Moore on Propositions

7/27/2019 Moore on Propositions

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PROPOSITIONS 53doubt at all, nor about what sort of a thing it is. You canvery easilyobserve 't -but he difficulty is to discover hat anything elsehappensat all, and, f so, what the exact nature of this something else s.But now, with regard to this part of what happens-this directapprehensionof sense-dzta-I said that an overwhelming,majorityof philosophershad held certainviews. They have held, namely (r)that no part of the sense-datawhich I ever directly apprehendz's rexistsat all, except at the moment when I am directly apprehendingit ; (z) that no part of the sense-datawhich I ever directly apprehend,is ever directly apprehendedby any one else and (3) that no part ofthe sense-datawhich I ever directly apprehend s in the samespacewith any part of those which are directly apprehendedby any oneelse.And by saying that they are not in the sarne pace, meant,asalways, hat they are neither n the sameplacenor at any distance nany direction from one another; or, if we are talking of the sense-givenspaceshemselves,we must say, o be accurate, hat no part ofzy sense-givenspace s the samepafi of spacezs any part of thesense-given paceof any one else,nor at any distance n any direc-tion from any such part. These three views, takentogether, f spoke,of as the acceptedview with regard to sense-data,hough of coursethey are not acceptedquite by everybody. They are, I said, oftenexpressed y saying that all sense-data xist only in the mind of thepersonapprehending hem; or by saying hat sense-data re notcxtqnal objects: and I think there is no great harm in expressingthem in this way, although when such expressionsare used, some-thing else may be meant as well, which is, I thint, more doubtfulthan arethese hree views. We may say, hen, that it is and has ongbeen he acceptedview that all sense-data xist only in the mind ofthe personwho directly apprehends hem, or arenot external objects-meaning by these expressionsmerely the three views, which Ihave ried to formulate more exactly above. And I wished to callyour attention to this acceptedview, and to make you grasp it asclearly as possiblefor two reasons.Firstly, because t seems o methatmany of the strangestviewsof philosophers, hosewhich departmostwidely from Common Sense,are founded, in the first instance,upon this view. Had not this view beenthought of, no philosopherwould ever have thought of denying the existenceof matter or ofinventing all sorts of other things to take its place.And secondly,wish to call your attention to it because think that so far as philo-'sophical views are founded upon this view, they are not badlyfounded. In other words, I think there really are very strong

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5+ soME MAIN PROBLEMSOF PHILOSOPHYarguments in favour of this view, arguments of a sort that I tried togive you. And though theseargumentsdo not seem o me absolutelyconclusive,yet they are so strong that I think none of us can reallybe sure that this accepted iew with regard o sense-datas not acor-rect one : though if any of you can find, either for or against t, anymore conclusive argumentsthan I can find, I should be only tooglad to hear them. The questionwhether this acceptedview aboutsense-datas true or not, may, I thinkflfairly be called one of _themain problems of philosophy.But now, in speaking of this acceptedview, I ought perhaps tohaveexplained hat somephilosophers,whom I meant to reckon asholding it, would not perhapsassert t quite in the unqualified formwhich-^t have given it. And I wish now to mention these possible@fffications, both for the sakeof accuracy,and ecause hEsequali-ficationscan only serve, think, to bring out more clearly hdeneralnature of the view and the immensenessof the range of facts towhich it is supposed o apply. The first qualification is this. Thereare somephilosopherswho hold that sense-dataexist in my mind,not only when I directly apprehend hem, but alsovery often whenI donot directlyapprehendhem: and so oo,of course,n the mindsof dl of us. And thesephilosophersmight, I think, perhaps hold (Ido not know whether they would) that the very sime sense-datumwhich I directly apprehend at one moment, may go on existing i'zmy mind even when I cease o apprehend it, and that this mayhappenvery often indeed. This, then, if it were held, would be tohold that there were exceptions o the first of my three rules, andeven possib|y many exceptions o it: it would involve holding thatsome sense-data,which I directly apprehend, may go on existingwhen I do not directly apprehend hem. But the philosophers amthinting of would certainly hold that this, if it happensat all, canonly happen n my mind: no sense-datum;which I ever apprehend,can exiit, aftu I cease o apprehend it, except n my minil. And thiywould hold, too, that of these sense-data,which exist in my mind,when I do not directly apprehend them, boththe other two rules arejust as true aBof those sense-datawhich I do directly apprehend:both tlnt nobody elsecan directly apprehend then, and that theycannot be in the same spacewith the sense-datan anybody else'smind. So that I think you can see tlnt this qualification, though,etrictly spealring, it doee admit many exceptions to my first rule, isyet not very important for our Present PurPose.An4 the secondqualification is thie: Some philosophers would, I think, admit thet


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PROPOSTTIONS 55in a few abnormal cases, lrere may be two or more different minds-two or more different persons-in or attached to the same ivinghumanbody, znd that in such cases hese different personsmay beable o apprehenddirectly the satne ense-data;and they would per-haps say also, that this, which may happen abnormally to humanminds n living human bodies, may happen constantly n the caseofothn spirits in the Universe. And this, of course, if it were held,would involve exceptions,and perhapsmany exceptions, o both mysecondand third rule. But this qualification also s, I think, plainlyunimportant for our presentpurpose.For theg4philosopherswould,I think, admit that in the caseof ozr minds, tffe mihds of each of zs,normal human minds, attached, eachof them, to a different livinghumanbody, no exceptions o these two rules ever occur. e LeWith these qualifilations, I think it is fair to say that my threerules with regard to sense-data re acceptedby the vast majority ofphilosophers;and these qualifications only, I think, serve to makeit plainer what an enormous range of facts the three rules aresupposed o apply to. They are supposed o apply to all the sense-data directly apprehende{ by all the human minds, attached likeours,eachof them, to a different living human body, with the possibleexception hat sense-data,directly apprehendedat one moment byonemind, may exist in that mind even when not directly appre-hended y it.But now, f this acceptedview is true, it follows, I said, that if wedo ever perceivea material object or any part of one, and if we doall of us now perceive he same material object-if, for instance,wedo all see his same envelope-this event cannot merelyconsist inthe fact that we directly apprehendcertain sense-data: t must con-sist, n part, of something else oo. For, according to the acceptedview, no part of the sense-datawhich any one of us directly appre-hendscanbe either a part of a material object nor a part of the spaceoccupiedby a material object, nor can any part of the sense-datadirectly apprehended by any one of us be the same as any part ofthosedirectly apprehended by any other of us. If, therefore, I doeverperceivea material object, then, on the acceptedview, some-fh[g {sC must happen besides he fact that I directly apprehendcertainsense-data.And I tried, at the end of my last lecture, to givea 5-rib:f?ccountoi what this something elsemight be. But I said Ishould-try o explain more fully at the beginningof this lectvre, whatthis somethingelsemight be; and this is what I shall now try to do.Only I am afraid that this explanationwill take me much longer than


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56 soME MAIN PROBLEMSOF PHILOSOPHYI thought it would. Insteadof occupyingonly the beginningof thislecture, it ufilt ocupy the a:holeof this lecture; and I shall not beable to finish what I have o sayabout it even n this lecture : I shallhaveto leaveover a part of the subject until next time. The fact isI want to makeas clear aspossibleexactly what sort of a thing theknowing of material objectsby meansof the senses an be, if it doesnot mereLy onsist n the direcK6pprehensionqf sense-data.And Ithink the way of doing this, which {vill in the end prove shortestandclearest, s to try and give an account of all the different ways wehave of knowing things: trying to distinguish different sorts oftbthgs which might be said o be ways of knowing from one another,andgiving hem separate ames.And I think I canbestdo his by firstcalling your attention to an entirely new class of facts-a class offacts which I have not yet mentioned at all.The fact is that absolutelyall the contents of qheUniverse,abso-lutely everything hat r at all, may be divided into two classes-namely into propoitions, on the one hand, and into things which arenot propositionson the other hand. There certainlyare n the Uni-versesuch hings aspropositions:he sort of thing that I meanby aproposition is certainly one of the things that zlc: nd no lesscertainlythere are in the Universe some hings which are not propositions:and also quite certainly absolutely everything in the Universeeitheris a proposition or is not, if we confine the word 'proposition' tosomeone,quite definite,sense:or nothing whatevercan both havea quite definiteproperty and alsonot have hat very sameproperty.This classification, herefore, of all the things in the Universe intothose which are and thosewhich are not propositions, s certainlycorrect and exhaustive.But it may seem,at first sight, as f it were avery unequal classification as f the number of things in the Uni-verse, which ere not propositions, was very much greater than thatof those which are. Even this, as we shall presently see,may bedoubted.And, whetherthis be soor not, the classifications, I think,by no meansunequal, f, instead of consideringall that rs in theIJniverse, we consider all those things in the Universe which wehnow. For, however t may be with thq Universe itself, it is, I think,certain that a very largeand important part of our hnowledge f theUniverse consists n the knowledge with regard to propositions hatthey are true.Now the new classof facts which I want to call your attention to,are certain facts ebout propositions and about our knowledge ofthem.


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PROPOSITIONS 57And, first of all, I want to pake it asplain as I can exactly what Imeanby a proposition. The sdrt of thing, which I mean by a propo-sition is, as I said,something which certainly is. There certainly arethings in the Universe, which have the properties which I shallmean o ascribe o a thing when I call it a proposition.And when I

call a thing a proposition I shall mean to ascribe o it absolutely noproperties,except certain definite ones which sode things certainlyhave. There may be doubt and dispute as to whethbr these thingshave or have not certain other properties besidesthose which Iascribe o them; and also as to whether what I mean by a propo-sition is quite the stme as what is usually meant. But as to the factthat some hings are propositions, n the sense n which I intend touse he word, I think there s no doubtFirst of all, then, I do not mean by a proposition any of thosecollectionsof utords,which are one of the things that are commonlycalled propositions.What I mean by a proposition is rather the sortof thing which these collectionsof words express.No collection ofwordscan possiblybe a proposition, n the sensen which I intendto use he ter*. bespeakrngr_Zqlof-e.-!99l9-s-gntg4gq-aere collection of words, but ofI do not then mean by a proposition any collection of words. Andwhat I do mean can, I think, be best explained as follows. I willutter now certainwords which form a sentence: hesewords, forinstance:Twice two are our. Now, when I say hesewords,you notonly hear thtm-the words-you a/soundbrstandwhat they mean.That is to say,something happens n your minds-some act of con-sciousness-ooatand.abooe he hearing of the words, some act of .consciousnesshich maybe called he understanding f their mean-ing. But now I will utter another set of words which also form asentence: utter the words: Twice four are eight. Here againyounot only hear the words, but also perform some other act of con-sciousness hich may be called the understanding of their meaning,Here then we havean instanceof two acts of consciousness, ach ofwhich may be called an apprehensionof the meaning of certainwords. The one of them was an apprehensionof the meaning of the

words Twice two are our; the other an apprehension f the mean-ing of the words: Twice four are eight. Both of these two acts ofconsciousnessre alike in respectof the fact that each of them is anact of apprehension,and that eachof them is the apprehensionof themeaningof a certain set of words which form a sentence.Each ofrl


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58 soME MArN PROBLEMSOF PHTLOSOPHYthem is an apprehendingof the meaning of a sentence:and each ofthem is an apprehmding in exactly the same sense: they are obvi-ously exactly alike{n flr& respect.But no less obviously they differin respect of the fact that uhat is apprehended n the one case, sdifferent from what is apprehended n the gghercase..In he one caseuhat ig apprehended s the meaning of tl{b words: Twice two arefour; in tbe other cesewhat is apprehended s the meaning of thewords: Twice four are eight. And the meaning of the first set ofwords is obviously different from that of the second.In this case,then, we have two actsof apprehension,which are exactly alike inrespect of the fact that they are acts of apprehension,and acts ofapprehen$on, too, of exactly the same kind; but which differ inrespect of the fact that what is apprehended n the cine, s differentfrom what is apprehended n the other. Now by a proposition, Imean tfie sort of thing which is apprchnded in these two cases.Thetwo acta of congciousnessdiffer in respect of the fact that what isapprehended n tbe one, is different from whnt is apprehended nthe other. And,what s apprehended n each c3se s what I mean y aprqposition. We might say, then, that the two acts of apprehensiondiffer in respectofthe fact that one s an apprehensionof one propo-sition, and the other the apprehension of a different proposition.And w9 might say also thet the proposition apprehended n the oneis the piopositron that twice two are four-not the words, twice twoare four, but the mcming of thesewords; and that t/rc propositionapprehended n the other is the difierent proposition that twice fourare eight-again notthe words, twice four are eight, but the meaningof these words.This, then, is the sort of thing that I meanby a proposition. Andwhether you agreeor not tbat it is a proper use of the word, I hopeit is plain that there certainly ara things which are propositions inthis sense.As a matter of fact this is, I think, one of the sensesnwhich the word is commonly used. Often, no doubt, we may meanby a proposition a sentencFa collection of words; but quite oftendso, I think, we mean by a proposition aot the words but theirmeaning. This, then, is how I am going to use the word 'proposi-tion'. And I hope it is plain that there certainly are such things aspropositions in this sense. t is quite plain, I think, that when weunderstand tle meaning of a sentence,something elsedoes happenin our minde bcsides he mere hearing of the words of which theEcntcncc s composcd. You.can easily satisfy yourselvesof this bycontrasting what happens *hcn you hear a sentence, which you do


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PROPOSITIONS 59understand, from what happens when you hear a sentencewhichyou do zol understand: for instance,when you hear words spokenin a foreign language,which you do not understand at all. Certainlyin the first case, here occurs, beside he mere hearingrof he words,another act of consciousness-an apprehensionof their meaning,which is absent n the second case.And it is no lessplain that theapprehensionof the meaning of one sentencewith one meaning,differs in some respect from the apprehensionof anotler sentencewith a different meaning. For instance the apprehehsioi-of themeaning of the sentence: Twice two are four, certainly differs insome espectrom the apprehension f the meaningof the sentence:Twice four are eight. They certainly differ in somerespect, whichmay be expressed y saying that one is the apprehension f onemeaning, and the other the apprehensionof a different n{eaning.There certainly g'e such thin$s as he two different meaningsapprerhended.And eachof these wo meanings s what I call a proposition.In calling them so, I do not mean to assertanything whatever as othe manner in which they are related to the apprehensionof them.All that I mean to assert s simply that eachof them is somethingwhich can and must be distinguished from the act of apprehensionin which it is apprehended. Each act of apprehension s alike inrespectof the fact that it is an act of apprehension,and an act ofapprehensionof the samekind. But they differ in that whereasoneis the apprehensionofone proposition, the other is the apprehensionof adifferent proposition. Each proposition, therefore, can and mustbe distinguishedboth from the other proposition, and also rom theact which is the apprehendingof it.But now, f we use he word'proposition' in this sense,t is plain,I think, that we can sayseverd other things about propositions andabout the apprehensionof them.In the first place, t is, I think, plain that we apprehend a propo-sition in exactly the same sense n three different cases.When wehearcertain words spokenand understand their meaning, we maydo three different things: we may believehe proposition which theyexpress,we may disbeliepet, or we may simply understandwhat t\ewor6mean, withoutgither believing or disbelieving t. In all thesethree cases,we do I think obviously apprehendthri proposition inquestion in exactly the same sense: namely, we understand themeaningof the words. The differencebetween hethree casesmerelyconsists n the fact, that when we believe or disbelieve,we a/sodosomcthing elsebesiihmerely apprehending the proposition: beside

cr


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6o SOME MAIN PROBLEMSOF PHILOSOPHYmerely apprehending t, we alsohave orilards t one attitude whichis calledbelief, or anotherdifferent attitudqwhich is calleddisbelief.To believea proposition, to disbelieveone, or simply to understandit, in the sense n which we do these things when we hear wordsspoken hat express he proposition, consist hen, all three of them,at least n part, in apprehending his propoihion ip exactly the samesense.n all three caseswe do apprehenda proposition in exactly thesamesense,houghwherewe believeor disbelievewealsodo some-thing elsebesides. his sensen which we apprehenda proposition,in all these three casesequally, is obviously one senseof the wordapprehension;and it is a sense o whiqh I wish to direct youragfuntion,as I shall presentlyhave more to say about it.n Ogepoint then with regard o propositionsand our apprehensionof them, is that there is a definite sort of apprehension f them,which occurs equally, whenever we either believe, disbelieve, ormerely understand a proposition on actually hearing spoken wordswhich express t.And a secondpoint is this. It is, I think, alsoplain that we oftenapprehendpropositions in exactly the same sense,when instead ofheaing words which express hem, we seawritten or printed wordswhich express hem-provided, of course, hat we are able to reafland understand he languageo which the words belong.This un-derstandingof the meaningof written or printed sentences, hichoccurswhen we actually ead hem, is, I think, obviouslyan appre-hensionof propositionsn exactly he samesenseas s the under-standingof sentences, hich we hear spoken.But just aswe appre-hendpropositions n exactly he samesensen both these wo cases-whether we hear spoken sentenceswhich express hem, or seethesesentenceswritten or printed-so also,obviously, we very oftenapprehend propositions in exactly the samesense,when we neitherhear nor seeany wordswhich express hem.'Weconstantly hink ofand believe or disbelieve,or merely consider,propositions,atmoments when we are neitherhearingnor seeingany words whichexpresshem; and n doingso,we areoeryoftenapprehendinghemin exactly he samesensen which we apprehend hem when we dounderstand he meaningof written or spokensentences. o doubtwhenwe do thus apprehendpropositions,without either hearingorseeing any words which express hem, we often have-hefore--or:rmin9s tlre"izrages_ofqrdq,which.would express hem. But it is, Ithink, obviouslypossiblehat we shouldapprehErxl roposirions,rrexactly the samesense,without even having before our minds aay


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PROPOSITIONS 6rimages f wordswhich would express hem. We may thus apprehenda proposition,whiqh we desire o-express, eforewe ate able o thinkbf any sentencewhich would express t. We apprehend he propo-sition, and desire o expresst, but none of the words we can thinkof will expressexactly tlzeproposition we are apprehendinganddesiring o coRvey. {i.Our,:sicond point, filen, with regard to propositiSnsand ourapprehension f them is this: namely, hat in exactly helame sensein which we apprehend hem, when we hear certainwordsspokenof which we understandhe meaning,we alsooftenapprehendhem,when we neither seenor hear any words which exPresshem, andprobably often without even having before our mfnds any mages fwordswhiqh would express hem.And a *ir\ iroint is ihis. Namely, hat the propositionswhich weapprehendn this sense, nd n all thesedifferentcases, reobviouslyquite a different sort of thing from many of the things which weapprehend.When, for instance, directlyapprehenda sense-datum-a patchof colour, for instance-the patch of colour is obviouslynot the samesort of thing as thesepropositionsof which we havebeen alking it, ttrepatchof colour, s not itself a proposition.Themost obvious way of expressing he differencebetween a propo-sition,andwhat is not a proposition, s by saying hat a propositionis the sort of thing which is commonly expressedby a whole sen-tence. say the sort of thing; because, s we have seen,we mayapprehendmany propositionswhich are not actuallyexpressed tall.And I saycommozly xpressed y a whole sentence, ecause amnot sure hat somewholesentences,or instance n mperative,suchas Go itwa!', expressa propositionat all; and because lsopropo-sitionsaresometimes xpressed y singlewords.For instance,whena man calls Fire', he is expressing proposition: he is expressingthe propositionwhich might be expressed y the whole sentence:There s a fire taking place.But, if we say hat a proposition s thesort of thing that is commonly expressed y a whole sentence,weindicate, think, pretty clearly he sort of thing that a propositionis. Things which arenot propositions,f expressed t all, areusuallyexpressed y single words or collectionsof words, which do notmakecompletesentences. hus, supposing utter the whole sen-tence:This patch of colour, which I now see,exists.One part ofthis sentence, amely, he words This patch of colourwhich I nowsee',may perhapsbe said to 'express'or mention this patch ofcolour, which I do now directly apprehend,and which is not a


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6Z SOME MAIN PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHYproposition; and obviously that particr{ar set of words, which men-tion this colour, do not by themselves6rm a completesentence: hewords 'This patch of colour, which I now see' are not a completesentenceby themselves.And similarly, whenever we utter a com-plete slgtence, while the whole sentengedoes, as a rule, expressaproposition, some of the words or sets if words of which it is com-posedexpress omethingwhich is not a ptoposition.For instance,consider again the sentence: Twice two are four. This whole sen-tence, as we saw, does expressa proposition. But, if we take someone of the words of which it is copposed, for instance the word

|two', this word by itself doesnot make a completesentenceanddoesnot expressa proposition. But it doesexpresssomcthing.Whatwb mean by the word 'two' is certainly something.This. something,therefore, rs-is something, and yet is not a proposition. In fact,wheneverwe do apprehend a proposition we alwaysalso apprehendthings which arenot propositions;namely, hings which would beexpressedby some f the words, of which the whole sentence,whichwould express he proposition, is composed.A third point, then, with regard o propositionsand our appre-hensionof them, is that propositionsare by no means he only kindof things which we apprehend;hut that wheneverwe do apprehepda proposition, we always alro apprehend something else,whie,h_iszol a proposition.And a fourth point with regard to propositions is this. Namely,that propbsiti'ons,n the sensen which I have been using the term,are obviously a sort of thing which canproperly be said tobe trueorfalse.Somepropositionsaretrue propositionsand otherpropositionsare alsepropositions.And I mention hispoint, becauseome philo-sophers eem nclined o say hat nothing can be properly said o betnre or f.alse, xceptan act of belief : that, therefore,propoitioz.r, notbeing acts of belief, cannot properly be said to be so. And I do nothere wish to deny thet an act of belief may be properly said to betrue or false; hough I think it may be doubted.We do undoubtedlyspeakof true and falsebeliefs; so that beliefs,at all events,may beproperly said to be true or false. But the fact is, I think, that, as withso many other words, we ude the word 'belief in two differentsenses: ometimes, o doubt, we meanby a belief an act of belief,but very often, I think, we mean by it simply the proposition whichis believed. For instance, we often say of two different people thalthey entertain the samebelief.And here, I think, we certainly do notmeanto saythat any act of belief performed by the one is the same


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PRoPOSITIONS 63act as zn act of belief performed by the other. The two actsof beliefarecertainly different-numerically different: the one act is the actof oneperson,and the other is the act of a different person; and wecertainly do not mean to assert hat these two acts are identical-that they are not two ^cts,but one and the sameact. What we do, Ithink, mean, when we say hat both personshave he samebelief, isthat what is believed in both of the two different acts s the same:we mean by a belief, in fact, not the act of belief, but athat is be-lieved; and what is believed is just nothing else han what I meanby a proposition. But let us grant that acts of belief may be properlysaid o be true and false. Even if this be so, t seemso me we mustallow that propositions, n the sense havegivento the term, can beproperly said to be true and false a/so, hough in a different sense.For what I mean by a proposition is simply that in respectof whichan act of belief, which is a true act, differs from another, which is afalseone; or that in respectof which two qualitatively different actsof belief, which are both false or both true, differ from one another.And obviously the quality in virtue of which one actof belief is true,and another false, cannot be the quality which they both have incommon: it cannot be the fact that they are both of them acts ofbelief we cannotsay hat the one is true, simply becauset is an actof belief, and the other false, for the samereason-namely, simplybecauset is an act of belief. What makes he onetrue and the otherfalsemust be that in respectof which they differ ; and that in respectof which they differ-whatever it may be-is just that which I meanbythe propositionwhich is apprehendedn eachof them. Even, there-fore, if we admit that nothing but an act of belief can be properlysaid o be true or false, n oaesenseof thesewords, we mustr I think,admit that there is another correspondingsbnse n which proposi-tions aretrue and false.Every true act of belief Partly consists n theapprehension f aproposition; and every alseact of beliefalsopartlyconsistsn the apprehension f a proposition. And any propositionapprehendedn a true act of beliefmust bedifferent from anyproposi-tion apprehended n rt false act of belief. Consequentlyall the pro-poeitionsapprehended n true actsof belief must havesomecommonpropertywhich is not possessed y any of thosewhich are apprehen-ded n falseacts of belief. And there is no reasonwhy we should notcall tfr r property' truth' ; and similarly t heproperty possessedn com-mon by all propositionsapprehended n falseactsof belief 'falsity'.propositionsare,then, a sort of thing which may be properly saidto be true or false. And this givesus one $zayof distinguishing what


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64 SOME MAIN PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHYis a proposition rom what is zol a proposition;sincenothing that isnot z proposition can be true or false in exactly the same sense nwhich a proposition is true or false. There are, indeed, we may say,two other senses f the words 'true' and 'false',which are closelyfiiied to those in which propositions are true or false.There is, tobegin with, if actsof belief can be properly said to be true or falseatall, the sense n which an ac!qf belief is true or false.An actof beliefis true, if and only if the propositionbelieved n it is true; and it isfalse, f and only if the proposition believed n it is false.Or, puttingthe matter the other way, we may say: A proposition is true, if andonly if any act of belief, which wasa belief in it, would be a true actof belief ; and a .proposition s false, f and only if any act of belief,which wasa belief in it, would be false.I do not pretend to say herelwhich of these yo wavs of putting the matter is the better way.

.-Whether, hat is to say, he sensen which acts of belief aretrue andfalse, should be defined by reference o that in which propositionsare true and false; or whether the sense n which propositionsaretrue and false should be defined by reference o that in which actsof belief are true and false. I do not pretend to say which of thesetwo sensess the more fundamental;and it doesnot seem o me tomatter much which is. What is quite certain is that they are twodifferent senses, ut also hat eachcanbe definedby reference o theother. One sense, hen, of the words true and false,beside hat inwhich propositions are true and false, is the sense n which actsofbelief are true and false. And there is obviously, also, another senseof the words, which, though different from these two, is equallyclosely elated o both of them. Namely, he sensen which any setof words-any Fentence,or instance-which expressestrue propo-sition is true ; and any setof words which etcpresscsfalsepropositionis false. Or here again, putting the matter the other lvay, we maysay: Any propositionwhich is such hat any verbal staternentwhichexpressedt would be a true statement, s true ; and any propositionwhich is such that a verbal statement which expressedt would bea falsestatement, s false. We may, therefore, say hat another senseof the words true and false s that in which anphing that expressestrue proposition is true I and anything which expressesfalsepropo-sition is false.And obviously in this sensenot only words, but alsoother things, gestures, or instance, may be true or false. If, forinstance, somebody asksyou: 'Where are my scissors ' and youpoint to a particular place by way of ansurer,your gesturFthegesture of pointing-expresses a proposition. By pointing you


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PROPoSITIoNS 65obviouslyexpresshe samepropositionas f you hadused he words'Your scissorsare there', or had named the particular placewherethey were. And just as any words you might have used would havebeentrue or fdse, accordingas the proposition they expressedwastrue or false, so your gesture might be said to be true or false,accordingas the scissors eally are in the placeyou point to or not.There are, herefore, hese hreesenses f the words rue and false:The sensen which propositionsare true or false; the sense n whichactsof beliefare rue or false,accordingas he propositions elievedin them are true or false; and the sense n which anything thatcrc2ressesproposition s true or false,accordingasthe propositionexpresseds true or false. And obviqusly these hree senses re notthe same, hough each can be defined by reference to the others.That is to say,neither an dct of belief nor the expression f a propo-sition, can be true or false in exactly the same sense n which aproposition s true or false.And the same, think, is true universallynothing but a proposition can be true or false inexactly the samesensen which propositions are so. And why I particularly wanted ocall your attentioh to this, is for the following reason. Some peopleseem o think that, if you have before your mind an image of anobject, which is lihe the object-a copy of it-in certain respects,you may be said, merely becauseyou have this image before yourmind, to havea true idea of the object-an idea which is true, in sofar as he image really is like the object.And they seem o think thatwhen this happens,you have a true idea of the object, in exactly thesamesenseas if you believed a true proposition about the object.And this is, I think, at first sight a very natural view to take. It isnatural, for instance, o think that if, after looking at this envelope,I havebeforemy mind (as I have) an image,which is like, in certainrespects,o the patch of colour which I just now saw, I have, merelybecause directly apprehend his image,a true idea of. he patch of-,colour which I just now saw. It is natural, I say, o think that merelyto apprehend this image ds o have a true idea (true, in certain -particulars) of the patch of colour which I saw; and that, in appre-hending his image, I have a true idea of the patch of colour, inexactly he same senseas if I had a true belief abwt the patch ofcolour.But it is, I think, easy o see hat this view, howevernatural,is wholly mistaken. The fact is that if. all that happened o me weremerely hat I directly apprehendedan image,which was ilr fact likesomeother object, I could not be properly said to have any idea ofthis other object at all-any idea, either true or false. Merely to


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66 SOME MAIN PROBLEMSOF PHILOSOPHYapprehendsomething, which is in fact like somethingelse, s obvi-ously not the same hing as having an idea o/the somethingelse. norder to have an idea o/the something else,I must zot only zppre-hend an image,which is in fact like the somethingelse: I mujfdsoeither know or think that the image rs like the something elqe. Inother words, I must apprehend somepropositionabout the relationof the image o the object: only so can I be properly said to haveanideaof. he objectat all. If I do apprehendsomepropositionabout therelation of the image to the object, then, indeed, I may be said tohave an iiha of the object: and if I think that the image is like theobject in respects n which it is not like it, then I shall have efalseidea of the object, whereas f I think that it is like it in respects nwhich it is in fact like it, then I shall have,so far, a true idea of theobject. But ifI apprehendno propositionat all about the relation ofthe image o the object, then obviously,however ike the image mayinfact be to the object, cannotbe said o haveany deaofthe objectat all. I might, for instance,all my life through, be directly appre-hending imagesand sense-data,vhich were n fact singularly accur-ate copiesof other things. But suppose never for a moment evensuspected hat there were these other things, o/'which my imagesand sense-datawere copies?Suppose t never occurred to me for amoment that there were any other things at all besidemy sense-dataand images ? Obviously I could not be said to have any idea at allabouttheseother things-any ideaat all, either true or false and thisin spite of the fact that my sense-dataand images werc, in fact,copies of these other things. We must, therefore, say that merely toapprehend an image (or anything else),which is, in fact, like someother object, but without eventhinking that the two are like, is zolto have a true idea of the object in the same sense as when weapprehend a true proposition about the object. No mere image orsense-datum can possibly be either a true idea or a false idez ofanything else, however like or unlike it may be to the something,else. Or, if you choose o say that it is, in e serrsc, true idea of anobject, if it be like it, and an untrue one, if it be unlike it, you mustat least admit that it is a truc idea in quite a different sense rom thatin which a proposition about the object, if true, ar a true idea of it.Nothing, in short, can be true or false n ttre same sense n whichpropositionsare true or false.So that, if we never apprehendedanypropositionswe should not be capableof ever making any mistates-a mistake,a\ error, would be impossible. Error alwaysconeistsnbelieving someproposition which is fdse. So that if a man mercly


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PRoPosrrroNs 67apprehendedsomething, which w?s in frct unlike something elsc,but without believing either that it was like or unlike, or anythingelseat dl about it, he could not possiblybe said o make any mistaLeat all: he would never hold any mistaken or fdse opinions, becausehe would never hold any opinionszt ell.Now I have nsisted on these our'points with regard to proposi-tions, chiefly in order to makeasplain aspossiblewhat sort of a thinga propoeition is: what sort of a thing I mean to talk about, when Italk of a proposition. But now I come to the two points about pro-positions to which I wish specially to direct your attention. iThe first of them is this. You may remember that I called yourattention to a particular way of apprehendingpropositions: the weyin which you apprehen{ oneowhenyou heara sentenceuttered andunderstand ts meaning the way, for instance, n which you appre-hend the proposition that Twice two are four, when you hear mesay Twice two are four', and understand what thesewords mean.Now I want a special name for this way of apprehendingproposi-tions, because,as we shall presently see, there is another quitedifferent sort of thing which might alsobe said o be a way of appre---hendingpropositions. I want, therefore, a specialnamefor this wayof apprehending them-the way I have hitherto been talking of,and which I have ust tried to define-so that you may always,bymeansof the name, recognise hat it is f&dsway that I am talking of,and not any other way. And f propose, or this purpose,to call tlrrbway of apprehending hem, the directapprehmsion f them. But nowat once a question arises. I have already given the nxrnedirect apprc-hmsion to something else. I have given the name direct appehensionto the relationwhich you have o a patch of colour, when you actuallysee t, to a sound when you actually hear it, to a toothache,whenyou actually feel it, etc. : f havesaid hat the actual seeingofa colourrs he direct apprehensionof that colour; that the actual hearingof asound ds he direct apprehension6fThat sound, etc. The question,therefore,now arises: Is this relation to a proposition, which I nowpropose o call direct apprehension'ofa proposition, the sameas herelation which I formerly called direct apprehension-namely, therelation which you haveto a colour, when you actually see t ? Or inother words: Is the relation, which you have o a proposition, whenyou hear words which express t uttered, and understand he mean-ing of thesewords, the samerelation as that which you have to acolour, when you actually see t ? f confess cannot tell whether thisis so or not. There are, I think, reasons or supposing that what I


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68 soME MArN pRoBLEMS oF pHrr,osopHycall the direct apprehensionof a proposition is something differentfrom the direct apprehension f a sense-datum:different I mean,not only in respect of the fact that, whereas he one is the directapprehension f a proposition, he other is the direct apprehensionof a sense-datum, nd that a propositionand a sense-datumaredifferent sorts of things; but different ako, in the sense, hat therelationwhich you have o a proposition,when you directly appre-hend it, is different from that which you have to a sense-datum,when you directly apprehend 27.There are, I think, reasons orsupposing that what I call direct apprehension of a propositionreally is, in this sense,a very different sort of thing from what I calldirect apprehension f a sense-datum:but I cannot tell what thedifferences, ifthere is one; and he reasonsor supposinghat thereis one do not ,seemo me to be perfectlyconclusive. must, there-fore, leaveugdecided the question whether I am using tIe niiledinet apprehmsionn two different senses.But even f I am, IT6[ethis neednot lead to anyconfusion. I shall alwaysmean by the nameeithr the kind of relation which you have to a colour, when youactuallysee t or the kind of relation which you have o a propositionwhen you understand t-for instance, when you hear words whichexpress it, and understand what they express.And if these tworelations are, in fact, different, then that will only mean that thereare in fact two different kinds of direct apprehension.And it is, Ithink, muchlJss important to decide whether there are wo differentkinds-whether that which I call direct apprehensionof a proposi-tion is in fact a different kind of thing from that which I call directapprehensionof a sense-datum,han to distinguish both of themquite clearly, from other kinds of things, which arecertainly differ-ent from either, but which might alsobe calledwaysof apprehending.My fust point about propositions is, then, that I want you tounderstand as clearly as possible what that way of apprehendingthem is, which I am going to call direet apprehensiohof them.And my secondpbint is this. Every proposition-is, as we con-stantly say,a proposition about somethingor other. Sor4e proposi-tions may be.about everaldifferent things; but all of them areaboutat leastonething. For instance, he proposition: Twice two arefour,might be said to be aboutboth the number two and the number four :when you believe t or apprehend t, you are apprehending ome-thing about the number two and also something about the numbprfour. But the point I wish to call your attention to is this. Namely,that in the caseof an immensenumber of the propositions which we


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PROPOSITIONS 69apprchend,evenat the moment when we do directlyapprehend thewhole proposition, we do ttot dtrec';lyapprehendby any meansallof the things which the proposition is abut. Propositions, in fact,have this strange property: that even at the moment when we do

, directly apprehend the whole proposition, we need not directlyapprehendthat which the proposition is about. And in the iase of

lctually looking at this patch of colour, and directly apprehendingit, I may also directly apprehend a proposition aboui it-for in-stance, he proposition that it ir or exists,or that it is whitish. Butobviously I can also directly apprehend propositions about it, at- momentswhen I amnot directly apprehendingit. Now,for instance,when I am rx) longer directly apprehending t, I can still directlyapprehendpropositionsabout t-for instance, he proposition thatit was, that I did see it just now, and so on. And it is, I think,obvious hat we are constantlythus directly apprehendingproposi-tions about things, when we ere rrot directly apprehending these things themselves.We are constantly talking and thinking aboutthings,which we arenot directly apprehendingat the momenl whenwe talk or think about them: indeed by far the greaterpart of ourconversationand our reading is obviously about things which wearenotdirectly apprehendingwhen we converseor readaboutthem:it is comparatively rarely that our conversation s confined exclu-sivelyto things which we are directly apprehendingat the moment.And yet, wheneverwe talk or read aboutsuchthing;s,we are directlyapprehendingpropositions about them, though we are not dfuecdyapprehending he things themselves.Obviously, therefore, we doconstantlydirectly apprehendpropositions about things, when wearenot directly apprehending hesethings themselves.And I want

\a namefor this kind of relation which we haveto a thing, when weldo directly apprehend a proposition abut it, but do not directlyapprehend 'r tself. I propose o call it ind.irectapprchmsionThat isto say, I propose, o say that I am nowindirectly apprehending hepatchof colour which I saw ust now when I lookedat this envelope:meaningby that the two things that I am directly apprehendingaproposition about it, but am not directly apprehendingthe thingitself.You may objectto this name,on the ground that I am not now


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70 soME MAIN PROBLEMSOF pHTLOSOpHyreally apprehending he patch of colour at all: on the ground that tosay that I haveto it any relation at all, which can be called appre-hension,s misleading.And I have a good dealof sympathywith thisobjection, because he very point I want to insist on is what animmanse ifference there is between this relation I have to it now,when I d.onot directly apprehend t, but merely directly apprehenda proposition about it, and the relation I had to it just now when Idid directly apprehend t. You may say he difference s so greatthatthey ought not to haveany common name: that they ought not bothto be called forms of apprehension.But then, great as s the differ-ence between these two different ways of being related to a thing,there is iust asgreat a differencebetween what happenswhen I dodirectly apprehend a proposition about a thing, and what happenswhen I do not evendo as much as this-when I do not even thinkof the thing in any senseat all. So long as am directly apprehendinga proposition about a thing, T amin a serneconsciousof that thing-I amthinhing of it or abmtt t, even though I am not directly appre-hending it, artd there is quite as greatL differencebetween this wayof being related to it, the apprehending of a proposition about it,and what happenswhen I an flot thinking of it in any senseat all-when it is utterly out of my mind, as between th* way of beingrelated to it and that which I have called direct apprehension.Somename is, therefore, required fot this way of being conscious of athing-this way which occurswhen you do directly apprehendsomeproposition about it, though you do not directly apprehend dr; andI cannot think of any better name than indirect apprehension.Youmight say that I ought to use the whole long phrase: That relationwhich you have to a thing, when you do directly apprehend aproposition about it, and do not directly a"rrrehend it. But thisphrase s inconvenient,because t is so long. You might saythat theshortphrase'thinkingof it'would do: that this is ust what we meanby thinking of a thing. But there are t\ryoobjectionsto this. In thefirst place, it may bc the case hat this relation is the only one wehave to a thing, even when we should not say that we were merelythinking of it, when we should say that we were doing somethingmore than merely thinhing of it. And in the secondplace, hough wedo often usethe name 'thinking of'for this relation, we alsogse itfor that of direct apprehension.For instance, we often sa5 I think,that we are thinking sfuj-roposition, when we are directly appre-hending the proposition: and so too, when I am said to be thinkingof thc number 2, I am,I think, very often directly apprehending


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PROPOSITIoNS 7rthe nurnber a. The name thinking of'will not, therefore,do, as anunambiguousname to distinguish the kind of relation which I wantto call 'indirect apprehension' rom that which I call 'direct appre-hension'. And I cannot think of any better name for the purposethan 'indirect apprehension'.And, in fact, it doesnot much matterwhat name I use, provided you understand what f mean by it. Imean, then, by 'indirect apprehension' the kind of relation whichyou have to a thing, when you do directly apprehendsomeproposi-tion about t, buiTo not directly apprehend he thing itself. And thepoint I want to insist on is that this is quite a different kind of rela-tion from that Which you have to a thing when you do directlyapprehend t. The only connection between the two is this, thatwhenever you indirectly apprehend any one thing, you must bedirectlyapprehending something lse--eithersome proposition aboutit, or perhapssometimes omethingother than a proposition.But now by the help of what I have said about propositions,andaboutwhat occurs, when we directly apprehend hem, I think I canclassifyand distinguish all the different sorts of relations to things,which would commonly be said to be ways of knowing them. Andthis is what I wish now to do.

Moore on Propositions

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