o u r s . — T r a n s .

Cosmos Baselius

1. T hi s text was first pub lis hed in Basileus, a n I n t e r n e t p h i l o s o p h y j o u r n a l , e d . P a u l M i n k k i n e n ( h t t p : / / w w w . h e l s i n k i . f i / b a s i l e u s , M a r c h 1 9 9 8 ) .

2 . I n t h e p r e v i o u s es s ay , " H u m a n E x c e s s , " w e t r a n s l a te d t h e w o r d

covenance a s "propriety" in order to ma inta in a certa in proximity wi th the

F r e n c h w o r d s propre a n d provenance. In the above text, we have rendered

i t a s "sui ta b i l i ty" in order tha t i t fol l ow more c l ose l y f rom the verb con-

venir, whi ch mean s "to be sui tab le," or "to be fitting." Ho we ve r, in a few

cases, w e have once a g a in tra nsl a ted covenance a s "prop riety , " b ut these

insta nces a re ma rked in the text .—Tra ns.

3. The word "g a ng ue" exists b oth in French a nd Eng l ish, b ut i t i s not

of ten used except in certa in spec ia l ized discourses. I t i s the worthl ess rock

o r v e i n m a t t e r f r o m w h i c h v a l u a b l e m e t a l s o r m i n e r a l s a r e e x t r a c t e d . —

Tra ns.

http://www.helsinki.fi/basileus

http://www.helsinki.fi/basileus



M E R I D I A N

Crossing Aesthetics

J e a n - L u c N a n c y , Being Singular Plural

M a u r i c e B l a n c h o t / J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , The Instant o f My Death I

Demeure: Fiction and Testim ony

N i k l a s L u h m a n n , The Social System of Art

E m m a n u a l L e v i n a s , G od, Death, and Time

E r n s t B l o c h , The Spirit of Utopia

G i o r g i o A g a m b e n , Potentialities: Collected Essays

E l l e n S . B u r t , Poetry's Appeal: Nineteenth-Century French Lyric and

the Political Space

J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas

W e r n e r H ar na ch er , Premises: Essays on Philosophy an d Literature from Kant to Celan

A r i s F i o r e t o s , The Gray Book

D e b o r a h E s c h , In the Event: Reading Journalism, Reading Theory

W i n f r i e d M e n n i n g h a u s , In Praise o f Nonsense: Kant an d Bluebeard

G i o r g i o A g a m b e n , The Man Without Content

G i o r g i o A g a m b e n , The End of the Poem: Studies in Poetics

T h e o d o r W . A d o r n o , Sound Figures



L o u i s M a r i n , Sublime Poussin

P h i l i p p e L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e , Poetry as Experience

J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , Resistances o f Psychoanalysis

E r n s t B l o c h , Literary Essays

M a r c F r o m e n t - M e u r i c e , That Is to Say: Heidegger's Poetics

F r a n c i s Ponge, Soap

P h i l l i p e L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e , Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics

G i o r g i o A g a m b e n , Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power an d Bare Life

E m m a n u e l L e v i n a s , O f G od Who Comes to Mind

B e r n a r d St ieg l er , Technics an d Time, 1: Th e Fault o f Epimetheus

W e r n e r H ar na ch er , pleroma—Reading in Hegel

Serge L e c l a i r e , Psychoanalyzing

Serge L e c l a i r e , A Child I s Being Killed

S i g m u n d F r e u d , Writings on Art and Literature

C o r n e l i u s C a s t o r i a d i s , World in Fragments: Writings o n Politics, Society,

Psychoa nalysis , and the Imaginatio n

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in Ethics and Politics

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Jacques D e r r i d a , On the Name

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Th is book, b y one of the most innovative and cha l lengin g contem pora

thin kers , consists of an extensive essay fr om w hi ch the book takes its title

and five shorter essays that are internally related to "Being Singular Plural ."

O n e of the strongest strands in N ancy 's phil oso ph y is his attemp t to reth inkco m m un it y and the very idea of the social in a way that does not grou nd these

ideas in some individual subject or subject iv i ty . The fundamental argument of

the book is that being is always "being with," that "I" is not prior to "we," that

existence is essential ly co-existence. Nancy thinks of this "being-with" not as a

comfortable enc losure in a pre-exist ing group, but as a mutual abandonment

and exposure to each other, one that would preserve the "I" and its freedom in

a m ode of ima gin ing co mm un it y as nei ther a "soc iety of spectac le" nor v ia

some fo rm of authen ticity.

The five shorter essays impressively translate the philosophical insight of

"Be ing S ingular P lu ral " in to sophist icated discussions of nat iona l sovereignty ,

w ar a n d te chnol ogy , id e n ti ty p oli t ics , th e G u l f W ar, a n d th e tr ag ic p l i g h t of

Sarajevo. The essay "Eulogy for the Mêlée," in particular, is a bril l iantdiscussion of ident i ty and hy bri dis m that resonates with m any contem pora ry

social concerns.

A s N a n c y m ov es t h r o u g h th e e x p osi t i on o f h is ce ntr al c o n c e r n , b e i n g - w i t h ,

Nancy Jean Luc Being Singular Plural 2000

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Transcript of Nancy Jean Luc Being Singular Plural 2000