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Monsters as (Uncanny) Metaphors: FreudLakoff , and the Representation of Monstrosity inCinematic Horror

Steven Schneider

Everything monstrous happening in the world has anancient ancestry. The monster is intrinsic while ourawareness of the monster has evolved.

Frank Cawson,The Monsters in the Minil (1'61)*

Monsters must be examined within the intricate matrix ofrelations (social, cultural, and literary-historical) whichgenerate them. A mixed category, the monster resists anyilassification built on hierarchy. .'.The monstrous is agenus too large to be encapsulated in any concepfualsystem.

ieffrey Cohen, "Monster Culture (Seven Theses)" (2-3)

I have always supposed that the universal and theparticular are compatible, that groundin-g in a particularListorical and cultural matrix is inevitable and could notconceivably be in conflict with universal principles.

Israel Scheffler, Teachers of My Youth (180)

Introduction: Horror Film Monsterswhat, if anything, do the monsters of horror cinema have in common,besides the fact that they are not real? They may be human-just thinkof Norman Bates, Leatherface, or Hannibal Lechter-but they are notreal, in the sense of experientially real. They may even benon-fictional-just think of Henry: Portrait of a serial Killer ('1.990), a filmabout real-life mass murderer Henry Lee Lucas-but that still doesn'tmake them real (the Henry of the film is iust an actor, Michael Rooker,pretending to be Henry Lee Lucas).'

so the monsters of horror cinema are depictions of monstefs, rePle-sentations of monsters. But what else ate they, as a gtoup? Perhaps noth-* Parenthetical numbers refer to pages of books in the Works Cited list.

Above, the proiotypicol 80s monster, Freddy Krueger {Robrt Englund), dressed upond reody io porty in A Nighlrnore on Elm Sfreel 5:The Dresm Child.

167

r68 Horror Film Reodering: after all, Dracula, Jaws, the Thing (both versions), Carrie, Chucky,Freddy Krueger, and the rest are a fairly diverse lot, to say the least, Ac-cording to horror film expert Mark Jancovich, "Different groups willrepresent the monstrous in different ways and representations will de.velop historically" (9). In her 1995 book, Skin Shows: Gothic Horror anilthe Technolory of Monsters, judith Halberstam makes almost exactlythe same claim: "The body that scares and appalls changes over time, asdo the individual characteristics that add up to monstrosity, as do thepreferred interpretations of monstrosity" (8). Can't we say of them thismuch at least, that their primary purpose is to horrify viewers? Sure,they don't always succeed-lots of times they fail-but isn't it the factthat they try that makes them horror film monsters? The dinosaurs of /a-rassic Park (1993) may or may not be depictions of monsters, but lurassicPark isn't a horror movie, and the dinosaurs aren't intended to horrifyus. We may feel terror at the sight of a Tyrannosaurs Rex tearing someguy apart, but, to quote Stanley Cavell, "terror is of aiolence, of the vio-lence I might do or that might be done me. I can be terrified of thunder,but not horrified by it" (418).

This is all, of course, to highlight the question, "What is horror?". Andthat is a very big question indeed. In a famous 1.919 paper, Freud charac-terized the "uncanny" as that which "arouses dread and horror...certainthings which lie within the class of what is frightenin€' (339). Now de-fining uncanniness in terms of horror obviously precludes us from de-fining horror in terms of uncarminess/ on pain of circularity. Nor wouldour intuitions support any claim to the effect that these terms are syn-onymous (most dictionaries define "uncanny" somewhere along thelines of "eerie," "mysterious," or "seemingly supernatural"). But if wecan at least find some independent reasons for thinking that psycho-analysis has the tools to explain the timeless appeal and efficacy of hor-ror fiction, this will jrstify our use of Freud's theory of the uncanny toshed light on the nature of horror films, and, by extension, the nature ofhorror film monsters.

Such "independent reasons" are readily available. Though sneered atby the highbrow, largely ignored by mainstream academics, and cen-sured by society's self-proclaimed moral guardians, it can hardly be de-nied that horror fiction (including cinema) serves a variety ofpsychological functions in society. The briefest review will suffice tomake the point. -Like fi agedy, horror promotes emotiona|.c-atha:Sjp--inaudiences; like fa4tasy, it offers viewers an escape flom thq tp.Cigm ofeVeryday life; like comedy, it provides a relatively q4f-e- (b-e_-c?u-qg.ryla-tively disguised/distorted) forum for the expression of socio-culturalfeari. All bf tnis is borne out by the fact that psychoanalysis has pro-

Monsters os (Unconny) Metophors: Freud' Lokoff' ond'in"" n"piJlnlotion of Monsiiosity in Cinemotic Horror 169

duced, by far,the most common and in{luential analyses "f F: horror

;h";;iiJi'*a',nvpet!'"sl'J1*i:*t:i"l#l;tf -:ft:Ht#:i3:Jf+': '['til?n":ro-?.#Sffi"one might sav-q'ul gr*a]g#t or the

ffi ;;;;; i;;r rr.. "

i ;"; . iffi ;?1"p ;ess eioi op-pres se s" (75). And'#""ffiil#;a?#*-iiFtry:""ojyctrilanalysisand.thehorrorfilm is mutually,"d;;tJ"' i'' A"d'"* rt"taot points oyt"'tfe [horror]

genre itself invokes btYtftt"-aydt ::Tti*ations' at times borrowing

its imagery from the

"ytUotit apparatus of dream interpretation as well

as allowing f ictional tt;;;;t;L'.1 9:."1* pseu do-Freudian accounts of

,trJo*" ind others' motivations" (M6)'

As we shall see, not everyone is convinced that psychoanalysis has

the resources to provide a satisfactory account of the horror genre' Be-

sides which, it is possiii".io 1"""5" psychoanalytic colcgPts'in this con-

text witho-ut f".",i;^:"i nt""J;t fi"l't P* niu (4-dmittedlv sketchy)-theorv of the uncanny'3 To make Tltttt """" *ot" complicated' partly

]l'i'ltttiirl" tt"itrlrtt"" r'"od'' theory of the uncanny can be ap-

plied to the hoffor g;;;" ".;;mue'.or dlfferent ways' But this multi-

tude of alternatrves .,"uJ ,.ot intimidate us, al least nol until they are all

showntobemutuarry"'.r'''i"".Tothe.extentthattheaccountofhorrorfilm monsterc p'"'"'{tJ h*"'; plausible (howe11e1 one wishe-s to cash

out the notion of "ptut"iUitity")' to that extent will the means used to ar-

rive at this account be justified' t

The thesis to be defended here, in four Pult', T as follows: (1) para-

digmatic horror "u'iu'it'u' work by reconfirming for audiences infantile

.beliefs that were abandoned rong ago, such as tie belief in the ability of

the dead to return '"'fO" ttintlt"otll* monsters are best understood as

metaphoricalr*aoaim'nt''of'otftnarratives'Assuch'theyarecapableofreconfirming rrrrrnorrnluJ u"t"rt by their very Presence; (3) these meta-

ohorical embodime"]ts-- u'"'on"ptual' not' merely cinematographic'

fi:ffi,;^;rh;i;#y J.l.,",n'".*ind, not just on the screen; and (a)

althouglr lhe metaprro"ric;il;;r" of horror film monsters is psychologi-

iarty ne ce ssarv, th"; 1;;;;;;;;;g"""itv is historicallv and culturallv

coniingent-Not only ;- -.ili i"t" #' -1e

monster is the reilication' the

'iiinbodimentinasymbol'ofanunconsciouscontentinthemind"(Caw-sonl);itisalsotn"-tu'"'tftut"themonster"'isanembodimentofacer-tain cultural ^o"t""iJ u ti"t"' a feeling' and a place" (Cohen 2)

What ma!-eq,ho-rror film monsters at least potentiatty horrifying-whatmdkes th"* *otst*i; ffi;*;ith-is the fact that they metaphorically

6?h-6oat ,,r,*o""tJi iltfiui'; .to. Tu "*t""t that they actuatly 'ii"ccee4 n

fioirifying rriu*u"iilo;;;;;; ilis betut'se the manner in which they em-

170 Horror Film Reoderbody surmounted beliefs is invested with culfural relevance. James lac-cino, submitting th9 horror genre to what he calls (following jung) ,,ar.chetypal analysis," arrives at a similar conclusion: "As lirritil-auonprogresses to higher stages of consciousness, newer interpretations ofthose age-old [horror] myths become necessary so that ttre links withhumankind's archaic past can be appropriately maintained" (1g1). Iac.cino thinks it "quite appropriate to refer to the new archetypes as techno-myths, reflecting the technological advances that oui- society hasattained" (181); our "culfural relevance" condition, in contrast, encom-passes not merely the technological,brft also the political, racial, religious,and sexual dimensions of society. And here what gets reflected ls oftenanything but an " adv ance."4

This same bias towards the present can be detected in an otherwiseinnocuous comment made by Barbara Creed: "The horror film is popu-lated by female monsters, many of which seem to have evolved f-mimages that haunted the dreams, myths and artistic practices of our for-bears many centuries ago" (1). Point well taken, but why speak ofchanges in the face of the (here, female) monster in euorutionary terms?At the very least it is misleading to suggest that representations of mon-strosity from ages past can be understood as ,,primitive,, in comparisonwith those of today (cf. Iaccino's talk of civilization progreising to"higher stages of consciousness"). One might put the point is follows:although the face of the monstrous aaies from time to time, and fromplace to place, there is no reason to believe that in doing so it becomesany more horrifc. Placing a value-neutral "cultural relevince" conditionon the efficacy of horror film monsters respects the fact that change doesnot always imply advancement.s A number of post-1960 horror films\e.g. Targets [1964, Martin [1971], The Funhouse [1981], Tle Howling[1981], Frightmare [1982], and Popcorn [1991]) have thematized the impo-tence of classic monsters when confronting today's supposedly mbre"sophisticated" audiences. But it is hard to believe that Freddy, fason,Michael, or Pinhead would have been more horrifying to pre-1960 audi-ences than were Dracula, the Wolf Man, Frankenstein,s Monster, or theMummy.6

what follows is an attempt to show how a psychoanalytic explanation"of'monstrosity-in terms of uncanniness may be compautb wiih a post-modernist explanation of monstrosity in terms of sociohistoriiii condi-"- tioning. Halberstam is mistaken when she claims that';monstrosity (and' the fear it gives rise to) is historically conditioned rather than a psycho-logical universal" (6: emphasis added); when it comes to horroi filmmonsters, the domains of history and psychology are nof mutually ex_clusive. By presenting (in broad outline, it must be admitted) a'itwo-

Monsters os (Unconny) Metophors: Freud, Lokoff, ondthe Representotion of Monstrosity in Cinemotic Horror 171

tiered,, theory of monstrosity, the goal is to blur-if not collapse-thesharp distinciion that is usually made betweenuniaersalizlng accounts ofthe lrorror genre, those assumhg "a social ontology wherein humanagents are pre-constituted in key respects," and parttcularistic accounb,th'ose assuming a social ontology "centered on active social agentswho...use cultuial artifacts as resources in rendering coherent their eve-ryday lives" (Tudot 460).7

Freud8(1,) Paradigmatic honor nartatittes wo* by reconfirming praudiences infantile beliefs that were abandoned long ago'

In 1906, the German psychologist Ernst ]entsch wrote a paPer in whichhe hypothesized that the essential factor responsible for the productionof ,rncanlry feelings is intellectual uncertainty, those doubts andconfusions which aie liable to arise when we come across somethingcompletely unfamiliar in a foreign ("alien") environment- In his ownpup", on the subject, Freud concedes the pima facie plausibility offunt".h'r view, according to which feelings of uncanniness regardingobjects and events in our immediate surroundings decrease as a

function of our comfort level: the more we feel at home in oursurroundings ("unhomely" is a more precise translation of the Germanword "unh-eimlich," from which the term "uncanny" was originallyderived), the less likely we are to feel frightened there. But Freud'sdissatisiaction with this view surfaces when he calls attention to the factthat clearly not eaerythircg instilling in us a sense of uncaruriness issomething we find alien or confusing. Attacking Jentsch on the groundsthat intellectual uncertainty could not be a necessary condition ofuncanny feelings, he urges his readers to resist the temptation "toconclude that what is unCanny is frightening precisely because it is notknown and familiay'' (341).

Freud proceeds by teasing out a secondary, and to some extent con-tradictory, meaning of the German word "heimlich"" concealed; kept fromsight; wiihheld from-others so that they cannot get to know of .or about lf- Thismleaning serves to ground Freud's alternative explanation of,uncannyphenoniena, according to which "the uncanny is in reality_nothing newor alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in themind and which has become alienated from it only through the processof repression" (363). or as he puts it a little later on: "[T]he unhtimlich iswhai was once heimlich, familiar; the prefix 'un' is the token of repres-sion,, (364). To support his radical thesis, Freud traces the most promi-nent uncanny themes back to infantile sources. Conceptual connectionsare establish"d b"t*""tt, for example, womb phantasies and the terrify-

172 Horor Film Reoderrng thgught of being buried alive, the castration complex and the shock.ing sight of a severed limb, the instinctual compulsion to repeat and threerie recurrence of unexpected events.

It is often held that Freud identifies repressed infantile wishes as thasole source of uncanny feelings. Thus, in hir inttodrr"tion to a casebookon Gothic literature, victor sage claims that',the whole shape of [horrorlfiction for author and reader alike becomes, in Freud,s view, a distortedprojection of desire fol jhe womb,, (23). Strictly speaking, however,,,thereturn of the repressed" constifutes only one irass of .rti.u.,rry phenom.ena. In his paper, Freud also identifies a second class of the ur,canny,constituted by surmounted beliefs which gain some measure of valida-fi9" T either experienced or depicted rearity. _In response to somethingwhich seems to confirm-our,rong-since discarded (or so we thought) belliefs in the ability of the dead to return to life, the omnipotence ofthoughts, and the existence of a double, we get a feeling of uncanniness:"we have surmounted these modes of thoughl but we"clo not feel quitesure of our new beliefs, and the old ones Jull exlst within us, ready toscize upon any confirmalon" (970-71). Here, what has been relegated tothe unconscious is a

-belief in the reality of a particular ideational content,

rather than a particular ideational contentitself.Admittedly, "the reconfirmation of the surmounted,, sounds less ele-gant than "the return of the repressed"; nevertheless, the former too oc-

cupies a position of central importance in Freud's theory of the uncanny.Tudor denies this, citing for support Freud's remark that only the classof uncanny phenomena constituted by repressed infantile complexes isguaranteed equal efficacy rn fiction and reality.g But just because sur_mounted beliefs do not necessaily engender thesame dLgree of uncannyfeeling when they are reconfirmed in fiction ur oppor"d to reality, thisdoes not me-an thgy neaer manage to do so. euite tire contrary. Accord-rng to Freud, so long as a certain "conflict of judgmenf' condition onthis class of the uncanny is satisfied, the intensiity ol feeling evoked willbe the same-if not greater-in the depicted *orid. (we shil have moreto say about this "conJlict of judgment,, condition beiow.)

Freud does, however, view repressed infantile complexes as the morefundamental class of uncanny phenomenon. Thus, ',rirhen we considerthat primitive beliefs are most intimately connected with infantile com_plexes, and are, in fact, based on them, we shall not be greatlyastonished to find that the distinction is often ahazy one,' (372).In botirclasses, y".3loy feeling-as opposed to, say, mere intellectuaf recognition (of the ideational content, of the reconfiimed belief)-gets produiedthe-same way. Briefly,. it is a tenet of psychoanalytic ttreof that anxietyis the cause of repression. Therefore, with the un-expected return to con_

Above, Funhouse..Amy (Elizobeth Benidge) fends off o shower oitock by her mon-ster-mosked liltle brother Joey (Shown corson) who is ormed with o rubber knife'

sciousness of some previously repressed ideational content comes all ofthe latent anxiety. And the same holds for the reconfirmation of primi-tive beliefs ,,intimately connected with...and...in fact, based on" thatsame ideational content.lo

Freud,s qualification of "haziness" aside, the crucial points to keep inmind here are (1) that a distinction between primitive beliefs and infan-tile complexes does exist, and (2) that despite the "intimate connectionl'between them (the former are in some sense parasitic on the latter), thisdistinction is still capable of being made. Contra Victor Sage, desire forthe womb does nof r-hup" the whole of horror fiction according to Freud'And contra Robin Wood, the true subject of horror cinema may be less,,the struggle for recognition of all that our civilization represses oI op-presses" ifr"" g9;glggl"lor validation of all that our civilizatipn dis-a-v-o_1gq glllglges.

(2) Horror flm monsters are best understood as metaphoricalembodiments of paradigmatic hortor narratiues, and as such'are capable of reionfrming surmounted beliefs by their uerypresence.

In a recent article, Ivan Ward calls for a distinction between "thenarratives of [cinematic] horror and the images" (274).Following Freud,one might begin to effect such a distinction bV* "qqggA&g

the mqstdisturb['rg imiges of ho1191qgq-egla'-with-the"returnto-ron5-Erpllg!99s*ofurc'vrouTffTdresrea-"id-ei"Uqa.al-3onrenr, -and-*the'mog- lrrghte$ng

174

I

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Horor Film Reodernarratiaes with the confirmation in depicted realnurruilues wlrn rne coruumatron m depicted reality of previouslypylmolnted _bg!!gfr One perhaps surprising consiquErrce*of-=fti;r _ __f _ _ _-r ^__.o vl utlEapproach is that the overwhelming majority of horror film monsters turnout to be not so much literal manifestations of paradigmatic uncannyimages as metaphorical embodiments of paradigmatic uncannynarratives. such a view diverg-es sharply from the one endorsed by inumber of contemporary psychoanalytic-minded theorists, namely,'theview that horror film monsters represent in various ways male fears ofcastration.ll

on the "surmounted belief mode( proposed here, the stars of classicreanimation tales--mummies, zombies, the Frankenstein monster--canbe viewed as more or less distinct embodiments*g-f our surmounted be-Etut=ULry-el$g4milGi-which=;su6-r'eTrrotertain conditions, gets reconfirmed by their very presence. Freud him-self lends support in favor of this hypothesis: "many people experiencethe [uncanny] feeling in the highest degree in reration to...ttre return ofthe dead, and to spirits and ghosts" (364). Again, the stars of classiccounterpart tales--doppelgangers, werewolves, murderous alter-egos (6la Mr. Hyde)----can be viewed as more or less distinct embodiments ofour surmounted belief in the existence of a double (a psychological in-vention which provides infants with insurance against the threat ofdeath and/or the destruction of the ego).12

rn The omen (1980), there is a memorable scene in which a large sheetof plate glass flies out from the back of a moving truck and decipitatessomeone/ all as a result of demonic intervention. Although there is aminimum of gore, we are left wittr a disturbing image oithe victim,shead spinning end over end in mid-air. If what his been claimed here sofar is correct, the effectiveness of this scene resurts primarily (thoughperhaps not solely) from its success in bringing back to coniciousneisthe content-of repressed infantile castration complexes (or their femalee-quivalentsl3).:T

"sepqe h_ol_ sJrue^f_sr au-thosercerreein:shich_qpcela-

-Stg takes precedence ove But in order to understand whatmakes Damien, the monstrous devil-child of rhe omen, himself so dis-furbing, we need to ask which paradigmatic horror narrative (or narra-tives) he metaphorically embodies, and so which surmounted belief (orbeliefs) his presence reconfirms for viewers. Considering Damien,s un-canny ability to cause death in all marmer of indirect ways, a prelimi-nary answer would b9 that he metaphorically embodies a paradigmatic"psychic" narrative, thereby reconfirming our previously surmountedbelief in the omnipotence of thought. Insofar as his birth signifies the re-turn of satan, however, he may also be said to metaphoricaly embody aparadigmatic reincarnation narrative, thereby reconfirming our pre-

Monsters os (Unconny) Metophors: Freud, Lokoff. ondthe Represenlotion of Monstrosity in Cinemotic Horror 175

viously surmounted belief in the ability of dead souls to return to life.(Like many of his monstrous cohorts, Damien is a mixed metaphor.)

As was pointed out earlier, not all horror film monsters manage tofulfill their primary purpose. Tudor, in presenting his case against uni-versalizing iccounts of horror cinema, stresses the fact that "preciselythe same iepresentation of a monster can be found frightening, repul-sive, hideous, pitiful, or laughable by audiences in different social cir-cumstances and at different times." (456) Of course, the degree to whicha monster succeeds in horrifying viewers is, to a large extent, a matter ofage, personal history, and taste (or lack thereof). But there is a furtheruJp"it of Freud's theory which may help to explain the fact that, al-though two (or more) monsters can metaphorically embody the same

surm-ounted belief, this by no means guarantees that both (or all) ofthem will successfully engender feelings of uncanniness/horror'

Freud makes an important distinction in his paper between the experi-enceil uncanny and the depicted uncanny. With respect to that class of un-canny phenomena stemming from repressed infantile complexes, itmakes little difference whether the refurn to consciousness takes placein real life or in fiction. As was noted above, we are as apt to feel a senseof horror reading about a dismemberment, for example, as we are actu-ally witnessing one (although there can be little doubt that actually wit-nessing a dismemberment would be more traumatizing than merelyreading about one). With respect to that class of uncalrny phenomenapro.""ditrg from surmounted beliefs, however, the domain in which re-confirmation takes place makes a huge difference. In everyday life, a re-confirmation of that which has been surmounted almost alwaysproduces uncanny feelings. B.fi.-!91 h-owever, such feelings do notarise unless there is a palpable"doifrliCfofiiidgmen{J-e-ga{dl{g:th9,-p-99-sn . Virhaf'*ei=musf 6iiiGni, in spiie*6rour'obttt6rt' 1*ltiiie, .onditioned, rational) judgment, is that the objectsor events being depicted really could exist or happen. But note: this isnot to say that what we must believe, in spite of our better judgment, isthat the oblects (events) being depicted really do exist (really are happen-i.g).14

In reading works of fiction, "we adapt our judgment to the imaginaryreality impJsed on us by the writer" (Freud 374). This applies to worksof film, as well. In the animistic worlds depicted in fantasy ("sword-and-sorcery,,) cinema, for example, there is nothing uncalrny or otherwisehorrifying about the reconfirmation of infantile beliefs in the omnipo-tence of -thought and the prompt fulfillment of wishes; according toFreud, this is b"cunru most of us are well aware of the fact that curses/charms, magic spells, and the like are regular, everyday events in the

t76 Horror Film ReoderFantasy Universe. Freud's "conflict of judgmenf' condition thus goes along way towards explaining why, when we watch horror films stirringDracula, Frankenstein's monster, or the wolf Man today, it often feelginstead like we are watching R-rated fairy tales. Although the hadi-tional/canonical monsters of horror cinema are just as threatening aethey used to be, our overfamiliarity with the fictional worlds these mon-sters inhabit has rendered ineffective their efforts to horrify, since theyno longer engender in us the requisite conflict of judgment. That is notto say that the narratiues these monsters metaphorically embody haveceased serving as a source of uncanniness; rather, it is to say that themanner in which these narratives are metaphorically embodied has be-come outdated.l5

Three recent trends in horror cinema can be viewed as attempts tosidestep, at least temporarily, this crifical problem of audience overfa-miliarity. One is the introduction of ever more bizarre, alien, and/or in-choate monsters (e.g. those in Eaent Horizon |19g7l, Mimic [1997f, andPhantoms [19981), monsters whose sheer novelty is supposed to over-come the conventionality of the fictional worlds they inhabit. A secondis the creative merging of realistic serial killers with demonic, other-wordly forces, in films such as Exorcist m Q990), The Fighteners (1996),and Fallen (1998). Here, the writer/director "betrays us to the supersti-tiousness which we have ostensibly surmounted; he deceives us bypromising to give us the sober truth, and then after all overstepping it',(Freud 374). And a third is the extreme self-reflexivity of "neo-stalkLrs,,such as Scream (1996), Halloween H2O Q.998), and Llrban Legend (199g). Inthese movies, survival depends not only on knowing the conventions ofmodern horror cinema, but on figuring out how to use that knowledgein order to break free of these conventions. Concomitant with the latter,of course, is a renewed opportunity for audiences to have a conJlict ofjudgment.

Herein lies a Freudian answer to the question how horror film mon-sters are able to horrify, considering the fact that audiences are fullyaware of their fictional status. Because a belief in the legitimate possibil-ity of reconfirmation is enough to produce a conflict of judgment, a be-lief in the actual existence of horror film monsters (or the paradigmaticnarratives they metaphorically embody) is not necessary to generatefeelings of uncanniness/horror. Noel Carroll, in his provocative study,The Philosophy of Horcor; or Paradoxes of the Heart (1990), fails to notethis difference between actual and possible existence beliefs. Wisely re-jecting the blanket assumption that "we are only moved emotionallywhere we believe that the object of our emotion exists," Carroll goes toofar in the other direction, claiming (a) that "the thought of a fearsome

Monsters os (Unconny) Metophors: Freud' Lokoff' ondthe Representotion of Monslrosily in cinemotic Horror 177

anddisgustingcharacterlikeDraculaissomethingthatcanbeenter-tained #ittronlU"tieving that Dracula exists," and (b) that "thought con-

tents we entertain without believing them can genuinely move us

emotionallY" (80-81).Byitself,(a)isutterlyharmless'Butcombinedwith(b)'itissimply

misLken. The mere entertaining in one's mind of a horror film monster is

insufficient to generate fear; at-the very least, it renders the production of,,r.n u' emotiinal response either mysterious or irrational. Unless a be-

ii"f * ,n" possible "tirt"rr.u of such a being (however l""dig this belief

may be), ti presupposed by tle u:ti".tty of entertaining' there is nothing-;;i"-# r,otniog rationai-for the feir to latch on to. We may agree withcurrolt so_ca[6d,,Thought-Theory of Emotional Responses to Fictiorl',when it comes to the ,,retirn of the repressed" class of uncanny phenom-

"iu. n.,, that is just because, what generates the uncanniness/horror here

is a return to ionsciousness of some particular ideational content and

*i6-g else . When it comes to the "reconfirmation of the surmounted".Us oFrrn anny phenomena, where most horror film monsters are to be

ir""o pr*urrio. of a possible (not an actual) existence belief is requiredfor the necessary conJlict of judgment to occur'

LetmedivergeforamomenttorespondtoanobjectionraisedbyCarroti against frre bringing to bear of psychoanalylc lnsi{gations inurrulyr"r if tf,u horror gE"tu' Near the end of his book' Carroll takes aimui #ooa,, return of th"e repressed argument: "it is not clear to me thatmonsters...much touch any infantile traumas or repressed wishes oru"*i"rilr,, (172). After citing as a ,,pertinent counterexample" the man-andwoman-eatingcephalodsfromH.G.Wells,shortstory,,TheSeaRaiders,,monsters|e ciaims are wholly lacking in latent psychic content,

cu,,ott concludes that ,,the psychoanalytic reduction of horrific crea-

**" ," objects of repression ls not comprehensive for the genre; not allhorrific creatures poitend psychic conflict or desire" (173)' His own, non-

osvchoanalytic characterizaiion of horror film monsters invokes the

il;;;iJanthropologist Mary Douglas, who attributes feelings ofJi"grrra and aversion to aplarent transgressions or violations of culturalcatJgories: "given u *ot"i"t in a horror story' the scholar can ask inwhai *ays it is categorically interstitial, contradictory (in Douglas',errr";, incomplete, or lormless""[M]onsters"'are unnatural relative to aculfure,s conceptual scheme of nature. They do not fit the scheme; theyviolate it''(34).15

Freud,s central claim, that feelings of uncanniness result either from a

return of the repressed or from a reconfirmation of the surmounted, is

gi"rr"Juv carrott as follows: ,,To experience the uncanny...is to experi-

l78 Horror Film Reoderence something that is known, but something the knowledge of whichhas been hidden or repressed" (1zs). Not badlor a star! but"what aboutthe experience of something the berief rn which has been abaniloned orsurmounted? In light of what has been said thus far, it should be evidentthat by identifying repressed infantile complexes as the sole source ofuncanniness /horror in psychoanalytic theory, Carroil is guilty of thesame mistake as victor sage (and perhaps Robin wood, is well). ButCarroll goes on to make the additional miitake of throwing the baby outwith the bathwater, taking the inadequacy of the return of"the repressedargument as a reason to reject all psychoanalytic accounts of the horrorgenre (though he concedes that "psychoanarysis nevertheless may stillfrave 11ch !o say about particular works, ,olger,r"r, and cycles withinhorror" [168]).

Because he ignores the "reconfirmation of the surmounted,, class ofuncanny phenomena, Carroll is tempted by an explanation of monstros-ity which, at the end of the day, amounts to little more than an anthro_pologically-informed recapitulation of the Jentschian position sosoundly defeated by Freud in his 1919 paper. According to Carroil,"monsters are not only physically threatening; they are" cognitivelythreatening. They are threats to common knowledge. liialonsters are in acertain sense challenges to the foundations of u ".tlfu.";, way of think_ing" (34). This appeal to "cognitive threaf' as the source of our simurta-neous fascination and disgust with horrific monsters is reminiscent of|entsch's appeal to "intellecfual uncertainw" as the source of our feel-ings of uncaruriness:

Most people...incorporate the new and the unusual withmistrust, unease.and even hostility... This can be explainedto a great extent by the difficulty of establishine quicidv andcompletely the conceptual connections that the"obyect slivesto make with the previous ideational spheie of theindividual-in other words, the intellectual mastery of thenew thing (8).

As a perhaps unsuspecting neo-Jentschian, Carroll's position is open toa revised version of-Freud's original criticism: since clearly noi nerymonster that successfully instills in us a sense of horror or uncanninessis "categorically interstitial, incomplete, or formless,,, cognitive threatcould not be a necessary condition of uncanny feelings., Even rf we accept Carroll's highly counterintuitive claim, that horrorfilm monsters must be "of either a supernatural or a sci-fi origin,, (15),and so agree not to count against him the plethora of realist ho"rror filmmonsters such as Norman Bates, Leatherface, and Jerry Blake (of stepfa-

Monsters os (Unconny) Metophors: Freud, Lokoff, ondthe Representotion of Monstrosiiy in Cinemotic Horror 179

tlrcr fame), cognitive threat-qua-categorical interstitiality sfill seems ines-sential. The entire class of psychic monsters (which includes Carrie, Pat-rickl7, and the eponymous "scanners") , infact, tells against the necessityof this condition, as the power of these-q1onstefO,tg hqlttfy can be Eacedto external effects ratheithan intefral properties.lS Carroll's ulterior mo-tive in anaiyzing ihe ontological itatus of hotro. film monsters is to dis-tinguish the emotion of "art-horror" from that of (presumably, "art-")feai. this leads him to regard horror film monsters as both "threateningand impure. If the monster were only evaluated as potentially threaten-ing, the emotion would [simply] befear" (28: emphasis added). We shallleave it an open question whether Carroll's strategy works; for our pur-poses, it suffices to note (1) that his analysis most naturally fits the classbf reincarnated monsters, whose members obviously transgress culturalcategories in virtue of their "living dead" stafus; and (2) that his analysisonly-works for other classes/kinds of monsters if we apply the notion ofcategorical interstitiality with generous ad hoc breadth. Clearly, an alter-native analysis is warranted.

That said, it is highly unlikely that every horror film monster, muchless every monster in the whole of horror fiction, can be understoodsolely rn terms of the "recon{irmation of the surmounted." Some ofthem---e.g. the Headless Horseman and the Beast with Five Fingers (asevered hand with a mind of its own)-may strike us as falling squarelywithin the "return of the repressed" category. And let us grant Carroll,at least for the sake of argument, that Wells' cephalods are frighteningprimarily because they are cognitively threatening. Even if we,allow fora minority of monsters who correspond neither to repressed infantilecomplexes nor to surmounted infantile beliefs, however, would this be,rr.h u bad thing so far as our overall proiect is concerned? After all, oneof the major criticisms levied against psychoanalytic theory in general,and its application to the horror genre in particular, is its propensity forself-confirmation.l9

The account of horror film monsters presented here is not intended toserve as a strict, much less an "essential," definition; rather, it is in-tended to serve as an interpretive tool for the understanding and con-struction of cinematic representations of monstrosity. As such, it canwithstand the pressure of a few prima fncie countetexamples.20 Near theend of his paper, Freud himself cautions that "we must be prepared toadmit that there are other elements besides those which we have so farlaid down as determining the production of uncanny feelings" (370).And if Freud canadmit of "other elements," we certainly can too'

180 Horror Film ReoderLakoff

(3) Horror flm monsters are conceptuaf not merelycinem ato gr aphic, metaphors.

It is one thing for metaphors to appear in a literary work; is it anotherthing--or perhaps no thing at all-for metaphors to appear in acinematic work? Although not everyone agrees that the ,,metaphoricaltransformation of ideas exists in film" (Markgraf 46), Trevor whittock,in an influential sfudy, concludes that metaphor can come from the,,role[of an image] in the thematic or narrative development of the film,...itsplace in social beliefs or customs, even its culfural and historical setting,,(39). If horror film monsters really are metaphorical embodiments ofparadigmatic uncanny narratives, and their role really is to reconfirmpreviously surmounted beliefs by their very presencl, ther, what weneed now is a theory of metaphor which ci.r snppott and help toexplicate this phenomenon.

George Lakoff has provided copious and convincing evidence for theview that "the locus of metaphors is not in language it all,, (203), but inthought. According to Lakoff, metaphors function by facilitating an un-derstanding of one conceptual domain in terms of another, ,trrrJly rrror"concrete, conceptual domain. Take the familiar LovE IS A IouRNEymetaphor: here, entities from the "target domain,, of love (e.g. lovers,their common goals, the love relationship) are understood inLrms ofentities from the "source domain" of traveling (travelers, destinations,the vehicle used to get there). This explains thsease with which we traf-fic in such metaphorical expressions as "their rerationship is going no-where," "they're sfuck in the slow lane," and ,,she,s got condol of thewh99l." The ontological correspondences constituting the LOVE IS AJOURNEY metaphor, and thousands of others, are tightly structured, in-sof arastarget_domainenti4-ef ?piceltypr-e,s-ery-e_.tb-e*l.Sgteellcafu res_af(a1d rglq{-o,as -between)-source-domain e,nti-ti,g€ They ari conuentional, inthat they function as relatively fixed parts of i curture's shared concep-tual system. And they exist in a hierarchical organization, whereby"lower" mappings inherit correspondence feafures irom ,,higher,, map_pings. To illustrate this last poin! note that the understanding of, for in-stance, difficulties in terms of impediments to traael occurs not only in thePURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor (e.g. ,,From now on, it'sgoing to be smooth sailing"), but also in the ,,lower-levef, LOVE IS AJOURNEY metaphor (e.g. "Their relationship is rocky,,), as well as in the"lower-level" CAREER IS A IOURNEY metaphor (e.g. ,,His rise to thetop has hit a snag").

Monsters os (Unconny) Metophors: Freud' Lokoff' ondthe Representotion of Monsirosity in cinemoiic Horror l8l

T'hree features of Lakoff's theory make it appealing in the presentcontext. First, his emphasis on the conceptual, rather than linguistic, ba-

sis of metaphor satisiies our need for a theory which readily accommo-dates (or aileast does not discriminate against) cinematic representationsof monstrosity. Lakoff repeatedly stresses that, in his theory, "the lan-

Buage is secor,dary. The mapping is primary" (208)' This is crucial' con-

ria"ii"g that in -our theory, th99,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,e narratives serving to reconfirmsurmorinted beliefs are "embodied" not in language, but by horror filmmonsters. In other words, the medium of our metaphor is primarily ols-

ual, rather than verbal.Second,theconventionalnafureofconceptualmetaphorsgoesalong

waytowardsaccountingfortheseeminglyubiquitousPresenceofhor-ror film monsters in oui culture. ]ust as the Love is a ]ourney metaphorhas become so much a feature of our unreflective thought and speech

that we often fail to recognize particular instances of it as metaphor, fas-

cination with---one mighl say affection for-the monsters of horror cin-ema has become ,o *id"spi"ad that most of us have no need to stopand figure out just which ,ttr.uolly narratives they metaphorically em-body. bracula, irreddy, ]ason, and company are referred to in sorgs' starin cartoons, appear on postage stamps... some even have breakfast cere-

als named afier them! For better or worse, the metaphorical nature ofhorror film monsters has facilitated their entrance into our collectiveconsciousness'

Third, the systematic and hierarchical organwatiort- of conceptualmetaphors helps to account for the intuitive plausibility of a "sur-*o.r.,tud belief;, horror film monster typology. The utility of arrangingwhat looks at first to be a seemingly incommensurable mass of monstersin a system that is both theoretically acceptable and aesthetically satisfy-mg n'ur recently been remarked upon by Gregory Waller' In his inho-ariction to a valuable collection of essays on the modern -Americanhorror film, waller writes that "a fully developed typology of monsterswould offer a valuable means of delineating the paradigmatic possibili-ties open to this genre and the sort of fears that will suitably trouble itsaudience" (9)' Ironically, the reverse turns out to be the case' Startingwith "the paradigmatii possibilities op,en to this genre and the sort offears that will suitably Louble its audience," we discover a valuablemeans of delineating,;a fully developed typology of monsters." In turn,no*".r"r, this typolJgy .ut, i".n" to motivate additional insights into themeans and "ttii of -horror cinema. According to Lakoff, metaphoricalmappings do not occur in isolation from one another.2l Neither, as we

shall see, do horror film monsters'

l.82 Horor Film ReoderIn light of our earlier discussion, and considering the three feafures ofLakoffs theory just mentioned, there is ample gro"unds roi trypo*resiz_ing the existence of a sURMouNTED ggfiEr's AR, ridnrion rrr.uM.NSTERS conceptual metaphor, according to which entities from therelatively abstract source domain of surmounted beriefs are understoodin terms of entities from the far more concrete target domain of horrorfilm monsters. The former domain is ,,relatively uirt u.i;l".urrr" ,.rr-mounted beliefs are propositional states with content that lil=#;dchieve titerai reco.tfirm "h"; ;!;i9i"g;gtly,the surmounted belief thitthe dead are capabte of returning to fir" 1u, oppo*J i;;;;; the betiefthat I am hungry) requires a whJle seies ot events to take place beforeits truth can be (re-) confirmed. Freud would seem to.or".ri,-;upparentdeath and the r€turn of the dead have be"n .ep.es;;,"d;, uncannythemes" (369: emphasis added).

The latter domain, in contras! is "far more concre td, for the obviousreason that horror film monsters are visual representatio.r, irriurra"a toengender a sense of horror/ uncanniness in vLwers uy **i, "*y pres-ence. The claim here is that, qs qymbolic cqrrela!-e-s gf, surmounted be_liefs, horror film monsters can ichieve 1*""fibr*r;;;;#;_"m"pictoilally and therefore arl at or,.". clrr". the requisite'.r"flt.r;l"dg:lent (by no means an easy condirion to suusryi,'tna uarr##*ma_*g t hg:loi"film monster onscieen ieconfirnis'r*

"i"#"rs -nm-"u*previously surmounted beriefs are associated with the p"r"iig*"ri. ""r_?atives that monster embodies.

- -ll_\::p_lgwith Freud, we can effect an initial breakdown of the SUR_M.UNTED BELIEFS ARE HoRRoR FILM M.NSTERS ctnceptoatmetaphor along the following lines:2I. surmounted Beliefs that the dead can return tolife are reincarnated monstersII. surmounted Beliefs in the omnipotence ofthought are psychic monstersIII. surmounted Beliefs in the existence of adouble are dyadic monsters

Each of these levels has at least one s-ub_level, whereby ,,lower,,monsters inherit correspondence feafures from ,,higher,, monsters. so,for example, beneath the suRMouNTED Beriefs that the dead canrefurn to life are reincarnated monsters level, we find theSURMOUNTED BELIEFS THAT DEAD BODIES CAN RETURN TOLIFE ARE

^'MBIES level (monsters here incrude *r"

- tut,rr.,*y,Frankenstein's monster, the innumerabre victims of Romero,s Liaing

Monsters os (Unconny) Meiophors: Freud, Lokoff, ondthe Represeniotion of Monstrosity in Cinemotic Horror r83

TObIC I: The SURMOUNTED BELIEFS ARE HORROR FILM MONSTERS conceptuolmetophor

L surmounted beliefs that the dead can return to life are ReincarnatedMonsters

A. surmounted beliefs that dead bodies can return to life are zombies1. non-natural zombies: Dracula, The Mummy, The Golem, Ja-

son, Nrgrhf of the Living Dead2. medico-scientific zombies: Frankenstein's monster, The Cra-

zies, Shivers, RabidB. surmounted beliefs that dead souls can return to life are spirits

1. disembodied souls: ghosts, haunted houses (The Haunting,Polte rge i st, Am ityv il I e H o rro r)

2. embodied souls: demonic possessions.(Ihe Exorcist, Fallen),Candyman, Chuckie

ll. surmounted beliefs in the omnipotence of thought are Psychic Mon-sters

A. surmounted beliefs in the prompt fulfillment of wishes are tele-kinetics: Carrie, FreddyB. surmounted beliefs in mentaltransparency are telepathics: Pat-rick, Scanners, (vampires)

lll. surmounted beliefs in the existence of a double are Dyadic Mon-sters

A. surmounted beliefs in the existence of physical doubles are repli-cas

1. surmounted beliefs in the existence of natural replicas are dop-pelgangers(a)twins: Sisfers, Dead Ringers, Raising Cain

'r (b) clones'. lnvasion of the Body Snatchers(c) chameleons: Carpente/s lhe Thing, Phantoms

2. surmounted beliefs in the existence of non-natural replicas arereplicants(a) robots: The Stepford Wives, Westworld(b) cyborgs'. Bladerunner, Terminator

B. surmounted beliefs in the existence of mental doubles are psy-chos

1. schizos [same body, different consciousness]: Norman Bates,Dressed To Kll, (Sisfers)

2. shape-shifters [same body, physical transformation]: Jekyll-Hyde, werewolves, vamps

3. projections [different body]: The Brood, (Frankenstein's mon-ster)

4. serial killers [same body, same consciousness]: Henry, Lechter,

lB4 Honor Film Reoder

Dead Trilogy, and |ason Vorhees), as well as the SURMOUNTEDBELIEFS THAT DEAD SOULS CAN RETURN TO LIFE ARE SP/RITSlevel (monsters here include ghosts, haunted houses, and thepossessed). In turn, each of these levels has at least one sub-level of itgown. Table I on the previous page is an attempt at elucidating thehierarchical organization of this metaphor (note that the terminologicalchoices are, to some extent, arbitrary, and that a number of moreparticularistic taxonomies may very well be compatible with this one),Perhaps as should have been expected, many of horror cinema's mostenduring monsters turn out to be mixed metaphors (recall ourdiscussion of Damien), insofar as their presence reconfirms more than onesurmounted belief.

Conclusion: the tepresentation of monstrosity in cinematichorror n,-.,,-. "..

(4) Although the metaphorical nature of horror flm monsters ispsychologically necessary, their surface heterogeneity ishistoically and culturally contingent.

Among the advantages of aligning our psychoanalytic explanation ofhorror film monsters with Lakoff's conceptual theory of metaphor isthat we now have the resources to explain away the apparentincompatibility between universalizing and particularistic accounts ofmonstrosity. On the one hand, we know that the basic types of horrorfilm monstsls-lsinsalnated monsters, psychic monsters, and dyadicmonsters-are psychologically necessary, in that the uncanny narrativesthey metaphorically embody correspond to a specific, and limited, set ofinfantile beliefs (namely, those which have been surmounted). What allhorror film monsters have in common, besides the fact that they are notreal, is that they all fall under the SURMOUNTED BELIEFS AREHORROR FILM MONSTERS conceptual metaphor. On the other hand,due to the ne-ejl for a conflict of judgmea! rgpgding.-tle-Loqsrbl!ry_gfiecon-firmation -1n a depicted w-orld, partieulat toker.p."*pf ..hoJ"or filmmonsters (i.u. ff,oru at lower levels oi the inheritance hierarc$@histo-ricaf!.y aaa"* e1i!![q-d,n"V* "t"-,11$n ql[ - All",. -tioriof]-1lgl*-$glfslersmetgphgrlg4\ll emb-ady Eurmounted beliefs, but not all of .!!"9p1."uglegeyg yegonfipa^-thpqe--b-e-ljs"fp -b-y- f-lrgir very presenqe; tha! i9 "y!"y_ tqt.3ll qfthem manage to fulfill their primary (that is, their horrifying) purpose."" in order to instill a confliit oi ludgment in viewers')'iiu'ril"*, i"which horror film monsters metaphorically embody surmounted beliefsmust be periodically updated; investing monsters with cultural rele-vance serves to "keep us in the dark about the precise nature of the pre-suppositions on which the world [depicted in the film] is based" (Freud

Monsters os (Unconny) Meiophorsi Freud' Lokoff' ondthe Represenlotion of'Monstiosity in Cinemotic Horror 185

37+1?t And how else could we willingly suspend our disbelief? The dis-

ti";;"" Leing made here, between (universal) monster types and (par-

[*i"il ,.,onrt", tokens, is theoleti-q4lly qlplicable in termq qf 'I'akof-f|sdiq$Lc-tiqn petween (gpneral) superordinate level mappings and (spe-

. iti:)_Pgli: !u-91- *uPP,Sgl'

It should come as no surprise that the generalization is.atthe superordinate level, while the special.:*:t "t"-lt -T:basic level' After all, the basic level is at the level ot nchmental images and rich knowledge structure"' A mappingat the supeiordinate level maximizes the possibilities for

-"ppf"g"i.h conceptual structures in the source domainonto the target domain, since it permits many-.basic levelinstances, each of which is information rich (212)' r .l

We might say: mappings at the superordinate level of monster {tpes !;;"il;" tnu po"rifititiles for satisfying Freud's conflict of i"{S11f 1,' icondition on the depicted uncanny, since it permits many. basic level /instances of monster tokens, each of which is (potentially) culturalyJrelevant.

Considering that analyses of the horror genre informed.by psycho-

analytic theor], are typicatly assumed.to.be universalizing in nature' it;;;;;; u, iorn"t(ir,g of L surptise. to find that Wood's "return of the

,epress"d" argument .io-"t in ^handy at just this polntt One finds inwood an invocation of the post-Freudian issjrql-b. et*e5n bgl:-'*:-g-

p r essi o n, wh ich is un iv ersa!-1qc esg45r, -45rd-inesc ap able' -an

d s urp I u s rc-iffi;ffi'f'q*- ;;;ti"s.l$i -varying ih both

#ffi;+*h"qffid"rr-4"f ;i ;;i"iil6;"'i whan w6odtafutaUa"i i.t-; fifm;;nsdis il ierms of a 'rieturn of the repressed,"

what he really has in mind is a "tetutn of the surplus tepressed": "in a

societybuiltonmonogamyandfamilytherewillbeanenormoussur-pi"r Jf repressed su"ial "t'u'gy,

and"'what is repressed must always

itrive to return" (80).

TheproblemwithWood,saccountisthat,bynotstickingtothefun-damenial suppositions of Freud's theory of the uncanny' he fails to ex-

;il," ;ht t'oiro. film monsters are capable of horrifying us. we may

mistrust, despise, evenfear the objects of surplus r9f1e-ssio1 in our soci-

etv. but it is not at ali obvious tirat we are horrifled by them' Indeed'

;rioj ;"#ro tn" possibility of extending his theory-to genres other

than horror: "substitute for 'Irionster' the teim'Indian" for example' and

""" n* a formula for a large number of classical Westerns; substitute,transgressive woman, and"the formula encompasses numerous melo-

dramas..." (79). But if we can so easily extend this "retum of the re-

| ,'/ .'o'- ;

" {\:t "

186 Horror Film Reoderpressed" argument, why should we believe that it captures anythingdistinctive about the cinematic representation of monstrosity?

wood concedes thaf as opposed to the Indian (and the transgressivewoman), "the monster is, of course/ much more protean, changing fromperiod to period as sociegr's basic fears clothe thei selves in faihionableor immediately accessible garments" (79). In order to characterize these"basic feats," however, we must furn to the SURMOUNTED BELIEFSARE HORROR FILM MONSTERS conceptual metaphor; it is only at theparticularistic level of "fashionable or immediately accessible garmenb"that we may wish to invoke (with wood) the objects of surprus repres-sion.'o Alternatively, this is just the point at which we migirt fruiffullyemploy/extend one or more of the wholly non-psychoanalytic particulai-istic accounts of monstrosity provided by Carroll, cohen, Halberstam, et,

fact that this metaphor is a fixed part of our conceptuaf iystem,new and imaginative mappings are capable of being understood immedi-

An example will serve to illustrate this point Abel Ferrara's The Addic-tion (1996) is a horror film that updates the vampire mythos in order toexplore and comment on a number of contemporary social issues. Al-though the bleakness and philosophical pretensions of this movie guar-anteed that it would not draw all that well at the box office, a number ofcritics had great things to say about it: "this is the vampire movie we,vebeen waiting for: a reactionary, urban-horror flick that truly has the aili4gpulse of the time. AIDS and drug addiction are points of reference, fiutthey're symptoms, not the cause" (Charity 70). In Freudian-Lakoffianterms, the vampire/blood-addicts in this filn can be viewed as novellx-tensions (i.e. cultural updates) of the SURMOUNTED BELIEFS THATTHE DEAD CAN RETURN TO LIFE ARE REINCARNATED MON-STERS sub-level metaphor; as such, they are able to produce in manyviewers that conflict of judgment necessary for a feeling-of uncanniness.4

f To sum up. One (empirical) problem facing any universalizing ac-i count of horror film monsters is how to account for the fact that suchi-I monsters often fail to horriff viewers, and so fail to fulfill their primary] purpose. This is where particularistic accounts come in. But particularis-I tic accounts have their own (conceptual) problem, namely, that of ac-

, j counting for what it is that makes horroi fit* monsters horrrtyng by, 1

'l their aery nature. Call back the universalizing accounts. so it appears thatf these two kinds of account must somehow be rendered compatible, in

Monsters os (Unconny) Melophors: Freud' Lokoff' ondihe Represenlotion of'Monstrosity in cinemotic Horror 187

order for a complete story to emerge. This paper is a firstattempt at ren-

;";i"g just such a compatibiliry; b{ filtering cerlll key aspects offieuaYr'theory of the ,rn.u*y through the lenses of Lakoff's conceptualtheory of metaPhor.

some final considerations. In answer to the question, "why do we

have the conventional metaphors that we have?", Lakoff postulates that a

great number of them are giounded in real li[e: "correspondences in real

E*p"riurr." form the basis ior correspondences in the metaphorical cases,

;f,t.h to beyond real experien e" @40;. So if the account of horror film;;;d, presented here is correct, then the paradigmatic horror narra-

tives such monsters metaphorically embody are likely !o haye a basis inreality. To make matters even worse, conceptual melqPhqt-l tByg'Sg'"ca-ouciw to impose themselves onjggll6.mougFthe creation of nerlleor-' - -- -"

re1). Now that's ahorrifying thought."respolqelg)slnSIPs

Notes1. Noel Carroll would deny the latter two claims. lnThe Philosophy of Horror;-'

or iarudoxes of the Heirt,he defines monsters as "any_being[s] not believed

to exist now bycontemporary science" (27). But cf. cynt{a Freeland: "In real-

ist horror llke Henry,th" -o*t"t is a true-tolife rather than supematural be-

ing. Henry is a monster,, [ao). otlgr horror films with non-fictional monsters

inltude The Honeymoon Kiillers (1969), and Deranged (1976)'

2. See, e.g.,Barbara Creed for a Kristevan focus; James Iaccino for a Jungian fo-

cus; and S|avoj Zizek,,,Grimaces of the Real, or When the Phallus Appears,,,

October 58 (1991) for a Lacanian focus'

3. Chief among the many examples to b-e found here are Carol Clover' Men'

women, oni choinrolts: Gender in the Modern Horor Filn (New Jersey:

Princeton UP,'1992); Harvey Greenberg' The Motties on Your Minil (New

York: Saturday n".'i"* fress,tOfs);Stephen Neale' Genre (England: BFI Pub-

uriln isgo),'urra James Twitch ett, oreaa1l nleasures: An Anatorny of Mod-ernHonot (Oxford: OUP, 1985)'

4.DavidCronenbergisperhapsthemostfamous/infamousdirectortobuildacareer on the taliing'of .ontu*porury social anxieties to horrific extremes

1i".f C.n"" and Glorge Romert are others)' A quick tour through his oeuore

;; "P films which J*plo'u-oo*e ^would say exploit--sexual perversity

(stereo ltgoel, shiaers ltgisl, crasn p9961), medico-scientific epidemics (Shio-

)rr, noiia Vgm), mass-media manipulation (Videodrome, V?:Zl' eXistenZ

tissslf, J-i udii"tion (Dead niysus--\l!!l' Naked Lun:\\19q:l)' cancerpho-'At" t{n" Bro"od 119791, fhe Oead Zine $'9831)' and' arguably' AlDgphobia (The

Fty l'Ie86l)-5.ItisworthquotingDavidSkalinsomelengthhere.Inhisbook,TheMonster

Show: ACilturalHistory of Honor' Skal writes:

IBB Horror Film Reoder

Most hisories of tre horror gerue begin widr rytrorogicar and liter-aryanbedqrb---l-rorrors and moruhs of antiquity n"a

" ,.,fue*r*-*,u"i,

expression in popular fictiontratis borrcwed and'improved- ro-, #the mass media of the twentieth century... In shorf *. #ry;" p"*J.,ea ia simplistic and self rcferefiar &onide.r"p-g*rr." Bfut*. is not tt*issue very litde about F "$*lyi"g srrctn= of honor"images rearly1!ra.ry. thougfr our culural "G fo, &en are *,irp"+,#.g!,gZDraculahimself (U).

6. It-is interesting to note that in at least half of the movies mentioned above_The Funhouse, Fightmare, and popcorn-the crassic monsters get to take a re-venge of sorts on those who would disregard, scom, or mo.k ti"m.7' Note: Tudor employs the distinction between universalizing and particularis-fic accounts when discussing various responses to the ques"tiorr, ,iwhut i, th"appeal of horror?", not when discussing various ."rpo*", to the questiory"What is a horror film monster?8. 9.9i" of the paragraphs in this section restate material from my 1,997 arrtcle,"Uncarmy Realism and the Decline of the Modem Horror Film.,,'9.Tudor M7.

10. I am grateful to Ivan ward of the Freud Museum, London for help with thisparagraph11. see, for example, Neale 61, and susan Lurie, "The Construction of the ,Cas-

trated woman'in Psychoanalysis and Cinema," Discourse 4(19g1-g2).12. It is a fairly complicated questiory whether the double signifies a ,,refum ofthe repressed" (through its connection with primary nariissism and repeti-tion-compulsion) or a "reconfirmation of the surmounted.,, Most likely, iisig_nifies both to some extent. In "The 'rJncar:rry'," however, Freud comes downin favor of the latter, with his remark that "the quality of uncanniness, canonly come from the fact of the'double' being a creation'dating u."L t-/"u.uearly_mental stage, long since surmounted" (asg). And cf. onl n""r., *h", iiThe Do-uble: A psychoanalytic study, athibutes'"the significance,rir,"U"rr,

ble [to] an embodiment of the soul-a notion represenied in p.i-iu"u uiiirand living on in our superstition,, (82-g3).13. It may be wiser in this context to speak of "casfration anxieties,,, a phrase thatis gender-neutral, rather than "castration complexes," a phrase ,,riith ptutto-

centric implications. Cf. Elizabeth Lloyd Mayer: "castration anxiety, in men orin womery is anxiety over losing that genital which is actually possessed. Thecastration complex, on the other hand, has traditionally rerurr"a to the girl,sfantasy of having had a penis that was lost. such a defi.rition of the castrationcomplex implies an essentially phallocentric experience and resolution of fe-male castrafion concems" (332).

14. This suggests an indirect means of- testing the validity of Freud,s theory: deter_mine whether or not those who have never surmounted their primitive be-liefs-people who must fail to experience a conflict of judgment with regards

Monsters os (Unconny) Metophors: Freud, Lokoff' ondlhe Represehtotion of Monstrosity in cinemotic Horror 189

to the reconfirmation of such beliefs--are immune to uncanny effects. In,,Animism, Magk and the omnipotence of Thoughts," Freud calls attention tothe fact that "the omnipotence ol thoughts...is seen to have unrestricted playin the emotional life of neurotic patients" (108). Question: Do neurotic patientsexperience a sense of uncanniness/horror when their beliefs in the omnipo-tence of thought ek. are reconfirmed? Cf. the "frank incomprehension" ex-

pressed by OEnis Nilsen (a serial killer who operated in London during theigZO, urd 8Or) ,,in response to the outrage felt by most people who lnow howhe disposed or tn" uoai"r: 'I can never quite understand a traditional andlargely superstitious fear of the dead and corpses,' he writes" (Masters 160).

At-the other extreme-but with the same effect-Freud claims that "anyonewho has completely and finally rid himself of animistic beliefs will be insensi-ble to this typ! of the uncanny" ('The'Uncanny"' 371)'

1"5. I discuss in some detail the ramifications of Freud's "conflict of judgment''condition on the horror genre in "uncanny Realism and the Decline of theModem Horror Film."

16. Mary Douglas, Puriry anil Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution andTaboo (New York: Praeger,1956)'

17. From the1978 movie of the same name'

18. Carroll apparently agrees with this, although the altemative, psychoanalyticexplanation he pro.rid"t is closer to Wood's "retum of the repressed" argu-ment than the "ieconfirmation of the surmounted" one offered here. Carrollwrites: ,,the recent popularity of telekinetic nastiness in films and nov-els...might be explainedu" g.uiifyitrg the infantile conviction in the unlimitedpo*.rif r"pressed .ug"...ihil" at the same time costuming this repressed

?antasy in the drapery ofhorror" (172)'

lg.SeeKarlPopper,ConjecturesanilRefutations:TheGtowthofscientificKnowleilge (New Yorki Basic Books, 1962) for this criticism of psychoanalybictheory in"general; and see Carroll 171-74; Tudor 450-51; and Mark Jancovich,ioni, @Jndon: BT Batsford, 192), p.12 for this criticism of psychoanalytictheory as applied to the horror genre'

20. In a sense, the account of horror film monsters presented here is intended toboot"trup its way from the theoretical/descriptive to the practical/prescrip-tive.

A.Lakoff 222.

22.\t isunclear whether or not Freud thinks there are additional surmounted be-

liefs universal enough to qualify as potential sources of uncanniness. At one

f.i"t l",,The ,Uncainy,,,,ihere is mention of "secret injurious powers" (370),

but this surmounted belief would aPPear to fall within the more general "om-

"if"*." of thought'' category. In any event, even if additional surmountedbeliefs of the kind Freud has in mind could be found (within Freud's corPusor outside it), this would not pose an insuperable problem for the account ofhorror film monstrosity presented here'

r190 Horor Film Reoder23' Besides or instead of the hero of the firm, it is often the viewer who is in-vited/compelled to be the double here: we are monsters to the extent that weidentify (aesrhetica'y, emotiona'y, intelrectually) with the kiri"r. s.",

".g.,Peeptng Tom (1950), The^Dritter_Ki,er (1979), t:kit: of the Eye (t987), Henry: por_trait of a Seial Killer (1990), and Silence of tlre UmAs (Oeg." \- -' ,' '24' Cf' fthneider: "The monsters in such films [e.g. Night of the Liuing Dead, TheHilLs Hazte Eyes, sisters,

.Rab.id, and carpenter's The Thinglembody the samesurmounted beliefs as their all_too_familiar predecurrorl, ;;."*: they em_body these surmounted beliefs in nover wayi, however, in"y ,r,uiugu to ir.,-duce in viewers a conflict of judgment t g.;Jil;;; G##ity of theirexistence" (125).25. Wood invokes the views of Herbert Marcuse in this context.26. cf. Iaccino: "audiences will continue to direct their attention to the widescreen in hopes that the horror profotypes of tomorrow *il.or,rir,.ru to elabo_rate on those ]ungian archetypes of past decades,, (35).2I' See also in this context Andrew Tudor, Monsters anil Mail Scientists: A CnI_tural History of the Hotor Moaie (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, l;;;;."-"28' Perhaps Ferrara's vampires are not ail thatnover: cf. Bob Clark,s Deathd.ream(1972), and George Romero,s Martin (1,9Tg).29. An earlier version of this paper was read at the 199g Festival of original rhea_,.e and Film, held at the University of Toronto and sponsored by tt " univer_siry of Toronto Graduare cenrre for srudy or o.u*u.li-Ltui'uiiuu..a ir,Other Voices: the (e)lournal of Cutturat Cntiism 1.g, -tggg nttp:J 1i$rcnglish.upenn.edu/-ov/1.3. Thanks to Michael Amzen, vance Bell, ri.r.y'C*.r, i"_dith Halberstam, Ivan ward and an anonymous reader at other voices forhelpful comments and suggestions.

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Routledge,1990.Cavelf Staniey. The Claim of Reason. New york: Oup,1g7g. \.-Cawsory Frar*. The Monsters in the Minir: the Face of Eztir in Myth, Literatare,arul Eaeryday Lift.England: Book Guild, 1995.tY#:Tom' "Preview: The Addiction." Time out (London edition) 16-23 Aprir,

Cohen, Jeffrey' "Monster Culture (seven Theses)" in Monster Theory: Readingculture, ed. Jeffrey Cohen. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press,-1996.Creed, Barbara. The Monstrous Feminine: FiIm, Feminism, psychoanarysis. NewYork Routledge,"1993.Freeland, Cynthia. ,,Realist Horror,, in philosophy and FiIm, ed. CynthiaFreeland and Thomas Wartenberg. New york: Rouiledge, 1995.

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