No. 08-16174-CC__________________________________________________________________

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

__________________________________________________________________

JAMES B. STEGEMAN,Plaintiff/Appellant

v.

SUPERIOR COURT, et., al.Defendants/Appellees

__________________________________________________________

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA,

Atlanta Division

1:08-cv-01971-WSD

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATON OF APPELLANT’S MOTIONS:

TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL, REMEDY DEFAULT, AND REINSTATE APPEAL, AND/OR

FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENTS OUT OF TIME AND REMEDY DEFAULT, AND/OR

STAY MANDATE OR RECALL MANDATE_____________________________________

JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se 821 Sheppard Road Stone Mountain, GA 30083 (404) 300-9782

COMES NOW, Appellant James B. Stegeman who files Motion for

Reconsideration of Appellant’s Motions: To Set Aside Dismissal, Remedy

Default and Reinstate Appeal; and/or For Leave to File Documents Out of Time

and Remedy Default; and/or To Stay Mandate or Recall Mandate.

BACKGOURND OF EVENTS LEADING TO DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

Appellant’sMotion to Appeal in Forma Pauperis was Granted by District

Court December 26, 20081. Appellant filed Motion for Appointment of Counsel

January 7, 2009, which was Denied by Judge Hull January 16, 2009; in the same

Order, Judge Hull denied Ms. McDonald, who was a party to the District Court

action, her Rights to Appeal. Motion for Reconsideration was filed January 30,

2009, Denied February 11, 2009.

Appellant filed Motion to Recuse Judges Hull, Wilson and Marcus February

18, 2009; Georgia Power Appellees filed Objection February 23, 2009 to which

Appellant filed Reply on March 6, 2009.

A. Clerk’s Communications

The Clerk failed to follow rules and procedures, and worked to have this

Appeal dismissed. Appellant disputes the omissions claimed by the Clerk,

nevertheless, he timely complied, hoping to have his Appeal decided on the merits.

1 District Court Order Ruled that the Appeal is not frivolous, and that Appellant is disabled with limited resources

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While awaiting this Court’s Ruling on Motion to Recuse, on April 1, 2009

Appellant received, a copy of the Clerk to Clerk communication stating the Appeal

had been Dismissed for failure to prosecute, and Motion to Recuse was Moot,2 an

appealable Order that cannot become Moot because a Clerk chose to ignore it.

Appellant’s Brief and Record Excerpts3 were hand delivered to the Court

April 13, 20094 per April 6, 2009 conversation with clerk (do not show filed until

April 16, 2009). April 18, 2009 Appellant received letter from Clerk stating

Appellant had failed to Motion to Reinstate;5 Motion filed April 22, 2009.

May 8, 2009 letter from Clerk that the Court did not receive Order/judgment

appealed from, Certificate of Service for Record Excerpts. Although Appellant is

positive the documents had been submitted, he re-submitted them, via USPS

Overnight signed for by S. O’Neal on May 15, 2009, see pg. 5 of Exhibit A.

Next, letter dated May 22, 2009 stating “if the corrections for the record

2 Appellant was not sent Notice, or an Order, he only received the Clerk to Clerk communication which stated Appeal was dismissed and Motion to Recuse was Moot. Copies of all letters from the Clerk are attached hereto as “Exhibit A”3 Records Excerpts consisted of: District Court Docket Sheet, Complaint, Answers from both sets of Appellees, the Rulings/judgments Appealed, Certificates of Interested Persons, and Certificates of Service.4 Appellant quotes the date he received a communication from the Clerk; the date(s) he references as filing or filed are the dates stamped “FILED” on Appellant’s copies; Appellant calls to this Court’s attention that he cannot be sure what was actually Filed and what was not as the Docket Report does not coincide with his “Filed” copies. Appellant cannot say for sure the document was ever even Filed, although his copy does reflect “Filed”, not “Received”, but “Filed”. 5 The telephone conversation with the Clerk informed Appellant that the only thing needed to be filed was the Brief and Record Excerpts, which was timely complied with;

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excerpts were not received within fourteen days, the motion to reinstate will be

returned unfiled”. Appellant called the clerk, was told she was out of town for a

week. Appellant again sent the documents, this time via Courier who signed a

document stating that he had visually seen the documents being delivered so that

Appellant had proof of what was delivered.

July 09, 2009 received Order Denying Motion to Reinstate which cites no

authority or caselaw. For all Appellant knows, the Clerk made the Ruling.

RELEVENT FACTS

Plaintiff/Appellant filed a prima facie Verified Complaint in District Court.

None of the Defendants/Appellees filed a Verified Answer. In this Court, none of

the Appellees bothered to file a Brief. The opposing parties obviously knew they

could violate Fed. R. Civ. P, Local Rules, and IOP without consequence; leaving

one to logically conclude prior agreement had been reached in both District Court

and this Court to have the Appeal dismissed. Perhaps the reason Judge Duffey, Jr.

Granted Appellant’s Motion to Proceed on Appeal in Forma Pauperis.

Without giving Ms. McDonald a chance to cure a defective Notice of

Appeal, Judge Hull denied Ms. McDonald the Right of Appeal.

The Georgia Power Appellees fraudulently concealed pertinent information

in both Superior and District Courts until after District Court dismissed the case.

In Superior Court, they claimed the need to investigate into Plaintiffs’ allegations

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about the easement documents being fraudulent, refusing to rebut the evidence.

In their Summary Judgment Brief “Exhibit B”, Georgia Power provided

further evidence that proved their claims were fraudulent. They suddenly

disregarded reformation and wanted the Court to just grant them prescriptive

easement, stating “prescription is to make a bad title good”, Exhibit B fn3.

Affidavit by Marcus Calloway “Exhibit C” clearly states that on August 13,

2007 Dale Reiner at Georgia Power contacted him and requested a title search on

Appellant’s property ¶3, which he performed August 15, 20076 ¶4; and another

search was conducted concerning the property November 20, 2007 ¶10.

Neither Mr. Calloway, nor Georgia Power have ever addressed the fact that

R. F. Wells or Robert F. Wells never existed; that the document in no way pertains

to Appellant’s property; shows the wrong road, wrong Land Lot, and the

description is incorrect “Exhibit D”. They attempt to claim “37” should have been

“73”, but in District 18, Land Lots 37 and 74 are together and touching, both are on

the other side of Ridge Avenue. Clearly, Georgia Power and Mr. Calloway

conspired and agreed to deceive, and work a fraud upon the court.

Judge Becker in Superior Court, violating Georgia Land Registration Laws,

6 Calloway’s findings show that the property description did not match Appellant’s property; Georgia Power knew the documents did not pertain to Appellant’s property, yet in Magistrate Court they swore under oath the document covered the property, was valid and legal. During both Superior and District Court cases, they insisted they had a legal valid easement knowing the entire time that was a lie. Georgia Power trespassed onto and damaged Appellant’s property August 30, 2007, after Calloway’s research.

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due process of law, Plaintiffs’ rights, participated in Conspiracy to violate rights

under color of law, allowed and committed fraud upon the Court. Becker Ruled

Georgia Power’s fraudulent easement document valid and granted prescriptive

easement and Summary Judgment in their favor without allowing Plaintiffs to

participate or file a Summary Judgment Responsive Brief.

Becker Ruled lacking personal and subject matter jurisdiction, she violated

due process of law; the ruling was obtained through fraud and fraud upon the

Court. Her Rulings go directly against Rulings of The Supreme Court of Georgia

which has consistently Ruled against utility companies having prescriptive

easement. The ruling isn’t merely voidable, but it is Void on it’s face.

Denial of Appellant’s Motion(s) to Reinstate results in manifest injustice;

there has been substantial fraud upon the Courts by Appellees to obtain judgments

in their favor in Superior and District Courts. Further, as a disabled pro se litigant,

Appellant has been subjected to disparate treatment; denied his Fourth, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment Rights, ADA Title II, and the equal protection clause.

ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES

I. RIGHT TO APPEAL

A. Ms. McDonald’s Right to Appeal

Ms. McDonald was neither Noticed of defective Notice of Appeal, nor allowed

to cure the defect. In Casanova v. Dubois, 289 F.3d 142, 145 (1st Cir. 2002) at 146

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“eighteen months had passed after Notice of Appeal had been filed”; “based on

Becker, the dismissal of appeals …was unwarranted.” And in Wash v. Johnson,

343 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 2003):

“The Supreme Court’s holding in Becker,…is jurisdictional and may be cured…once omission is called to a party’s attention, effectively overrules our holdings in Mikeska and Cater” “…based upon Becker and in agreement with our sister circuit’s reasoning in Casanova, we grant Moore’s motions to reinstate appeal and to reconsider the clerk’s refusal to do so…”

The Supreme Court has stated that Right to Appeal is not lost due to a defect

in Notice; Plaintiff/Appellant must be “Noticed” and afforded opportunity to cure

the defect”. Becker 532 U.S. at 764, 766. Judge Hull’s Order Denying

Appellant’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel clearly stated that Ms. McDonald

is not part of the Appeal.

B. Clerk’s Violation of 11th Cir. R. 42-1(b)

“…when appellant fails to file a brief or other required papers within the time permitted,…the clerk shall issue a notice…, that upon expiration of 14 days from the date thereof the appeal will be dismissed for want of prosecution if the default has not been remedied by filing the brief… and a motion to file documents out of time.”.

Appellant was not provided Notice as shown in this Court’s Local Rules,

Rule 42-1(b), which goes against Supreme Court Rulings. One doesn’t have to be

extremely intelligent to conclude that this Appeal had been predetermined.

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The United States Supreme Court, and sister circuits have long held that

that the late filing of a brief is “insufficient to warrant dismissal”, see Marcaida v.

Rascoe, 569 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1978):

[26] This court is not required to dismiss every appeal which does not meet the time limitations…In Phillips v. Employees Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 239 F.2d 79, 80 n.2 (5th Cir. 1956), …the late filing of briefs is ‘at most [a] non-jurisdictional [defect]…which we consider insufficient to warrant dismissal’. See also King v. Laborers Internat’l Union, 443 F.2d 273 (6th cir. 1971); United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853 (2 Cir. 1966); cert. denied, 386 U.S. 908, 87 S, Ct. 852, 17 L.Ed. 2d 782 (1967); cf. Walker v. Matthews, 546 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1976) (late filing of record).[33] “In Childs v. Kaplan, 467 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1971), the court held that the appeal of an appellant who did not file a brief would not be dismissed for want of prosecution….”

C. Appellant’s Right to Appeal

From inception, the Clerk has tampered with and hindered Plaintiffs/

Appellants attempt to Appeal. Judge Hull saw to it that a Plaintiff was not

afforded opportunity to cure defect in Notice, and take part in the appeal.

This Court’s refusal to reinstate the Appeal hindered by acts of this Court’s

Clerk and who failed to adhere to 11th Cir. R. 42-1(b), thereby denying Appellant

his Right to Appeal, and results in disparate treatment. Appellant has been treated

differently than others in the same position resulting in discrimination, Rights

violations, violations of equal protection, and ADA Title II.

8

This Court held in Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-12692 (2007) C11.0001537 “…

occurs when a disabled individual is treated differently than a non-disabled or less

disabled individual…” The Supreme Court in Lane upheld Title II as “valid § 5

legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial

services” 541 U.S. at 331.

“The Supreme Court further held that Title II enforces rights under the Equal Protection Clause, …“a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, and infringements”…”an array of rights subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-523; accord Constantine, 411 F.3d at 486-487. “Mere negative attitudes alone cannot justify disparate treatment of those with disabilities” University of Ala. V. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001).

It would be fair and just to Grant Appellant’s Motion to Reinstate.

II. FRAUD UPON THE COURT

Defendants/Appellees in both state and federal Courts worked a fraud upon

the Court to obtain judgments in their favor. See Bulloch v. United States, 763

F.2d held the following:

“Fraud on the court… is directed to the judicial machinery itself … H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir.). It is thus fraud where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function--thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted.” "Since attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if dishonest, would constitute fraud on the court." Porter, 536 F.2d

7 The case was before Judges Edmondson, Hull and Forrester

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at 1119.”

“Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit:

"…fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23"

Georgia Power has made a mockery of the court(s). This Court’s Clerk’s

apparent willingness to violate rules and procedures shows fraud upon the Court

has continued into the Appeal as well.

Judge Becker’s blatant disregard for her Oath of Office, Georgia’s statute

and both Constitutions, refusing to Rule on Plaintiffs’/Appellants pending Motions,

and granting what The Supreme Court of Georgia has Ruled cannot be granted

shows partiality, conspiracy to violate Rights under color of law, and that she was

participant in the fraud upon the Court. See Appellant’s Brief in general.

Plaintiffs’ Filed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law June 03, 2008, and

Motion to Set Aside a Void Judgment February 24, 2009. Neither Motion has ever

been ruled on. Georgia Power’s Motion for Continuance and Amendment of their

Verified Answers were never ruled on.

The changing of Georgia Power’s Verified Answers in Superior Court two

months after Plaintiffs filed Motion to Strike the answers and Motion for a

protective order, transformed their counterclaim into a compulsory counterclaim

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that would have had to be claimed in the original filing of their answers or in a

different suit.

III. GEORGIA LAND REGISTRATION - EASEMENT LAWS

A. Georgia’s Land Registration Laws

Georgia Power’s Verified Answer claimed to have a valid, legal express

grant easement. Six months after filing verified answers, two months after their

easement document was legally challenged, they Moved to Amend8 claiming the

document needed a reformation9, admission in judicio, Plaintiffs had to be granted

Judgment as a Matter of Law; they were denied.

Six months or more after Georgia Power’s request for reformation, in their

Summary Judgment Brief they made clear they only wanted the Court to Rule that

they have a prescriptive easement.: “prescription makes a bad title good”. The

statement is totally ludicrous, and nowhere is that stated in the caselaw used.

Judge Becker refused to adhere to mandated Georgia statute concerning real

property and Georgia Land Registration Laws10. The property was not brought

8 The Amendment was not Ruled on, neither Granted nor Denied.9 Statute of limitations for reformation is seven years, all original parties must still control the original estate involved, and other relevant reasons preventing reformation10 O.C.G.A. §44-2-40 This article shall be known and may be cited as "The Land Registration Law."

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under jurisdiction of the Court11; no appointment of mandatory examiner12; use of

fraudulent land documents was allowed in an attempt to gain an interest in land

which is a felony13. Becker then Dismissed with prejudice on grounds for which

the action could not be dismissed14 due to lack of appointment of auditor/

examiner/ master15 See Woodruff et., al., v. Morgan County, 670 S.E.2d 415, 284

Ga. 651 (2008) reversed, which The Supreme Court of Georgia held:

“[12] Here, a special master was never appointed…Without the appointment…, were not required to answer…, and the trial court was not authorized to enter a default judgment against them. See Bonner, 272 Ga. 545 (2) (533 S.E.2d) (2000).”

B. Summary Judgment

A case Dismissed with prejudice is equivalent to having been decided on the

11 O.C.G.A. §44-2-61: all proceedings in the court in relation to registered land shall be proceedings in rem against the land12 O.C.G.A. §44-2-100 shall appoint at least one auditor, who shall be known as the examiner, who shall discharge the duties provided for the examiner in this article…”13 O.C.G.A. § 44-2-43 Any person who: (1) fraudulently obtains or attempts to obtain …to any land or interest therein; (2) knowingly offers in evidence any forged or fraudulent document in the course of any proceedings …; (3) makes or utters any forged instrument ..or any other paper, writing, or document used in connection with any of the proceedings …or the notation of entries upon the register of titles; (4) steals or fraudulently conceals …; (5) fraudulently alters, changes, or mutilates any writing, instrument, document, record, registration, or register …; (6) makes any false oath or affidavit …; or (7) makes or knowingly uses …provided for by this article shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.14 O.C.G.A. §44-2-81 No decree shall be rendered by default and without the necessary facts being shown.15 O.C.G.A. §44-2-102 the examiner shall proceed to hear evidence, The examiner shall give notice of the time and place of the hearing

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merits, it concludes the action. Even so, Georgia Power Defendants filed for

Summary Judgment. Becker refused to set aside her judgment dismissing the case

and refused to allow Plaintiffs to participate in the proceedings and/or file

Response to Summary Judgment.

Judge Becker granted a prescriptive easement, going against The Supreme

Court of Georgia’s Rulings on prescriptive easements.

OCGA § 44-5-161 provides: (a) In order for possession to be the foundation of prescriptive title, it: (1) Must be in the right of the possessor and not of another; (2) Must not have originated in fraud …(3) Must be public, continuous, exclusive, uninterrupted, and peaceable; and (4) Must be accompanied by a claim of right.(b) Permissive possession cannot be the foundation of a prescription until an adverse claim and actual notice to the other party.

C. Prescriptive Easement

Appellant bought the property August 1994, right away they erected a eight

(8) to (10) ten foot tall combination of chain link, privacy, and granite along with

a gated entry around the entire property. Certainly a large fence encompassing an

entire property with a gated entry is not “peaceable”, “uninterrupted”, “exclusive”,

“continuous”, and/or “public” except when viewed in the favor of

Plaintiffs/Appellants who succeeded to “prevent occupation by another”. See

Georgia Power Co. v. Irving, et., al. 267 Ga. 760, 482 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. 03/19/1997)

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The Supreme Court of Georgia held:

[33] "any use and occupation which is so notorious as to attract the attention of every adverse claimant and so exclusive as to prevent actual occupation by another." Friendship Baptist Church v. West, 265 Ga. 745 (462 S.E.2d 618) (1995)

Judge Becker, denied Appellant right to a jury, which Plaintiffs/Appellant

never waived Right to.

[44] While "[a]dverse possession is usually a mixed question of law and fact — whether the facts exist which constitute adverse possession, is for the jury to judge… " Thompson v. Fouts, 203 Ga. 522 (2) (47 S.E.2d 571) (1948).

See also Thompson et., al., v. Mcdougal, 248 Ga. App. 270, 546

S.E.2d 44 (2001) reversed

“Factual questions…regarding whether or not a prescriptive easement has been established must be resolved by a jury. See Hasty v. Wilson, 223 Ga. 739, 743 (2) (a) (158 SE2d 915) (1967).”

Georgia Power, has continually insisted they have easement over the entire

property; the lack of definite boundaries makes Appellant’s property unmarketable.

“This Court has recognized that …so long as the boundaries are clearly defined, i.e., where the evidence identifies the part which is in possession and distinguishes it from the part which is not.” Ragan v. Carter, 145 Ga. 320 (1) (89 S.E. 206) (1916); Whitehead v. Pitts, 127 Ga. 774 (1) (56 S.E. 1004) (1907); Tripp v. Fausett, 94 Ga. 330 (21 S.E. 572) (1894).

D. Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause

The fraudulent easement document that Becker Ruled was valid, shows that

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Georgia Power had been granted easement for all properties in the District 18,

Land Lots 37, 74 (Land Lots consist of around 44 acres) on Shiphud Rd and Ridge

Avenue. Appellant’s property is the only property in District 18, Land Lot 73 that

Becker Ruled Georgia Power has easement over; and the only property affected

that is not in Stone Mountain City Limits. Lack of ruling that every property

between Appellant’s property and Ridge Avenue has an easement, shows Becker

clearly, unreasonably discriminated, violating Rights and her Oath of Office.

“[t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, …by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.'" Sioux City Bridge Co., supra, at 445 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352 (1918)).’ Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (U.S. 02/23/2000)

IV. FED. R. CIV. P. AND N.D. Ga. L. R.

The case in District Court listed causes of action for conspiracy to violate

rights under color of law, fraud upon the court, violation of Civil and

Constitutional Rights. Judge Duffey allowed violations of Federal Rules and Local

Rules, ignored Defendant’s refusal to file Initial Disclosures, Certificate of

Interested Persons, Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan without consequence.

Instructions …Pretrial Proceedings pg 1 states:“…assuring the orderly conduct of discovery…submitting promptly …without further notice, order, or direction. Failure… in compliance with these instructions… default judgment…”

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Page 6:I. Initial Disclosures“Each party’s “Initial Disclosures” shall be…within thirty (30) days after the appearance of a defendant…”

II. Certificate of Interested Persons“LR 3.3…all private (non-governmental) parties shall be required…within thirty (30) days…”V. Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan“LR 16.2; LR 84.1.C…to promote early analysis…and to alert the Court…must be…within thirty (30) days…This Local Rule applies to all cases…”

LR 16.5 Sanctions“Failure to comply with the court’s pretrial instructions… default judgment.”

V. EVIDENCE / CREDIBILITY

District Court went along with the charade; none of the Defendants/

Appellees filed a Verified Answer, without consequence. The failure to “file their

claim under oath” was a “failure to present necessary evidence” see Lamb v. T-

Shirt City, Inc., et., al, 618 S.E.2d 108, 272 Ga. App. 298 (2003); Piedmont Cotton

Mills v. Woelper, 209 Ga. 109, 110 (498 S.E.2d 255) (1998).

Georgia Power Defendants attached evidence to which Duffey gave

credibility to, while discrediting Plaintiffs/Appellant’s evidence and their

credibility; Both conflicting evidence and credibility are matters reserved only for

a jury as fact trier. In Therrell v. Marble Holdings, Crop., 96 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir.

1992) this Court held:

[93] “Credibility is a matter solely for the jury. ‘It is the function of the jury as the traditional finder of the facts, and not

16

the court to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine credibility…’ Buckley, 785 F.2d at 1527 (quoting Boeing, 411 F.2d at 375).”

Judge Duffey, ignoring that it was the duty of a jury to make decisions on

evidence and credibility, acted as trier of fact and deemed Georgia Power

Defendants’ Unverified answer and evidence as factual, then dismissed under

Younger.

VI. SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA RULINGS

Judge Duffey’s Dismissal goes into detail about Federal Courts not

offending State courts, and that Federal Courts cannot baby-sit state Courts. He

also ruled that there had been no due process violations in state court; going

completely against The Supreme Court of Georgia and The Georgia Court of

Appeals’ past rulings.

Judge Becker refused to adhere to the laws concerning real property and

easements. Supreme Court of Georgia has ruled “to ensure due process to the

property owner” the governing laws must be “strictly conformed to”, in order to

not “deprive the owner of the property of due process of law as guaranteed by the

Constitutions of Georgia and of the United States” City of Atlanta v. Yusen Air &

Sea Service Holdings, 263 Ga. App. 82, 83 (1) (587 SE2d 230) (2003).

Supreme Court of Georgia has also held that an easement document “must

describe the easement with the same degree of definiteness required in a deed to

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land”. See City of Atlanta v. Airways Parking Co., 225 Ga. 173, 178-181(4) (167

SE2d 145) (1969); B. & W. Hen Farm v. Georgia Power Co., 222 Ga. 830, 831(2)

(152 SE2d 841) (1966); Gunn v. Georgia Power Co., 205 Ga. 85, 86 (52 SE2d

449) (1949).

See also Ga. 400 Industrial Park, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 274 Ga.

App. 153 (616 SE2d 903)(2005):

“Nothing must be left open to the judgment or interpretation of another, not even a court. Without this, the owner of the property cannot know what portion of his land is required…and the petitioner cannot know the precise boundaries of the land so as not to trespass on property not acquired.” Mollester Mill, Ltd. v. Ga. Power Co., 271 Ga. App. 287, 289(1) (609 SE2d 211)(2005).

“description of easement, omitting width of the right-of-way or any key as to such width, failed to sufficiently describe the land interest” Gunn, supra at 87.

Becker’s ruling granting Ga. Power Co. prescriptive easement is violative in

that nowhere does anything state how much property Ga. Power has been granted;

Ga. Power has continually claimed rights to the entire property. Judge Becker and

Judge Duffey both disregarded Supreme Court of Georgia and Georgia Court of

Appeals rulings; due process has been violated by both courts.

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VII. UNITED STATES AND GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONS

Judge Duffey, Jr. ruled that he had investigated the proceedings in Superior

Court16 and found no constitutional or due process violations. One can only

conclude that Judge Duffey has deemed Georgia statute concerning land (which is

to be strictly adhered to) unconstitutional, deemed that Georgia’s Supreme Court

and Georgia Court of Appeals have ruled wrongly; and deemed that The United

States and State of Georgia Constitutions concerning “denial of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law” is either fictional, or only for a select few.

“A court should be cautious in exerting its inherent power and ‘must comply with the mandates of due process” First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21117, -25; 2002 FED App. 0356P (6th Cir. 2002); In Re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2002)

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Appellant MOVES this Honorable Court for an Order Granting His Motion

to Reinstate his Appeal. The District Court, clearly brings into question whether or

not Georgia’s Land Registration Laws, United States’ and Georgia’s Constitutions

and Bill of Rights are unconstitutional, or if they are only there for a select few

individuals. Manifest Injustice and uncertainty will be the end result unless

16 Appellant has failed to find where a District Court Judge has authority to investigate into proceedings of a state Court; further, by looking into the proceedings (Duffey fails to explain what is meant by looking into the proceedings, one could deduce that he had ex-parte communications with Judge Becker, or all of the Defendants) Duffey goes against his own Ruling that the Federal Courts cannot be babysitters of state Courts.

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Appellant’s Motion to Reinstate is Granted and the issues addressed.

Respectfully Submitted this 28th day of July, 2009

By: _____________________________JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se

821 Sheppard RdStone Mountain, GA 30083

(404) 300-9782

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

CERTIFICATION

I, James B. Stegeman the Plaintiff/Appellant, hereby Certify that to the best

of my knowledge and belief, that the Certificate of Interested Persons and

Corporate Disclosure Statement required by 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1 is complete with no

additions or omissions to date.

By: ____________________________ JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se

821 Sheppard RdStone Mountain, GA 30083

(404) 300-9782

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U. S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

James B. Stegeman vs. Superior Court, et., al., Appeal No. 08-16174-CC

I Certify that I have this 28th day of July, 2009 served a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Appellant’s Motion to Reconsider Motion to Set Aside Dismissal,

Remedy Default and Reinstate Appeal; and/or Motion for Leave to File

Documents Out of Time and Remedy Default; and/or Motion to Stay Mandate or

Recall Mandate. upon Defendants/Appellees, through their attorneys on record by

causing to be deposited with the U.S.P.S., First Class Mail, proper postage affixed

thereto, addressed as follows:

Daniel S. Reinhardt Devon OrlandTroutman Sanders, LLP State of Georgia Dept. of LawBank of America Plaza – Suite 5200 40 Capitol Square, S.W.600 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30334-1300Atlanta, GA 30308-2216

_______________________________JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se

821 Sheppard RdStone Mountain, GA 30083

(404) 300-9782

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