4 CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL PROGRAM CHEMICAL WEAPONS 1/2MOVEMENT HISTORY CON..(U) OFFICE OF THE PROGRAM MANAGERCHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION RBERD.. W R BRRNKOWITZ

UNCLASSIFIED 12 JUN 87 SRPEO-CDE-IS-87U01 F/G 5/6. 3 NL

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEIa. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS

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4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) S. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

SAPEO-CDE- IS-870 SAPEO-CDE- IS-87001

6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION

Ofc of the Prog Executive (If applicable) Ofc of the Prog Executive Officer-Officer-Prog Mgr for Cml DemilI SAPEO-CDE Prog N gr for Cml Demil

6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

Bldg E4S8S, Edgewood Area Bldg E4585, Edgewood AreaAberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5401 Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5401

So. NAME OF FUNDING /SPONSORING 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER0(co~ NProg EecutiveOfficer-Prog Mzr for Cml Demil NA

8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS

Bldg E4585, Edgewood Area PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5401 ELEMENT NO. NO. NO. CESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Clasification)

Chemical Weapons Movement Histroy Complilation (U)

( 12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)William R. Brankowitz

-, 13a. TYPE OF REPORT 113b. TIME COVERED . 14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Atonth, Day) S. PAGE COUNT

Historical FROM 124_ TO 1987 June 12 14816. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

- Prepared for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Programmatic EIS.17. COSAII CODES 18. SUOCT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necenary and identify by block number)

FIjLD GROUP SUB-GROUP Chemical weapons, chemical munitions, transportation,

1 hazardous chemicals, GB, VX, HD, movement)history. 4----

19AB /rTRACT (Continue on reerse if necary and idntify by block number)

This report was produced to study the history of past chemical weapons movement operationsfrom 1946 to 1986. The history was then to be used as a source of lessons learned forplanning any transportation which might be required to implement the Chemical StockpileDisposal Program. The report candidly discusses problems encountered on past chemicalweapons movement operations and suggests areas in which the movement of chemical weaponscan be improved based on past experience. The report summarizes all movement operationsfrom 1946 to 1986, while acknowledging that this record is incomplete for some yearsbecause not all movement records were preserved. - , "

20, DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONQUNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED 0 SAME AS RPT. C3DTIC USERS UNCLASSIFIED

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%Q illiam R_ Brankowitz (301) 1 71-4505 SA EO-CDEDO FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

All other editions are obsolete.UNCLASSIFIED

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$ECUNIIV CLASSIPICAI|ON O~r THIS P&AQr

Chemical Weapons Mvenent

History Capilation

William R. Brankowitz.

12 June 1987 J' ' "" -

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Office of the Program Manager for ChemicalMunitions (Demilitarization and Binary) (Provisional)

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21010-5401

- *43a

Chemical Weapons

Movement History Cc.ilation

Table of Contents

Executive SmmIary1

How To Use The Ccmpilation 3

Introduction 7

Location Key 17

Incident Sumarization Sheets 20

Compilation of Moves Pages By Year

1946 11 pages1947 2 pages1948 2 pages

1949 4 pages

1950 3 pages

1951 3 pages

1952 2 pages

1953 3 pages1954 3 pages S1955 1 page1956 2 pages1957 3 pages

1958 4 pages

1959 1 page1960 1 page

1961 1 page1962 2 pages1963 3 pages1964 4 pages

1965 5 pages

1966 4 pages

1967 6 pages1968 8 pages

1969 2 pages

1970-77 2 pagesSETCN I (1978) 3 pagesSEI'CON II (1978-1980) 3 pages

1981-86 3 pages

Recommendations and Conclusions 27 1

References i

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Executive Summary

Title 14, Part B, Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (the Department ofDefense Authorization Act, 1986) directs the Secretary of Defense to carry outthe destruction of the United States stockpile of lethal chemical agents andmunitions by 30 September 1994. The law specifically directs the developmentof a plan defining the safest and most effective means of disposing of thestockpile. The plan was provided to Congress on 14 March 1986, by theSecretary of the Army and was the basis for a Draft Progammatic EnvironmentalImpact Statement (DEIS) issued 1 July 1986.

During the public cam-ent period following the issuing of the DEIS, theArmy's past record of moving chemical munitions was questioned. The Army hasreviewed its records in an effort to canpletely answer this question and todevelop a list of lessons learned and recumnendations as a result of pastmtv nent operations.

The production of a compilation of movement operations provides a base ofdata which can be used or interpreted in many ways. Same are favorable to theArmy, and some are not. However, the Army wishes to show that (1) it has movedlarge quantities of chemical weapons over many years with relatively fewproblems and that (2) the Army has learned lessons from the problems which ithas encountered. The Army also shows in this study that although there havebeen some problems associated with the movement of chemical weapons, there hasnever been a chemical agent fatality associated with such a move. The majorityof the incidents catalogued in the study did not result in injuries due tochemical agent.

That the Army records on chemical movement operations are incomplete is atheme frequently returned to in the stuey. There are many reasons for this,but one which overshadows all others. The fact is that by the 1950's thesemovement operations had become so common, that an attitude had became prevalentthat these moves were no longer anything "special." They were regarded as amatter of routine, and as a result, few photographs were taken, and manyrecords were disposed of as excess files according to then existingregulations. It was not until 1969 and 1970 that close control of movementsunder the new public laws (91-121 and 91-441) made these moves once again intosomething special or different which required better tracking of operations and

* preservation of records.

Lastly, it should be noted that the U.S. Army throughout all of these yearshas operated one unit to escort these munitions and to respond to emergencies.This unit, the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit has existed since 1943 and hasthe responsibility for the moving of all chemical munitions. The vast majorityof the information contained in this study comes either directly, or indirectlyfram their records. These records have been kept under the followingorganizational titles:

January 1943 - February 1944 Guard and Security Section, Camp Siebert,Alabama

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February 1944 -January 1946 Guard and Security Section, EdgewoodArsenal, Maryland

January 1946 -March 1947 9710 Technical Service Unit, Guard andSecurity, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

March 1947 - September 1957 9710 Technical Service Unit, TechnicalEscort Detachment, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

Septemiber 1957 - Present U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, EdgewoodArsenal/Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

in conclusion, between 1946 and 1986, the Army has nraved large quantitiesof chemical weapons many tines. There were saie problems encountered during aminority of these xmves, and these problems have presented lessons which theArmy has used in the construction of its plans for disposing of the chemicalstockpile. Specific input frarn this report has been used in the TransportationConcept Plan, the Emergency Response Concept Plan, the Monitoring Plan, theOverpacking Study and the Reduced Temperature Study. Mokvement of chemicalweapons today would be conducted both in light of lessons learned and under farmore stringent safety conditions.II

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OPERATION RED HAT-

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1970-1977, PAGE 1.

OPERATION RED HAT-

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M55 ROCKETS - OKC

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How to Use the Ccapilation

Excluding the Executive Summary, the movement history ccnpilation consistsof five principal sections: (1) an introduction, (2) a location key, (3) asummarization of the known incidents associated with moves, (4) a compilationof the actual moves, and (5) recomrendations and conclusions.

Introduction:

The Introduction is provided to explain the resources used to produce thisreport.

Location Key:

The Location Key provides a list of codes, usually three or four letters,which conveniently represent locations where chemical weapons were shipped toor fran. The Location Key directly refers to the To and Fram columns inthe section covering the ccmpilation of moves.

Incident Sunarization Sheets:

The section titled Incident Summarization Sheets contains, by referencenumber, a listing of incidents which occurred on movement operations. Thesewere developed fran existing trip reports, special project reports, depotrecords and, in same cases, personal interviews with former escort officers.This section is probably incamplete, owing to the condition of Anry records,however it is felt that it documents all major incidents and shows most of theminor incidents. It is important to note that there has never been a chemicalagent fatality on a chemical weapon movement operation.

The definition of an incident, for purposes of this report, is anything outof the ordinary which either resulted in, or might have resulted in, a spill oran injury. The term incident, as rigidly defined by AR 50-6 or AR 335-40, isnot applicable in this report. For purposes of this report, a major incidentis presumed to involve injuries fran chemical warfare agent, or a large spill.A minor incident is defined as having no injuries, or a small/no spill.

Cmilation of moves:

The section covering the compilation of actual moves is the heart of thereport. The section is divided into years fran 1946 to 1986. Within each yearthe pages are numbered, so that a move can be referred to by referring an entryon "1946, page 5," as an example. The section shows the following infonration:

1. From: The location from which the shiprent originated. This is alsosametimes an intermediate point where modes of transportation were changed suchas Fran EA To ENJ, then Fran ENJ to Sea.

2. To: The location to which the shipment was sent. The destination of"sea" indicates a sea dumping of chemical weapons.

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3. Date: where two dates are given, the dates represent the date theshipment left, and the date that it arrived. Where one date is given, the daterepresents only an arrival date or an approximate date of the mo.ve, due topoorer quality of historical records.

4. Typ: Moves were categorized into mvmnt types as follows:

S = sea shipment (either for transport or disposal)R = rail shipmnentM. = tractor trailer truck shiprentA = air shipment

5. Cargo: The type of cargo requires scme discussion of what was then,and is now, in the inventory, as well as the camorn abbreviations for chemicalsused by the Army.

Rockets - includes the current M55 Rocket, as well as the no longerextant Honest John Rocket, 4.5" aircraft rocket and German rockets captured%during World War II.

Drumns - refers to the practice of storing chemicals in 55 gallon drums,generally discontinued in 1946.

Bulk or Cylinder - refers to one-ton containers or commercial gascylinders. -.

Projectiles - refers to steel shelled artillery and mocrtar rounds, both .

U.S. and German, some of which are now obsolete (such as the 75nin), and sane ofwhich are currently stored (10Sm, 155m, 8 inch artillery and 4.2 inch mortarrounds).

Mines - refers to liquid filled land mines such as the current M23 VXfilled land mine or the formrer British H or HIT filled land mine.

Banbs - refers to both current and obsolete liquid filled aircraftbcmbs of several nations. All mustard filled bcxnbs have long been disposed ofother than periodic infrequent recoveries.

CAIS - an acronym referring to chemical agent identification sets.These items actually consisted of seven different configurations of trainingsets made over a period of almrost 50 years by the Army and the Navy. They weresets intended for use by troops during training so that chemical agents couldbe properly identified and decontaminated in canbat. Sca sets contain littleagent, while others contain as much as a large projectile.

CL - the abbreviation for chlorine gas, a World War I choking gas,identical to what is used for water purification today.

CG - the abbreviation for phosgene, another choking gas used in WorldWar I and stockpiled extensively as a deterrent during World War 11. Phosgeneis used extensively by the chemical industry as a raw material for items suchas plastics and fertilizers. The Army has periodically sold excess stocks of ~,~phosgene to private industry. "

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CK - the abbreviation for cyanogen chloride, a cyanide gas stockpiledextensively as a deterrent during World War II.

H - the abbreviation for mustard, manufactured by either the levinsteinor thiodiglycol process, a blister agent used in World War I, stockpiled duringWorld War II and which remains stockpiled today. It is found filled in manydifferent weapons, by many different nations. All of the belligerents duringWorld War II stockpiled extensive quantities of mustard.

HD - the abbreviation for distilled mustard, chemically identical to H,but purified further so that it can be stored longer before polymerizing.

HT - the abbreviation for mustard mixed with T, which isbis 12 (2-chloroethylthio) ethyll ether, a ccmpound used to depress the normalfreezing point of mustard which is about 58 0 F.

L - the abbreviation for lewisite, an arsenical blister agentstockpiled extensively during World War II of which very little exists today.

GA - the abbreviation for Tabun, the first nerve agent developedsecretly by Germany in 1936 (GA or German A-type). Stockpiled extensively byGermany during World War II.

GB - the abbreviation for Sarin, the standard non-persistent nerve

agent stockpiled by the U.S. today.

VX - the abbreviation for the standard persistent nerve agentstockpiled by the U.S. today.

AC - the abbreviation for hydrogen cyanide, a cyanide gas stockpiledduring World War II.

CN - the abbreviation for an early form of tear gas (such as today'sriot control gas CS). CN, and its derivatives, CNS, CNB, etc., were relativelynon-toxic.

PS - the abbreviation for chloropicrin a World War I tear gas which was a'

relatively toxic when ccarpared to CN or CS.

DM - the abbreviation for an arsenical riot control vomiting gas, nolonger stockpiled.

BZ - the abbreviation for a hallucinatory non-lethal agent developed bythe Army during the 1960's.

6. Quantity: Where it could be determined, this item shows the numberof railcars, the number of aircraft, the number of trucks, and the naxre of thecargo ship. Where this information was unavailable, whatever information thatwas provided was used. It is emphasized that, due to the variety of recordssources used, the description of cuantity varies from the standards; forinstance, instead of railcars of projectiles, the quantity may be found shcwn

.5

as pounds, tons or numbers each. Wherever possible, the quantity of railcars,aircraft, or trucks was used. Where railcars, aircraft or trucks arespecified, the number reflects cargo carrying vehicles, without escort orsecurity.

7. Incidents: Where an incident was identified, a number appears. Thisrefers the reader to the section titled Incident Summarization Sheets. Bylooking at the corresponding number, the reader will find a summary describingthe incident. Where "None" is stated, there is some documentation whichsupports that no incident occurred. Where the column is left blank noinformation could be found. This almost certainly means that no incidentoccurred, however, no confirming documentation could be found to substantiatethis conclusively.

Reccmrendations and Conclusions:

The section covering recamaendations and conclusions deals with theproblems discovered by researching past movement operations and what might be .1

done to prevent them fram being repeated. It is presented in the context oflessons learned.

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Introduction

The material that follows in this report is a ccapilation of Army ChemicalWarfare Service Records which were located in November 1986 to April 1987 bythe Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Munitions. The compilationdocuments, as far as the existing records allow, the major chemical warfaremoves which were made from 1946 to 1986, and shows what problems wereencountered during these moves when problems did arise.

Purpose of the Ccapilation:

The purposes for constructing the canpilation were to document, insofar asexisting records allowed, the movements of chemical weapons:

(1) To show how often chemical munitions were moved by the Armywithout problems,

(2) To describe what kinds of problems were encountered when chemicalweapons were moved and things did go wrong, and

(3) To benefit frao the lessons learned based on past movementproblems by providing this information to other Army and contractor personnelworking on studies for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program.

Although current movement concepts involve packaging, air monitoring andsecurity measures far more stringent than those used previously, sane lessonscan still be learned fran the earlier successes and particularly the earliermistakes. These are summarized in the section entitled "Recamiendations andConclusions."

In addition, a section of this introduction is devoted to a description ofmonitc,::Lnr for chemical agents and how this has changed through the years.This mk, assist the reader in putting into context the fact that the airmonitoring devices available to the Army today are far more sophisticated thanthose of the previous periods, and that leaking weapons can be detected anddealt with today far more rapidly than in the past.

Scope of the Campilation:

As a part of the process of preparing this compilation, it is alsonecessary to define what items are covered, and what items are not covered bythe report. At times, due to the lack of ccnpleteness of the records, samejudgement was called for on the part of the researcher. If this has resultedin any inaccuracy, corrections can be made by contacting the researcher, Mr.William Brankowitz, at (301) 671-4505/2056. Corrections or the contribution ofmissing material is encouraged by the Army.

First, the period of World War II was not covered even though these recordsdo exist. As can be easily imagined, there were movements during the war tocounteract the very real threat that either Germany, Italy or Japan would usechemical weapons. These moves were conducted under wartme conditions, andwere extremely numerous. They were not included in this ccpilation due to the

7

fact that they do not address any of the agent or weapons currently in thestockpile today except for a small quantity of the bulk mustard. Recordspredating the war were not researched, although some are known to exist.

Second, throughout the years since world War II, and continuing to thepresent, there have been a multitude of mo~vements of wnall quantities ofchemical agent. These snall quantity mo~ves are currently restricted to lessthan one liter by public law, and typically go to U.S. Army contractors for usein defense contracts, such as developing new filters for gas masks. Moves ofsmall amounts of very pure agent for quality control of U.S. Army laboratoriesthat perform air moKnitoring on the various depots are also in this category.These mo~ves do not resemble, either in size or risk, the movement of munitions,and were therefore excluded from this compilation.

Also, throughout the years since World War I, a class of operations hasbeen conducted by the Army which can be called recovery operations. Prior to1969, when strict accountability of chemical weapons was put into effect bypublic law, conditions existed in which sawe chemical items or munitions wereused in training or fired. At these locations, chemical items or imnitions aresometimes still discovered.* There have also been documented cases of chemicalweapons being recovered from civilian residences where they were kept afterbeing obtained as "war souvenirs" during World War I or II. The Army providesfor the recovery of these items so that they can be returned to the nearestsafe storage-location. This is done on a no-questions-asked basis to encouragesuch itemns to be turned in. These imves have been included in the caompilation,however, some discretion has been used in documenting these item such thatrecoveries fron private citizens are shown as transportation f ram therecovering military installation.

Lastly, during the period covered by this report, a small number ofclassified chemical moves have been made. These movement operations remainclass if ied for national security reasons and therefore are not included in thiscompilation. on one of these mo~ves there were two, truck accidents in an areaof mountainous terrain. Although neither accident resulted in a chemicalrelease, a guard riding in one of the trucks was fatally injured when the truckstruck a ditch and overturned. There were no injuries associated with theother accident. There have been no spills or injuries during other classifiedmoves.b

Construction of the Compilation:

The compilation was constructed principally by researching the records of a

chemical depots (past and present) and records retained by the Army which dealwith the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit. The Technical Escort Unit (locatedat the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland) has been theresponsible unit for the movement of chemical weapons since World War II, andis specifically trained for this purpose. Under previous narmes it was kncwn asthe Guard and Security Section, the 9710th Technical Service Unit, and the U.S.Army Technical Escort Ui, Edgewood Arsenal.

After each move, officers of this unit were required to write a tripreport. These trip reports were detailed and included point of origin, point '

of destination, makeup of the team, makeup of the cargo, and specific details ''

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of the operation such as any incidents. They were frequently classifiedConfidential or Secret at the tine. In addition, at the end of each year,until the late 1950 's, a historical summiary of the unit was constructed.Unfortunately, since this was required to be an unclassified document, itusually lacked details other than origin and destination of a move, andtypically listed the cargo as "classified toxic gases" or same similar phrase.Details of the operation itself, unless considered extraordinary, were notincluded.

Lastly, for large operations involving high public visibility such as sameof the sea dumps, specific historical documents were assembled, complete withreports, messages, and photographs. These volumes were extremely useful foroperations such as CHASE 8 and the 1958 sea dumps.

The above, had all of it been preserved, would have made for a comrpleterecord of all operations. unfortunately, this was apparently not the case.

The proper course for documents to be turned in fram the U.S. ArmyTechnical Escort Unit is, and has been, twofold. Documents, if believed to beof sufficient historical value, could be turned in to the Edgewood ArsenalHistorical Office. If not so judged, these records could be turned in to thepost Records Retention Center. Records would be held here for about a year.They would then be sent to the Mo~dern Military Records Retention Center atSuitland, Maryl and, where the National Archives and Records Administration(NARA) maintains themi for the Army for a number of years. The records areperiodically reviewed by the Army and are then turned over to the completecustody of the Archives.

Fran 1942 to 1950, this system was observed well, and all of the records -

from this period have survived intact. From 1951 to 1954, only the HistoricalSunmmaries appear to have survived. These documents are in the custody of NARAand may be viewed in the research roan in Suitland, Maryland.

Fran 1955 and 1956 no Technical Escort Unit records at all have beenfound. Fortunately, this could be supplemented with sane records fran otherdepots which survived as part of their depot surveillance records.

In searching the files at the U.S. Technical Escort Unit, the comiplete tripreports for 1957 and half of 1958 were discovered. These were preserved by theunit historian.<

For 1959, a sumnary document was discovered, at the same location, whichdescribed air mvements; however, little information on other moves has beenfound.

Fram 1960 to the first half of 1964, only limited information has beendiscovered. This information came f ran a variety of sources including thespecial Historical volumes mentioned above, the U.S. Army Armament, Munitionsand Chemical Command (AMCCCI4) Transportation Office, chemical depot records,and the personal remebrances of sane former escort officers.

9i

Fran the last half of 1964 through 1969, a summnary of mo~vement operationswas fortunately preserved by the unit historian at the U.S. Army TechnicalEscort Unit. This summnary was apparently constructed during the early 1970 'sby COL Phillip Blackwell who used the original trip reports. It includes allinformation except a description of any incident which occurred on the move.Information on incidents, where possible, was obtained frain personalremembrances and depot records. The trip reports fran which the summnary wasconstructed, with a few minor exceptions, have been misplaced in the Armyrecords system or have been disposed of. The few that survived did,apparently, because they were unclassified and were kept separate fram the rest.

In addition to the "Blackwell summary", depot records have been found whichsignificantly supplement the data for 1968 and 1969. This is significant inthat the "Blackwell summary" appears to be very complete for 1964 to 1967, butis missing many mo~ves fran 1968 and 1969.

For the reasons above, the information provided in the compilation is notcomplete. Wherever possible, the Army will continue to seek missing records,and will update the campilation as any new information becomes available.

Additional Historical Background:

Over the years, the Army has adopted same nanes or expressions for specificmroves, or groups of mroves, which are not caompletely clear to someone readingthe movement tables. This section is provided to add mrore background as an aidto the reader.

Most early moves of chemical weapons were simply isolated events. Thosethat were big enough not to be, such as the return of the stocks f ran Europe,took on no specific namre, but might sametinms be referred to by the name of theship they came "hame" on. However, incidents which were noteworthy to thetechnical escort personnel frequently were given names either by thosepersonnel or by the news media. Early incidents which typify this were asfollows:

* (1) The Francis L. lee incident - frequently used to describe all ofthe problems involved with handling the leaking cargo of captured German warstocks aboard the ship, the Francis L. Lee fran 1 May 1946 when it left Antwerpuntil Decenber of 1946 when "mrothballing" of the vessel was finally completed.See incident 19 on the Incident Summarization Sheets.

(2) The Leaking Nazi War Gas Train - refers to the series of events atPanola, Alabana; Amrory, Mississippi; and Memphis, Tennessee caused by atrainload of munitions being moved fran the Francis L. Lee to Pine Bluff

Aserial, Arkansas in July 1946. See incident 18 on the Incident SummiarizationSheets.

In late 1948, the Army made the decision to sea dump the majority of itsremaining stock of lewisite. Sea dumping had been accomplished previously, but

* before this time mrunitions were generally loose dumped from barges. in thiscase the Army decided to fill a World War II merchant hulk, the S.S. JoshuaAlexander, with the bulk lewisite to be sea dumped. The hulk was then towed tosea and scuttled (see 1948, page 2). This work was assigned a code name,

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Operation Geranium (lewisite has an odor like Geraniums) . This was a method ofoperations and a naming convention not used again for some time; but eventuallythe Army returned to it.

During the 1950's, the only major operation referred to by name was theRalston sea dump. This operation was carried out in the spring of 1958, andconsisted of the sea dumping of the remaining stocks of M70 bombs and someremaining lewisite. The operation took its name fran the name of the merchanthulk to be filled with the bcnbs, the S. S. William Ralston. The operationconsisted of rail moves from Deseret Chemical Warfare Depot (now the south areaof Tooele Army Depot) and Navajo Army Depot to the Naval Weapons Station at IConcord, California. Fran there, the Ralston and, later, a barge of one-toncontainers, were moved to sea for scuttling/dumping.

In the early 1960 's, the system of using code names came back into use.This systemi has continued to the present day. Some notable examples which aresaretines referred to in the text of this report are as follows:

(1) Operation YBA -The first mcvement of chemical weapons to Okinawafrom the Continental United States (see 1963, pages 1 and 2). This includesthe acccopanying rail moves to Concord Naval Weapons Station, the port ofdeparture.

(2) Operation YBB -The second movement of chemical weapons to Okinawa(see 1963, pages 2 and 3).

()Operation YBF -The third and final movement of chemical weaponsto Oknw nApril 1965 (see 1965, pages 2 and 3).

()Operation CHASE 8 - The first of the four CHASE sea dumps ofchemical weapons. CHASE was a U.*S. Navy acronym for "Cut Holes and Sink 'Emn."The Navy had been sea dumping conventional high explosive ammnunition at seausing former merchant hulks which were scuttled for years. One series of thesedumps were the CHASE dumps. Many people, even within the Army, erroneouslyassume that all CHASE dumps were chemical weapon dumps. In fact, the vastmajority were not. CHASE 8, the first chemical weapons CHASE dump, was made inMay-June 1967 (see 1967, pages 2 and 3). The material dumped was bulk mustardton containers and GB filled M55 rockets. The rockets were placed into steelvaults which were then filled with concrete. All of the cargo was placedaboard a merchant hulk (the S.S. Corporal Eric Gibson) and was then sunk indeep water off the continental shelf. V

stcs (5) Operation YZU - The mo~vement of the current chemical weaponsstcsto Europe in June 1967. Most aspects of this movement remain classified.

(6) Operation CHASE XI - The second CHASE operation (see 1968, page 2)involving chemical weapons held in May-June 19,68. This operation was conductedsimilarly to the previous CHASE operation.

(7) Operation CHASE XII - The third CHASE operation (see 1968, pages 2

was one-ton containers contaminated with mustard and filled with water.

(8) Operation CHASE X - The fourth and final CHASE operation (see1970-1977, page 1) involving chemical weapons conducted in August 1970. WhyCHASE X followed XI and XII is unclear, although it was probably plannedearlier and executed later. The cargo consisted of solid concrete vaults of GBfilled M55 rockets.

(9) Operation Red Hat - The movement of all chemical munitions onOkinawa to Johnston Atoll in January - September 1971 (see 1970-1977, page 1).This operation involved the last major movement of M55 rockets.

(10) Operation TNS - The movement of mustard filled mortar projectilesfran the north area of Tooele Army Depot to the south area of Tooele Army Depotby train in August 1977 (see 1970-1977, page 2).

(11) Operation DTS - The movement of various chemical rmunitions fromDugway Proving Ground to the south area of Tooele Army Depot in August 1977 bytruck convoy (see 1970-1977, page 2).

(12) Operation SETCON I - The movement (set consolidation, or SETCON)of small stocks of Chemical Agent Identification Sets (CAIS) to Rocky MountainArsenal fran worldwide sites for incineration during the pilot test of adisposal facility at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in January and February 1978.

(13) Operation SEICXt II - Following the successful pilot incinerationprogram, the movement of all remaining stocks of CAIS to Rocky Mountain Arsenalin May-June 1980 (with an earlier Navy move in 1978 to facilitate the airlift).

(14) Operation RMVff - The airlift of the GB-filled Weteye bcombs atRocky Mountain Arsenal to Dugway Proving Ground, and the associated truckconvoys fron Dugway Proving Ground to Tooele Army Depot in August 1981 (see1981-1986, page 1).

Description of Monitoring:

The monitoring of the air and of suspect liquids for chemical agent hasdeveloped tremendously over the last 40 years. It is important to keep incontext while reading this report exactly what monitoring was available duringtransportation to the U.S. Army over the years.

a. Mustard and Lewisite: Detection of a nustard or lewisite leak duringthe late 1940's and early 1950's consisted of visual inspections and odor.Using sense of smell to detect a mustard or lewisite leak is less hazardousthan might be normally suspected, as both ccnpounds have very characteristicodors which can be detected by sell at very low concentrations. Mustard hasan odor described as that of garlic, while lewisite has an odor similar togeraniums.

During the same period, the Army had a detector crayon for localizingmustard or lewisite leaks. This crayon would turn color in the presence of thechemical agents and was useful for verifying, for instance, if a wet spot undera one-ton container plug might be chemical agent seepage or merely watercondensation. e I

12

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Later, in the mid-1950's, the Army developed detector tubes. Thesetubes were thin glass tubes with a chemical substance inside. The substancewas wetted with a second reactive chemical, then an aspiration bulb wasconnected to the glass tube. The tube was aimed at the desired sample area andthe aspiration bulb was used to pump air through the glass tube. If mustard orlewisite was present, the primary substance in the tube would turn color. Thissystem is still in use today for spot checks, and is similar to theindustrially used Draeger-style tubes available for many cumpounds.

At the same time as the detector tubes were developed, an impregnatedpaper was also developed to replace the detector crayon. This detector paper,referred to as M8 paper, is still in use today.

Recently the Army has begun limited use of the British manufacturedChemical Agent Monitor, or CAM, which can perform similar spot checks formustard by using an ionization principle similar to hcme smoke alarms.

However, this new device has not been previously used in nnitoring a move.

The U.S. Army uses other very sensitive devices to monitor for mustard,such as bubblers and the gas chromatographic based Automatic Chemical Agent _Monitoring System (ACAMS). However, neither of these systems is easilyportable and they have never been used in a move. Their principal applicationhas been at fixed storage or disposal sites. Monitoring for lewisite hasbeccue relatively unimportant as mst remaining stocks were destroyed at RockyMountain Arsenal in 1981 and 1982. Only sall quantities remain at Tooele ArmyDepot.

A complete analysis of the air monitoring devices which are availablefor a movement of mustard filled items is available in the Monitoring Plandeveloped for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program ProgrammaticEnvirorental Impact Statement.

b. Nerve Agents (GA, GB, and VX): Detection of nerve agents was amatter of great concern thrust upon the U.S. Army upon discovery of Germany'ssecret stocks of Tabun (GA) in 1945. As all of the nerve agents areessentially odorless and are deadly at low concentrations, a quick and accuratemethod was required.

The method selected was biological monitoring. Rabbits, which werefound to be very susceptible to the nerve agents, were placed in the vicinityof the weapons. Usually four rabbits in small cages would be placed in arailcar. This method continued in use during transportation until 1969, and atsame storage installations into the early 1980's.

In the mid-1950's, as with mustard, a detector tube was developed fornerve agent. The detector tube has continued into use today, but issupplemented by a newer wafer-like paper held in a plastic matrix that can besimilarly aspirated and changes color in the presence of nerve agent.

13

* * .a..,AL

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in the late 1960's, a chemical reaction based alarm, the M8, was >developed which detected nerve agent at the level immediately dangerous to lifeand health. This alarm was used extensively in later moves, such as OperationiRtr in 1981, although it was not as rugged as was desirable and wouldfrequently "false alarm."

Since that time, the Army has fielded the MBA1 alarm, which is anionization alarm for GB and VX. This alarm is considerably more rugged thanthe M8 and "false alarms" with less frequency. It is suitable for mo~vementoperations, as is a similar alarm, the British CAM, and either of these alarmswrould replace older methods..4

As with mustard, the Army has other techniques for the mo~nitoring ofnerve agent (bubblers and ACAMS) which are excellent, but are designed forfixed storage or disposal facilities. These methods are not easily portableand have not been used during transportation. A mo~re ccmplete analysis of themonitoring devices which are available for movement of nerve agents isavailable in the Monitoring Plan for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal ProgramProgrammatic Environmental Impact Statement.

Description of Packaging.

Past packaging and shipment of chemical munitions was not considered withthe scrutiny currently being given this issue. Currently, the transportationof chemical munmitions to support the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, ash.0outlined in the Environmental lImpact Statement, would be conducted under muchstricter packaging requirements than previously used. This particularlyrelates to the issue of overpacking munitions in a vapor tight container.Packaging, prior to Operation W~r in 1981 (the mvement of Weteye bombs fromRocky Mokuntain Arsenal to Tooele Army Depot - see the Additional HistoricalBackground section and 1981-1986, page 1), concentrated on adequate blockingand bracing of the munitions. Sate excellent photographs of this, taken duringOperation Red Hat, are provided in the section for mo~ves from 1970-1977. Otherthan blocking and bracing, the munitions were shipped in their storageconfiguration. This configuration generally had the munitions stored onsturdy wooden pallets, which were not overpacked in any fashion. The numberof munitions per pallet varied with the size of the munition.

The only exception to the palletized configuraticn were the Navy banbs(1,194 and Weteye), the spray tanks and the one-ton containers. The Navy bombshave their own specially designed overpack to protect then fran salt spray andother environmental effects, as well as to protect the crew from a leakingbanb. The spray tanks used by the Air Force also ccte in a specially designedoverpack. One ton containers have previously been shipped "as is".

Typically, on early moves, weapons were shipped in closed box cars and werestacked as efficiently as possible. During the incidents mentioned in thisreport, several disadvantages of doing this became apparent:

(1) If an item on the top leaked, it contaminated everything Ii

14

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(2) If an item on the bottom leaked, everything above it had to beimved to reach it, and

(3) Such cramped conditions made emergency response more hazardous tothe technical escort team coping with the problem.

In the 1950's, a modified approach using less dense packing was adopted.This was later formalized in rail and air packaging drawings published in the1960's. Generally speaking, rockets, mines, and projectiles were still movedin boxcars, although they were not stacked as high or packaged as densely asbefore. One ton containers and bombs were moved in gondola cars (there aresane excellent photographs of this in the section for 1958 on the Ralston seadump). Spray tanks were moved on flat cars.

During Operation IMT in 1981, packaging was given sate additional attentionfor the first time. Several Weteye bambs had been discovered leakingthroughout the years prior to the move, and their contents had been drainedinto one-ton containers. These one-ton containers were overpacked for the airmove in a special steel container. The Weteye bambs, as previously mentioned,are already overpacked and were shipped as stored. Prior to Operation Fr,overpacking was accomplished only for munitions found to be leaking just priorto or during a move.

Reconciling the Records:

" .__ For anyone reading the history ccmpilation pages, there is a tendency towant to reconcile all movenents. That is, if VX projectiles went into Dugway,and are no longer stored there, the reader might wish to search for an outgoingshipment to show what happened to these items.

In same instances this can be done. In many instances, however, thisattempt would be doomed to failure. Failure to reconcile the records couldoccur for several reasons as follows:

(1) For many years, the Army fired chemical weapons during tests atmany of the locations shown. Sce locations which extensively fired chemical

weapons were Pine Bluff Arsenal, Edgewood Arsenal, and Dugway Proving Ground.

(2) The Army has transferred agent fram certain munitions into othercontainers or munitions. For instance, at Pine Bluff Arsenal, captured Germanstocks and British stocks were transferred from bombs and land mines intoone-ton containers. At Rocky Mountain Arsenal, phosgene from bombs andprojectiles was transferred into one-ton containers. The containers were latersold by the governent to private industry. The phosgene was then used as araw material for fertilizers, plastics, etc.

(3) The Army has run many major disposal programs. For instance, allGB and HD stocks remaining at Rocky Mountain Arsenal after 1970 wereincinerated or neutralized in controlled industrial facilities. At earlierdates, many installations destroyed chemical munitions by open pit burning.

15

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(4) Finally, as referred to earlier, the records are not complete forall years. There are same movement records, for instance the specific date ofmovement of GB rockets fran Rocky Mountain Arsenal to east coast depots(accomplished sane time in 1961-1963), which are simply missing.

For whatever admitted flaws in records carpleteness that exist, the recordsdo give a picture of the magnitude of moves made over the years, and thesuccess, and sometimes the problems, which the Army has encountered during thistime. For further discussion of this issue, the reader is referred to thesection on "Recommendations and Conclusions."

'.

16

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Location Key

ACY American Cyanamid Chemical Company - Azusa, California

ANAD Anniston Army Depot - Anniston, Alabama

BAAB Brooksville Army Air Base - Brooksville, Florida

BARB Barbers Point Naval Air Station, Hawaii

BHOD Black Hills Ordnance Depot - Igloo, South Dakota

BRAG Ft. Bragg - North Carolina

CAAA Crane Army Ammunition Activity - Indiana

CAAF Campbell Army Air Field - Kentucky

CHAS Charleston Naval Weapons Station - South Carolina

CNAD Crane Naval Anmunition Depot - Crane, Indiana

CON Naval Weapons Station - Concord, California

CZ Canal Zone Tropical Test Areas

Deseret Deseret Chemical Warfare Depot - Utah

DCW Dow Chemical Company - Pittsburg, California

DPG Dugway Proving Ground - Utah

EA Edgewood Arsenal - Maryland

ELM Elmendorf Air Force Base - Alaska

ENJ Colts Neck Naval Pier - Earle, New Jersey

FALL Fallon Naval Air Station - Nevada

FCA Fort Churchill - Rivers, Manitoba, Canada

FM Fort McClellan - Alabama

FTR Ft. Richardson - Alaska

FPST Ft. Stewart - Georgia

GAAF Godman Army Air Field - Ft. Knox, Kentucky

'AK Ft. Greely - Alaska

17

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Location Key (Continued)

GCWD Gulf Chemical Warfare Depot - Huntsville, Alabama

GUAM Anderson Air Force Base - Guam

HAAP Hawthorne Army Amnition Plant - Nevada

JA Johnston Atoll "

KEY Keyport Naval Torpedo Station - Washington -

LA114 Los Alamitos Naval Air Station - California

LBDA Lexington-Blue Grass Depot Activity

LEJ Camp Lejeune - North Carolina

LLL Lualualei Naval Magazine - Hawaii

LOD Letterkenny Ordnance Depot - PennsylvaniaS.P

LRAFB Little Rock Air Force Base - Arkansas

MAAB MacDill Army Air Base - Tampa, Florida

MAAP McAlester Axmy Aimnition Plant - Oklahana

MAFB Maquire Air Force Base - New Jersey

MAP Mukilteo Ammnition Pier - Mukilteo, Washington

MCMA Mineral County Mnicipal Airport - Nevada 5.

MMIA McAlester Municipal Airport - Oklahama

NAAP Newport Army Anmunition Plant - Newport, Indiana

NAVG Naval Magazine - Guam -'

NAZ Navajo Army Depot - Arizona

NMD Naval Mine Depot - Yorktown, Virginia S

NOPE New Orleans Port of Entry - Braithwaite, Louisiana

ITAF New River Marine Ccrps Air Field - North Carolina A

CKC Chibana Army Depot - Chibana, Okinawa

, - .A P

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Location Key (Continued)

PAAF Phillips Army Air Field - Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

PAFB Pope Air Force Base - North Carolina

PBA Pine Bluff Arsenal - Arkansas

PN4A Pendleton Municipal Airport - Washington

PUDA Pueblo Depot Activity - Pueblo, Colorado

QUAN Quantico Marine Corps Air Field - Virginia

RAH Rahway Arsenal - Rahway, NJ

RMA Rocky Mountain Arsenal - Colorado

SBSB Small Boat Wet Storage Basin - Charleston, South Carolina

SBCA Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station - California

SJOD San Jacinto Ordnance Depot - Houston, Texas

SUF Suffield Test Center - Ralston, Alberta, Canada

SUN Sunny Point Naval Pier - Sunny Point, North Carolina

SVOD Savanna Ordnance Depot - Savanna, Illinois

TAFB Travis Air Force Base - California

TEAD Tooele Anry Depot - Tooele, Utah

TNM Theodore Naval Magazine - Mobile, Alabama

TORO El Toro Marine Corps Air Station - California

T Tulalip Backup Storage Depot - Tulalip, Washington

UKMR Upper Kipapa Military Reservation - Hawaii

UMDA Umatilla Depot Activity - Herniston, Oregon

VMAF Wainwright Army Air Field - Ft. Wainwright, Alaska

WHID Whidbey Island Naval Air Station - Washington

WTRAF Wright Army Air Field - Georgia

YTS Yuma Test Station - Yuma, Arizcna

19

5Z 0

Incident Su~mmarization Sheets

1. (Date: Jul/Aug 47, Ref: 1947, page 1) one 4.2 inch phosgene (CG)filled mrtar cartridge was discovered leaking while unloading on the dock.The item was destroyed by immersing it in a decontaminating chemiical solutionuntil all the phosgene had been chemically reacted. Then the item was removedfor explosive deolition. There were no injuries.

2. (Date: Mar 48, Ref: 1948, page 1) Minor valve leaks were discoveredduring the movement on tuv bulk containers of murstard (H). The leaks waresealed and decontaminated. There ware no injuries.

3. (Date: Feb 48, Ref: 1948, page 1) A switching accident at Pine BluffArsenal resulted in two railcars filled with HT ton containers derailing andoverturning. No leakers occurred and there ware no injuries.

4. (Date: Jul 47/Jan 48, Ref: 1947, page 1) One minor road accident. Noinjuries and no leakers.

5. (Date: Aug/Sep 49, Ref: 1949, page 3) Truck 3 of the convoy wasinvolved in a slow-speed collision with a civilian automobile near JeffersonCity, Missouri. No leaks, spills or injuries ware involved.

6. (Date: Nov 49, Ref: 1949, pag~e 4) 1Truck 9 o f the convoy was involvedin a serious (20 mph) accident, with a civilian truck when the police escort in

*St. Josephs City, Missouri failed to block off an intersection. There were nospills or leaks. Personnel on the truck were injured by the collision (injuredneck and back, bruised knee, bruised side, etc.).

* 7. (Date: Oct 49, Ref: 1949, page 4) During unloading of the trucks, thefact that one 75mm projectile had rolled out of its pallet want unnoticed. Theprojectile was found later in the day still in the truck at the RingsbyTransportation Company Garage, Denver, Colorado. The projectile was reportedto the Army and removed to Rocky Muntain Arsenal without further incident.

* 8. (Date: Oct 49, Ref: 1949, page 3) The air brakes on truck 8 of theconvoy failed causing it to rear-end truck 7 near Bennett, Colorado. A vehiclefire started as the collision was serious, but was quickly extinguished by theescort personnel. There was no leak or spill, but there were saw~ collisionoriented injuries.

* 9 (A). (Date: Nov/Dec 48, Ref: 1948, page 2) During placeuvent of the ton* containers in the hold of the vessel prior to sea dump, a valve was

accidentally sheared off. A vapor leak occurred but was sealed and* decontaminated. There were no injuries.

9 (B). (Date: Nov/Dec 48, R~ef: 1948, page 2) During~ the sea duip, thescuttling crew reported donning masks due to vapor in the hold of the vessel.

It is probable that a ton container leaked during rrcvefent to the dt~tp site.There were no injuries.

20I

10. (Date: Jun 50, Ref: 1950, page 2) Truck 303 of the convoy wasinvolved in a collision in Red Bird, Wyaming on 8 June 1950. No furtherdetails regarding this accident exist in the historical files.

11. (Date: Jun/Jul 50, Ref: 1950, page 2) Upon starting from a dead stop,a tractor and trailer uncoupled causing the trailer to fall forward onto theground. There was no damage to the load. There were no spills, leaks orinjuries.

12. (Date: Sep 46, Ref: 1946, page 10) Three leaking lewisite bombs werediscovered during movement fram the train to the barge. These were sealed anddecontaminated, and then overpacked. There were no injuries.

13. (Date: Aug 46, Ref: 1946, page 9) Mustard bambs were discoveredleaking during the unloading of the barge. The leaking bombs were sea dumpedwith the other bambs and the spill was chemically decontaminated by a teamdressed in protective clothing. One Non-Caomissioned Officer was injured.Hospitalization was not required.

14. (Date: Aug 46, Ref: 1946, page 9) Leaking chemical munitions werefound during the unloading of the S.S. Richardson. They were segregated ontospecial barges after being sealed and decontaminated. The leakers included 2German GA bambs, 2 British H land mines, 46 CG barbs and 154 German H bombs.During the handling of these items "three civilian enployees of this station

(' received mustard gas injuries in handling contaminated lines to bargescontaining leaking munitions. None were hospitalized. Eight enlistedpersonnel received injuries from mustard gas in miscellaneous operationshandling leakers. None were hospitalized." The barges were being used toremove unserviceable munitions found on the S.S. Richardson to a sea dtmpingarea.

15. (Date: May/Jun 46, Ref: 1946, page 5) "Hold Number 2 had aconsiderable concentration of CG from leaking bambs." The hold was ventilatedusing large fans. The leakers were sealed. The cargo was unloaded by 18 June1946. There were no injuries.

16. (Date: May/Jun 46, Ref: 1946, page 5) When unloading of the vesselbegan, personnel were not in protective clothing and leakers were soonencountered resulting in injuries. Both civilian stevedores and militarypersonnel were then put into full rubber protective clothing. Eventually atotal of 2 leaking GA bombs and 154 leaking mustard munitions were discovered.The leakers were sealed, decontaminated and overpacked. They were thensegregated on the dock for sea dump. "Fifty-two civilians of the CharlestonStevedoring Campany were treated for gas injuries, and 10 of them werehospitalized. Nine civilian employees of the Basin were treated for gasinjuries and 3 were hospitalized. Eight Army personnel were injured, and 3 ofthem were hospitalized." All injuries were mustard burns.

17. (Date: Jul 46, Ref: 1946, page 9) Leaking mustard bombs from thecargo hold of the S.S. Francis Lee were taken by barge to Horn IsIand,Mississippi, and were open air burned. "All working personnel received vaporburns in the wrist area... same men also had slight burns on the neck." Theseinjuries were incurred by the military group which off-loaded and burned thebarbs.

21

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18. (Date: Jul 46, Ref: 1946, page 8) The famous "Leaking Nazi War Gas '

Train." Soon after leaving Theodore Naval Magazine (12 July 1946) leakingGerman H bambs were discovered in one railcar. This car was detached fran thetrain at Panola, Alabama, the leaks sealed and the car was returned to TNM forinspection and later shipment.

At Awory, Mississippi, a second car was discovered to be leaking seriously(13 July 1946). It was detached and moved to a siding in Bigbee, Mississippiand was left under guard. In spite of this, several railroad employees of theAmory yard ventured too close to the car and received vapor burns. A militaryescort team fram Edgewood Arsenal arrived and by 17 July 1946, had isolated theleaker, decontaminated the area and destroyed the munition. The railcar thenwas forwarded to Pine Bluff Arsenal without further incident on 21 July 1946.

Meanwhile, the train with the remaining 8 cars had continued on toward PineBluff Arsenal. Arriving at the yard in Mmphis, Tennessee (late on 13 July1946), it was discovered that 3 more cars had leakers on board, and that onewas very serious. The train had, in fact, contaminated 10 miles of trackleading to the yard. Another special escort team fram Edgewood Arsenal wassent to Memphis. The tracks were decontaminated, the leaking railcars wereseparated and decontaminated, and the leaking munitions were isolated anddestroyed. These 3 railcars eventually reached Pine Bluff Arsenal on 30 July1946.

During the Amwry and Memphis operations, at least 21 civilian railyardworkers received vapor burns fran mustard and 2 were hospitalized. At leasttwenty-five military personnel received both vapor and liquid burns and atleast 4 were hospitalized. The final medical report on these incidents lists60 total gas exposures - 28 at Amory and 32 at Mmphis. The injuries weremainly due to the high summer temperatures, poor availability of properprotective clothing and a lack of understanding and cooperation by localmilitary authorities. This incident resulted in the virtual rewriting ofchemical movement procedures used at that time.

19A. (Date: May-Jul 46, Ref: 1946, page 5) This ship, the S.S. FrancisLee, like others carrying captured German stocks, was found to contain leakers;however, this ship contained far more leakers than any of the others. Thesewere segregated on the pier after decontamination and were placed on a bargefor disposal (see Incident 17). During the unloading of the vessel 375 peoplewere injured by exposure to mustard, and at least 22 people were hospitalized, -making this the worst chemical incident the Army has ever incurred duringtransportation (excluding combat action during World War II). All of theinjured were military personnel, or civilian contract personnel to the Army,principally stevedores.

19B. (Date: Jul-Aug 46, Ref: 1946, page 9) Upon opening the last hold ofthe Francis Lee, the situation was determined to be beyond handling with theresources at TNM. Consequently, the hold was sealed and the ship was moved toEdgewood, Maryland. Here, technical teams off-loaded the last 300 bcmbs,destroyed them and campletely decontaminated the ship. There were 52 cases ofminor vapor burns during this operation, and same personnel were brieflyhospitalized. The ship was subsequently moved to Baltimore for "moth balling" . ,prior to being placed in long-term storage. During the moth-balling process, .three civilians were injured and hospitalized due to contamination which had

22

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gone undiscovered in a remote portion of the bilge. This area wasdecontaminated by teams fran Edgewood. The ship was checked periodically atits naval reserve mooring for the next 3 years, and no further contaminationwas found.

20. (Date: May/Jun 46, Ref: 1946, page 4) This ship, the S.S. Isaac Wise,contained same leakers. These were destroyed at San Jacinto Ordnance Depot.Five men received mustard vapor burns during the unloading operation - oneship's crewman, three stevedores, and one military escort person.

21. (Date: Jun/Jul 46, Ref: 1946, page 8) A serious mustard leaker wasdiscovered as the train approached Chattanooga, Tennessee. The car wasisolated at Tinner, Tennessee. The leaking bomb was sealed and decontaminated,and mustard which had spilled onto the siding was also decontaminated.

22. (Date: Jun/Jul 46, Ref: 1946, page 8) A leaking railcar wasdiscovered upon entering the Georgia Railroad Yard at the corner of Delta andDeKalb Streets, Atlanta, Georgia. The car was isolated and a military escortteam frca Edgewood Arsenal was sent to decontaminate the area. The siding wasdecontaminated and the bcmb was isolated and destroyed. Same militarypersonnel on the escort team received minor vapor burns, and one air forceenlisted man was briefly hospitalized with vapor burns. During this incidentcivilians in the vicinity of the leak repeatedly refused to be evacuated.Fortunately, the leak was rapidly contained and no civilians were injured.

23. (Date: Jun 46, Ref: 1946, page 7) One railcar was found to containleaking drums of mustard upon arrival at Gulf Chenical Warfare Depot. Theleaking drums were inmediately transferred into sound one-ton containers andthe drums were decontaminated. There were no injuries.

24. (Date: Apr 46, Ref: 1946, page 3) On 8 April 1946, while at sea, aton container of chlorine began leaking through a faulty fusible plug. Afterunsuccessful efforts to plug the leak, the ton container was thrown overboard.There were no injuries.

25. (Date: Mar 46, Ref: 1946, page 2) On 6 March 1946, while at sea, a150 pound cylinder of chlorine was found to be leaking. After unsuccessful a

efforts to plug the leak it was thrown overboard. There were no injuries.

26. (Date: Apr/May 46, Ref: 1946, page 4) Eight 1,000 pound phosgene (CG)bambs and six 500 pound phosgene (CG) bcnbs were discovered leaking during a,

unloading of the S.S. Park Benjamin. Twelve were repaired and two were "Kdestroyed (see Incident 39). There were no injuries.

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27. (Date: Mar 46, Ref: 1946, page 2) Two mustard banbs were found to beleaking upon arrival. These were placed on a barge and dumped at sea. Therewere no injuries.

28. (Date: Feb 46, Ref: 1946, page 2) A gasoline line broke causing thetruck to catch fire near Little Rock, Arkansas. The crew quickly extinguishedthe fire. There were no spills, leaks or injuries.

23

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29. (Date: Jun 46, Ref: 1946, page 7) A railcar was discovered leakingmustard near Manchester, Georgia. Military escort teams were sent franEdgeood Arsenal, Maryland, to decontaminate the spill and arrived on 25 June1946. The teams located a leaking bcmb on 26 June 1946 and decontaminated it.The railcar was then forwarded to Gulf Chemical Warfare Depot (GCWD) withoutfurther incident. During the decontamination operations at Manchester,approximately 6 civilian employees of GCWD received mustard vapor burns.Approximately 14 members of the military escort teams also received vaporburns, and 7 men were hospitalized for approximately 2 weeks.

30. (Date: May 68, Pef: 1968, page 2) During the movement of this trainfram ANAD to Earle, New Jersey, the train was required to be repositioned whilein the Potanac River Railroad Yard, Alexandria, Virginia. During this time twocarloads of rockets were uncoupled fron the train, and upon departure, wereinadvertently left in the yard. When this was discovered, a military team wassent to secure them, and they were subsequently moved to the sea dump areawithout incident. The rockets in the carloads were canpletely encased inconcrete for the sea dump, and at no time leaked or caused injuries.

31. (Date: Mar 58, Ref: 1958, page 1) Leakers developed during the moveas follows: 7 discovered in Elko, Nevada, 23 discovered in Portola,California, 34 discovered in Sacramento, California, and 59 discovered uponarrival in Concord. This resulted in 7 of the 15 gondola cars beingcontaminated. Load was decontaminated enroute and on arrival. No injuries.

32. (Date: Mar/Apr 58, Ref: 1958, page 1) Leakers developed during themove as follows: several minor leaks discovered in Portola, California, majorleaks were apparent by the time the train arrived in Sacramento, California.

During off-loading in Concord, about 150 leakers were found in 22 of 30gondolas. Promt decontamination and temperatures dipping into the 30's atnight prevented a major spill. Spills were confined to the gondolas and weredecontaminated. There were no injuries.

33. (Date: Apr 58, Ref: 1958, page 1) Leakers developed during the move.During off-loading, leakers were found in 29 of 30 cars. Promptdecontamination prevented a major spill and spills were confined to thegondolas. Leakers were segregated and rapidly overpacked in propellant chargecans during the off-loading at Concord, and all rail cars were decontaminated.There were no injuries.

34. (Date: Sep 65, Ref: 1965, page 4) The VX spray tank being returnedwas almost, but not quite, empty. During the movement, the spray tank nozzleleaked a snall amount of VX. The military escort team used a powdered andspray decontaminant to clean the spill, and the chemical reaction caused asmall on-board fire on the aircraft. The fire was quickly extinguished andthere were no injuries.

35. (Date: May 65, Ref: 1965, page 3) During Operation YBF as the USNSMcGraw was moving out of San Francisco harbor, another ship turned across itsbow resulting in a near collision. The ships cleared each other by

approximately 600 feet.

24

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elmj~P 36. (Date: Oct 68, Ref: 1968, page 5) Upon preparing to unload onerailcar at JUmatilla, the rabbits were found dead. Further inspection discloseda wnall leak in an W~-1 banb (GB) at the edge of the center suspension lug.The banb, was immuediately taped to stop the leak and was then overpacked. The

area was then decontaminated. There were no injuries.

37. (Date: Sep 68, Ref: 1968, page 4) During unloading of one railcar atUmkatilla, a leaking fW-1 bomb (GB) was detected. The leaker was taped andoverpacked. The area was then decontaminated. There were no injuries.

38. (Date: Aug 64, Ref: 1964, page 2) During the movement to sea, a tonIcontaier of mustard leaked at the valve asseanbly. The lip of the toncontainer had filled with mustard and the ton container below was contaminatedas well. The team evacuated the barge, suited up in protective clothing andreturned to the barge. They then dumped both ton containers over the side anddecontaminiated the spill on the barge deck. There were no injuries and therest of the material was sea dumped without further incident.

39. (Date: May 46, Ref: 1946, page 6) Three leaking German phosgene baubswere disposed of by taking them offshr and dumping them in deep water. Therewere no injuries.

40. (Date: Jul 46, Ref: 1946, page 9) During unloading of the FrancisLee, 33 leaking German bombs were set aside on a barge for sea disposal. These

,%, were dumped on 13 Jul 46 20 miles off the coast. While dumping the banbs, aC, forklift pierced one bomb accidentally, contaminating the barge and allowing

the mustard to partially drain. Since the personnel conducting the dump werein protective clothing, there were no serious injuries and the barge wasdecontaminated. However, the partially drained bomnb floated away rather thansinking. It subsequently washed ashore (20 Jul 46) where local residentsretrieved it as a war souvenir. The Army recovered the item on 23 Jul 46.Fortunately, the mustard had been flushed frain the banb, broken up by waveaction, and had reacted with the seawater. The bomb was completely clean ofmustard. There were no injuries to the civilians who retrieved the banb.

41. (Date: Aug 71, Ref: 1970-1977, page 1) During the loading of the UISbSSealift, one pallet of 15 M55 rockets was accidently dropped approximately 40feet into the hold of the vessel fran a crane. Although subsequent examinationshowed that same of the rockets had been severely damaged, no spill occurred,and there was no harmi to operators or the general public.

* 42. (Date: Aug 77, Ref: 1970-1977, page 2) Prior to Army inspection, andprior to arrival in the North Area of Tooele Army Depot, one of two enginesscheduled to pull the numnLitions train was involved in a collision %,.hen its

* brakes failed allowing it to roll into another train. Although no weapons wereinvolved in this crash whatsoever, the event was widely covered by the media,

* so it is mrentioned here for clarification. No chemicals were involved in or* spilled during this accident. The engine was replaced, and the actual mrovement* operation proceeded without incident.

VVN

25I

*1

43. (Date: May 80, Ref: SETCN II, page 1) A helicopter transferringChemical Agent Identification Sets (CAIS) fram Crane Army Anmunition Activity,Indiana, experienced engine failure iniediately after takeoff and crashed.None of the CAIS in the helicopter leaked or spilled. One crew member suffereda broken foot. These CAIS and the remaining CAIS at Crane were removed withoutfurther incident.

I

26

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OPERATION RED HAT- M55 ROCKETS LIE IN THE HOLD OF

USNS SEALIFT AFTER ACCIDENTAL DROPPING - OKC TO JA,1970-1977, PAGE 1.

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RD-AI93 348 CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL PROGRAM CHEMICAL WEAPONS 2/'

MOVEMENT HISTORY COM..(U) OFFICE OF THE PROGRAM MANAGERCHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION ADERD. N R BRANKONITZ

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* OPERAT-ION RED HAT-

M55 ROCKETS BEING

STORED FOR SHIPMENT-

OKC TO JA, 1970-1977,

4W, PAGE. 1

OPERATION RED HAT-

ONE-TON CONTAINERS

(BULK) AND MC-1

BOMBS ABOARD SHIP -

OKC TO JA, 1970-1977,

PAGE 1.

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.~~V- RBCt'IMEN1DATIONS AN~D CONCLUSIONS .

Preface. The recaomendations and conclusions provided herein have beenreflected where applicable in the construction of other studies supporting theChemical Stockpile Disposal Program Programmnatic Envirounental ImpactStatement. Specific studies which have utilized input from this report arethe Transportation Concept Plan, the Emergency Response Concept Plan, the

* Mitigation Study, the Monitoring Plan, the Packaging Plan and the ReducedTemperature Study.

Overpacking. The overpacking of munitions and containers duringtransportation is recommended. It appears f ran the movement history thatparticular attention should be paid to bulk storage item such as bombs (whichare stored without explosives, and as such are essentially bulk containers)and one-ton containers. Both bombs and one-ton containers have shown asmall, but repeated history, over a period of many years of leakage duringmoves.

As for the remaining munitions, none have been transported in quantity formany years. The history of the rockets in storage is particularly well knownto include leakage problems, and overpacking would appear to be anappropriate action.

Refrigeration. The movement history docume~nts several key incidentswhere transportation during warm weather, combined with other factors,resulted in leakage of munitions. Consequently, a study to investigatereduced temperature transportation of munitions has been done to provide inputto the Mitigation Study for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal ProgramProgrammatic Environmental Impact Statemrent. Some of these incidents are asfollows:

(1) The leakage of captured German mustard banbs abo~ard the cargroship Francis L. Lee in the su.mmer of 1946 (see incident 19 on the IncidentSummarization Sheets).

(2) The leakage of captured German mustard bombs being transportedfran Theodore Naval Magazine, Alabama to Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas (theNazi War Gas Train) in the summer of 1946 (see incident 18 on the IncidentSummarization Sheets) .

orte(3) The leakage of M70 mustard bombs during the transportation mrovesfrteRalston sea du~mp (see incidents 31, 32 and 33 on the Incident

Sumrmarization Sheets).

The use of refrigeration as a mitigation technique is dealt with in detail inthie Reduced Temperature Study of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal ProgramProgrammatic Environmtental Impact Statement.

Maintenance. In the past, item earmarked for disposal frequently .

received little maintenance for prolonged periods prior to disposal. Theseitems then became leakers during mroves when relatively minor maintenancecould have prevented it. .

27

As a rslit is cnlddthat th ryshould carefully provide fundinand manpower for munition inspection and maintenance to continue for ailmunitions right up to the time of mrvmnt, and that all munitions should becarefully inspected immtediately prior to movement. This has been recog~nizedand is discussed in the Transportation Concept Plan of the Chemical StockpileDisposal Program Programmiatic Environmrental Impact Statement.

Explosive Disassembly and Downloading. Historically, projectilesmoved for disposal were most frequently moved by truck convoy, and sometimesby rail. During the early 1950 's, the standard procedure for doing this wasto send, about 6 months prior to the move, a technical escort team to thedonor location, and to proceed to remove all fuzes and propellant from theprojectiles. This was felt to be a reasonably safe operation and, so far ascan be ascertained, never resulted in an incident or casualty. Fuzes andpropellant were incinerated locally, and then the projectile bodies were sentto the disposal location, which was usually Rocky Mokuntain Arsenal. It is notclear from the documents whether bursters were remved, although it isdoubtful they were.

Rockets and land mines right up to the 1970 CHASE X dump, were always moved ina full explosive configuration. There is no historical evidence that thisever resulted in an incident or problem. During the CHASE moves, the rocketswere effectively disabled by being embedded in concrete coffins.

* lMortar rounds (4.2 inch) were sarwtimes defuzed, and scretns not. There* ~is no data available to determine the basis for this procedure. Due to the ~

configuration of the mortar, when fuzes were removed it would also result inthe burster being removed.

It was concluded that this area needed further study and discussion. Thisproblem was resolved in discussions involving the Transportation Concept Planby presenting the problem to a panel of transportation experts. A detaileddiscussion of the Army's concept for dealing with this problem is contained inthe Transportation Concept Plan and the Packaging Plan of the ChemicalStockpile Disposal Program Programmnatic Environmental Impact Statement.

Use of Contract Carrying Services. Throughout the available tripreports, there runs a cam-on thread of complaint about the ability of contractlabor (air, rail, ship or truck) to fully understand and comply with theArmy's safety procedures. The biggest offender was apparently the railroads,who repeatedly treated chemical cargo roughly.

Another related issue was the inability of Technical Escort personnel to stopsuch behavior when it was discovered. Crews would occasionally blatantlydisregard military personnel, and would counter criticism with the attitudethat this was their train (or ship, plane or truck), they would move itaccording to railroad (or other) regulations, and if the Army didn't like it,they could find another carrier.

Mnother prim offender in this area was stevedoring companies. Thesecomtpanies, in spite of intensive training and oversight, would blatantlyignore Army guidance during stevedoring operations. Perhaps the best example 7,

90a

of this instance was the events surrounding the unloading of the Francis L.Lee (see incident 19 cn the Incident Sumnarization Sheets). Here stevedoresrefused repeatedly to obey Army safety regulations, resulting in many injuries.

These problems all revolve around the issues of:

(1) Ccaman and control of movement operations.

(2) Use of military versus contract personnel for certain key tasks.

(3) Training of contractors.

(4) How contracts should be written to maximize Army control.

These issues have been recognized and were used as input to the TransportationConcept Plan.

Emergency Response. Emergency response teams for past moves frequentlyhad to travel creat distances, and coordination with local Army ccunandsrevealed inadequacies. Also, control of civilians was a problem.

During past moves where serious problems with leaking munitions werediscovered, it wuld typically take 24 to 72 hours for technical escortresponse teams to respond to an emergency in sufficient strength to deal withit. A good example of this was the response to the leaking Nazi War GasTrain (see incident 18 on the Incident Sumarization Sheets). The emergencyresponse teams originated at Edgewood, Maryland and had to fly to Tennessee Wand Mississippi causing a delay in response of about 48 hours in thisparticular case. As a result of delays such as this, several undesirableevents usually occurred.

(1) The escort with the move generally had inadequate personnel tocordon off the leak.

(2) Civilians, when warned, would frequently disregard warnings(see incident 22 on the Incident Sumarization Sheets). The military, undercurrent law, did not have the power to force an evacuation, and still do not.

(3) The prolonged response time waiting for the team created a tense"stand-off" situation between Army officials and local officials who perceivedthat "nothing was being done."

(4) The response teams were frequently sent with junior officers whofell under the ccmmand of a high ranking local officer. The local officer attimes had no real chemical experience.

(5) The response teams were frequently supplied with local protectiveclothing which proved defective, or local decontaminant, which lacked strength ->due to prolonged storage. Logistics of erergency response were generally aproblem.

29

"

As a result of these deficiencies, the Army has recognized that much closercoordination and placement of emergency response teams and their resources is 'required. This planning is reflected in the Emergency Response Concept Planof the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Progiarmmatic Envirormntal ImpactStatemnt.

Communications. During past moves, person to person relationships andcommunications were frequently handled as an afterthought. Problems werecaused by this condition fairly routinely, for instance:

(1) Cczmmications between the escort personnel and the train crew onrail moves was frequently poor or even nonexistent. In May 1968, escort -

personnel determined they were leaving two railcars behind by accident asthey were leaving a railyard (see incident 30 on the Incident SummarizationSheets). Due to lack of ccmmunication with the engine crew, the train couldnot be stopped. The cars were left behind and had to be retrieved hours later.

(2) On more than one occasion, personnel arrived at the destinationto deliver the chemical ammunition and found that:

(a) No one was there to receive the material.

(b) The wrong people were there to receive it.

(c) The people receiving it could not produce proper credentials.

(3) On more than one move, members of the emergency response team did Snot know and had never met, members of the escort team, local commanders,local support personnel, and local officials. This created tensions and ."people problens" which could easily have been avoided.

These conditions are also recognized and addressed in further detail in theEmergency Response Concept Plan and the Transportation Concept Plan.

30

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%,*.-.-.'. U.

References

1. Trip Reports, January - June 1946, 9710 Technical Service Unit, one file,Record Group 175, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA),Suitland, Maryland.

2. Trip Reports, July - December 1946, 9710 Technical Service Unit, one file,Record Group 175, NARA, Suitland, Maryland.

3. Trip Reports, 1947, 9710 Technical Service Unit, one file, Record Group175, NARA, Suitland, Maryland.

4. Trip Reports, 1948, 9710 Technical Service Unit, one file, Record Group175, NARA, Suitland, Maryland.

5. Trip Reports, 1949, 9710 Technical Service Unit, one file, Record Group175, NARA, Suitland, Maryland.

6. Trip Reports, 1950, 9710 Technical Service Unit, one file, Record Group175, NARA, Suitland, Maryland.

7. Historical Program File, 1951, 9710 Technical Service Unit, one file,Record Group 338, stack area 4, row 67, ccapartment 22, NARA, Suitland,Maryland.

8. Historical Program File, 1952, 9710 Technical Service Unit, one file,Record Group 338, stack area 4, row 67, ccapartment 22, NARA, Suitland,Maryland.

9. Historical Program File, 1953, 9710 Technical Service Unit, one file,Record Group 338, stack area 4, row 67, couipartment 22, NARA, Suitland,Maryland.

10. Historical Program File, 1954, 9710 Technical Service Unit, one file,Record Group 338, stack area 4, row 67, ccnpartment 22, NARA, Suitland,Maryland.

11. Personal Transportation Logbook, Operations YBA, YBB and YBF, Ms. BeverlyGraham, AMCCCM4 Transportation Office, Rock Island, Illinois.

12. Personal Interview, Mr. Neil Baker (former escort officer), AliCCOM SuretyOffice, Rock Island, Illinois.

13. Trip Reports, 1-57 through 26-57, U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, EdgewoodArea, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

14. Trip Reports, 1-58 through 56-58, U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, EdgewocdArea, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

15. Trip Report, 1-63, U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, Edge%%x-d Area, AberdeenProving Ground, Maryland.

UV:U.

16. Letter, 6 April 1960, subject: Use of LOAR Service for Airlift of"Chemical Corps Shipments, from Headquarters, Departnent of the Army, Offic-e ofthe Chief Chemical Officer to Ccnranding General, U.S. Army Chemical Center,filed with the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen ProvingGround, Maryland.

17. Summary of Trip Reports, 1-65 through 34-70, U.S. Army Technical EscortUnit, ccupiled by COL Phillip Blackwell, Edgewoo Area, Aberdeen ProvingGround, Maryland.

18. Guard/Security, historical monograph, 9710 Technical Service Unit, November1945, AMCCCM Historical Office, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground,Maryland (Historical Volume).

19. Receipt of Genan Toxic Gas Munitions at Mobile, Alabama and Shipment ofThese Munitions to Pine Bluff Arsenal, Data RE S.S. Francis L. Lee, June 1946-August 1946, AMCCOM Historical Office, Edgewoxxd Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground,Maryland (Historical Volume) .

20. S.S. Francis L. Lee Activity at Edgewood Arsenal, August 1946 - September1946, AMCCCM Historical Office, Eag eoo Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground,Maryland (Historical Volume).

21. Receipt of German Toxic Gas Murditions at Mobile, Alabama and Shipment ofthese Munitions to Pine Bluff Arsenal, Data RE S.S. Francis L. Lee, Septf~rber .-1946 - November 1946, A14COM Historical Office, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving .Ground, Maryland (Historical Volume). ."

22. Project Report 1-63, Report of Operations Involving Disposal of PackagedRadioactive Waste and Other Condenried Materials by Dumping at Sea, Date: 9July 1962 to 19 July 1962, AMCO Historical Office, Edgewood Area, AberdeenProving Ground, Maryland (Historical Volume).

23. Rad Sea Dump, 1964, AMCCOM Historical office, Edgewo Area, AberdeenProving Ground, Maryland (Historical Volume).

24. Sea Dump of Unwanted Radiological and Chemical Material, 1964, A11COMHistorical Office, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (HistoricalVolume) .

25. Gibbstown, N.J., 1959, AM4CCCM Historical Office, Edgewood Area, AberdeenProving Ground, Maryland (Historical Volume).

26. Report of Operations Involving the Disposal of 8,000 Tons of Lewisite andMustard Gas by Dumping at Sea During the Period 15 March 1958 to 19 April 1958Through the U.S. Naval Aniuition Depot, Concord, California, AMCCOM Historicaloffice, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (Historical Volume).

- ~ - - - - -.. ,

27. Sea Dump of 700 Tons of Lewisite and Mustard, NAD, Concord, California,1958, AMCCCM Historical Office, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground,Maryland (Historical Volume).

28. Chase 8, Sea Dump, 1967, AICOM Historical Office, Edgewood Area, AberdeenProving Ground, Maryland (Historical Volume).

29. History, Technical Escort Unit, 1943-1953, A4XCI4 Historical Office,Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (Historical Volume).

30. Letter, subject: Significant Escort and Disposal Operations, 10 July 1964,to Commanding General, Edgewood Arsenal, ATTN: Dep Dir Sup Svc fran CarmnandingOfficer, U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit; letter now in the historical files ofthe U.S. Army Technical Escort Center, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground,Maryland.

31. Depot Record, U.S. Army Depot Surveillance Record, Bomb, Gas GB, MC-1, 27Sep - 25 Oct 68, Uatilla Depot Activity, Hermiston, Oregon.

32. Depot Record, U.S. Army Depot Surveillance Record, Bomb, Gas GB, MC-1, 25Oct 68 - 27 Mar 69, Umatilla Depot Activity, Hermiston, Oregon.

33. Trip Report, 465-68, U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, Edgewood Area,Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

34. Depot Records (Confidential), Form DD250 Materiel Inspection andReceiving Report, 1961-1968, Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Newport,Indiana. (NOTE: These records as a group remain classified as they containdetail, in addition to movement information, which is related to the Armychemical warfare production capability.)

35. Depot Records, Form DD1348 Transfer of Accountability Record, DM move r1983-1984, Chemical Research and Development Center, Edgewood Area, AberdeenProving Ground, MD.

36. After Action Report, Operation DTS, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, September1977; AMCCOM Historical Office, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground,Maryland (Historical Volume).

37. After Action Report, Volumes I, II and III, Transportation of ChemicalMateriel, Operation RMT, October 1981, U.S. Army Materiel Development and

Readiness Cammand, Alexandria, VA; AMCCCO4 Historical Office, Edgewood Area,Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (Historical Volume).

38. After Action Report, Operation Red Hat, 4 November 1971, U.S. ArmyTechnical Escort Center; AMCCCM Historical Office, Edgewood Area, AberdeenProving Ground, Maryland (Historical Volume).

39. After Acticn Report, Volume 1 & 2, Operation SETCON I, 2 March 1978, Rocky

Mcuntain Arsenal, Commerce City, Colorado; AMCCOM Historical Office, EdgewoodArea, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (Historical Volume).

40. DTS and TNS, 1977; AFECOM Historical Office, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, Maryland (Historical Volume).

~iii ,

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41. OPLAN SETON II, 1978; ANCCM Historical Office, Edgewood Area, AberdeenProving Ground, Maryland (Historical Volumes).

42. SITREP File, SFTCM II, 1980; Chemical Agent Identification Sets(CAIS) Historical File; Information Center, Office of the Program Manager for

Chemical Munitions (OPMM), Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

43. Trip Report #30-81, 11 May 81, U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit; AMCt4Historical Office, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

44. Letter, subject: Chemical Weapons Movement History Ccapilation, 26 Mar "87, Umatilla Depot Activity to Office of the Program Manager for ChemicalMunitions; letter outlines 14 movements with attached Depot Surveillancerecords.

45. Depot Records (Confidential), Various, 1953-1969, Rocky Mountain Arsenal,Ccmmerce City, Cclorado; Boxes S-29, S-26, E-9, A-41, RS-38, and Vault # 1.(Note: These records as a group remain classified as they contain detail, inaddition to moverent information, which is related to the Army chemicalwarfare production and storage capability.)

46. Depot Records (Confidential), Various, 1966-1986, Tooele Army Depot,Tooele, Utah. (Note: These records as a group remain classified as theycontain detail, .in addition to movement information, which is related to theArmy chenical warfare production and storage capability.)

S47. Depot Information Paper, Chenical Weapons Movement History for Pine BluffArsenal, 1981 to Present, 23 Apr 87.

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