Being Singular Plural

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BEING SINGULAR PLURAL


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M E R I D I A N

Crossing Aesthetics

Werner Harnacher

& D a v i d E . W e l l b e r y

Editors


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BEING SINGULAR PLURAL

T r a n s l a t e d b y

R o b e r t D . R i c h a r d s o n

a n d A n n e E . O ' B y r n e

Jean-Luc Nancy

Stanford

University

Press

Stanford

California

2000


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Contents

S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s

S t a n f o r d , C a l i f o r n i a

2 0 00 b y th e Bo a r d o f Tr us tees

o f t h e L e l a n d S t a n f o r d J u n i o r U n i v e r s i r y

Being Singular Plural'was originally published as Etre singulier pluriel

1 9 9 6 , di t io n s G a l i l e .

A s s is ta n c e fo r th e t r a n s l a t io n wa s p r o v ided b y th e F r en c h Mi n i s t r y o f Cul tur e .

Pr i n te d in the U n i te d S tates o f A m er ic a o n a c id- fr ee , a r c h i v a l - q u a l i ty p a p er .

L i b r a r y o f C o n g r e s s C a t a l o g i n g - i n - P u b l i c a t i o n D a t a

N a n c y , J e a n - L u c .

[ E t r e s i n g u l a r p l u r i e l . E n g l i s h ]

B e i n g s i n g u l a r p l u r a l / J e a n - L u c N a n c y ; t r a n s l a te d b y R o b e r t D . R i c h a r d s o n

a n d A n n e E . O ' B y r n e

p . c m . ( M er id ia n , c r o s s in g a es th et ic s )

In c l udes b ib l io g r a p h ic a l r e fer en c es a n d in dex .

I S B N 0 - 8 0 4 7 - 3 9 7 4 - 9 ( a 'k - p a p er ) I S B N 0 - 8 0 4 7 - 3 9 7 5 - 7 (pbk. : alk. p a p er )

I. O n t o l o g y . 2 . P h i l o s o p h i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g y . I . T i t l e . I I . M e r i d a n

( S t a n f o r d , C a l i f . )

B2 4 30. N36 3 E 8 71 3 2 00 0

1 9 4 d c 2 i 0 0 - 0 5 7 3 2 6

O r i g i n a l p r i n t i n g 2 0 0 0

L a s t f ig ur e b el o w in dic a tes y ea r o f th is p r in t in g :

09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00

Ty p es et b y Ja m es P . Br o m m er

in 1 0. 9 / 1 3 G a r a m o n d a n d L i th o s d is p l a y

Preface XV

O f B ein g S in g u l a r P l u ra l1

Wa r , R ig ht , So v ere ig n t yTec hn IO I

Eulogy for the Mle 145

Th e Surprise of the Event 159

H u ma n Ex c ess 177

Cos mos Basel ius 185

Notes 193


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Lead, as I do, the flown-away virtue back to earth

yes, back to body and life; that it may give the earth its

meaning, a human meaning! May your spirit and your

virtue serve the meanin g of the earth. . . . M a n and

man's earth are still unexhausted and undiscovered.N iet z sc he


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Th is epigr aph is chosen quite deliberately. I r un the risk of its

seeming to lend itself to a certain Ch ris tia n, idealist , and huma nist

tone, a tone in which it is easy to recognize those well-meaning

virtues and values that have loosed upon the world all the things

that have drive n the hu ma nit y of our cen tury to despair over itself, where these values are both blind to and complicit in this letting

loose. In h is ow n w ay , Nietzs ch e h im s el f w ou ld h ave undoub te dly

participated in this dubious, moralizing piety. At any rate, the word

"meaning" rarely appears in his work, and stil l more rarely in any

positive sense. One would do well , therefore, not to give any hasty

interpretations of it here. The above excerpt appeals to a "human

meaning," but it does so by aff irming that the human [l'homme]

remains to be discovered. 1 In order for the human to be discovered,

and in order f or th e ph ras e " h um an m eaning" to acquire s om e

meaning, everything that has ever laid claim to the truth about the

nature, essence, or end of "ma n" mu st be undone . In other words,

not hin g must remai n of what, u nder the tit le of mea nin g, related

the earth [la terre] and the human to a specif iable horizon. Again, it

is Nietzsc he who said that we are now "on the hor izon of the inf i

nite"; that is , we are at that point where "there is no more ' land,'"

and where "there is nothing more terrible than the inf inite." 2

Are we f inally going to learn this lesson? Are we perhaps f inally

able to hear it , or is it now impossible for us to learn anything


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X l l Xlll

else? Can we think an earth and a human such that they would be

only what they arenothing but e a r t h a n d h u m a n a n d s u c h

that they wo ul d be none of the various hor izons often harb ored

unde r these names, none of the "perspectives" o r "views" in view

of whi ch we have disf igured hu mans [les hommes] and driven th em

to despair?

"Th e horiz on of the inf init e" is no longer the hor izo n of the

whole, but the "whole" (all that is) as put on hold everywhere,

pus h ed to the outs ide justas much as it is pushed back inside the

"self ." It is no longer a l ine that is drawn, or a l ine that will bedra wn , whi ch orie nts or gathers the mea nin g of a course of progress

or navigation. It is the opening [la brche] or distancing [lecarte-

ment] of hori zon itself , and in the openi ng: us. We happen as the

ope nin g itself , the dangerous fault l ine of a ruptu re.

I want to emphasize the date on which I am writing this. It is

the summ er of 1995, an d as far as specif ying the situ ation of the

earth and h um ans is concerned, noth ing is m ore pres s ing ( h ow

co uld i t really be avoided?) than a l ist of prop er name s such as

these, presented here in no particular order: Bosnia-Herzogovina,

Ch ec h ny a , Rw anda , Bos nian S erb s, T uts is , Hutus , T am i l T igers ,

Kra jina Serbs, Casamance, Chia pas, Is lamic Jiha d, Banglad esh, the

S ecret Ar m y f or th e Lib erat ion of Arm eni a, H am as , Kazakh s tan,

K h m e r s Ro u g es , E T A m i l i t i a , K u rd s ( U P K / P D K ) , M o n t a t a i r e, t heM ovem ent f or S el f - determ inat ion, S om al ia , Ch icanos , S h i i tes ,

F N L C - C a n a l H i s t o r i q u e , L i b e r i a , G i v a t H a g a d a n , N i g e r i a , t h e

League of th e No rt h , Af gh anis tan , Indones ia , S ikh s , Ha it i , Ro m a

gy psies of S lovenia , T aiw an , Bur m a, P L O , Iraq, Is lam ic Front S al

vat ion , S h in ing P ath , Vaulx- en - Vel ins , N euh of . . . . Of cours e, i t

woul d be dif f icult to bri ng this l ist to an end if the aim was to in

clude all the places, groups, or authorities that constitute the the

ater of blo ody conflicts am ong id entities, as well as wha t is at stake

in these conflicts. These days it is not always possible to say with

any assurance whether these identities are intranational, infrana-

t ional , or t rans nat ional ; w h eth er th ey are " cul tural ," " rel ig ious ,"

"ethnic," or "historical"; whether they are legitimate or notnot

to mention the question about which law would provide such le

gitimation; whether they are real, mythical, or imaginary; whether

they are independent or "instrumentalized" by other groups who

wield polit ical, economic, and ideological power. . . .

This is the "earth" we are supposed to "inhabit" today, the earth

for which the name Sarajevo will become the martyr-name, the

testimonial-name: this is us, we who are supposed to say we as if

we know what we are saying and who we are talking about. This

earth is anythi ng but a sharing of huma nity. It is a wo rld that doesnot even manage to constitute a world; it is a world lacking in

w orld , and lack i ng in th e m eaning of w orld . I t is an enum erat ion

that brings to light the sheer num ber an d proli fera tion of these var

ious poles of attrac tion and r epul sion. It is an endless l ist , and

everything happens in such a way that one is reduced to keeping

accounts but never taking the f inal toll . It is a l itany, a prayer of

pure sorrow and pure loss, the plea that falls fro m the lips of mi l

lion s of refugees every day: wh ethe r they be deportees, peop le be

sieged, those who are mutilated, people who starve, who are raped,

ostracized, excluded, exiled, expelled.

What I am talking about here is compassion, but not compassion

as a pity that feels sorry for itsel f an d feeds on itself. Com -p ass io n

is the cont agi on, the contact of bei ng with one anothe r in this tur

moil. Compassion is not altruism, nor is it identif ication; it is the

distur bance of viol ent relatedness.

Wha t does the above-named p roliferation require of us, this pro

liferation that seems to have no other meaning than the indetermi

nate multipli catio n of centripetal mean ings, mean ings closed in on

themselves and supersaturated with signif icancethat is , meanings

that are no longer meaningful because they have come to refer only

to their ow n closure, to their hori zon of appr opr iati on, and have

begun to spread nothing but destruction, hatred, and the denial of

existence?

Wha t if this autistic mul tipl ici ty, whi ch tears open and is torn


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XI V

open, lets us know that we have not even begun to discover what it

is to be many, even though "la terre des hommes" 3 is exactly this?

What if it lets us know that it is itself the first laying bare [mise

nu] of a wo rl d that is only the wo rl d, bu t wh ic h is the wo rl d ab

solutely and unreservedly, with no meaning beyond this very Be

ing of th e w orld: s ingular ly p lural an d p lura l ly s ingular?

Preface

The f irst and pr inc ipa l essay of this book, w hic h gives it its t it le,

was not composed in an altogether sequential manner, but rather

in a discontinuous way, repeatedly taking up several themes. To a

certain extent, then, the sections can be read in any order, s ince

there are repetition s here and there. B ut this is the result of a fun

damen tal dif f iculty. Th is text does not disguise its am bit ion of re

doing th e w h ole of " f i rs t ph i los oph y " b y g iv ing th e " s ingular

p lural" of Being 1 as its foundation. This, however, is not my a m b i

tion , bu t rather the necessity of the thi ng itself and of our history.

At the very least, I hope to make this necessity felt. At the same

time, apart from the fact that I do not have the strength to deliver

the treatise "of the singular p lura l essence of Bei ng, " the for m of

the ontological treatise ceases to be appropriate as soon as the sin

gular of Bei ng itself, an d therefore also of ontolog y, is in qu estion .

This is nothing new. At least s ince Nietzsche, and for all sorts of

reasons that no doubt come together in the reason I invoke, phi

losophy is at odds with its "form," that is , with its "style," which is

to say, f inally, with its address. H o w does thin ki ng address itself to

itself , to thinking (which also means: how does thinking address

itself to everyone, wi thou t its being a matter of a "com prehe nsion "

or " unders tanding" th at m igh t b e cal led " com m on" ) ? How is

thinking addressed? (The philosophical treatise, and "philosophy"

as such, is the neut rali zati on of address, the subjectless discou rse of


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X V I Preface

Being- S ub ject [l'Etre-Sujet] itself.) Put another way, what is the "di

alogue of the soul wi th itself" that Plato talks about, whic h dem on

strates that this ques tion , or this wor ry, has always been par t of ou r

history? If thi nk ing is addressed, then it is because there is mea ning

in this addre ss, and no t in disc ourse ( but it is in the address of dis

cours e) . T h is ob eys th e pr im ordi al , ontological c ondi t ion of b eing-

with or being-together, which is what I would like to talk about. A

treatise, therefore, is not suff iciently discursive. Nor is it enough to

dress discourse in the f orm of an address ( for me to address you

w ith th e f am il iar " y ou" [tu] the whole way through). The address

mean s that thi nk in g itself addresses itself to "me" a nd to "us" at thesame time; that is , thi nki ng addresses itself to the wo rld , to history,

to people , to th ings : to " us ." Anoth er am b it ion s prings f rom th is

or, better yet, another, more restricted, attempt: to allow thinking's

address to be perceived, an address that comes to us from every

where simultaneously, multiplied, repeated, insistent, and variable,

ges turing only tow ard " us " and tow ard our curious " b eing- w ith -

one- anoth er ," [tre-les-uns-avec-les-autres], tow ard our addres s ing-

one- anoth er . 2

(By the way, the logic of "wi th" often requires heavy-handed syn

tax in order to say "being-with-one-another." You may suffer from

it as you read these pages. But perhaps it is not an accident that

language does not easily lend itself to showi ng the "wit h" as such,

for it is itself the address and no t what mu st be addressed.)

In this , there is an il lu sion that l ies in wait, the il lu sion of wi ll i ng

th e adequat ion of " f orm " and " content ," o f w i l l in g t ruth i t s el f intopresence: as if I co ul d write to every addressee a seismo grap hical

account of our ups ets , our agitat ions , our t roub les , an d our ad

dresses without addressees. My only response is no: no will , "on

my life I did not know what it was to will" (Nietzsche). Or I might

say the following: will ing (or desire) is not a thinking; it is a dis

turbance, an echo, a reverberating shock.

The latter essays were chosen because their subjects converge

wi th that of the pri ma ry essay. As you wi ll see, the first two are con

necte d to the exact circ umsta nces of the most viole nt events of

these last years.


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Of Being Singular Plur al

I t i s g o o d to r e l y up o n o th er s . F o r n o o n e c a n b ea r th is l i fe a l o n e.

H l d e r l i n

S i n c e h u m a n n a t u r e i s t h e t r u e c o m m u n i t y o f m e n , t h o s e w h o

p r o d u c e t h e r e b y a f f i r m t h e i r n a tu r e , h u m a n c o m m u n i t y , a n d s o c i a l

b ein g wh ic h , r a th er th a n a n a b s tr a c t , g en er a l p o wer in o p p o s i t io n

t o t h e i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l , i s t h e b e i n g o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l , h i s o w n

a c t iv i ty , h is o w n l i fe , h is o w n jo y , h is o w n r ic h n es s . To s a y th a t a

m a n is a l ien a te d f r o m h im s el f i s to s a y th a t th e s o c iety o f th is

a l ien a ted m a n is th e c a r ic a t ur e o f h is r ea l c o m m u n it y .

M a r x

We Ar e Mea ning

It is often said today that we have lost meaning, that we lack it

and , as a result , are in need of and wa iti ng for it . The "one" wh o

speaks in this way forgets that the very propa gati on of this discourse

is itself mea nin gfu l. Re gre tting the absence of me ani ng itself has

meaning. But such regret does not have meaning only in this nega

tive mode; d enyi ng the presence of mea ning aff irms that one knows

what meaning would be, were it there, and keeps the mastery and

truth of mea nin g in place (whi ch is the pretension of the human ist

discourses that propose to "rediscover" meaning.) Whether it is

aware of it or not, the con tem por ary discourse on me ani ng goesmuch further and in a completely dif ferent direction: it brings to

light the fact that "meaning," used in this absolute way, has become

the bared [dnud] name of our being-with-one-another. We do not

" h ave" m eaning any m ore, b ecaus e w e ours elves are m eaning en

tirely, without reserve, inf initely, with no meaning other than "us."

Thi s does not mean that we are the content of mea nin g, nor are

we its fulf il lm ent or its result , as if to say that hum ans were the

mean ing (end, substance, or value) of Bein g, nature, or history. The

mean ing of this mea ni ng t ha t is, the signif ication to whi ch a state

of af fairs corresponds and com pa re s is precisely what we say we


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2 Being Singular Plural

have lost. But we are meaning in the sense that we are the element

in which signif ications can be produced and circulate. The least s ig

nif ica tion just as mu ch as the most elevated (the me ani ng of "na il"

as well as the meani ng of "G od ") has no mea nin g in itself and , as a

result , is what it is and does what it does only insofar as it is com

m unicated, even w h ere th is com m unicat ion takes p lace only b e

tw een " m e" and " m y s el f ." M eaning is i t s ow n com m unicat ion or

i ts ow n c irc ulat ion. T h e " m eanin g of Bein g" is not s om e property

that will come to qualify, f il l in, or f inalize the brute givenness of

"Being" pure and simple.' Instead, it is the fact that there is no"brute givenne ss" of Bei ng, that there is no desperately poor there

is presented when one says that "there is a nai l catching. . . . " But

the givenness of Bei ng , the givenness in here nt to the very fact that

we understand something when we say "to be" (whatever it may

be and however confused it might be), along with the (same)

givenness that is given with this factcosubstantial with the given

ness of Bei ng and the under stand ing of Bei ng, that we under stand

one another (however confusedly) when we say it, is a gift that can

be summarized as follows: Being itself is given to us as meaning.Be

ing does not have m ean ing. Bein g i ts elf , th e ph en om en on of Be

i n g , i s m e a n i n g t h a t i s , i n t u r n , i t s o w n c i r c u l a t i o n a n d we are

th is c irculat io n.

T h ere is no m ea ning i f m ean ing is not s h ared,2 and not because

there would be an ultimate or f irst s ignif ication that all beings have

in com mo n, but because meaning is itselfthe sharing of Being. Mean

ing begins where presence is not pure presence but where presence

comes apart [se disjoint] in order to be itselfas such. This "as" pre

supposes the distancing , spacing, a nd divi sion of presence. O nl y the

concept of "presence" contai ns the necessity of this divi sion . P ure

uns h ared pres ence pres ence to noth ing, of noth ing, f or no th in g

is neither present nor absent. It is the simple i mp losi on of a being

that could never have beenan implosion without any trace.

Th is is why what is called "the creation of the worl d" i s not the

p r o d u c t i o n o f a p u r e so m e t h i n g f r o m n o t h i n g w h i c h w o u l d n o t ,

at the same time, im plo de into the nothi ng out of whi ch it could

never have com e bu t is the explosion of presence in the origina l

Being Singular Plural 3

m ul t ip l ic i t y of i t s d iv i s ion. I t is the exp los ion of nothing, in fact,

it is the spacing of me ani ng, sp acing as m e a n i n g a n d c i r c u l a t i o n .

T h e nihilof creatio n is the truth of m ean ing, b ut m ea ning is th e

orig inar y sharing of this truth. It coul d be expressed in the follo w

ing w ay : Being cannot b e any th ing b ut b eing- w ith - one- anoth er ,

c irculat ing in th e with and as the with of th is s ingular ly p lu ral

coexistence.

If one can put it l ike this , there is no other mea nin g than the

m ean ing of c ircula t ion. But th is c irculat io n goes in a l l d irect ions

at once, in all the directions of all the space-times [les espace-temps]

opened by presence to presence: all things, all beings, all entities,

everything past and future, alive, dead, inanimate, stones, plants,

nails , godsand "humans," that is , those who expose sharing and

circ ulati on as such by saying "we," bysaying we to themselves in all

possible senses of that express ion, a nd by saying we for the totalit y

of all being.

(Let us say we for all being, that is, for every being, for all beings

one by one, each time in the singular of their essential plural. Lan

guage speaks for all and of all: for all, in their place, in their name,

including those who may not have a name. Language says what there

is of the world, nature, history and humanity, and it also speaks for

them as well as in view ofthem, in order to lead the one who speaks,

the one through who m language comes to be and happens ("man"), toall of being, which does not speak but which is neverthelessstone,

fish, f iber, dough, crack, block, an d b reath . Thespeakerspeaks for

the world, which means the speaker speaks to it, on behalf of it, in or

der to make it a "world. "As such, the speaker is "in its place" and "ac

cording to its measure"; the speaker occurs as its representative but also,

at the same time (and this has all the values ofpr o in Latin), in an

ticipation of it, before it, exposed to it as to its own most intimate con

sideration. Language says the world; that is, it loses itself in it and ex

poses how "in itself" it is a question of losing oneself in order to be of it,

with it, to be its meaningwhich is all meaning)


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Circulation goes in all directions: this is the Nietzschean thought

of the "eternal retu rn," the aff irmation of mea nin g as the repetition

of the instant, noth ing but this repetiti on, and as a result , nothi ng

(since it is a matter of the repe tition of what essentially does not

return). But it is a repetition already comprised in the aff irmation

of the instant, i n this af f irmation/req uest {re-petitid) seized in the

lett ing go of the instant, a ffir min g the passing of presence and its elf

passing with it , af f irmation abandoned in its very movement. It is

an im pos s ib le th oug h t , a th in kin g th at does not h ol d i t s el f b ack

f rom th e c irculat i on i t th inks , a th i nki ng of m ea nin g r igh t at [

mme]3 mea ning , where its eternity occurs as the tru th of its pass

ing. ( F or instance, at th e m om ent at w h ich I am w ri t ing , a b row n -

and-white cat is crossing the garden, s lipping mockingly away, tak

ing my thoughts with it .)

It is in this way that the thi nki ng of the eternal return is the in

augural tho ught of our contem pora ry history, a think in g we must

repeat (even if it means ca lling it some thin g else) . We must reap-

propriate what already made us who "we" are today, here and now,

the "we" of a wor ld wh o no longer struggle to have mean ing bu t to

be meaning itself . This is we as the beginning and end of the world,

inexh aus t ib le in th e c ircum s cript ion th at noth ing c ircum s crib es ,

that "the" nothing circumscribes. We makesense [nous faisons sens],

not by setting a price or value, but by exposing the absolute value

that the world is by itself . "World" does not mean anything other

than this "nothing" that no one can "mean" [vouloir dire], but thatis said in every saying: in other words, Bei ng itself as the absolute

value in it self of all that is, but this absolute value as the being-with o f

all that is itself bare and im possible to evaluate. It is neither mean

ing [vouloir-dire] nor the giving of value [dire-valoir], but value as

such, that is , "mean ing" w hich is the mean ing of Bein g only because

it is Being itself, its existence, its truth. Existence is with: otherwise

nothing exists.

C i r c u l a t i o n o r e t e r n i t y g o e s i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s , b u t i t m o v e s

only insofar as it goes from one point to another; spacing is its ab

s olute condit ion . From p lace to p lace, and f rom m om ent to m o

ment, without any progression or l inear path, bit by bit and case by


case, essentially accidental, it is s ingular and plural in its very prin

ciple. It does not have a f inal fulf il lment any more than it has a

poin t of orig in. I t is the origin ary plur ality of origins an d the cre

ation of the wor ld in each singularity, creation c onti nued i n the dis

cont inu ity of its discrete occurrences. F ro m now on , we, we others4

are charged with this truthit is more ours th an ever th e t ruth of

this paradoxical "f irst-person plur al" w hic h makes sense of the worl d

as the spacin g and inte rtw ini ng of so man y world s (earths, skies,

histories) that there is a takin g place of mea nin g, or the crossing-

through [passages] of presence. " We " says (and "we say") the uni que

event whose uniqueness and unity consist in multiplicity.

People Are Strange

Everything, then, passes between us.''This "between," as its name

implies, has neither a consistency nor conti nui ty of its own. It does

not lead from one to the other; it constitutes no connective t issue,

no cement, no bridg e. Per haps it is not even fair to speak of a "co n

nection" to its subject; it is neither connected nor unconnected; it

falls short of bo th; even better, i t is that whi ch is at the heart of a

connection, the interlacing [Yemrecroisment] of strands whose ex

tremities rem ain separate even at the very center of the knot. T he

"between" is the stretching out [distension]and distance opened by

the singul ar as such, a s its spaci ng of me ani ng. Th at whi ch does

not maintain its distance from the "between" is only immanencecollapsed in on itself and depr ived of mea ning .

From one singular to another, there is contiguity but not conti

nuity. There is proximity, but only to the extent that extreme close

ness emphasizes the distanc ing it opens up. A ll of being is in touc h

with all of being , but the law of tou chi ng is separation; more over,

it is the hetero gene ity of surfaces that tou ch each othe r. Contact is

b ey ond f u l lnes s and em pt ines s , b ey ond connect ion and dis con

nect ion. If "to come i nto con tact" i s to begin to ma ke sense of one

another, then this "coming" penetrates nothing; there is no inter

m ediate and m ediat ing " m il ieu ." M eaning is not a m il ieu in w h ich

we are immersed. There is no mi-lieu [between place]. It is a mat-


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6 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 7

ter of one or the other, on e and the other, one wi th the other, bu t

by no means the one in the other, which would be something other

than one or the other (another essence, another nature, a diffuse or

infuse generality) . From one to the other is the syncopated repeti

tion of origi ns-of-th e-wor ld, wh ich are each time one or the other.

T h e or ig in is a f f i rm at ion; repet i t ion is th e condi t ion of a f f i rm a

tion. I say "that is, that it is." It is not a "fact" and has nothing to

do wit h any sort of evalua tion. It is a s ingu larity tak ing refuge inits af f irmation of Bei ng, a tou ch of mea ning . It is not an other Be

ing; it is the singular of Bei ng by whic h the being is, or it is of Be

i n g , w h i c h is being in a transi tive sense of the verb (an un hea rd of,

inaudib le s ens e th e very m eaning of Being) . T h e touch of m ean

ing b r ings into p lay [engager] i t s ow n s ingular i ty , i t s d is t inct ion ,

and br ings int o play the plura lity of the "each time" o f every touch

of mea nin g, " min e" as well as all the others, each one of whi ch is

" m i n e " in turn, acc ord ing to the singular turn of its af f ir mati on.

Rig ht away, then, there is the repetition of the touches of mea n

ing, w h ich m eaning dem ands . T h is incom m ens urab le , ab s olutely

heterogeneous repetition opens up an irreducible strangeness of

each one of these touches to the other. Th e other origi n is in co m

parable or inassimilable, not because it is s imply "other" but be

cause it is an or igin and tou ch of mea ning . Or rather, the alterity of

the other is its originary contiguity with the "proper" origin. 6 Y o u

are absolutely strange because the world begins its turn with you.

We say "people are strange."7 Thi s phrase is one of our most c on

stant and rudimentary ontological attestations. In fact, it says a

great deal. "People" indicates everyone else, designated as the in

determinate ensemble of populations, lineages, or races [gentes]

from which the speaker removes himself . (Nevertheless, he re

moves h ims elf in a very par ticula r sort of way, because the desig

nat ion is s o general and th is is exact ly th e point th at i t in

evitably turns back around on the speaker. Since I say that "people

are strange," I incl ude m yself in a certain w ay in this strangeness.)

The word "people" does not say exactly the same thing as the

H e i d e g g e r i a n 8 " o n e , " 9 even if it is partl y a mod e of it . W i t h the

word "one," it is not always certain whether or not the speaker in

cludes hims elf in the anony mit y of the "one." For example , I can

say "someone said to me" ["on m'a dit"] or else "it is said that" ["on

dit que"] or else "that is how it is done" ["c'est comme a qu'on

fait"] or else "one is born; one dies" ["on nat, on meurt"]. These

uses are not equivalent and, moreover, it is not certain that it is al

ways the case that the "one" speaks of him sel f ( fro m an d about

himself) . Heidegger understood that "one" would only be said as a

response to the question "who?" put to the subject of Dasein, bu t

he does not pose the other inevitable question that must be asked

in order to discover who gives this response and who, in respond

ing like this , rem oves him self or has a tendency to remove himself .

As a result, he risks neglecting the fact that there is no pure and

simple "one," no "one" in which "properly existing" existence [l'ex

istant"proprement existant"] is , from the start, purely and simply

imme rsed. "People " clearly designates the mode of "one" by whic h

"I " remove myself , to the poi nt of appea ring to forget or neglect

the fact that I my sel f am par t of "pe ople ." In a ny case, this setti ng

apart [mise l'cart] does not occur without the recognition of

identity. "People" clearly states that we are all precisely people, that

is, indis t inc t ly pers ons, h um a ns , a l l o f a com m o n " k in d, " b ut of a

kind that has its existence only as numerous, dispersed, and inde

terminate in its generality. This existence can only be grasped in

th e paradoxical s im ultane ity of togethernes s ( anony m ou s , co n

fused, and indeed massive) and disseminated singularity (these or

those "people(s) ," or "a guy," "a girl ," "a kid") .

"People" are silhouettes that are both imprecise and singular-

ized, faint outlin es of voices, pattern s of com por tme nt, sketches

of af fects, not the anonym ous chatter of the "publ ic do ma in ." B ut

what is an affect, if not each ti me a sketch? A com po rt me nt , if not

each time a pattern? A voice, if not each time a faint outline? Wh at

is a s ingularity, if not each time its "own " clearin g, its "ow n" i m

m inence, th e im m i nenc e of a " propriety " or propriety i t s el f as im

m inence, a lw ay s touch ed upon, a lw ay s l igh t ly touch ed: reveal ing

itself beside, always beside. ("Beside himself" ["a ct de ses pom

pes " 10 ] , as the saying goes. The c ome dy of this expression is no ac

cident, and, whether it masks an anxiety or l iberates the laughter


15/118


of the ignora nt, it is always a matter of an escape, an evasion, a nd

an e mpt yin g out of what is closest, an oddi ty presented as the rule

itself.)

"I" take refuge in an exception or distinction when I say "peo

ple," but I also confer this distinction on each and every person,

although in just as obscure a way. This is undoubtedly why people

so often make the judgment "people are strange" or "people are in

cred ible. " It is not only, or even prim ari ly, a questi on of the ten

dency (however evident) to set up our own habitus as the norm. It

is necessary to uncove r a more pr im iti ve level of this partic ular judgm ent , one w h ere w h at is appreh ended is noth ing oth er th an

singularity as such. From faces to voices, gestures, attitudes, dress,

and conduct , w h atever th e " ty p ical" t ra i t s are , every one dis t in

guis h es h im s el f b y a sort of s udden and h e adlong pr ec ip i tat ion

where the strangeness of a s ingulari ty is concentrated. Wi th ou t this

prec ip itat ion th ere w ould b e, quite s im ply , no " s om eone." And

there would be no more interest or hospitality, desire or disgust, no

matter who or what it might be for.

"Someone" here is understood in the way a person might say

"it 's him all right" about a photo, expressing by this "all right" the

cover ing over of a gap, mak in g adequate what is inadequa te, capa

ble of relatin g only to the "insta ntaneo us" gra sping of an instan t

that is precisely its own gap. The photoI have in mind an every

day, banal photosimultaneously reveals s ingularity, banality, and

our curios i ty ab out one anoth er . T h e pr in cip le of indis cernab i l i ty

here becomes decisive. Not only are all people dif ferent but they

are also all dif ferent from one another. They do not dif fer from an

archetype or a generality. The typical traits (ethnic, cultural, social,

generational, and so forth), whose particular patterns constitute an

other level of s ingula rity, do not aboli sh singular dif ferences; in

stead, they bring them into relief . As for singular dif ferences, they

are not only " indiv idual ," b ut in f raindiv idual . I t is never th e cas e

that I have met Pierre or Marie per se, but I have met him or her in

such and such a "form," in such and such a "state," in such and

s uch a " m ood," and s o on.

Thi s very humb le layer of our everyday experience contains an

other rudimentary ontological attestation: what we receive (rather

than what we perceive) with singularities is the discreet passage of

other origins o f the world. What occurs there, what bends, leans,

twists, addresses, deniesfrom the newborn to the corpseis nei

ther primarily "someone close," nor an "other," nor a "stranger,"

nor "someone simi lar ." It is an ori gin ; it is an aff ir mati on of the

world, and we know that the world has no other origin than this

singular mult ipl ici ty of origin s. The worl d always appears [surgit]11

each time accord ing to a decided ly local turn [of events] . Its unity,

its uniq uenes s, and its totality consist in a co mb in ati on of thisreticulated multiplicity, which produces no result .

Without this attestation, there would be no f irst attestation of

existence as such, that is, of the nonessence and non-subsistence-by-

itself that is the basis of being-oneself . Th is is w hy the H eideg ger-

ian "one" is insuff icient as the i n i t i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g ofexistentielle

"everydayness." Heidegger confuses the everyday with the undif

ferentiated, the anonymous, and the statistical. These are no less

important, but they can only constitute themselves in relation to

the dif ferentiated singularity that the everyday already is by itself:

each day, each time, day to day. One cannot aff irm that the mean

ing of Be ing m ust express itself starti ng fro m everydayness an d

then begi n by neglecti ng the general dif ferent iation of the every

day, its constantly renewed rupture, its intimate discord, its poly-

mor phy and its polyphon y, its relief and its variety. A "day" is not

s im ply a unit f or coun t ing ; i t is th e tur nin g of th e w o rl d ea ch

time singular. An d days, indee d every day, could not be similar if

they were not f irst dif ferent, dif ference itself . Likewise "people," or

rather "peoples," given the irreducible strangeness that constitutes

them as such, are themselves prima ril y the exposin g of the singu

larity according to which existence exists , irreducibly and primar

i l y an d an expos it ion of s ingular i ty th at experience c la im s to

com mun icat e wi th, i n the sense of "to" and "alon g wi th ," the to

tality of beings. " Nat ure " is also "strange," and we exist there; we

exist in it in the mod e of a constantly renewed singula rity, whether

the singula rity of the diversi ty and dispa rity of our senses or that

of the disco nce rtin g profu sion of nature's species or its various


16/118


metamorphoses into "technology." Then again, we say "strange,"

"o d d ," "c u r io u s ," "d isc o n c ert in g " about all of being .

Them es o f "wo n d er" a n d t he "ma rv e l o f B e in g " a re suspec t i f

they refer to an ecstatic mysticism that pretends to escape the world.

Th e theme of scientific curi osity is n o less suspect if it boils d ow n

to a collector's preoccupation with rarit ies. In both cases, desire for

the exception presupposes disdain for the ordinary. Hegel was un

doubtedly the first to have this properly modern consciousness of

t he v io l en t pa ra d o x o f a t h i n k in g who se o w n v a l u e i s a s yet u n

heard of, and whose dom ai n is the grayness of the wo rld . Thi s or

d in a r y g rayn ess , t he in s ig n i f ic a n c e o f t he ev e ryd a y wh ic h t he

H eid eg g er ia n "o n e" s t i l l bea rs t he ma rk o fa ssu mes a n a bsen t ,

lost , or far away "grandeur. " Yet , truth can be no thi ng if not the

truth of being i n totality, that is, the totality of its "ordinarin ess,"

just as meaning can only be right at [ mme] existence and no

where else. The modern world asks that this truth be thought: that

me ani ng is right at. It is in the indefin ite plur ality of origins and

t he ir c o ex ist en c e . The "o rd in a ry" i s a l wa ys ex c ept io n a l , ho wev er

lit t le we understand its character as origin. What we receive most

c o m mu n a l l y a s "st ra n g e" i s t ha t the o rd in a r y i t se l f i s o r ig in a ry.

Wi th existence laid ope n in this way and the meani ng of the wo rld

being what it is, the exception is the rule. (Is this not the testimony

of the arts and literature? I s not the first and on ly pur pos e of thei r

strange existence the prese ntati on of this strangeness? Aft er all , in

the etymo logy of the word bizarre) 1 whether the word comes from

Basque or Ara bic , there is a sense of valor, com ma nd in g presence,and elegance.)

Gaining Access to the Origin

As a consequence, gaining access to the origin,1 3 en t er in g in t o

mea ning , comes dow n to exposing oneself to this tru th.

What this means is that we do not gain access to the origin: ac

cess is refused by the origin's conc eali ng itself in its mu ltip lic ity . We

do not gain access; that is, we do not penetrate the origin; we do

not identify with it . More precisely, we do not identify ourselves in

it or as it, but with it, in a sense that must be elucidated here and is

noth ing other than the mean ing of origi nary coexistence.

Th e alterity of the other is its being-o rigin . Conve rsely, the orig-

inarity of the origin is its being-other, but it is a being-o ther than

every being forand in crossing through [ travers] all being. Thus,

the originarity of the origin is not a property that would dist inguish

a being from all others, because this being would then have to be

som ethi ng other than itself in order to have its ori gin in its own

turn . Thi s is the most classic of God's aporias, an d the pr oof of his

nonexistence. In fact , this is the most immediate importance of

Kant 's destruction of the ontological argu ment, wh ic h can be de

ciphe red in a quas i-l ite ral ma nner ; the necessity of existence is

given right at the existing of all existences [l'exister de tout l'exis

tant], in its very diversity and contingency. In no way does this

constitute a supplementary Being. The world has no supplement. It

is supp lemen ted in itself and, as such, is indefinite ly supp leme nted

by the origin.

Th is fol low s as an essential consequence: the being-other of the

orig in is not the alterity of an "oth er-th an-th e-w orld. " It is not a

question of an Othe r (the inevitab ly "capital ized Othe r" ) 1 4 than the

world ; it is a ques t ion of the alterity or alterat ion of t he wo r l d . I n

other words, it is not a ques tio n of an aliudor an alius, or an

alienus, or an other in general as the essential stranger who is op

posed to what is proper, but of an alter, that is, "one of the two."

This "other," this "lowercase other," is "one" among many insofar

as they are ma ny ; it is each one, an d it iseach time one, one among

them, one among all and one among us all. In the same way, and

reciprocally, "we" is always inevitab ly "us al l , " where no one of us

can be "a ll " and each on e of us is, in tu rn (wh ere all our turns are

simultaneous as well as successive, in every sense), the other origin

of the same wor ld.

Th e "o u ts id e" o f t he o r ig in i s " i n s id e" i n a n in s id e mo re in t e

rior than the extreme interior, that is, more interior than the inti

macy of the worl d and the int im acy that belongs to each "me." If

int im acy must be defined as the extremity of coinciden ce with one

self, then what exceeds int imacy in inferiority is the distancing of


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coin cide nce itself . It is a coexistence of the origi n "i n" itself , a co

existence of orig ins; it is no accide nt that we use the wor d "i nt i

macy" to designate a relation between several people more often

than a relation to oneself . Our being-with, as a being-many, is not

at all accidental, and it is in no way the secondary and random dis

persio n of a prim ord ial essence. It forms the proper an d necessary

status and c onsistency of orig inar y alterity as such. The plurality o f

beings i s at the foundation [fondment] of Being.

A single being is a contradiction in terms. Such a being, which

w ould b e i t s ow n f oundat ion, or ig in , and int im acy , w ould b e incapable of Being, in every sense that this expression can have here.

"Being" is neither a state nor a quality, but rather the action ac

cordin g to w h ich w h at Ka nt cal ls " th e [ m ere] pos it in g of a th i ng " 1 5

takes place ("is") . The very simplicity of "position" implies no more,

although no less, than its being discrete, in the mathematical sense,

or i t s d is t inct ion from, in the sense ofwith, other (at least possible)

positions, or its distinction among, in the sense ofbetween, other

positions. In other words, every position is also dis-position, and,

consi der ing the appea ring that takes the place of and takes place in

the position, all appearance is co-appearance [com-parution]. T h i s

is why the mean ing of Bei ng is given as existence, being-in-oneself-

outside-oneself , which w e m ake expl ic i t , w e " h um ans ," b ut w h ich

we make explicit , as I have said, for the total ity of beings.

I f th e or ig in is i rred ucib ly p lur al , i f i t i s th e indef in ite ly unf ol d

ing and var ious ly m ult ip l ied in t im ac y of th e w or ld, th en not gaining access to the origin takes on another meaning. Its negativity is

neither that of the abyss, nor of the for bid den , no r of the veiled or

the conceal ed, nor of the secret, nor that of the unpresen table. It

need not operate, then, in the dialectical mode where the subject

must reta in in itse lf its own n egation (since it is the negation of its

own origin). Nor does it have to operate in a mystical mode, which

is the reverse of the dialec tical m ode , where the subject mus t rejoice

in its negation . In bot h of these, negati vity is give n as the aliud,

where alien ation i s the process that must be reversed in terms of a

reapprop riat ion. A l l f orm s of th e " capita l ized Oth e r" pres um e th is

alienation from the proper as their own; this is exactly what con

stitutes the "capi taliza tion" of the "Othe r," its unif ie d and br oke n

transcendence. But, in this way, all forms of the capitalized "O the r"

represent precisely the exalted and overexalted mode of the propri

ety of what is prop er, w hi ch persists an d consists in the "some

where" of a "nowher e" an d in the "someti me" o f a "no time ," that

is, in the punctum aeternum outside the world.

Th e outside is insi de; i t is the spaci ng of the dis-p osit ion of the

world; it is our disposition and our co-appearance. Its "negativity"

ch anges m eaning; i t is not converted into pos it iv i ty , b ut ins tead

corres ponds to the m o de of Being w h i ch is th at of d is pos it ion/ co -appearance and w h ich , s t r ic t ly s peaking, is neith er negat ive nor

pos it ive , b ut ins tead th e m ode of b eing- togeth e r or b ein g- with.

T h e or ig in is togeth er w ith oth er or ig ins , or ig inal ly d iv ided. As a

matt er of fact, we do have access to it. W e have access exactly in

the mode of hav ing access; we get there; we are on the br ink , clos

est, at the threshold; we touch th e or i g i n . " ( T ruly ) w e h ave access

(to the truth). . . . " , 6 [" la vrit, nous accdons . . . "] is Ba

tai l les ph ras e, 17 the ambi gui ty of wh ic h I repeat even thou gh I use

it in another way ( in Bata ille, it precedes the aff irm ation of an i m

mediate loss of access) . Pe rhaps ever ythin g happens betw een loss

and appropriat ion: neith er one nor th e oth er , nor one and th e

other, nor one in the other, but much more strangely than that,

m uch m ore s im ply .

" T o reach 18 [toucher] the end" is again to risk missing it , because

the orig in is not an end. E n d, l ike Pr inci ple , is a form of the Other.To reach the origin is not to miss it ; it is to be properly exposed to

it . Since it is not another thing (an aliud), th e or ig in is neith er

"missable" nor appropriable (penetrable, absorbable) . It does not

obey this logic. It is the plural s ingularity of the Being of being. We

reach it to the extent that we are in touch with ourselves and in

touch w ith the rest of beings. We are in touc h wit h ourselves inso

far as we exist. Be ing in to uch wi th ourselves is what makes us "us,"

and there is no other secret to discover buried behind this very

touch ing , b e h ind th e " w it h " of coexis tence.

We have access to the tru th of the ori gi n as ma ny tim es as we are

in one ano ther's presenc e an d in the presen ce of the rest of bein gs.

,


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'4 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 15

Access is "com ing to presence," but presence itself is dis-pos ition ,

the spacing of s ingu larit ies. Presence is nowhe re other than in

"coming to presence." We do not have access to a thing or a state,

but only to a coming. We have access to an access.

"Strangeness" refers to the fact that each singularity is another

access to the world. At the point where we would expect "some

thing," a substance or a procedure, a principle or an end, a s ignif i

catio n, there is noth ing but the mann er, the tur n of the other ac

cess, wh ic h conceals itsel f in the very gesture wher ein it offers itself

t o u s a n d w h os e c o nc e a l i n g is the turning itself . In the singularity that he exposes, each child that is born has already concealed

the access that he is "for himself" and in which he will conceal

himself "within himself ," just as he will one day hide under the f i

nal ex pressi on of a dead face. Thi s is why we scruti nize these faces

with such curiosity, in search of identif i cation, l ooki ng to see wh om

the chil d looks like, and to see if death looks like itself . Wh at we

are looking for there, l ike in the photographs, is not an image; it is

an access.

Is this not what interests us or touches us in "literature" and in

"the arts"? W ha t else interests us about the dis jun cti on of the arts

among themselves, by which they are what they are as arts: plural

singulars? W ha t else are they but the expo siti on of an access co n

cealed in its own opening, an access that is , then, "inimitable," un-

trans portab le , untrans latab le because it forms, each time, an ab

solute point of translation , transm ission, or transi tion of the origininto origin. What counts in art, what makes art art (and what

makes hu man s the artists of the worl d, that is , those wh o expose

the world for the world), is neither the "beautiful" nor the "sub

l im e" ; i t is neith er " purpos ivenes s w ith out a purpos e" nor th e

"jud gme nt of taste"; it is neither "sensible manifest ation" nor the

"pu ttin g into wor k of tru th. " Undo ubte dly, it is all that, but in an

other way: it is access to the scattered origin in its very scattering; it

is the plur al tou chin g of the singular ori gin . This is what "the im i

tati on of natu re" has always meant. A rt always has to do wit h cos

mogony, but it exposes cosmogony for what it is : necessarily plural,

dif fracted, discreet, a to uch of color or tone, an agile tu rn of phrase

or folded mass, a radiance, a scent, a song, or a suspended move

men t, exac tly because it is the birt h of a world(and not the con

stru ctio n of a system). A wo rl d is always as many worl ds as it takes

to m ake a w orld.

We only have access to ourselvesand to the world. It is only

ever a ques tio n of the foll ow in g: f ull access is there, access to the

whole of the orig in. Thi s is called "f initude " in Heideg gerian te rmi

nology. But it has become clear since then that "finitude" signifies

the inf inite s ing ularity of mea ning , the in f inite s ing ularity of access

to t ruth . F in itude is the origi n; that is , it is an inf in ity of origin s." Origin" does not s igni f y th at f rom w h ich th e w orld com es , b ut

rather the com in g of each presence of the wo rl d, each t ime singu lar.

The Creation o f the Wo rl d and Curiosit y

The conc ept of the "creation of the wor ld " 1 9 represents the origin

as originarily shared, spaced between us and between all beings.

This, i n turn , contributes to ren dering the concept of the "author"

of the wo rld u ntenable. In fact, one could show ho w the moti f of

creation i s one of those that leads dir ectl y to the death of G o d un

derstood as author, f irst cause, and supreme being. Furthermore, if

one looks at metaphysics carefully, there is not a Go d who sim ply

and easily conform s to the idea of a producer. W het her in Au gus

tine, Aquinas, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, or Leibniz, one al

ways finds that the theme of creat ion is burd ene d wit h and mi srep resented as a probl em of pr odu cti on, ri ght up until the decisive

moment of the ontological argument's downfall . (Hegel's restoration

of the argument, the one to whi ch Sc helling assigned signif icant im

portance, is no thin g but an ela boration of the concept of creation.)

The dist incti ve characteri stic of the concept of crea tion is not

that it posits a creator, but that, on the contrary, it renders the "cre

ator" indistinct from its "creation." (It has to be said, here, in a gen

eral way, that the distinctive chara cteristic of Weste rn mon othe ism

is not the pos iti ng of a single god , but rather the effacin g of the di

vine as such in the transcendence of the wo rld . W it h respect to the

question of ori gin , this is surely the precise poin t at whi ch the lin k


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i 6 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 17

is forged that makes us unfail in gly Jew-G reek in every respect. An d ,

with respect to the question of dest in ation, this is the point fro m

which we are sent into the "global" space as such.20 ) I n myt ho l o g i

cal cosmogonies, a god or demiurge makes a world start ing from a

situation that is already there, whatever this situation may be. 21 In

creation, however, it is the being-already-there of the already-there

that is of con cer n. In fact, if crea tion is ex nihilo, this does not sig

nify that a creator operates "start ing from nothing." As a rich and

complex tradit ion demonstrates, this fact instead signifies two

things: on the one hand, it signifies that the "creator" itself is thenihil', on the other, it signifies that this nihilis not , logical ly speak

in g , so met hin g " fro m whic h" ["d 'o "] wha t i s c rea t ed wo u l d c o me

[provenir], but the very origin [provenance], and destination, of

some thi ng in general and of everything. No t only is the nihiln o t h

ing prior but there is also no longer a "nothing" that preexists cre

ation ; it is the act of app earin g [surgissement], i t i s t he v ery o r ig in

insofar as this is understood only as what is designated by the verb

"to originate." If the nothin g is not anything prior, th en only the ex

re ma in s i f o n e c an t a l k a bo u t i t l ik e t h i s t o q u a l i fy c rea t io n - in

a c t io n , t ha t is, the a ppea r in g or a rr iv a l [venue] in nothing (in the

sense that we talk about someone appearing "in person").

Th e nothin g, then, is no thin g other than the dis-p osit ion of the

appearing. The origin is a distancing. It is a distancing that imme

diately has the mag nitu de of all space-time an d is also not hin g other

than the interst ice of the int i ma cy of the world : the among-being[l 'entre-tant] of al l beings. Thi s among -bei ng itself is not hin g but

[a] being, and has no other consistency, movement, or configura

t ion th an that of the being-a-being [l'etre-tant] of al l beings. Be ing,

or the am ong , shares the singula rit ies of al l appearings. C rea tio n

takes place everywhere and alwaysbut it is this unique event, or

advent, onl y on the condi tion of bei ng each time wha t it is, or being

what it is only "at each t ime," each t ime appearing singularly.

On e can understa nd how the creation, as it appears in any Jew ish-

Chr ist ia n -I s l a mic t heo l o g ic o -myst ic c o n f ig u ra t io n , t est i f ies l ess

(a n d c er t a in l y n ev er ex c lu s iv e l y) t o a pro d u c t iv e p o wer o f G o d

than to his goodness and glory. In relat ion to such power, then,

creatures are onl y effects, whi le the love and glo ry of G o d are de

posited right at [ mme] the level of wh at is created ; that is, crea

tures are the very bril l iance [clat]11 of God's c om in g to presence.

It is necessary, then, to u nder stan d the theme of the "ima ge of

Go d" a nd/or the "trace of G od " not acco rding to the logic of a sec

o n d a ry imit a t io n , bu t a c c o rd in g t o t h is o t her l o g ic where "G o d " i s

itself the singular appearance of the image or trace, or the disposi

t ion of its exposi t ion: place as divine place, the divine as strict ly lo

cal. As a consequence, this is no longer "divine," but is the dis

l o c a t io n a n d d is-p o si t io n o f the wo r l d (wha t Spin o z a c a l ls " t hedivine extension") as that opening and possibil ity [ressource] w h i c h

comes from further away and goes farther, infinitely farther, than

any god.

If "creation" is i ndeed this singu lar ex-posi t ion of bein g, then its

real name is existence. Existence is creation, our creation; it is the

beginning and end that tware. This is the thought that is the most

necessary for us to think. If we do not succeed in thin ki ng it , th en

we will never gain access to who we are, we who are no more than

u s in a wo r l d , whi c h i s i t se lf n o mo re t ha n the wo r l d b u t we wh o

have reached this point precisely because we have thought logos (the

self-presentation of presence) as creation (as singular com ing ).

This t h in k in g i s in n o wa y a n t hro po c en t r ic ; i t d o es n o t pu t hu

man ity at the center of "cre ation "; on the contrary , it transgresses

[traverse] humanity in the excess of the appearing that appears on

the scale of the tota lity of bei ng, but w hi ch also app ears as that excess [dmesure] which is impossible to totalize. It is being's infinite

original singularity. In humanity, or rather right at [ mme] h u

manity, existence is exposed and exposing. The simplest way to put

this into language would be to say that humanity speaks existence,

but what speaks thro ugh its speech says the who le of being . W ha t

Heidegger cal ls "the ontico-ontological privilege" of Dasein is nei

ther its prerogative nor its privilege [apanage]: it gets Being on its

way [//engage l'tre], but the Being ofDasein is nothing other than

the Bein g of being .

If existence is exposed as such by hu ma ns, wh at is exposed there

also holds for the rest of being s. The re is n ot, on the one sid e, an


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originary singularity and then, on the other, a simple being-there of

things, more or less given for our use. On the contrary, in exposing

itself as singularity , existence exposes the singula rity of Bei ng as s uch

in al l being . Th e difference between hum ani ty and the rest of be

ing ( whi ch is not a concer n to be deni ed, b ut the nature of wh ich is,

nevertheless, not a given), wh ile itself being inseparable fr om other

differences within being (since man is "also" animal, "also" l iv ing,

"also" physio-chemical), does not dist inguish true existence from a

sort of subexistence. Instead, this difference forms the concrete con

dit i on of singularity. We wo uld n ot be "hum ans" if there were not

"dogs" an d "stones." A stone is the exteriority of singu larity in w hat

would have to be cal led its mineral or mechanical actuality [litter-

alit}. But I wou ld no longer be a "h um an" if I di d not have this

exteriority "i n me, " in the form of the quasi-mi nerality of bone: I

woul d no longer be a hu ma n if I were not a body, a spaci ng of all

other bodies and a sp acing of "me" in "m e." A singularity is always

a body, and all bodies are singularities (the bodies, their states, their

movements, their transformations).

Existence, therefore, is not a property of Dasein; it is the origi

n a l s in g u l a r i t y o f B e in g , whi c h Dasein exposes for al l being. This

is why hu ma n it y i s n o t " in t he wo r l d " a s i t wo u l d be in a mi l ieu

(why would the milieu be necessary?); it is in the world insofar as

the wo rl d is its ow n exteriority, the pro per space of its being- out-

in-the-world. But it is necessary to go farther than this in order to

avoid giving the impression that the world, despite everything, re

main s essential ly "the wo rl d of hum ans ." It is not so muc h the

world of hum anity as it is the wor ld of the nonhum an to whi ch hu

ma n it y i s ex po sed a n d whic h hu ma n it y , in t u rn , ex po ses . O n e

could try to formulate it in the fol lowing way: humanity is the ex

posing of the w orld; it is neither the end nor the ground of the world;

the world is the exposure of humanity; it is neither the environment

nor the representation of humanity.

Therefo re, howev er far hu ma nit y is fro m bein g the end of na

ture or nature the end of hum ani ty (we have already tried al l the

variat ions of this formul a), the end is always bei ng-i n-th e-w orld

and the being -wor ld of al l being.


Even supposing one st il l wished to take the world as the repre

sentation of human ity, this woul d not necessarily imp ly a solipsism

of hu ma nit y: because, if that is the case, then it is the representa

tion itse lf that instructs me abou t what it necessarily represents to

me, an irrefutable exteriority as my exteriority. The representation

of a spacin g is i tself a spaci ng. An intuitus originarius, w h i c h w o u l d

not be a representation but rather an immersion in the thing-itself,

would exist alone and wo uld be for itself the origin an d the thing:

this was shown above to be contradictory. Descartes him sel f test i

fies to the exterio rity of the wor ld as the exter iority of his body. Because he hardly doubts his body, he m akes a fict ion of dou bti ng it ,

and this pretension as such attests to the truth of res extensa. It is

also not surp risi ng that for Descartes the reality of this wor ld,

about wh ich G od coul d not deceive me, is mai ntain ed in Being by

the continuous creation on the part of this very God. Reality is al

ways in each instant, from place to place, each time in turn, which

is exactly how the reality ofres cogitans attests to itself in each "ego

sum, " whi ch is each t im e the "I am" of each one in turn [chaque

fois de chacun son tour].

Once again, this is the way in which there is no Other. "Cre

ation" signifies precisely that there is no Other and that the "there

is" is not an Other. Being is not the Other, but the origin is the

punct ual and discrete spacing between us, as between us and the rest

of the world, asbetween all beings.25

We find this alterity primarily and essential ly intriguing. It in

trigues us because it exposes the always-other origin, always inap

propriate and always there, each and every t ime present as inim

itable. This is why we are primarily and essential ly curious a bo u t

the world and about ourselves (where "the world" is the generic

name of the object of this ontolog ical curiosity ). Th e correlate of

creation, understood as existence itself, is a curiosity that must be

understood in a completely different sense than the one given by

Heidegger. For h im , curiosity is the frantic act ivity of passing from

being to being in an insa tiable sort of way, wi tho ut ever bei ng able

to stop and think. Without a doubt, this does test ify to being-with-

one-another, but it testifies to it without being able to gain access to


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2 0 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 21

the existent opening that characterizes Dasein in th e " ins tant ." 2 4 It

is necessary, then , to disconn ect the most pri miti ve layer of curio s

ity, the level on which we are primarily interested by what is inter

esting par excellence (the origin), from this inconsistent curiosity

an d also from the attent ion that takes care of others (Fiirsorge). At

this level, we are interested in the sense of bein g intri gue d by the

ever-re newed a lterity of the orig in a nd , if I ma y say so, in the sense

of havi ng an affair wi th it . (It is no accident that sexual curio sity is

an exem plary f igure of curiosi ty and is , in fact, more than just a f ig

ure of it.)

As English [and French] allows us to say, other beings are curious

(o r bizarre) to me because they give me access to the origin; they

allow me to touch it; they leave me before it, leave me before its

turning, which is concealed each time. Whether an other is another

person, animal, plant, or star, it is above all the glaring presence of

a place and m om ent of absolute origi n, irrefutable, offered as such

and va nish ing in its passing. This occurs in the face of a new born

child, a face encountered by chance on the street, an insect, a shark,

a pebble . . . but if one really wants to und ersta nd it , it is not a

matter of ma kin g all these curious presences equal.

If we do not have access to the other in the mo de just descri bed ,

but seek to appropriate the originwhich is something we always

do th en this same curiosity transforms itself into appropriative or

destructive rage. We no long er look for a s ingula rity of the orig in

in the other; we look for the unique and exclusive origin, in order to

either adopt it or reject it . The other becomes the Other according

to the mod e of desire or hatred. Ma ki ng the other divine (together

with our voluntary servitude) or making it evil ( together with its

exclu sion or extermin ation) is that part of curio sity no longer in

terested in dis-position and co-appearance, but rather has become

the desire for the Position itself. This desire is the desire to fix the

or i g i n , or to give the origin to itself, once and for all , and i n one place

for all, that is, always outside the world. This is why such desire is a

desire for murder, and not only murder but also for an increase of

cruelty and horror, which is l ike the tendency toward the intensif i

cation of murd er; it is mutila tion , carvin g up, relentlessness, metic

ulous exe cut ion , the joy of agony. O r it is the massacre, the mass

grave, massive and te chnologic al execu tion, the boo kkee ping of the

camps. It is always a matter of expe ditin g the transforma tion of the

other into the Other or making the Other appear in the place of

the other, and, therefore, a matter of iden tifyi ng the Oth er and the

origin itself.

The O the r is nothi ng more tha n a correlate of this mad desire,

but others, in fact, are our originary interests. It is true, however, that

the possibility of this mad desire is conta ined in the very dispo si

tion of orig ina ry interests: the dissem inat ion of the origi n upsets[affole] the origin in "me" to exactly the same extent that it makes

me curious about it, makes "me" a "me" (or a "subject," someone

in any case). (It follows, then, that no ethics would be independent

from an ontology. Only ontology, in fact, may be ethical in a con

sistent manner. It will be necessary to return to this elsewhere.)

Between Us: First Philosophy

When addressing the fact that philosophy is contemporaneous

with the Gree k city, one ends up losi ng sight of what is in que s

t ion and r igh t ly s o . As is only f i t t ing, h ow ever , los ing s igh t of

what is in question returns us to the problem in all its acuity after

these twenty-eight centuries.

It returns us to the qu estion of the origi n of our history. Ther e is

no sense of reconstituting a teleology here, and it is not a matter of

retracing a process directed toward an end. To the contrary, history

clearly appears here as the movement sparked by a singular cir

cumstance, a movement that does not reabsorb this s ingularity in

a universality (or "universal history," as Marx and Nietzsche under

stood it) , bu t instead ref lects the impac t of this s ingula rity in re

newed singular events. Thus, we have a "future" [avenir] and a "to

com e" [ venir]; we have this "future" as a "past," which is not past

in the sense of bein g the starting po int of a directed process, but

past in the sense of bei ng a "curios ity" ["bizarrerie"] (the "Gre ek

miracle") that is itself int rig ui ng and, as such, rema ins stil l "to

come." Th is dis-po sition of history indee d makes there be a h is tory


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2 2 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 2 3

and not a processus (here as elsewhere, the Hegelian model reveals

itself as un coverin g the truth by way of its exact opposite). O ne can

unders tand, then, Heidegger's "history of Bei ng, " and understand

that our relati on to this h istor y is necessarily that of its Destruktion,

or deconstruction . In other words, it is a matter of brin ging to l igh t

this history's singulari ty as the disassem bling law of its unity an d

under stand ing that this law itself is the law of mea ning .

This clearly supposes that such a task is as demanding and ur

gent as it is impossible to measure. The task is to understand how

h i s t o r y a s a s i n g u l a r , W e s t e r n a c c i d e n t " b e c a m e " w h a t o n emig ht c a l l "g l o ba l " o r "pl a n et a ry" wi t ho u t , a t t he sa me t ime, en

gend ering itself as "unive rsal ." C onseq uently , it is the task of un

d erst a n d in g ho w t he West d isa ppea red , n o t by rec i t in g t he fo r

mu l a s o f i t s g en era liz ed u n i fo r mit y , bu t by u n d erst a n d in g t he

expansion, by and through this "uni form ity," of a plur al singularity

that is and is not , at the same t ime, "proper" to this "o/accident."

An d o n e mu st u n d erst a n d t ha t t h is fo rmid a bl e q u est io n i s n o n e

other than the questi on of "ca pita l" (or of "cap ital is m") . If one

wa n t s t o g iv e a fu l l a c c o u n t o f "c a p i t a l "s t a r t i n g fro m t he v ery

first mome nts of history that began in the merchant cit ie s the n it

is necessary to remove it , far more radically than Marx could have,

fro m i t s o wn represen t a t io n in l in ea r a n d c u mu l a t iv e h ist o ry , as

well as fro m the representation of a teleological history of its over

c o m i n g o r r e j e c t i o n . T h i s w o u l d a p p e a r t o b e t h e p r o b l e m a t i c

lesson of history. Bu t we cann ot under stan d this task unless we first

understand what is most at stake in our history, that is, what is

most at stake in philosophy.

Ac c o rd i n g t o d i f feren t vers ion s , bu t in a pr ed o min a n t l y u n i f o rm

ma n n er , t he t ra d i t io n pu t fo rwa rd a represen t a t io n a c c o rd in g t o

whic h ph i l o so p hy a n d t he c i t y wo u l d be ( wo u l d ha v e been, mu st

have been) related to one another as subjects. Accordingly, philos

ophy, as the art iculat ion of logos, is the subjec t of the city, w here

the city is the space of this art icul at ion . Li kew ise, the city, as the

gathering of the logikoi, is the subject of philo soph y, where ph ilos

o ph y i s t he pro d u c t io n o f t he ir c o mm o n logos. Logos itself, then,

contains the essence or mea nin g of this recipro city: it is the com

mo n fo u n d a t io n o f c o mm u n it y , where c o mm u n it y , in t u rn , i s t he

fo u n d a t io n o f B e in g .

It is within this uniform horizon, according to different versions

(whether strong or weak, hap py or unhap py) of this pred omi nan t

mode of inqu iry, that we st il l understand the famous "pol it ica l an

i m a l " of Ari stot le: it is to pres ume that logos i s t he c o n d i t io n o f

c o mmu n it y , w hic h, in t u rn , i s t he c o n d i t io n o f hu ma n it y; a n d /o r i t

is to presume that each of these three terms draws its u nit y and

consistency from [its sharing] a com mu nica tion of essence wi th the

other two (where the world as such remains relat ively exterior tothe whole affair, presuming that nature or physis accomplishes itself

in humanity understood as logos politikos, whereas technsubordi

nates itself to both).

B u t t h is ho r i z o n t ha t o f po l i t i c a l phi l o s o phy in t he fu l l est

sense (not as the "ph iloso phy of poli t ics," b ut philo sop hy as po li

t i c s)mig ht v ery wel l be wha t po in t s t o t he s in g u l a r s i t u a t io n

where our history gets under way and, at the same time, blocks ac

cess to this situation. Or instead, this horizon might be that which,

in the course of its history, gives an ind ica t ion of its ow n dec on

struction and exposes this situation anew in another way. 25 " P h i

losophy and polit ics" is the exposit ion [nonc] of this situation.

But it is a disjunc tive expos it ion, because the situation itself is dis

ju n c t iv e . The c i t y i s n o t pr ima r i l y "c o mmu n it y , " a n y mo re t ha n i t

is primarily "public space." The city is at least as much the bringing

t o l ig ht o f be in g - in -c o m mo n as the dis-position (dispersal and dis

parity) of the comm un ity represented as foun ded in interio riry or

t ra n sc en d en c e . I t i s "c o mmu n it y" wi t ho u t c o mmo n o r ig in . Tha t

being the case, and as long as philosophy is an appeal to the origin,

the city, far from being philosophy's subject or space, is its prob

lem. Or else, it is its subject or space in the mod e of bei ng its pro b

lem, its aporia. Philosophy, for its part , can appeal to the origin

only on the condit ion of the dis-posit ion oflogos (that is, of the o r i

gin as just ified and set into discourse): logos is the spacing at the

very place of the orig in. C onseq uently , phil osop hy is the probl em

of the city; p hil oso phy covers over the subject that is expected as

" c o m m u n i t y . "


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2 4 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural *5

This i s why phi l o so phic a l po l i t i c s a n d po l i t i c a l phi l o so phy reg u

l a r l y ru n a g ro u n d o n t he essen ce o f c o m mu n it y o r c o m mu n it y a s

o r ig in . R o u ssea u a n d Ma rx a re ex empl a ry in t he ir s t ru g g l e wi t h

these obstacles. Rousse au revealed the aporia of a com mu ni ty that

wou ld have to precede itse lf in order to consti tute itself: in its very

concep t, the "social contr act" is the den ial or foreclosure of the orig-

i n a r y d i v i s i o n [dliaison] between those singularit ies that would

have to agree to the contr act and, thereby, "d raw it to a close." Al

though assuredly more radical in his demand for the dissolution of

polit ics in al l spheres of existence (which is the "realizat ion of ph ilosophy"), Marx ignores that the separation between singularit ies

overcome and suppressed in this way is not , in fact , an accidental

separation imposed by "polit ical" authority, but rather the consti

tut ive separation of dis-p osit ion . Ho wev er powerfu l it is for thi nk

in g t he "rea l re l a t io n " a n d wha t we c a l l t he " in d iv id u a l , " "c o mmu

nism" was st il l not able to think being-in-common as dist inct from

c o m m u n i t y .

In this sense, philosophical polit ics regularly proceeds according

to the surrep tit ious appeal to a metaphys ics of the one -or igi n,

where, at the same time, it nevertheless exposes, volens nolens, the

situatio n of the dis-po sit ion of origins. Oft en the result is that the

d is-po si t io n i s t u rn ed i n t o a ma t t er o f ex c l u s io n , in c l u d ed a s ex

clud ed, an d that al l philo sop hica l polit ics is a polit ic s of exclusiv

ity and the correlat ive ex clu si on o f a class, of an order, of a "c om

mu n it y" t he po in t o f whi c h i s t o en d u p wi t h a "peo pl e , " in t he"base" sense of the term . Th e dem and for equality, t hen , is the nec

essary, ult imate, and absolute gesture; in fact , it is almost indica

t ive of dis-p osit ion as such. Howe ver, as lon g as this continues to

be a matter of an "egalitarian dem and f ounde d upo n some generic

i d e n t i t y , " 26 eq u a l i t y w i l l never do justice [ne faitencorepas droit] to

singula rity or even recognize the considerable difficult ies of want

in g to do so. It is here that the criti que of abstract rights com es to

the fore. However, the "concrete" that must oppose such abstrac

t io n i s n o t ma d e u p pr im a r i l y o f empir ic a l d et ermin a t io n s , whic h ,

in the capital ist regime, exhaust even the most egalitarian wil l :

rather, concretehete. pri mar ily signifies the real object of a thin kin g

0 f be ing -in -co mm on, and this real object is, in tur n, the singula r

pl u ra l o f t he o r ig in , t he s in g u l a r pl u ra l o f t he o r ig in o f "c o m mu

nity" itself (if one st il l wants to cal l this "com mun ity" ). A ll of this is

undoubtedly what is indicated by the word that fol lows "equality"

in the French republican slogan: "fraternity" is supposed to be the

solution to equality (or to "equil iberty" ["galibert"]) 27 by evok

ing or invoking a "generic identity." What is lacking there is exact ly

t he c o mm o n o r ig in o f t he c o m mo n . 2 8

It is "lacki ng" insofar as one attempts to take account of it with in

t he ho r iz o n o f phi l o so p hic a l po l i t i c s . O n c e t h is ho r iz o n is d ec o n structed, however, the necessity of the plu ral sing ular of the orig in

comes into playand this is already under way. But I do not plan

to propose an "other polit ics" under this heading. I am no longer

sure that this term (or the term "polit ical philosophy") can con

t inue to have any consistency beyond this op eni ng up of the hori

zon whi ch come s to us bo th at the end of the long histor y of our

West ern s i t u a t io n and as the reop enin g of this situati on. I onl y

want to help to bring out that the combination philosophy-polit ics,

in al l the force of its being joined together, simultaneously exposes

and hides the dis-position of the origin and co-appearance, which is

its correlate.

The phi l o so phic o -po l i t i c a l ho r iz o n is wha t l in k s t he d is-po si t io n

to a contin uity and to a com mu ni ty of essence. In order to be ef

fect ive, such a relat ion requires an essential iz ing procedure: sacri

fice . If one look s carefully, one ca n fin d the place of sacrifice in a llpolit i cal phi loso ph y (or rather, one wi l l find the challenge of the

abstract, wh ich makes a sacrifice of concrete singularity). B ut as sin

gular origin, existence is unsacrificable. 29

In this respect , then, the urgent demand named above is not an

other politic al abstrac tion. Instea d, it is a recons idera tion of the very

mea n in g o f "po l i t i c s "a n d , t herefo re , o f "ph i l o s o ph y" in l ig ht o f

the origina ry situation: the bare exposit ion of singular origins. Th is

is the necessary "first ph ilo sop hy " (i n the canoni cal sense of the ex

pression). It is an ontology. Philosophy needs to recommence, to

restart itself from itself against itself, against polit ic al p hil oso phy

and philosophical polit ics. In order to do this, philosophy needs to


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2 6 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 2 7

think in principle about how we are "us" among us, that is, how the

consistency of our Being is in bei ng- in-c omm on, and how this con

sists precisely in the "i n " or in the "betw een" of its spac ing.

Th e last "first philo soph y," if one dare say any thin g about it , is

given to us in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. It is that which

has put us on the way [chemin] to where we are, together, whether

we know it or not. But it is also why its author was able to, in a sort

of retur n of Destruktion itself, com pro mi se himse lf, in an unpa r- i

d o n a bl e wa y, wi t h h is in v o l v emen t in a phi l o so phic a l po l i t i c s t ha t

became criminal. This very point , then, indicates to us that placefro m whic h f i rst phi l o so phy mu st rec o mmen c e: i t i s n ec essa ry t o

refigure fundamental ontology (as well as the existential analyt ic ,

the histor y of Bein g, and the th ink ing ofEreignis that goes along

with it) with a thorough resolve that starts f rom the plural singular

of origins, from being-with.

I wan t to return to the issue of "first philo sop hy" in order to push

it even further, but without claiming to be the one who can fully ac

complish such an undertaking. By definit ion and in essence, the

above "first philosophy" needs "to be made by al l , not by one," l ike

the poetry of Mal doror . Fo r the mom ent, I only want to indicate the

pri nci ple of its necessity. H eideg ger clearly states that bein g-w ith

#1 {Mitsein, Miteinandersein, and Mitdasein) is essential to the consti

tut ion of Dasein itself. Given this, it needs to be made absolutely

clear that Dasein, far from being either "man" or "subject ," is not

even an isolated and unique "one," but is instead always the one,each one, with one another [l'un-avec-l autre]. If this determinati on

is essential, then it needs to attain to the co-originary dimension and

expose it without reservation. But as it has often been said, despite

this affirm ative assertion of co-ori ginari ry, he gives up on the step to

the consideration ofDasein itself. It is appropriate, then, to examine

the possibil ity of an explicit an d endless exposit ion of co-origin arity

and the p ossibil ity of takin g account of what is at stake in the to

getherness of the ontolog ica l enterprise (and , in this way, tak ing ac

count of what is at stake in its polit ic al consequen ces.) 30

It is necessary to add here that there is a reason for this exami

nation which is far more profound than what first appears to be a

simple "readjustm ent" of the Heideg geri an discourse. Th e reason

obviously goes much farther than that, since at its fullest, it is about

nothing less than the possib il ity of speaking " ofDasein'' in general ,

or of saying "the exist ing" or "existence." Wh at wo ul d happe n to

philosop hy if speaking about Be ing in other ways than saying "we,"

"you," and "I" became excluded? Where is Being spoken, and who

speaks Being?

The reason that is foreshadowed has to do precisely with speak

in g (o f) B e i n g . The t hemes o f be in g -wit h a n d c o -o r ig in a r i t y n eed

to be renewed and need to "reinit ial ize" the existential analyt ic , exact ly because these are mean t to resp ond to the qu estio n of the

Being Singular Plural

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