Miles Stanley Oral History Interview – 7/13/1964

Administrative Information

Creator: Miles Stanley

Interviewer: William L. Young

Date of Interview: July 13, 1964

Place of Interview: Charleston, West Virginia

Length: 23 pages

Biographical Note

Stanley, president of the West Virginia Labor Federation, AFL-CIO (1957-1974); and

alternate delegate to Democratic National Convention from West Virginia (1960, 1972),

discusses the organization, expenditures and effectiveness of John F. Kennedy’s (JFK)

1960 primary campaign in West Virginia, personal contacts with JFK, and the position of

unions and organized labor in the West Virginia primary and general election, among

other issues.

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Transcript of Oral History Interview

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room

of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character

recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts.

Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have

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transcripts and the interview recordings.

Suggested Citation

Miles Stanley, recorded interview by William L. Young, July 13, 1964, (page number),

John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

Miles Stanley

Table of Contents Page Topic 1, 4, 15, 22 Unions and organized labor in the 1960 West Virginia Democratic

primary and general election 1, 18 Personal contacts with John F. Kennedy (JFK) 2, 21 Role of JFK’s personality and origin in West Virginia primary 10, 15 Religion in West Virginia primary 12 Organization, expenditures and effectiveness of JFK’s primary campaign 19 New Frontier social and economic programs initiated by JFK

Oral History Interview

with

Miles Stanley

July 13, 1964 Charleston, West Virginia

By William L. Young

For the John F. Kennedy Library

YOUNG: This interview is being recorded at the Daniel Boone Hotel, Charleston, West Virginia, on July 13, 1964, with Mr. Miles Stanley, who in 1960 and at the present time, 1964, was and is president of the West Virginia Labor Federation, AFL-CIO. Mr. Stanley, could you tell me first when you first became interested in the Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] candidacy or your first contact with the late President? STANLEY: My first contact with the late President was in mid-1959 while I was in Washington; he sent a message to our national office that he would like to talk with me personally about his anticipated candidacy. Of course, I responded and met with him in his Senate office on the Hill, and we spent about 35 to 40 minutes discussing the general political situation and his anticipated entrance into the West Virginia primary. I didn’t realize at the time that he was thinking seriously about entering the primary—eventually it resulted that he was—but he asked me very candidly at that time what effect did I think his religious affiliation would have on his candidacy in West Virginia. I equally as candidly answered him that I thought it would have an adverse effect. I’m happy to say in retrospect that I was proved wrong. YOUNG: What then was the official position of organized labor in West Virginia in the primary itself?

STANLEY: Well, I received a telegram from our National Executive Council, which was meeting at Miami Beach in their Winter meeting in early 1960 advising me that the position of the AFL-CIO in West Virginia should be one of complete neutrality—realizing that Senators Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] and Kennedy were our friends; that we should cooperate with them in every way possible, and we endeavored to follow that to the letter.

[-1-] YOUNG: Mr. Stanley, did you have any contact with the late President then after this initial meeting and before the primary itself? STANLEY: Yes—on the first official trip that I recall he made to West Virginia—he came into Wellsburg in the northern panhandle, and I received a call there from Hulett Smith [Hulett C. Smith], the State Democratic Executive Committee Chairman at the time, asking me if I would be willing to meet with the late President, Mr. McDonough [Robert P. McDonough], and him, when they came to Charleston that afternoon, since the Senator had a speaking engagement at the Young Democrats meeting here in the evening. Of course, I advised him that I would be happy to meet with them, and they came to my office at 5:30 in the afternoon and we spent 30 minutes discussing again the general political situation. The Senator was primarily interested at that time in explaining his role in the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Bill which had, you may recall, just passed the session of Congress, and he was very much in the forefront in that legislative battle and he felt that the labor movement—or at least some segments of it which did not understand his involvement—might feel that he had not protected the union’s interests. At the end of his explanation I was completely satisfied that he had acted in what he considered to the best interests of the labor movement and of the country. YOUNG: At this particular time, do you have any memories of the President as a personality or public figure rather than policy? How did he strike you as an individual? STANLEY: Well, this occasion—as I indicated—was my second direct personal contact with him and, again, as I look back I can only regret that I did not have the opportunity to know him earlier because he made a tremendous impact on me personally by his understanding of the economic and social issues of the day and, most of all, the real feeling of compassion that I felt he had for the people and for their problems. For these reasons I knew at the end of our second meeting that I had indeed met a great man. YOUNG: You felt then that his concern for West Virginia as a depressed area was a rather genuine feeling? STANLEY: Absolutely! I had no doubt in my mind at all but that his compassion for and the understanding of the problems of the people was genuine beyond doubt

and he communicated to me in that brief period of time the very definite feeling that, if he were successful in his bid for the presidency, we could expect him to take direct and dynamic action to help solve

[-2-] these problems. YOUNG: Did you feel at any time that his Harvard accent and Eastern mannerisms perhaps might be in his way in the State of West Virginia? STANLEY: Well, yes—I’d be less than honest if I said otherwise—because his environment, his background, his educational training and all were in areas that are completely foreign to West Virginia and I felt that again this might be some liability to him. I suppose I was underestimating the real magnetism of his personality. As he projected himself in his speeches around the state in subsequent months, it became evident to most of us that he was having a terrific impact on the common people whom I felt it would be difficult for him to reach. But I think he was able, through his tremendous feeling which came from the inside and through his ability to articulate this feeling, to convey the same feeling to a thousand people that he was able to convey to me as one individual, and that these feelings were genuine and that he had real deep inward concern for these people who were unfortunate to have been kind of shoved out of the mainstream of American life. YOUNG: Would you agree with me that, in general, West Virginians tend to have a natural suspicion of carpetbaggers? STANLEY: Yes. I think that most of us West Virginians—and I’m proud to be one—are a little provincial in our nature and in our outlook, and it’s a real commendation to any individual who can come into our state and be able to convince our people, as the late President so ably did, that he was one of us—that he wants to help us. YOUNG: How would you evaluate Senator Humphrey along the same lines? STANLEY: Well, Senator Humphrey, for whom I have a great admiration, was, as everyone knows, a different type of individual and I think that he too possessed some of the characteristics which I commented on. But Senator Humphrey was unable for many reasons, most of them physical, I suppose, to project himself in the manner that the late President did. I think that if he had had more time—perhaps more resources, in some instances—that he would have been able to have done a much better job.

[-3-] YOUNG: Mr. Stanley, let’s go back to a point that you made earlier—that the official position of labor in West Virginia was one to observe strict neutrality and that

you extended the same kind of cooperation to both candidates. Could you describe in detail the term “cooperation” just exactly what did you—did your organization do for both candidates? STANLEY: Well, officially, in accordance with our advice from the national office— although we are not required legally to follow that to the letter—I have always felt that the national organization should have sole discretion as to whom the organization would support for nationwide offices. So, therefore, I was perfectly willing to follow their advice. In extending cooperation to each of the candidates, this involved the transmission of lists of leading labor people in the state, leaders of our organization, to each of them, which we did—an exact duplicate—working closely with their West Virginia people—in the late President’s case, Mr. Ralph Dungan [Ralph A. Dungan], and in the case of Senator Humphrey, Rein Vanderzee [Ryan VanderZee]. YOUNG: Were they both West Virginians? STANLEY: Neither of them were West Virginians. They were—oh, I don’t know—Mr. Vanderzee, I believe, came initially from Minnesota, perhaps Wisconsin—I’m not sure at this point—and Mr. Dungan was from up East—Massachusetts perhaps. They were in our office two or three times a week and—an interesting sidelight—almost every visit each of them made they would tell me how they had heard in some section of the state that I was supporting the other candidate for president; that I had made some comment, or I had made a speech in which I had indicated my preference for either Senator Kennedy or Senator Humphrey. Of course, I hastened to assure them that this was not the case—as a matter of fact, I leaned over backwards to stay away from rallies where either of the candidates were appearing, and the only exception to this was in Clarksburg, where our Committee on Political Education at the local level held a “Meet-the-Candidate Night” and we invited both Senators Humphrey and Kennedy to appear. Senator Kennedy unfortunately was tied up campaigning somewhere else and could not be present but Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr. represented him and Senator Humphrey was there in person, and we endeavored in every way possible to give each of them exactly the same kind of courtesy and same kind of cooperation.

[-4-] YOUNG: Well, did you, as probably the most important labor official in West Virginia, ever feel any pressure from either camp? STANLEY: Well, no, I couldn’t say that I felt pressure. YOUNG: You were invited to come to church… STANLEY: Yes, I received numerous telephone calls from Washington and from other places when some of these rumors, which were spread around by supporters

of the respective candidates, that I was leaning one way or the other, it wasn’t unusual for me to receive a call making an inquiry and in each instance I endeavored to explain my position. YOUNG: Well, Mr. Stanley, you have spoken of the official position of organized labor in West Virginia—would you draw the subtle shades of distinction perhaps between the old AFL and the old CIO as to position and then talk about individually affiliated unions as well as perhaps independent unions that are not part of your organization? STANLEY: Well, that’s a very good question because there were differences. I don’t know if I can distinguish between the old AFL and the old CIO unions. It’s a little difficult because, really, we had supporters of the respective candidates which came from both the old AFL and the old CIO unions. The Building Trades Unions which, as you know, were formerly AFL affiliates—many of the leaders of the Building Trades Unions —appeared to lean toward the candidacy of Senator Kennedy. YOUNG: Can you give any special reason for this? STANLEY: Well, I think it’s a reflection of their international unions’ position. In most instances, if their general president had his preferences, it drifted down to the local business agents or the local presidents and had a definite influence on them. In some of the Industrial Unions we had leaders who were apparently leaning toward Senator Humphrey but, by the same token, we had some who were leaning toward Senator Kennedy. And the whole situation was pretty much split up. Now, with regard to the independent unions, again to my knowledge, neither the Teamsters nor the United Mine Workers took an official position in the matter, but it was my understanding at the time that the leadership of those unions

[-5-] preferred Senator Humphrey over Senator Kennedy. I don’t know all the reasons because I’m not that close officially to those two organizations. Our own organization through our Central Labor Bodies, of which we have thirteen in West Virginia, did not take any official part in the campaign and made no kind of an endorsement. Nor did any of the local unions, per se, but the statement that I made earlier comes from my personal knowledge of the individual leaders of the respective unions and what they indicated to me to be their own preference. I didn’t get any kind of pressure from any of the leadership of the various international unions to give the support and influence of our office to either candidate because our position was well established and well stated and everyone knew what it was—and that was the position of neutrality and friendly cooperation. YOUNG: You spoke of sentiment drifting down from labor leadership at the top—were there any examples of sentiment drifting up from the bottom in terms of support for either candidate?

STANLEY: Well, I can’t recall any at this date where this was the case. The reason for that is the structure of the organization because most of the general presidents and general officers knew both of the candidates very well personally and they had their individual preferences. But this didn’t apply in so far as local leadership was concerned. Few of them had had an opportunity to know either Senator Kennedy or Senator Humphrey personally and therefore they would not have occasion to endeavor to influence their own international organization as to which way they should go. YOUNG: Were any of the labor leaders or labor personnel who were active for Humphrey really active for Humphrey because they felt that perhaps they might help the candidacy of Senator Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] at that time? STANLEY: No, I don’t believe so. At least in our own organization I don’t think that this was the case. Now, there was some indication that this might be true in the United Mine Workers at that time and, of course, there are some reasons for that—I’m quite sure—and I’m not in a position to officially comment on that. YOUNG: If you were to assess the labor voting record of both candidates, would one or the other have a slight edge as far as your organization would be concerned or would they balance each other pretty evenly on the labor seesaw?

[-6-] STANLEY: Well, strangely enough, I think their voting records were rather evenly balanced. As you know, each of the candidates had been identified with the liberal progressive wing of the Democratic Party and each of them had been involved most of the time on the side of the liberal cause in the various legislative battles which had taken place over the years. Going back to the time that the late President served on the House Education and Labor Committee, he was very active and led some of the fights for some of the progressive legislation which has been brought into being in recent years. So, voting record-wise, there was not a great deal of difference, although I’m sure there was a little difference. YOUNG: Well, could you weigh the difference one way or the other? Or do you feel it’s so close that this would be irrelevant? STANLEY: I feel that it was rather close, and from my level of operation it would be most difficult for me to weigh the difference. YOUNG: We’re all aware of the very special pitch that Senator Kennedy made, of course, to members of the United Mine Workers who presumably were suffering from unemployment. What special pitch did Senator Kennedy make toward the members of labor unions that were employed and could not be called “depressed”

—in other words, worker, cabinetmaker, someone like that who had been employed and had not suffered unemployment. Was there any attempt to make the pitch at that level? STANLEY: Well, one of his most famous statements that I recall hearing in this regard was with respect to the overall economy that, if you plant a tree and it grows two feet and yet it should have grown five feet in a given period of time, it hasn’t grown enough. He kept trying to tell all the people, and I assume this was aimed primarily at those who were gainfully employed, that although their own situation might be good, that it could be better. And another facet of this that I thought he communicated quite well was trying to reawaken within all of the people this feeling of concern for those who were less fortunate than themselves—that they had a moral and social responsibility to help the unemployed—those who were out of a job because of mechanization, technological change, or because the economy was not growing fast enough to absorb the increased manpower, or for whatever reason. I think that among trade unions especially, he tried to impress on them the traditional moral and social responsibility of the

[-7-] trade union movement and that is to help the economy move ahead and move fast enough to take up the changes that were occurring and thus give employment to all those who were willing and able to work; this is the trend that I seemed to note in most of his speeches and public statements. YOUNG: Time after time we’ve heard about the effect of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., especially among the unemployed United Mine Workers—could you comment on the role of FDR, Jr., in terms of trade unions? STANLEY: Well, yes, I think the Roosevelt name is still magic among most trade unions because it was under the leadership of the late President Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt] that the labor movement really began moving ahead—it received its Magna Carta under the Wagner Act—the National Labor Relations Act—and really started organizing the mass production industries. The coal miners in West Virginia became much more heavily organized and started gaining some of the benefits which they had been denied for too many years. So the Roosevelt name in West Virginia is magic—political magic, that is—and I think when he spoke that most of the unemployed miners who, incidentally, were the older miners and they remembered the days of the ‘30s and what his father had been able to do for them—I think that the effect was a big plus in Senator Kennedy’s campaign. YOUNG: Would you say, however, that FDR, Jr., was probably more effective among the miners than among the trade unions? STANLEY: Well, as a group of trade unions—yes, I would say that his effect on the mine workers was probably greater than it was among the trade unions as a whole

because the miners again tend to be older workers; you get into the chemical industry and steel industry and others, workers are younger and perhaps they don’t remember the days of the ‘20s and ‘30s quite so well. YOUNG: Did President Kennedy bring in any other outsiders that were designed particularly to woo the labor vote other than FDR, Jr.? Or, we might put it another way—can you think of any other special techniques or slants that Senator Kennedy used with respect to organized labor—either outside visitors or just simply special appeals on his own part?

[-8-] STANLEY: Well, he used a lot of techniques—he was out early and worked late. He was at the mill gates in the morning—the President personally or some of his aides—handing out the literature. He was there late at night—he went down into the mines and had good coverage on TV and film clips of it which were later played back—he had paid political broadcasts. All these things I think tended to make the working people and the trade union members feel that he was truly interested in their problem and he wasn’t just playing around and coming in and making a bold dash through the State and going out again. In other words, it was just plain hard work. On the other side of the coin, however, as you know, the present Attorney General, his brother Robert [Robert F. Kennedy], had been very close to the McClellan Hearings, acting as the General Counsel for the McClellan Committee [Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in Labor and Management], and by and large the McClellan Committee was not received with great enthusiasm among the leaders of the trade union movement. So this was a situation which the late President had to overcome—he had to combat this kind of an image which connected his name with investigation and what-have-you in the activities of the trade union movement. I’m not commenting on the merits of the McClellan Hearings—I’m just saying that this was a factor and I felt that to his credit he was able to so effectively overcome the adverse feeling which had developed out of those hearings which had been held, as you know, just prior to the beginning of the ‘60 campaign. YOUNG: Could you evaluate the role of Sargent Shriver [R. Sargent Shriver Jr.] as far as the labor movement is concerned? STANLEY: Well, really, I don’t believe that Mr. Shriver was well enough known at that time to make any substantial impact or impression one way or the other on the trade union movement. At a later date, of course, he did become well-known and it would be different today, but his appeal, again, was one of being connected with one of the nation’s leading families and willing to come into the State in an activity of this sort. YOUNG: Could you say a word of evaluation with respect to the role that Mrs. Kennedy or the Kennedy daughters or daughters-in-law played in the West Virginia campaign?

STANLEY: Well, this, of course, was one of the big pluses that the Senator had going for him because wherever the family went, they made a good impression. They were able to get down with the people and make the people feel as if, as I’ve said before, they were one of them and part of them and were truly

[-9-] interested in the problems which they had, and this was a tremendous asset to the President in the West Virginia campaign, in my judgment. YOUNG: I think if we deal in just broad general figures, the primary results indicated that Senator Kennedy received about 60% of the vote as opposed to about 40% of the vote for Senator Humphrey. Do you feel that if we broke this figure down, the support of organized labor would have been greater than 60%? In other words, did labor, as such, vote for President Kennedy to a greater degree in the primary than did the average registered Democrat who was voting in that contest? I don’t know that the figures would be available exactly on this—this would have to be intuitive, I suppose. STANLEY: No, they wouldn’t be available exactly—but we did a little survey of our own after the primary election was over and we found generally that the voters with labor union affiliation didn’t vote too much different from the general voting electorate because there was no special emphasis from the trade union movement on either of the candidates. So, it stands to reason then that the voting patterns would have been about the same. This little survey, which was very small and perhaps too insignificant in number, indicated that the voting pattern was not too much different among our members. YOUNG: You indicated at the beginning of this interview that you had had to eat crow with respect to advising the President that religion might be an issue which might even defeat him in the West Virginia primary. Could you tell me—was this just simply a bad guess on your part or did Kennedy forcefully overcome a situation which you were correct about in the beginning and did exist? STANLEY: Well, I believe it’s the latter. I think he was able, by meeting the issue head-on as he did and discussing it very openly and very frankly, to overcome the sentiment. I feel that my advice to him in ‘59 was essentially correct. Had the religious issue been kept in the background and not discussed openly and frankly as he chose to do, I believe it would have had a very adverse effect on the campaign. YOUNG: Can you think of any other methods other than just a head-on approach to religion that might have reduced anti-Catholic feeling to the point that the Senator was able to win the primary?

[-10-] STANLEY: Well, I can’t think of any other specific action with regard to this specific

issue that might have reduced that issue some but I believe it was just an act among the many things that he so ably did, in projecting his own personality and his programs, his feelings about, particularly, the economic situation in West Virginia and what he proposed to do about it—they all added up to so much that he was able to overcome the religious issue plus—and that’s a real good commentary on his own campaign abilities. YOUNG: Well, does organized labor in West Virginia have a religious complexion? If you were to take all the unionized workers in West Virginia, would it be possible to indicate whether the percentage of Protestants, Catholic, Jews—that sort of thing? STANLEY: We’ve never attempted to do that, but it’s my judgment that it wouldn’t be much different from the general population—it would be about the same. YOUNG: It would be similar to the general… STANLEY: So far as the leadership is concerned—I’m sure that’s true—the organized labor movement—there is a percentage of leadership that has Catholic affiliation and a much larger percentage that has Protestant affiliation. Of course, this is a general pattern in West Virginia. YOUNG: You already mentioned that you think that Senator Kennedy won at the primary because he met the religious issue head-on, because he did talk about economic issues, and identify himself with the public because of the role of FDR, Jr. Before we move on to the general election, do you have any other observations on the primary that perhaps we have not yet covered? STANLEY: Well, I will say this—that up until about two weeks before the primary, it appeared that the sentiment was the other way and then due to President Kennedy’s decision to meet the religious issue head-on and some other factors that entered in the later days of the campaign, the sentiment began to swing heavily the other way. It was evident to most of us a week or ten days before the election that President Kennedy was on the upgrade and unless the situation reversed itself, he was going to be the winner.

[-11-] YOUNG: Mr. Stanley, would you comment on three aspects of the Kennedy primary campaign which are considered quite frequently: the organization of the campaign, its effectiveness, the expenditures in the campaign by both candidates, and then Senator Kennedy’s war record? STANLEY: Well, with regard to the first item, the organization, I will have to say that Senator Kennedy’s campaign was well-organized—far outshone Senator

Humphrey’s campaign in so far as organization was concerned—particularly so as to its involvement of volunteers—young men and women—who caught the spirit and were willing to give their time, their talent, toward putting the campaign on the road. YOUNG: May I interrupt just a minute? Did Kennedy get more volunteers than Humphrey? STANLEY: I believe so…. Yes, from my observation, I believe that he had more volunteers working for him. YOUNG: Well, what was the secret of this? STANLEY: Oh, I think it was the involvement of the total Kennedy family in the campaign and the magnetism that his family had in drawing people into the campaign—the personal visits that the family made in the state in addition to the Senator himself coming in. This sort of drew the younger group—the young Democrats—into the Kennedy camp. YOUNG: Do you think that religion had anything to do with the number of volunteers? STANLEY: Well, it very easily could have—although many people young people that I knew were associated with the Kennedy campaign, were devout Protestants. But many were, of course, of the Catholic faith, and I think that it aroused somewhat of the state patriotism of these young people—you know, to defend the State and do what they could to see that people didn’t go out and vote against Senator Kennedy just because he was of the Catholic Faith. They wanted to defend their own—not only their state but perhaps their faith to some extent. So, my observation, and I wasn’t around the headquarters or involved personally too much in the campaign, but reports that I received around over the state, indicated that due to the staff that Kennedy was able to pull together, going into communities and being able to make contacts and find leadership in the local communities that were willing to give of their

[-12-] time toward furthering the campaign that he was able to pull together more volunteers than were the Humphrey people. Now, with respect to the second item—money. Of course, this is always a big factor in any political campaign, particularly so in West Virginia, and it is not one that can be disregarded in this case because of the political structure of the state. On a county level invariably the main interest of the county political groups is concentrated on the county offices like the county commissioner and county sheriff and what-have-you, and these candidates build up their own respective organizations in a primary, and in order to put on a good campaign they must have money. So national candidates and state candidates who win elections in West Virginia go into the counties and endeavor to, what we call, “buy in” to the strongest organization. That is, they put so much money on the line in exchange for the support of that organization which has already been built up, and from the reports which I

have read and reports which I have received, the Kennedy campaign people had more money to work with, more resources—they could “buy in” to more organizations and perhaps stronger organizations than could the Humphrey people. Now, with regard to the last item… YOUNG: Mr. Stanley, may I interrupt a minute? I’d like to continue this for just a minute. I have been told—not in any of these tapes but simply in private conversation earlier—I think it’s Lincoln County that is the county in which money counts for the most and yet in that county, Kennedy lost. I think I am correct on this issue—do you know anything about it? STANLEY: Well, I would disagree—yes. As an observer of West Virginia politics, Lincoln County is this kind of a county—I mean more this kind of a county than another—say Logan or McDowell, for example. YOUNG: In other words, you think that McDowell and Logan are the counties where “buying in” is most important? STANLEY: Yes, I do because the political organizations in those counties have traditionally been stronger than the political organization in Lincoln County. YOUNG: Why is this so? STANLEY: Well, they’ve just been better organized over the years and perhaps have had stronger political leadership—more centralized political leadership. In McDowell County, for

[-13-] example, the Executive Committee has for many years made endorsement of the candidates in the primary election and they have the strongest single organization in the county. When they make an endorsement, at least it’s been true since I’ve been involved in West Virginia politics, the endorsed candidate carries the county by a very substantial majority. I’m talking six to eight thousand votes, and I think that it would be much more of a bellwether in this kind of thing than would Lincoln County. YOUNG: Well, when you “buy in,” generally speaking, what is the money spent for? STANLEY: Well, it’s spent for organization on election day—to set up outside poll workers and cars—this kind of thing. Of course, there are always a few gratuities I’m sure that are spread around among the voters. I haven’t been involved personally in this kind of thing. I am again going on reports that have been given to me—that you go into the precinct and the leader in that particular precinct is given a certain amount of money to work with, whether it’s a hundred, two hundred, three hundred or five hundred dollars, and for that amount of money he sets up the organization and gives you all the assurances that are necessary that he will deliver the majority of that precinct vote for a

candidate. I’m sure that the bulk of it goes to hire workers and, of course, it always helps if you can hire a worker that happens to have 15 or 20 votes in the family, or more, and to this extent perhaps it could be called vote-buying. I haven’t, as I said, been personally involved, but I know all these techniques that are used and apparently in some instances they pay off quite handsomely. YOUNG: Well, pardon the interruption. Would you go ahead then to the third point, which I think was the effectiveness of the Kennedy war record? STANLEY: Well, this was used quite effectively, as I recall, in the week preceding the election. I think that of any single item that this might have had the greater impact on particularly the female vote. I know from comments which have been passed on to me by the women who saw the televised portion of the PT-109 episode that they were just tremendously impressed with this kind of record. YOUNG: Would you compare this to General Eisenhower’s [Dwight D. Eisenhower] “I will go to Korea” in 1952?

[-14-] STANLEY: Well, I think it has some of the same elements involved although it’s a different type of thing. This was an act that had already been committed. And, of course, the whole world loves a hero and certainly the President was a hero in every sense of the word, and the televised portion of that PT-109 incident depicted this very effectively and I think made a terrific impression on the voting electorate and again I would say particularly on the female vote. YOUNG: Do you think that the labor vote per se or the labor vote, if it does exist, was any more sensitive to the war record than the average voter? STANLEY: Oh, I would rather doubt that. I think that trade unions or labor people receive these matters in much the same way as do others. I think it would have some natural impression on them. I know from personal experience with my wife—we watched the film together the evening it came on. At the conclusion of it, she turned to me and said, “Well, I think that Senator Kennedy is going to win the nomination,” and this was the first time that she had ever made this kind of an observation. And others with whom I talked the next day in my own office and others with whom I had contact, I detected the difference in their comments and I noticed especially because I am, of course, sensitive to those things which can persuade a voter’s judgment and reaction. YOUNG: Well, you have already admitted that in one instance, at least, you made a bad guess on the religious issue. I don’t mean to put you on the spot, but had you been placing bets on the night before the election, do you remember how you might have….

STANLEY: Oh, yes—very definitely. I think I indicated earlier that the last week or ten days of the campaign those of us who were watching it closely had begun to feel that Senator Kennedy was going to be the winner, and I think if I had been placing bets the night before election I would have bet on Senator Kennedy but not by the margin by which he won. I would have—rather—I would have said it would have been within $5 instead of $10. YOUNG: If you have no further observations on the primary, let’s move on to the general election—although we can always come back to the primary if you remember anything important. What role then did organized labor in West Virginia play in the general election in the fall of 1960?

[-15-] STANLEY: We, of course, following the policy of our national organization, went all out for the election of Senator Kennedy after he received the nomination. I was in Los Angeles at the Democratic Convention and had an opportunity to observe firsthand the maneuvers in that Convention, and I came back very much inspired and much more enthused about the candidacy of Senator Kennedy, I must say, than I was prior to that time and subsequent to the nomination of Senator Kennedy by the Convention. Our own Convention met and reaffirmed our support for him, in keeping, as I said, with national policy. We set up special organizations in the state and we tied in very closely with the Kennedy organization and there was $100 cooperation all down the line and, of course, we know what the results were. I know that in so far as the AFL-CIO is concerned that we did all that we could do on behalf of his candidacy, and I’m glad that we were successful in West Virginia in giving him a good vote in the general election. YOUNG: Do you think that the West Virginia campaign in the general election had any unique features or would it more or less resemble the campaign as conducted in all the other states? STANLEY: I don’t know as it had any unique features. I do think that due to the interest that was incited in the presidential election by the primary in West Virginia, that the interest was perhaps higher here than it might have been in some other states where there was not a presidential preferential primary. I think that this caused the electorate in general to take more interest and to vote in a much larger percentage than they would have voted in the absence of such a primary campaign. Of course, they felt they had a personal stake in it since they had given the candidate such an overwhelming vote in the primary and since he had been identified so much with West Virginia during that campaign. YOUNG: Did you meet the President personally after the primary at any time, either in West Virginia or in Washington…. Any place? STANLEY: Yes—I met him in Washington at a reception which was held by the Massachusetts Labor Council on his behalf and chatted with him just very

briefly, and after the general election campaign I was appointed, along with a number of other individuals, to serve on the Kennedy Task Force on Depressed Areas under the Chairmanship of Senator Paul Douglas [Paul H. Douglas].

[-16-] We met throughout December and had a final report ready for the President-elect prior to January 1, 1961. We filed our report with him and I was privileged to serve during that period of this Committee’s work as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Unemployment Compensation, Public Welfare and Surplus Food Distribution. I’m happy to say that, with one exception, all the recommendations which were made by my subcommittee have been implemented. YOUNG: You don’t remember what the one exception was? STANLEY: Yes—that’s federal standards for unemployment compensation. YOUNG: Nationwide standards? STANLEY: Yes—the President had co-sponsored this legislation while he was in Congress but to this date we haven’t been successful in having that legislation enacted. It’s still a goal for the future. YOUNG: Do you have any anecdote material or any stories of your contacts with the President after the primary that might be of interest? STANLEY: No—I really don’t because my contact with him was brief, as I have indicated, but I felt that we did have a personal relationship and I feel it’s really one of the great privileges of my life to have had the opportunity to meet with him on a few occasions and listen to some of the great things which he had to say and some of the ideas and ideals that he expressed. YOUNG: One question that is frequently asked is this: Had the Kennedy-Humphrey forces been equal in West Virginia or at least a little more equal in terms of family, expenditures, that sort of thing—do you feel the results of the election might have been a little different? This is still in the primary—I’m going to go back to it for just a minute. STANLEY: Yes, I do—being very honest about the matter—I feel that all of these elements were part of the victory which resulted and had you taken away any one of them or any group of them, the results could have been different. There’s no question about it in my mind.

[-17-]

YOUNG: Mr. Stanley, will you tell me about your personal contacts with the President then after the Inauguration? STANLEY: Well, after the Inauguration, my first contact was on May 1. I remember it so vividly because I received a call at home on Sunday evening from the White House which said the President had invited me to be in the White House at 11:00 a.m. the next morning for the signing of the Area Redevelopment Act which, of course, was part of the so-called distressed areas legislation that came out of the Committee on which I had worked. I was delighted to accept. I was there for the signing of the ARA Act, and I received from the President one of the pens which he used to sign that historical act. I say historical because it was the first act of its kind that we have ever had in the United States, although in England and other countries this kind of legislation has been in effect for several years. Later in 1962, the President was in West Virginia in October of that year for the congressional campaign in the First District in which our organization was heavily involved in support of Congressman Cleveland M. Bailey who had served in Congress for many years and was part of the liberal wing of Congress and had traditionally supported those measures in which we were interested. In 1963, I was in the White House on two occasions—once for a luncheon of labor leaders from all over the country, and later for a meeting on civil rights at which about 200 labor leaders were present. The President discussed with us his program for bringing equality of treatment to all people, irrespective of race, creed, or color, and it was in early June 1963 on one occasion I was there for the luncheon and this was just prior to our centennial ceremony which was to take place on June 20, and the President had been invited to give the centennial address—Statehood Day address… YOUNG: This was the West Virginia centennial? STANLEY: Yes—and at that moment there was doubt as to whether he could make it due to a trip to Europe which he had scheduled and I said, “Mr. President, we in West Virginia would love to have you come down and give our Centennial Day address because, as you know, we have a special interest in you as president and we think that this would be the ultimate in celebrating our 100th year of statehood.” And he said, “Miles, you can tell them that I’m going to try to be there if at all possible.” And, of course, you know he was here and one of the interesting

[-18-] sidelights—I don’t know—others may have remembered it too—but it seemed as if each visit the President made to West Virginia, it rained. It rained at Wheeling when he gave the speech and it rained again on Statehood Day, and he said that, “Well, the sun may not always shine in West Virginia but the people always do.” I think that I shall always remember that—certainly we West Virginians understood the meaning of this phrase. YOUNG: Were there any other personal contacts with him during the presidency?

STANLEY: No—other than—of course I was in New York when he made his last labor speech to the AFL-CIO Convention in November, at which I saw him very briefly along with a number of other people. Those were the only contacts I had with him directly, although I was in the White House on other occasions to discuss special problems with members of his staff. YOUNG: This turned into a broader, more general approach. How do you, as a labor leader, feel the organized labor movement evaluated the Kennedy years? Which of the programs did you approve of wholeheartedly? Which ones were you perhaps mild about, and which ones in any way might you have been critical about? STANLEY: Well, I’m not in a position to speak from the national level with regard to all the programs of the New Frontier, but as a West Virginian where my primary field of responsibility is, the reaction that I have personally is one of gratitude and a feeling that he did everything humanly possible to carry through on his commitments to West Virginia. Now, some of the programs nationally perhaps were not received universally by the leaders of the national labor movement, that is received well—but by and large if you take it across the board—the programs of the New Frontier were in perfect accord with those objectives and ideals for which the labor movement has striven throughout its existence to raise the economy, eliminate poverty, have an adequate housing program, to build adequate hospital facilities, roads and to upgrade the level of education generally throughout the nation—all of these things have been part of labor’s program since its inception. If I can return just a moment to West Virginia, the North-South Highway, I think was one of the outstanding examples of carrying through a commitment which was made. The doubling of the surplus food to those of our people who are unfortunate and who need to receive surplus government commodities in order to

[-19-] have a fairly balanced diet—these things took place, as you recall, almost immediately after his Inauguration. One of the first orders he issued—and these were things that we had been trying to get on in West Virginia for a long time; our organization caused to be introduced in 1959 State legislation that would set up a Food Stamp Program—it wasn’t until President Kennedy took office that there was anything done about this on the national level. YOUNG: Were there any slight disappointments—any places where you think West Virginians may have felt they were left out? STANLEY: Well, there was, I think, some thinking that after the President took office there was going to be a tremendous upsurge in the economy, the defense contracts were going to start rolling into West Virginia and all of these things, and I had heard some disappointment expressed by people who didn’t feel this was done in sufficient quantity. But they didn’t take into account, I don’t think, the fact that facilities have

to be set up—that we weren’t perhaps in a position to receive as much consideration from the national level as other states which were far more advanced than we had been because we had been dragging our feet for a number of years and not preparing ourselves to take advantage of opportunity that came along and it has taken several years to get ourselves in a position where we are able to take advantage of various opportunities that are available to us on a national level. YOUNG: Well, in the final analysis, what do you think was President Kennedy’s greatest contribution to West Virginia? STANLEY: Well, I believe the greatest single contribution which the President made to West Virginia is really intangible in nature. This is really a rebirth of spirit—a rebirth of hope—and the real sense that there were those who cared—that the President, the White House was concerned about West Virginia and wanted to help us find ourselves again and make our contribution to total national development. YOUNG: This is the end of the first part of an interview with Miles Stanley.

[-20-]

This is the second reel of two tapes with Mr. Miles Stanley. Mr. Stanley, you have some comment which you wanted to make with respect to President Kennedy, which we were unable to get on the first tape. STANLEY: Yes, Mr. Young, I have given a great deal of thought to which of the many great characteristics the late President had, that I felt made the greatest impression on me in my exposure to him, to his many writings and his speeches over the past few years, and I think the single characteristic which made its greatest impression on me was his tremendous sense of history and the way that our nation fits into history. I’m talking now over hundreds of years or perhaps even thousands of years as to the role that we should play as a nation, and more particularly I sense that he had very definite convictions about the role that he as an individual should play in helping to shape America’s role in history. I don’t know if this has expressed all that I feel but as I listen to his speeches and as I had occasion to talk with him from time to time, this is the one thing that always stood out, and I feel this Library, for example, being erected in his memory is something that he dreamed about, and again it is a reflection of the thoughts which I have just expressed. YOUNG: President Kennedy, I think, thought of himself frequently as carrying on the tradition of the New Deal as established by Franklin Roosevelt. Would you agree with that analogy or do you see other historical implications in his term of office? STANLEY: Well, I agree with that, but I think it was more than his conviction that he should carry on the traditions of the New Deal and the Fair Deal. Because of

the changing world patterns I feel that President Kennedy, perhaps more than any of his predecessors, sensed that the United States had a very definite role to play in bringing social, economic and political freedom to mankind throughout the world, and that if we failed in this effort, or if he failed in his effort to give this kind of leadership, it would be a lack of measuring up, as it were, to the destiny which the Creator had given to us. Today is different than it was in the ‘30s during the New Deal, and certainly under the Truman Administration [Harry S. Truman] when we were involved in a shooting war so to speak, the issues worldwide today are much different, and I feel the late President sensed beyond question what these issues were and how we should move to meet them and play our own role.

[-21-] YOUNG: Did you ever get any indication from the President or any of his aides that he was sensitive to the long struggle of organized labor—the history of organized labor in our country? STANLEY: Oh, yes! He was very definitely sensitive to the role that organized labor had played. I remember at the Miami Convention of the AFL-CIO in 1961, when he was making a few remarks as a preface to his speech—he said that he was happy to come there to speak—and I’m paraphrasing to some extent—he was happy to come there to speak to a group of people who had more or less been responsible for his employment for the last several years. Of course, this was said jokingly, but I think that it did indicate his own feelings, his own role in what leadership he was giving to meeting the social and economic problems which we have today—was very closely allied with the programs and ideals and aspirations of organized labor, and he had a great feel, I think, for the programs organized labor believes in and espoused and understood them perhaps better than anyone else. YOUNG: You’ve almost answered the next question which was going to be of the President’s first consciousness of the history of labor and, secondly, the President’s awareness of labor as a pressure group, as a political force. Would you have any further comment on that? STANLEY: Well, I think he was very definitely conscious of the fact that organized labor is a political and economic pressure group within our great free society, and it just so happened that in this instance the goals that we have had since our beginning paralleled in almost every instance his own convictions which he held as an individual. YOUNG: Miles, we’ve done a great deal of talking about West Virginia because that’s a subject that you and I know the most about, but as a regional labor leader, let me ask you this, and, if you would, answer as though you were answering on a national scale: Which of the Kennedy programs—which of the New Frontier programs

received the warmest reception from the group that you represent, not just in West Virginia, but in the country as a whole? STANLEY: Well, this is a most difficult question because all of the programs to which the late President gave support and many of them which he initiated were programs that were timely, and to say that one received a greater reception in its particular time than did another is a little difficult to answer.

[-22-] I know the passage of the Area Redevelopment Act, which I referred to earlier in the interview, was at the time hailed as a great accomplishment and was received very warmly by my own organization because we had given support to it for six years in Congress, and had seen it go down the drain with two vetoes. So this one, although in magnitude and scope it did not have near the impact that others might have had, it represented a giant step forward. His position on civil rights among the labor leadership was probably received with as much acclaim as any other single program, and, of course, the tax cut program he initiated as a stimulus to the economy was received with great acclaim among all the labor leaders with whom I’m acquainted in the national leadership—so it’s really quite difficult to say that one received a better reception than another because they were all, as I said, timely and they were all geared to meet a specific problem. I know this isn’t answering your question, but that’s the best I can do. YOUNG: No. I was going to say that the answer to the next question would probably just be the same, but I don’t think you said anything about the Kennedy medical program. Do you have a comment on that? STANLEY: Well, this program which still needs to be enacted has received as much support as we could possibly give it as a labor movement throughout the country and had it been enacted, I suspect that it would have received more acclaim than any other preceding program because the adversaries in this particular program put up a much stiffer battle than did those of some other programs in which the President was interested. So I think victory is always sweeter when the opposition has been the strongest. YOUNG: I suppose it goes without saying that in West Virginia the Area Redevelopment Program would be received most warmly and had the medical program passed it would have at least been a high second on the list. STANLEY: Yes, and I believe the tax program, which was initiated under President Kennedy’s leadership, would come in very close to the top because this was interpreted by most people, in economic life at least, to be a real boon to the economy.

[-23-]

YOUNG: This has been an interview with Mr. Miles Stanley, President of the West Virginia Labor Federation, AFL-CIO, recorded in the Daniel Boone Hotel in Charleston, West Virginia, on July 13, 1964, by William L. Young. This is the final reel of two reels.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

[-24-]

Miles Stanley Oral History Transcript Name Index

B Bailey, Cleveland M., 18 D Douglas, Paul H., 16 Dungan, Ralph A., 4 E Eisenhower, Dwight D., 14 H Humphrey, Hubert H., 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13 J Johnson, Lyndon B., 6 K Kennedy, John F., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22 Kennedy, Robert F., 9 M McDonough, Robert P., 2 R Roosevelt, Franklin D., 8, 21 Roosevelt, Franklin D. Jr., 4, 8, 11 S Shriver, R. Sargent, Jr., 9 Smith, Hulett C., 2 T Truman, Harry S., 21

V VanderZee, Ryan, 4