Military Review December 1968

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Military ReviewProfessional Journal of the US Army

The Unit ed Stat es and Europe . . . . . . Raymond 1. Barrett 3$.

An M R Spec ia l Feat ureand LTG Sai yud Kerdpho l , Royal Thai Army

Futureof Armor . . . . . . MG Walt er M . Hutt on, Br i t ish Army 15The Mi l i taryHandgun . . . . . . . LTC Morr i s 1. Herbert, USA 23Beauf re and Total St rat egy . . . . . COL Robert G. Krebs, USA 34Cuerri l laWarfare in Central Europe . . . . . . Adolf Reini ck e 41

Civ icAct ion in Thai land . . . . . . . Frankl in Mark Osanka 46

Searc hf or Professional Excel len ce . . . . . LTG Vinh Lot , ARVN 51Highway19: Then and Now . . . . . . . . . , . l acWeHer 56Mi l i t arySi t uat ion in South Asia . . . . . . . . Ashok Kapur 65Nucl earPoli cy and Mi l i t ary St rat egy . . LTC Loui s S, Holl ier, USM C 73The Del icateBalance . . . . . . . . . Eughe Hint erhoff [ 78Tact i calCommuni cat i ons . . . . . COL Emmet t R. Arnold, USA BbTransport at i on sRole in M oder n War . . LTG I. Kovalev, Sovi et Army 93M i l i t aryNot es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99M i l i t aryBooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessari ly those of the: USArmyor the Command and General Staff Col lega.L


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Editor in ChiefCOL DonaldJ. Delaney

Associate EditorCOL John B. . 6. Trussell , Jr.Army War College

Assistant EditorLTC A. Leroy Covey

Features EditorLTC Robert G. Main

Production EditorHelen M. Hall

Spanish-American EditorMAJ Juan Horta.Merly

Brazilian EditorsLTC Samuel T. T. Pri moLTC Romero Lepesqueur

Publication SupervisorAmos W. Gallaway

Art and DesignCharles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-Pubtished monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of this publication hssbeen approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 25 July 1968.Second.class postage paid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rates: $4.oo (US currency)ayear in the United States, United States military post oFRces,and those countries which are membersofthe PamAmerican Postal Un~on fincludhrg Spain); $5.00 a year in all other countries single copy price50 cents. Address subsr F1.hon mail to the Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.


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EuropeRaymond

The views expressed in this arti-cle a re the aczthore and do not nec-essarily reflect those of the Depart-ment of Defense or ite agencfee.Editor.

uNITED States policy in E uropeie a vict im of its own success.This pa ra dox proba bly a ccount s formuch of th e current perplexity a boutrela tions betw een tbe U nited St a tesa nd Eur ope. Our success, as with a nypolicy, brings us both risks a nd prospects for grea ter a chievement .

It is importa nt to acknowledgeclea rly w here we now sta nd a nd toidentify a ccura te] y the da ngers a ndDecember968

J. Barfett

possibilities th a t now confr ont ue. Theconfronta tion w ith th e Soviet U nionha s not been elimina ted, but its qha ra cter ha s cha nged.

The funda ment a l interest of th pU nited St a tes in Eur ope h a s been theprotection of her ow n na tional eecurit y. The experien ce of tw o WorldWa rs h ad ta ught the Uni ted Sta testha t her security would be in gra vejeopa rd y if a hostile power cont rolledth e oth er s ide of th e Atla nt ic Ocean .The Unit ed St a tes th us sought to foresta ll th a t possibility by linking th e security of Western E urope directly totha t of the United St at es herself .La rgely prostr a ted by World Wa r II

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EUROPE ,a nd directly th reat ened by ma ssive Soviet milita ry forces a nd Communistsubversion, th e count ries of WesternEurope found themselves vitally dependent on the ~ ted St a tes for th eirsecurity. IDependence Increked

The funda ment a l proposition th a tthe security of the U nited S ta tes a ndtha t of Western E urope a re inextr ica bly linked w a s forma lly recognizedin th e Nort h Atla nt ic Treat y. Milita rydevelopments over th e past tw o decades ha ve tended t o strengthen ra therth a n erode th is proposition. The va stcost an d complexity of modern Milita ry Esta blishments have put them beyond th e means of the Eur opea n countries. In the last an a lysis, th erefore,th e dependence of th eir securit y onthe sophistica ted a nd var ied defenseca pabilit ies of the U nited St a tes ha sgrown.

While the U nited Sta tes ca me underthe immedia te da nger of at ta ck in1962, the thr eat w ould be fa r great er,a nd proba bly intolera ble, if th e east ern shores of th e Atla nt ;c w ere inunfriendly ha nds. In a cknowledgingth ese fundam enta l tr uths, bow ever, w eshould not let our vision of reality

Raymond J. Banett is Deputy Chiefof the Program Staff, Ofice of Inter-national Conferences, Department ofState. A US Foreign Service oficerformerly assigned to the AmericanEmbassy in Madrid, Spain, he Ilasserved at American Embassies in Mez-ico City, Managua, Dzblin, and Cairo.He has also served with the Otlice ofEast and Southern African Affairs andwas US Secretary of the PermanentJoint Board on DefenseUnitedStates and Canada, in Washington,D. C. His article, US-Canada Def ensePrograms, smeared


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w ords, th e ty pe of concentra tion ofeffort needed to lau nch a Soviet effortof simila r str ength a ga inst NATO t erritory would provide wa rning for appropriate NATO counterdeployment.The st a t ioning of S oviet t roops onthe Czech-G erma n border is not a netga in for the Soviets in th e E uropea n

P a tr ol boa ts of th e Federa l Republic of G erma ny Na vy h elp gua rd NATOs nort herntlank !

pow er ba lan ce. They ha ve lost in th eprocess th e considera ble va lue of th eCz ech Arm y w hich ha d been reputedto be the best E a st Eu ropean mili ta ryforce. They have also lost the Romanian a rmed forces a nd wh a tevercha nces th ere w ere of Yugoslav support.

The S oviets ca n ha rdly be free fromsuspicions regar ding th e loya lties ofP ol ish,, Hunga rian, a nd Ea st G erma nt roops either . The Soviet un its inDecember1968

... EUROPECz&hoslova kia w ill be sta tioned a mongunfriendly hosts with a tt endant logist ics a nd mora le problems. The inva sionof Czechoslova kia wa s a sobering remiider of Soviet st rength a nd bruta ldetermina tion, but the Soviets ma ywell have a t iger by the ta il.

Mean w hile, cha nge ha s gone on

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Ia pace in the rela tionships betw e~ n theU nited S ta tes a nd Western Eu rope,within Western Europe, within theCommun ist bloc, a nd betw een th eU nited S ta tes a nd the Soviet U nion.

The U nited St a tes a nd Western E urope in the postw a r years ha ve grow ncloser together in ma ny w a ys. Thevolume of tr a de a nd investm ent betw eeethe tw o a reas ha s grown enormously. Tourist t ra ffic ha s increa sed;tra nsporta tion a nd communicat ion a d

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EUROPEva nces ha ve brought th e peoples of th etw o a reas fa r closer together tha n everbefore. There is a va st a nd const a nteconomic, cultu ra l, a nd huma n intercha nge. While t hese ties a re loosertha n those a rising from milita ry coopera tion in th e fa ce of da nger, th ey

more independent a nd self-a ssertilvetone of the G erman G overnment isa nother clear indicat ion of cha nginga tt itudes. The Czechoslova kian situa tion ha s given Western E uropea nspause a nd may result in some renew eda tt ention to str ength ening NATG s

us Amu!Ea st Germa n troops opera te a hea vy morta r in Warsaw Pact exercises

a re likely to be more funda menta l a ndendu ring . The psychological ties th a tw ere ba sic to our involvement in West ern E urope ha ve thus been. str onglyreinforced.

Rela tionships a nd a tt i tudes w ithinWestern E urope a lso a re chan ging.Diversit y a nd self-confiden ce a re onthe increase. G enera l Cha rles de G a ullelooms large because h. epitomizes thenew mood of West ern E ur ope. The

defenses. B ut the ba sic forces a t w orkdo not seem likely to be permanentlydivert ed. A concern for milita ry security is no longer domina nt a mongWestern Eu ropea ns, a nd with i t t hesense of coopera t ion in th e fa ce ofimminent da nger ha s declined. Tbe impulse towa rd closer politica l integra tion a lso seems to ha ve passed.

Mean w hile, ha ving lost most of th eircolonies a nd ma ny of th eir overseas

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,EUROPE

connections, Western E uropea ns a remuch less interested th a n t hey oncew ere in oth er a reas of t he world, par ticular ly in th e developing count rieswhich are likely to be the source ofinstabili ty a nd futur e internat iona lcrises. E conomic a nd cultu ra l tiesa mong Western E uropea ns ha ve beenincrea sed grestly by tr a de, investment, tourism, immigra nt w orkers,a nd commu nicat ion netw orks. WesternEur opea n a tt i tudes a re clea rly moreconcerned w ith economic a nd socia lwell-being than with cooperation orcommon defense.Witlrin Eastern Europe

The Commun ist count ries of E a stern E urope no longer const itut e a monolith ic bloc. E ven before C zechoslovakia, there hae heen an undeniableprocess of fra gmenta tion in th e Commun ist w orld. Dist inct differences ininterna l a rra ngements , a t t i tudes, a ndpolicies ca n be observed in th e va riousEa st Eu ropean count ries. Nat iona l a spira tions a nd feelings ha ve had a significa nt impact on doctr ina l formu las.Clea rly, th e Sine-Soviet dispute ha sa lso intensified the na tiona listic tr endsin Ea stern E urope a nd encoura ged agrea t er degree of independence bymany of these governments.

The tr ends towa rd diversity a lsofoster a nd a re fostered by grow ingeconomic, tourist, a nd cultura l conta cts with Western E urope.

The development s in Cz echoslova kiadurin g 1968 ha ve dra ma tized th istr end. The Yugoela v a nd Roma nia nrea ctions to th e Soviet inva sion ofCzechoslova kia a lso underline th egrow th of diversity in Ea stern E urope. Their dogged independence a ndthe sta rtl ing determina tion a nd resourcefulness of th e Czechoslova kian sma ke clear how deep a nd perva sive a re

the differences a nd na tiona l a spira tion? in E a stern E urope.

The S oviet occupa t ion of Czechoslovakia wa s, in itself, st a rk confirma tionof th is movement towa rd diversity ,ma nifesting a s it did how deeplyw orried the Soviets a re a bout t hegrowing independence a mong th eirone-t ime sa tellites. The Soviet movema y well retfect feelings of vulnera bility ra th er tha n renew ed a ggressiveintentions against Western Europe.

At t he very lea st , there a re a mbiguity a nd movement in Ea stern E urope th a t can not be ignored. The Soviet occupa t ion of Cz echoslova kia islikely to slow some of these changes,but ca n har dly deter them in thelonger run. Ea st E uropeans will becaut ious beca use of recent event s, butevidence cont inues of t heir desires todevelop relat ions w ith t he West. Ea etE uropea n economic a nd technologica lneeds a nd the underlying cultura l a spirat ions seem likely to ma inta in a ndstrength en the desire for cont a cts withthe West.United States and USSR

The United St a tes a nd the U SS Rha ve found a specia l dialogue betw eenthemselves well-nigh inevitable. Iflogic a nd ra tionality w ere to prevail,I th e tw o superpow ers ha d to recognizeth e mut ua lity of th eir interest in reducing th e likelihood of general w a r.In a more direct sense, each is the ~only tr uly morta l thr eat to the other.A significant reduction in th e un certa inties a nd da ngers t ha t could lea dt o either s dest ru ction could only benegotia ted w ith tbe other. The limitedtest ban treaty , the spa ce treaty , thenonproliferat ion trea ty, a nd tbe ta citrestr a ints on each others a ctivities inVietna m a nd the Nea r Ea st crisis ar eal l pa~t of this pat tern.

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EUROPEThis d ia logue, of cour se, is not a n

uncomplica ted ma tt er. At best, it isa wa ry a rra ngement betw een capa blea nd determined a dversa ries. The Soviet a ggression a ga inst C zechoslova kiaha s inhibited U nited St a tes-U SS R conta cts, but, significant ly, neither sideha s sought to cut off discussions ina reas of fundamenta l mutua l concern,such as disarma ment a nd a rms control. C ommunist China a nd, to a lesserextent, De G a ullist Fra nce, a dd increa sing elements of uncerta inty toth e a lready complex equa tion.All ied Interests

Negotia tions betw een t he tw o superpow ers a lso involve a n often delica tew eighing of a llied interests. U S milita ry pow er is the sine qua non ofWestern securit y, but th e commu nityof interests is th e ba sic strengt h oft he West ern World. As t he hist ory ofthe nonproliferat ion trea ty ha s shown ,tbe United States must give carefula nd a ppropriat e considera tion to theint erests of her a llies. The Sine-S ovietdispute a lso clear ly ha s placed constra ints on the U SS R in o;der to a voidcompr omising her position in tbeworld Communist movement. Whileneither side is th us a n entirely freea gent, i t is a lso clear tha t a specialrelat ionship ha s evolved.

Wha t a re th e implica tions of th esenew relat ionships for US policy t ow a rd E urope ? Severa l points a re:

e The need t o dea l w ith E ur ope onits own terms.

es An a ccepta nce of NATOscha ng ing role.o A rea listic a ssessment of West

ern mili ta ry requirements in E urope.e An effort to sha pe a more con

structive rela tionship with E a sternEurope.

e A positive ini: i.ive t o fur t her

th e superpow er dialogue betw een theUni ted Sta tes and the US SR.

There, u ndoubt edly, a re oth er considera tions a nd ma ny a spects of thesepoints that will have to be examinsdcarefully. H owever, th ese five pointssta nd out as consequences of th eemerging situat ion in E urope a nd a ssubsta ntia l depa rt ures in a pproach orempha sis from th e previous pa tt ern ofU S rela tions with Eur ope.Western Europes Terms

The first requisite is th a t the U nitsdSt a tes dea l with Western E urope onth e lat ters terms. The emerging situa tion in Eur ope is a sign of successa nd not of failure in U S policy. TheU nited St a tes set out in the postw a rera to encoura ge th e development ofa free an d strong E urope. Now, thereis one. We a re going to ha ve to livewith, a nd to lea rn to a ppreciat e, differen ces of opinion a nd policy. Thevery mea ning of th e w ord free isthe right to disagree.

Rela tions betw een t he U nited St a tesa nd Western E urope a re going to hemore fluid a nd unpredicta ble, a ndt hose count ries a re likely t o resist being pla ced in molds fa vored by th eUnited States .

Dea ling w ith Western E urope on itsown terms will have certain advanta ges, a s well a s disa dvant a ges. Western Europe a nd tbe Un ited Sta tes a redeveloping towa rd a common pa tt ern.A commu nity of industr ial democra cies, dominat ed by ega lita rian a tt itu des an d concern for economic a ndsocia l w ell-being, is emerging . Ma nyof th eir importa nt problems a nd policies a re simila r. Fu ll employm ent , economic growt h, broader educa tiona l opportun ities, a nd improving rura l a ndurban incomes a re importa nt to a lmostall of these countries.

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On a broa der internat iona l pla ne,the U nited St a tes a nd the nat ions ofWestern E urope a re bound togethernot by a nt icommunism, but by acommon concern a bout th e potent ialdestructiveness of wa r, virulent na tiona lism, a nd internat iona l a na rchy.These positive, sha red va lues a nd th eever-growing economic a nd cultu ra l

sona bly expect of NATO, na mely t heesta b~ ishment of a mili ta ry equilibrium in E urope, ha s been a chieved.Accordingly, w e must a nt icipat e th a tNATOs orga niza tiona l concern s a regoing t o be less cent ra l for its member governments tha n th ey ha ve beenin the past.

NATO can st ill provide a useful

NAfONATo ha s a chieved its prima ry purpose of esta blishing a mifita ry equilibrium in Eur opeties offer a bunda nt room for constr uctive common concerns th a t w ill tendt o delimit , if not out w eigh, t he likelydiversity in oth er a reas of thought a ndpolicy.

NATO is a pt to play a substa nt iallydifferent role than it has up until now.A rea listic a pproach to NATO is t hesecond requisite of U S policy tow a rdE ur ope in th e comin g decad es. Theprimary purpose tha t w e could reaDECeinber1968

!forum for t he exam ina tion of political,politico-miht a ry , t echn ologica l, a nd relat ed problems of clear interest to someor a ll of its members. We should turnour minds to const ructi~ ve initiat ivesthat will utilize and develop NATOsstill a ppreciable va lue in th is rega rd.

We also wilI have to accept that,even a s a vehicle for polit ica l consu lt a t ion,, NATO is likely t o ha ve decidedlimita ti?hs from t he U S point of view .

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not, a s th e Czechoslova kian crisis vividly demonstr a ted, a ma tt er of unconcern to it . The United States and theSoviet U nion cont inue to be th e ma jorfactors in th e milita ry bala nce in E urope a nd w ill cont inue to be for th eforeseeable future.

The mut ua l securit y int erest betw een th e U nited St a tes a nd WesternE urope is st ill great . Even less tha hbefore can w e cont emplat e a cceptingcont rpl of Western E urope by a hostile pow er. The increa sed int ima cy ofour relat ions w ould ma ke our responseto th is prospect even more sensit ivea nd ra pid. Should the security situa tion cha nge to one of heightenedthr eat , th e milita ry a spect would, undoubtedly, a ga in become the cent ra lfeatu re of reIa tions betw een theUn ited Sta tes and Europe.Constructive Relationship

The fourt h requisite of US policyin meeting th e cha nges in Eur ope isan effort to shape a larger an d moreconst ructive relationship w ith theCommunist sta tes. Our J everage, ofcours e, is limited in th is area becausecha nges in Ea stern Eur ope will proba bly reflect developments w ithin t hesecountries more tha n a nything tha t wecan do.

We ca n tr y to ta ke a dvan ta ge ofthe t rends in Eastern Europe to en-coura ge the kinds of cha nges tha t wew ould like t o eee. The prospect s forsolution of th e E a st -West confr onta tion in Eur ope increase primarily a sEa stern E uropea n a t t i tude: cha nge tow a rd openness a nd coopera tion.

We a re going to ha ve to proceedvery gingerly in rega rd to Ea sternE urope beca use of th e Soviets st rongsensitivities in th is area . We a re going to have to be ~nntent wi th SIOWcha nge ra ther tha n drama t ic l ibera l i

zat ion in Ea stern Eur ope. We will ha vsto a bsta in from forceful moves likelyto be desta bilizing by a rousing Sovietcount eractions. Inst ead, we shouldth ink in term s of th ose sma ller st epsnot likely by t hems elves to provokeSoviet count ermeasures, but tha t bitby bit do cha nge th e underlying sit .uation.Two-Way Street

Tra de is th e principa l a venue opento us. Many economic needs in Ea st.ern E nrope ca n best be met by theWest, a nd, in some ca ses, t hey canproba bly only be met from Westernsour+ cee. Ea stern Europeans a [readyha ve a ta ste of the bett er life a nd theyw a nt m ore. E conomic problems in th ea res, a re mounting a nd will not goa wa y. I f the Soviet U nion ca nnot pro.vide th e resources, technology, a nd motiva tion requir ed to meet th ese problems, discontent will, undoubtedly,grow a nd so w ill Soviet difficulties inkeeping the lid on. In Ea stern Eur ope,th e Soviets confr ont a n a lmost insolubIe economic dilemma, a nd tra de th usseems th e best a venue for t he West tofost er psychologica l a nd politica l currents toward change.

Tra de is not just comm ercia l, buta lso politica l. It is a tw o-w a y str eeta nd a cha nnel of communicat ion. I ta )so tend s to stimula te ever-increas ingint erest in Western goods, t echniq ues,a nd idea s in Ea stern Eu rope. The export of milita rily useful items to th esecoun t ries is, of cour se, effectively prohibited by a llied a greement. Furt herrestrict ions on tra de w ith these sta tesdo not, in tbe long run, deny the Communists a nyt hing beca use they obta inmost of th e goods elsew here. Our in-tent is not to subvert the Ea stern European governments, but to dra w themtowa rd more responsiveness to domes-

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EUROPEt ic needs a nd pressures, a nd towa rdmore cont a ct a nd coopera tion w ith allth e na tiOns of Eu rope, the U nitedSta tes, and the USS R.

Placing t he G erman quest ion in thecont ext of improving relat ions w ithEa stern E urope ma y help to suggesta more fruitful a pproach to this keyE uropean questiOn. This iesue rema insth e ma jor intern a tiona l politica l question in E urope a nd a n inherently da ngerous one beca use it direct ly involvesth e Soviet U nion a nd t he Un itedSt a tes. The issue ha s been dead lockedhy Western insistence th a t proposa lsfor sett lement must begin wit h th eending of the Eas t G erman regimea nd th e not surprising refusal of t heother side to proceed on such a basis.The dominan t Western view th us ha ebeen tha t movement towa rd a settlement ha d to depend on a cha nge in theSoviet position.

However , Ea s t G ermany growsst ronger a s time goes on. I n Eu ropespresent mood, unit ed Western supportfor a show of s trengt h to ma inta inthe s ta tus quo in fut ure moments ofstr ess w ill become more difficult toachieve.

These consid era t ions cIea rly pointto the conclusion tha t a G erman settlement is fa r more likely t o follow continued mutual acceptance of the mili -tary balance and change in EasternEurope than to come from some appli-cation of Western pressure on the So-viet union and her al]iea. Soviet fearsof G erman y are r eal a nd h istorica llynot unw a rra nt ed. In effect, the Sovietsha ve w orked consistently to ma inta int he statue quo, thwa r t ing any a t t emptto unify Germa ny. We a re unlikely toget drama tic cha nges in the G ermansituat ion. P rogress on th e G ermanproblem seems possible only a fter th eDmember968

slow accumulat ion of change in Eastern Eprope. When t he sit uati on therehas basical ly altered, the Soviets mayf i nal ly come to view cont inued obduracy on Germany as count erproduc.t i ve on untenable.

What appears to be the only feasi ble road toward set t l ement of the German problem thus l ies in pat ient a ndpra gma tic explora tion of chan ge inrela tions betw een th e tw o part s ofG ermany and betw een Western a ndEa stern Eu rope. The new G ermanG overnment ha s sta rted to move inth is direction. Tha t t his is a promising approa ch is suggested by the nervous react ion in Ea s t G ermany.

The Czechoslova kian crisis a nd th eSoviet threate againet Germany counsel some pruden ce in th is a pproa ch.But the change and movement in East-ern Eu rope w ill cont inue to provideopport unit ies for judiciously pursuin gt his policy. The init ia t ive should rema in with t he Federal Republic ofG erman y, but i t behooves the U nitedSt a tes to support, a lbeit discreetly , th eG erman effort s a nd to encoura ge oth ermembers of tbe Western a llia nce todo likewise.Posit ive Init iat iveFurtherance of the dialogue w it hthe US SR is the f if th requirement ~ fU S policy t ow a rd E urope. While ma king clear the inhibiting effect of th e \Soviet a ggression a ga inst Czechoslovakia , w e must q uietly cont inue to exa mine th e fundam enta l problems ofmnt ua l concern. The imperat ives ofpow er politics w ould not a llow theUn ited Sta tes to interrupt this dialogue even if she w ould. Wit h a llprudence, w e must ta ke positive a ndconstructive initiatives.

The riva lry betw een th e U nitedSt at es a hd the U SS R will not be ended.

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EUROPEe,

However, wit h t i me, i t should be poseible to sta bilize a nd ease th e milita ryconfront a tion bet w een th e two. A low-ering of tensions, even t hough limited,provides gr &t er scope for cons t ru ctive cha nge in Ea st Eur opean countr ies a nd betw een th e lat ter a nd Western E urope a nd the U nited St at es . I ta lso helps to ma ke a t lea st somew ha tmore ma na gea ble oth er crucial problems such a s th e emergence of t he Ch inese nuclea r th reat . We should ma keit a cent ra l objective of our associa tion w ith Western E urope over th elonger term to w iden th e a rea of coopera tive rela tions w ith th e SovietUnion.

We should, of cour se, keep firm ly inmind t ha t only a l imited ditente ispossible in t he presen t period. TheCzechoslovakia n crisis ha s produced asa luta ry, sobering effect. E ffort s toimprove r ela t ions wi th the U SS R a ndEa stern E urope involve a dilemma.P a rt of th e problem is to develop areasonably fort hcoming a nd coopera tive clima te. This requ ,ires at lea stsome empha sis on psychological inta ngibles.

At the same time, symbolic gesturesw ith only l imited substa nce ma y provecoun t erproductive beca use th ey canlea d to self-deception a nd miscalcula tion. We do not w a nt th e Western a llies tra mpling each oth er on th e roadseast . There is no clea r a nsw er to th isdilemma except to keep it car efully inmind a nd to w eigh judiciously th e psychological pros an d cons of a ny proposed steps towa rd ra pprochement.

In a broa der framework, wha t isha ppening in E urope is much in l inew ith th e ty pe of w orld w e wa nt. Thelong view shows us tha t th e force of

national identity is the fundamenti]fact of our era. The deepest hopeseems to be for a w orld w here, w ithina fra mew ork of coopera tion, ea chcoun t ry can solve its own problemsa ccording to i ts ow n tr a ditions a ndideals.

P luralism is th us splitt ing both th eWestern a lliance a nd th e Communistbloc. P lura lism is incompa tible w ithth e Communist system. If th ere w erea ny doubts on thk score, they w ereviolent ly laid t o rest by S oviet use ofbrute force against .Czechoslovakianeffort s to pursue t heir own va riety ofcommunism.

One great source of Communist a ppea l ha d been the belief tha t i t w a sa universa l creed capa ble of a nsw er.ing all needs. But the historic forcesof diversity are bursting Communistdiscipline and shattering Communistideology. Pluralism, on the other hand,is w holly compa tible w ith our syst em.It is, indeed, its very ba sis. Diversitya nd independence, fa r from being opposed t o th e America n concept ofw orld order, express th e very essenceof our view of the future.

The future for relations between theU nited Sta tes a nd Eu rope is likely tobe more difficult tha n it has been inthe past, but it is full of promise. Tofirmness a nd lea dership w e must a ddpat ience a nd tolera nce. No ra pidbrea kthroughs a re in s ight , an d therisks an d uncert a inties continue to begrea t. The problems in E urope will beended only t hr ough a long pr ocess ofcha nge. I t is importa nt tha t we movefirmly in th e right direction. We nesdto give zest an d mean ing to our commitment to seek a new E urops inw hich a more dura ble settlement ca neventua lly bs a tt a ined.

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rA M:v+?wFrom Jozuqd of the RUSI (Gre;t Britain)

The Future of Armor

Major General Walter

FOR centuries, man ha s tr ied t oproduce a more mobile a n,d pow erful w eapon system th a n th e individual~ a rmed ma n. The cha riots used a t th e B a tt le of Ka desh on the River Oront es

in Sy ria in 1286 B . C., betw een t heEgyptians and the Hit t i tes, a re anear ly exa mple. The Egy ptia n char iotsw ere man ned by a driver an d a bow-ma n.- The Hitt i tes, however, ha d ath ird ma nthe shield hea rer-onth eir cha riots to give some protect ionto th e oth ers a nd, perha ps, beca use ofOetemher966

M. Hutton, British Armg

th is, w ere ra t her more successful. T~ ew eapons of th e cha riot w ere no morepow erful th a n those of t he foot soldier.Their sole a dva nt a ge w a s superiorspeed w hich provided a mean s of str iking a sudden blow from a flank beforet he opposit ion could deploy t o meet it.Thus, t hey ha d th e pow er a nd th eflexibility to ga in th e initia tive a ndproduce dscisive results.

Tbe Assyr ia ns, w ho succeeded t heHitt i tee as th e domina nt pow er inSouth w estern Asia, developed th eir

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FUTURE OF ARMOR

1The British C/zieftwin (left) mounts a 120-millimeter gun. Latest Soviet tank, the T62(right), mounts a 115-miHimeter main gun.cha riots so tha t they beca me too heavy

a nd cumbersome. They lost th eir mobility w ithout a ny ma rked improvement in w eapons or prot ection.

The cha riot th en ga ve w ay t o th ehorsema n in th e period of th e firstmillenium. The w ea pons w ere st illroughly the same for both mounteda nd dismount ed men, but the vast lysuperior mobility of th e cava lry ena bled it to become th e decisive a rm.

In medieva l times, th e horse bega nt o lose some of its mobility beca useof th e increasing w eight of th e knightin a rmor. H e relied more on his

;rength and the protecti on of his ar-This article was condenssdfrom the oreginal, published inthe J OU RNAL OF TH E ROYALU NITED SE RVIC E INS TITU TION(Great Britain) May 1968. Copyrighted @ 1968 by the J OURNALOF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICEINSTITUTION.Ge?seral Hutton commanded the5th Royal Tank Regiment at theBattle of Alamein and the .@thRegal Tank Regiment in the Italian campaign. He became Director General of Fighting Vehiclesin 1961 and has been responsiblefor coordinating the plans for thenew range of fib.. Ling vehicles.

mor than on rapid maneuv& and sur.prise.

Subsequent ly, th e int roduct ion offirea rms furt her reduced th e pow erof th e cava lry. H orsemen could not usefirear ms accura tely except dismounteda s infant ry, putting th em on levelterms a t th e point of engagement. Onth e oth er ha nd, f irea rms improved thedefensive ca pability of th e infa nt ryaga inst a cava lry cha rge.

This is th e ba ckground to th e rigidity of t he ba t tlefield in World Wa r 1.The horse w a s t oo vulnera ble to modern w eapons a nd obsta cles, a nd w asno longer ca pable of ca rrying a dequat ew eapon pow er to enable effect ive mobile opera tions to be condu ct ed. La ndw a rfa re wa s reduced to a sloggingma tch a s in earlier da ys, th e ma indifference being th a t the slogging w aswit h firepow er ra th er tha n muscle-power.

Then came the internal combustionengine a nd its vast ly great er horsepow er. The ta nk na tu ra lly follow ed a sa mobile gun ca rr ier. The foresighta nd imagina tion of th e G erman s indeveloping t he new concept a chievedt he outst a nding, but perha ps predict.able, reeults of 1940 with their panzerdivisions.

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a.,: FUTURE OF ARMOR

The French AlfX30 (left) has a 105-millimeter gun. The IffBT70 (right), joint Unitedt3tates-Wee.t German development, has a 152-millimeter gun-launcher.

This brief int roduct ion is enoughto remind us tha t land opera tions needa pow erful, mobile element if th ey a renot to stagna te into a r igid wa r ofa tt rition. The ma in requirement s fort his mobile element ha ve a la o _beenpretty clea rly demonst ra ted in wa r.I suggest t hey a re mob]lity, w eaponpow er, cont rol, some degr ee of protection, a nd comma nders w ho rea llyunders ta nd mobile opera tions.

In the last w ar, this element wa sbased on th e ta nk w hich dominat edall land opera tions w herever th e terra in permit ted its free deployment . Itprovided a n unprecedent ed combina t ion of mobility, firepower , cont rol,and protection.

Deployment of forces by a ir w a sa n r. tt empt to achieve even great ermobility, but th e a vailable a irlift wa suna ble to produce a dequa te firepow era nd mobility on a rrival on th e groundto ma tch th e enemy forces deployedagainst them by land.

At the end of t he last wa r, the ta nkwa s firmly esta blished a s th e ma inelement of th e ha rd-hit ting , mobileforces requir ed to prevent rigidity inlan d opera tions a nd to a chieve decisive results. Nothing, including th ea ir, ha d repla ced it or ma de it reOecemher1968

dunda nt in a ny w ay in spite of repea ted prognostica tions a gainst i tsvalue.

There w ere m a ny w ho sa id in WorldWa r I tha t t he ar t i llery would a nnihila te th e ta nksit did not. In between the wars, they said that thea irplane w ould destroy th e ta nks fromth e a irth ey did not, not even in th eopen deserts of North Africa . InWorld Wa r II , i t wa s th e bazookacheap t o produce a nd easily car ried,concea led, a nd fired-but it ha d litt lerea l effect on ta nk opera tions except ,perh a ps, in very close count ry a nd ur ban areas.

What had also been clearly substantiated was the need for mobile forces,based on the tank or its equivalep,to be a bala nced mixture of all a rmsa nd services. The t heory, fa vored bysome in t he ear ly 1930s, of independent action by tanks alone had beenshow n to be falae. E qua lly, th e employm ent of mobile forces in un coordinat ed penny packets or in wildcha rges a nd w ithout proper t ire a ndlogist ic support t oo often pr oduced d isaster to bear repetition.

The outst a nding new fea tur e sinceWorld Wa r H is, of cour se, t he developm~ t of nuclear w eapons and

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FUTURE OF ARMORtheir del ivery systems. Whether they present, th ey a re rela tively cheap a ndcan ever be used, oth er th a n a s a de- unsophistica ted, but th e need to im.terrent a nd, i f th ey a re, w hether land prove th eir all-w eat her guidan ce an dopera tions of a ny sort w ould be feasi- a ntijamming ca pabilities ma y cha ngeble, ia not certa in. They ha ve not been th is. How ever, if th ey are kept fairlyused since World Wa r I I a lthough sev- simple, th ey ar e easy to ca rry, conceal,era l opera tions, w hich included la rge a nd deploy a nd, being guided in flight ,numbers of tanks, have been conducted should be a ccura t e. This a ll a dds up toin var ious part s of the w orld in th is a formidable threat to the ta nk.period. B ut let us exa mine th e oth er side

If milita ry opera tions did ta ke place of t he coin. Tbe follow ing limita tions~.m-:4,

. .:

.,

Hugh.. AircraftCmmmvUS Marines test f ire the YOB missi le. Anti tank guided missiles have not eliminatedthe tank role in modern armies.under nuclea r conditions, a ta nks a r- to an tita nk guided w eapons muet bemor a nd mobility seem to give it th e remembered a nd ca refully bala ncedbest cha nce of surviva l a nd effective aga inst their advant ages i f tbe misuse. This is a lso t ru e of chemical a nd judgments of the pa st a re not to beba cteriologica l w a rfa re. The int erior repeated:of th e ta nk ca n be slightly pressurized e They provide only a limitedto provide prot ection to its crew. means of att a ck on a rmor-na mely,

Anoth er a rea of cha nge is in new hollow cha rge or squa sh head. If th ew eapon a nd t echn ica l development. designer of a rm or does not need toNew ant i tank guided weapons ar e w orry about th e much more da ngerouscoming into servi in considerable a nd flexible a tt a ck by kinetic energynumbers in all th e ma in a rmies. At project ile, his ta sk is simplified.

Milit a ryRev iew-

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They h a ve a relat ively long timeof flight . This opens U P opportu nit iesof prevent ing th e missile from rea ching i ts ta rget, pat i lcularly those typesw hich need clear visibility a nd car efulcont rol by th e opera tor th roughouttheir f light. Compare this w ith thehigh-velocity-gun projectile which,once fired, ca nnot be diverted from itspredetermined course a nd needs noguidance. It reaches i ts ta rget a t norma l bat tle ra nges in a fra c%on of thetime ta ken by t he missile, even if t helatter is supersonic. They seem to be rather more com

plex a nd expensive tha n gun a mmunition, a nd fewer rounds ca n be stowedin a given vehicle. Also, developmentin ra ngefindere a nd gun cont rol equipment provide simila r cha nces of afirst-round hit. There is, therefore,proba bly litt le ca ving in th e numberof rounds needed, a nd th e use ofguided w eapons a dds to stowa ge problems, cost s, a nd complexity. The homing t ype of guided

w eapon can be tw o edged. If it homeson heat , i t is nondiscriminat ing a ndcould enda nger friendly forces. If ituses ra da r or other elect ronic mea neof homing, its use could be inhibitedby th e need for a source of pow er a ndby possibilit ies of coun t ermea sur es.

o They a re, in some cases, less effective a t night or in condition ofpoor visibility t ha n a high -velocit ygun.

. The ta nk ie a n integra l pa rt ofthe modern combat team w hich includes infant ry, a rti l lery, morta rs, m a chineguns, a nd a irborne w eapons. Thea ntit a nk guided w eapon w ill be subjected to a tt a ck by th e w hole t eam ifnecessa ry, just aa a ny oth er wea ponw hich ia th rea tening th e success ofth e tea m. If it is to ha ve mobility,December1968

FUTURE OF ARMORit wjll be seen and be vulnerable. I fit does not, it will have only limiteduse in th e fa st-moving operat ion ofthe future.

Al] th ese a rgum ents th row considerable doubt on the ra ther extra vaga ntcla ims a dva nced by some people on t heeffectiveness of a ntit a nk g uided w eap-

Amw NeIo. Feat.%.US Army Cobra armed helicopters providea perfect partner for the tank, but do not

replace itons and on t he w isdom ck doing w ithout ta nks beca use of th em. The needto ha ve something to fulfill th e ta nkrole will still remain. [

The next logica l st ep is to exam inea ny a lternat ive wa ys of meeting th e\requirement for a ta nk-ty pe w eaponsyst em. Tw o a pparent ly pra ctical idea sw hich seem to merit study a re themecha nized fighting vehicle a nd th ehelicopter.

Colonel Robert P . Zeigler sugg estedth e mecha nized fighting vehicle in a na ti lcle in the Mili ta ry Review in J uly1966.* It is simply a combina t ion ofCOI OW1ober tP. Zeiule?,United States ArmY,

WechmlzeclFighting Vehicle,,)Militar# Reuieto,JIY 1966, PP S-12.19


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IFUTURE OF ARMORthe tank and the armored personnel there are some. The most importantcar rier (AP C ) in one vehicle. I n his seem to be:a rt icle, he sa ys: A o The limits on sust a ined orrera .We need a light mechanized fight-ing vehicle (MFV) that is an armoredpersonnel carrier, antimechanizedweapon, direct fire wpport vehicle, amfa n assault or fighting vehicle.

He suggests that this dual-purposevehicle might lea d to th e eliminat ionof the present ta nk a e a separa tew eapon sy etem. H is w hole th esis, ofcourse, rests on th e a bility to mounta dequa te wea pon pow er on a l ighttr a cked vehicle a nd a lso provide spacefor 10 men .

Thie solut ion ha s th e sa me appea la s the idea tha t AP CS should mounta n effective w eapon to enable infa nt ryto f ight with ta nks on the move. However, there seems little chance of itproducing a nyt hing oth er tha n a poor,second-best ta nk for t he obvious rea son th a t t he design w ould need to ca terfor too many requirements.Use of HelicoptersH elicopt ers, on t he oth& ha nd, offer more int erestin g possibilities, pa rticularly heca uee, a s car riers of w eapons, men, a nd supplies, th ey providea n unpa ra lleled degree of mobility a ndflexible deploym ent for la nd forces.Terra in obst a cles can be exploitedmuch more effectively. In deed, a rt ificial obsta cles ca n be crea ted w hereveropera tional pla ns fa vor th eir use, w ellbefore a ny bat tle a nd in a reas behind,a s w ell a e in front of, forw a rd tr oopsbeca use they w ould not ~ mpede themovement of helicopters. Thus, in mobility a nd flexibility , th ey representa vas t improvement over the tank orany other land vehicle.

B ut wha t of the r l isadvant ages inusing helicopters a s th e ma in vehiclefor m echa nized divisions ? Inevita bly,

t i s by day a nd night in al l weat her ,The difficult ies of supplying a de.%qua te petr oleum, oile, a nd lubrica nt s

mines, a nd other supplies to insurefull use of t he superb mobility pro.vialed.

e The still unknown vulnerabilityof helicopters a ga inst sophistica tedenemy land and air forces.

@ The problems of comm a nd a ndcont rol in la rge-scale mobile opera tions. A study of the desert opera-tions in the la st wa r shows how dim.cult t his pr oblem is on la nd, even inflat , open count ry a t relat ively slowepeeds. It w ould be mu ch more difficultin the air at high speeds.

e The limita tions imposed by t herelat ively sma ll pay loa d a vaila ble forw eapons, am munit ion, a nd protectivea rmor. The a verage pay loa d is mea sured in pounds ra ther tha n tons andposes the great est single disadva nta gein comparison w ith th e lan d vehicle.PerfectTank Partner

There is an establi shed need foreomething like a ta nk t o meet th ema in w eapon requirement for mecha nized forces. Noth ing produced sofa r h a s ma de it possible or a dvisableto do without the tank, nor is thereany better way of meeting the require-ment at present. A glance at the Se-viet and other major armies of theworld endorees t his view. This doesnot detra ct from th e obvious need toexploit th e helicopt er t o t he ma ximumextent possible, both by formin g a irmobile divisions a nd by th eir grea teruse w ith convent iona l forma tions. Onth e contra ry, th ey provide a perfectpart ner for the ta nk, part icularly thea dvan ced ta nk of the future.

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FUTURE OF ARMOR

The next genera tion ta nk should, ofcours e, go ae fa r a s possible to remedyth e know n w eaknesses in ta nk designw hich ha ve etill not been a dequat elyresolved. If the tank is to fulfill therequirement for a pow erful, highlymobile w eapon syst em, capa ble of effective, eusta ined da y-night opera tions a gainst str ong a nd sophistica tedenemy forces, come of t he presen tw eaknesses in ta nk design nmet beremedied. Theee include: Weight should be und er 40 tons

an d prefera bly within a pract ica l a ir-port a ble w eight of a bout 30 tons orless. P ow er of about 20 horsepow er

per ton of vehicle ie necessa ry. Mobility is presently rest ricted

by ground pressur es. A reduction tow ell und er 10 pound s per squa re inchis highly desira ble. Also needed a rebett er solutions to th e problems ofwater and other obstacles. Ra nge a nd self-cont a inment of

toda ye ta nks a re too rest rictive onmobile operations.

. Relia bility of ta nks ca n be improved by designing for only essent ia lneeds, th us reducing th e repair a ndmaintenance loads. Logistic support ha s been re

str icted in th e past by the limited fuela f id am munit ion ca rried in a ta nka nd th e lack of ba d ca rriers designedto opera te a cross count ry w ith mobileforces.

. Communica tions ha ve never quiteca ught up w ith requirement, par ticularly for w orkbrg with a ircra f t . Na viga tion st ill present s a prob

lem a cross count ry und er difficult condit ions and at night . Weapon power has been the ma

jor w eakness of B rit ish ta nks, but thespecia lly design ed 20-poun der, 105December19S8

mill met er a nd now 120-mill~ meter,t a n I ! guns have corr ected it .

P rospects a re encoura ging for meeting requirements w ith th e next generat ion ta nk. The w eight of a ta nkstems from th e w eapon to be mounted;th e crew , fuel, an d a mmunition to becar ried; th e size of th e pow erpack;an d the extant to w hich they a l l needto be protected by a rm or. If a guidedw eapon could meet th e w eapon requirement, a considerable sa ving inweight might result .

\H i.git -VelocityG unFor rea sone I ha ve a lready given,

I w ould still recomm end a high -vehcity-gun solution. The next genera ~ longun could be sma ller a nd lighter w itha n even bett er cha nce of a first-roundhit. A crew of four may still be requir ed in ord er to keep th e designsimple, improve r elia bility, a nd a llowfor reliefs. B ut it might be possibleto reduce the crew to three men byduplica tin g fa cilities for driving , firing tbe gun, an d opera ting th e communications, a nd by using a utomat icloading.

Developments in engines a nd th eirrelia bility should permit a significa ntreduction in size in spite of th e extrapow er-to-w eight ra tio requ ired. Thea uxilia ry engine requirement shouldbe dr opped. The ma in en gine couldea sily do t he job of charging batteriek.as is done on the German Leopardta nk. This leaves th e a rm or, fuel, a ndammunition.

I feel sure a light er gun, combinedw ith modem techniques for a rmor,could a chieve sta rt ling results. Alltbeee improvements w ould, I believe,produce a ta nk weighing less tha n 35tons a nd ca pable of opera ting by da ya nd Sight for about seven days without a ny resupply other t ha n ammuni

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i

/=.FUTURE OF ARMORtion. The increa sed pow er a nd reducedw eight w ould provide a ma jor a dvan cein mobility. Im proved versions ofa lready exist ing na vigation devicesshould be a vailable at least on a basisof one per tr oop. G rea tly improved logistic support could stem from tbe useof helicopter s, a ir-dr opped supplies,a nd specia l logist ic vehicles.

The ta nk should be w ell equipped toopera te closely w ith helicopters to pro

)vide mecha nized forces of sta rt lingmobility, pow er, ra nge of a ction, an dendura nce, provided tbe orga nizat ion,communications, commanders, a ndtra ining ca n ma tch the cha llenge. Withtbe helicopter, w e a t last h a ve some.th ing w hich will enable the ta nk todevelop its full poten tia l. These tw ocombined could produce t he sa me leapforw a rd in mobile wa rfare as the G er.ma n pa nzers in 1940.

. . . we are all interested in one ultimate goal, a just and honorable peacein the world. To have an adequate military posture, we must apply the mostadvanced technology to our weapons and equipment. To stay abreast of advarrces in technology, the military must be intimately involved in the supportof research.

Lieutenant General Austin W. Betts

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t

Milifary I=latklgunLieutenant Colonel Morris J. Herbert, United States Armu

The views expressed in this article are the authors and do not necessarily rejlect those of the Department of Defense or its agencies.Editor.

1F YOU find yourself dispa tched toa comba t zone in the foreseea blefutur e, a nd th e G overnment decidesto a rm you with a ha ndgun, the oddsa re overwh elming tha t it will be tbeAutomatic Colt Pistol (ACP), caliber.45, Model 1911A1. I t is not exactlya new w eaponthe last ma jor modifica tions w ere ma de in 1921but itha e been the sta nda rd sidear m fortlecernber963

the U S Army since it w on th e G overnmen t compet ition in 1911.

For t he paat severa l years , ~ a nyvoices w ithin th e Army a nd w ithoutha ve been ra ised a gainst the Colt .45;recomm ending it be junked in f a verof a better weapon. Compla int ta keva rious ta cks: th e .45 is ina ccura te;it is t oo oldin fa ct, it is t he oldestw eapon we ha ve in lengt h of cont inuous service; a nd it is a n odd ca libersince a l l s ta nda rd foreign ha ndgunsa re nin e millimet er (caliber .357).

Some of th ese comm ent s a re tr ue,a nd @me a re only part ly tr ue. H uw ever, w hether complaints a gainst th e

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HANDGUNArmys present ha ndgun a re valid ornot is rea lly beside th e point . B eforeth e .45 a utoma tic can be judged, w emust first define the form and substa nce of th e ha ndgu n problem. Thiscan best be done by asking threequestions:

e Wha t is th e purpose of a milita ry ha ndgunin other words, wha tis the job tha t the handgun musttackle ?

o I s tbe purpose th e sa me for a llpersonnel w ho w ill be a rmed w ith aha ndgun -or is it so diverse tha t moretha n one type of ha ndgun w ill be required?

e D oes t he caliber .45 ACP accomplish this purpose ?

And, as a corollar y to th e last quest ion, if t he .45 w ill not do the job,is a ha ndgun ava ilable tha t wil l meetour requirements ?Individual Defense

To begin with, the purpose of ai~ i li tary ha ndgun is individual defense. No modern ha ndgun ever w ona wa r or even influenced ~ he decisionin a ta ctica l bat t le. The ha ndgun isca rried beca use t he bearer ha s oth erma t ters on his mind. H e must plan,or comma nd, or serve as part of a team

Lieutenant Colonel Morms J. Herbert is Commander of the 6th BattaLion, 61st Artillery, Fort Bliss, Texas.A graduate of the US Military Academg, West Point, New York, he received a Masters degree in MechanicalEngineering from the University ofSoutherw California, Los Angeles, andis a gradruate of the US AmmI Command and Genera l Sta# College. ffeserved with the 2d Infantry Divisionin Korea, and, from 1964 to 1968, w a sAssistant Professor, Ballistics, andlater Associate Professor, Departmentof Ordnunce, at :I US MilitaryAcademy.

ma nning a lar ger offensive w eapon.His primar y miesion never enta ils fir .ing his sidea rm. The ha ndgun, then,is a personal weapon, with limited of.fensive potent ia l, designed to give itsuser optimum protection un der all con.ditions a nd extremes of service.Man Is Target

The ta rget w ill be ma na single-a rmed, a ggressive enemy moving ra pidly and with malice. His armamentw ill proba bly be a service rit le. Atworst , the ta rget for a n enga gemsutmight consist of tw o oi th ree individuals . I f the target is a squad or apla toon, th e ha ndgun ie not the snsw er. The lar ger t a rget mean s a different problem w ith a totally differentw eaponperha ps a subma chineguna s th e solution. The ha ndgu ns ta sk isto hit and disable a s ingle ta rget a tclose range, and, if properly aimed,to do it every time th e tr igger ispulled.

The ra nge for the ha ndgun engagement will be 25 yards or less. Becauseof the ta rget an d the ra nge, t he environment w ill be one of sur prise,excitement , fear , a nd tens ion. Thus,th e probability is high th a t th e firsta nd most importa nt round fired fromthe ha ndgun w ill be poorly a imed andw ill achieve only a ma rgina l hit , i fi t hi ts a t a l l .

Eva luat ion of a mili tary ha ndgunca n be determined only by ga ugingits char a cterist ics a nd performa ncea gainst a set of definit ive criteris.In order to fulfill it s mission a s snindividua l defensive w eapon, th e ha ndgun must achieve a sa t isfa ctory ma rkw hen tested a gainst each of thesefactors:

o ReU a bWt~ -When th e tr igger ispulled, the gun fires.

e Du ra bility Rugged; cont inuesMilitary Rsview4


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,.,>

to operat e under a dverse field conditions of dust , tempera tur e, a nd humidity; is easy to clean , disa ssemble, a ndmainta in . D eetm ctiva E fiect-The bullet,impacting at a ra nge of 25 ya rds orless, tr a nsfers enough linea r kineticenergy to the tar get , an a rmed individual, to render him inca pable of furth er offensive a ction. Acczw a o&-Fr om a fixed rest , a ll

~ Foundsfrom one ma ga zine land in at hr ee-inch dia meter circle a t 25 ya rde.~ Comfort Must w eigh no moretha n 32 ounces; bar rel lengt h mustbe no more tha n five inches; w eaponmu st be double a ction self-load ing;ba rr el-to-st ock a ng le mus t be 110 to .120 degr ees; a nd r ecoil mu st be lessth sn five f-+ -pound s.Relialdlityand Ruggedness

It is not poseible to different ia teclea rly betw een reliability a nd dura bility of a w eapon. The t w o ca tegoriesa re closely interrelat ed since the ruggedness an d etrength of a han dguncont ribute to its reliability . In thefield, und er a ll extremes of service,th e revolver ca nnot compa re to th eauto]oading pistol. Becauee of its design, th e revolver clogs more ra pidlya nd needs clea ning more often. I t ha smore openings to a ccumula te dirt a ndforeign ma tt er, a nd its rotat ing cylinder detra cte from th e strengt h ofthe gun.

G enera lly spea king, however, th erevolver ie consider ed to be a morerelia ble w eapon th a n an a utomat ic pistol. If a double-a ction revolver misfires, the tr igger ca n be pulled a gain,rotst ing another round int o firing position a nd firin g it a ll on one motion.

If the a utomat ic misfires, both ha ndsmust bq t ieed to eject the ca rt ridgea nd cha mber a new round. This couldOeeernber1966

-m

HANDGUNbe $isa str ous since th e sight pictu reis lost a nd considera ble time is used.Among US-made autoloading handgun st th e eingle exception is th e Sm ith& Weeeon, nine-millimeter, Model 99w hich is a doubie-a ction gun.

Despite i ts disadva nta ge, with am munition tha t toda y is a lmost 100 percent r elia ble, th e caliber .45 a utoma ticsta nds a lone am ong al l ha ndguns inreliability a nd ruggedness. Not a complicat ed w eapon, it is easy t o keep nfirin g cond ition. For over 50 yea rs , 1nevery conceiva ble field a nd comba t situa tion, th e .45 ha s proved tha t it w illfire when called upon.Dest ruc t i veEf f ectMeasuring th e destructive effect ofa bullet, or, litera lly, its stoppingpow er a nd shock a ction, is usua lly doneby record ing th e bullets linear kineticener gy ( % M v) before a nd a ft erpaseing th rough the ta rget . The difference, or th e kinetic energy a bsorbedby th e ta rget , should be a measur e ofthe dama ge done to the ta rget . I sayehould beca use th e numerica l a nsw ers.a re subject t o int erpreta tion. Thesha pe a nd ma ss of the bulletits ballistic coefficient , t he bullete sta bilityin flight, th e impa ct velocity of th ebullet , and the nature of the tarketma terially a ffect th e a mount of da m \age inflicted.

From empirical data obta inedth rough cont rolled experiment a tion inthe B a llist ics La bora tory a t WestP oint , i t appea rs tha t , within thera nge of impa ct velocities encount eredwith ha ndguns, t ra nefer of kinet icenergy to the ta rget ma teria l is thebest mea sur e of t he project iles dest ructive effect. At impa ct velocitiesover 1,s00 feet per second , compa ra tive stopping pow er of a bullet seemsto be govern ed by a fa ctor involving

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jectile velocities in qu estion, t he sh ockwa ve in a ir w ill ha ve l i t t le da ma gingeffect on th e ta rget . I t may cau se apreeeure wa ve to pass th rough theta rget at conic velocity a head of thebullet.

H ow ever, th e bulletas it movesthr ough the ta rget ma teria l a t severa l ,hun dr ed feet per secondforcibly displa ces th e t issue a nd fluids tha t it hitsin passa ge, a nd these pa rt icles moveout a t high velocity. This phenomen onca us& ca vitat ion w ithin th e t issue-th e tempora ry forw a tion of a ca vitymuch greater in volume tha n the t ra ctof t he project ile its elf.PermanentCavity

After passa ge of th e bullet, a perma nent cavity of dama ged a nd dest royed tissue a nd blood vessels w itha grea ter over-a ll volume tha n t he bullet tra ct it self ma y he formed. Wheth eror not perma nent ca vita t ion occurs de.pends on th e ma ss a nd impact velocityof th e bullet , i ts stability , a nd the na tu re of th e ta rget. These a re basicallythe same factors associa ted with t ra nsfer of energy.

P hysica l exa mina tion of gela tinblocks a fter firing clea rly indicat estha t a bullet muet t ra nsfer a t least 160foot-pound s of energy to th e ta rgetin order to form a significa nt perma nent ca vity. B y significa nt is mean ta ca vity with a t least tw ice the diameter (or four t imes th e volume) of th ebullet tr a ct itself . Figure 1 shows th eperma nent ca vit ies creat ed in gela tinby a caliber .45 ACP bullet, and bya nine-millimeter round fir ed from a-hw sr pistol. ~

Fr om th e viewpoint of dest ructiveeffect, th e caliber .45 roun d is ineffective, tr a nsferring a pproxima tely 105foot-pound s of energy to th e ta rget.The nine-mill imet er, 115-gr a in bulletDecember 968

HANDGUNis tfia rgina l, impa cting a t 1,210 feetper second vers ue a bout 800 feet persecond for the .45 ACP, and t r ans .ferr ing 140 foot -poun ds of ener gy.

The impa ct momentu m of th e bullet,w hich is measur ed by ta king th e product of the bullet mass and velocity,a lso cont ribut e to th e destr uctive ca-

Cowtenuof authorP a t h of crdiber .45 ACP bullet throughgelatin (top), and nine-millimeter, 115grain, parabellum bullet thrqugb gelatin

(bottom) Ipacity of th e round. Momentum isreal] y impetus, or the force w ith w hich{th e projectile moves a ga ina t r esista nce. As such, it is a good ya rdst ickof th e bullets a bility to car ry th rougha thick, dense, or protected ta rget .

Often referred to as th e freighttr a in effect, it is most noticeable ina sta ble bullet euch a e th e old M-2ball a mmu nition for th e caliber .30Ml rifle of World Wa r II fa me. Fora ha n~ gun, the momentum at impa ctshould be at Ieaet .50 pound-eecondeto give th e bullet sa t isfactory carr y

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HANDGUNing uow er a s it moves th rough bone,muscle, a nd tendons.

Impact momentums for ~ e ha ndgunbullets shown in Figure , measuredin poun d-second s, a re:.25 Aut oma t ic .166

.32 Aut oma t ic .265.33 Revolver .596.45 Automatic .8679-millimet er Aut oma tic .626.357 Magnum .910.44 Magnum 1.620The caliber .45 ACP has good impact , moment tirn, but tr a nsfers lit t le

energy to th e ta rget . U nless tbe .45round hits bone-w hich w ould norma lly str ip the ja cket a nd mushr oomth e bulletit bores a nea t ca liber .45hole th rough tbe ta rget , a nd inflictslit t le rea l da ma ge to t issue more tha none-ha lf inch out side of t he bullett rack.Accuracy

The biggest compla int a ga inst t he.45 is ita a ccura cy or la ck of it . Admittedly, it is not th e most a ccura teha ndgun on the ma rket. Worse yet ,it point s ba dly. D ifficulty in lining upthe gun on th e ta rget a nd holding itth ere-point ing-is due prima rily toa poor ba rr el-t o-st ock a ng le (107 degrees) a nd, to a lesser extent , to itsw eight of 39 ounces.

B ut we a re now discussing the ma n-gun combina tion, not th e gun itself.In a combat s itua t ion, i t is the ma n-gun team that does the job. Tbe manw ho carr ies th is defensive w eapon willprobably be a poor ma rksma n, or, a tbest , he will not h a ve had much pra ctice. The .45 ACP, as part of thema n-gun team , is guilty a s cha rged.It is a difficult w eapon to shoot a ccura tely , a nd i t ta kes instruct ion an dhours of pra ctice to ma ster.

The gun itself is more th a n a ccura te28

enough t o a ccomplish its miss ion. The.45 a utomat ic, or a ny of th e availableha ndguns tha t we wil l compare withth e .45, can place a ma ga zine of sevenor eight rounds in a th ree-inch ta rgeta t 25 ya rds. Misses occur because oflack of pra ctice, excitement , a nd ten sion. Every major pistol championshipis w on by an a utoloa ding gunprofessiona l shooters a lwa ys prefer a utoma tics to revolvers. Neverth eless, th etime for pra ctice is not a lwa ys a vail-.able, and the caliber .45 ACP losesmany points in th e cat egory of comfort --a nd comfoii a ffects th e a cctir a cyof the ma n-gun team ,Weight

A better term for comfort might h;feelth e feel of th e gun in your ha ndw hile>u a re shooting it . E ver sinceth e Wa r Depart ment bought #,000sm oot hbore, flint lock pistols, caliber.69, w eighing 52 ounces a nd w ith a n8 %-in ch barrel from North and Chewin 1800, i t ha s been tra dit iona l for theArmy to ha ve lar ge, heavy sidea rms.With th e high strengt h steels usedin todays guns, the milita ry sidea rmneed not w eigh tw o and one-ha lfpounds.

@inioh is divided a s to w here th eline should be dra w n on ha ndgunw eight. Cert a inly, t he .44 Magnum,a t 46 ounces, is uncomforta bly hea vy.I t takes both ha nds an d a t r ipod tohold it on ta rget unless you a re a nexperienced ehoot er wit h w ell-developed band a nd forea rm muscles. Inaddit ion, there a re not ma ny ha nd-gunners w ho ca n put up wit h its excessive recoil for long. The .25 a ut cma tic, a t less tha n a pound, feelsequally uncomfort a ble to ma ny men.I ts lightness is a disadva nta ge inpointing.

The best heft a mong modernMil it a ryReYiw


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HANDGUNha ndguna comes w ith Sm ith & Wessons Model 39 a ut oma tic w hichw eighe 26% ounces, a nd the nine-millimeter Luger a t 30 ounces. B ear ingin mind tha t t he great ma jority ofthose a rmed with a ha ndgun will notbe experienced shots, t here is a str ong

~ a rgument that the ha ndgun shouldw eigh betw een one a n_d7tw o pound s.A hea vier gun w ill be ha rder to a im,a nd the a ccura cy of the ma n-gun teamwill suffer accordingly.Mu@ VelocityModern pow der a nd primers ha veincrea sed mu zzle velocity to t he pointw here a long-ba rrelled w eapon is nota necessity . Again, a compromise mustbe str uck. As ba rrel lengt h is shortened below t hr ee inches, point a hilityia a ffected a nd a ccura cy suffers. Ade.qua te muzzle velocity ca n b obta inedw ith ba rrels five inches 10 g, and t hisshould be t he ma ximum a l{ w ed, w itha minimum lengt h of four jnches fora iming a ccura cy. Fr om tests in benchrests, it is genera lly concluded tha tbarrel length does not affect the basic,built-in a ccura cy of the gun a s longa s th e ba rrel is long enough to impa rtsufficient spin t o t he project ile. Ath ree-inch ba rrel ca n do th is for ahandgun.

Long neglect ed in selection of ha nd.gum ha s been th e ba rrel-to.-stock a ngle. For a gun to feel right in th eha nd, for it to point correctly, th ea ngle betw een ba rrel a nd etock mustbe a t least 110 degrees. Of t he r epresenta tive a utomat ics show n in Figure2, only th e World Wa r II G erma nLuger ha s th is minimum a ngle. TheuP P er fimit is more flexible. The L ugsr point s w ell a t 124 degrees, but a morereasona ble va lue would h e closer to120 degrees.

Recoil, usua lly m ea eured in foot Oecember1968

po~ nds of energy a bsorbed by th eshooters ha nd, should be less th a nfive foot -pounds for comfort a ble firing. The most pow erful ha ndgu n onth e, ma rket, th e .44 Magnum six-shooter, kicks w ith a force of over 18foot -pound s. The nin e-millim eter a utomat ics var y between th ree a nd 3.5foot -pound s, a nd t he Arm ys .45 holdsa t 4.5 foot -pound s. Like the upper.limit on th e ba rrel-stock a ngle, th ema ximum energy level of five foot -pounds is a n a rbitra ry figure. M chmore tha n tha t , and the ave ) a geshooter w ill tend t o flinch, or lose hissight pict ure, or find himself drea ding to pull t he t rigger . The result , ofcours e, w ill be decrea sed a ccur a cy.Stopping Power

Aga ina t th e criteria of comfort , th e.45 a utoma tic is cert a inly too heavy ,by ha lf a pound . The size is righ t , butth e single-a ction feat ure is una ccepta ble in a modern ha ndgun. The recoilis w ithin limits, but ma rgina lly so,a nd t he ba rr el-t o-st ock a ngle is toosmall for a ccura te pointing. In thenice-to-ha ve cat egory, t he ma ga zinecapa cit y of seven round e should be increa eed. At t he present time, only th eBelgium-made Browning automaticholds more tha n 10 rounds; no w e~ ponin its ca liber ra nge ha e a sma ller ma gazine than the .45. !Measured a gainst the performa ncecriteria tha t w e ha ve esta blished, the.45 a utoma tic is not a n effective ha ndgun. It ra tes high in reliabili ty a ndstrength, a nd sat isfa ctory in a ccura cy,but it does not ha ve efficient stoppingpow er. It does not meet r equirementsin the a rbitra ry a rea of comforttha tnebulous qua lity tha t cont ributes soma rkedly to th e efficiency of th e ma n-gun te2m.

The list of possible repla cemen t s for29


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-,

th e .45 na rrows quickly w hen compa red to these five criteria . A quickcompa rison of 10 modern ha ndgu ns isshown in F igure 2. Among th e a utoloa ders, only th e Smith & Wessorz,nine-millimeter,Model 39 meets a ll th erequirementsunder cOmfOrt.TOgether.w ith every aut oma tic on the list , h ow ever, i t ha s ma rgina l destr uctive effect . Only tw o of th e automa tics a redouble a ct ion, a nd t he reliability a nddurabili tyof every candidate is an unknownquant i t y when gauged aga ine tt he Model 1911AI Colt .45.

This, perha ps, is t he key t o t he problem. The stopping Power of a gun isimporta nt , hut i ts reliability must beuricha llenged.E xha ust ive field testkgw ould be necesea ry hefore a ny a utoloa der could be considered equa l to t heArmys .45.NewIdeal WeaponSince no single handgun meets allth e requirements for a n individua l defensivew eapon, let us buildup a n idea lmilita ry ha ndgun, keeping w ell w ithinth e pres~ nt sta te of th e art in ball istics. Th gun must be a n a ut oloa der,

1nd, in o der to a void cocking th e ha mmer bef re firing th e first round, it/mu et be a double-a ction model. Tokeep w ithin th e. limits on eize a ndw eight , a nd t o d evelop sufficient im pact velocity , th e gun ehould he nin emillimet er in ca liber. The .32 simplydoes not pa ck enough w a llop, a nd a nything over nine millimeters Iimite thema ga zine ca pacity a nd requires alarger, heavier gun for sufficient muzzle velOcity .

The over-a ll w eight of th e gun w illbe no more tha n 32 ounces, including aba rrel length of five inches. With th islength of ba rrel a nd a redesigned 130gra in, nine-millimeter ca rt ridge, amu zzle velocity of 1,275 feet per sec-Oecembere68

ond can easily he achieved. The propellant charge would be between fivea nd five a nd one-ha lf grains of pow der.A velocity of 1,275 feet per second isnot in th e Magnum range, but i t ishigh enough, demonstrated by empirical work in the laboratory, to ineurea step increase in destructive effecton the target .Impact MomentumAt our maximum anticipated lethalra nge-25 ya rdsthe bullet velo ity!will have dropped to 1,200 feet persecond, an d t h]z is t he impa ct velocity .Thus, a sat isfactory impact momentum of .69 pound-seconds can be attained. The kinetic energy of theround at impact will be 416 footpounde, and at an impact velocity of1,200 feet per s econd, t he bullet! w illtranefer about 182 foot-pound$ oflinear kinetic energy to the gelatintarget. Minimum barrel-to-stock angleis a comforta ble 110 degr ees. Theproba ble a ppeara nce a nd the sta t ist icsof an improved handgun are shown inFigure 3.

Is it t ime, then, to replace the .45?The automatic described here wouldbe an improvement over any militaryhandgun in use today , but how muchof a n improvement, a nd a t w ha t Icostin t ime, m a npow er, development, a ndproduction fun ds ? The conclusion ibinescapable that this improved handgun does not represent the results ofextensive, advanced research. It is nota lea pfrogging step forw a rd in th edesign of individual defensive weapons. I t is simply an evolutionary gunthat could have been produced anytime in the past 20 years. Should itbe produced right now?Th: a nsw er ha s to be no. Ma rginalimprovement of a 50-year-old weaponsystem is not worth the t ime and ex.i. .

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HAND6UNpense involved. There a re definit e lim be a s revolutiona ry a s th e develop.ita tions on th e a dva nces tha t ca n be ment of the guided missile w a s toma de in convent iona l project iles, pro- a nt iaircraft gunnery. The convenpellan t s , and hand guns . Ev en the im t iona l pis tol shou ld be shou ld ered

1 proved nine-millimeter a ut oma tic just a side a s qu ickly a s tbe 90-millimet erdiscuseed will be less tha n optimum. gun ga ve w a y to th e Nike family ofThe proba bility of a sure kill a nd missiles.insta nt inca pacita tion of the ta rget In order to ta ke a giant step for

IMPROWEO HANDGUN

\Transf erof Li near Esergy( to7. i nJ i i net i c g~ati nbl ock) 182f oot. pounds

Pigure 3.i s now here nea r 100 percent unless w a rd in individual defensive w eapons,t he shot is w ell a imed. There is rea lly the s tate of the ar t must be advancednot a grea t dea l tha t we ca n do with considera bly beyond its present level.th e convent iona l ha ndgu n t ha t w ill Obviously, a ma jor development pro-improve th e cha nces of a poor ma rks- gra m, costly both in money a nd inman who is h igh ly excited a nd under- scien t i fic resources , w i ll be necessa rygoing th e str ess of th e combat a rena . before a completely new, optimum

The Army does not need a bett er, w eapon ca n be furn ished to tbe servtwo-pound, nine-millimeter autoload- ices. The timefra me is a minimum ofing w eapon, but, ra th er, i t neede a 15 years.ra dica l a pproa ch L th e problem of This gun; t he ID W150, w ouldindividual defense. The a pproa ch must w eigh 32 ounces fu lly loa ded, w ith a n

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over-a ll length Of not more th a n nineinchee. P roject iles w ould coneist of10-gra in, a rr ow-sha pqd f%chett es, oneinch in length each. Ma ga zine ca pacityw ould be 150 rounds , w ith a select orsw itch to permit firing f16chett es single or in fixed bur st s of five with onetr igger pull.

F16chett e rounds for th e Ifl WI 50w ill be t oo sma ll t o be guided in flight ,but th e w eapon itself should h a ve apassive hea t-seeking guida nce systemmount ed in th e barrel . At a ma ximumra nge of 100 feet, th e infra red cellw ould detect w a rm bodies, a nd aemall l ight would glow red w hen theta rget is properly tra cked, giving thefirer a n instan t check on his s ightpict ure und er a ny light ing condit ions.Today, weight and size of these guida nce components w ould present a serious design problem, a nd detectionra nge w ould be equa lly difficult toachieve.

The propella nt for t he ID W150 mustbe a low -molecula r-w eight ga s underhigh pressure, ra th er tha n conventional pow der, providing a muzz le velocity of 4,000 feet per second. Atra nges of 100 feet or less, no guid a nce syst em is needed. The fir er neednever lea d the ta rgethe a ims at ta rget cent er, gets his red light w itbinmilliseconds, a nd fires. A ta rget moving at a speed of 15 miles per houra cross his front a t a ran ge of 100 feettravele only six inches in the 25 milliseconds betw een t rigger squeeze a ndt k%het t e impact.

The high -mu zzle velocity insu res alkill~ ~ even wit h a ma rginal hit . Thefl&hett e, sta ble in a ir, loses its st a bility a nd tum bles on impa ct, emerging from the ta rget mat er ia l wi th avelocity of 1,000 feet per second orless. This t ra nsfer s some 334 foot

Oecember1968

HANDLWNp$unds of kinetic energy to th e ta rget.E ven a t a reduced muzz le velocity of3,000 feet per eecond, 180 foot-poundsof kinetic energ y w ould be a bsorbed.

The lDW150 will not need to becocked before firing t he first round.It w ill combine light w eight , lar gema gazine ca pacity , high ra te of f ire,great destruct ive effect , infra red-a ided sighting, a nd excellent a ccura cy.These cha ra cteristics a ll a dd up to ama n-gun syetem kill probability ofnea r unit y. Thie is th e gun t ha tshould replace the Colt .45.P rotect ion of the individual aga instan a rmed a ssailan t is being a ccomplished toda ya s it ha s been in th epa st by t he caliber .45 ACP. Its complete relia bility is th e one overridingreason for reta ining it a s th e servicesta nda rd until a ma rked increase inha ndgu n effectiveness can be a chieved.If t here w ere a question of reliabilityor ruggedn ess, th e .45 w ould ha ve tobe replaceda nd it w ould ha ve been,yea rs a go. Although its hea vy, slowbullet does not insure insta nt disability of th e ta rget, tbe probability iss t i ll qui te high t hat a man s t ruck w itha 230-gra in, ja cketed bullet tra velingat 800 feet per second will be put outof action.

Tbe probability of a ba sic de~ elopment progra m in th e bandgun fieldbeing init ia ted in th e near fut ure isopen t o donbt . It is reasona ble to suppose, therefore, th a t t he .45 w ill bea ma ineta y for some time to come.Int erest a nd effort a re needed heforethis barely a dequat e w eapon ca n beretired. It is not time t o replace t he.45 yet beca use no st rong repla cementexiets, but it is t ime to sta rt th e pick-a nd-shovel resea rch a nd developmentw orkv tha t will lead t o a totally newindividual defensive weapon.

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. . .. .

. --

BEAUFREand ,Total strate

.....Colonel Robert G . Kr ebs, United States Armu

G ENE RAL Andr6 B eaufre ha s laid out a ma in design for stra tegytota letra t egytha t we in the Un ited Sta tes, a s well as our counterpart s inother count ries of th e West, can w ell a fford t o etudy .G 6n6ral dArm6e B eaufre is th e director of th e Inst itut Fran@s dEtudes

Strat4giwtes in P a rie. H e is a litera te polit ico-milita ry a na lyst , a n a ccomplisheda uth or, a nd a keen student of milita ry history a nd stra tegy. B efore hie retirement a s G 6n6ra 1 d Arm6e in 1961, h e w a s t he F rench representa tive on th eNort h Atla nt ic Treat y Orga nizat ion St a nding G roup in Wa shington, D. C. B efore tha t , he wa s Deputy Ch ief of St a ff , Logistics a nd Administra tion, Supreme

Witary Revim34


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Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe.E a rlier, he comma nded Fr ench forcesin t he S ueZcrisis Of 1956, par t icipa t edin the Algeria n a nd Indochina ca mpaigns, a nd saw service w ith Fr enchresista nce a nd regular forces th roughout World War II .Codif ication of Eventa

St ra tegic th inking a nd concepts a senunciat ed by G enera l B eaufre meritconsidera t ion if only beca use of hisschola rly effort a t a codifica t ion ofstra tegies. Of tr a nscending importa nce, however, is his overview of t oda ys w orld wh ere neither peace norwa r , but cold w a r a nd counterinsurgency obta in, a nd w here t he possibility of nuclear holoca ust is held to bevirtually nil because of the deterrentaspecte of the very weapons of annihi lation.

In his book, An Introduction toStrategy, Genera l Beaufre s ta tes tha t :Strategg cannot be a eimple defineddoctrine; it ie a method of thought,

the object of which is to codtfg events,set them in order of priomtg, and thenchoose the meet effective coewse of a ction,

H e concurs w ith B . H. Liddell Ha rtColonel Robert G. Krebs ie on thestaff and faculty of the US ArmyWar College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn-sylvania. A graduate of the US ArmsIMititar~ Academy, West Point, NewYork, he rece


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BEAUFREf ive pat terns, togeth er w ith the tw ocited modes, help to provide a ba sisfor understa ndir ig his- various brea kouts of strategy.

G enera l B eaufre has pla ced totals tra tegy at the pinna cle of s tra tegy,a ssigning it th e overr iding ta sk of conducting genera l w a r. For componentsor f ields of tota l stra tegy, B eaufre ha sdesignated political, economic, diploma tic, milita ry, a nd. psychologica lmea sures. AR a re blended int o a single,coordina ted, a nd coordina tin g mecha nism or a gency designed to receivelong-ra nge goa ls an d policy, a nd th enproduce a finished producttota lstr a tegy. This is not new ; w e in America have sometimes referred to it a sna tiona l s tra tegy. U nfortuna tely , thefunction seems to ha ve been left unfulfilled completely a t na tiona l or a Riance levels.Over-All StrategyThe next tier under total strategyis over-a ll st ra tegy. H ere, G enera lB eaufre indica tes tha t, in each of th efields-polit ica l, economic, diploma t ic,milita ry, a nd psychologica la separa te over-a ll st ra tegy should be moldedso tha t a l l ta sks w ithin a part icularfield a re fully coordina t ed. H e point sout tha t t his coordina tion is a common pra ctice w ithin th e milita ry profession, but not so in other fields w hereit may be just as important.

G enera l B eaufres is a fully reasona ble cont ention here. Cert a inly, itw ould be begging t he issue to suggestth a t, for inst a nce, in t he economicsfield in the United St a tes, th ere iscomplet e coordina t ion of product ion,financial policy, overseas trade, bala nt e of-pa yment s, economic w a rfa re,a nd the ma ny oth er bra nches of economics in and bet~ ~ pen governm ents.

To meet t he requir ements of t he

individua l bra nches of each functiona lfield w ithin over-a ll stra tegy, G enera lB eaufre puts forth operat iona l s tra tegy. Exa mples of opera tiona l stra tegyw ithin the Defense Est a blishment ofthe U nited Sta tes would be the s tra tegies employed by th e individual unified a nd specified comma nds a nd, in th einsta nce of a dministra tive a nd logistic support , by th e individual milita ryservices.Logistics Strategy

One of th e opera tional stra tegiesespecia lly cit ed by B ea ufre is th a t ofth e pea cetime stra tegy concerned principally w ith t echnology a nd, specifica lly, how to produce m odern equipment th a t will outda te th e ma teriel ofa n opponent . For th is specia l opera t ional s trat egy, G enera l B eaufre selected t he term logistics str a tegy. Rega rding it , he cites tw o salient fea tures : tha t nuclea r weapons ha veenha nced the import a nce of this stra tegy, a nd tha t full a tt ention should bepaid to th e ma na gement a spects oft his complica t ed process. This w ouldbe a n effort to insure t ha t t he budgeta ry a lloca tion is in ba lan ce, product ionpriorities a re coordina ted, a nd yet,t ecL LCS Isuperiority is reta ined.

G enera l B eaufre feels that this particula r stra tegy is fa r from fully developed. This ma y be t rue of ma nypar ts of the w orld, a nd certa inly inCommunist China . In th e ca se of theU nited S ta tes, how ever, th ere a rema ny in th e Depart ment of Defensew ho w ould disa gree sha rply, especia llyw hen the rela tively recent ma na geria limprovement s, a s w ell a s th e significa nt cha nges w hich occurr ed in theorga nizat ion of function, a re ta keninto full considera tion. In th e U nitedSt a tes, i t is not know n a s logisticsstra tegy, but i t is th ere.

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BEAUFREReturn ing to th e top of his stra tegy . D efensiv+ physical protectionpyramid, G ene~ a l B eaufre feels tha t a gainst nuclear effects.

sea rching considera t ion should be In direct offensiv+ th reat of nu-given to nuclear stra tegy. He a ccords cIear retaliation.i t tota l s tra tegy s tat us , a nd uti l izes B eaufre considers the first th reeit for the development of his key nuclea r forms not fea sible. H e citestheme of deterrence. t he first a s th e form previously em-

In the opinion of G enera l B eaufre, ployed by th e U nited St a tes unt il th e

US A!, F.,..With the destruction of Wlroshima, nuclear strategy became the principal element tototal strategy !

th e nuclea r w eapon cann ot be consid- USSR developed deliverable strategicered only a s a more pow erful, longer nuclea r w eapons of her ow n. The secranging weapon. ond form, in bis opinion, represen t sB eau fre set s out th e follow ing forms a technological race in progress, while

of nuclear strategy: he feels th e th ird is not feaeible be. D irect offensive-prevent ive de- cause of cost and insufficient protec

st ruction of enemy nuclea r wea pons tion. Thus, only th e fina l form , th eand production, reta lia tory thr eat , is left . D efensiveint erception of en- It seems tha t t he form on prevenemy nuclear w eapons in tra nsit . t ive destruction sta nds t he test of fea -

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sible. The nuclear w ea pon is seeminglyvita l to superpow er sta ndoff. It doesuot, th en, 10gica lly follow th a t aw eapon w hich provides pa rity , prestige, and possibly peace is to become aserious candida te for being done a wa ywith a ltogether. Nuclea r wea pons ca na nd should be subject ed t o cont rols,although this will be difficult, but thewea pons must not be a bolished. B eaufres a na lysis of nuclear disa rma menta nd a rms cont rol seems par ticular lywell considered.ConventionalForcesShif t ing from world political consequences of deterr ence to th e effect sof deterr ence on milita ry esta blishments, wha t is th e sta tus of conventional force st ructu res ? At first gla nce,i t w ould seem tha t th ere should ha veoccurred a sha rp u psurge in conventiona l forces. To th e cont ra ry, t hereha s, in fa ct, been a decline. Fu rt hermore, B eau fre feele th a t th ere will bea new empha sis on sma ll-nnit mobileforces with ta ctica l nuclear w eaponsa nd ha cked up by a well-tra ined militia.

Why the decrease ra ther tha n anupsw ing in convent iona l forces? It isG enera l B eaufres opinion tha t th ea nsw er lies in th e deterr ent effect ofta ctica l i iuclea r wea pons w hich w ithth eir use, or th rea t th ereof, immedia tely ra ise the thr eat of esca lat ion toth e str a tegic nuclear level. This situa tion quite definitely a ffects t heU nited Sta tes and the US SR, tendingto mili ta te ehar ply a gainst th e outbrea k of conventiona l w a r in a reasvita l to eith er na tion.

Where suh deterr ence ma y w ell fa ilto ta ke hold is in a reas of seconda ryinfluence or interest not cont iguous toeith er superpow er. In such insta nces,it is B eau fres cont ention th a t conDecember 19a8

BEAUFRE

ve tiona l wa r ma y occur a s a pro10 ged1 w a r of a t t rit ion a t a ba eica llylow level of int ensity. Wha t is th eeffect of nuclear deterr ence w ith rega rd to cold wa r situa tions? To B eaufr~ , deterr ence does not neutr a lize coldw a r, but all forms of pressure a re possible, a nd peace is no longer pea ce.

H is th esisth a t th ere is no pea ce,only cold w a rw ould seem to a ddcredence t o his cont ention th a t deterrence leaves cold w a r undeterr ed. This ~ma y be only par tia lly tr ue. There w illbe implicit in ma ny cold w a r c~ isesa th rea t of employment of convent iona l a nd high er levels of force. Whenthis occurs, these other levels will mostsurely cast their effect upon cold wara tt i tudes a nd hot spots even th oughth ey ma y fail t o produce a ny completeneutra lizat ion. In cold wa r, freedomof a ction rema ins la rge-so does instabil i ty.Indirect Approach

The second portion of General Beaufres th eme of tota l stra tegyindirectstra tegylooms large, a fter th e stra tegy of deterrence, a s th e great est single stra tegic determina nt opera ting inth e w orld toda y. The rea l essence ofhis indirect stra tegy is tha t thisstra tegy a tt empts to employ a ll meansoth er tha n mili ta ry to a tt a in (objectives. In direct str a tegy is ba sica llypolitical, economic, a nd, perha ps, abdveall, psychological.

U nder indirect s tra tegy, G eneralB eaufre visua lizes a tw o-phase ma neuver concept:

E xterior ma neuvera ction isprima rily psychologica l, a lthough political, economic, diploma t ic, or evenmilita ry measures ma y be ta ken. Thetw o requirement s for its success areth~ t the mili tary deterrent must besufficient to prevent a ny siza ble rea c

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BEAUFREtion by the enemy, and tbe policy pursued must a ppea r logica l.

e In terior ma neuvera ction ta kespla ce in the a ctua l geogra phica l a reaof interest a nd involves ma teria l ormora l force w hich m a y be employedin a ra pid fa it a ccompli-ty pe opera tion or via protra cted conflict over aprolonged period.

Most of toda ys w orld opera tions occur under the a egis of indirect stra tegy, a nd it goes w ithout sa ying tha t,for every int erior ma neuver, th ere w illbe ma ny more exterior ma neuvers.Ra re will be the insta nce w here ma nw ill employ force if he feels he ca na ccomplish his ends w ithout it.

In the indirect s tra tegy arena, thecont est is on a w orld scale and goesunder cold war rules, with freedomof a ction unlimited a nd insta bilitylooming lar ge. In itia tive is a primefa ctor. For th ese rea sons, formula tionof a ca refully coordina ted tota l stra tegy on both a na t iona l a nd an interna tional level is a n a bsolute must .With t his, th e vying for developingna tion influence an d fa vor sh ould endw ith the West overma tching developing nat ions a s th ey emerge inta ct,hopefully a s viable independent na t ions ra ther tha n as underl ings to thecolonia lism of comm un ism.

Thus, la rge-scale w a r a nd t rue peace

ma y h e buried side by side. B eaufrema y pr ove t o be corr ect, especia llyconcerning th e la tt er a nd hopefullytbe form er a s w ell. E ven th en, adra ma tic coun ter force technologicalbreakthr ough or a n irrat iona l interna tiona l a ct might cut short severelyth is existing timeout on genera lwak .

Tota l st ra tegy must be a pplied bothfrom a na tiona l , a s well a s a n a lliance,standpoint. Political, diplomatic, economic, a nd psychologica l fa ctors mustbe interw oven a nd coordina ted a longwith t he mili ta ry factor. This tota lstr a tegy w ill reflect both a directmode, a s in the insta nce of the stra tegy of deterr ence, a nd a n indirect one,w ith indirect stra tegy being no lessa frontrun ner tha n its direct count erpa rt , in fa ct, perha ps, more so. Foreven th ough deterr ence opera tes to in.hibit genera l a nd la rge-scale conventional wars, actual low-scale mili taryopera tions can be expected w ithin t hepurview of indirect stra tegy.

General Beaufresstra tegy, his a lgebrawar, and, above all ,to stra tegic thoughtHiq glances into th e

codification ofof modern-day

his contributionare significant.mirror of thepas~ , -th s cha nge of t he present, a nd

th e telescope of th e fut ure a re sea rching and sound.

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Military Review December 1968

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Transcript of Military Review December 1968