Miller e Saltzman, Beyond the Three ‘Isms’, Rethinking IR and the Post-cold War Order

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Original Article

Beyond the three ‘isms’: Rethinking IR and thepost-cold war order

Benjamin Miller a,* with Ilai Z. Saltzmanba School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel.

E-mail: [email protected] Department, Claremont McKenna College, 500 E. Ninth St., Claremont, CA 91711, USA.

E-mail: [email protected]

*Corresponding author.

Abstract The division of IR theory into the ‘holy trinity’ of the three ‘isms’ (realism,liberalism and constructivism) is the most common classication of theories in the eld.

While this division has numerous theoretical benets, it also has some major short-

comings with regard to the conceptualization of substantive changes in world politics,

especially in the post-Cold War security order. In order to better capture conceptually

these changes and also to be able to provide falsi

able predictions, we offer a novel con-ceptual classication based on three key factors: (i) the level of analysis used by the

approach; (ii) whether the state continues to be the central actor in the international system

and (iii) whether the post-Cold War international system is more peaceful in relation to

previous eras. Each of the approaches identied in this work – ‘Liberal/Constructivist

Optimists’, ‘Hegemonic Optimists’, ‘New Conict Pessimists’ and ‘Balance of Power

Pessimists’ – highlights different and sometimes contradictory aspects of these develop-

ments. We probe the empirical applicability of this novel typology on a sequential time

base since the end of the Cold War and nd that each of these approaches accounts for the

major patterns of the international security order in a given time period but not in other

periods. We also brie

y identify the conditions under which each one perspective is morevalid than the others for accounting for key patterns of international security.

International Politics advance online publication, 18 March 2016; doi:10.1057/ip.2016.3

Keywords: IR theory; realism; liberalism; constructivism; international order; post-Cold

War security

Introduction

This article advances a novel conceptualization of the changes in the post-Cold War

order. The objective is to strengthen the relations between IR theory and international

politics. We will do that by introducing a new classication of four conceptual

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approaches and applying it to the post-Cold War world. This four-fold classication

draws on the ‘

holy trinity’ of the three

‘isms

’ in IR theory, but aligns it more carefullywith post-Cold War changes.

The most common typology of International Relations (IR) theory is the conventional

triangle of realism, liberalism and constructivism (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010, pp. 24–25;

Lake, 2011; Maliniak et al , 2011; Sil and Katzenstein, 2011; and Nau, 2011). While

useful for numerous theoretical purposes, this division does not capture the essence of

some of the key changes in the international order (Bull, 1977; Sørensen, 2011),

especially in international security, which took place since the end of the Cold War as we

elaborate in this article. We argue that this is at least partly due to the mismatch between

the conventional theoretical triangle and some of the key substantive issues and

components of the post-Cold War international security order (namely, war and peace),

in the following ways:

First, despite the numerous theoretical differences between them, liberals

and most constructivists usually share quite a similar substantive position on some

of the key issues involved in the debate on the nature of the post-Cold War

security order and on some of the underlying conceptual elements (Rathbun, 2012,

p. 613). We call this approach the ‘Second-Image/Non-State-Centric Optimists’.

For the purpose of clarity or simplicity – we call them Liberal/Constructivist-

Optimists.

Second, the traditional typology misses a key post-Cold War perspective, which

has distinctive positions on substantive issues pertaining to international security and

more generally on the key concept of anarchy; We call this approach ‘Second-Image/

Non-State-Centric Pessimists’ (or briey – New Conict Pessimists – as this approach

underlines the dominance of new type of conicts in the post-Cold War Era).

Third, the third paradigm – realism – is split down the middle on the peace/

stability nature of the international system between two different realist approaches:

‘Third-Image/State-Centric Optimists’ (or Hegemonic Optimists) versus ‘Third-Image/

State-Centric Pessimists’ (or Balance of Power [BOP] Pessimists).

Lastly, realism and constructivism (though less so liberalism) do not providecoherent and falsiable predictions or prescriptions, making it extremely dif cult to

confront their expectations with the empirical record.

Thus, we argue that there is a need to better align the common typology of IR

theory to key approaches used to analyze the contemporary international security

order. This can be done by focusing on three key factors consisting of Waltz’s

enduring level of analysis question (Waltz, 1959) and two additional issues that have

generated major debates in the post-Cold War era (Waltz, 1993; Harrison, 2004):

(i) whether the post-Cold War international system is more peaceful than earlier

congurations, especially the bipolar era (Patman, 1999; Lynn-Jones and Miller,2001); and (ii) whether the state is still the central actor in the international system or

whether non-state actors are replacing it as the key actors (Guehenno, 1995; Hobson,

2000; Seymour, 2004).

Miller and Saltzman

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This second issue relates to the level of analysis in the following way: a third-

image (structural/systemic) analysis is state-centric and the state is seen as a unitaryactor in contrast to the second-image analysis, which allows for much more inuence

of various non-state/domestic actors on the international behavior of the state

(Hobson, 2000: Chapters 2 and 3).

With the end of the Cold War, analysts advanced competing and even contra-

dictory expectations about the likely character of post-Cold War international

security. Among the large number of predictions which were voiced, some were

optimistic while others were quite pessimistic; others foresaw more continuity in

international politics emphasizing the circular nature of world politics.

More specically, in this post-Cold War marketplace of explanations, four leading

predictions have emerged. The most optimistic with regard to the end of major

conict was Fukayama ’s (1989, 1992) notion of ‘the End of History’, celebrating the

termination of East –West rivalry and the universal victory of liberalism, and

anticipating the end of major geo-political conicts. In contrast, two scholars with

completely different views suggested more pessimistic predictions. Mearsheimer

(1990a, b) claimed that rather than ‘a brave new world’, the post-Cold War era will

resemble more the conictual world of ‘Back to the Future’. Just as pessimistic was

Huntington (1993a) who predicted some major international conicts under the cloak

of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’.1 The fourth perspective, articulated by scholars such

as Krauthammer (1990/91) underlined the emerging distribution of capabilities and

its implications during ‘the Unipolar Moment ’.

About two decades or so have passed since these predictions were made. In order

to evaluate their validity, we need, however, to introduce a fresh classication of key

perspectives on international security, which accounts for the historical develop-

ments we witnessed ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in

international security. This novel taxonomy embeds the predictions in a larger

conceptual framework, which integrates approaches to international security with IR

theories. We nd the existing theoretical classications lacking in some fundamental

ways, as we elaborate below, and thus introduce a new set of conceptual approachesto international security. This new typology contributes to a more accurate and

nuanced evaluation of the character of the post-Cold War international security order.

This article will focus on the following twin objectives: rst, introducing a novel

classication of the key approaches to post-Cold War international security.

We incorporate these key predictions, expressed with the end of the Cold War, into

four major approaches for the study of the international security order, while making

explicit the fundamental logic behind each one of them as well as their similarities

and differences. We argue that the division of the three ‘isms’ – realism, liberalism

and constructivism – is not suf ciently helpful for studying post-Cold War international security; therefore, we will present an alternative quadruple typology.

Second, we do not claim that this new typology substitutes the leading triangle in the

more theoretical/scientic sense of epistemology and ontology. Our claim is rather

Beyond the three ‘isms’

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much more modest – that this novel typology makes empirical probing of the

character of the post-Cold War security order considerably more effective. We dothat by presenting a brief illustration of the applicability of the four approaches to

different time periods since 1989. This can be only suggestive at this stage as even a

quarter of a century may be too little time to condently conclude how each approach

will work out. Surely, no devotee of a particular approach would say it always applies

everywhere. Elements and patterns of several or even all of the approaches can be

found in operation at any one time. Still, even a relatively brief empirical application

of the four approaches can be useful for showing the utility of this new classication

and its potential relevance for the post-Cold War security order.

Accordingly, we begin by succinctly outlining some of the limitations of the most

common explanations for the post-Cold War international security order: realism,

liberalism and constructivism. The second section will present a new classication that

differentiates among four novel approaches to the world security order: second-image

(and non-state-centric) Optimists; third-image (and state-centric) Optimists; second-

image (and non-state-centric) Pessimists; and third-image (and state-centric) Pessimists.

The third section will exemplify the utility of the four ideal-type approaches by applying

their logic to the unipolarity of the post-Cold War era. The nal section will conclude the

theoretical contributions of this article and offer some suggestions for future research.

IR’s Holy Trinity and its Limits

Most of the theoretical literature in IR which deals with the post-Cold War

international security order is still evolving around the traditional differentiation

between the existing triumvirate of IR paradigms: realism, liberalism and constructi-

vism. The dominance of this division also becomes clear in the major overviews of

the IR literature in recent years by, for example, Walt (1998), Jervis (2002), Snyder

(2004), Friedberg (2005) and Betts (2010).

This dominant classication does not capture, however, some of the most important issues and variations in the post-Cold War international order, especially

with regard to the centrality of the state and the challenges it confronts (from both

‘good’ and ‘bad’ actors) and also with regard to the extent of stability/peace in the

system. In order to address these key issues, we need a new distinction which, while

drawing on enduring IR theory questions (such as the level of analysis), captures

some of the key elements of the post-Cold War security order by introducing the

four-fold typology introduced here. More specically, this distinction renes the

conventional ‘isms’ typology in the following ways:

(a) What we call the Second-Image Optimists include liberals and most (although

denitely not all) of constructivists as both share very similar views regarding

the nature of the emerging order after the Cold War, thus they can be seen as

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af liated with the same substantive approach to world order despite some major

theoretical differences.

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(b) The Second-Image Pessimists, who are absent from the traditional ‘ism ’ triangle,

include not only Huntington’s concept of the ‘Clash of Civilizations,’ but also the

‘failed states’ syndrome (and the related newly emerging asymmetric security

threats of terrorism/warlords/militias/insurgents/guerrillas/drug cartels and so on)

despite the major differences between these two type of challenges.

(c) The Third-Image (who are also state-centric) analysts as we call them here, or

realists as they may also be called, are divided into two clusters: Optimists, who

are hegemonic stability theorists whose approach coincides with ‘The Unipolar

Moment ’ proposition and Pessimists who tend to be proponents of balance of

power (BOP) theory who believe in the idea of ‘Back to the Future’.

We start the discussion of the new classication by introducing some of the basic

theoretical differences among the two variants (second and third-image) of both

Optimists and Pessimists (see Tables 1A and 1B) and then we move into a presen-

tation of the four-fold typology based on three key factors: the level of analysis, the

centrality of the state and the effects of the end of the Cold War on international

peace (see Table 2).

Optimists and Pessimists: Conceptual Differences

Table 1A is based on the three components of the Waltzian international structure:

the ordering principle – anarchy; the key units – the states and the lack of functional

differentiation among them; and the distribution of capabilities – the key element

which differentiates among the states (Waltz, 1979: Chapter 5 and 6). Table 1B

presents the three dimensions generating the two-by-two typology of the four

approaches: the level of analysis, the view of the meaning of the end of the Cold

War with regard to war and peace, and the importance and nature of non-state actors.A major point of division is the conception of anarchy in the post-Cold War

world order. While second-image Optimists argue that international anarchy is being

transformed and a much more cooperative community of states (Katzenstein, 1996;

Adler and Barnett, 1998; Oneal and Russet, 2001), and a global civil society of non-

state actors (Matthews, 1997; Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 2003; Slaughter, 2004; Kaldor

et al, 2012), are replacing the old BOP system, the second-image Pessimists highlight

the detrimental change in the character and locus of anarchy (Job, 1992; Ayoob, 1995;

Holsti, 1996; Patrick, 2011). What is relevant for these Pessimists is not so much the

international anarchy among states, but the anarchy inside states, at least in some of them; although this has implications for regional and international security much

beyond these weak states. For third-image/state-centric theorists (the Realists),

however, international anarchy endures in the post-Cold War era as it always was the




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dening attribute of international politics. This means that international institutions

continue to reect state interests and positional relations, and that the distribution of

capabilities among states persists to be the key determinant of international outcomes.3

The perspective’s conception of anarchy has major implications for their viewsof the centrality of the state as the key actor in world politics (Sørensen, 2004).

For both versions of the Realists, the state continues to be the central actor,

particularly the great powers, which determine the key outcomes in international

politics either through hegemony of one of them or BOP among them (Waltz, 1979;

Gilpin, 1981; Mearsheimer, 2001). In the eyes of second-image Optimists, the

centrality of the state as the key actor in world politics is in relative decline when

compared with non-state actors, operating above the level of the state – in the global

level (Barnett and Duvall, 2004), as well as below it – as part of states’ domestic

affairs and also transnationally. The state is also undergoing a major transformationof its character from a competitive actor to a cooperative member of international

institutions and regional integration frameworks. From such a vantage point, states’

freedom of choice has become increasingly constrained by rising economic

Table 2: Predictions – Typology of the major approaches to international security in the post-cold war era

The effects of the end of the cold war/globalization

Level of analysis/is the

state the central actor?

Benign De-stabilizing

third image/state-centric

(the realists)

1

Hegemonic Optimists

2

Balance of Power Pessimists

The benign hegemon/pacifying

effects

● The hegemon as peacemaker

● Stabilizing interventions led by

the hegemon

Inter-State, esp. Great power, conict

● Abuse of power by a revisionist

hegemon due to lack of balance

of power

●

Balancing by rising/revisionist great powers

second- image/

Non-state-centric

4

Liberal/constructivist-Optimists

3

New con ict Pessimists

International Peace&Cooperation

● The liberal/cooperative/

peaceful/status quo state

● Regional integration

● International institutions

● Humanitarian intervention

● INGOs

●

Democratic peace● Economic interdependence

● The information Revolution

● Social networks

Violent non-state actors

● The failed state

● Clash of civilizations

● Terrorism

● Civil wars

● Trans-border violence

● Foreign interventions

●

Asymmetric con

icts● Democratization and War

● Warlords, armed militias

● Transnational Crime




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interdependence, multilateral arrangements and universal norms such as those related

to human rights (Hurrell, 2007, p. 65). Second-image Pessimists argue that states arebecoming materially and ideationally weaker in relation to a variety of non-state and

trans-border actors, especially violent ones that undermine the traditional role of the

state as the legitimate and ample security-generating sociopolitical entity in inter-

national politics (Kaldor, 2006).

Indeed, while both second-image Optimists and Pessimists share the view that

non-state actors are on the rise in relation to the state, they have completely different

views about the character of rising non-state actors. For the Optimists, these are

‘good guys’ that include international institutions, regional integration and interna-

tional non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such as Amnesty International and

Human Rights Watch. For the Pessimists, these are violent groups such as terrorist

networks, armed militias and drug cartels (Shultz and Dew, 2009).

The perspectives also diverge with regard to Waltz’s claim that all states are similar

because they fulll similar functions. While the third-image scholars (the realists)

basically share this point of view, for the second-image Optimists, there is also a

transformation in the functions some states carry out – from the focus on military

security to a greater emphasis on trade (Rosecrance, 1986) and ‘soft power ’ of culture

and diplomacy (Nye, 2004). Thus, in their view there is an increasing differentiation in

the functions the states fulll. According to the second-image Pessimists, there is also a

growing differentiation between well-functioning states versus malfunctioning states

which lack effective institutions even in the key area of internal (but also external)

security (Huntington, 1968; Migdal, 1988; Mann, 1993; Ayoob, 1995).

The perspectives have also competing views about the relevance of differences in

material capabilities for determining key patterns and outcomes in the international

order. Because of the rising importance of common liberal norms and ideas, and the

institutions which promote them, second-image Optimists believe that gaps in

material power should matter much less than before. Second-image Pessimists

highlight the growing constraints on the utility of superior resources, especially

vis-à-vis failed states and extremist groups, which resort to asymmetrical warfare.For both camps of the realists, however, gaps in material capabilities continue to be

the key determining factor in international politics (Waltz, 1979; Wohlforth, 1999;

Mearsheimer, 2001).

The perspectives also differ in their views about the meaning of the end of the Cold

War. For second-image Optimists, the peaceful end serves as an inspiration for the

way intransigent and protracted conicts will end via both the ‘power of example’ of

the ‘big guys on the block ’, as well as the material effects of the end of superpower

support for various antagonists around the world. For second-image Pessimists, the

end of the Cold War opened the oodgates for the rise of new asymmetric conicts,such as those involving Al-Qaeda, culminating with 9/11 and its aftermath or the

revival of dormant conicts, especially in the former Soviet sphere such as in the

Balkans and the Caucuses. For third-image analysts (the realists), the transition from

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a bipolar to a unipolar world generated a lot of compelling consequence (even if

third-image Optimists differ from third-image Pessimists in evaluating the natureof the consequences). The Cold War ended, however, the way all international

conicts have always ended: the stronger party, possessing superior material

capabilities (the United States), won and got the benets from its victory, although

a peaceful one, either due to nuclear deterrence or because of the fact that the weaker

party (the USSR), rather than the hegemon, had declined in its material resources

(Wohlforth, 1994–95). But, at any rate, the end of the Cold War does not constitute

an inspiration for a ‘brave new world’ of peace and cooperation or a complete shift to

new types of asymmetric conicts. Rather, the world continues to function within a

competitive anarchy as has been true over the millennia.

The Four-Fold Classication

Which are the most useful criteria for classifying post-Cold War security approaches?

This article’s novel typology is based on three major factors, two of which are partly

overlapping and thus can be collapsed into a single category, which in turn allows us

to distinguish among four ideal-type approaches (see Table 2): (i) which is the key

level of analysis: domestic or systemic and the partly overlapping question – does thestate continue to be the central actor in world politics? and (ii) whether the post-Cold

War system will be more or less peaceful than the Cold War era? With regard to the

rst issue, the realists’ view is that the international systemic level is the most

important factor and that the state, as a unitary actor, continues to be the key actor in

world politics. In contrast, both the second-image Optimists and the second-image

Pessimists argue that the state level is the most important (especially whether the

state is liberal or failed), while the unitary-actor state is in relative decline as the

central actor in relation to non-state actors. According to the Liberal/Constructivist-

Optimists, the liberal/cooperative/ status quo state allows for the working and themajor inuence of the ‘good’ non-state actors, whereas according to second-image

Pessimists, violent ‘bad’ non-state actors exercise overwhelming inuence in failed

states.

There are also two competing positions with regard to the effects of the second

factor. Third-image Optimists view the effects of the end of the Cold War and the rise

of globalization as benign because of the change of the system from bipolarity

to unipolarity in contrast to third-image Pessimists who, for their part, see more

de-stabilizing effects. Second-image Optimists, on the other hand, highlight the

benign effects of globalization and the post-Cold War dominance of various liberalfactors. Second-image Pessimists believe, however, that the highly globalized

post-Cold War era will be characterized by a variety of new detrimental security

threats and new types of emerging conicts.




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Second-image/non-state-centric/liberal/constructivist-optimists

In this group we can nd scholars af liated with both the liberal and constructivist

schools in IR, working especially on the domestic level of analysis, and sharing a

similar belief in the peaceful and cooperative character of the post-Cold War era.

Though they differ in their theoretical reasoning, liberals and at least most

constructivists believe that the peaceful ending of the Cold War and the demise of

the Soviet Union presented a golden opportunity to spread and embed the same

nonviolent ideas and institutions that brought this era to an end. As Russett (1993,

p. 138) had argued, expressing second-image Optimist logic: ‘the emergence of new

democracies with the end of the Cold War presents an opening for change in the

international system more fundamental than at the end of other big wars … If the

chance for wide democratization can be grasped and consolidated, international

politics might be transformed’.

Liberals, to begin with, see the primarily normative and institutional dimen-

sion of the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) as the underlying mechanism for

the spread of peace and security. Whether it is the norms of democratic regimes

that encourage the peaceful resolution of conicts among democracies, or the

procedural feature of democracy that reduces the prospects of armed conict

among them, the spread of democracies should result in greater stability and

peace (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russet, 1993; Ray, 1995). As the Soviet Union

collapsed and numerous states reclaimed their independence or autonomy and

commanded a process of political democratization and economic liberalization,

especially in Central and Eastern Europe, the DPT was put into practice with

the expectation of preventing a resurgence of regional instability (Ward and

Gleditsch, 1998).

Another liberal strand focuses on the positive and stabilizing nexus between

economic cooperation and peace and stability, as their motto ‘better trade than

invade’ clearly suggests (Rosecrance, 1986). It highlights the stabilizing effects of

economic interdependence and the premise that the benets of trade far exceed theutility of war, making the latter expendable or illogical from a utilitarian perspective.

If wars of the past were fought over control of territory and resources, in modern time

economic development combined with technological progress deem these objectives

to be obsolete. With the further opening of the international system to free trade in the

post-Cold War and the reduction to barriers on foreign direct investment and

monetary transactions to different parts of the international system, the pacifying

effects of economic interdependence should increase dramatically (Oneal and

Russett, 1997).

As for the role of the state, liberals traditionally considered the role of the stateinstrumental to international politics. However, they were receptive to various

erosion processes that the states, as a political entity, had experienced throughout

the years. Indeed, as the Cold War had ended, and the rise of globalization,

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democratization and international governance captured the eyes and minds of many

liberals, so did the state began to lose its preeminence in parts of liberal politicalthought. Consequently, liberals called for a reevaluation of the roles the state may

play in the post-Cold War era. According to Hoffmann (1998), the eroding nature of

the modern nation-state as an international actor results from the outdated distinction

between the domestic and the international and the gradual yet continuous move

toward an intermestic approach (See also Held, 1995; Cha, 2000). Forces from within

and outside wear down the central government ’s autonomy and freedom of action,

and under such circumstances, McGrew (1997, p. 10) maintains, ‘the Westphalian

institution of sovereign statehood no longer appears as robust as it may once have

done’.

Liberal Optimists believe that the end of the Cold War and the intensication of

globalization facilitated the strengthening of cooperative sub-state ‘government

networks’ (Slaughter, 2004). Globalization has also made possible the emergence of

various ‘good’ and benign non-state actors at the expense of the state, includ-

ing INGOs, international institutions and Multi-National Corporations that are

expected to reduce the danger of war and further increase the level of international

transparency and cooperation (Risse-Kappen, 1995; Mathews, 1997; Keck and

Sikkink, 1998).

Despite growing controversy among theorists as to the effect of democratization

on the likelihood of war and instability (Manseld and Snyder, 1995; Miller, 2007),

liberals suggest that the political transformation actually encourages restraint and

nonviolence. As Ward and Gleditsch (1998, p. 60) maintain, ‘it appears that the

broad and overall effect of democratization is to promote peace’. For that reason,

liberals argue in favor of increasing the number of democracies in the world through

a sustained democratization process. Indeed, the prescriptive recipe of liberal

Optimists was actually quickly adopted and applied by the Clinton Administration

throughout the 1990s. As Clinton and his advisors identied the spread of democracy

and economic interdependence as the solutions to the post-Cold War international

predicament, it was only natural that these elements have become the Americanforeign policy catchphrases with ‘enlargement ’ as its interwoven slogan (Lake, 1993;

for a critique see Carothers, 1994).

Constructivists, on the other hand, present a more ideational-based descriptive and

prescriptive argument for post-Cold War security and stability. They believe that

world politics is socially constructed. Hence for Constructivists, the possibility to

achieve and maintain peace is, in fact, a function of ideational changes that the end

of the Cold War created or at least encouraged and their codication hereafter

(Risse-Kappen, 1995, p. 502). Consequently, the ideas and understandings that

created and preserved the Cold War ’s bipolar world order gave way in its aftermathto ideas of progress and universalism to the extent that the global discourse

had changed and improved inter-state interaction correspondingly (Wendt, 1992;

Finnemore, 2003).




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The conclusion is that instability and international rivalry can be prevailed over

and it is the nature of the social interaction that may transform a ‘

zone of confrontation’ such as the post-Soviet sphere into a celebrated ‘zone of peace’ and

tranquility through a process of normative and political socialization that system-

atically and deliberately transformed the behavioral and ideational foundations of

state identity into a benevolent one (Schimmelfenni, 2000). Through the use of

agents for normative change, such as Western and Western European institutions,

including NATO, the European Union (EU) and the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), it was possible for the victors of the Cold War to

‘reprogram ’ the inter-subjective identity of various former Soviet-ruled countries in

order to reduce the risks of inter-state conict but also, and perhaps more

importantly, eliminate intra-state conict (Flynn and Farrell, 1999).

Just as international anarchy or animosity is a social construction that results from

the mutually constitutive nature of international politics, so can the structure and

functions of the state as a social edice may change over time. In other words, states

are a normative-adaptive entity, to use Finnemore’s (1996, p. 128) terminology, that

can be ‘socialized to accept certain preferences and expectation by the international

society in which they and the people who compose them live’. More critically,

ideational theorists such as the postmodernists argue, for example, that the state has

been non-existent as a genuine material or institutional entity ever since the creation

of the Westphalian state system. From their perspective, all states are the fabrication

of inter-subjective notions of legitimacy that are constantly and increasingly

challenged by globalization and other processes that erode the internal and external

validity of this ideational formation and that were especially intensied in the post-

Cold War era (Shapiro and Alker, 1996).

The way to translate constructivist research into a policy-oriented prescriptive

outline is highly risky. Nevertheless, it would principally consist of the different

ways that norms, identities and interest may be proactively constructed in a certain

fashion in order to encourage peace and stability rather than rivalry and competition

that were cultivated during the Cold War (Walt, 1998, p. 41). For example,Frederking (2003, p. 376) argued that the world is experiencing a trend supporting

and encouraging increased collective security which is characterized by an ongoing

attempt to legitimize certain practices and disapprove others. ‘Through this inter-

action’, Frederking maintains, ‘linguistically competent agents challenge and/or

perpetuate the rules constituting world politics’.

More specically, Constructivist-Optimists focus on normative changes in favor of

universal human rights irrespective of ethnicity and nationality, and the emergence of

new ideas on peaceful cooperation and reconciliation starting to dominate interna-

tional politics with the peaceful end of the Cold War (Wendt, 1999; Finnemore,2003). These ideas were expected to spread more quickly and widely than before,

partly due to the information revolution that, in turn, inhibits the ability of states to

manipulate their citizens. The combined effect of all these changes should make

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states more peaceful and status quo-oriented, and discourage violent attempts to

change the current world order, while also leading to a decline in the centrality of thestate as the key actor in world politics. One key manifestation of the spread of

new peaceful ideas and norms is the rise of ‘security communities’, which also

incorporate new regional identities, transcending the nation-state and anticipating the

growing deterritorialization of world politics (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Mansbach,

2002).

Second- image/non-state-centric/new conict pessimists

Despite the numerous differences among the New Conict Pessimists, they share

similar answers to the three key questions addressed here. While focusing on the

nature of the state, these scholars believe the state is in decline due to the various

processes of globalization and the lack of unconditional support by the Cold War

superpowers to their clients. Moreover, in the post-Cold War/globalization era, the

state is replaced by violent, ‘bad’ non-state actors, which benet from states’ decline,

while these actors also contribute to this process by challenging the state and further

weakening it.

The outcome is the spread of ‘failed states’ – lacking the monopoly over the means

of violence within their sovereign territory, while having ineffective, malfunctioning

state institutions (Gros, 1996; Traub, 2011; Patrick, 2011). These conditions

encourage the proliferation of ‘bad’ non-state actors such as extreme ethno-

nationalists, secessionists, terrorists including suicide bombers, religious fundamen-

talists, warlords, armed militias, drug traf ckers, transnational criminal syndicates

and various anti-Western ‘civilization’ groups and organizations whose anti-Western

anarchist agenda is either on an economic basis (anti-globalization) or due to cultural

opposition, especially advocates of radical Islam (Rotberg, 2002; Kaldor, 2006;

Lowenheim, 2007; Snyder, 2011; Shah, et al, 2012).

The volume of work associated with the idea that the end of the Cold War essentially revolutionized the security environment has grown immensely by the

mid-1990s, and especially in face of the different security challenges that emanated

from erosion in traditional great power politics that the Soviet Union and

the United States played since the end of the Second World War. For example,

some observers alleged that the collapse of the Soviet Union could contribute

directly and indirectly to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology

associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Directly since the Soviets

had some restraining inuence over their clients’ behavior and proliferation

policies, and indirectly because Soviet nuclear technology that was shared withthree of the former republics – in addition to Russia – became ‘loose nukes’ –

practically unmonitored and unaccounted for (Nye, 1992, p. 85). Moreover, with

the collapse of Yugoslavia, the ethnic fragmentation in the Balkans and the spread




14/30

of civil wars in other regions, various studies began to question the relevance

of existing paradigms and theories of warfare that apparently did not

t thenew trends in interstate and especially intra-state security (Van Creveld, 1991;

Kaldor, 2006).

Among the very rst, Huntington (1993a , p. 22) advocated the need to talk

of civilizations as the key fault lines in the emerging security environment:

‘The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between

civilizations will be the battle lines of the future’. The implication was not

only a potential clash between states from different civilizations but also

internal conicts in states where people from a number of civilizations live.

A key example is the former Yugoslavia where people from three civilizations

(in Huntingtonian terms) lived together until the end of the Cold War, but

following its termination, some major internal conicts emerged among the

different ethnic groups especially those af liated with the different civilizations:

Orthodox/Eastern Christians (the Serbs) against Muslim (in Bosnia and Kosovo);

and Orthodox against Western Christians – the Croats (Huntington, 1996, for

example, see p. 208).

Other Pessimists like Kaplan (1994, 1997, 2000), characterized the post-Cold

War international security environment as comprising of various ‘fragile’ states

or political units that suffer from a number of overlapping deciencies such as

environmental scarcity, food shortage, cultural and racial clash and ethnic conict

that have a negatively devastating effect on regional peace and stability.

Indeed, Maynes (1993, p. 5) argued that rather than solely focusing on traditional

conceptions of security, ‘animosity among ethnic groups is beginning to rival the

spread of nuclear weapons as the most serious threat to peace that the world faces’.

In the eyes of many Pessimists, the problem of security has moved in the aftermath of

the Cold War from the international, inter-state arena to the domestic arena – internal

to the states – of civil wars and trans-border violence. For them, globalization, rather

than pacifying the world, as expected by the Optimists, in reality promotes instability

(Keating, 2001).Ethnic conict and various armed militias, separatists, religious fundamentalists,

warlords, terrorists and drug traf ckers take refuge in collapsing states – making the

failure of weak states much more likely in the rst place. Rice (2005), in her position

as Secretary of State during the Bush administration, argued similarly:

The phenomenon of weak and failing states is not new, but the danger they

now pose is unparalleled. When people, goods and information traverse the

globe as fast as they do today, transnational threats such as disease or terrorism

can inict damage comparable to the standing armies of nation-states. Absent responsible state authority, threats that would and should be contained within a

country’s borders can now melt into the world and wreak untold havoc. Weak

and failing states serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of

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pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of

the world's most dangerous weapons.Scholars af liated with this group believe that state-building is the best remedy to

engage the major post-Cold War challenges to stability and peace. From their

perspective, threats to peace emanate from the awed and failing structure of states,

especially in the Third World but also in other faltering regions such as the post-

Soviet sphere. These underlying deciencies encourage the growth of extremism,

terrorism, political radicalization and general lawlessness (Helman and Ratner,

1992–1993). Thus, the solution must rst involve the proactive creation and

protection of state agencies that will impose governments’ monopoly over the use

of violence. In turn, this will inhibit the growth of politically and militarily parasiticalgroups and promote order and stability that can strengthen regional peace (Ayoob,

1995; Krasner, 2004; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Haims et al, 2008).

Beyond the key component of the monopoly over the means of violence, state and

institution-building should include constructing legitimate and professional law and

order institutions, effective and unbiased state bureaucracy, independent court

system, professional military and police force and free media. A key point is that

public institutions should be effective, functioning and professional, so that they

would be able to deliver key services to all the citizens of the state, irrespective of

ethnicity, in the area of law and order, infrastructure (water, electricity, transportationand so on), social services and public education, thus preventing the hijacking of

these services by radical religious or nationalist organizations (Paris, 2004;

Fukuyama, 2004). As Cohen (1992, p. 32) commented, failed states ‘need our

understanding, assistance and perhaps direct intervention to achieve the kind of

stability that benets them individually, and the world collectively’.

Third-image/state-centric pessimists (or BOP pessimists)

This group of theorists does not share the view about the decline of the state, whilethey share the pessimistic view about the de-stabilizing effects of the end of the Cold

War, particularly the collapse of the bipolar world. Thus, we call them Third-Image/

State-Centric Pessimists or BOP Pessimists.

The BOP school argues that hegemony is not feasible because of the effective

functioning of the balancing mechanism as in the cases of Philip II, Louis XIV,

Napoleon, German Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler (Posen, 1984, pp. 68–69; Rosecrance,

1999, pp. 56–58; Van Evera, 1999, p . 9 ; Layne, 2006). At the same time,

preservation of the balance among the great powers helps to maintain the peace.4

A major example is the nineteenth century Concert of Europe which both maintainedthe balance among the ve great European powers and succeeded in keeping the

peace starting from the 1815 Congress of Vienna and at least until the eruption of the

Crimean War in 1854 (Miller, 2002).




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In this view, the inherent balancing tendencies in world politics have two major

implications:

rst, states will tend to join the weaker coalition (Waltz, 1979, p. 127;Walt, 1987, pp. 18–19; Layne, 1997, p. 16); second, an imbalance among the major

powers will trigger great efforts by the lesser among them to catch up with the

‘hegemon’ through alliance building and expansion of their own power base. Thus,

the end result of disequilibrium could be more intensive competition and a more

dangerous situation than in a state of parity. In contrast, the achievement of rough

equality would reduce the incentives for a rising power to challenge the status quo.

With the end of the Cold War, scholars who were especially af liated with Waltz’s

structural realism began to argue that the modication of the international system

from a bipolar to a unipolar constellation will result in renewed inter-state chaos and

instability. They believed that the most stable international arrangement is BOP in

which the great powers constantly check and balance each other, a pattern leading to

moderate and cautious behavior, thus reducing the danger of war or the infringement

on the autonomy of small states. In the absence of a balance, the hegemonic

power will expand and abuse its superior power (Claude, 1962, p. 65; Bull, 1977,

pp. 110–111; and Waltz, 1993, p. 189; 2000, p. 13, 27; 2009, pp. 31–32), while the

other powers will try to counterbalance it (Waltz, 1979: l27; Rosecrance, 1987,

pp. 56–58; Walt, 1987, pp. 18–19; Layne, 2006, p. 16) leading to arms races,

tensions, conicts and instability (Layne, 1993).

BOP Pessimists echo the fundamental premise of BOP theory that ‘without a

state of equilibrium among them one element will gain ascendancy over the

others, encroach upon their interest and rights, and may ultimately destroy them ’

(Morgenthau, 1973, p. 169; Waltz, 2000, p. 28). As the international system appeared

to be moving toward a condition of an imbalanced concentration of power after the

collapse of the Soviet Union, in contrast to the stable bipolar structure of the Cold

War, these scholars feared a renewed struggle for power and inuence in Europe and

around the world. Thus, Mearsheimer (1990a) lamented the disappearance of the

simplicity and restraining effects of the relatively stable bipolar world order and

warned that we ‘will we soon miss the Cold War ’.Elsewhere, Mearsheimer (1990b) depicted the future of Europe under renewed multi-

polarity to be rather ominous given that the United States and the Soviet Union were

expected to terminate their military presence in the continent and disengage politically.

Under such conditions, Mearsheimer (1990b, p. 52) predicted that ‘the demise of the Cold

War order is likely to increase the chances that war and major crises will occur in Europe’.

In this regard, what BOP Pessimists fear the most is the emergence of a nationalism-driven,

nuclear capable, revisionist states in either the global or the regional level that would

bluntly offset the already fragile systemic constellation in this period of post-Cold War

reorientation (Van Evera, 1990–1991; Schweller (1994)).BOP Pessimists see the unipolar constellation as something that can easily threaten

the regional and global peace and stability as the hegemonic power will face no

countervailing coalition to prevent it from pursuing expansionist policies. Under the

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control of a hegemonic power, these scholars posit, there can be no assurance for

the security and national interests of the weaker actors because they will alwaysbe at the mercy of the unipole (Layne, 1993). Yet, because of the lack of a

countervailing coalition, the hegemon will expand constantly, leading to an over-

stretch, which eventually might bring about its decline and thus the end of unipolarity

(Kennedy, 1987).

In terms of the state decline variable, BOP Pessimists remain convinced that the state

is still the major political entity in international affairs. They see little if no devaluation

in the role states play and only differentiate between weaker or stronger actors based on

their material capabilities and resources. Scholars holding this position argue that the

state is neither endangered by ethnic fragmentation nor by multi-national corporations

and other globalization-induced supranational economic entities and trends. As Waltz

(1999, p. 696, 697) argued, ‘The twentieth century was the century of the nation-state.

The twenty-rst will be too … The range of governmental functions and the extent of

state control over society and economy has seldom been fuller than it is now … The

challenges vary; states endure. They have proved to be hardy survivors’. With regard to

one of the key threats to the state highlighted by second-image Pessimists, BOP

Pessimists see the threat posed by terrorists as a limited one – terrorism is the weapon

of the weak, which cannot pose a major threat to the national security of strong states or

the stability of the system as a whole (Waltz, 2009, pp. 34–35).

From a prescriptive point of view, BOP Pessimists maintain that while the

hegemon cannot and should not relinquish its predominance unilaterally and

abruptly, it should progressively facilitate the creation of a new BOP arrangement

in the global and regional levels. In other words, the hegemon ought to allow and

encourage the peaceful rise of other security-seeking powers that would assume

responsibility of maintaining the equilibrium alongside the hegemon. The hegemon,

in turn, should pursue an ‘offshore balancing’ grand strategy that would prevent the

resurgence of uncontrolled power politics by pledging to intervene whenever and

wherever the BOP in key regions is threatened. In ‘normal times’, the regional order

is based on mutual balancing among the regional powers and the curtailment of attempts at reaching regional hegemony. According to the ‘offshore balancing’

strategy, the hegemon encourages the mutual balancing among the regional powers

without its direct military involvement in the region. When the regional balance is

threatened as an offensive power seems to emerge, then the hegemon will consider a

direct military intervention in the region – but only if the region is important enough

for the great power from the perspective of the global distribution of capabilities

(Layne, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2001; and Walt, 2011). The hegemon may help to

construct a balancing coalition which opposes revisionist attempts at reaching a

regional hegemony. The key members of the coalition are the major regional statusquo states. But at the same time, the hegemon should abstain from over-meddling in

non-acute aspects of international affairs, thus mitigating the negative effects of its

preeminent position (Layne, 1997; See also Art, 1991, 2003).




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Third-image/state-centric optimists (or hegemonic optimists)

While some offensive realists focus on the contribution of hegemony to the national

security of the hegemon itself (Zakaria, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2001; Layne, 2006),

others emphasize the benecial attributes of hegemony for world order (Organski and

Kugler, 1980; Gilpin, 1981; Modelski, 1987; Wohlforth, 1999). This is partly related

to hegemonic stability theory (HST), the logic and implications of which for world

peace are contradicted by BOP theory associated with defensive realism. Despite

their common roots in classical and structural realism, the basic premises of HST

directly contradict those of the BOP school. The rst assumption of this school is that

order in world politics is usually created and maintained by a single dominant

state (Organski, 1968, p. 354; Modelski, 1978, p. 217; Gilpin, 1981, p. 145). This

assumption rests on the logic of collective goods theory; hegemons are both more

able and willing to provide public goods than other states, which prefer to free ride

rather than share in the costs. Hegemons, for their part, will be more willing to pay

these costs because they benet greatly from a well-ordered and stable political and

economic system (Olson, 1971).

The second assumption is that continued order depends on the persistence of

hegemony since the emergence of powerful challengers undermines the established

and mutually benecial international order (Organski, 1968: Chapter 14, esp. 361,

366–367; Modelski, 1978, p. 217).

Contrary to traditional BOP expectations, Organski’s ‘power transition’ model, for

example, suggests that growing equality in the distribution of capabilities among

the great powers will make the international system, in reality, less rather than more

stable and increase the risks of a major war. The classic historical illustration of

the hegemonic stability argument is the nineteenth century ‘Pax Britannica ’, which

was supposedly guaranteed by Britain’s predominant economic and maritime power.

Rising German capabilities at the end of that century, so the argument goes, posed a

challenge to the British-led international order; this challenge culminated in WWI

and its destructive aftereffects. After 1945, and especially in the post-Cold War era,the hegemonic stability school maintains, it has been US preponderance that has

ensured peace and prosperity through Pax Americana, and the emergence of equally

capable powers could undermine this order (Layne and Schwarz, 1993; Sheetz,

1997/98).

Hegemonic Optimists argue that hegemonic systems have the potential of actually

providing security, stability and economic prosperity rather than inducing political or

economic rivalry and strife (Keohane, 1980). As Lake (1984, p. 147) has put it, the

existence of a hegemonic international system ‘may approximate conditions of low

uncertainty, where nations can be reasonably condent that the leader will maintainstability and a liberal regime’. On the basis of the logic of HST, these writers argue

that a benign hegemonic order is not only possible, but is also very much desirable as

long as the hegemonic power acts responsibly and prudently (Keohane (1984, p. 31).

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A benign hegemon, namely a non-coercive one, may create an orderly and stable

international system. This, however, also depends on the duration of the hegemonicconstellation. In addition to material superiority and the willingness to act as the

ultimate provider of collective goods, the hegemonic power furthermore needs to

generate support and approval for its policies and administrative principles

(Ikenberry, 2001, p. 28; Mastanduno, 2002, pp. 264–265).

From such a vantage point, the post-Cold War international system that is

missing both the bipolar distribution of capabilities and the ideological rivalry

between the United States and the Soviet Union is at present a hegemonic/unipolar

system under US leadership, with a golden opportunity to freely implement what

writers referred to in the past as American providence or exceptionalism (Lipset,

1997; Mead, 2002). This perspective essentially entails a fundamental under-

standing that the international environment is much more receptive to American

policies and ideals as they proved to be better than the alternatives and serve as an

indispensable option for all democracies. The same American model can be

also applicable to other regions and regimes as the cases of Central and Eastern

Europe or the former Soviet Republics suggests. The end of the Cold War has

provided a genuine, and perhaps unprecedented, opportunity to build an inclusive

world order that will be based on American benign hegemony and Washington’s

willingness to extend its inuence in a global scale. As former American President

George H.W. Bush and his former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft

recalled:

We were suddenly in a unique situation, without experience, without

precedent, and standing alone at the height of power. It was, it is, an

unparalleled situation in history, one which presents us with the rarest

opportunity to shape the world and the deepest responsibility to do so wisely

for the benet of not just the United States but all nations. (Bush and Scowcroft

1998, p. 564)

Hegemonic Optimists see no erosion in the role of the state as the major actor ininternational politics. Indeed, prominent hegemonic stability theorists such

as Gilpin (2001, p. 17) insist that despite the rise in number and importance of

INGOs and the overall effects of globalization, ‘in the determination of international

affairs… the state remain[s] the principal actor ’ (see also Gilpin, 1996). Globalization

is a force that, from their point of view, completes the triumph of the West over

the East as this process encompasses everything that the United States stands for:

human and civil rights, free trade, free movement of people, services and nance. It is the

internationalization, liberalization, universalization, westernization and moderni-

zation, and interdependence of world affairs (Scholte, 2000, pp. 15–16; Agnew, 2005:Chapter 6).

From a prescriptive vantage point, hegemonic Optimists believe that only the

United States is able to generate a truly stable and peaceful hegemonic world order




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for the benet of all mankind.5 As Kagan (1998, p. 26) argued:

The truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the US is good for a vast portion of the world’s population. It is certainly a better international

arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many

others around the world far more than it would cost Americans – and far sooner

(see also Kagan, 2012).

(Huntington, 1993b, p. 83) asserted similarly that

A world without US primacy will be a world with more violence and

disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the

United States continues to have more inuence than any other country inshaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the US is central

to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom,

democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.

Thus, American strategists illustrated this line of thinking in the 1992 leaked

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) that called for the preservation of American

global ascendancy and proactive opposition to hegemonic contenders (Tyler,

1992).

But how does this notion of American exceptionalism coincide with other states’

interests and security concerns? According to Ikenberry, there exists a trade-off

between American willingness to behave in compliance with certain broadly dened

rules or norms and US expectation that others will cooperate and concede to its

preeminent global position. The hegemonic order satises both the hegemon and the

weaker actors in the system; the hegemon’s interests in retaining a predominant

position are rather self-evident and revolve around the capacity to shape the world

order and enjoy the spoils of providing collective goods. The weaker actors accept

reassurances for their security and long-term prosperity that is based on the

hegemonic economic and political benevolent character (Ikenberry, 1998/1999,

2001).

Propositions: Under which Conditions Does each Perspective Have aGreater Validity?

To turn the novel typology introduced here into an explanatory framework, we have

to specify the conditions under which one perspective is more valid than the others.

As the focus of this article is on presenting the new typology and illustrate its

usefulness, we can address this issue only briey in the form of propositions andbriey suggestive/illustrative applications which have to be more comprehensively

investigated in a future study. As the collapse of bipolarity has made the international

system essentially unipolar (Wohlforth, 1999; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008),

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it makes sense to focus on the hegemon (or unipole) and its effectiveness (or lack of)

in providing collective goods, including coping with various challenges and threats.Thus, the basic proposition is that the conditions for the dominance of each of the

perspectives refer to the distribution of capabilities in the international system

and the extent of the challenges/threats faced by the hegemon (or unipole) in the

following combinations:

1. The conditions under which the Liberal/Constructivist-Optimists’ expectations

are more likely to take place: Under Hegemony of a liberal great power which

confronts relatively low threats

The Logic of the proposition: Under a powerful liberal hegemon, democratiza-

tion and free trade are going to make a major headway and ‘good’ /benign

non-state actors (international institutions and INGOs) can prosper, while

advancing and proliferating a great variety of the aspects of the liberal agenda

(ideas, norms and institutions). All of these produce a more peaceful and

cooperative world.

Key Application – 1989–1994 period: The Optimists’ expectations seemed

to be met in the rst few years following the end of the Cold War and the

collapse of the Soviet Union. During the rst half of the 1990s we witnessed

two major developments: (i) Growing role and inuence of ‘nice’ non-state

actors: the EU, the UN, numerous INGOs; and also the rising acceptability of

the idea and the practice of humanitarian intervention in the domestic affairs of

sovereign states; and (ii) A more peaceful and stable international system than

the Cold War because of the termination of the protracted rivalry between the

United States and the Soviet Union and related proxy conicts in the Third

World.

2. The conditions under which the Hegemonic Optimists’ expectations are more

likely to take place: Under Hegemony which confronts challenging threats in

unstable regions, but is still able to pacify these regions.

The Logic of the Proposition: The powerful hegemon shows its ability to contributeto public goods by effectively addressing important challenges to international

peace and stability, while non-state actors fail to deliver these goods.

Key application – 1995–2000: The hegemonic predictions seemed to be met most

forcefully during the second half of the 1990s. After a few years of reluctance to

intervene in the bloodshed in the Balkans, and the failures of the EU and the UN to

end the violence there, the United States successfully pacied this extremely

volatile region. The transition to unipolarity also helped to produce some progress

in the Arab–Israeli peace process and curb Chinese aggressive policies in the

Taiwan Straits.3. The conditions under which the New Conict Pessimists’ expectations are more

likely to take place: The Hegemon is confronted by a new type of threats posed by

violent non-state actors and asymmetric warfare in failed states. The unipole has a




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hard time pacifying growing instability in these places.

The Logic of the Proposition: The hegemon is unable to deal effectively and inaffordable costs with these ‘bad’ /violent non-state actors (which might also be

af liated with another ‘civilization’). Thus, this conguration shows the limits to

the capacity of even powerful states to address the new challenges posed by non-

state actors and failed states.

Key application – 2001–2007: The New Conict Pessimists’ predictions appeared

to be coming to fruition following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,

especially considering the growing challenges to the US. Violent non-state

actors, and in this case Al-Qaeda and its af liated terror cells, seemed to be on

the rise, while international peace and stability were threatened more than in

the 1990s. The hegemon did not seem to be able to pacify the failed states in

which it intervened – Afghanistan and Iraq – and even made the situation there

worse despite the considerable blood and treasure it spent over there.

4. The conditions under which the BOP Pessimists’ expectations are more likely to

take place: Major changes in the distribution of capabilities – a relative decline of

the hegemon who is confronting rising powers.

The Logic of the Proposition: Major changes in the distribution of capabilities are

taking place toward a greater balance in the system – a power transition in which

the hegemon is in relative decline, while new powers are rising and presenting

growing challenges to the dominance of the hegemon (though, none of them

seems to become the hegemon in the foreseeable future).

Key application – 2008–2014: The transition of relative power in the last years of

the rst decade of 2000s seems to reinforce the credibility of the BOP perspective

as the world seems to be moving to a relatively greater balance among the great

powers even if the United States is still the dominant power. This is reected by

the growing capabilities of the rising powers: most notably China but also to a

lesser extent – India and Brazil (see Table 3), while the West has suffered the

consequences of the ‘Great Recession’.

Moreover, there is some return of great power conict in the last few years,especially as revisionist powers – China and Russia – pose greater challenges to

the hegemon and its allies. These conicts include Japan and China in the East

China Sea; United States and China as a result of the growing conicts between

China and US allies in East Asia, notably Japan and the Philippines; and the

conict between Russia and the West over Ukraine in 2014.

Conclusions

In face of the deciencies in the existing theoretical literature concerned with the

post-Cold War international security order, we offer a novel typology that

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Table 3: The global change in the Balance of Power

Gross domestic Production

(in current million US$)

GDP growth Rate

(%)

Military b

(in million

1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000

Brazil 461 951 644 701 2 143 035 −4.3 4.3 7.5 52 182 25 1

China 356 936 1 198 474 5 930 529 3.8 8.4 10.4 19 820 37 0France 1 244 163 1 326 334 2 548 315 2.6 3.6 1.7 70 527 61 7

India 326 608 474 691 1 710 917 5.5 3.9 10.5 18 807 27 6

Japan 3 103 698 4 731 198 5 495 379 5.5 2.2 4.6 47 802 60 2

Russian (Soviet Union) 516 814 259 708 1 524 916 −2.9 10 4.5 291 082 32 5

The United Kingdom 1 019 307 1 475 705 2 256 260 −1.55 4.2 1.7 58 828 48 0

The United States 5 750 800 9 898 800 14 419 400 1.8 4.1 2.3 527 174 394 1

Source: World Bank, SIPRI.

2 3

©2 0 1 6 M a c mi l l a nP u b l i s h e r s L t d .1 3 8 4 - 5 7 4 8

I n t e r n a t i on al P ol i t i c s

1 – 3 0


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diverges from the strict traditional division of realist, liberal and constructivism

scholarship. Instead, we advocate a more nuanced understanding of post-Cold War international security that generates four ideal-type categories that encapsulate the

variation in levels of analysis and in the role and centrality of the state, on the one

hand, and the degree of peacefulness and stability of the post-Cold War order, on the

other hand.

Unlike previous attempts to interpret the post-Cold War order according to the

common ‘isms’, this article chooses to differentiate between the various theoretical

explanations based on their relations to three key factors: (i) whether the state is still

the central actor in international politics relative to non-state actors; (ii) whether the

post-Cold War international system is more peaceful than earlier congurations,

especially the bipolar era; (iii) the level of analysis on which the school is operating:

second-image versus third-image analysis. Each of the approaches identied in

this work – ‘BOP Pessimists’, ‘New Conicts Pessimists’, ‘Liberal/Constructivist-

Optimists’ and ‘Hegemonic Optimists’, highlight different and sometimes con-

tradictory aspects of these developments. Some (the BOP Pessimists and the

Hegemonic Optimists) argue that the role of the state remains central to world

politics, whereas others (both the liberal/constructivist-Optimists and the New

Conicts Pessimists) argue that the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of

numerous kinds of non-state actors hinder its conventional functions as the key actor

in international politics.

Some argue that the transformation from a highly discordant bipolar world order to

unipolarity under American hegemony has greatly contributed to the stability of

the international system (the Hegemonic Optimists), while another approach (the

Liberal/Constructivist-Optimists) shares the view of the peacefulness of the post-

Cold War system, but attributes it to the spread of liberal/democratic actors,

institutions, norms and ideas.6 Others (the BOP Pessimists) observe the negative

effects of unipolarity arguing that American hegemony actually encourages the abuse

of power by the hegemon and thus the pursuit of balancing behavior, which in turn

will eventually bring about major conict between the hegemon and the emergingpower(s). Still others (the New Conict Pessimists) highlight the de-stabilizing

effects of the Clash of Civilizations, and the spread of violent non-state actors in

failed states.

We suggest two key conditions for the dominance of each one of these

perspectives in the post-Cold War era: the balance of capabilities and the level of

threat in the international system. The combined effect of variations in these

conditions generates four propositions. Each one of these propositions seems to

capture some of the key developments in one sub-period of the post-Cold War era.

This highlights some of the most interesting changes during the post-Cold War era,especially in the international security eld. A rigorous examination of these

propositions and their empirical application calls for a future study.

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About the Authors

Benjamin Miller is Professor of International Relations at the School of Political

Sciences, The University of Haifa. His work in international relations focuses on

explaining patterns of international conict and cooperation and the sources of war

and peace. His current project focuses on explaining changes in US grand strategy

since World War II. Another major project explains variations in war and peace in the

post-Cold War era. Among his publications – When Opponents Cooperate: Great

Power Con ict and Collaboration in World Politics (Ann Arbor, MI: The University

of Michigan Press, 2nd edn., 2002); and States, Nations and Great Powers: The

Sources of Regional War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press –

Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 2007).

Ilai Z. Saltzman earned his PhD in International Relations from the University of

Haifa. He is currently the Schusterman Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at

Claremont McKenna College. He is the author of Securitizing Balance of Power

Theory: A Polymorphic Reconceptualization (Lexington Books, 2012).

Notes

1 Another important pessimistic prediction was Kaplan (1994). Even though it differed from Huntington’s

view quite a bit, we highlight some basic similarities inside the framework of the same ‘pessimist ’ approach.

2 It is true that constructivism provides a more general paradigm focusing on ideas, norms and identities,

which can also capture illiberal ones, but as a matter of fact most constructivists have advanced ideas and

norms which are close to liberalism (see Moravcsik, 1997, pp. 539–540; for a partial qualication see

Barnett, 1997, pp. 550–551).

3 See Mearsheimer (1994/1995), who was criticized by neoliberal institutionalists (Keohane and Martin,

1995), liberals (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995) and a constructivist (Wendt, 1995).

4 For a critical review of different theoretical approaches to the balance of power, see Little (2007).

On theoretical, regional and policy aspects of the balance of power in the post-Cold War era, see Paul et al.

(2004). For competing theoretical perspectives on the balance of power, see Vasquez and Elman (2003).5 For different perspectives on post-Cold War US hegemony, see Zartman (2009). For a liberal

perspective, see Ikenberry (2011).

6 For different theoretical perspectives on unipolarity, see Ikenberry et al. (2011).

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Miller e Saltzman, Beyond the Three ‘Isms’, Rethinking IR and the Post-cold War Order

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