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Military History Group

U3A Dorking

Newsletter Number 5

Ready for Anything!

Contact email: mhgu3adorking@gmail.com

Phone Barrie Friend 07796 633516

Contributions for the newsletter to Robert Bartlett 938at938gmail.com

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Contents

From Group Leader Barrie Friend. Page 2

Programme 2021 Page 4

Zoom Presentations Page 4

Fascinating Tales from Balloons, Barnstormers and the Royal Flying Corps Page 5

The 1914 Christmas Truce in the Trenches Page 11

The Battles of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift: Part 1 Isandlwana Page 18

Book Reviews Page 28

From Group Leader Barrie Friend

Fellow enthusiasts: Welcome to the December edition of the Military History Group’s

Newsletter which comes with safe seasonal greetings

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Some Reflections

Farewell 2020

2020 has seen many changes in our personal lives, in the relationship we each have with the

U3A and also with our U3A special interest groups. We all have adapted to the circumstances

knowing that not to do so would be folly.

The cry ‘don’t let the group wither on the vine’ was heard loudly within the Military History

Group (MHG) in very early Spring, and we responded by maintaining relationships through

Zoom meetings supported by the introduction of this Newsletter. Thank you, Bob Bartlett, for

the initiative. From a MHG core of 15 members at that time we had enough who took the

plunge and gave Zoom talks with George Blundell-Pound and Jim Barnes flying to the fore.

By welcoming the total membership of Dorking U3A to these talks’ attendance has steadily

increased and the November meeting recorded 55 attendees. Thank you for your support. The

talks are available on Dorking U3A YouTube site. It’s most heartening to note that the core

MHG membership has increased significantly.

By distributing The Newsletter to the Dorking membership, we connect with more members

and it means that those members who don’t view Zoom can read a summary of the talk given

the previous month. Military related articles and book reviews add to readers’ interests and the

Newsletter provides an opportunity for anyone to make their own contribution. This latter

aspect is yet to be fully realised but as there are many very capable members, I know that this

will emerge.

John Sinclair has been a major support to the MHG on our Zoom learning curve and has been

proactive in emailing the talk invitations. Thank you.

Welcome 2021

The introduction of the Covid vaccine means that we can start to look forward with optimism

to the next phase of the group’s evolution. We will continue with Zoom presentations with

invitations to all the Dorking membership. We have our first Zoom guest speaker in January:

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Mike Smith from the U3A Bookham MHG will talk at 1030 on Tuesday 5th January about the

Battle of Gallipoli 1915/1916 and 6 Victoria Crosses awarded before breakfast. Cracking stuff!

You are invited to a Zoom meeting on January 5:

https://zoom.us/j/95576285916?pwd=dHZHR1pnWDdnVWtIYTFMazk0OUVZZz09

Meeting ID: 955 7628 5916 Passcode: 318495

The Newsletter will also be widely distributed.

At some stage the Zoom meetings will finish and we will recommence our face to face meetings

using The Pavilion in Brockham. Hilda Burden’s MHG garden meeting in September

demonstrated how much we needed to talk face to face. A significant number our MHG

members are in the wings waiting to enthral us with face to face talks and speakers from other

U3A MHGs will be invited. Dorking U3A membership will continue to be welcomed to these

meetings and the Newsletter will still play a significant role in our relationship within the MHG

and with the overall membership. With the group growing in size and with the help of Dorking

U3A resources we can consider a Covid safe summer visit to a local military site supported by

a previous illustrated talk.

No time for Churchillian epithets - simply to say that with your support the future looks bright.

Programme for 2021 Meetings via Zoom during Pandemic

January 5: Battle of Gallipoli 1915/1916: Mike Smith

February 2: 1914 Battle for the Falklands: George Blundell-Pound

March 3: Defending Britain from Invasion by the French and by the Germans: Barrie Friend

April 6: Jim Barnes – title to be announced

May 4

June 8

July 6

August 3

September 7

Zoom Presentations

https://www.danhillmilitaryhistorian.com/archive

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Fascinating Tales from Balloons, Barnstormers and the

Royal Flying Corps

Jim Barnes: The link to Jim’s talk on You Tube: https://youtu.be/CSKAkUONzV8

Whilst we know what a balloon is and have heard of the Royal Flying Corps, the word

Barnstormer may be new. A Barnstormer is a pilot who flies in a flying circus or shows off

with his aerobatics. When I researched the story of the RFC I found various authors had the

same idea of chronicling every flight. The story becomes boring and tedious to read so, with

a cruise ship presentation in mind, I decided to create a story of the birth of flight and air

warfare. By the end if the war in 1918 the RAF had 125 different types of aircraft so the story

cannot be about that! So, my presentation has picked out the interesting stories of British,

German and even French exploits in the air.

In 1777 the Mongolfier brothers developed the hot air balloon when Joseph saw the laundry by

the fire billow and lift. He thought perhaps impregnable Gibraltar could be attacked from the

air. Jean Coutelle took the idea further and formed La Compagnie d’Aéronautiers in 1794 and

aimed to help Napoleon in the Egyptian war of 1798 but the ship carrying his equipment caught

fire. However, it was in the American civil war that the balloon came into its own with artillery

spotters giving corrections to the Unionists who could not see the enemy.

In the late 1800s several balloon units were formed in England at Woolwich, Aldershot and

Chatham. But what about heavier than air machines? Sir George Cayley is credited with

discovering weight, lift, drag and thrust building a glider which was like a flying parachute. By

July 1909 Blériot had flown the channel winning £10,000, the Wright brothers had established

themselves with the American military but the British Army were sceptical about the use of an

aircraft. Sam Cody, an American Barnstormer offered to develop the first British aircraft and

although the Army stopped funding him he continued to experiment and take up passengers for

ten shillings and sixpence. Sadly he was killed in 1913 when his aircraft broke up in the air

with passenger W Evans – the opening bat for Kent - who then lost the match! A fine statue of

Sam Cody stands outside the Farnborough museum.

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The first British pilots’ licence was gained by Brabazon and he never let people forget it with

his car registration “FLY 1”. Pilots paid for own lessons which cost £75 and were reimbursed

by the Government if they were successful. Nobody over 40 was allowed to train to be a pilot.

In 1912 Geoffrey De Havilland (of Comet fame) set up his own factory to build the Blériot

aircraft BE1. In April 1917 the superior German aircraft – the Fokker Eindecker – out classed

the RFC’s BE aircraft. It became known as “bloody April”.

Eindecker

In 1911 Prime Minister Herbert Asquith pushed for a committee to be formed to consider a

flying corps of Army and Navy sections. The Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air

Service. On 12th April 1912 the RFC and RNAS was formed under General David Henderson

the Director of Military Training. Aircraft were not fitted with parachutes and this was

considered a lack of moral fibre and only balloon observers were permitted to have a parachute.

France had the largest Army and provided nearly all the aircraft engines – notably the Gnome

radial engine. In August 1914 2, 3 and 4 squadrons were deployed with 16 other aircraft to

France and after three weeks an Avro 504 crashed in German territory advertising that the

British had an air force. The British Expeditionary Force under General French were saved by

a French reconnaissance aircraft which spotted the advancing German army.

Germany was keener on airships but did have the Rumpler Traube which almost resembled a

kite and was given all tasks.

Aircraft were of two basic types ‘Pushers’ with the propeller behind the crew giving an

uninterrupted arc of fire and ‘Pullers’ with the prop on the front with restricted arcs of fire.

Vickers made the Gun bus which was a pusher.

Vickers Gun Bus

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The first VC in the RFC was given to William Rhodes-Moorehouse who attacked a railway

line. At Courtrai. On his return he was mortally wounded but flew 35 miles to report his action

before his death. But the first fighter pilot to gain the VC was Lt Insall.

He was patrolling in a Vickers Fighting Machine, with First Class Air Mechanic T. H. Donald

as gunner, when a German machine was sighted, pursued, and attacked near Achiet.

The German pilot led the Vickers machine over a rocket battery, but with great skill Lieutenant

Insall dived and got to close range, when Donald fired a drum of cartridges into the German

machine, stopping its engine. The German pilot then dived through a cloud, followed by

Lieutenant Insall Fire was again opened, and the German machine was brought down heavily

in a ploughed field 4 miles south-east of Arras.

Germans on the ground then commenced heavy fire, but in spite of this, Lieutenant Insall turned

again, and an incendiary bomb was dropped on the German machine, which was last seen

wreathed in smoke. Lieutenant Insall then headed west in order to get back over the German

trenches, but as he was at only 2,000 feet altitude he dived across them for greater speed,

Donald firing into the trenches as he passed over.

It was clear that aircraft needed guns and the mechanics and pilots fitted their aircraft

themselves with either the Lewis light machine gun or the heavier Vickers machine gun. There

was a high death rate. Life expectancy of pilots was 17 days.

So what about tactics? One of the early tacticians was Lanoe Hawker who had a moto “attack

everything”. He taught his pilots how to attack and survive and even how to get out of a spin.

During the second battle of Ypres Hawker was wounded in the foot but insisted on being carried

to his aircraft. He gained the VC for shooting down three aircraft in the same mission.

He met his death aged 25 when shot down by von Richthofen. Such was his

respect for him that von Richthofen put Hawker’s Lewis gun above his office

door.

Lanoe Hawker

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So what is an ‘Ace’? – 5 kills made you an Ace and von Richthofen had 80 kills.

The great tactician, who taught von Richthofen, was Oswald Boelke . Bolke wrote

the first tactics manual called Dicta Boelcke.

Oswald Boelke Max Immelmann

An equally successful German pilot was Max Immelmann who had 16 kills and

was called the Eagle of Lille. Immelmann developed the Immelmann turn which

is still taught today. It was Lt McGubbin on 18th June 1916 who shot down

Immelmann. Germany would not admit one of its great aces had been shot down

and blamed ground fire.

After a year of war a new commander of the RFC was appointed – Brigadier

Trenchard whose ideals were ‘support the ground’ ‘Know the importance of

morale’ and ‘Offensive Action’. He was the only pilot over 40 years old.

Meanwhile the French came up with the idea of a metal propeller which could

deflect shells enabling the pilot to shoot straight ahead. The aircraft was the

Morane Saulnier and Sub Lt Warneford gained the VC by knocking down a

German airship.

Morane Saulnier

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The Navy wanted aircraft on ships but Handley Page offered the first heavy

bomber to be used against ships. The Americans made 1,500 but the bombing

accuracy was so poor it soon became obvious small aircraft should be on ships.

Albert Ball enlisted in the Army in 1914 but soon transferred to the RFC. In 1916

British ace Albert Ball from Nottingham became a hero by shooting down 44

German aircraft. He was flown back to the UK to visit towns and cities lifting

public morale becoming a symbol of hope. At the age of 20 he was shot down

and lost his life. He was awarded a posthumous VC because of his 44 victories.

The most famous ace of the war was Manfred von Richthofen who served in the

trenches before becoming a pilot. He came up with an idea of selecting the best

pilots and forming teams of 11 to fly together – called Jasta Eleven. So successful

was the idea it produced bloody April 1917 when the RFC lost 80 aircraft despite

having more aircraft in the air than Germany. On 21st April in 1918 von

Richthofen was shot down by Canadiuan Lt Brown RNAS. He was buried with

full military honours at Bertangles France by the Australian Flying Corps. RFC

pilots attended.

Captain Albert Ball VC

In 1918 there were some potent aircraft. The Sopwith Camel – with the first

synchronized gun - which could out turn inside the German Albatross and the

SE5, fitted with a powerful Italian engine, which could fly high and dive with

great success.

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In England there was concern about air defence as the German Gotha bombers

had bombed Liverpool station killing 162 people. But it was Lt Leefe Robinson

who brought down a German airship witnessed by Londoners who sang the

National Anthem.

Lt Leefe Robinson VC

In 1918 Prime Minister David Lloyd George tasked General Smuts with looking

at merging the RFC and RNAS to form the RAF. Many arguments about funding

between the Navy and Army air wings were making air power rivals.

On 1st April 1918 the RAF was formed with paperwork signed by Trenchard in

his office at Farnborough.

Finally, in August 1918 the Germans faced 465 tanks and 1400 aircraft from

Britain, France and the USA. Some 3000 missions were flown. By September

the allies were unstoppable and by November the Armistice was signed. Such had

been the development of air power from the early days of the RFC and RNAS

with 143 Officers and 63 French aircraft, to 27,000 Officers and 22,000 aircraft,

that warfare would never be the same again.

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Myth or Mistletoe?

The 1914 Christmas Truce in the trenches

Barrie Friend

Christmas carols sung between enemies, gifts exchanged, and a grand football match in no

man’s land – it seems that the 1914 Christmas Truce has become almost as well known as the

First World War itself. Various books and articles, a 2005 film (‘Joyeux Noel’) and the 2014

Sainsbury’s Christmas advert have helped to popularise this event.

But what exactly was the 1914 Christmas Truce? Did it happen? Why and where? How did it

start? And who won the grand football match?

A mountain of written correspondence, some with photos, from both sides exist of experiences

along the Western Front demonstrate that the 1914 Christmas Truce occurred. These meetings,

and exchanges of gifts (such as Maconochie’s tinned stew for German cigars, sausages or

sauerkraut), occurred at various points up and down the line and were part of a larger covert

phenomenon known as ‘live and let live’ and not a one-off event.

The BBC/PBS series ‘The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century’ reports: “On

Christmas Eve, 1914… all across the German lines, lights began to appear … sounds of singing

drifted across no man’s land.” The British heard “Stille nacht! Heilige Nacht” and responded

with their own carols. On Christmas Day, men began emerging from their trenches and met

between the lines. One of those who emerged early on was Captain Charles Stockwell who

recalled “I ran out into the trench and heard the Saxons shouting, ‘Don’t shoot! We don’t want

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to fight today. We will send you some beer’.” Stockwell met his German opposite number in

no man’s land “We met, and formerly saluted. He introduced himself as Count something-or-

other and seemed a very decent fellow.”

As Malcolm Brown and Shirley Seaton explain in ‘Christmas Truce’, the ceasefire took place

over more than two-thirds of the British section of the 440-mile Western Front offering a

chance for men on both sides to bury the dead and to take a break from the hostilities.

In ‘Silent Night’, Stanley Weintraub explains that as the spontaneous truce gradually unfolded

many of the greetings between participants were polite, even a bit formal.

Weintraub talks of a Saxon smoking a pipe in no-man’s-land that one British officer took to be

an official gift from German 5 Army commander Crown Prince Wilhelm.

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But what of the grand football game, and of the way it is portrayed in the 2014 Sainsbury’s

advert?

Weintraub mentions unit histories for those in Flanders that refer to football matches between

British units within British lines, and some with the Germans in no man’s land. Although these

games couldn’t have been too elaborate given the difficult terrain, moving aside the dead did

provide some space, at one point is seems amongst turnip and cabbage fields.

Footballs were not in plentiful supply and one unit had to shove straw into a cap-comforter to

create a makeshift one – something the Saxons opposite apparently found amusing.

G Farmer of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles reported that they couldn’t convince the Germans

to participate in a football game – perhaps because their officers had forbidden it, or because

the ground was not really suitable, given the rough terrain and freezing conditions. But a scratch

match was reported “On 1 January, 1915, The Times published a letter from a major in the

Medical Corps reporting that in his sector, after the Saxons sung ‘God Save the King’ to ‘our

people’, one of his men ‘was given a bottle of wine to drink the King’s health’, following which

his regiment ‘actually had a football match with the Saxons, who beat them 3-2!’ ” This is

backed up by the war diaries of the 133 Saxon Regiment unit. Hugo Klemm, of the unit,

remembered “Everywhere you looked, the occupants of the trenches stood about talking to

each other and even playing football.”

This match was denied in the official history of the British brigade. Covered up perhaps for

political reasons (fraternising with the enemy) the history noted, “it would have been most

unwise to allow the Germans to know how weakly the British trenches were held”. For

Oberstleutnant Niemann, football wasn’t the most memorable aspect of the truce: “At our

soccer match we discovered that the Scots wore no underpants … (as) their behinds became

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clearly visible any time their skirts moved in the wind.” Yet, the whole affair was not the grand

get-together of the Sainsbury’s advert.

Another account, from Sergeant Bob Lovell of 3 London Rifles, said that he could “scarcely

credit what (he had) seen and done”, and that even if his side did lose, it was “indeed … a

wonderful day”. Although Weintraub notes that actual footballs were rare at this time, there

are some reports of them being used. One came from Kurt Zehmisch of 134 Saxons:

“Eventually the English brought a soccer ball from their trenches, and pretty soon a lively game

ensued.”

The kind of truces, the level of friendliness between participants, or even that truces occurred

at all, was a mixed picture up and down line. Sergeant Major Nadin of 6 Cheshire Regiment

described one match as “a rare old jollification” whilst Captain Thomas Frost of 1 Cheshires

wrote home about a football match and visits to the German lines in which plum puddings were

swapped for sausages when simultaneously “ … a desperate fight was going on about 800 yards

to our left between the French and the Germans.” Some encounters fell somewhere between

these two extremes.

Private Mullard said in his letter home that men of his unit, the Rifle Brigade, had agreed to

play a game of football with the Germans on Christmas Day and got a ball ready. But the match

was blocked by their commanding officer, and so the British played amongst themselves. In

this case Weintraub says the Germans still managed to join the British for tea and cocoa and

some singing, until they were ordered back to their line when night fell. Then, Mullard recalled

“Just after midnight you could hear, away on the right, the plonk-plonk of the bullets as they

hit the ground, and we knew the war had started again.”

Naturally, there were also those on both sides who wanted to shut the truces down. Lancashire

Fusiliers Lieutenant C Richards was ordered to fill in shell holes by his commander at battalion

HQ, that way a football pitch could be established. But he refused. And Obersleutnant

Riebensahm, of 2 Westphalians, said in his diary that he thought “The whole business is

becoming ridiculous and must come to an end. I arranged with the 55th Regiment that the truce

will end this evening.”

Phillip Maddison, who had seen behind the German lines, summed things up thus: “Both sides

were misled by half-truths. Each side was more inefficient than the other assumed. Beneath the

artificial hatred each respected the other. Victory, if it came at all, would be long delayed,

costly and worthless. Perhaps a football match, after which both sides went home, might be a

better solution.”

Although Weintraub, and Brown and Seaton, questions the credibility of some accounts, they

acknowledge credible sounding accounts of at least one match with a proper football, such as

that given by Ernie Williams of 6 Cheshire’s in a TV interview in 1983. “The ball appeared

from somewhere, I don’t know where, but it came from their side … They made up some goals

and … it was just a general kickabout. I should think there were a couple of hundred taking

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part … Everybody seemed to be enjoying themselves. There was no ill-will between us …

There was no referee, and no score, no tally at all. It was a simple melee … “

Overlooking no man’s land where the two sides met on Christmas Day

With or without football, it’s now been well established that the truce itself came out of a larger

phenomenon known as ‘live and let live’. University of Aberdeen historian Thomas Weber has

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uncovered much evidence that festive truces continued after 1914. One eye-witness account of

a later truce is of Ronald MacKinnon, a Canadian soldier at Vimy Ridge during Christmas 1916

“I had quite a good Xmas considering I was in the front line… We had a truce on Xmas Day

and our German friends were quite friendly. They came over to see us and we traded bully beef

for cigars”.

Covert peace-making during the First World War is described in ‘Trench Warfare 1914-1918

The Live and Let Live System’ by Tony Ashworth. Evidence from 98 per cent of the British

divisions on the Western Front has shown that frontline soldiers “hated the sight of staff

officers”, held generals in contempt, and how the truce system developed despite the High

Command’s edicts that they should not.

“It is no secret that the resentment of trench fighters towards high command was expressed in

derisory and colourful language, but it is less well known that such resentment was also

translated into subtle, collective action, which thwarted the high command trench war

strategy”. “Live and let live was a truce where enemies stopped fighting by agreement for a

period of time: the British let the Germans live provided the Germans let them live in return”.

The truces that developed were tacit and tit-for-tat in nature. As what he refers to as a

‘bureaucracy of violence’ meted out from the top became more elaborate, so too did the truce

systems as they evolved around official censure and measures to stop them.

At first, truces were more overt, for example the 1914 Christmas Truce, but this was the tip of

a much larger iceberg, and one that possibly emerged initially around tacit agreements not to

shell each other during mealtimes.

Ritualised violence was more elaborate. This might involve firing the exact same number of

shells at the exact same spot in the enemy line at the exact same time every day – thus enabling

the enemy to avoid it.

Of course, not all units participated in all of this, and there was a contest between those who

wanted to fight and those who didn’t. Approximately one-third of British units were aggressive

more or less all of the time, one third avoided aggressing the enemy whenever they could, and

the final third varied in their levels of aggression.

Although later it became harder to sustain this kind of open rebellion, “Live and let live was

endemic to trench warfare… one can know neither how men endured the war nor the nature of

the war experience, without also knowing how trench fighters controlled some conditions of

their existence”.

On Christmas Day 1914 there were 77 deaths of BEF servicemen in France and Belgium

(CWGC data). Did the truce slow the killing? Maybe - on the 23rd and 24th December

respectively 110 and 106 deaths occurred and the two following days (26th and 27th) the

numbers were 46 and 76. Was this decline chance, or a reflection of both sides’ desire to

achieve some form of peace on earth?

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The 1914 Christmas Truce was not a one off occurrence but part of the developing culture of

co-existence in trench warfare. Both sides willingly participated and as the war progressed the

live and let live system became more subtle but with fewer units participating.

Memorial in the town of Messines, Flanders.

A Christmas reading and viewing list:

Ashworth, Tony. ‘Trench Warfare 1914-1918. The Live and Let Live System’ (2004)

Brown, Malcolm and Seaton, Shirley. ‘Christmas Truce. The Western Front December 1914’

(2001)

Weber, Thomas. ‘Hitler’s First War’ (2010),

Weintraub, Stanley. ’Silent Night. The remarkable Christmas Truce of 1914’ (2002)

‘Joyeux Noel’ (2005)

‘The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century’ BBC/PBS series

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The Battles of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift

Part 1 Isandlwana

Robert Chase

Presentation to the Oxford and Cambridge Club Military History Group March 2017

These two battles are a textbook illustration of the enduring strengths and weaknesses of the

British Military. The defeat at Isandlwana on 22 January 1879 caused by the poor generalship

of the military establishment's General Frederic Thesinger, Lord Chelmsford contrasted with

the victory against the odds of 30 to 1, 4000 Zulus versus 130 British soldiers at Rorke’s Drift,

which attributable in the view of their superiors to two mediocre junior officers. However, they

sensibly had made full use of the local expertise and initiative of their subordinates. It was a

battle won by the guts and ingenuity of the rank and file and two junior officers earning them

11 VCs and 4 Distinguished Conduct Medals, whereas Isandlwana, where the odds were 2,200

British troops and African auxiliaries versus 24,000 Zulu warriors, only 14 to 1 was a battle

lost by senior officers, who declined to accept the advice of subordinates and local experts.

Lord Chelmsford

The Zulu Nation “People of the Clouds” began as a small sub-tribe numbering just 3000

occupying only 10 square miles, but which at its zenith encompassed Natal, Swaziland and

Mozambique, some11,500 square miles. Its founder Shaka “intestinal beetle” was the exiled

son of the troublesome Nandi the third wife of a minor Zulu sub chief. Shaka changed the

nature of warfare in Southern Africa, which up to then had been limited to a ritual display of

force with few casualties. This left a defeated tribe largely intact and capable of renewing

hostilities. Shaka initiated wars of annihilation; any survivors were either slaughtered or

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incorporated into Shaka's army. He replaced fighting at a distance with light throwing spears

for close combat using broad bladed short stabbing assegais.

Chelmsford

The Zulus' classic attack formation was “the horns of the charging bull, the mature married

men formed the chest for the frontal assault, while the younger warriors formed the flanking

parties the right and left horns and the senior warriors provided the reserve or loins, which were

positioned behind the chest. The warriors of the Chest would hold the enemy in place, while

the horns moved round to attack the flanks and rear, supported as necessary by the reserve.

They would discharge their firearms before the final charge, then throw them down and charge

in with their stabbing spears. In the Anglo Zulu War, which would ultimately be decided by

firepower, this would prove to be a fatal weakness. The 40,000 strong Zulu army was a part-

time body, which required a period of service for a few months a year for all the young men.

At the age of 18 or 19, they were called together to form an amabutho guild or regiment in

which they would serve with the rest of their age group for all their lives. The men were not

allowed to get married or to have full sex, until they had proved themselves as warriors. Once

the members of an amabutho had proved themselves in battle, the King would reward them by

giving permission to marry and wear their hair in a round topknot. The King would then provide

brides for the entire regiment.

Shaka granted Port Natal (Durban) with 3,500 miles of territory, which became Natal to the

English freebooter Henry Flynn, who nursed him back to health after an assassination attempt.

Meanwhile to escape British colonial rule after the British takeover of the Transvaal, the Dutch

vortrekkers in their search for new farming land started to move into Natal and Zululand. This

led to endless friction with the Zulus and the defeat of King Mpande's Zulu army by the Boers'

defensive laager of wagons at Blood River. Mpande's successor King Cetshwayo sought to

coexist with the British. However, the British Government feared that the troublesome Boers

would plot with foreign powers to secure independence from Britain. The British Governments

High Commissioners Bartle Frere and Shepstone therefore argued that despite 40 years of

peaceful coexistence with the Zulu Nation, the Zulu Kingdom should be conquered and

incorporated as part of a South African Confederation in order to promote political stability

and economic development. This would eliminate any potential threat of a Zulu invasion of

Natal, remove a cause of friction with the Boers and free up the young men in the Zulu army

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to be exploited as agricultural labourers and miners by the entrepreneurs needing more labour

to develop the vast economic potential of South Africa. However, the British Government was

already fully occupied in Afghanistan confronting the Russian threat to British India. They did

not want to get involved in yet another colonial war in Southern Africa.

Bartle Frere therefore decided to provoke a war with the Zulus, the “celibate man slaying

gladiators” and present London with a fait accompli. He found a willing accomplice in General

Frederick Thesinger. Lord Chelmsford, who had just successfully put down a rebellion in the

Cape using the men of the 24th

Regiment with their Martini-Henri rifles. Lord Chelmsford's

experience in campaigning in the Cape against the Xhosa had convinced him and Frere of the

superiority of white troops and of the power of the Martini Henry rifle. Lord Chelmsford, “I

am inclined to think that the first experience of the power of the Martini Henry will be such a

surprise to the Zulus that they will not be formidable after the first effort”. His experience with

fighting the Xhosa, who sought to avoid pitch battles made him misjudge the aggressive

fighting capacity of a Zulu impi. A disciplined, well led force of strong athletic warriors, trained

in field craft, who on average were three inches taller than their redcoat opponents, moved with

the speed of cavalry and carefully prepared to be fearless in battle by their medicine-men with

doses of cannabis and powdered red mushroom snuff. Lord Chelmsford was convinced that the

existing forces at his disposal, some 17,000 men and 20 guns would be more than sufficient to

quell the Zulus and there was no need to ask London for reinforcements.

Frere then set out to provoke a war. First, he tried to use the incident when a party of Zulus

crossed the border to seize two errant wives of Chief Sitiwayo, a favourite of King Cetswayo

and their lovers, who were executed on their return to Zululand as a justification for declaring

wars on the Zulus. However, London did not consider this a justification for war and Cetswayo

agreed to pay a fine. Then without consulting London Frere issued an ultimatum, whose terms

he knew no Zulu King could possibly accept as it would be tantamount to abolishing the

monarchy. The ultimatum required Cetswayo to dissolve the army within 30 days, handover

Sitwayo and his sons, dismantle the anbutho system and accept a British Resident, who would

oversee the administration and judicial system. The ultimatum deadline was 31 December 1878

and Cetswayo asked for more time, but on 4 January 1879 a military column under Col. Wood

crossed the Blood River into Zululand. Lord Chelmsford's invasion plan involved five columns.

Columns 1, 2 and 3 were each big enough to defend themselves against the Zulu army and

were to converge on the royal kraal at Ulindi. Each column was composed of a mixed force of

British infantry, artillery and in the absence of regular cavalry, mounted infantry and colonial

volunteers supported by a large force of African auxiliaries. The smaller Columns 2 and 5 were

to defend Natal. He had opted to divide his forces rather than advancing with one large strong

column, because he did not wish to deter the Zulus from engaging in a pitched battle. Also, the

multiple columns approaching from different directions made it more difficult for the Zulus to

bypass them and invade Natal.

Lord Chelmsford joined the Central 3rd

Column, nominally commanded by Col. Glyn, but in

reality, led by Lord Chelmsford. This column crossed the Buffalo at Rorke’s Drift on 11th

January 1878 heading for Ulindi. Its purpose was to hunt down and defeat the main Zulu army.

21

The Column of 4,700 men was made up of 1,891 European and 2,400 African troops. Its

comprised two battalions of 24th

Regiment of Foot (2nd

Warwickshire), a battery of six 7pdr

guns of the Royal Artillery, a unit of mounted police and various units of volunteer European

irregular horse. 60% of the force was composed of newly raised half trained and poorly armed

black African troops, (only 1 in 10 had a firearm mostly muzzle loaders with only 4 rounds of

ammunition because distrusted by the whites, whereas in contrast 1 in 4 of the Zulu warriors

had rifles) of the 1st

and 2nd

battalions of the Natal Native Contingent (NNC) and 300 African

Natal Native Pioneers. The cumbersome column required 2000 oxen and 68 mules to haul the

guns, 220 wagons and 82 carts over rough territory with no roads. It took 10 days to reach

Isandlwana, while in contrast the Zulu impi covered 70 miles in 5 days. The major weakness

of the column was the lack of regular cavalry to help with scouting and intelligence gathering.

Chelmsford had considerable staff officer experience but was not used to battlefield command.

He could not delegate and was old school British army, preferring to have friends on his staff

rather than properly trained staff officers, which was to cause confusion. He neglected the need

for reconnaissance and did not bother to appoint trained intelligence officers. He

underestimated Cetswayo, who realised that in the longer term, he could not defeat the

resources of the British Empire. Therefore, his plan was to crush the individual columns

separately, before they could unite before Ulindi and drive them out of Zululand. His Impis

would then halt on the frontier, while he sought to negotiate peace, before the British could

send out reinforcements.

After crossing the Buffalo, the Central Column destroyed the kraal of Cetswayo's close ally

Chief Sikayo, despite a resolute defence by two or three hundred warriors. Lord Chelmsford

and his troops' over confidence and contempt for the Zulu enemy was increased by this easy

victory. A private of the 24th

wrote “I can tell although large and powerful they have not the

pluck and martial aspect of Englishmen”. On arriving at Isandlwana on the morning of 20th

January many noted the Sphinx-like shape of the hill, which recalled the 24th

regimental badge

awarded after the Battle of the Nile and they called it “the little sphinx”. In Zulu it was “the

little hand”. The site for the camp was chosen by Major Clery who laid out a sprawling camp

with an extensive perimeter, which needed the full column to defend it. Lord Chelmsford took

no interest in the camp and left all the arrangements to his staff, as he expected the camp to be

very temporary.

22

Cetswayo

A number of his officers and advisers were unhappy with the siting of the camp, because it was

overlooked by hills, which could provide cover for enemy forces approaching the camp. They

argued for camping further out in the open plain. Captain Duncombe complained, “Do the staff

think we are going to meet an army of schoolgirls. Why in the name of all that is holy do we

not laager”. However Lord Chelmsford dismissed such criticism retorting to a comment from

Sub Inspector Phillips of the Natal Mounted Police “Tell the police officer my troops will do

all the attacking, but even if the enemy does venture to attack, the hill he complains about will

serve to protect our rear”. Lord Chelmsford did not consider precautions necessary; he was

convinced by reports that the Zulus were gathering around Mangani and that the Zulus would

not dare to attack the camp. So, the camp was neither entrenched nor laagered in contravention

of Lord Chelmsford's own field regulations. Like Custer with the Sioux, he was totally

preoccupied with locating and attacking the Zulus, before they could melt away. So

immediately on arriving at Isandlwana, he galloped off on a reconnaissance with his staff

leaving the column to make camp. He rode out to the Mangeni Hills, where the Zulus were

supposedly gathering.

They spotted small groups of Zulus, but no sign of an Impi. In fact, the Zulus were using their

scouts to draw the British away from their camp at Isandlwana and away from the line of march

of the advancing Zulu Impi. On his return Lord Chelmsford ordered Major Dartnell with most

of the mounted troops to conduct at dawn on 21st

January a reconnaissance of the Hlazkazi

Ridge. At the same time the thousand strong 3rd

Regiment of the Natal Native Contingent under

Commandant Rupert Lonsdale were ordered to reconnoitre the area around Malakatha, which

they did without spotting any Zulu. The use of such a large force for reconnaissance, a quarter

of the column's strength was a strange decision, as such numbers were very conspicuous and

being foot soldiers, they would not be able like cavalrymen to withdraw quickly if attacked.

Also, they lacked firepower, as most were only armed with spears, so they would be no match

for the

Zulus. Lord Chelmsford was playing into the Zulu commanders’ hands by dividing his forces,

over a quarter of which were now operating well away from the camp. In the late afternoon a

23

force of several hundred Zulus appeared, but retired out of sight. Thinking he had found the

advance guard of the Impi Dartnell sent a report to Lord Chelmsford, but he did not realise that

these warriors were only those of the local chief. In fact, the main Zulu army numbering some

23,000 warriors was camped on the night of 20/21 January on the eastern slopes of Siphezi

Mountain. On the morning of 21st

January moved undetected northwest into the Ngewebeni

Valley to camp overnight just 4 miles from the Isandlwana Camp.

At 2 am on receiving Dartnell's report requesting reinforcements, Lord Chelmsford decided to

march out with a flying column to surprise the Zulus, before they could disperse into the hills.

He ordered Col. Glyn with 5 companies of the 2nd

Battalion and Major Harness with 4 of the

guns from his six-gun battery to be ready to depart at dawn on 22nd

January. For maximum

speed and mobility, they would like Custer take no spare ammunition or food, they would only

have their marching allocation of 70 rounds (first extensive use of the Martini Henry rifle in

combat with a rate of fire of 12 rounds a minute made approved Horseguards marching

allocation inadequate. Lord Chelmsford's had casually now like Custer two years previously,

fragmented Number 3 Column into three widely separated components; Durtnall and

Lonsdale's reconnaissance force, the flying column and Col Pulleine's Isandlwana camp guard.

The Central No 3 Column was being subdivided across a distance of 20 miles. Nowhere was

there a sufficient concentration of troops to repel a determined mass attack by the Zulu army

and nowhere did any of the forces have ready access to supplies of reserve ammunition

necessary for a prolonged engagement. (Custer)

Meanwhile Lord Chelmsford sent instructions to Col. Dunford to bring up the 2nd

Column to

reinforce the camp. Lord Chelmsford chose to ignore snippets of information gleaned from

captured Zulus regarding the direction of the Zulus advance towards Isandlwana from the North

East, because it contradicted his own evaluation that the Zulus would be gathering to the South

East of Isandlwana around Mangeni. He led out the 24th

and the guns, riding ahead with his

staff to join Lonsdale's battalion of NNC, which attacked the Zulus on the nearby hills.

However, these Zulus were just a decoy; they fell back and then dispersed. All the time Lord

Chelmsford was being drawn further from the Isandlwana Camp. Chief Ntshingwayo, the

commander of the Zulu army, had not intended to fight on the 22nd

January 1879, as it was a

day of the dead moon. However, Lord Chelmsford had now presented the Zulu commander

with too good an opportunity, having split his forces not just once, but twice. The Zulus would

never get a better chance of destroying the British column. His young warriors were eager for

the fight and his scouts reported that, “The white people were scattered about on the hills

around the camp like a lot of goats out grazing”.

Lord Chelmsford had been so preoccupied with organising the flying column that he neglected

to give orders for the command and security of the camp. Major Clery stepped in and appointed

Henry Pulleine a 40-year-old Major just made Brevet Lt. Col and CO of the 1st

Battalion 24th

in charge of the camp. Pulleine was a socially accomplished staff officer, well regarded by

Horseguards, a good administrator with 24-year’s service, but with no combat experience. He

had had only one week as CO to get to know his fellow officers and men of the 24 . Pulleine

24

received messages from the cavalry outposts located three miles out from the camp reporting

that thousands of Zulus were advancing towards the camp. Pulleine assembled the men of the

1st

24th

then left them on the parade ground for an hour without orders. Then he sent them back

to their tents for lunch for three quarters of an hour after receiving reports from lookouts that

the Zulus appeared to be retreating. At 9.30 am Lord Chelmsford received a message from

Pulleine that the Zulus were advancing on the camp. Lord Chelmsford commented, “There is

nothing to be done”. He sent Milne RN up to the summit of the hill with a naval telescope to

observe the camp, while he enjoyed breakfast with his staff. Milne reported the tents still

standing and all seemed to be quiet. Lord Chelmsford then set off after breakfast with his staff

to find the site for a new camp in the Mangeni Valley, which put him out of contact with the

camp at Isandlwana for an hour.

Meanwhile Lt Col Durnford arrived at Isandlwana at 10.30 am with his 250 troopers of the

Sikhali native horse, a rocket battery and 200 native infantry from the 1st

battalion 1st

Regiment

of the NNC, a total of 526 men, which brought the garrison up to 2,200 men. Durnford did not

take command of the camp, but he did take command of all the mounted troops in the camp.

When the lookouts on the top of Isandlwana reported that the Zulus were retreating, Durnford

decided to ignore his orders from Lord Chelmsford to defend the camp and instead to ride out

towards the Mangeni Hills with the objective of preventing the retreating Zulus joining those

supposedly already facing Lord Chelmsford. Over breakfast he asked Pulleine for two

companies of 1st

24th

(slow moving infantry) to support his cavalry column. At first Pulleine

objected pointing out that his orders were to use the 1st

24th

for the defence of the camp' but

then in deference to a senior officer he gave in. However, Adjutant Melville intervened and

Dunford withdrew his request. Dunford, a Custer look alike with drooping moustaches and a

slouch hat hooked up on one side, rode off at 11.30am on his stallion Chieftain at the head of

his Second Column hoping to take a leading role in the expected battle at Mangeni. He made a

parting request to Pulleine “If you see us in difficulty you must send and support us” to which

Pulleine agreed.

As a result, he in advisedly sent Lt. Cavaye's E Company of 1st

24th

to Tahelane Spur about a

mile from the camp, so as to be in a position to support the two troops of Zikhali Horse. Cavaye

deployed his men along the rocky crest line at five-yard interval and posted Lt. Dyson's

detachment 500 yards to the left. Cavaye's men fired volleys at the Zulus of the right horn as

they moved round the back of the Isandlwana Hill to get into position to attack the camp from

the rear. Pulleine also ordered Major Smith and his 70 artillerymen to deploy the two 7 pdr

guns on a rocky ridge 800 yards on the far left in front of the camp with a good field of fire

over the plain to assist Durnford's retreat if required.

Degacher's A Company was sent to the ridge to protect the guns and Wardell with H Company

was deployed to his right. Mostyn with F Company was sent to support Cavaye on the spur.

The soldiers lay down in skirmishing order with a gap of 10 yards between each man.

Younghusband with C Company anchored themselves against the hillside to facilitate the

withdrawal of Cavaye and Mostyn should this prove necessary. Pulleine had ineptly established

25

a very extended firing line almost a mile out from the camp and the ammunition reserves, which

faced onto a depression. This dead ground provided cover for the advancing Zulus to close

within 200 yards of the firing line unseen or 35 seconds away at charging speed. The firing line

from Cavaye posted on the far left of the camp to Pope on the right extended for 2000 yards or

over a mile, although he had only deployed 400 infantrymen to man it. He initially mobilised

only half of his force of 891 Europeans and 350 natives to man the firing line. All the cooks,

orderlies, clerks, bandsmen and wagon drivers were left to carry on with their normal duties

rather than help with the defence of the camp. He did not strike the tents or laager the wagons

as he was expecting orders to move camp.

Such was the confidence of his fellow career officers in the British superiority over the Zulu

that many officers were hoping for the glory of defeating a Zulu attack before the General got

back. Pulleine may not therefore have wished to take measures, which might have served to

deter a Zulu attack. If, however, on the first sighting of the Zulus Pulleine had struck the tents

and concentrated all his troops in a tight defensive formation with adequate ammunition

supplies close to hand and with their rear protected by Isandlwana Hill, the camp might have

been saved. Dunford sent out reconnaissance patrols to follow up a reported sighting of 600

Zulus. A patrol led by Lt Raw discovered the Zulu Impi concealed in the Ngwebeni Valley just

4 miles from the camp. Raw's troop of irregular native horse fired on the Zulus, who rushed to

the attack around 11.30am and the battle of Isandlwana began. Raw's Zikhali Horse retreated

to join Cavaye on the Tahelane Spur.

Meanwhile Dunford ordered Major Russell and the rocket team together with their NNC escort

to advance towards the right flank in order to outflank the Zulus. Durnford and his mounted

men outstripped the rocket battery and its NNC infantry escort leaving them to fend for

themselves. Having fired just one rocket they were attacked by Zulus at 12.05pm. Major

Russell and several of his team were killed. At midday, four miles from the camp, Durnford

was overtaken by a Caribineer scout who reported seeing a Zulu impi advancing towards the

camp. Durnford realising that he had been duped organised a fighting withdrawal with his

troopers stopping to dismount and fire volleys at the pursuing Zulus until they reached the

Nyokana Donga. Meanwhile staff officer Captain Gardner was sent by Lord Chelmsford with

orders to Pulleine to strike part of the camp and send up supplies for his flying column, so he

could camp in comfort at the Mangeni Falls.

Pulleine on receipt of the orders around 11.30am hesitated over the reply. While he wished to

obey Lord Chelmsford 's instructions he realised that it was rather late in the day to be packing

up a portion of the camp and moving it over 15 miles, at a time when large numbers of Zulus

appeared to be advancing on the camp. Shepstone of the NNC, the Commissioner's son, advised

him to disobey Lord Chelmsford 's orders in the face of the Zulu threat and so he drafted a

reply explaining that “there is heavy firing on the left and we cannot move camp at present”.

Unfortunately, Pulleine did not make it clear that an attack was being launched by thousands

of Zulus, which might have brought home to Lord Chelmsford that the main Zulu Impi had

succeeded in bypassing his flying column. Gardner added an unhelpful message of his own to

the effect that there was fighting about a mile from camp and it is reported that the Zulus are

26

retreating. Once again Lord Chelmsford on receipt of Pulleine's report on the camp being under

attack ignored it to concentrate on his Mangeni campaign.

Major Harness with his guns and infantry escort following several miles behind Lord

Chelmsford heard the field guns firing and could see the flashes of the explosions coming from

Isandlwana. Hamilton Brown's NNC battalion were returning to Isandlwana, but their way was

blocked by the Zulu impi six miles from the camp and had to withdraw. Brown sent a request

to Major Harness RA for help, who turned back with his guns to march towards Isandlwana.

However, Lord Chelmsford's staff officer Major Gossett loudly decrying Brown's reports as

“what bosh” intervened to stop Harness. Lord Chelmsford then confirmed that Harness should

continue the march to Mangeni. The last chance of saving at least some of the camp garrison

had been lost. Lt. Pope's G Company of the 2nd

24th

was posted 800 yards to the right of the rest

of the 24th's firing line to protect the front of the camp and to support Dunford, who had

positioned himself at 12.30pm with his dismounted Edendale, Basutos troopers and military

police in the Nyokana Donga a mile to the far right of the camp. The intensity of Dunford's

troopers' fire initially stalled the advance of the Zulu Left Horn, until they began to run low on

ammunition. Durnford sent Harry Davies to ride over a mile get more ammunition for their

carbines, but he could not find the Second Column ammunition wagon. Durnford could no

longer hold back the Zulu left horn from outflanking his position and as Davies had not yet

returned with the ammunition, Durnford ordered his men at 1.15pm to abandon the Donga and

ride back to the camp in search of ammunition. Durnford had failed to note the location of their

carbine ammunition wagon before riding out for Mangeni, so time was wasted locating it.

Durnford's withdrawal had left Pope dangerously isolated and with his flank exposed. Pulleine

ordered Cavaye's and Mostyn's two companies to withdraw from the spur and reinforce the

firing line. By 12.20pm all six companies of 1/24 with their 440 Martini Henry rifles were now

dispersed along a firing line now reduced in length from 2000 to 700 yards. One soldier every

3 yards to the left of the guns and one every 6 yards to the right.

The Zulus were advancing in skirmish order skilfully using the dead ground in front of the

firing line to conceal their movements, sometimes running and sometimes crawling. The

warriors bobbing up and down in the tall grass to fire their weapons obscured by gun smoke

and the fading light, with the coming eclipse of the sun, were difficult targets. One in four Zulus

had a firearm, so they heavily outgunned the 24th. However, for most part they were poor

marksmen and so their fire only became effective at close range. The casualties amongst the

24th

rank and file were light at this stage, as they used cover to reload. The Zulu fire was

however taking its toll amongst the officers and the gunners, who remained standing. Much of

the Zulu fire overshot the 24th's firing line and fell amongst the NNC standing well back behind

the 24th, who began to desert in large numbers.

The companies on the firing line were managing to stall the advance of the Zulu chest, but then

they began to run low on ammunition and being so distant from the camp, the rate of resupply

was inadequate. Also, after two-dozen shots the Martini Henri rifle barrels heats up to 46

degrees baking the black powder residue into a hard coating and the soft brass casings were

easily damaged, which led to some rifles jamming. A few guns jamming would not pose a

27

problem for troops in close formation, but in skirmish order with troops strung out with six-

yard gaps, it caused significant gaps in the fire wall. At that moment the Induna of the Meijo

Chief Mkhouza raced down from the command post on the Nyoni Ridge to relaunch the

advance shouting, “Your King sent you to kill red soldiers, not to hide in the grass”. He was

killed in the renewed advance.

At 1.15pm Pulleine finally realising the danger ordered the firing line of the 24th

to withdraw

closer to the camp and nearer to the ammunition supplies. There were 400,000 rounds stored

in the camp and the ammunition boxes were not difficult to open even without a screwdriver.

The real problem had been getting the ammunition delivered in sufficient quantities out to the

distant fighting units. As soon as H and A Companies, who were flanking the guns started to

retire, the Zulu chest rushed forward and became interspersed with the withdrawing

artillerymen, who were cut down. The men of Pope's company were now isolated with no hope

of re-joining their comrades and they were brought to bay on the nek/pass. Pope shot and

wounded an Induna, who then stabbed him to death with his Iklwa. Pulleine now finally

realised that the right horn having passed behind Isandlewana were now advancing unopposed

to attack the camp from the undefended rear.

It was 1.30pm and he had no reserves and all the 24th

together with the European officers of the

NNC and the volunteers were already engaged in trying to keep the frontal attack by the Zulu

chest at bay. Belatedly Pulleine sent staff officers to round up the cooks, bandsmen and

orderlies in order to bolster the firing line. However, as Pulleine had less than 2000 to defend

a sprawling camp designed for 4,000, his only viable option would be to contract the perimeter

and form a fighting square. The 24th managed to retreat again halting to fire volleys to keep

the Zulus at a distance. However, some of the units became disorganised amongst the tents and

were cut off from their ammunition supplies by the surrounding Zulus as they retreated to the

Saddle. Around 2pm there was an eclipse and all went dark. The remaining men of the 24th

succeeded in forming a two-rank battle line, but they were now standing close together, which

made them easier targets for the Zulus, who had 5,000 rifles to the 24th's 300. Meanwhile the

retreating guns and limbers had overturned and the artillerymen slaughtered. Durnford's

volunteer cavalrymen and Pope's regulars gallant final stand helped for a time to cover the

retreat. This allowed some of the fugitives to escape mostly on horseback making their way

over the rocks the six miles to the Buffalo River, before the left and right horns closed trapping

the remaining camp defenders.

Amongst the fugitives were Coghill and Melvill with the Queen's Colour, which Pulleine had

asked Melvill to save. They were both killed on the banks of the Buffalo. Captain

Younghusband and his Company held out on the slopes of Isandlwana until they exhausted

their ammunition, when he led a final downhill charge to join the last of the soldiers still

fighting. Col Pulleine was killed in the square, as the ammunition failed and the survivors were

left facing Zulu bullets and throwing assegais with only their much feared lunger bayonets for

defence. The last soldier died defending a hillside cave above where Younghusband had made

his stand. At 2.30 pm the fighting had ceased. Out of the garrison of 1,762, only 55 Europeans

and 350 Africans survived. The surviving Europeans included just five British regular officers,

28

of which four were staff officers. Only one, Lt. Curling RA, had been on the firing line. Many

of the bodies suffered ritual disembowelment to release the spirit and protect the killer from

harm. The Zulus captured the two 7pdr guns, 1000 Martini Henry rifles and 250,000 rounds.

An estimated thousand Zulus were killed and many of the wounded later died.

NNC Commandant Brown informed Lord Chelmsford that the Zulus had taken the camp. Lord

Chelmsford retorted, “How dare you tell me such a falsehood. On your honour tell me is it

true”. Brown responded, “The camp was taken at 1.30pm, the Zulus are burning the tents”.

Lord Chelmsford replied, “That may be a quartermaster's fatigue burning the tents”. Brown

riposted “Quartermasters' fatigues do not burn tents”. Meanwhile Lonsdale had ridden back

towards the camp. He was shocked to discover that the scarlet jacketed figures were not the

24th , but Zulus, so he withdrew to report to Lord Chelmsford. On hearing the news Lord

Chelmsford expostulated “But I left 1,000 men to guard the camp”.

To be continued in Newsletter 6

Book Reviews

Johnnie Johnson's Great Adventure

The Spitfire Ace of Ace's Last Look Back

By Dilip Sarkar MBE

Imprint: Pen & Sword Aviation

Pages: 288

Illustrations: 16 black and white illustrations

29

ISBN: 9781526791740

Published: 29th October 2020

Author Dilip Sarkar MBE

Driven by his passion to research and share the stories of casualties and record the human

experience of war, DILIP SARKAR is a best-selling author whose work is highly regarded

globally. A noted expert on the Battle of Britain period, who enjoyed a long and very personal

relationship with the Few, Dilip was made an MBE in 2003 for ‘services to aviation history’,

and, in 2006, elected to the Fellowship of the Royal Historical Society. A sought-after, dynamic

speaker, Dilip's work has been exhibited internationally and he continues to work on TV

documentaries, on and off camera.

Synopsis

Air Vice-Marshal Johnnie Johnson – a policeman’s son from Leicestershire – ended the Second

World War as the RAF’s top-scoring fighter pilot. Fearless, and an exceptional pilot and

marksman, Johnnie was also highly intelligent and a gifted writer.

Having published two of his own books, Wing Leader and The Circle of Air Fighting, during

the 1980s and 1990s, Johnnie co-authored several more with another fighter ace, namely Wing

Commander P.B. ‘Laddie’ Lucas. In 1997, the ‘AVM’ suggested to his friend, the prolific

author Dilip Sarkar, that the pair should collaborate on The Great Adventure – a book that

would, in effect, be Johnnie’s account of the ‘Long Trek’ from Normandy across Northern

Europe into the heart of the Third Reich itself. ‘Greycap Leader’ was to produce a draft, after

which Dilip would add the historical detail and comment. Sadly, the project was unfulfilled,

because Johnnie became ill and passed away, aged eighty-five, in 2001. Years later, Johnnie’s

eldest son, Chris, discovered the manuscript among his august father’s papers. In order to keep

Johnnie’s memory evergreen, Chris turned to Dilip to finally see the project through to its

conclusion.

In this book Johnnie re-visits certain aspects of his wartime service, including the development

of tactical air cooperation with ground forces; his time as a Canadian wing leader in 1943,

when the Spitfire Mk.IX at last outclassed the Fw 190; and details his involvement in some of

the most important battles of the defeat of Nazi Germany, including Operation Overlord and

the D-Day landings in 1944, Operation Market Garden and the airborne assault at Arnhem, and

the Rhine Crossings, throughout all of which Johnnie also commanded Canadian wings. Here,

then, we have The Great Adventure – ‘Greycap Leader’s’ previously unpublished last look

back.

Review

Boys growing up in the 1950s had the choice of many heroes. Johnny Johnson was one of mine

along with Ginger Lacy, Al Deere, Bob Tuck and Adolph Gysbert Malan, we knew as Sailor

Malan, a South African fighter pilot. Top of the list was of course Johnny Johnson who

published an autobiography “Wing Leader” in June 1956. A cracking book of courage and

30

adventure for naïve young people unable to contemplate the horrors involved. These brave and

resourceful men began to fade from the public consciousness but then came Dilip Sarkar whose

work post police force, has been to ensure the names and brave actions of the Second World

War fighter pilot have been recorded forever. It is fitting that the son of a policeman has as his

biographer a former police officer from West Mercia!

This is believed to be the third book by Dilip concentrating on Johnson and his war. The first

published in 2011 was “Spitfire Ace of Aces, the Wartime Story of Johnnie Johnson.” Then

came “Johnnie Johnson – the Wartime Diary of a Spitfire Ace” which is to be re-published

soon and the 2020 “Johnnie Johnson’s Great Adventure”.

Johnnie was a nickname, they all seemed to have nicknames, he was christened James Edgar

Johnson and who was to achieve the high rank of Air Vice Marshall and a career officer after

being the RAF’s top-scoring fighter ace during the Second World War.

So why another book? Has the ground not already been covered? Yes and No! “Johnnie

Johnson’s 1942 Diary – the Wartime Diary of the Spitfire Ace of Aces” is Johnnie’s 1942 diary

is, according to Sarkar, “what it says on the tin”. “Spitfire Ace of Aces, the Wartime Story of

Johnnie Johnson” was written by Sarkar in 2011 and covers the full wartime career, proliferated

with first-hand accounts from his pilots and includes the last interviews he ever gave

“Johnnie Johnson’s Great Adventure” published in 2020 was supposed to have been a

collaborative effort but at the age of 85 the Ace of Aces died (2001). Almost twenty years later

this final part of the story a book starting after Johnnie is posted away from Kenley Canadian

Wing in 1943. Much of this work is extracted from “Spitfire Ace of Aces” which remains the

only biography of this fighter ace.

Sarkar knows his subject well and unusually for a biographer had the privilege of knowing his

subject well, albeit in the twilight of Johnson’s long and active life. The book has a great deal

of detail and description of the life of an operational pilot during the Second World War. What

the reviewer found difficult and at time frustrating, was the jump from quotations to narrative

and back and recognising that such a switch had occurred! There are no references, no dates or

sources. Was it in conversation, was it in a previous Sarkar book or from one of Johnny

Johnson’s published works? The final chapters appear to be totally Johnson but it is unclear

if this is fully the case.

Do not let these niggles stop you buying the book. If you are a Johnson follower you will buy

it as that is what you do! If you are an enthusiast of wartime RAF operations, particularly

fighter command this is a must.

There are a number of black and white photographs, an outline of Johnson’s service record

with postings and squadrons, an extraordinary list of combat claims and an impressive list of

decorations and awards.

31

Beating the Nazi Invader

Hitler’s Spies, Saboteurs and Secrets in Britain 1940

Neil R Storey

Imprint: Pen & Sword Military

Pages: 310

Illustrations: 150-200 black and white illustrations

ISBN: 9781526772947

Published: 15th October 2020

Neil R Storey is an award-winning historian and author. A graduate of the University of East

Anglia, he lectures widely on 20th Century history and has assembled a fine collection of

original First and Second World War images.

His published works include The British Soldier of the Second World War, Women in the

Second World War and The Home Front in World War Two. The King’s Men: The

Sandringham Company and Norfolk Regiment Territorial Battalions 1914 – 1918 is published

by Pen and Sword Books Ltd.

Synopsis

Beating the Nazi Invader is a revealing and disturbing exploration of the darker history of

Nazis, spies and ‘Fifth Columnist’ saboteurs in Britain and the extensive top-secret

countermeasures taken before and during the real threat of invasion in 1940.

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The author’s research describes the Nazi Party organisation in Britain and reveals the existence

of the Gestapo headquarters in central London. The reader gains vivid insights into Nazi agents

and terrorist cells, the Special Branch and MI5 teams who hunted them and investigated

murders believed to have been committed by Third Reich agents on British soil.

Accessing a host of recently de-classified files the book explores the highly classified measures

taken for the protection of the Royal Family, national treasures and gold reserves. The British

government made extensive plans for the continuation of government in the event of invasion

including the creation of all-powerful Regional Commissioners, ‘Blacklists’ of suspected

collaborators and a British resistance organisation. We also learn of the Nazis’ own occupation

measures for suborning the population and the infamous Sonderfahndungsliste G.B, the Nazi

‘Special Wanted List’.

The result is a fascinating insight into the measures and actions taken to ensure that Great

Britain did not succumb to the gravest threat of enemy invasion and occupation for centuries.

Review

Storey has gone back to primary sources, best evidence, for a great deal of this work and that

is obvious from the accounts and elucidations given to a comprehensive explanation of the

German intelligence operations in the UK during the build-up to war and the early years. He

is to be congratulated as so many so-called historians use little more than secondary sources

including the Internet for their research. The reader is soon disabused about German efficiency

as the Abwehr sent men, and it was mostly men, on missions to the UK under trained and

poorly prepared. Capture or death of these luckless yet extremely brave agents, gave

opportunities for the British to establish Double Cross, using turned agents to supply

misleading “intelligence” to the Abwehr. It is believed that almost every agent dropped into

the UK was soon found, turned or executed. The iron fist of the British state usually very well

hidden appears above the parapet. There are chapters on Nazi supporters in Britain in the build-

up to war, murder cases where German intelligence may well have been involved with the

author using Metropolitan Police archive material to ensure exactness of his interpretation. The

role of MI5 and Special Branch are crucial to this story and there is accurate reference to their

activities, investigations and methods of working.

This is a really good book. Highly readable, always interesting with new material accurately

established by an historian’s reliance on primary sources. High production values with

numerous photographs. There are three appendices giving additional details of MI5 activities.

Notes on sources, chapter by chapter, which are critical in a book such as this. There is also an

extensive biography, again essential for other than the casual reader to see the source of detailed

material. Highly recommended.

Hitler's Spies

Lena and the Prelude to Operation Sealion

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By Mel Kavanagh

Imprint: Pen & Sword Military

Pages: 320

Illustrations: 16 black and white illustrations

ISBN: 9781526768728

Published: 29th October 2020

Mel Kavanagh

Born in Hampshire, Mel Kavanagh spent his childhood in Surrey before joining the RAF in

1972. He comes from a family steeped with military history. His father served with the army

during WWII, serving overseas. Other relations served in the Royal Navy and RAF. His

grandfather was at the Battle of Jutland during WWI aged just 16.

He spent many years in IT as a computer programmer and systems analyst before retraining as

a teacher in 2003 Hitler’s Spies: Lena, The Prelude to Operation Sealion is his first work in

non-fiction.

Synopsis

September 1940: Britain stands alone against the might of the advancing German Army and

the spectre of invasion looms. Using a wealth of primary material including sources previously

designated secret, this is the first book, written in English, dedicated to the story of the first

four German spies who successfully arrived in the south of England. Using the codename

Operation Lena, it was the initial undertaking to necessitate Hitler’s invasion of England, itself

codenamed Operation Sealion. These men were to be the pathfinders, the scouts, the eyes and

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ears that would help the first invasion of England for several hundred years.

This extraordinary story stands as evidence of the only part of the invasion actually to arrive,

of the abysmal quality of their selection and training, of the extraordinary fair-mindedness of a

British jury, especially when Britain was gripped by spy paranoia. This is possibly one of the

most audacious and least known episodes of the Second World War.

Review

This is the story of four men who were sent as pathfinders for Operation Sealion, in preparation

for the proposed invasion of England. To write this detailed and readable account of Operation

Lena and the response of the UK defence forces, a significant amount of research has been

undertaken by Kavanagh for this his first work of non-fiction. There is a comprehensive

catalogue of documents from the National Archives particularly Security Services and Cabinet

Office material. Also, extensive bibliography of associated books with a significant list of

Internet links to a broad range of related sites. A good deal of the latter is associated with

providing the timeline which is imbedded across the book.

There is no index (why?) which is always frustrating but there are extensive notes, sources, a

list of key players and a glossary of terms. However, it is difficult to look for specifics including

individuals and locations, without the help of an index. There is an unusual mix of narrative

and timeline of Second World War events happening that day, which can be distracting and it

is not clear why the author chooses to use this device. There is a mix therefore of “big picture”

material with detail of Op Lena and its unravelling by British security personnel.

By concentrating on what Kavanagh refers to as The Brussels Four, luckless Abwehr agents

sent on what for some appeared suicide missions, significant knowledge is added to the history

of these dangerous times. There were about 12 agents sent to the country in September 1940

under Op Lena to supply information on British preparations to counter an invasion. All were

detained before they could do any harm. The book clearly establishes the detention,

interrogation along with detail of time in custody of the Brussels Four, their exposure to British

judicial process and outcome. There is considerable detail of the activities of MI5 and what

took place at the MI5 camp, Latchmere House at Kew where almost 500 prisoners were

detained from which fifteen were executed at the Tower of London. About a dozen became

highly valued double agents.

The questions remain. Was Op Lena a poorly planned and executed operation or did they come

up against a country ready to discover a spy at every turn? Vigilance and super-awareness of

the invasion threat particularly on the Kent coast. It is even written that it was a devious plot

by Abwehr leadership to destroy any likelihood of the invasion taking place. Maybe there was

some of that but the conspiracy would have to involve many and it never leaked!

A worthwhile book very well researched and which breaks new ground.

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