NADER_The Harder Path-Shifting Gears
Transcript of NADER_The Harder Path-Shifting Gears
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Social Thought &Commentary: The Harder Path: Shifting GearsAuthor(s): Laura NaderSource: Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 771-791Published by: The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic ResearchStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150857 .
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SOCIAL
HOUGHT
COMMENTARY
h e
a r d e r
Path Shifting
e a r s
LauraNader
Universityf California, erkeley
Introduction
This
essay
deals
withold
science
practices
nd the
development
f innovative
practices
hat are a
mixture
f
theory,
research,
nd
practicality.
mericans
have an
extraordinary
ecord
n
starting
up
projects,
but
they
have trouble
shiftinggears.
Some
say
we havecreateda worldwhere
everything
hanges,
but
nothing
moves. Professional
mind-sets, rises,
ncremental
hange,
and
leapfrogging
re
part
of the
story.
So too is culture-science
culture,
political
cultureand the
production
f
knowledge.
In
a
book
about
he
biological
onstraintsn the human
pirit, nthropolo-
gist
MelKonner
1982:xii)
opened
withthe
following
bservation:
The
prob-
lem is not thatwe knowmore
about ess
and
ess.
The
problem
s
that
we
know
more
and more
about
more
and
more,
and
although
we
will
neverknow
very-
thing
about
everything
he time will come
when
we know o
much
aboutso
manyhings
hatno one
person
an
hope
o
grasp
ll
the
essential
acts...need-
ed to makea
single
wise decision.
Knowledge
ecomes ollective
n the
weak-
*An
earlierversion of
this
paper
was
presented
as the 6th Annual
Lecture
n
Energy
nd
the
Environment,
University
f
California,
Berkeley,
n
1998.
771
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The
Harder
ath-Shifting
Gears
est senseandsciencebecomes ikemenandwomen
n
a
crowd,
ooking
orone
another,
ach
holding
single
piece
of
a
veryexpensive
adio."
A. L.
Kroeber
aid much he sameabout
ust plain
people
n
1948
(p.291):
"As
he total
culture
s
thereby
ariedand
enriched,
t
also becomesmore
dif-
ficult
or each member f the
societyreally
o
participate
n most
of its
activ-
ities. He
begins
o be an
onlookerat most
of
it,
then a
by-stander,
nd
may
end
up
with indifferenceo the welfareof his
society
and
the
values
of his
culture.He alls
back
upon
he immediate
roblems
f his livelihood nd he
narrowingange
of
enjoyments
till
open
to
him,
because
he
senses hat his
society
and
his
culturehavebecome ndifferento
him."
SuchKroeberianbservationstem froman anthropologicalrameof ref-
erence hat reaches
deep
into the human
past
in
order o
comprehend
he
moment
n
which
we
live.
A
long
time
perspective
ncludes
recognition
f
cumulative
knowledge,knowledges
athered
n
real
life
conditions
Nader
1996).
As
others
have
noted,
he inventors f
myth
also
invented
fire,
and
the
meansof
keeping
t.
They
domesticated
nimals,
bred
new
types
of
plants,
kept
varieties
eparate
o an extentthat exceeds
what is
possible
n
today's
scientific
griculture.
hey
nventedrotation f
fields and
developed
an
art
now soughtafteron thewesternmarket.They rossed ceans nvesselsmore
seaworthy
han
modern
vessels
of
comparable
ize,
and demonstrated
sophisticated
knowledge
f
navigation.
Native
Americansmaintained
con-
tinuity
of
occupation
n
Californiand
Nevada or
over8000
years,
andas
my
colleague
Robert
Heizer
reminded
me,
no
complex
civilization an make
such
a
boast,
not
yet
anyways.
Anthropologists
ave
earned
hat
civilizationsre
fragile.
We
haveachieved
an
individualife
expectancy,
utsocial
ife
expectancy-that
s a
moreelusive
accomplishment.
nthropologists
nderstandhatcivilizationsiseand
collapse
which
ndicates
f
course hat sciences oo wax and
wane.
The
evolutionists
know
that in
the
history
f humanexistencewe are but a
tinyspeck
n
time.
However,
e also
live in an
era
in
which he
technological
apacity
o
obliter-
ate the whole chain
of
humanevolution
by
catastrophe
r
by
cumulative
action s a
possibility.
et,
f
we lookaround
s,
there
eems
o be little
urgency.
When
long
ime
perspective
s
absent,
humility
s often n short
upply.
The
capacity
of the
human
species
to
change
the entire
globe
in
irre-
versible
ways
was
limited
until
recently,
nd
decisions
mpacting
n
group
survivalmust have been shared for most of our existence. Weevolved and
survived as hunters
and
gatherers
for
some 1.5
million
years;
there's not
much
hierarchyamong
hunters and
gatherers.
Those
who
think
about this
772
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LAURA ADER
long
past
wonder,
will
civilizational
ociety
be able to
survive or 1.5 million
years?
Throughout
most of humanexistencewhen
people
made disastrous
environmental
ecisions he scaleof destructionwas
relatively
mall,
even
if
at times
overwhelming
or
individual
groups.
The future will
not be an
extrapolation
f the
past
because herehas been
a
qualitative
ransformation
of the humanworld.
Human
echnology
has movedat
breakneck
peed,
and
in modern ultures
people
do not
have
the
necessary
ultural
knowledge
o
routinelyparticipate
n
choosing technologies hough
they may
want to.
It
follows hat as a
species
we are
unprepared
o deal
with
events unrelated o
first-hand
xperience.
nsteadwe
depend
on
experts.
Thecultural imensionnthe fieldof anthropologyomplementsrecogni-
tion of the
global,
he unrestrictedime
perspective
nd
movesus to exam-
ine unexamined
ssumptions
f the
modern
period.
Along
with
othercritical
thinkers,
we
subject
o
inquiry
he dominant
hinking-that
large
scale
sys-
tem-centered
omplex
echnologies
are more
likely
o
spread
he
good
life
than small scale
man-centered
impler
echnologies.
Rooted
n
the belief
that
more
s
always
better ies a
system,
an
ideology,
n
expertise,
hubris,
perhaps,
hat needs
to be
subjected
o critical
nalysis,
ne that
needs
to be
recognizedsa controllingprocesshat normalizesuchbeliefs, eadingus to
accept
hem
as
natural.
This
paper
reflectson old concernsabout dilemmas
nherent
n
expert
knowledge
and
compartmentalization-dilemmas
hat
are
in
the
case
of
energy
associatedwith
stagnation
n
high
places,
unscientific ttitudes
n
sci-
entific
places,
insecuritieshat
produce
new and
powerful
Luddites
ho stick
to old
technologies
or fear of
displacement,
ith the
production
f indiffer-
ence
in
scientific
aboratories,
nd towardsworkon new
technologies
Braun
1995).
My
research eals with old science
practice
ndthe
development
f
new
practices
which
n
the
energy
ield s a
mix
of
theory,
esearch,
and
prac-
ticality,
what
French
nthropologist
ClaudeLevi-Straussn
anothercontext
describes s
"bricolage,"nlightened inkering
one
by
people
who can see
with
different
yes
and utilizewhatexists.
I
first
began
to
workon
energy
n
the mid-1970s s
part
of the National
Academy
f
SciencesCONAES
rojectNader 980).
I
founda
strange
ield,
one
characterized
y
innocenceand
ignorance,by
idealists
and
impresarios, y
pessimists
nd
optimists,
ysecrecy
nd
wild
predictions,
y
an ethicof waste
and
recklessness,
and across the
board
by
a truncated
time
perspective.
The
strangeness
was
undoubtedly
exacerbated
by my
being
the
only anthropolo-
gist
of the 300 or
so
participants,
as well
as
the
only
woman.
773
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The Harder
Path-Shifting
Gears
Also
n
the mid-1970s omeonesent me a
prepublicationopy
of
Amory
Lovins'samous
potboiler
ThePathNotTaken"
hat later
appeared
n
Foreign
Affairs
1976).
Lovins ontrasted oft
paths
and
hard
paths
n
energy
policy.
For Lovins he soft
energy
path
was one full
of alternative
possibilities
nd
central
among
them were renewable
nergy
sources.The soft
path
would
makeuse of the
potential
n
various olar
echnologies;
mall s beautiful
n
the soft
path.
Thehard
path
wouldbe a continuation
r elaboration f tech-
nologies
uch
as
nuclear,
which wouldbe
centralized,
uthoritarian,
ontrol-
ling
and not
friendly
o the democratic
process-such
distinctions
eing
ver-
sions of
LewisMumford's
1970)
earlier
dichotomy
between man-centered
andsystem-centeredechnologies.Lovinswas seen as an ecofreak, n ideal-
ist,
a tree
hugger,
r an
impractical
reamer aston the
calculator.
n
a
word,
"ThePathNotTaken" as
heresy.
At
the time
I
did not understand
hy
his
workcaused
controversy.
oran
anthropologist
t
was obvious hereweredifferent
possibilities.
t
was
equally
obvious hat
all
energy
choiceswouldbe linkedwith if
not determinativef
other
socio-political
hoices;
ifestyles
wasa favoredword.
learned ater hat
Margaret
Meadhad cautioned
youngAmory
never o use the word"soft"
f
you'retryingto persuadeAmericans o take seriouslya differentpath,
because
soft has feminine connotationswhile
hard s masculine nd indica-
tive of
powerfulpossibilities;
oft
paths...well,
"cavesand
candles." n
the
1970s
every
new alternativedeawas
dubbed"caves nd
candles,"
meaning
that
it
was backwards
hinking.
Experience
as to
prove
Margaret
Mead
correct.Soft
energy
paths
were
considered eminineand weak
by
leadingenergy
experts,
while hard
nergy
paths
with heir
accompanyingigh
risk
possibilities
ere
perceived
s intel-
lectually
challenging,
test of the mettleof scientificman.On
hindsight,my
advice to
Amory
Lovinswould have been of a
different ort than
Mead's,
although
t would not have
changed
he substanceof
his
argument.
The
harder
path
is the soft
path,
because t is
the
path
that
changes
he
status
quo.
It
requires
ew
institutions,
ew
technologies,
cience
statesmen ather
than technician
cientists,
nd
engineers
who
rememberhe first
principle
f
engineering-keep
it
simple. Creativity,
rive,
and a dramatic
ealignment
and
disaggregation
f scientists nd their
publics
re also
necessaryngredi-
ents for Lovins' arder r moredifficult
path.
The harder
path
is
what
I
wish to call attention to in what follows. I
chose
this
focus because over the
years
I
notice serious
students
anxiouslytrying
to
understand how
to
change
what does not
change.
I
also call attention to the
774
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LAURA
ADER
harder
path
because it
appears
that while Americans
have a clear and
extraordinary
ecord
n
starting arge-scale
rojects-witness
he Manhattan
Project-once
we have
started
up
we have trouble
shiftinggears.
We have
created,
as David Noble
(1977 xvii)
puts
it,
"a world
where
everything
changes,
yet nothing
moves."
Thereare also
interesting
nd
opposing
heoriesof
change
hat need to
be
addressed.There
are those who
argue
hat
change
n American ulture
only
accompanies
rises-like
war or
depression,
he Araboil
embargo
or some
sort of
catastrophe
ike
the Greenhouse ffect-while others
document he
incremental
processes
f
change
hat
transformed merican
ociety
roman
agriculturalo an industrializedociety Noble1977).Othermodelsof change
may
also need to
be examined-the
leapfrog pproach
a
term
I
believe irst
coined
by
Brazilian
hysicist
ose
Goldemburg)
hereby
hirdworldcountries
jump
the first
world nto new
technology
rather han
following
linearevo-
lutionarypath
of
wood,
coal
oil,
nuclear o the new
technologies,
or
the
absenceof
leapfrogging.
ndof
course,
haos
heory
has
generated
till
other
models.More bout
models ater.
First
Contact-Discovering
Science Practice
As I mentioned t the
outset,
in
the mid-1970s
nterdisciplinary
esearch n
energy
was often characterized
y
ignorance
and innocence.
I
myself
was
both innocent nd
ignorant,
nnocentof howso-calledhard cience
works n
practice,
and
ignorant
f
the relevant
workings
f
energy
echnologies,
heir
economic
justifications,
nd above all how an
anthropologist
might
con-
tributeto
"solving
he
energy
problem."
Permitme
a brief
reviewof
my
socializationnto the cultureof
energy
experts.
When
anthropologists
re in
strange
ands
and
amongst
people
whose cul-
tures
hey
do not
yet
understand
hey
often make
mistakes,
y
which
I
mean
they
violate ultural ules.Part f our
methodology
equires
hat
we review uch
mistakes
s
a
way
o
begin
o
profile
he cultureunder
tudy.
While
doing
he
energy
work
recorded
n
my
notebooknstances f suchrule
violation,
nd
my
responses.
Wordshat
frequently ppeared
n
my
journal
were
bizarre,
ut of
touch, mpervious
o
evidence,unscientific,rapped.
twasculture
hock.
I cameto realize
hat
energy
discourseswereoftenone of
"no
option."
The
inevitablity syndrome
I called it. Whatever
path
was
being
proposed
was a
"haveto
path."
For
example,
"we have to
push
nuclearbecause there are no
alternatives."Such a coercive frame was
limiting
to
say
the
least,
especially
775
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TheHarder
ath-Shifting
Gears
since
other
options
were
whatwas
being
examined.Methodwas also
part
of
the
problem.
For
example,
growth
models-that took for
granted ncreasing
percapita
nergy
onsumption-were
disabling
wheneconomists
even
Nobel
economists)
were
examining
ess is more
options.
Also
striking
was the
omnipresent
modelof
unilinear
evelopment
a concept
hat
anthropologists
had
left
in the dust
decades
earlier),
with
little
general
understanding
f
macro-processes.
or
example,
he
recognition
hat civilizations
risebut
that
they
also
collapse
was
missing
rom he
thinking
bout he
present.
Prevalent
was
the
nineteenth
entury
beliefthat
technological rogress
was
equivalent
to social
progress.
n
such
a
progressivistvolutionary
rame cience oo could
onlyriseand not fall orwane.Furthermore,he possibilityhatexpertsmight
be
part
of the
problem
was novel o the
expert
who
thought
hat
he
stood
out-
side of
the
problem.
The
idea that the
energyproblem
had humandimen-
sions,
that it was
a human
problem,
lowly
began
o sink
in,
although
uch
realizationwas
rarely
ttributedo socialsciencesources.
Many
f
my
com-
mentarieswere
adamantly
pposed
n those
years,
o
put
it
mildly.
Colleagues
rejected
he ideathat the science
bureaucraciesada
limiting
ffect
on defi-
nitions
and
solutions,
nd
also a
framing
ffect
on cultural utlook.This iew
wasadamantly pposedbydirectors t Lawrence ivermoreaboratory,ndby
those
who believe hat
science s
autonomous
nd culture ree.
In
his
thoughtful
book
on
the
SocialProduction
f Indifference
Michael
Herzfeld
1992)
xplores
he
symbolic
oots
of
Western
ureaucracy.
erzfeld
cautionsus not to dismiss
bureaucracyimply,
s inhumane r
inefficient,
s
did Weber nd Marx.
Lumping
ll bureaucracies
ogether
means
accepting
kindof
determinism.He
callsfor more
utopian
consideration-critical on-
siderations,
what he called a
"productive
iscomfort o the
certainties f
bureaucraticlassification." erzfeld nderstands
nly
oo well
that,
"thereal
danger
of indifferences not that it
grows
out
of the barrel f a
gun,
butthat
it too
easily
becomeshabitual.
ibid:184)."
It
was that
habituation
mongenergy
cientists hat
pushed
me
even
fur-
ther to
suggest
hat
Americancientistswere
not as free as
they
thought.
t
followedthat standardizationnd
conformity
were
incompatible
with
the
possibility
orexcellent
deas
n
science o
flourish.
The
most
shocking
ealiza-
tion
was that the most
conformist
f
these
energyexperts xhibitedprofiles
of
reckless
experimentation.
istanced s
they
were from the
social
fabric,
they
could
easily speak
of mass deaths in
percentages.
Their
utterances
of
disdain,
totally
unselfconscious
utterances,
were
indicatorsof the
prevalence
of
group
think,
and a
deep
disregard
or
human
life.
776
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8/16/2019 NADER_The Harder Path-Shifting Gears
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LAURA ADER
To
my
surprise,
fter he
publication
n
PhysicsToday
f
my
essay
"Barriers
to
Thinking
ew
About
Energy"
Nader 981),
an
avalanche
f
responses
rom
scientists nd
engineersworking
n
energy
questions greed
with
many
of
my
critical
bservations
nd
even
expanded
on them.
They
commentedon
cen-
sorship,
he
predominance
f
group
hink,
he
educational
rocess
n
science
that
does little o enhance
original hought
anda
great
deal
to
stop
t,
the
irra-
tionality
amongenergy
pecialists.They
oo noted
positions
hat were
value
laden, macho,
unimaginative,
elf-serving,
nd
unscientific. uchreflections
from
some of
the
leaders
n the
science
and
engineering
ields
argued
or
hope
and
for
disaggregation.
ot all scientistsand
engineers
were alike.
Therewerevarieties f them. Letme lista few:the scientistwho has retained
a
capacity
or
critical
hinking,
he technician cientistwho
does what
he
is
told without
thinking,
he
impresario,
he
lobbyist,
he
propagandist,
he
conformist,
he
creative
problem-solver.
he
standard
scientific
extbook
does
not
describe arieties.Onthe
contrary-the
ideal
science
performer
s
idealized,
ssentialized.
Of
course,
here
s
a
function,
o
making
ifferences
etween cientists
dis-
appear.
t
serves
o contrast cientistswith
non-scientists. he
light
and
the
darkof suchcontrast reprofiled egularlynthe pagesof Sciencemagazine,
thereby
ignoring
eriousdifferences f
opinionamong
scientists,
differences
which
may
be as
great
or
greater
hanthat between he
scientist
and
the
lay
person.
Chemists nd
physicists
avedifferent
profiles,
s
scientists;
nd each
of
them
from
the
biologists,
he
evolutionary
cientists,
etc.
The idea
that
there
is a standard
way
of
thinkingscientifically
as
been
questionedby
sci-
entists
hemselves.One
need
only
read Richard
eynman,
or
instance.
Yeta
recent
Science
ssay
(Augustine,998)
continues he
unenlightened
radition
of
essentializing
cienceto
expose
the
problems
cientistshave in
dealing
with
"ignorant"ay
people.
On
the other
hand,
such
formulation
uggests
that scientists re not that
different
rom
anybody
lse
in
that
they
observe,
make
decisions,
nd
ask
questions
on
the
basis
of cherishedvalues.
Although
had
not startedout to look
at science
practice,
hat
was
what I
was
doing.
The more
I
lookedat
science
practice
he
more it
becameclear
that differentactors
were
caught
n
differentnets.
First,
he
workplace
f sci-
entists-the
institutions nd
bureaucracies
hat hire
scientists nd
organize
science
work-seemed to
expect
creativity
ut
to
require
onformity,
tan-
dardized
hinking
and
compartmentalizedexpertise,
all within
a
well
defined
level of
permissible
dissent. Behavior s selected
for, learned,
structurally
and
culturally
transmitted.
Beyond
the
workplace
there are the
technological
777
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TheHarder
ath-Shifting
Gears
imperatives
hat
drive he
actors,
mperatives
hat are enmeshed
n
particu-
lar
echnologies.
A
physics
olleague
ecently
eferred o LosAlamos cientists
as
"high
price,high
tech,
not
good
at
practical
hings-shiny
and
high
ech"
he
repeated.
To understand
what
anthropologists
ould
contribute o
the
energy
debates
I
had to
understand
cience
practice.
This work has since
taken
anthropologists
ike Sharon
Traweek
1987)
and
Hugh
Gusterson
1996)
and
others into U.S.national
aboratories
o
study
he science
culture hat
C.P.
Snow
1964)
had
written
about
earlier
n
his
Two
Cultures ook.Suchwork
also involves
knowledge
f
science
networking
utside of
laboratories ith
industry ndgovernment gencies as in Schwartzn Nader1996); t exam-
ines the
symbolic mportance
f science
exhibits
denied or
modifiedat
the
Smithsonian
Vackimes
996),
and includes
nterviewing
nterested
parties,
e.g.
aboutradioactive asteon NativeAmericaneservations
Ou1996).
n
all
this
work there
seems to
be
a
disparity
etween he
ideal
scientific
method
and its use
in
ordinary
ife,
between he scientific
pirit
of
free
inquiry
nd
censorship.
he
deal
scientific
nterprise
hows
ess than
perfect ongruence
with
actual
practice
because
of
so
many
ntervening
ariables ike
funding
andbureaucraciesn bothcivilianandmilitaryontexts, r the needsof pri-
vate
industry.
Howelse can we
explain
he
diffusion f civiliannuclear ner-
gy
before
nergy
xperts
hadwritten ven
one
articleor
report
n decommis-
sioning
a nuclear
plant,
and
before
hey
knew
what
they
were
going
to do
with nuclearwastes?
Wehad
to know
all
of
this
if we
were
to
understand
why
so
many
energy
scientistswere
unable o
shift
gears,
o
even
imagine
new
technologies
ther
than the same
old ones
they
were
elaborating
nd
calling
"new."Was t
their
workplace,
asit the
laboratory
cience
culture,
wasit bureaucraticndiffer-
ence,
was
t
lack
of
imagination
r
creativity,
as
t
censorship,
as
t
the
gov-
ernment'swelfare
program
or
science,
or
all
of
these
things?
The
Energy
Decade-What
Happened?
The1970swas
he
energy
decade.Since
henand
even
with
he end
of
the Cold
War he issue s
once
again
nuclear
weapons
s
indicated
y
the
yearly
billion
dollar
budgets
argeted
or Livermore
nd
LosAlamos or
"new"
weapons.
n
the
Reagan,
Bush,
and Clinton
years
the focus has not been on nuclear
energy
but
on nuclear
weapons.
Under Clinton/Gore here
was not
one
major
talk
about civilian
energy
policies.
After
he
dissolution of
the
Soviet
Union
there
778
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LAURA ADER
was
a
possibility
hat
peacetime
onversion
might
alter the directionof the
national aboratories. here
was at least
alk that national aboratories
might
move
ahead
on
new
energy
research uch
as
solar,
hydrogen,
r
photovoltaic.
Alas,
the
laboratory
eadership
ouldnot
shift
gears,
and
although
herewere
some innovators
aliantly
working
or
conversion nside the national
abs,
peacetime
onversion
ailed,
and we
were back o
business s usual.
Philosopher
f sciencePaul
Feyerabend,
imself
rained
n
physics,
pub-
lishedan irreverent ook
n
1978 n which
he asked
"What'so
great
aboutsci-
ence?"He asked
this
question
o
point
out that
today
sciencestands
unop-
posed,
and
for
Feyerabend
hat
is
one of the
problems.
n
the 19th
century
therewerefiercedebates about he worthof sciencebetweenproponents f
religion
nd
proponents
f
science,
but in the
20th
century, articularly
n
the
latter
part
of the
century,
o
criticize cientific
practice xposes
one
to
Gross
and Levitt
1990)
ype
silencing
ccusations. here
s a
difference etweenanti-
science
positions
nd
anti-bad
cience and
technology ritiques.
Public
opin-
ion on scienceas
if
people
mattered,
r an
interest
n
howscience s
practiced
is
necessary
or the nourishment
f an
unopposed
cience.
Physicians,
ike
John
Gofman
who is
also a
physicist,
ave
spoken
out
against
he
"expose
he
people irst, earn heeffects ater"yndrome.Gofmanwasthought o be an
extremist
y
some,
while
public
utterancesike
Sigvard
Eklund ho
was
gen-
eral director f
the
International tomic
EnergyAgency,
were
apparently
ot
extremist.As noted
in
Brownand
Brutoco
1997:25).
Eklund
ays
that "the
problem
of
the
nuclear
power
ndustry
s that we
have had
too few
acci-
dents...It's
xpensive,
but that's
how
you
gain
experience."
Whenstatements
like hat
pass
or "normal"t
makes
one
think hat
Feyerabend
s on the
right
track-science s
being
reated ike he
religious henomena
t
fought
a centu-
ry
earlier,
mpervious
o
doubt,
and reckless s well.
Some
Recent
History
After
he
Cold
War,
ustification
or
nuclear
esearchwas
replacedby
new
jus-
tification-the
rogue
tatesof
Iraq,
North
Korea,
Libya,
tc. Business s usual
continues. ince
he
1990s,
n the
UnitedStatesnuclear
power
s
being
revived
and
described s
a new
generation
f
safe,
clean
plants,
and we still
do
not
know much about
decomissioning
r
what
to do with nuclear waste.
Bureaucratic
ntermingling
f civilian
energy
needs
and national
security
needs at the DOEweakens
possibility
or conversions t the labs. As
David
Noble
ays"everythinghanges
and
nothing
moves,"
eemingly
t. least.
779
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TheHarder
ath-Shifting
Gears
After
dropping
he
atomicbombson Hiroshimand
Nagasaki
n
1945,
he
public
debatewas about nuclear
militarypower.
Later en.
McCarthy
rand-
ed scientific issidents
n
the
subjectguilty
of treason.
n
1962 Linus
auling
won the
Nobel
Peace
Prize
or his work
o
stop
the
atmospheric
esting
of
nuclear
weapons.
Scientific issentabout he
health,
afety
andenvironmen-
tal
impact
of nuclear
energy
urfaced
n the
late 1960s
with the
research
f
Gofman,
nd
Tamplin,
nd
Sternglass.
n
1971,
nuclear
ngineers
nd
physi-
cists
of
the Union
of
Concerned cientists
uestioned
he
safety
of
nuclear
power laiming rrogance,xpert
litism,
and
stacked
AEC
roceedings.
here
was a
national
movement
against
nuclear.
At the same
time,
however.
PresidentNixonexpanded upport or nuclearenergy,which was in some
small measurereversed
by
President
Carter. or
some Carter
had
authority;
he was
after
all a nuclear
ngineer.
In
the Carter
ears
herewasan
expansion
f
coal,
synthetic
uels,
alterna-
tive
energy
and
conservation.
n
the same
period,
anti-nuclearctivistKaren
Silkwoodwas killed
n
a caraccident
eavingpeoplewondering
boutstake-
holders.
Therewas
the
1975
fireat the Browns
erry
uclear
lant.
Four
eac-
tor
engineers
defectedfrom the
industry
o
speak
out.
1977
brought
anti-
nuclearprotestsat the Seabrook nd DiabloCanyonplants.In 1979 the
accidentat 3 Mile
Island
happened
and
in
1986,
Chernobyl.
ut
it
was the
Reagan
revolution
hat
decisively
nded the
energy
decade
and shifted he
discourse
once
again
from
nuclear
power
to nuclear
war
and
weapons.
President
Reagan
branded
anti-nuclear ctivistsas
modern-day
Luddites.
With
Presidents
Reagan
nd
Bush,
downwent
credits or
renewables,
own
went
the Solar
Energy
Research
nstitute
SERI)
nd
solar
energy
subsidies,
down
went
government
esearch
nd
development
nd on
energy
options.
President
Reagan
ook PresidentCarter's
ymbolic
olar
panels
off the White
House,
discontinued
olar
energy
ax
credits,
and had the
safe
efficiency
ar
model
that
had been
developedby
a
fatherand son team
in
Santa
Barbara
with tax dollars and which ran
over 55
miles on the
gallon
physically
destroyed,hereby
adumbrating
he
real
Luddites.
Shifting
Gears-New Alliances
It
is
worth
paralleling
hese
politicalhappenings
with
other
happenings
hat
were
not
making big
headlines.
An
alternative
energy paradigm
of the sort
that
Amory
Lovins
had
written
about in 1976 was
moving
forward.A
coalition
of business
executives,
consumers,
environmentalists, scientists,
labor lead-
780
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LAURA ADER
ers
and
legislators
brought
bout a conservation evolution n some of the
nation's
argest
electric
utilitycompanies.
The conservation evolution
was
an
alternative
o
building
new base-loadnuclearor
coal
plants.
Atthe same
time a
generation
f
energy entrepreneurs
nd solarscientistswere demon-
strating
iable
alternatives. merican
ngenuity
was
creating
ew
echnologies
that
challenged
he old
technologies.
They
demonstratedhe
potential
o
transformhe
energy
ystem
through
renewables
uch as
solar,
ight
weight
electric
cars,
super
efficient
ight
bulbs,
giant
wind farms-
showing
hat a
handful f
innovators,
rivate
itizens,
and
business xecutives an effectan
un-official
ublicenergypolicy
hrough
organizational
work,
and activism.
Peoplebegan o remember istory nd an expandedime horizon.Those
living
during
he 20th
century
will
be
seen
as
having
been
on
a drunken
il
binge.
From
geological
ime
perspective,
il
took
millions f
years
o
create;
spending
t
was
a brief
aberration
n world
nergy
history.
Oil
andcoal uels
are
sunset
industries,
utthe
society
s
still
a
hydrocarbon
ociety.
Thenation
hat
used railroadso
forge
a
political
ntity
s
the leastadvanced f
any
industrial
nation
n
the use
of
long
distancerains.
Even
t the turn
of the
nineteenth en-
tury
we
had
automobiles
unning
n
electricity,
nd steam
power,
s
well as
gasoline Montaguend Bird1971).In 1902,the President f the American
Chemical
ociety,HarveyWiley
1902)
who
was both
chemist
and
physician,
predicted
hatthe United
States
wouldbe
running
n
solar
by
the 1970s.
A
few
examples
of how
an un-official
nergy
policy
was
chartered
would
include
breakthroughs
obilized
by
green
utility
xecutives,
ree market
eg-
ulators,
independent
power
producers,
demand-side
efficiency experts,
renewable
nergy
innovators nd solar
entrepreneurs.
n
California,
everal
of
these
people
have
becomewell-known
ublic
igures.
They
ookthe
hard-
er
path
and came
up
with some
interesting
esults.
ohn
Schaeffer,
ho was
inspired
by
the 1970 Earth
Day,
graduated
rom
the
BerkeleyAnthropology
Department
n 1971.He
got
intothe rural
evitalization
nd
independent
iv-
ing
movements,
developed
a business
n
renewables
espite
the miserable
level of
federal
nvestment n renewable
esearch
and
development.
While
new
energy echnologies
were
being
mothballed
n
Washington,
chaffer's
RealGoodswas
operating
successful
etail
tores
plugging
nto
the sun
(see
also Berman nd O'Connor
996).
The anti-nuclear nd environmental
movements
were
making
alliances
with
progressive
utilities,
once seen as the
enemy.
Unusual
people
like David
Freeman,
author of
Energy:
The New
Era
(1974)
which
brought
him
to
the
attention of President
Carter,
energized
the Sacramento
Municipal Utility
781
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TheHarder
ath-Shifting
Gears
District
SMUD).
Freeman
claims
to have been educated
by
a
group
of
activistswho were
fighting
a nuclear
powerplant
n New
England,
nd
was
inspired
o
join
the race
or
survival
f our
high
energy
civilization. t
SMUD
he rana
tight
ship
strictly
n
economiccriteria.As
Freeman
xplains,
t
was
a
competition
with
Japan
as
a
high
tech leader n the solarand
hydrogen
energy
and
transportation
ields.
He
recognized
obstacles
o
the
great
ndus-
trial
opportunity
f the
future
o
capture
he
automobileand
energy
mar-
kets:
the
nuclear
power industry
discredited n the
grounds
of economic
malpractice
s well as
safety problems,
he
Exxons,
he
Texacos,
he
anti-
Progress
tatus
quo
which
ncludes
he federal
government.
he rulesof the
presentenergyeconomywereestablished o favor ystemsn place.There s
an obvious
inconsistency
etween ree-market
olicies
or
the
economy,
nd
the state
supportedpolicies
or science
of an
industrial elevance.But
hat
did not
stop
DavidFreeman.
The
Sacramento
Municipal
Utility
District
SMUD)egan moving
n 1984
whenSacramento
esidents oted o closeRancho
eco,
a nuclear
owerplant
plagued
withtechnical
problems.
MUD
moved
quickly
nto renewable
ner-
gy.
They
builttwo
of the
world's
argest,utility-owned hotovoltaic ower
plants-twentyacresworth-that surroundedhe defunctRancho ecoPlant.
Not
much,
but a start.
In
1994 SMUD
pened
its
Hedge
SolarStation.
Solar
collectorswere mounted on customer's
rooftops
and the
rooftops
of 5
churches.SMUD
s
harvesting
wind
and
a host
of
other initiatives
uch
as
mini-power lants
and
co-generation;
nd
using
rees
n
lieu
of air
condition-
ing.
Currently
MUD
roduces
ver
half of its
energy
rom renewables
nd
conservation
n
such itemsas
refrigerators,
nd
has
even
developed
lectric
transportation.
reeman imed
to createa new
federal
industrial
olicy.
n
1994 he was
appointed
president
and chief executiveofficerof New York
StatePower
Authority,
aking
with him the
view
that
we areawash
n
power
and don'tneedthe
large
dams
planned
or
Quebec.
Freeman eferredo
him-
self
as
an
electric
repairman.
he ecofreaks f the 1970s
were
innovating,
while
those
backing
he
sunset
technologies
re the new
Luddites,
ureau-
cratic echnicians
fraid
of
being
work
displaced
r downsized.
The
alliances
and
cross-linkages
ave
been
extraordinary.
ould
we have
imagined
n the seventies he
Royal
Dutch/Shell
roupbuying
nto Lovins'
"Road
Not
Taken"? he nuclear
cycle
is a
nightmare-from
the uranium
mines,
to the
dumping
of
tailings,
to
the
transportation
of
radioactive
mate-
rials,
to
the
spent
fuel
rods,
to the
plants
as national
security problems,
the
ambiguously
labeled low level waste
and
high
level waste. There are
also
782
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LAURA ADER
worries boutthe Greenhouse
ffects.
John
Brown f
British
Petroleum nd
European
nsurance xecutives
re
takingglobal
warming eriously.
As
Amory
Lovins
ut
it-before
buying bigger
bathtubbecause he
water
keepsrunning
ut,
go get
a
plug
Bricolage
s attractive.
outhern
California
Edison's
ohn
Bryson
Lerner
997)
pointed
out
there'sno need to mention
nuclear,
nvironmental
hreats,
tc. Small
s
beautiful
and
profitable...noth-
ing
futuristic,
nothing
experimental, othing
technically aulty, hey
made
more
moneyby
saving.
A
smallamount
of
leverage
an
produce
powerful
effect. Conservationnd
alternative
nergy,
Bryson
noted,
could
replace
at
least9
out of
10
big
plants
he
company
has on the
drawing
boards.
n the
meantimehe nuclear nd oil industries ontinued o argue hat renewable
energy echnologies
re
idealistic nd
futuristic,
ut
they
were
speaking
ess
and less
about
Luddites,
r
anti-progress
co extremists.
Consideration
f the
past
25
years
in
energy
is
instructive.
Mundane
changes
were a
reality
by
the
time the National
Academy
CONAES
eport
was
published
n
1980,
even
though
he mainstream
xpert
avants aid
it could-
n't
happen
by
the
year
2010.
They
were
way
off
in their
predictions,
0 to 40
years
off. We haveautomobiles
hat runmore
miles
per
gallon
of
gas (albeit
alongsidegasguzzlingutilityvehicles), nd refrigeratorshatuse lessenergy
without
reduced
unctionality. efrigerators
arketed
n
1972 consumed
14
watts
per
cubic
foot,
compared
o 6 watts
for the
average
refrigerator
old
between1925 and 1950.
Wasting
owerreplaced
prudent
use.
In
1978
the
average efrigerator
sed
1,
663
kilowatthours
per
year
as
compared
o 819
kilowatt ours
peryear
n
1994.
The
energy
avings
rom
refigerator
fficien-
cy
alone
roughly
quals
36,000
coal-bed
methanewells
(see
Hawken,
Lovins
and Lovins
000).
The
Europeans
ave moved
even
faster.Denmark's
ramm
is overtwice as efficientas the best American uilt
refrigerator.
orhomes
without
air
conditioning,
efrigerators
se
20 to 50
percent
of electric
power
consumed. t hastaken
about50
years
o
surpass
he
performance
f the aver-
age
refrigerator
old
between1925
and 1950.
Efficient
ompact
luorescent
lamps
consume
only
one fourth
he
energy
of common ncandescent
amps.
It is
important
o remember
hat the
U.S. s the
world
eader
n
energy
con-
sumption
nd
production
f Greenhouse
ases.
The
economists
who
coupled
economic
growth
and
energyconsumption
were
wrong
about
he futures
hey
predicted.
t
is
possible
o haveeconomic
growth
with reduced
energy
consumption.
Brazil
taught
us about
the
prob-
lems of
producing
alternative
fuels like
ethanol,
but
they
continue
to move
ahead.
Russia
provides
a
dismal
example
of an undiversified
energy policy
783
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8/16/2019 NADER_The Harder Path-Shifting Gears
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The Harder
Path-Shifting
Gears
dependent
on
nuclear
power.
The
coupling
of
technological
progress
with
social
progress
s held as erroneous t
leastsince
Jefferson's
ime.
Evolution
s
not
necessarily
inearnor
built
on
technological rogress.
But he
irony
of
the last
25
years
s also
in
our
headlines.
Although
here
has not beena new
nuclear
plant
ordered orwell
over
a
decade n thiscoun-
try,
he USnuclear
ndustry
as
produced
uclear
plants
or Asia
Cole 998).
Asian
waste,
as
part
of the sales
agreement,
ow n
the
form
of
spent
uel
rods
is sent to the
UnitedStates.
The
waste fromother
countries
was not
part
of
the
civilian cenariobut
rather
part
of
the
military
non-proliferation
gree-
ments.
Nevertheless,
he
reality
s that the
beautiful
tates of
Idaho,
South
Carolina,Kentuckyndelsewhere,orthe mostpartnotknown o the gener-
al
public,
are
becomingdumpinggrounds
or nuclear
uel rods and
other
formsof
waste,
romothercountries.
Washington
Will
Be the Last o
Know-Why?
The
phrase
"Washington
ill be the last o
know"
ppears
requently
n
the lit-
erature n
un-official
nergy
directions. here s
little
question
hat environ-
mentalpolicyhas beenaffectedbythe oil, coal,andchemical ompanies, y
the
power
of the
automobile
ompanies, y
national
ecurity
nterests.
Energy
involves
echnology
nd
profit
making,
s wellas a number
f other
hings
hat
are
subject
o
fierce
bidding
uch
as the formsof
energy
echnology
nd
who
should
profit.
Whenas
part
of
the 1980
National
Academy
CONAES'
tudy,
mathematical
ociologist
Otis
Dudley
Duncan
sked,
"How
id we
get
into
his
mess
anyway,
nd arethe
people
who
got
us
intothis mess
still
n
charge?"
e
was
referring
o a
legacy
of
corporate
nd
government
odies
hatdecidedon
the modesof
technology
ndthe
energy
hoices,
and on theeconomic
rgan-
ization
urrounding
hese modes.The
gravity
f
the
issues, .e.,
safety,
enewa-
bility, carcity,
ntermittency,
nternational
risis,
civil
liberties nd
inflation,
make
it
all the more
strange
hat
energy policy
was treated
as
if it were
estranged
rom
ts environment
f
political
ndeconomic
power.
The act hat
the
phenomenon
of
power,corporate
and
governmentpower,
has been
excluded rommost
analyses
f
energy
policies
has made t
difficult o under-
stand the conflicting ositions f the groups nvolved ndthe contradictory
nature f official
nergy
eports.
he
pretense
f
objectivityequires
hatsocial
power
discussions not
be included. The most recent
study
on Greenhouse
gas
projections provides
an
example.
One
might
argue
that
we don't
need
more
reports
o tell us what
government
needs to
do.
784
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LAURA
ADER
On the other
hand,
these
reports
erve as
ritual
ace-saving
evices,
or
sometimesas forms of non-violent
dueling
or
status
quo
maintenance. n
preparation
or
meetings
n
reducing
missions
f Greenhouse
ases,
Clinton
Administration
conomistswere
arguing
hat
complying
with
any
internation-
al
agreement
n Greenhousemissions
was too
expensive,
hereby
ndanger-
ing
U.S.
cooperation.
A 5
lab
report
Chen 998)
examined arbon-reduction
strategies.
The
report
erved o counter he
position
of the market
conomists
therebyallowing
he U.S. o move
slightly
n the direction f
reducing
arbon
dioxide
output
in the
United
Statesbefore he
meeting
n
Kyoto
n
spite
of
Administrationconomists
predicting
hat suchaction
might
harm he econ-
omyas muchas the oil shocksof the 1970's. ncredible s it might eem,the
choicewas between he chance
of a recession
n
the nextfew
years
and the
near
certainty
f drastic nvironmental
hange
within 50
years
(McKibben,
New YorkTimes:8 March
1997,
p.
A19).
In
Washington
he economists
disagree
with the
imperatives
of
the
Greenhouse
cientists;
he
physicists
lame
the economists or market
para-
digm myopia.
And
reports
re the means of
argument.
The
reports
are not
contaminated
y political
ontent,
nor
are
they
contaminated
y
paradigm
assessment, ndtakenliterallyhey produceunrealassessments.Aformof
denial. Meanwhilehe
unofficial
nergy
effortsare
proceeding
nabetted
n
the
style
of
bricolage,
while
n
othercountries
overnments
re
achieving
ra-
maticsuccess.
Germany
nd
Japan
are two success
stories.
Germany assed
the United
States o become
the world's
eading
wind
energy
producer
n
1997.
In
less than a
decade,
Germany
chieved10%
of its total
electricity
demand
hrough
wind
power. apan's xperience
with
photovoltaic
lso in
the
90s
decade moved he
country
o
become
the world's
argest
producer
nd
user.
Japan
has three times as much
photovoltaic
apacity
as the United
States.
Andas others have
noted,
"It
s
difficult o claim that
something
s
impossible
nce it has
already
ccurred"
Swain
004).
Crisis,
Bricolage
and Models of
Change
People
who
operate
with he crisis
heory
of
change
usually
model
change
as
a seriesof
punctuated
vents.
A
period
of
stability
s
interrupted y
a
period
of
rapid
hange,
ollowed
by
another
period
of
stability.
his
parallels
model
in
biology
of
change operating
in
a nonmonotonic
manner and
suggests
that
cultural
change
may
often
operate
in this
manner,
rather than
in
a
steady
monotonic drift.
Energy
scientists and
government
commissions
commonly
785
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8/16/2019 NADER_The Harder Path-Shifting Gears
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TheHarder
ath-Shifting
Gears
operate
with
the
crisis
heory
of
change.
Things
nly
change
when
there s a
crisis.
Theypoint
o the 1971 crisis n
oil,
the 1973 oil
embargo,
he
hot
sum-
merof 1988
which
stimulated he
interest
n
Greenhouseffectsnow
viewed
as a crisis. n
this
model
crisesare what
make
hings
move,
and one
does not
worry
about
things
not
moving
while
waiting
or the next
crisis,
or
the third
flood
as one
scientist
predicts.
Those
who work
withthe incrementalmodelof
change
visualize
hange
s
happening
it
by
bit,
even
if it
is two
steps
forward nd one
step
back,
onfi-
dent that
things
are
quasi-reversible.
eople
working
n the
bricolage
mode
press
on
from one
pioneering
ask to another.The
eco-pioneers
ee them-
selvesas preparingorthe future n thismanner, nd so do manyenergy on-
servationists. he
Germans nd the
Japanese
ee the incremental
model
as a
win/win
olution
o
jobs,
environment,
nd
energy
ndependence.
Yet
others work
with
linear models
of
development
or
whatever
hey
defineas
progress,
modelswhich
postulate
hat
anything
hat
might
nter-
rupt
unilinealmovement
s eithernot
feasible,
or
anti-progress. hey
arethe
"can't
urn
back
people."
For hem
things
are not even
quasi-reversible.hey
are the
expertsworking
n nuclear
power,
he new Ludditesome
call
them,
scienceworkerswho feardisplacement, nd thereforeearthe newenergy
technologies.
Their
whole life work s threatened.Those
who
think
unilineal
development
s
inevitable
might
read Noel Perrini's
1979)
wonderfulbook
Giving p
the Gun:
apan's
Reversion
o
the
Sword
ndicating
hat
"progress"
s
not an
inexorable
orce
outsideof human
ontrol.
The
crisismodel
is usefulfor
governments
nd
corporations.
rises erve
as
justification
or
shifting gears
and
shafting people.
The
incremental
model
is used
by
people
and
groups
with
more
flexibility,
more slack.
They
makealliances n
unexpected
places.
Thosewho
espouse
the linearmodel
perceive
hemselves
in
one lane.
They
look
for shortcuts
o
maintain
or
extend
heir
power.
In
1984,
a business
executive,
Harold
Willens,
wrote a book titled The
Trimtab
actor-HowBusinessExecutives
an
Help
Solve he Nuclear
Weapons
Crisis.
Hestartsout:
"In
he worldof
business,
unexamined
ssumptions,us-
tifications,
and
self-deception
can become
prescriptions
or
bankruptcy.
Successful
xecutives,managers
nd
entrepreneurs
must be
objective, pen
minded,
and flexible.
They
mustknowwhen it is time
to cut lossesand move
in
a new
direction
(ibid:23)."
Willens hen introduces
architect R. Buckminister
Fuller's
notion of
the "trimtab."Fuller made use of the
analogy
with
large
ships
that
in
days past
had a
second,
smaller
rudder-the
trimtab.
By
exerting
786
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8/16/2019 NADER_The Harder Path-Shifting Gears
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LAURA ADER
a
small amountof
pressure,
ne
person
could
easily
turn the trimtab.
The
trimtab hen turned he
rudder,
nd the rudder urnedthe
ship.
Thus,
he
trimtab actordemonstrates owthe
application
f a smallamountof lever-
age
can
produce
powerful
ffect.Willens awthe trimtab
actor,
n
this case
the
leverage
f business
eadership,
s
changing
ur direction
n
the nuclear-
weapons
risis.
think t
significant
hat
a business
man,
a
sane and sensitive
business
man,
profiled
he trimtab actor
n
relation o businessmobilization
on issuesof nuclearwar.Hiscriteria
or
whata
good
business
man
might
do
wouldhave
been
good
advice orthe nuclear
ndustry
o
heed,
had
hey
been
subject
o market
principles
ather han welfare
principles
f the federal
gov-
ernment.Furthermore,hinking bout how trimtabs ctuallywork ensitizes
us to the likelihood
hat,
like almost
any
control
mechanisms,
rimtabs re
double
edged.
Witness
utility
deregulation
n
California nd
the
disastrous
resultsbetween2000 and 2001.
MachiavellianPower
I
notedearlier hat mostof the discussion nd
reports
n
energy
needsdo not
contextualizehe issues ntermsof anotherkindof power-corporate ower.
I
concludewith reference o the
utility
deregulation
hat
started
n California
with
the unanimous
passage
of
AB1890
n the California
egislature
n
1996.
The
bill demonstrates
he
complexity
f cross-interests hichbuilt nto a cri-
sis that not all
energy
players
were
prepared
o deal
with-the
restructuring
of the
$212
billion-a-year ower ndustry.
Willenswas
right-business
has
clout
n
the
government;
n contributionso state
legislators
he
utility obby-
ists are second
o
none.
Although
AB1890
passedunanimously
ome
legisla-
tors
certainly
ad second
houghts
by
the
year
2000.
Those or
deregulation
dvertised,
n the March
2
Sunday
Chronicle nd
Examiner
upplement
n
"Energy
fter
Deregulation"1998),
hat
deregula-
tion
increases
hoice,
a choiceof
powercompanies, uggesting
hat
competi-
tion
of electric ervicewill
provide
arge
dividends,
better
service,
and more
innovation
responsive
to consumer needs.
They
described the CTC
r
Competitive
ransition
hange
s "the means
by
which
state
law allows he
electric
utilities o recover he reasonable osts
of their uneconomic
power
plants
and
high-costpurchasedpower
contracts" nd reminded
he reader
not to
be
"misled
by
those
with
political agendas."
The headlines were meant
to
call attention to
novelty:
"PG&Eo offer'Green
Power,"'
New EntrantsNow
Free
to
Compete,"
"FuelCells
Have Potential as
Important Electricity
ource."
787
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8/16/2019 NADER_The Harder Path-Shifting Gears
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The
Harder
ath-Shifting
Gears
As
hey
indicated,
he
supplement
wasan advertisement.
ivision
nddouble
talk
are
the themes.
The
other side
of the
picture
ooked a bit different.Consumer
roups
warned
hat
deregulation
ill
drive
prices
down
or
big
ndustrial
sers,
up
for
homeowners,
enters,
ndsmall
businesses.
Unions laimed hat
deregulation
was
a
thinly
veiled
move to de-unionize
he
utility ndustry.
Environmental
groups
hat
originally
houghtderegulation
might
be the
way
to
shut
down
nuclear
eactors
weredividedwithNRDC
nd
utilities n
one side
and
the
rest
who
thoughtderegulation
will
prop
up
dying
nuclear
plants
while diminish-
ing
advances
n
renewables, onservation,
nd
pollution
ontrol.
We
were
n
an oil andgas glut,at thatmoment.Furthermoreherewas the outragehat
state
legislatures
re
helping
utilitieswith a "strainedost"
of
$135
billion n
bad
reactor,
nvestments-stranded
osts ranslates s
imprudent
nvestment
and
the
gift
of utilities
s
corporate
welfare.
Asone
public
itizen
advocate
ut
it
"What
aliforniaasdefinedas
deregulation
means hat
he
big
utilitieswill
get
the
public
o
pay
or
theirnuclear
plants,
and then
establish
network f
nonunion
unregulated
monopolies."
ndeed heredoes
appear
o
be a
merg-
er
frenzy
Wasserman998).
TheNRDClaimed hatAB1890 rovidedome$872million or conserva-
tion
and
another
$540
million
n
subsidies
or
renewable
nergy
ndustries-
merely
drops
n billion
dollar
buckets.
Therewas
a referendum
rewing
n
California.
he
challenge
was
howto
explain
he
complexity
n
a soundbite.
A
senioradvisor
o
GreenpeaceWasserman
998)
put
his
finger
on
the
ulti-
mate hreat
o
private
tility
iants-the
idea
of
publicpower:
"Thosemunic-
ipalities
hat
fought hrough
mountains
f
legal
red
ape
o
win
their
own
util-
ities have
enjoyed
ar
cheaper
rates
and better
service."
He continues:"In
1989 Sacramento's
Municipal
tility
District ecame he first o voteto close
a
reactor
nd
replace
t
largely
with
solar
and wind
power
o increase fficien-
cy,
a transition
hat has
brought
worldwide
ttention."
AB1890
wasa
happening,
n
event,
what
anthropologists
ight
refer
o as
a
social
drama.
Therewas no
pretense-the players
nd
their nterests re
all
out there.
All
he
powers-raw corporate ower,
ocial
power,
nvironmental
power,
nd the
power
of
renewables-all
therefor us to see. The
agenda
was
a
broad
one. Some
ay
t
was
about
reforming
ur
argest
ndustrial
ector,
n
issue
which akes
us back
o
the real
reason
whyAmory
Lovins's 976
paper
was considered
heresy-democratic
control. Human-centered
or
system
cen-
tered
was
the
issue,
and
as
such was not an issue for
experts-unless
the
expert
is the
person
downwind from
a
nuclear
reactor.
This was an issue
for
788
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LAURA ADER
citizens.
By
2004,
the California
nergy
risisof
2000-2001 s
being
ought
out
in
the courtsas an
energyconspiracy, conspiracy
y
meansof a series of
schemesknownwithin
Enron s Death
Star,
Get
Shorty,
Ricochet,
nd others
(Corporate
rime
Reporter,
ol.
18,
No.
32,
Aug.
2004).
Concluding
Comments:
A
Blind
Eye
Inthe
1950s
James
D.
Conant,
ne of the
2
overseers f the
Manhattan
roject
and
president
f
Harvard
niversity,
hought
hat
by
the
end of the
century
solar
energy
would
be "the
dominating
actor
n
the
production
f industrial
power"Hershberg963:595).He had in mind a vast technicalundertaking
modeled fter he
Manhattan
roject.
Conanthe chemist
also referredo "our
friends he atomic
physicists"
s the modern
lchemists.Casks
hat are inches
thick
won't
leak,
but
they
do. Hanfords
leaking
nto the
Columbia iver.
Nuclearwaste is
being
transported
ack o
the US
hrough
he
Bay
Area or
national
ecurity
easons,
utthere s a
security roblem
n that
very ransport.
The
Titanic ouldn't
be
sunk,
butthe
unsinkable
ank.
The
nability
o see
past
a
short
pan
of time
meanswe can't ee what
kindof a worldwe have
created.
Anewworldhasspawnedmultigenerationalechnologieswhosevery ntercon-
nectedness
enerates
ost and
security
problems
s a break n
the
chainwill
reverberate
hroughout
he
society.
Weneed
an answer o Otis
Dudley's ues-
tion,
"Are
he
people
who
got
us intothis messstill in
charge?
f
so,
why?"
nd
how is
it
thatthe
Germans nd the
Japanese
an
accomplish
n a
decadewhat
the
United tateshasnot
beenableto achieve n
severaldecades? f
knowledge
is
power,
nthropologists
ave heirwork ut out
forthemselves.
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This content downloaded from 143.234.88.102 on Fri, 7 Nov 2014 05:49:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
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