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www.nspa.nato.int
PREPARED FOR
PRESENTED BY
@nspa.nato.int
MoD Life Cycle Management of Conventional Ammunition
RASR Podgorica
October 2017
David TOWNDROW
NSPA Project Officer
David.Towndrow
An Understanding of:
• Concept of MoD LCM,
• Factors and challenges of MoD LCM,
• Understand the processes to manage the
stockpile given limited resources,
• How might donors assist.
David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme 2October 2017
Facilitate Discussions
• MoD LifeCycle Management of Ammunition
• Storage
• Quantity
• Management of a national stockpile
• Disposal
• Transportation
David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme 3October 2017
Agenda
NATO AAP-48
The purpose of AAP-48 is to provide guidance on the implementation of System Life Cycle Management, which is
used to mitigate risk, reduce acquisition times and to identify, quantify and control Life Cycle Cost, from the earliest possible
opportunity. Principles and application in the NATO context. SLCM will assure that the processes used across projects are consistent, harmonized, and that there is effective sharing and coordination of resources, information and technologies.
David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme 4October 2017
Definitions
Recycling serviceDisposal of materiel
PRE-CONCEPT
DEVELOPMENT
PRODUCTIONUSE and SERVICING
MAJOR REPAIR
CONCEPT
Repair service
Defense Industrial
Armed Forces
General (policy);
Research-scientificConceptual design
Experimental-design work
Manufacture design
Design supervision while in operation
Military Equipment Lifecycle from a product (ammunition) perspective
October 2017 5David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
Processes to manage the stockpile –ammunition management organisation can only be MoD
6David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services ProgrammeOctober 2017
MoD
Mature, well resourced MoD
7David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services ProgrammeOctober 2017
Mature Policy and Guidance
October 2017 8David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
In-service surveillance of ammunition is undertaken to ensure that ammunitioncontinues to meet the required quality standards throughout its entire life cycle. Surveillance is undertaken to ensure "that
the ammunition continues to meet the required quality standards throughout its life. Quality, from this perspective, includes the performance of ammunition during use and its safety and stability during storage. The chemical, electrical,
and mechanical properties of ammunition change and degrade with time, leading to a finite serviceable life for each munition. The accurate assessment of munition life is of paramount importance in terms of safety and cost
Defence Industry NATO Standard National Defence Policy
Critical factor is to monitor the ongoing safety of ammunition during its lifetime
Delivery of a partial capability
October 2017 9David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
A Eur 8M project to deliver ammunition depot infrastructure, logistic equipment and training
Addressing only part of the problem?
October 2017 10David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
Old, potentially unsafe and improperly stored Safe demilitarisation, recovery of
valuable materials, reduction of
stockpile, reduction of logistic burden
Strong political
leadership, focused
effort, secure
funding – but only
for demilitarisation
How far can an individual donor assist?
October 2017 11David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
Political & senior
leadership
intervention
Complex equipment
(demil facility and
propellant
surveillance lab)
Low level skills
and direct
support
(MANPADS
destruction)
Stockpile Management (LCM of ammunition)
October 2017 12David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
Stockpile management is a wide-ranging term when applied to ammunition.
Defined as those procedures and activities regarding ammunition safety
and security, including accounting, storage, transportation, and handling. It
includes:
• Definition of stockpile types;
• Determination of required stockpile levels;
• Location of stockpiles;
• Financial management of stockpiles;
• Accounting for ammunition;
• Safety, storage, and transport of ammunition;
• Security of stockpiles; and
• Disposal, demilitarization, and destruction of surplus ammunition.
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Stockpiles and ownership
Stockpile LocationMinistry
Division
Brigade
Regiment
Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO)
Forward Stock
Defence Positions
Basic Loads
October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
Remote/Poor Storage Sites
14October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
Good Storage Sites
15
12 Heavy NATO standard bunkers Chimtallah, Afghanistan
Dispersed ammunition storage UK, and CAD Kineton storage, UK MoD
October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
Determination of Ammunition Stockpile
16
EQUIPMENT DAER FORCE
EQPT LEVEL
DAYS FORCE DAER SUSTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT
IS PSO GW (L) GW (I) IS PSO GW (L) GW (I) Rifle 5.45mm Ball 5 20 60 120 600 30 9000 360K 1.08M 2.16M Rocket A/Tk RPG 7 0 1 4 20 100 30 0 3,000 12K 60K Mortar 60mm HE 0 1 10 20 40 30 0 1,200 12K 24K 152mm Gun HE 0 0 50 200 20 30 0 0 30K 120K
Operational Stocks (Police) - 30 DAER at Internal Security Operations rates;Operational Stocks (Military) - 10 DAER at General War (Light) Rates;
War Reserve - 25 DAER at General War (Intensive) Rates; andTraining Stocks - 10% of Defence Stockpile
IS Internal SecurityPSO Peace Support Operations
GW (L) General War (light)GW(I) General War (intensive)
Daily Ammunition Expenditure Rates (DAERs)DAERs is one method to calculate the quantity of ammunition required to support different types of operation. These base figures are a start point to determine the global stockpile requirement for a nation. Issues such as shelf life, procurement strategy, available finance, accepted risk, availability of storage, rates of training, operational disbursement and readiness all influence the final figures for National Stockpile.
Other nations have simply inherited a quantity of ammunition
October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
Surplus Ammunition
17
Surplus ammunition should be the total of: •ammunition that exceeds the stockpile level requirements of the national stockpile for in-service weapon systems;
•ammunition that is now obsolete or obsolescent;•ammunition for which weapon systems are no longer held;
•ammunition that has exceeded its serviceable life and has been declared for disposal by the national authority. This surplus ammunition should be:
•officially declared as surplus to national security or defence requirements;
•taken out of service;•recorded by type, lot, batch and/or serial number;
•stored separately; and•preferably destroyed or demilitarized.
Challenges to determination of National Stockpile•Some nations do not have accurate national accounts (Typically former WP members or nations coming out of conflict or nations where the previous policy had been to devolve ammunition resupply to local commanders)
•Estimates of stockpiles often fluctuate significantly and are very difficult to determine even with modern stock control systems.
•Perceived national secrecy.•Reluctance to offer-up surplus at a local or national level.
October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
March 2008 Gerdec, Albania
26 people killed, hundreds injured, widespread damage when an uncontrolled
munition disposal facility caught fire
October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme 18
It’s a major issue, it’s expensive to solve and it’s ongoing
19David Towndrow Project Support Branch4 October 2017
Explosions at two large Ukrainian military depots this year have caused losses of ammunition so high that they represent the biggest blow to Ukraine's combat capability since the start of the conflict with Russia-backed separatists in 2014, a senior security official said on September 28 in Kyiv. Source RFE 28 Oct 17. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-ammunition-depot-blasts-combat-capability/28762247.html
Balaklia, 23 Mar 17 explosions/fireKalynivka, 27 Sep 17 explosions/fire
20
DECLARED CAUSE # OF EVENTS % ADJUSTED
%1 REMARKS
Auto-Ignition of Propellant 7 3.7 5.8 During Demil / EOD Clearance 17 9.0 14.0 Electrical Fault 5 2.6 4.1
Fire 48 25.4 39.7 A significant number of these may be propellant auto-ignition.
Handling / Negligence 24 10.6 19.8 High Temperature 3 1.6 2.5 Lightning 8 4.2 6.6 Not Known 68 36.0 Security 6 3.2 5.0 Others 3 1.6 2.5 TOTALS 189 100.0 100.0
1 Assuming all ‘Not Knowns’ are spread proportionally against the other possible causes.
Ammunition Storage Incidents
Declared Cause of Depot Fires/Explosions 1995 - 2009
Source: www.explosivecapabilities.com (Adrian Wilkinson 16 Feb 10)
October 2017
21
Functional Management & Expertise
Defence Policy
MoD
Management/resources
J4
Storage Depots Transport Testing/training Monitoring Procurement Disposal
Ammunition Competencies
Basic Awareness
Functional responsibility
Expert knowledge
• Nation’s own knowledge, resources and experts
• Use of another nations expertise or international management
• Use of advisors (ammunition experts – Regional, OSCE, UN, NGO, NATO, commercial)
David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services ProgrammeOctober 2017
Functional areas of ammunition stockpile management
22
Functional Area Requirements Ammunition Management § Inventory Management System and Procedures
§ Risk Management System and Procedures § Procurement System and Procedures § Hazard Classification System § Accident, Fault and Performance Failure
Investigation Capability and Procedures § Ammunition Surveillance and In-Service Proof
Capability and Procedures Ammunition Storage § Field and Temporary Storage Procedures and
Operations § Depot Storage Procedures and Operations § Safe Depot Storage Infrastructure § Unit Storage Procedures and Operations § Safe Unit Storage Infrastructure
Ammunition Processing § Ammunition Inspection Capability and Procedures
§ Ammunition Maintenance Capability and Procedures
§ Ammunition Repair Capability and Procedures § Ammunition Process Building Infrastructure
Ammunition Disposal § Identification of Ammunition for Disposal Methodology
§ Disposal Technology and Infrastructure § Disposal Capability and Procedures
Ammunition Security § Physical Security Infrastructure of Explosive Storage Areas
§ Security System Capability and Procedures § Vetting System for Staff
Ammunition Transport § Transport Procedures in accordance with International and National Legislation
§ Intrinsically Safe Vehicles
October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
23
Stockpile Surplus
Why Stockpile Destruction Programmes
• Baseline Stockpile Planning / Capability• Reduce resource burden; space and physical security• Reduce hazard; loss of stock, loss of life and infrastructure• Remove overage and dangerous stock• Remove obsolete stock; no weapons/no ammunition
Stockpile reduction is good management for defence and civil obligations: • Focus resources and supports a better capable defence• Reduces hazard, improves safety and security
October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
Techniques
•Dumping
•Open Burning / Open Detonation
•Closed Burning/ Detonation Systems
•Disassembly Reduction & Separation
As UN Dangerous Goods Class 1 all ammunition is subject to safety
regulations throughout Whole Life from manufacture to disposal
David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme 24October 2017
Ammunition Destruction
Dumping
Dumping is not destruction; it is a disposal method that puts ammunition
beyond reach. Aging and degradation is not stopped. Unlike
radioactive material, explosives do not have a decay or have ‘safe life’.
(Deep) Sea DumpingLegacy activity now banned. Shallow
dumps and ocean movement now
causing problems.
Landfill/BurialShort term for immediate problem.
Require some safeguarding. Problems
with theft, leakage and functioning.
David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme 25October 2017
Ammunition Destruction
Burning/Detonation
Military munitions are optimised and designed to
be efficient. Causing them to function as close to
as intended is a most efficient destruction.
Open Burning / Open DetonationRequires approved sites and safety exclusion.
Low cost with open ranges. Capability for large
destructions. Consider Impact of residual scrap.
Closed Burning / DetonationCost of building a contained system. Reduced
safety exclusion, reduced throughput.
26October 2017
Ammunition Destruction
David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
27October 2017
Ammunition Destruction
Burning/Detonation
Burning and incineration is often subject to Directives and permits to control civilian non-operational activities.
Military Field Operational Demolitions
Explosives Incineration Pollution Abatement System
David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
Disassembly
Either complete or partial disassembly techniques to recover all
materials or to separate for destruction through burning/detonation.
• Mechanical: pull apart, saw, unscrew etc
• Cryogenic: freeze and shatter
• Melt out: heat to soften or liquifiy
• Wash: water jet, solvent etc
28October 2017
Ammunition Destruction
David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
29October 2017
Ammunition Destruction
Disassembly/RecoveryMost demilitarisation programmes do not permit military reuse of components.
Explosives may be recycled for civilian use
(including Mine Action and some EOD) which requires a user market and
application of civil/international rules for security and certification.
Not suitable for civilian purposes without
reworking and not necessarily economic.
Explosives also present significant health hazards in handling and reprocessing.
David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme
October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme 30
Example of European demil facilitiesused/potentially used by NSPA
Norway
Nammo NAD
SwedenNammo
Vingo
Germany
Nammo BuckISL
EST
UK
Qinetiq
Bulgaria
ExpalDunarits
France
Alsetex
MBDA
SpainExpal (Faex)
Italy
Expal (UEE Italia)Esplodenti Sabino
Albania
ULP-Mjekës
KM-Poliçan
SerbiaTRZ Kragujevac
TurkeyKirikkali
Ukraine
Pavlograd
DonetskShotska
Poland
Bumar
Czech Republic
VOPSTV
Commercially sustainable, competitive and high quality industrial base
From military depot to demil facility
31David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services ProgrammeOctober 2017
Points of Contact
Fred PEUGEOTChief, Project Support TeamGeneral and Cooperative Services Programme
Tel.: (+352) 3063 5994 E-mail: [email protected]
David TOWNDROWTechnical Officer – Project Support Branch
Tel.: (+352) 3063 7234E-mail: [email protected]
32David Towndrow Project Support Branch4 October 2017