Munich Agreement

For the annual global security meeting held in Munich,see Munich Conference on Security Policy.The Munich Agreement was a settlement permitting

After the summit, the British prime minister Chamberlain re-turned to Great Britain where he declared that the Munich agree-ment meant “peace for our time”

Nazi Germany's annexation of portions of Czechoslo-vakia along the country’s borders mainly inhabited byGerman speakers, for which a new territorial designation"Sudetenland" was coined. The agreement was negoti-ated at a conference held in Munich, Germany, amongthe major powers of Europe, excluding the Soviet Unionand Czechoslovakia. Today, it is widely regarded as afailed act of appeasement toward Germany. The agree-ment was signed in the early hours of 30 September 1938(but dated 29 September). The purpose of the conferencewas to discuss the future of the Sudetenland in the faceof ethnic demands made by Adolf Hitler. The agreementwas signed by Germany, France, the United Kingdom,and Italy. Sudetenland was of immense strategic impor-tance to Czechoslovakia, as most of its border defenseswere situated there, and many of its banks and heavy in-dustries were located there as well.Because the state of Czechoslovakia was not invited to theconference, it considered itself to have been betrayed bythe United Kingdom and France, so Czechs and Slovakscall the Munich Agreement theMunich Diktat (Czech:Mnichovský diktát; Slovak: Mníchovský diktát). Thephrase "Munich Betrayal" (Czech: Mnichovská zrada;Slovak: Mníchovská zrada) is also used because the mili-tary alliance Czechoslovakia had with France and Britainproved useless. Today the document is typically referredto simply as the Munich Pact (Mnichovská dohoda).In Germany the Sudeten crisis led to the so-called Oster

Conspiracy. General Hans Oster, deputy head of theAbwehr, and prominent figures within the German mili-tary who opposed the regime for its behaviour that wasthreatening to bring Germany into a war that they be-lieved it was not ready to fight, discussed overthrowingHitler and the Nazi regime through a planned stormingof the Reich Chancellery by forces loyal to the plot.

1 Background

1.1 Demands for Sudeten autonomy

Czech districts with an ethnic German population in 1934 of 25%or more (pink), 50% or more (red), and 75 % or more (darkred)[1] in 1935

From 1918 to 1938, after the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, more than 3 million ethnic Germanswere living in the Czech part of the newly created stateof Czechoslovakia.Sudeten German pro-Nazi leader Konrad Henleinfounded Sudeten German Party (SdP) that served asthe branch of the Nazi Party for the Sudetenland.[2] By1935, the SdP was the second largest political party inCzechoslovakia.[2] Shortly after the anschluss of Aus-tria to Germany, Henlein met with Hitler in Berlin on28 March 1938, where he was instructed to raise de-mands unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government ledby president Edvard Beneš. On 24 April, the SdP issueda series of demands upon the government of Czechoslo-vakia, that were known as the Carlsbad Program. [3]

Among the demands, Henlein demanded autonomy forGermans living in Czechoslovakia.[2] The Czechoslo-vakian government responded by saying that it was willingto provide more minority rights to the German minoritybut it refused to grant them autonomy.[2]

1

2 1 BACKGROUND

Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudeten German Party (SdP), abranch of the Nazi Party of Germany in Czechoslovakia.

Edvard Beneš, the second President of Czechoslovakia andleader of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile.

1.2 Sudeten Crisis

See also: Sudetendeutsches Freikorps

As the previous appeasement of Hitler had shown, thegovernments of both France and Britain were set onavoiding war at any cost. The French government did

not wish to face Germany alone and took its lead fromthe British government and its Prime Minister, NevilleChamberlain. Chamberlain believed that Sudeten Ger-man grievances were justified and that Hitler’s intentionswere limited. Both Britain and France, therefore, ad-vised Czechoslovakia to concede to Germany’s demands.Beneš resisted and on 19 May a partial mobilization wasunderway in response to possible German invasion.[4]

On 20 May, Hitler presented his Generals with an in-terim draft for an attack on Czechoslovakia codenamedOperation Green,[5] whereby he insisted that he wouldnot “smash Czechoslovakia” militarily without “provo-cation,” “a particularly favourable opportunity” or “ade-quate political justification.”[6] On 28 May, Hitler calleda meeting of his service chiefs where he ordered an ac-celeration of U-boat construction and brought forwardthe construction of his first two battleships, Bismarckand Tirpitz, to spring 1940, and demanded that the in-crease in the firepower of the battlecruisers Scharnhorstand Gneisenau be accelerated .[4] While accepting thatthis would be insufficient for a full scale naval war withBritain, Hitler hoped it would be a sufficient deterrent.[7]Ten days later, Hitler signed a secret directive forwar against Czechoslovakia to begin no later than 1October.[4]

Hitler’s adjutant, Fritz Wiedemann, recalled after the warthat he was “very shocked” by Hitler’s new plans to attackBritain and France 3–4 years after “deal[ing] with the sit-uation” in Czechoslovakia.[8] General Ludwig Beck, chiefof the German general staff, noted that Hitler’s change ofheart in favour of quick action was due to Czechoslovakdefences still being improvised, which would cease to bethe case 2–3 years later, and British rearmament not com-ing into effect until 1941/42.[7] General Alfred Jodl notedin his diary that the partial Czechoslovak mobilisation of21 May had led Hitler to issue a new order for OperationGreen on 30 May, and that this was accompanied by acovering letter from Keitel stating that the plan must beimplemented by 1 October at the very latest.[7]

In the meantime, the British government demanded thatBeneš request a mediator. Not wishing to sever his gov-ernment’s ties withWestern Europe, Beneš reluctantly ac-cepted. The British appointed Lord Runciman, the for-mer Liberal cabinet minister, who arrived in Prague on3 August with instructions to persuade Beneš to agreeto a plan acceptable to the Sudeten Germans.[9] On 20July, French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet, told theCzechoslovak Ambassador in Paris that while Francewould declare her support in public to help the Czechoslo-vak negotiations, it was not prepared to go to war overthe Sudetenland question.[9] During August the Germanpress was full of stories alleging Czechoslovak atroci-ties against Sudeten Germans, with the intention of forc-ing the Western Powers into putting pressure on theCzechoslovaks to make concessions.[10] Hitler hoped theCzechoslovaks would refuse and that the Western Powerswould then feel morally justified in leaving the Czechoslo-

1.2 Sudeten Crisis 3

vaks to their fate.[11] In August, Germany sent 750,000soldiers along the border of Czechoslovakia officially aspart of army maneuvers.[2][11] On 4 or 5 September,[9]Beneš submitted the Fourth Plan, granting nearly allthe demands of the Munich Agreement. The SudetenGermans were under instruction from Hitler to avoid acompromise,[11] and after the SdP held demonstrationsthat provoked police action in Ostrava on 7 Septem-ber in which two of their parliamentary deputies werearrested,[9] the Sudeten Germans used this incident andfalse allegations of other atrocities as an excuse to breakoff further negotiations.[9][11]

On 12 September, Hitler made a speech at a NaziParty rally in Nuremberg on the Sudeten crisis inwhich he condemned the actions of the government ofCzechoslovakia.[2] Hitler denounced Czechoslovakia asbeing a fraudulent state that was in violation of inter-national law’s emphasis of national self-determination,claiming it was a Czech hegemony where neither theGermans, the Slovaks, the Hungarians, the Ukrainians,nor the Poles of the country actually wanted to be ina union with the Czechs.[12] Hitler accused Czechoslo-vakia’s President Edvard Beneš of seeking to graduallyexterminate the Sudeten Germans, claiming that sinceCzechoslovakia’s creation over 600,000 Germans wereallegedly intentionally forced out of their homes un-der the threat of starvation if they did not leave.[13] Heclaimed that Beneš' government was persecuting Ger-mans along with Hungarians, Poles, and Slovaks, and ac-cused Beneš of threatening these nationalities with beingbranded traitors if they were not loyal to the country.[12]He claimed that he, as the head of state of Germany,would support the right of the self-determination offellow Germans in the Sudetenland.[12] He condemnedBeneš for his government’s recent execution of sev-eral German protesters.[12] He accused Beneš of beingbelligerent and threatening behaviour towards Germanywhich, if war broke out, would result in Beneš forcingSudeten Germans to fight against their will against Ger-mans from Germany.[12] Hitler accused the governmentof Czechoslovakia of being a client regime of France,claiming that the French Minister of Aviation Pierre Cothad said “We need this state as a base from which to dropbombs with greater ease to destroy Germany’s economyand its industry”.[13]

On 13 September, after internal violence and disrup-tion in Czechoslovakia ensued, Chamberlain asked Hitlerfor a personal meeting to find a solution to avert awar.[14] Chamberlain arrived by plane in Germany on15 September and then arrived at Hitler’s residence inBerchtesgaden for the meeting.[15] The Sudeten Ger-man leader Henlein flew to Germany on the sameday.[14] On that day, Hitler and Chamberlain held dis-cussions in which Hitler insisted that the Sudeten Ger-mans must be allowed to exercise the right of nationalself-determination and be able to join Sudetenland withGermany; Hitler also expressed concern to Chamberlain

Adolf Hitler greets British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlainon the steps of the Berghof, 15 September 1938

about what he perceived as British “threats”.[15] Cham-berlain responded that he had not issued “threats” andin frustration asked Hitler “Why did I come over hereto waste my time?".[15] Hitler responded that if Cham-berlain was willing to accept the self-determination ofthe Sudeten Germans, he would be willing to discussthe matter.[15] Chamberlain and Hitler held discussionsfor three hours, after which the meeting adjourned andChamberlain flew back to the UK and met with his cabi-net to discuss the issue.[15]

After the meeting, French Prime Minister Édouard Dal-adier flew to London on 16 September to meet Britishofficials to discuss a course of action.[16] The situationin Czechoslovakia became more tense that day with theCzechoslovak government issuing an arrest warrant forthe Sudeten German leader Henlein, who had arrived inGermany a day earlier to take part in the negotiations.[17]The French proposals ranged from waging war againstGermany to supporting the Sudetenland being ceded toGermany.[17] The discussions ended with a firm British-French plan in place.[17] Britain and France demandedthat Czechoslovakia cede to Germany all those territorieswhere the German population represented over fifty per-cent of the Sudetenland’s total population.[17] In exchangefor this concession, Britain and France would guaranteethe independence of Czechoslovakia.[17] The proposedsolution was rejected by both Czechoslovakia and oppo-nents of it in Britain and France.[17]

On 17 September 1938 Hitler ordered the establishmentof Sudetendeutsches Freikorps, a paramilitary organiza-tion that took over the structure of Ordnersgruppe, an or-ganization of ethnic-Germans in Czechoslovakia that hadbeen dissolved by the Czechoslovak authorities the previ-ous day due to its implication in large number of terror-ist activities. The organization was sheltered, trained andequipped by German authorities and conducting crossborder terrorist operations into Czechoslovak territory.Relying on the Convention for the Definition of Ag-gression, Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš[18] andthe government-in-exile[19] later regarded 17 Septem-

4 1 BACKGROUND

A 1938 terrorist action of Sudetendeutsches Freikorps

Czechoslovak Army soldiers on patrol in the Sudetenland inSeptember 1938.

ber 1938 as the beginning of the undeclared German-Czechoslovak war. This understanding has been assumedalso by the contemporary Czech Constitutional court.[20]

On 18 September, Italy’s Duce Benito Mussolini made aspeech in Trieste, Italy where he declared “If there aretwo camps, for and against Prague, let it be known thatItaly has chosen its side,” with the clear implication beingthat Mussolini supported Germany in the crisis.[15]

On 20 September, German opponents to the Nazi regimewithin the military meet to discuss the final plans of a plotthey had developed to overthrow the Nazi regime. Themeeting was led by General Hans Oster, the deputy headof the Abwehr (Germany’s counter-espionage agency).Other members included Captain Friedrich WilhelmHeinz, and other military officers leading the plannedcoup d'etat met at the meeting.[21]

On 21 September, Czechoslovakia capitulated to acceptthe demands that were agreed upon by Britain, France,and Germany. The next day, however, Hitler added newdemands, insisting that the claims of ethnic Germans inPoland and Hungary also be satisfied.On 22 September, Chamberlain, about to board his planeto go to Germany for further talks, told the press whomet him there that “My objective is peace in Europe, Itrust this trip is the way to that peace.”[17] Chamberlainarrived in Cologne, where he received a lavish grand wel-

General Hans Oster, deputy head of the Abwehr met with otherGerman military officers on 20 September 1938 to discuss finalplans of a plot to overthrow the Nazi regime.

Protest in Prague against German aggression, 22 September1938.

come with a German band playing “God Save the King”and Germans giving Chamberlain flowers and gifts.[17]Chamberlain had calculated that fully accepting Germanannexation of all of the Sudetenland with no reductionswould force Hitler to accept the agreement.[17] Upon be-ing told of this, Hitler responded “Does this mean that theAllies have agreed with Prague’s approval to the trans-fer of the Sudetenland to Germany?", Chamberlain re-sponded “Precisely”, to which Hitler responded by shak-ing his head, saying that the Allied offer was insignificant.He told Chamberlain that he wanted Czechoslovakia to

5

be completely dissolved and its territories redistributedto Germany, Poland, and Hungary, and told Chamber-lain to take it or leave it.[17] Chamberlain was shaken bythis statement.[17] Hitler went on to tell Chamberlain thatsince their last visit on the 15th, Czechoslovakia’s actions,which Hitler claimed included killings of Germans, hadmade the situation unbearable for Germany.[17]

Later in the meeting, a prearranged deception was un-dertaken in order to influence and put pressure on Cham-berlain: one of Hitler’s aides entered the room to informHitler of more Germans being killed in Czechoslovakia,to which Hitler screamed in response “I will avenge ev-ery one of them. The Czechs must be destroyed.”[17]The meeting ended with Hitler refusing to make any con-cessions to the Allies’ demands.[17] Later that evening,Hitler grew worried that he had gone too far in pressuringChamberlain, and telephoned Chamberlain’s hotel suite,saying that he would accept annexing only the Sudeten-land, with no designs on other territories, provided thatCzechoslovakia begin the evacuation of the German ma-jority territories by 26 September at 8:00am. After beingpressed by Chamberlain, Hitler agreed to have the ulti-matum set for 1 October (the same date that OperationGreen was set to begin).[22] Hitler then said to Cham-berlain that this was one concession that he was willingto make to the Prime Minister as a “gift” out of respectfor the fact that Chamberlain had been willing to backdown somewhat on his earlier position.[22] Hitler wenton to say that upon annexing the Sudetenland, Germanywould hold no further territorial claims upon Czechoslo-vakia and would enter into a collective agreement to guar-antee the borders of Germany and Czechoslovakia.[22]

A new cabinet, under General Jan Syrový, was installedand on 23 September a decree of general mobilizationwas issued. The Czechoslovak army, modern and pos-sessing an excellent system of frontier fortifications, wasprepared to fight. The Soviet Union announced its will-ingness to come to Czechoslovakia’s assistance. Beneš,however, refused to go to war without the support of theWestern powers.In the early hours of 24 September, Hitler issuedthe Godesberg Memorandum, which demanded thatCzechoslovakia cede the Sudetenland to Germany nolater than 28 September, with plebiscites to be held inunspecified areas under the supervision of German andCzechoslovak forces. The memorandum also stated thatif Czechoslovakia did not agree to the German demandsby 2 pm on 28 September, Germany would take the Sude-tenland by force. On the same day, Chamberlain returnedto Britain and announced that Hitler demanded the annex-ation of the Sudetenland without delay.[22] The announce-ment enraged those in Britain and France who wanted toconfront Hitler once and for all, even if it meant war, andits supporters gained strength.[22] The CzechoslovakianAmbassador to the United Kingdom, Jan Masaryk, waselated upon hearing of the support for Czechoslovakiafrom British and French opponents of Hitler’s plans, say-

ing “The nation of Saint Wenceslas will never be a nationof slaves.”[22]

On 26 September, Chamberlain sent Sir Horace Wilsonto carry a personal letter to Hitler declaring that the Al-lies wanted a peaceful resolution to the Sudeten crisis.[22]Later that evening, Hitler gave his reply in a speech atthe Sportpalast in Berlin, in which Hitler gave Czechoslo-vakia a deadline of 28 September at 2:00pm to cede theSudetenland to Germany or face war.[22]

On 28 September at 10:00am, four hours prior to Hitler’sdeadline and with no agreement to Hitler’s demand byCzechoslovakia, the British ambassador to Italy, LordPerth, called Italy’s Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano torequest an urgent meeting.[22] Perth informed Ciano thatChamberlain had instructed him to request that Mus-solini enter the negotiations and urge Hitler to delay theultimatum.[22] At 11:00am, Ciano met Mussolini andinformed him of Chamberlain’s proposition; Mussoliniagreed with it and responded by telephoning Italy’s am-bassador to Germany and told him “Go to the Fuhrer atonce, and tell him that whatever happens, I will be at hisside, but that I request a twenty-four hour delay beforehostilities begin. In the meantime, I will study what canbe done to solve the problem.”[23] Hitler received Mus-solini’s message while in discussions with the French am-bassador. Hitler told the ambassador “My good friend,Benito Mussolini, has asked me to delay for twenty-fourhours the marching orders of the German army, and Iagreed. Of course, this was no concession, as the inva-sion date was set for 1 October 1938. "[24] Upon speakingwith Chamberlain, Lord Perth gave Chamberlain’s thanksto Mussolini as well as Chamberlain’s request that Mus-solini attend a four-power conference of Britain, France,Germany, and Italy in Munich on 29 September to set-tle the Sudeten problem prior to the deadline of 2:00pm.Mussolini agreed.[24] Hitler’s only request was to makesure that Mussolini be involved in the negotiations at theconference.[24]WhenUnited States President Franklin D.Roosevelt learned the conference had been scheduled, hetelegraphed Chamberlain, “Good man”.[25]

2 Resolution

A deal was reached on 29 September, and at about1:30 am on 30 September 1938,[26] Adolf Hitler, NevilleChamberlain, Benito Mussolini and Édouard Daladiersigned the Munich Agreement. The agreement was of-ficially introduced by Mussolini although in fact the so-called Italian plan had been prepared in the German For-eign Office. It was nearly identical to the Godesberg pro-posal: the German army was to complete the occupationof the Sudetenland by 10 October, and an internationalcommission would decide the future of other disputed ar-eas.Czechoslovakia was informed by Britain and France that

6 3 REACTIONS

Third Reich Poland

Hungary

5

64

12

3

Slovakia

Sequence of events following the Munich Agreement:1. Germany occupies the Sudetenland (October 1938).2. Poland annexes Zaolzie, an area with a Polish plurality, overwhich the two countries had fought a war in 1919 (October1938).3. Hungary occupies border areas (southern third of Slovakiaand southern Carpathian Ruthenia) with Hungarian minoritiesin accordance with the First Vienna Award (November 1938).4. On March 15, 1939, during the German invasion of the re-maining Czech territories, Hungary annexes Carpathian Ruthe-nia (which had been autonomous since October 1938).5. Germany establishes the Protectorate of Bohemia andMoravia with a puppet government, on March 16, 1939.6. Meanwhile, during the German invasion of Czech territories,a pro-Hitler Catholic-fascist government splits off the remainingterritories of Czechoslovakia and declares the Slovak Republic,an Axis client state.

From left to right: Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini, andCiano pictured before signing the Munich Agreement, which gavethe Sudetenland to Germany.

it could either resist Nazi Germany alone or submit tothe prescribed annexations. The Czechoslovak govern-ment, realizing the hopelessness of fighting the Nazisalone, reluctantly capitulated (30 September) and agreedto abide by the agreement. The settlement gave Ger-many the Sudetenland starting 10 October, and de factocontrol over the rest of Czechoslovakia as long as Hitlerpromised to go no further. On 30 September after somerest, Chamberlain went to Hitler and asked him to sign apeace treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany.After Hitler’s interpreter translated it for him, he happily

agreed.On 30 September, upon his return to Britain, Chamber-lain delivered his infamous "peace for our time" speechto crowds in London.[27]

3 Reactions

Czechs expelled from the border looking for new home, October1938 .

Sudeten Germans cheering the arrival of the German Army intothe Sudetenland in October 1938.

Though the British and French were pleased, as werethe Nazi military and German diplomatic leadership,a British diplomat in Berlin claimed he had been in-formed by reliable sources that soon after the meetingwith Chamberlain Hitler had furiously said: “Gentlemen,this has been my first international conference and I canassure you that it will be my last”. The British diplomatclaimed his sources relayed that Hitler viewed Chamber-lain as “an impertinent busybody who spoke the ridicu-lous jargon of an outmoded democracy.”[28]

Joseph Stalin was also upset by the results of the Mu-nich conference. The Soviets, who had a mutual militaryassistance treaty with Czechoslovakia, felt betrayed byFrance, who also had a mutual military assistance treatywith Czechoslovakia. The British and French, however,mostly used the Soviets as a threat to dangle over the Ger-mans. Stalin concluded that the West had actively col-

3.1 Opinions about the agreement 7

A Polish cartoon says to Russians that civilized Europe has a bet-ter ally and no help from “Ivan” is required.

Czech refugees expelled from the Sudetenland at the Refugees Of-fice October 1938

luded with Hitler to hand over a Central European coun-try to the Nazis, causing concern that they might do thesame to the Soviet Union in the future, allowing the par-tition of the USSR between the western powers and thefascist Axis. This belief led the Soviet Union to reori-ent its foreign policy towards a rapprochement with Ger-many, which eventually led to the signing of theMolotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939.[29]

The Czechoslovaks were greatly dismayed with the Mu-nich settlement. With Sudetenland gone to Germany,Czecho-Slovakia (as the state was now renamed) lostits defensible border with Germany and its fortifica-tions. Without them its independence becamemore nom-inal than real. In fact, Edvard Beneš, the President ofCzechoslovakia, had the military print the march ordersfor his army and put the press on standby for a declarationof war. Czechoslovakia also lost 70% of its iron/steel,

70% of its electrical power and 3.5 million citizens toGermany as a result of the settlement.[30]

The Sudeten Germans celebrated what they saw as theirliberation. The imminent war, it seemed, had beenavoided.Before the Munich Agreement Hitler’s determinationto invade Czechoslovakia on 1 October 1938 had pro-voked a major crisis in the German command struc-ture. The Chief of the General Staff, General LudwigBeck, protested in a lengthy series of memos that it wouldstart a world war that Germany would lose, and urgedHitler to put off the projected war. Hitler called Beck’sarguments against war "kindische Kräfteberechnungen"(“childish force calculations”). On 4 August 1938, a se-cret Armymeeting was held. Beck read his lengthy reportto the assembled officers. They all agreed something hadto be done to prevent certain disaster. Beck hoped theywould all resign together but no one resigned except Beck.However his replacement, General Franz Halder, sympa-thised with Beck and they both conspired with severaltop generals, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (Chief of Ger-man Intelligence), and Graf von Helldorf (Berlin’s Po-lice Chief) to arrest Hitler the moment he gave the inva-sion order. However, the plan would only work if Britainissued a strong warning and a letter to the effect thatthey would fight to preserve Czechoslovakia. This wouldhelp to convince the German people that certain defeatawaited Germany. Agents were therefore sent to Eng-land to tell Chamberlain that an attack on Czechoslovakiawas planned, and of their intention to overthrow Hitler ifthis occurred. However, the proposal was rejected by theBritish Cabinet and no such letter was issued. Accord-ingly, the proposed removal of Hitler did not go ahead.[31]On this basis it has been argued that the Munich Agree-ment kept Hitler in power, althoughwhether it would havebeen any more successful than the 1944 plot is doubtful.

Map of the Sudetenland Reichsgau.

3.1 Opinions about the agreement

The British population had expected imminent war andthe “statesman-like gesture” of Chamberlain was at firstgreeted with acclaim. This generally positive reaction,however, quickly soured despite royal patronage. Cham-berlain was greeted as a hero by the royal family and in-vited on the balcony at Buckingham Palace before he hadpresented the agreement to Parliament. But there was op-

8 4 CONSEQUENCES OF THE MUNICH AGREEMENT

position from the start; Clement Attlee and the LabourParty opposed the agreement, in alliance with two Con-servative MPs, Duff Cooper and Vyvyan Adams who hadbeen seen, up to then as a die hard and reactionary ele-ment in the Conservative Party.In later years, Chamberlain was excoriated for his roleas one of the “Men of Munich”, in books such as the1940 Guilty Men. A rare wartime defence of the MunichAgreement came in 1944 from Viscount Maugham, whohad been Lord Chancellor at the time. Maugham viewedthe decision to establish a Czechoslovak state includingsubstantial German and Hungarian minorities as a “dan-gerous experiment” in the light of previous disputes andascribed the Munich Agreement largely to France’s needto extricate itself from its treaty obligations in the light ofits unpreparedness for war.[32]

Édouard Daladier believed he saw Hitler’s ultimate goalsas a threat. He told the British in a late April 1938 meet-ing that Hitler’s real aim was to eventually secure “a dom-ination of the Continent in comparison with which theambitions of Napoleon were feeble.” He went on to say:“Today it is the turn of Czechoslovakia. Tomorrow it willbe the turn of Poland and Romania. When Germany hasobtained the oil and wheat it needs, she will turn on theWest. Certainly we must multiply our efforts to avoidwar. But that will not be obtained unless Great Britainand France stick together, intervening in Prague for newconcessions but declaring at the same time that they willsafeguard the independence of Czechoslovakia. If, on thecontrary, the Western Powers capitulate again they willonly precipitate the war they wish to avoid.”[33] Perhapsdiscouraged by the arguments of the military and civil-ian members of the French government regarding theirunprepared military and weak financial situation, as wellas traumatised by France’s bloodbath in the First WorldWar that he was personally a witness to, Daladier ulti-mately let Chamberlain have his way. On his return toParis, Daladier, who was expecting a hostile crowd, wasacclaimed. According to French author Jean-Paul Sartrehe would then have told his aide, Alexis Léger: "Ah, lescons!" (“Ah, the fools!").[34]

American historian William Shirer, in his The Rise andFall of the Third Reich (1960), took the view that althoughHitler was not bluffing about his intention to invade,Czechoslovakia would have been able to offer signifi-cant resistance. Shirer believed that Britain and Francehad sufficient air defences to avoid serious bombing ofLondon and Paris and would have been able to pursue arapid and successful war against Germany.[35] He quotesChurchill as saying the Munich agreement meant that“Britain and France were in a much worse position com-pared to Hitler’s Germany”.[30] After Adolf Hitler per-sonally inspected the Czech fortifications, he privatelysaid to Joseph Goebbels, “we would have shed a lot ofblood” and that it was fortunate that there had been nofighting.[36]

Adolf Hitler drives through the crowd in Cheb, October 1938

4 Consequences of the Munichagreement

On 5 October, Beneš resigned as President of Czechoslo-vakia, realising that the fall of Czechoslovakia was in-evitable. Following the outbreak of World War II, heformed a Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London.

4.1 Pertaining to the territories ofCzechoslovakia after the MunichAgreement

4.1.1 The first Vienna Award to Hungary

Main article: First Vienna AwardIn early November 1938, under the first Vienna Award,which was a result of the Munich agreement, Czechoslo-vakia (and later Slovakia)—after it had failed to reach acompromise with Hungary and Poland—was forced byGermany and Italy to cede southern Slovakia (one third ofSlovak territory) to Hungary, while Poland gained smallterritorial cessions shortly after.As a result, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia lost about 38%of their combined area to Germany, with some 2.8 mil-lion German and 513,000-750,000[37][38] Czech inhabi-tants. Hungary, in turn, received 11,882 km2 (4,588 sq

4.1 Pertaining to the territories of Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement 9

Admiral Horthy during the Hungarians’ triumphant entry intoKošice, November 1938

“For 600 years we have been waiting for you (1335-1938).” Eth-nic Polish band welcoming the annexation of Zaolzie by the Pol-ish Republic in Karviná, October 1938.

mi) in southern Slovakia and southern Ruthenia; accord-ing to a 1941 census, about 86.5% of the population inthis territory was Hungarian. Slovakia lost 10,390 km2

(4,010 sq mi) and 854,218 inhabitants for Hungary (ac-cording to a Czechoslovak 1930 census about 59% wereHungarians and 31.9% were Slovaks and Czechs[39]).Meanwhile, Poland annexed the town of Český Těšínwith the surrounding area (some 906 km2 (350 sq mi),with 250,000 inhabitants; Poles made up about 36% ofthe population)[40] and two minor border areas in north-ern Slovakia, more precisely in the regions Spiš andOrava. (226 km2 (87 sq mi), 4,280 inhabitants, only0.3% Poles).Soon afterMunich, 115,000 Czechs and 30,000Germansfled to the remaining rump of Czechoslovakia. Accordingto the Institute for Refugee Assistance, the actual countof refugees on 1 March 1939 stood at almost 150,000.[41]

On 4 December 1938, there were elections in ReichsgauSudetenland, in which 97.32% of the adult populationvoted for NSDAP. About a half million SudetenGermansjoined the Nazi Party which was 17.34% of the Germanpopulation in Sudetenland (the average NSDAP partic-ipation in Nazi Germany was 7.85%). This means theSudetenland was the most “pro-Nazi” region in the Third

Reich.[42]

Because of their knowledge of the Czech language, manySudeten Germans were employed in the administrationof the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia as well asin Nazi organizations (Gestapo, etc.). The most notablewas Karl Hermann Frank: the SS and Police general andSecretary of State in the Protectorate.

4.1.2 German invasion of the remainder ofCzechoslovakia

Main article: German occupation of Czechoslovakia

In 1937, the Wehrmacht had formulated a plan called“Operation Green” (Fall Grün) for the invasion ofCzechoslovakia[43] which was implemented as “Opera-tion Southeast” on 15 March 1939.On 14 March Slovakia seceded from Czechoslovakia andbecame a separate pro-Nazi state. On the following day,Carpathian Ruthenia proclaimed independence as well,but after three days was completely occupied by Hungary.Czechoslovak president Emil Hácha traveled to Berlinand was left waiting, while orders to invade were alreadygiven. During the meeting with Adolf Hitler, Hácha wasthreatened with the bombing of Prague if he refused toorder Czech troops to lay down their arms. This induceda heart attack, from which he was revived by an injectionfrom Hitler’s doctor. He then agreed to sign the commu-nique accepting the German occupation of the remain-der of Bohemia and Moravia “which in its unctuous men-dacity was remarkable even for the Nazis”.[44] Churchill’sprediction was fulfilled as German armies entered Pragueand proceeded to occupy the rest of the country, whichwas transformed into a protectorate of the Reich.By seizing Bohemia and Moravia the Third Reich gainedall the skilled labour force and heavy industry placedthere as well as all the weapons of the Czechoslovakianarmy. At the time of Hitler’s later attack on France,roughly 25% of all German weapons came from the pro-tectorate Böhmen und Mähren. The Third Reich alsogained the whole Czechoslovakian gold treasure, includ-ing gold stored in the Bank of England. Of a total 227tons of gold found after the war in salt mines, only 18.4tons were returned to Czechoslovakia in 1982, althoughmost of this gold came from Czechoslovakia. Czechoslo-vakia was also forced to “sell” to the Wehrmacht war ma-terial for 648 million of pre-war Czechoslovak crowns.This debt was never repaid.Germans even took the precaution of sending their troopsover borders as early as the afternoon of 14 March, caus-ing an incident between 13th (Silesian) CzechoslovakianBattalion and the 8th Infantry Division of the Nazi armyin Místek. After a while the Germans decided to pull outas the escalation could endanger “peaceful” takeover.Chamberlain[45] claimed the Prague annexation was a

10 5 QUOTATIONS FROM KEY PARTICIPANTS

“completely different category”, moving beyond the le-gitimate Versailles grievances.Meanwhile, concerns arose in Great Britain that Poland(now substantially encircled by German possessions)would become the next target of Nazi expansionism,which was made apparent by the dispute over the PolishCorridor and the Free City of Danzig. This resulted in thesigning of an Anglo-Polish military alliance, and the con-sequent refusal of the Polish government to accept Ger-man negotiation proposals over the Polish Corridor andthe status of Danzig.Prime Minister Chamberlain felt betrayed by the Naziseizure of Czechoslovakia, realizing his policy of ap-peasement towards Hitler had failed, and began to take amuch harder line against the Nazis. Amongst other thingshe immediately began to mobilize the British Empire’sarmed forces to a war footing. France did the same. Italysaw itself threatened by the British and French fleets andstarted its own invasion of Albania in April 1939. Al-though no immediate action followed, Hitler’s invasionof Poland on 1 September officially began World War II.Non-negligible industrial potential and military equip-ment of the former Czechoslovakia had been efficientlyabsorbed into the Third Reich.

4.1.3 Strengthening of Wehrmacht’s armament

Since most of the border defenses laid in the territory se-ceded as a consequence of the Munich Agreement, re-maining part of Czechoslovakia was entirely open to fur-ther invasion, despite having relatively large stockpiles ofmodern weaponry. In a speech delivered in Reichstag,Hitler stressed out also the military importance of occu-pation, noting that by occupying Czechoslovakia, Ger-many gained 2.175 field guns and cannons, 469 tanks,500 anti-aircraft artillery pieces, 43.000 machine guns,1.090.000 military rifles, 114.000 pistols, about a billionrounds of ammunition and three millions of anti-aircraftgrenades. This amount of weaponry would be sufficientto arm about half of the then Wehrmacht.[46] Czechoslo-vak weaponry later played major part in the German con-quest of Poland and France, the countries that pressuredthe country’s surrender to Germany in 1938.

4.2 Pertaining to international politics

4.2.1 Italian colonial demands from France

In October 1938 in the aftermath of the Munich Agree-ment, Italy demanded concessions from France to yieldto Italy: a free port at Djibouti, control of the AddisAbaba-Djibouti railroad, Italian participation in the man-agement of Suez Canal Company, some form of French-Italian condominium over Tunisia, and the preservationof Italian culture in French-held Corsica with no Frenchassimilation of the people.[47] Italy opposed the French

monopoly over the Suez Canal because under the French-dominated Suez Canal Company all Italianmerchant traf-fic to its colony of Italian East Africa was forced to paytolls upon entering the canal.[47][48] Mussolini hoped thatin light of Italy’s role in settling the Munich Agreementthat prevented the outbreak of war, that Britain wouldreact by putting pressure on France to yield to Italy’s de-mands to preserve the peace.[47] France refused to acceptItaly’s demands as it was widely suspected that Italy’s trueintentions were territorial acquisition of Nice, Corsica,Tunisia, and Djibouti and not the milder official demandsput forth.[47] Relations between Italy and France deterio-rated with France’s refusal to accept Italy’s demands.[47]France responded to Italy’s demands with threateningnaval maneuvers as a warning to Italy.[47] As tensions be-tween Italy and France grew, Hitler made a major speechon 30 January 1939 in which he promised German mil-itary support in the case of an unprovoked war againstItaly.[49]

5 Quotations fromkey participants

German occupation of Prague, 15 March 1939

Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia

Germany stated that the incorporation of Austria into theReich resulted in borders with Czechoslovakia that werea great danger to German security, and that this allowedGermany to be encircled by the Western Powers.[50]

Neville Chamberlain, announced the deal at HestonAerodrome as follows:

11

The daily newspapers carried long columns of the names of theexecuted Czechs, 1944

... the settlement of the Czechoslovakianproblem, which has now been achieved is, inmy view, only the prelude to a larger settle-ment in which all Europe may find peace. Thismorning I had another talk with the GermanChancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paperwhich bears his name upon it as well as mine.Some of you, perhaps, have already heard whatit contains but I would just like to read it toyou: ' ... We regard the agreement signed lastnight and the Anglo-German Naval Agreementas symbolic of the desire of our two peoplesnever to go to war with one another again.'[51]

Later that day he stood outside 10 Downing Street andagain read from the document and concluded:

My good friends, for the second time in ourhistory a British Prime Minister has returnedfrom Germany bringing peace with honour. Ibelieve it is peace for our time.” (Chamber-lain’s reference to Disraeli's return from theCongress of Berlin in 1878)[51][52]

Chamberlain in a letter to his sister Hilda, on 2 October1938, wrote:

I asked Hitler about one in the morn-ing while we were waiting for the draftsmen

whether he would care to see me for anothertalk….I had a very friendly and pleasant talk,on Spain, (where he too said he had never hadany territorial ambitions) economic relationswith S.E. Europe, and disarmament. I did notmention colonies, nor did he. At the end Ipulled out the declaration which I had preparedbeforehand and asked if he would sign it. Asthe interpreter translated the words into Ger-man, Hitler said Yes, I will certainly sign it.When shall we do it? I said “now”, and we wentat once to the writing table and put our signa-tures to the two copies which I had brought withme.”

Winston Churchill, denouncing the Agreement in theHouse of Commons, declared:

We have suffered a total and unmitigateddefeat ... you will find that in a period of timewhich may be measured by years, but may bemeasured by months, Czechoslovakia will beengulfed in the Nazi régime. We are in thepresence of a disaster of the first magnitude... we have sustained a defeat without a war,the consequences of which will travel far withus along our road ... we have passed an aw-ful milestone in our history, when the wholeequilibrium of Europe has been deranged, andthat the terrible words have for the time beingbeen pronounced against the Western democ-racies: “Thou art weighed in the balance andfound wanting”. And do not suppose that thisis the end. This is only the beginning of thereckoning. This is only the first sip, the firstforetaste of a bitter cup which will be profferedto us year by year unless by a supreme recov-ery of moral health andmartial vigour, we ariseagain and take our stand for freedom as in theolden time.

On 3 October 1938, Churchill added:

England has been offered a choice betweenwar and shame. She has chosen shame, andwill get war.

6 Legal nullification

During the Second World War, British Prime Minis-ter Churchill, who opposed the agreement when it wassigned, became determined that the terms of the agree-ment would not be upheld after the war and that the Sude-ten territories should be returned to postwar Czechoslo-vakia. On 5 August 1942, Foreign Minister AnthonyEden sent the following note to Jan Masaryk:

12 7 LEGACY

In the light of recent exchanges of viewbetween our Governments, I think it may beuseful for me to make the following state-ment about the attitude of His Majesty’s Gov-ernment in the United Kingdom as regardsCzecho-Slovakia.

In my letter of the 18th July, 1941, Iinformed your Excellency that the King haddecided to accredit an Envoy Extraordinaryand Minister Plenipotentiary to Dr. Beneš asPresident of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Iexplained that this decision implied that HisMajesty’s Government in the United Kingdomregarded the juridical position of the Presidentand Government of the Czecho-Slovak Repub-lic as identical with that of the other Alliedheads of States and Governments established inthis country. The status of His Majesty’s rep-resentative has recently been raised to that ofan Ambassador.

The Prime Minister had already stated in amessage broadcast to the Czecho-Slovak peo-ple on the 30th September, 1940, the attitudeof His Majesty’s Government in regard to thearrangements reached at Munich in 1938. Mr.Churchill then said that the Munich Agree-ment had been destroyed by the Germans. Thisstatement was formally communicated to Dr.Beneš on the 11th November, 1940.

The foregoing statement and formal actof recognition have guided the policy of HisMajesty’s Government in regard to Czecho-Slovakia, but in order to avoid any possi-ble misunderstanding, I desire to declare onbehalf of His Majesty’s Government in theUnited Kingdom that as Germany has delib-erately destroyed the arrangements concerningCzecho-Slovakia reached in 1938, in whichHisMajesty’s Government in the United Kingdomparticipated, His Majesty’s Government regardthemselves as free from any engagements inthis respect. At the final settlement of theCzecho-Slovak frontiers to be reached at theend of the war they will not be influenced byany changes effected in and since 1938.

To which Masaryk replied as follows:

I have the honour to acknowledge the re-ceipt of your note of the 5th August, 1942,and I avail myself of this opportunity to conveyto your Excellency, on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak Government and of myself, as well as inthe name of the whole Czecho-Slovak peoplewho are at present suffering so terribly underthe Nazi yoke, the expression of our warmestthanks.

Your Excellency’s note emphasises the

fact that the formal act of recognition hasguided the policy of His Majesty’s Governmentin regard to Czecho-Slovakia, but, in orderto avoid any possible misunderstanding, HisMajesty’s Government now desire to declarethat, as Germany has deliberately destroyedthe arrangements concerning Czecho-Slovakiareached in 1938, in which His Majesty’s Gov-ernment in the United Kingdom participated,His Majesty’s Government regard themselvesas free from any engagements in this respect.At the final settlement of the Czecho-Slovakfrontiers to be reached at the end of the war,they will not be influenced by any changes ef-fected in and since 1938.

My Government accept your Excellency’snote as a practical solution of the questionsand difficulties of vital importance for Czecho-Slovakia which emerged between our twocountries as the consequence of the MunichAgreement, maintaining, of course, our polit-ical and juridical position with regard to theMunich Agreement and the events which fol-lowed it as expressed in the note of the Czecho-Slovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the 16thDecember, 1941. We consider your importantnote of the 5th August, 1942, as a highly signif-icant act of justice towards Czecho-Slovakia,and we assure you of our real satisfaction andof our profound gratitude to your great coun-try and nation. Between our two countries theMunich Agreement can now be considered asdead.[53]

Following Allied victory and the surrender of theThird Reich in 1945, the Sudetenland was returned toCzechoslovakia, while the German speaking majoritywas expelled.

7 Legacy

During the Cold War, Chamberlain’s agreement at Mu-nich again resurfaced, with prominent anti-communistsarguing that the United States could not reverse his per-ceived mistakes by “appeasing” the Soviet Union.[54]

TheWest German politics of staying neutral in the Arab–Israeli conflict following the Munich massacre and thesubsequent hijacking of Lufthansa Flight 615 in 1972,rather than taking the decided pro-Israel position of ear-lier governments, led to Israeli comparisons with the Mu-nich Agreement and the Appeasement.[55]

In the 2013 phase of the Syrian crisis, U.S. Secretary ofState John Kerry said on 7 September 2013 “this is ourMunich moment” in which the West should not remain“silent spectators to slaughter”, an invocation to othercountries to support a U.S. led strike against the regime of

9.1 Notes 13

Bashar al-Assad. Ironically, that strike never took place,despite Obama’s invocation of the “red line”, chemicalattacks, which he asserted Assad had crossed.[56]

8 See also

• Appeasement of Hitler

• Neville Chamberlain’s European Policy

• German occupation of Czechoslovakia

• Lesson of Munich

• Treaty of Prague (1973)

• Western betrayal

• Sudetenland Medal

• Causes of World War II

9 References

9.1 Notes

[1] Statistický lexikon obcí v Republice československé I. Zeměčeská. Prague. 1934.Statistický lexikon obcí v Republice československé II. Zeměmoravskoslezská. Prague. 1935.

[2] Eleanor L. Turk. The History of Germany. West-port, Connecticut, USA: Greenwood Press, 1999. ISBN9780313302749. Pp. 123.

[3] Noakes & Pridham 2010, pp. 100–101.

[4] Noakes & Pridham 2010, p. 102.

[5] Noakes & Pridham 2010, p. 101.

[6] Noakes & Pridham 2010, p. 1001–1002.

[7] Noakes & Pridham 2010, p. 104.

[8] Noakes & Pridham 2010, p. 102-3.

[9] Bell 1986, p. 238.

[10] Noakes & Pridham 2010, p. 201.

[11] Noakes & Pridham 2010, p. 105.

[12] Adolf Hitler, Max Domarus. The Essential Hitler:Speeches and Commentary. Bolchazy-Carducci Publish-ers, 2007. ISBN 9780865166271. Pp. 626.

[13] Adolf Hitler, Max Domarus. The Essential Hitler:Speeches and Commentary. Bolchazy-Carducci Publish-ers, 2007. ISBN 9780865166271. Pp. 627.

[14] Bell 1986, p. 239.

[15] Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. Hitler & Mussolini: TheSecret Meetings. New York, New York, USA: EnigmaBooks, 2008. ISBN 9781929631421. Pp. 71.

[16] Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. Hitler & Mussolini: TheSecret Meetings. New York, New York, USA: EnigmaBooks, 2008. ISBN 9781929631421. Pp. 71–72.

[17] Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. Hitler & Mussolini: TheSecret Meetings. New York, New York, USA: EnigmaBooks, 2008. ISBN 9781929631421. Pp. 72.

[18] President Beneš' declaration made on 16 December 1941

[19] Note of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile dated 22February 1944

[20] Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (1997), Rul-ing No. II. ÚS 307/97 (in Czech), Brno Check datevalues in: |accessdate= (help); Stran interpretace “kdyzemě vede válku”, obsažené v čl. I Úmluvy o natural-izaci mezi Československem a Spojenými státy, publiko-vané pod č. 169/1929 Sb. za účelem zjištění, zda jesplněna podmínka státního občanství dle restitučních před-pisů, Ústavní soud vychází z již v roce 1933 vypracov-ané definice agrese Společnosti národů, která byla převzatado londýnské Úmluvy o agresi (CONVENITION DE DEF-INITION DE L'AGRESSION), uzavřené dne 4. 7. 1933Československem, dle které není třeba válku vyhlašovat (čl.II bod 2) a dle které je třeba za útočníka považovat ten stát,který první poskytne podporu ozbrojeným tlupám, jež seutvoří na jeho území a jež vpadnou na území druhého státu(čl. II bod 5). V souladu s nótou londýnské vlády ze dne 22.2. 1944, navazující na prohlášení prezidenta republiky zedne 16. 12. 1941 dle § 64 odst. 1 bod 3 tehdejší Ústavy, av souladu s citovaným čl. II bod 5 má Ústavní soud za to,že dnem, kdy nastal stav války, a to s Německem, je den 17.9. 1938, neboť tento den na pokyn Hitlera došlo k utvoření“Sudetoněmeckého svobodného sboru” (Freikorps) z uprch-nuvších vůdců Henleinovy strany a několik málo hodin potéuž tito vpadli na československé území ozbrojeni německ-ými zbraněmi.

[21] Nigel Jones. Countdown to Valkyrie: The July Plot to As-sassinate Hitler. Pp. 73-74.

[22] Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. Hitler & Mussolini: TheSecret Meetings. New York, New York, USA: EnigmaBooks, 2008. ISBN 9781929631421. Pp. 73.

[23] Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. Hitler & Mussolini: TheSecret Meetings. New York, New York, USA: EnigmaBooks, 2008. ISBN 9781929631421. Pp. 73–74.

[24] Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. Hitler & Mussolini: TheSecret Meetings. New York, New York, USA: EnigmaBooks, 2008. ISBN 9781929631421. Pp. 74.

[25] Dallek, Robert (1995). Franklin D. Roosevelt and Amer-ican Foreign Policy, 1932-1945: With a New Afterword.Oxford University Press. p. 166. ISBN 9780199826667.

[26] Gilbert & Gott 1967, p. 178.

[27] http://www.britannia.com/history/docs/peacetime.html

[28] Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick 1959, p. 135.

14 9 REFERENCES

[29] Klaus Hildebrand 1991.

[30] Shirer, William L. 1960.

[31] Terry Parssinen 2004.

[32] Viscount Maugham 1944.

[33] Shirer, William L. 1969, p. 339–340.

[34] Jean-Paul Sartre, Le sursis

[35] Shirer, William L. 1960, p. 520.

[36] See Joseph Goebbels diary, 2 Oct 1938, p. 2.

[37] http://www.bruntal.net/2007072602-k-otazce-vysidleni-obcanu-csr-ze-sudet-tesinska-podkarpatske-rusi-a-slovenske-republiky-v-letech-1938-1939

[38] http://www.bohumildolezal.cz/texty/u074-08.htm

[39] http://www.forumhistoriae.sk/documents/10180/70153/hetenyi.pdf

[40] Siwek nd.

[41] Forced displacement of Czech population under Nazis in1938 and 1943, Radio Prague

[42] Zimmermann, Volker 1999.

[43] Herzstein, Robert Edwin 1980, p. 184.

[44] Noakes, J. and Pridham, G. (eds) (2010) [2001] Nazism1919-1945, Vol 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial Exter-mination, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, p.119

[45] McDonough, 2002, p.73

[46] Motl, Stanislav (2007), Kam zmizel zlatý poklad republiky(2nd ed.), Prague: Rybka publishers

[47] H. James Burgwyn. Italian Foreign Policy in the Inter-war Period, 1918-1940. Westport, Connecticut, USA:Praeger Publishers, 1997. p182-183.

[48] "French Army breaks a one-day strike and stands on guardagainst a land-hungry Italy", LIFE, 19 Dec 1938. pp. 23.

[49] H. James Burgwyn. Italian Foreign Policy in the Inter-war Period, 1918-1940. Westport, Connecticut, USA:Praeger Publishers, 1997. p185.

[50] Reinhard Müller 1943, p. 116-130.

[51] The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations

[52] “Neville Chamberlain”. UK government. Retrieved2008-09-23.

[53] League of Nations Treaty Series, p. 378–380.

[54] “Peace in Our Time: The Spirit of Munich Lives On”, byMichael Johns, Policy Review magazine, Summer 1987

[55] “Deutsche Feigheit” (PDF). Der Spiegel (in German). 11November 1972. Retrieved 16 July 2013.

[56] http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/

9.2 Bibliography

Books

1. Noakes, J.; Pridham, G. (2010) [2001]. Nazism1919–1945: Foreign Policy War, and Racial Exter-mination 2 (2nd ed.). Devon: University of ExeterPress.

2. Noakes, J.; Pridham, G. (2010) [2001]. Nazism1919–1945: Foreign Policy War, and Racial Exter-mination 3 (2nd ed.). Devon: University of ExeterPress.

3. Bell, P. M. H. (1986). The Second World War inEurope. Harlow, Essex: Longman.

4. Gilbert, Martin; Gott, Richard (1967). The Ap-peasers. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

5. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick (1959). The Inner Circle.Macmillan.

6. Shirer, William L. (1960). The Rise and Fall of theThird Reich. Pan.

7. Shirer, WilliamL. (1969). The Collapse of the ThirdRepublic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940.De Capo Press.

8. Klaus Hildebrand (1991). Das Dritte Reich. (inGerman). München: Oldenbourg Grundriss derGeschichte. S.36

9. Terry Parssinen (2004). The Oster Conspiracy of1938: The Unknown Story of the Military Plot to KillHitler. Pimlico Press. ISBN 1-84413-307-9.

10. Viscoumt Maugham (1944). The Truth about theMunich Crisis. William Heinemann Ltd.

11. Zimmerman, Volker (1999). Die Sudetendeutschenim NS-Staat. Politik und Stimmung der Bevölkerungim Reichsgau Sudetenland (1938–1945) (in Ger-man). Essen. ISBN 3-88474-770-3.

12. Reinhard Müller (1943). Deutschland (in German).München and Berlin:: Sechster Teil, R. OldenbourgVerlag.

13. Herzstein, Robert Edwin (1980). The Nazis. WorldWar II series. New York: Time-Life Books.

14. McDonough, F. (2002). Hitler, Chamberlain andAppeasement. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Web

1. Siwek, Tadeusz (n.d.). “Statystyczni i niestatysty-czni Polacy w Republice Czeskiej” (in Polish).Wspólnota Polska.

15

Other

1. League of Nations Treaty Series 204.

Journals

1. Dray, W. H. (1978). Concepts of Causation in A.J. P. Taylor’s Account of the Origins of the SecondWorld War 17 (2). History and Theory.

9.3 Other sources

• Madeleine Albright with Bill Woodward, PragueWinter: A personal Story of Remembrance and War,1937–1948, Harper, 2012

• Peter Bugge, Czech Democracy 1918–1938.Paragon or Parody?, in Bohemia, Vol 47, no. 12006/2007

• Cole, Robert A. “Appeasing Hitler: The MunichCrisis of 1938: A Teaching and Learning Re-source,” New England Journal of History (2010)66#2 pp 1–30.

• David Faber, Munich, 1938: Appeasement andWorld War II (2009) excerpt and text search

• Daniel E Miller, Forging Political Compromise:Antonín Švehla and the Czechoslovak RepublicanParty, 1918–1933, University or Pittsburgh Press,1999

• Andrea Orzoff, Battle for the Castne: Myth ofCzechoslovakia in Europe, 1914–1948, Oxford Uni-versity Press, 2009

10 External links• The Munich Agreement – Text of the MunichAgreement on-line

• TheMunichAgreement in contemporary radio newsbroadcasts – Actual radio news broadcasts docu-menting evolution of the crisis

• The Munich Agreement Original reports from TheTimes

• British Pathe newsreel (includes Chamberlain’sspeech at Heston aerodrome) (Adobe Flash)

• Peace: And the Crisis Begins from a broadcast byDorothy Thompson, 1 October 1938

• Post-blogging the Sudeten Crisis – A day by daysummary of the crisis

• Text of the 1942 exchange of notes nullifying theMunich agreement

• Photocopy of The Munich Agreement from Politis-ches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts in Berlin (text inGerman) and from The National Archives in Lon-don (map).

• Map of Europe during Munich Agreement at omni-atlas

• Dr. Quigley explains how Nazi Germany seized astronger Czechoslovakia

16 11 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

11 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

11.1 Text• Munich Agreement Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_Agreement?oldid=675231637 Contributors: Mav, Bryan Derksen,Szopen, Scipius, Roadrunner, SimonP, Mintguy, Olivier, Wapcaplet, Sannse, Paul Benjamin Austin, G-Man, Darkwind, Dietary Fiber,Dpol, Andres, Wik, Mackensen, Cjrother, Jfruh, Jason M, Qertis, JorgeGG, Jeffq, Juro, Altenmann, Romanm, Der Eberswalder, Tim-rollpickering, DHN, Halibutt, Bkell, Hadal, Mushroom, Cautious, Lupo, Guy Peters, Mattflaschen, Lysy, Psb777, DocWatson42, Christo-pher Parham, Oberiko, Everyking, Matthead, Wmahan, Stevietheman, Fys, Traumerei, LiDaobing, Rworsnop, Rienzo, Piotrus, Dominotheory,Wikimol, PFHLai, Cubelodyte, Necrothesp, Vasile, Allissonn, Beardless, Salvadors, Lumidek, Irpen, Picapica, Now3d, Lacrimosus,Esperant, Millisits, Warfieldian, Bruzie, Twinxor, Rich Farmbrough, Rhobite, Pavel Vozenilek, Ratonyi~enwiki, Bender235, Yasis, Shanes,Mentatus, Bobo192, Nyenyec, Wtmgeo, Darwinek, Helix84, Pearle, Alansohn, Astronomy76, 119, Ixnay~enwiki, Droob, Impin, AshleyPomeroy, UnHoly, Denniss, Snowolf, Wtmitchell, Binabik80, Rebroad, ProhibitOnions, Kusma, Redvers, Adrian.benko, RyanGerbil10,Brookie, Daveydweeb, Joriki, Sandius, Camw, Aldiboronti, Carcharoth, Schultz.Ryan, Ardfern, Tabletop, Kelisi, Kriegman, Zzyzx11,Deltabeignet, Kristo~enwiki, Tim!, Jmcc150, Smithfarm, Cepek, Olessi, MartinC~enwiki, Fred Bradstadt, JanSuchy, Cocheese805,Ground Zero, RexNL, Nicmila, Volunteer Marek, YurikBot, Wavelength, RobotE, Tommyt, A.S. Brown, Reo On, John Quincy AddingMachine, WO2~enwiki, Xihr, Rsrikanth05, Wimt, EWS23, Phoenix79, David McCormick, CJK, Jamesg, Rjensen, Howcheng, D. F.Schmidt, Szalas, LodeRunner, Bota47, Barnabypage, Tullie, Nlu, Chaleur, Petri Krohn, DGaw, LeonardoRob0t, Scoutersig, Wikipeditor,Curpsbot-unicodify, Nixer, Markvs88, Whouk, Allens, Otto ter Haar, GrinBot~enwiki, CIreland, Fjeinca, Attilios, SmackBot, Britannicus,Hux, Melchoir, Ominae, Delldot, Onda, Timeshifter, Kintetsubuffalo, Edgar181, HalfShadow, Yopie, Gilliam, Quidam65, Underneath-it-All, Keegan, Iskander32, Jprg1966, Xx236, Nataraja87, Makif2074~enwiki, DHN-bot~enwiki, Colonies Chris, GoodDay, Javalenok, Can'tsleep, clown will eat me, Rhollenton, Dave Rave, Cplakidas, Jaro.p~enwiki, Greenshed, Victor V V, CharonX, Sidious1701, Kalathalan,Tankred, Will Beback, SashatoBot, Chaldean, Esrever, Acebrock, Teneriff, Tazmaniacs, Airminded, Edwy, IronGargoyle, Yuri GouveiaRibeiro~enwiki, Bluewind, Fisel, Illythr, Ziggyrunner08, Tedman1973, Neddyseagoon, Dl2000, D64, Keith-264, Yarp, RudyB, Iridescent,Shanem201, Fitzwilliam, Rubisco~enwiki, Richard75, Sabik, Eluchil404, Tawkerbot2, Filelakeshoe, Chris55, Flambelle, Triage, SivArt,Pseudo-Richard, Misswiki89, Karenjc, Hemlock Martinis, AndrewHowse, Themightyquill, TheRegicider, Cydebot, FrankDynan, GogoDodo, R-41, Odie5533, 79spirit, Englishnerd, ObjectivityAlways, Omicronpersei8, Robert.Allen, Unknown entity, Thijs!bot, Robsinden,Mkenact, Keraunos, Commonlaw504, Staberinde, Mikethemessiah, Electron9, Mbburch, Escarbot, AntiVandalBot, Luna Santin, Amer-icanPatriot29, Smith2006, DarthShrine, DuncanHill, Skomorokh, Ericoides, Panarjedde, Magioladitis, Albmont, Freefry, Nick Cooper,Thedreamdied, Coughinink, Cpl Syx, Vltava, Cloudz679, Bardhylius, BaomoVW, MartinBot, 5618, Lahaun, Dapi89, Kateshortforbob,CommonsDelinker, Yuval a, J.delanoy, Rotek, Grim Revenant, Tlawrence85, TomyDuby, Yar, Jn25b, DadaNeem, Honzula, Lebob, Je-vansen, Ja 62, M. Frederick, Beezhive, Leightonmowbray, Idioma-bot, Hugo999, Sam Blacketer, Treos, VolkovBot, Rwestera, TXiK-iBoT, Mowsbury, Steven J. Anderson, Sintaku, Nazgul02, ^demonBot2, Mkpumphrey, Rjm at sleepers, DesmondRavenstone, River-Styx23, Baltiron, Andy Dingley, Enviroboy, Truthanado, Pjoef, Imperfection, Jomfan, EmxBot, Hughey, SieBot, Tresiden, Sakkura,Winchelsea, Careyman, Flyer22, Cuvette, Yerpo, Phil Bridger, Invitamia, Hello71, Lightmouse, Hobartimus, La Parka Your Car, Seed-bot, Quest4history, Morstar, Squirrel06, ClueBot, RobertLunaIII, The Thing That Should Not Be, Fadesga, Black&White, Xeno malleus,Kucera~enwiki, Piledhigheranddeeper, Excirial, Alexbot, Jusdafax, Asmaybe, Gtstricky, Estirabot, Dudeski17, Cunikm, Arguepower22,Kate Phaye, Versus22, SoxBot III, Longmemory, Conrad4ever, Mjancuska, XLinkBot, Tuxlie, Fastily, Ernst-Günther Baade, Robveget,Darth Catherine, Nemoniac, WikHead, HerkusMonte, Rividian, Moisesencyclopedia, WikiDao, Good Olfactory, PeterWD, Johnkatz1972,Gggh, CalumH93, Addbot, Kristinamwood, Davrosuk, Fieldday-sunday, OOooMileyooOO, Morning277, Favonian, Hamnoctori, Tourvel,Tide rolls, Bartledan, Tommyv580, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Ptbotgourou, Ben Pisarski, Rsquire3, Evans1982, XrysD, PMLawrence, Chuckp15,KamikazeBot, AnomieBOT, Andrewrp, VanishedUser sdu9aya9fasdsopa, Archon 2488, Rubinbot, Adeliine, JackieBot, Kingpin13, Mannjess, Materialscientist, ImperatorExercitus, Oceanoceanoc, Potočnik, FreeRangeFrog, Xqbot, TomB123, The sock that should not be,Tagryn, Tiller54, GrouchoBot, Sydneytw, Pavlor, Von.grzanka, AlphaRed3, Shadowjams, Drmissio, Dougofborg, Frozenevolution, Stone-Prophet, FrescoBot, Ryryrules100, Tobby72, Breasts of life, G6350, Jonathansuh, Grandiose, SpacemanSpiff, Zafartahirov, Moonraker,Mellios1, RedBot, MastiBot, PB0305, Salvidrim!, Yunshui, Breconborn, Lotje, Brian the Editor, Deagle AP, EmausBot, Mamalala, John ofReading, Grottenolm42, Gfoley4, T700, Bernard Teo, GoingBatty, Oakcroft, Slightsmile, Tommy2010, Wikipelli, MrTvolaCZ, Solomon-fromfinland, Josve05a, Érico Júnior Wouters, Sswitzer, The Nut, Lucerna-iuris, A930913, Cimmerian praetor, Cymru.lass, Rthompson54,Sfdyoung, DASHBotAV,Whoop whoop pull up, ClueBot NG, Chiyoko46, Bpolania, Kasirbot, Helpful Pixie Bot, Breckham101, Gob Lofa,Stas-Adolf, Arionstone, Marcocapelle, Benzband, BattyBot, Ganpati23, Majesty of Knowledge, AutomaticStrikeout, Dexbot, Irondome,Mogism, Morfusmax, Tony Mach, Ekips39, Sczchech, Adnan Farooq Chatha, Tigran khalatyan, Isaac Mayne, FoxyOrange, Avenflight,Newropean, PussBroad, C super2, Quenhitran, Notthebestusername, Hamzaz27, Monkbot, Marcosoldfox, Ciaratoon156, Biblioworm,Julius the Siezer, Theanon12321, Anonymous5152, KasparBot, Booklover19a and Anonymous: 551

11.2 Images• File:Bekanntmachung_cz.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1e/Bekanntmachung_cz.jpg License: Publicdomain Contributors: http://www.druhasvetovavalka.nazory.cz/images/mrtvi11.jpg Original artist: Unknown

• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_121-0008,_Sudetenland,_Besuch_Wilhelm_Frick_(cropped_Konrad_Henlein).jpg Source:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2e/Bundesarchiv_Bild_121-0008%2C_Sudetenland%2C_Besuch_Wilhelm_Frick_%28cropped_Konrad_Henlein%29.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors:

• Bundesarchiv_Bild_121-0008,_Sudetenland,_Besuch_Wilhelm_Frick.jpg Original artist: Bundesarchiv_Bild_121-0008,_Sudetenland,_Besuch_Wilhelm_Frick.jpg: Unknown

• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_137-004055,_Eger,_Besuch_Adolf_Hitlers.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c0/Bundesarchiv_Bild_137-004055%2C_Eger%2C_Besuch_Adolf_Hitlers.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This imagewas provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. TheGerman Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalizationof the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown

• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1976-033-20,_Anschluss_sudetendeutscher_Gebiete.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/98/Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1976-033-20%2C_Anschluss_sudetendeutscher_Gebiete.jpg License: CC BY-SA

11.2 Images 17

3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as partof a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/orpositive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown

• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-2004-0007,_Hans_Oster.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-2004-0007%2C_Hans_Oster.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided toWikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German FederalArchive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originalsas provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown

• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-H12478,_Obersalzberg,_Münchener_Abkommen,_Vorbereitung.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a3/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-H12478%2C_Obersalzberg%2C_M%C3%BCnchener_Abkommen%2C_Vorbereitung.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by theGerman Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authenticrepresentation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital ImageArchive. Original artist: Unknown

• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-R69173,_Münchener_Abkommen,_Staatschefs.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-R69173%2C_M%C3%BCnchener_Abkommen%2C_Staatschefs.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as partof a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/orpositive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown

• File:Chamberlain_returns_from_Munich_with_Anglo-German_Agreement.ogg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c3/Chamberlain_returns_from_Munich_with_Anglo-German_Agreement.ogg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/ww2outbreak/7907.shtml Original artist: Richard Dimbleby / Neville Chamberlain

• File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Originalartist: ?

• File:Czech_refugees_from_the_Sudetenland_3.gif Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1f/Czech_refugees_from_the_Sudetenland_3.gif License: Public domain Contributors: Czech archiv Original artist: Unknown

• File:Demonstrace_před_Rudolfínem_22._9._1938.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Demonstrace_p%C5%99ed_Rudolf%C3%ADnem_22._9._1938.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Mnichov 1938 Original artist: Unknown

• File:Edvard_Beneš.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/98/Edvard_Bene%C5%A1.jpg License: Public do-main Contributors: This image is available from the United States Library of Congress's Prints and Photographs division under the digitalID fsa.8e00866.This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work. A normal copyright tag is still required. See Commons:Licensing for more information.Original artist: Unknown. Transfer; United States. Office of War Information. Overseas Picture Division. Washington Division; 1944.

• File:Flag_of_Czechoslovakia.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2d/Flag_of_Czechoslovakia.svg License:Public domain Contributors:

• -xfi-'s file• -xfi-'s code• Zirland’s codes of colors

Original artist:(of code): SVG version by cs:-xfi-.

• File:Košice_11._november_1938.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2a/Ko%C5%A1ice_11._november_1938.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Ladislav Luppa

• File:Lesser_coat_of_arms_of_Czechoslovakia_(1918-1938_and_1945-1961).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1f/Lesser_coat_of_arms_of_Czechoslovakia_%281918-1938_and_1945-1961%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contribu-tors: Own work Original artist: Shazz

• File:MunichAgreement.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c7/MunichAgreement.jpg License: Public do-main Contributors: This is photograph D 2239 from the collections of the Imperial War Museums. Original artist: Ministry of Informationofficial photographer

• File:Münchner_abkommen5_en.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5e/M%C3%BCnchner_abkommen5_en.svg License: CC BY-SA 2.5 Contributors: File:Münchner abkommen5+.svg Original artist: Jaro.p

• File:Protectorate_Of_Bohemia_and_Moravia.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5a/Protectorate_Of_Bohemia_and_Moravia.png License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: XrysD

• File:Sudetendeutsche.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d3/Sudetendeutsche.png License: CC BY-SA3.0 Contributors: Own work, Statistický lexikon obcí v Republice československé I. Země česká (Praha, 1934), Statistický lexikon obcív Republice československé II. Země moravskoslezská (Praha, 1935) Original artist: Fext

• File:Sudetenland_Reichsgau_1944.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/41/Sudetenland_Reichsgau_1944.png License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: XrysD

• File:Teroristická_akce_sudetoněmeckého_Freikorpsu.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d5/Teroristick%C3%A1_akce_sudeton%C4%9Bmeck%C3%A9ho_Freikorpsu.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Cesta k dekretůma odsunu Němců Original artist: Unknown

• File:The_German_occupation_of_Bohemia_and_Moravia.gif Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/46/The_German_occupation_of_Bohemia_and_Moravia.gif License: Public domain Contributors: Rozumět dějinám Original artist: Unknown

• File:Zaolzie_karwina_1938.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6f/Zaolzie_karwina_1938.jpg License:Public domain Contributors: Książnica Cieszyńska Original artist: Unknown

18 11 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

• File:Češi_vyhnaní_z_pohraničí_hledají_nový_domov.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/40/%C4%8Ce%C5%A1i_vyhnan%C3%AD_z_pohrani%C4%8D%C3%AD_hledaj%C3%AD_nov%C3%BD_domov.jpg License: Public domainContributors: Cesta k dekretům a odsunu Němců Original artist: Unknown

• File:Čs._vojáci_v_Krásné_Lípě.gif Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/33/%C4%8Cs._voj%C3%A1ci_v_Kr%C3%A1sn%C3%A9_L%C3%ADp%C4%9B.gif License: Public domain Contributors: Mnichov 1938 Original artist: Unknown

• File:Польша_показала_Ивану_его_место.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c5/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%88%D0%B0_%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B0_%D0%98%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%83_%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%BE_%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE.jpg Li-cense: Public domain Contributors: ГРАНИЦЫ АЛЬМАНАХ ЦЕНТРА ЭТНИЧЕСКИХ И НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙИВАНОВСКОГО ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА Вып. 2 2008 reports that cartoon appeared in Mucha, 1938, №43. Poostatnich wydarzeniach Original artist: S. Rydygier

11.3 Content license• Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0