Military Strategy and Conflict between China and Vietnam during the Third Indochina War (1979):...

7/30/2019 Military Strategy and Conflict between China and Vietnam during the Third Indochina War (1979): Battle for Asian

1/22

MilitaryStrategyandConflictbetweenChinaandVietnam

duringtheThirdIndochinaWar(1979):BattleforAsian

Dominance

AditiGarg

GOVT-451:ConflictinAsia

ProfessorKarber

December7,2012


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2

Introduction

ThroughouttheColdWarera,theEastAsianfrontwasentangledinahotbedofterritorialconfrontationsamongstthegranderideologicalbackdropoftwo

polarizingSuperpowers.Unquestionably,theSino-VietnameseBorderWarof1979

wasfueledbyunderlyingtensionscausedbydifferingideologiesandever-changing

alliances.However,itcanalsobebestunderstoodasalimitedconventionalwarof

territorialdominance.Inordertoassessthemilitarystrategyofbothnations,one

musttakeintoaccountbothexternalinfluencesaswellasdomesticlustsforAsian

dominationandincreasingfearsofterritorialloss.

WhilemuchhasbeenwrittenabouttheThirdIndochinaWar,the

conventionalwisdomhasbeenthat,inreality,borderandterritorialdifferences

wereoflittletonosignificanceinexplainingtheoutbreakofwarfareorthe

intentionsofeithernation.Invariousinstances,ithasevenbeendescribedasa

whollybogusborderwarwheretheentirelandboundaryhadbeendemarcated

andnoterritorialdisputeswereknowntoexist1.Whileexternal,ideological

conflictandhistoricaltensionscertainlydidcontributetobothnationsdecisionto

gotowar,itisclearfromanalysisofChineseandVietnameseobjectivesthat

territorialambitionswereattheheartofthisconflict.

Initiallyconsideredfraternalnationsandbrothersingrowingsocialist

beliefs,ChinaandVietnamgenerallysharedcommonobjectives,derivedfromtheir

1BruceBurton,ContendingExplanationsofthe1979Sino-VietnameseWar, InternationalJournal,

Vol.34,No.4,China:ThirtyYearsOn,(Autumn,1979),706.


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anti-imperialiststrugglestosocialisttransformationsintheirsocieties.2Their

collaborationduringVietnam'sthirty-yearstruggle,firstagainstFrenchcolonialism

andlateragainsttheAmericans,appearedtostrengthentheircommonbond.

However,whenconflictinghegemonicinterestsovershadowedtheircommon

objectives,bothnationstwistedideologytotheiradvantage. Themilitaryconflictthatensuedintheearlymonthsof1979canbeviewed,

firstandforemost,asademonstrationofChinaandVietnamscommondesiretobe

thedominantplayerinIndochinaatthismomentinhistory.Thebriefborderwar,

referredtotodayastheThirdIndochinaWar,wasabloodyepisodethatclaimed

tensofthousandsoflivesinthespanoflessthanamonth.Asanexampleofclassic

limitedwarinaimandscope,timeandspace,andweaponsusagelevels,thedirect

conflictstemmedfromanoutburstofunderlyingtensionoverterritorialownership

ofCambodiaandgrowthofsoviet-VietnameserelationshipinthewakeoftheSino-

sovietsplit.Thispaperwillexplorethemultiplecontributingfactors,rangingfrom

historicalanimositytoexternalinfluencesoftheSuperpowers,toamoretraditional

analysisofterritorialtensions.Theoutcomeofthewarandrelativesuccessofeach

nationwillbeassessedandanalyzedinthecontextofdisputedwinnersandlosers.

Finally,thesignificanceoftheIndochinaWarinthegreater,modernframeworkof

Asianpowerdynamicsandcurrentconflictswillbeaddressed.

HistoricalBackground

2StephenJ.Hood,DragonsEntangled:IndochinaandtheChina-VietnamWar,(NewYork:M.E.Sharpe

Inc.,1992),15.


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Overthelastcentury,VietnamandChinahaveviewedeachotherinmixed

terms.ForVietnam,Chinawasconsideredahelperandallywhenthenationwas

fightingforindependencefromWesternpowers.Chinasinterestindefending

Vietnam,inturn,stemmedfromitsdesiretoestablishabufferagainstnon-Asian

nations.3WhiletheSino-Vietnameseallianceatthistimewasgenerally

advantageousforbothnations,manyVietnamesenationalistsconsideredChinato

bedangerouslyoverinvolvedinthedirectionandscope 4ofVietnamsfightfor

independenceagainsttheWest.Forexample,withregardtoChinesemilitary

interventionagainstFrenchimperialistsinVietnam,HoChiMinharguedthatitwas

bettertosniffFrenchdungforawhilethantoeatChineseallourlives5.Thus,

underlyingtheoutwardappearanceofcamaraderielayasignificanttensionthat

wouldeventuallymanifestitselfintheformofwar.

Additionally,eachnationsdesiretobeadominantforceinIndochinamade

HanoiandBeijingdeeplysuspiciousofeachothersroleintheaffairsofother

Indochinesestates,specificallyCambodia.Historically,Vietnamhadinvaded

Cambodianumeroustimes,andheldontolandalongtheborderthatCambodians

consideredproperlytheirs.Hanoiscontinuedaggressiongaverisetothepopularity

oftheKhmerRouge,drivingitsleaderPolPottoadoptananti-Vietnamese

sentimentandresultingpro-Chinaallegiance.Accordingly,theChineseappeasedPol

PotandtheextremistKhmerRouge,debatablyoutoftheirincreasinglyanti-Soviet

3EdwardC.O'Dowd,ChineseMilitaryStrategyintheThirdIndochinaWar:TheLastMaoistWar,

(London:Routledge,2007),26.4Hood,156.

5NicholasKhoo,CollateralDamage:Sino-sovietRivalryandtheTerminationoftheSino-Vietnamese

Alliance,(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2011)


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sentimentandconfirmeddislikeforVietnameseterritorialexpansion.Furthermore,

asconflictbetweenCambodiaandVietnamworeon,Chinadirectlyattemptedto

placeblamefortheborderconflictinHanoisdirectionbycommentingtothepress

abouttheKhmerRougeseffortsatself-defenseinthemidstofVietnamese

aggression.

Territorialandborderissuesbetweenthetwonationsisreachedapeakin

January1974,whenChineseforcesseizedcontroloftheParacelIslandsintheSouth

ChinaSea.TheVietnameserespondedbytakingpossessionoftheSpratlyIslands,

whoseownershipwasalsodisputed,inApril1975.Thetwonationsongoing

conflictovertheownershipoftheislandscontributedtothemountingseriesof

incidentsalongthejointlandborder.Thetwogroupsofislandspossessedstrategic

importanceforbothcountriesintermsoftraderoutesandnaturalresources.

Dominanceovertheseislandswouldcertainlycontributetoeachnations

hegemonicambitionsinSoutheastAsia.Insofarasthestrategicandeconomic

Figure1:MapoftheParacelIslandsin1974delineatedasVietnameseandChineseTerritory


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thistime,over160,000peopleattemptedtofleeintoChina.8Thecauseofthismass

exoduswashighlycontestedbetweenbothnations,withtheChineseallegingthat

theVietnamesepersecutedandexpelledtheoverseasChinese,andtheVietnamese

chargingtheChinesewithspreadingalarmistrumorsthattheChinesecommunity

wouldbecometargetsfortheVietnamesemilitaryamidtensionswithPolPots

regime.RelationssufferedfurtherwhentheChineseannouncedtheywouldendaid

toVietnamduetothethousandsofChineserefugeeswhomhadbeenexpelled

fromHanoi.Beijingrevealedthatitwasrecallingallaidandtechnicalpersonnel

becauseofVietnamsapparentanti-ChineseactivitiesandostracismofChinese

residents9.TheethnictensionanddisputeoverthedisplacedChinesepopulationin

Vietnam,aswellastheofficialendtoaidduetosupposedVietnameseaggression

certainlyfueledthefirethatwouldsoonbreakintowar.

Theimmediateactofaggressionthatessentiallytriggeredtheongoing

conflictbetweenChinaandVietnamoccurredonChristmasDayof1978,when

VietnaminvadedCambodia(Kampuchea).Despitethehistoryofterritorialconflict

betweenthetwonations,Vietnamsintentwastostrokeaquickandfatalblow10

toPolPotandtheKhmerRougeleadership,takingcontrolofthecountrys

governmentswiftlyandsignificantly.TheVietnamesemilitarydeclaredthe

establishmentofanewPeoplesRepublicofKampucheaonJanuary7,1979,

essentiallyinstallingapuppetgovernment.Hanoiceasedthisopportunityto

8Burton,709.9Ibid,710.10ZhangXiaoming,Chinas1979WarwithVietnam:AReassessment, TheChinaQuarterly,vol.184,

(2005),853.


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establishitsdominanceinIndochina,butwasincreasinglydeterredbyunexpected

ChinesesupportforPolPotandthecounterattacksoftheKhmerRouge.

JustasimportantinthebuilduptowardsthebreakoutofwarwasChinas

obsessiveconcernwiththetighteningmilitaryandpoliticalalliancebetweenSoviet

globalhegemonismandVietnameseregionalhegemonism11.Someauthorsargue

thatthispreoccupationwasprobablythemostimportantfactorindeterminingthe

ChineseattackonVietnam.HanoiscaptureofKampucheaviewedinconjunction

withtherecentsigningofthefriendshiptreatywiththeSovietssentanunshakeable

messagethatVietnamwasbecominganexpansionist,militariststatebecoming

morealignedwiththemoredangerousSuperpower12.TheVietnameseinvasionof

KampucheaandincreasingalignmentwiththeSovietslefttheChinesewithacrisis

ofcredibility,wherebyfailingtoopposeVietnameseaggressionwouldbeseenby

theSovietUnionasaninvitationtomoveaggressivelyintoChina13.Thefearof

fightingatwo-frontwar,orbecomingvulnerabletoSovietdomination,wasenough

toinvokeamilitaryresponsefromtheChineseintheformoflimitedwar.

MilitaryObjectives

TheChineseapproachedtheensuingmilitaryconflictwithVietnamasa

punitiveaction,withthegeneralpurposebeingtosweepawaytheobstacleof

VietnameseaggressioninCambodiabymilitarymeans.14DengandthePLAmilitary

11Ibid711.12Xiaoming,855.13Burton,711.14MinChen,TheStrategicTriangleandRegionalConflicts:LessonsfromtheIndochinaWars .Boulder:

LynneRiennerPublishers,1992),2.


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leadersemployedateachalessonmodelofswiftandsuddeninvasion,inorderto

inflictahumiliatinglocaldefeatandthenstageamagnanimousunilateral

withdrawalthatwasdesignedtounderlinetheimpotenceofthevictimnation15.The

Chineseusedthispunitivemodelbeforeinotherscenarios,suchastheSino-Indian

WarandinKorea,anddecidedtoreplicatethesamestrategyagainstVietnam.

KissingerexplainedtheChinesetraditionofpunitivewarfarebynotinghowChinese

strategistsweremorelikelytoincreasecommitmenttosubstitutecourageand

psychologicalpressureagainstthematerialadvantageoftheadversarythey

believeindeterrenceintheformofpreemption 16.Thus,muchoftheChinese

strategyinvolveddisarmingtheenemysconfidenceandallowingChinatoreclaima

psychologicalupperhand.

InjustifyingaChineseinvasioninVietnam,Dengreiteratedtheleaderships

positionthatVietnamhadtobepunishedforitsinvasioninKampuchea,pledging:

Toupholdthelong-termprospectsofinternationalpeaceandstability...[the

Chinesepeople]willfirmlyfulfillourinternationalistduties,andwillnothesitateto

evenbearthenecessarysacrifices17.DengsanalysisoftheChinesestrategic

situationincludedanotificationtotheU.S.thatChinaintendedtogotowarwith

VietnambecauseithadconcludedthatVietnamwouldnotstopattheinvasionof

Cambodia.DengwarnedagainstthegrowthofHanoislustforanIndochinese

15HenryKissinger,TouchingtheTigersButtocks:TheThirdVietnamWar, OnChina,(NewYork:

PenguinBooks,2011),14.16Ibid,14.

17Ibid,15.


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Federation,anideathatHoChiMinhhimselfcherished18.AccordingtoDeng,the

conqueringofthreestateswasonlythefirststep,withThailandasthenextprospect

tobeincluded.Fromthisvantagepoint,Chinahadanobligationtoact,andnotawait

developmentsonVietnamspart,foroncetheyhadoccurred,itwouldbetoolate.

Furthermore,theChineseclearlyestablishedthattheydidnottrulywantto

gainanyVietnameseterritory,andthattheywouldwithdrawtheirforces

unilaterallyassoonastheyhadreachedtheirobjectivesofdefinitelypunishing

Vietnam19.However,Dengwaslessthanclearaboutexplicitlystatingwhatthose

objectiveswereorhowtheycouldbemeasuredandachieved.Forexample,a

punishmentcouldrangefromwipingoutafewsignificantdivisionsofVietnamese

forcesandmilitarybases,tooccupyingtheborderlandinitsentirety20.Itisclear

fromthelackofexplicitlystatedobjectivesonthepartofChineseleadershipthat

theywereunsureoftheextentoftheirmilitarycapabilities,andwerethusreluctant

tomakedefinitivestatementswhichwouldmarktheirattackasafailureifthey

werenotmet.IfDengsobjectivewasnottocaptureVietnameseterritory,thenit

wasalmostsurelytopreserveastrategicequilibriumofinfluenceinAsia.Further,

Chinaundertookthecampaignwiththemoralsupport,diplomaticbacking,and

intelligencecooperationoftheUnitedStates,thesameimperialistpowerthat

BeijinghadhelpedejectfromIndochinafiveyearsearlier 21.

18Ibid,15.19M.Chen,7.20Ibid,8.21Kissinger,16.


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TheVietnameseobjectivesformilitaryactionweredirectlyinfluencedby

HanoisdecisiontoinvadetheKampuchearegionandoverthrowthePolPotregime.

VietnamsinterestinKampucheastemmedfromthebeliefthatitwasthekeyto

maintainingabalanceofpowerandsphereofinfluenceinIndochina.Victoryover

CambodiawouldmaximizeVietnamsindependencefromWesternpowersandfrom

China,andwouldgreatlyincreaseVietnamsinfluenceintheentireSoutheastAsia

region22.AsHoodargues,thedecisiontoconductapreemptiveoffensivetodeal

withPolPotinCambodiacouldbeinterpretedasacoupdemain23tosecureaone-

frontoperation.

Likewise,fromtheVietnameseperspective,Chineseantagonizingoverthe

apparentmistreatmentoftheHoa24inSouthVietnamandtheresultingrecallingof

allaidandassistancewasactuallydoneforthepurposeofdestabilizationofHanoi.

Chinesefull-fledgedforthePolPotregimefurtherencouragedVietnamesefearsofa

two-frontwarsituationwherebytheChinesewouldaimtokeepVietnammilitarily

preoccupiedandboxedinwiththehelpofitsneighbors25.

ODowdoffersanexplanationforhowVietnamesemilitaryobjectivesand

ensuinginvasionofKampucheacanbeinterpretedasjustwar,asanefforttofree

theCambodianpeoplesfromoneoftheworsttyranniesinrecenthistory26.

However,inlightofotherscholarshipandHoChiMinhsdesireforanIndochina

22Hood,45.23Hood,46.ACoupdemainisdefinedasanoffensiveoperationthatcapitalizesonsurpriseand

simultaneousexecutionofsupportingoperationstoachievesuccessinoneswiftstroke. 24TheHoaaretheethnicChinesepopulationinVietnam.25O'Dowd,45.

26Ibid,55.


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Federation,aswellasthegrowingSoviet-Vietnamesealliance,itismorelikelytobe

consideredanaggressive,conventionaloffensiveattack,despiteanyhumanitarian

consequences.InresponsetotheinitialChineseinvasion,Vietnamengagedina

WarAgainstChineseExpansionism,essentiallyoutliningtheirmainobjectivetobe

aholdadefensivefrontagainstunwarrantedChineseaggression.

CourseofWar

InitialPeriod:February17-26,1979

OnFebruary17,1979,Chinamountedamultiprongedinvasionofnorthern

VietnamfromsouthernChinasGuangxiandYunnanprovinces.Thiswasfifteen

weeksafterthesigningoftheVietnameseSovietTreatyofCooperationand

FriendshipandjustsixweeksaftertheVietnameseinvasionofCambodia.The

Chinesestrategywastoengageinapeopleswar,utilizingMaosstrategyofthe

useofmanpoweroverweaponry.Theprincipleofpeopleswar,proposedbyMao

andusedthroughoutseveralChineseconflictsincludingthecivilwar,impliedthat

gainswerenotachievedbyweaponry,butbyoverwhelmingmanpower27.Thesize

oftheChineseforcereflectedtheimportanceChinaattachedtotheoperation.The

officialChinesepressaccountscalledtheinitialinvasiontheSelf-Defensive

CounterattackAgainstVietnamortheCounterattackinSelf-DefenseontheSino-

VietnameseBorder.ItrepresentedtheChineseversionofdeterrence,aninvasion

advertisedinadvancetoforestallthenextVietnamesemove.

27M.Chen,5.


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Table1:RelativeManpowerattheOnsetofWar(February,1979) 28

Intermsofmanpower,theVietnamesePeoplesArmyattheonsetofwarhad

asignificantlysmallerforce.Whenwarbrokeout,therewereonlyfiveregular

divisionsandfourbrigadessurroundingtheHanoiarea.However,therewere

initiallysixdivisionsalongtheborderareawheretheentiretyofthewarwasfought.

IncomparisonthefiguresinTable1showthat,priortothewar,theChineseforces

ontheborderareawerequantitativelysuperiortotheirVietnamesecounterparts

by3to129.Manpowerwasupheldasthedecisivefactorfordeterminingthe

capabilitiesofbothforces.

Duringthefirstoffensive,theChineseunleashedablitzkriegof100,000men,

andlaunchedpowerfulartilleryshellings,followedbytankunitesandwavesof

troops30.ByFebruary20th,theChinesehadadvancedtenmilesfromtheborderand

intoVietnameseterritory.Atthatpoint,theChinesereleasedreportsthatestimated

thattherewere10,000Vietnamesekilledandonly5,000killedontheChineseside.

TheVietnamesegavedifferentaccount,claimingthattheycausedheavycasualties

tothePLAarmy.Atthispoint,accountsofthefightingbecamecontradictory,yetit

28M.Chen,10-11.29M.Chen,14.30Ibid,15.

Army Navy AirForce

VietnamesePeoples

Army(VPA)

600,000 150,000 300

PeoplesLiberation

Army(PLA)

3.6million 280,000-300,000 400,000


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wasclearthatthesheerChinesemanpowerwasenoughtodeteraVietnamese

defense.

Figure2:MapofChineseBorderInvasion 31

Surprisingly,theSovietreactiontoChinasinitialinvasionofVietnamwas

subdued.ItwasmadeclearduringthisinitialperiodofwarthattheSovietresponse

wouldbeprimarilysupportiveinnature.MoscowcontinuedtowarntheChinese

againstfurtheradvancementintoVietnam,butmaintainedthattheVietnamese

peoplewerecapableofdefendingthemselves.Asaresult,theactualfightingwas

totallylefttotheVietnamesesonottobringSoviettroopsintodirectconflictwith

31http://cdn.dipity.com/uploads/events/6c8e1912751546c9fe60ee0be82218c0_1M.png


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theChinese32.Nevertheless,theVietnameseborderdefensewasamazinglystrong.

TheVietnamesePeoplesArmyemployedvariousformsofcreativewarfaresuchas

tunnelwarfare,junglewarfare,surpriseattacks,boobytraps,andlandmines,laser

weapons,andbamboostakes,whichweresuccessfulattamingforcefulactsof

Chineseaggression33.Havingcapturedseveralbordercitiesjusttwoweeksintothe

bloodywar,itwasclearthattheChinesewouldnotadvanceintoHanoi,andthatthe

SovietswouldnotintervenemilitarilyintheSino-Vietnameseconflict.

FinalPeriod:February27-March16,1979

Afterannouncingalimitedscopeofwaranddeclaringanintentionnotto

invadeHanoi,theChineseforcesfocusedoncapturingmorebordercitiesinthefinal

periodofwarfare.Inadditiontocapturingandlayingwastetothecapitalsofthree

Vietnameseborderprovinces,thePLAcapturedthehilltopcityofLangSong,and

blewupthebridgesouthofthecity.ImmediatelyafterthecaptureofLangSong,the

ChineseannouncedtheircompletewithdrawalfromVietnamandclaimed,Wedo

notwantasingleinchofVietnameseterritory,butneitherwillwetoleration

incursionsintoChineseterritory34.Ironically,thisoccurredonthesamedaythat

Vietnamcalledforanationwidegeneralmobilizationforwar35.Chinaslimited

punitivestrikelastedatotaloftwenty-ninedays,includingthewithdrawalperiod

fromMarch5-17th.

32HarlanW.Jencks,China's"Punitive"WaronVietnam:AMilitaryAssessment, AsianSurvey,Vol.

19,No.8,UniversityofCaliforniaPress(Aug.,1979),805.33M.Chen,15.34Hood,78.35Ibid,17.


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Assessment

Table2:EstimatedWarLosses:ManpowerandWeaponry 36

Chinese Vietnamese

Killed 26,000 30,000

Wounded 37,000 32,000

POWs 260 1,638

Tanks,armoredvehicles 420 185

Heavymortars/guns 66 200

Missilestations 0 6

Oneofthemostinterestingaspectsofthisbriefbutbloodymilitaryconflict

wasthefactthatbothChinaandVietnamclaimedavictoryoveroneanother.Upon

furtheranalysisoftheoutcomesofthewar,itisclearthatneithercountrytruly

achievedallofitsobjectivesinordertodeclareadecisivevictory37.Bothsideswere

willingtoendhostilitiesandwererelievedthatthewarwaswindingdown.The

priceofwarhadbeenhigherthanexpectedfortheChinese,astheVietnamesewere

abletomustermoreresistancethanBeijinghadoriginallyexpected.

AsfarasChinaisconcerned,itappearsthatoneofthebiggestweaknesses

wasthebackwardweaponryandlogisticsofthePLAforces38.Manymilitary

scholarshavenotedthatthePLAscommandsystem,operationaltactics,logistics,

and,aboveall,weaponrywerenotinmodernconditionstheywerebehindthe

times39

.FailingtomodernizetheirarmyandweaponryintimecosttheChinese

36M.Chen,25.

37KingC.Chen,China'sWarwithVietnam,1979Issues,Decisions,andImplication,(Stanford,Calif.:

HooverInstitution,StanfordUniversity,California,1987),104.38M.Chen,27.39Burton,8.


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morecasualtiesthanexpected,almostonparwithVietnameseonesasshownin

Table2.TheyalsogravelyunderestimatedVietnameseforcesandtechnology.Maos

peopleswardoctrinealsoprovedtobeanunsuccessfulstrategyinthefaceofthe

guerillaandmodernwarfarefoughtbytheVietnameseArmy.ThePLAfailedto

destroysomeofVietnamsstrongestdivisionsanddidnotachievetheobjectiveof

pacifyingVietnameseaggressioninKampucheaorforcingthewithdrawaloftheir

forcesfromtheregion.However,theChinesedidsucceedinthepunitiveaspectof

warfarebyfollowingthroughonascorchedearthpolicy,leavingextensivedamage

totheVietnamesecountryside,infrastructure,andeconomy.Accordingly,itis

estimatedthatabouteightypercentoftheinfrastructureinareaswheretheChinese

invadedwasdestroyed40,andcitieswerereducedtorubbleandmassgraveswere

everywhere41.

FortheVietnamese,thelimitedassistancefromtheSovietUnion,andits

lukewarmresponsetoChineseinvasion,hadagreatimpactontheircapabilities

andresources.TheSovietsdidendupsendinganavaltaskforcetotheSouthChina

Sea,undertakingalimitedarmsairlifttoHanoi,andsteppingupairpatrolsalong

theSino-Sovietborder.However,theseactionswereconstrainedbyPLAblockades

andwerethusnotdecisiveinassistingtheVPA.Furthermore,theVietnamesewere

abletoclaimavictorybecauseChinafailedtotakeHanoi,andbarelypenetratedthe

borderbeforeultimatelywithdrawingalltroops.Despitecausingsignificant

infrastructuraldamage,Hanoiwasleftintact.Mostsignificantly,theChinesedidnot

40Burton,718.41NguyenHung,TheSino-VietnameseConflict:PowerPlayamongCommunistNeighbors, Asian

Survey,Vol.19,No.11,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,(Nov.,1979),1045.


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managetoforceVietnameseforcesoutofKampuchea,andthusdidnotwinthe

campaign,butratherwithdrew.WhilesomebelievedthataChineseinvasionwould

explodethemythofVietnamesemilitarypower,themilitaryperformanceproved

astonishinglyimpressive,especiallybyborderandmilitiaunits42.Nevertheless,the

Vietnamesepopulationsufferedsignificantcausalitiesandfacedeconomic

consequencesofthePLAsscorchedearthstrategy.

WhenassessingtheThirdIndochinaWarinthecontextofEastAsian

relationsinthepost-ColdWar,theconventionalassessmentfromhistoriansisthat

thewarwasacostlyChinesefailure43.Intheend,Chinawasnotabletorescuethe

KhmerRougeorforceHanoitowithdrawitstroopsfromCambodiaforanother

decade.ItispossiblethatDengframedChinesewarobjectivesinmuchmorelimited

termsandwithdrewPLAforcespromptlyonceherealizedthisthelimitsofChinese

capabilities.AsaresultofthefailureonChinasparttodissuadeVietnamese

involvement,VietnamesetroopsremainedinCambodiauntilthefalloftheSoviet

Unionin1989.

Kissingersassessment,essentiallyrootedintheU.S.perspectiveontheSino-

Vietnameseconflict,differedfromotherhistoriansinthathebelievedthatthe

Chinesecampaignreflectedaseriouslong-termstrategicanalysis44ofreversingan

unacceptablemomentumofSovietstrategy.ItisundeniablethattheSino-

VietnameseconflictresultedintheclosestcollaborationbetweenChinaandthe

42HarlanW.Jencks,China's"Punitive"WaronVietnam:AMilitaryAssessment, AsianSurvey,Vol.

19,No.8,UniversityofCaliforniaPress(Aug.,1979),81443Ibid,816.44Kissinger,17.


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UnitedStatesfortheperiodoftheColdWar,andaperiodofnormalization.

Kissingerthusarguesthat,thoughprovidingbreathingspacefortheremnantsofthe

KhmerRougecanhardlybecountedasamoralvictory,Chinaachieveditslarger

geopoliticalaimsvis--vistheSovietUnionandVietnambothofwhosemilitaries

werebettertrainedandequippedthanChinas 45.Whilehisanalysisalignswith

ChinasultimatesuccessinestablishingitsdominanceinSoutheastAsia,itperhaps

givestoomuchagencytoDengsmilitarystrategytowardsVietnamandtheSoviet

Union.Nevertheless,SingaporesPrimeMinisterLeeKuanYewsummedupthe

ultimateresultofthewar:TheWesternpresswroteofftheChinesepunitiveaction

asafailure.IbelieveitchangedthehistoryofEastAsia.

Conclusion

DespitethewithdrawalofChineseforcesfromVietnamandtheofficialendto

theThirdIndochinaWarinMarch1979,borderskirmishesbetweenthetwonations

continuedthroughoutthe1980s.Armedconflictonlycametoanofficialendin1989

aftertheVietnamesefullywithdrewfromCambodia.TheVietnameseandChinese

finallysignedaborderpactin1999,afteryearsofnegotiations46.Despitetheofficial

demarcationoftheborderbeingofficiallycomplete,controlovertheParaceland

Spratlyislandsremainsapointofcontentionbetweenthetwonations.

Inlightoftheaforementionedanalysisofthehistoricalcontextandmilitary

objectivesofbothnations,itisclearthattheSino-VietnameseWarof1979was

45Ibid,18.46Xiaoming,870.


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muchmorethanananachronismfromabygoneera47.Chinasinitialinvasionand

themilitarycampaignthatfollowedwereresponsestogrowingunderlyingtensions

betweentwonationslustingfordominanceovertheIndochinaregion.The

ideologicalaspectsofthewar,suchassocialistcamaraderiefirstbetweenVietnam

andChina,thenVietnamandtheSovietUnion,provednottobeasimportantas

imminentterritorialthreatsofexpansionismbybothparties.Thus,itisclearthat

territoryandboundarieswereattheheartofthisconflict,despiteauthorswho

suggestitshouldnotbeconsideredaborderwar.WhiletheSino-VietnameseWar

canbeanalyzedasabaroqueparodyofaColdWarconflict,48itssignificanceis

clearlyrelevanttodayasChinaandVietnamcontinuetoassociateterritorialcontrol

intheEastAsiaregionwithhegemonicpower.

47Hood,95.48AnneGilks.TheBreakdownoftheSino-VietnameseAlliance,1970-1979 .(Berkeley:

InstituteofEastAsianStudies,UniversityofCalifornia,CenterforChineseStudies,1992),226.


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