The Strategic Depth Doctrine ofTurkish Foreign Policy

ALEXANDER MURINSON

Given the boost provided by a promise of admission to the European Union on 17December 2004, the regional standing of Turkey is bound to increase in the comingdecades. This new stature will affect Turkish relations not only with the Arabneighbours and Israel, but also with Iran, Central Asia, South Caucasian and Balkanstates. This article analyzes the institutional and intellectual sources of a new visionthat animates contemporary Turkish foreign policy.

The main sources of the traditional foreign policy of the Turkish Republic are thehistorical experience of the Ottoman empire (the tradition of the balance of power);the nationalist Kemalist revolution and creation of the republic itself (hence,isolationism); western orientation expressed in the policy of Europeanization andmodernization; the suspicion of foreign powers and interests (the Sevres syndrome).There were two other ideological sources of this traditional foreign doctrine, whichsurfaced in the pre-First World War years: pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism. Pan-Turkism was a movement to unify the eastern (Central Asia and Caucasus) and thewestern (Anatolian) Turks. Following Russian expansionism in the Balkans underthe banner of pan-Slavism in the later half of the nineteenth century, pan-Turanismarose as a romantic idea to unify Turkic, Mongol and Finnish-Ugorian peoples.It later served for a short time as a basis for the Turkish–Hungarian collaborationduring the first two decades of the twentieth century to stem the Russian threat.These movements gained some influence among the Young Turks in the yearspreceding the First World War. During the cold war Turkey generally avoided anypotentially long-term entanglements in the Middle East with the exception of thefiasco of the Baghdad Pact.

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy, which had been firmlyanchored upon the verities of Kemalism for 70 years, has also undergone atransformation. This transformation hinges upon a growing embrace of thephilosophy of neo-Ottomanism. If this philosophy originally was employed as aresponse to the domestic challenge of ethno-national conflict with the Kurdishseparatists led by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party – Partiya KarkerenKurdistan) it later organically infused the foreign policy thinking of contemporaryTurkish policy makers.1 As theorists of international relations concur, foreign policybecame an extension of domestic policy and the transformation in domestic policyhas also affected the foreign policy doctrine.2 Turgut Ozal, the first president ofTurkey in the post-cold war era laid the foundations of this new foreign policyconcept. However, a new doctrine took its more mature and comprehensive shape

Middle Eastern Studies,Vol. 42, No. 6, 945 – 964, November 2006

ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/06/060945-20 ª 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/00263200600923526

under the Adalet ve Kalkinma (AK – ‘Justice and Development’) Party governmentlead by Recep Tayip Erdogan. This doctrine, known as the Strategic Depth doctrine,found particular resonance among the AK party leadership and its core electorate.The acceptance of such a dramatic shift in foreign policy vision is also due to thechanged perceptions of the foreign policy establishment and the military of externalcircumstances (Syria and Iran ceased to be viewed as enemies after the resolution ofthe Turkish–Syrian crisis in 1999) and heightened domestic empathy with Muslimcauses such as the Palestinian cause and the opposition to the American occupationof Iraq. According to Graham Fuller, ‘[S]trategically, Turkey has become part of theMiddle East’.3 Ahmet Davutoglu, who occupies a position of chief foreign policyadvisor to the Prime Minister Erdogan, has become the architect of the new Turkishforeign policy concept. His thinking was compared with the strategic vision ofAmerican neo-conservatives. But Ahmet Davutoglu responded to this charge:

A comparison with neo-cons does not seem very accurate to me. Especially inview of developments to do with the Middle East and its surroundings, we mayagree that the neo-cons produce speculative ideas but I have serious doubtsabout whether they construct theories having objective validity and rationalframeworks.4

Firstly, this article will outline the institutional, philosophical and ideologicalsources of this new foreign policy conception, and then it will focus on its specificprescriptions. In the third part this article will reflect on the new practical aspects ofthe new Turkish foreign policy conducted by the AK party leadership.

Turkish foreign policy has undergone a paradigmatic shift from Kemalism to neo-Ottomanism under the leadership of Turgut Ozal during his tenure, first as primeminister from 1983 through 1989 and then president from 1987 until his death in 1993.His era as a Turkish leader was characterized by his singular involvement in therestructuring of the Turkish economy and robust internal and activist foreign policy.His style of governance had so many common themes with the concurrent rule of theBritish prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, that some in Turkey called it Ozalism.

Prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Turkish Republic was guided by themaxim ‘Peace at Home, Peace Abroad’ promulgated by the founder of the modernTurkey, Kemal Ataturk. This saying essentially enunciated the era of isolationism inforeign policy and rejection of the claims of pan-Turkist movement for politicalunion with external Turks (Turkic-speaking peoples of Caucasus and Central Asia).The dissolution of the Soviet Union, which brought independence to the Turkicrepublics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, offered new unprecedented possibilities forTurkish foreign policy. The conflict in Balkans also stirred historical connectionswith the Muslim population of the region. All these events amplified historicalparallels of the current position of Turkey with the glory of the Ottoman Empire.5

Since 1991 Turgut Ozal has supported and provided political stature to the YeniOsmanlicaler (neo-Ottomanist) movement also known as Ikinci Cumhuriyetciler (theSecond Republicans).6 The term neo-Ottomanism was introduced by a leadingTurkish columnist and academic Cengiz Candar. This was an intellectual movementthat advocated Turkish pursuit of active and diversified foreign policy in the regionbased on the Ottoman historical heritage. The neo-Ottomans envisioned Turkey as a

946 A. Murinson

leader of Muslim and Turkic worlds and a central power in Eurasia.7 Since thatperiod the Turkish body politic has increasingly embraced the philosophy of neo-Ottomanism. In 1993, Candar told the Washington Post, ‘I think Kemalism makesTurkey turn in on itself. The time has come to reconsider the policy’. A decade later,Ali Bayramoglu, in the Islamist daily Yeni Safak, wrote that the partisans of ‘neo-Ottomanism . . . are increasing every day’.8

Turgut Ozal was the first Turkish leader to challenge the role of the military in thesphere of ‘high politics’. He also put his personal stamp on foreign policy making inTurkey. He achieved this by changing the institutional framework of foreign policydecision making. Ozal also used his prerogative as president to remove some powersfrom the Foreign Ministry.9 Turgut Ozal’s party Anavatan (The Motherland) inmany respects served as an ideological precursor of the AK party. Anavatan Partisiwas a ‘nationalist and conservative party, devoted to national and moral values’, andhad ‘a liberal outlook based on free market and free enterprise’.10

The leadership of the AK party demonstrates a renewed zeal for involvement in theaffairs of the Middle East, the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia, but it acts muchmore cautiously than its Islamist predecessor Refah (Welfare) party. When weconsider the ideational content and symbolic significance of the name of the rulingparty, we need to recognize its historical referent.11 The name of the new partyreflects in the Turkish public consciousness and in its core outlook its identificationwith the Ottoman past.

When Recep Erdogan became prime minister in March 2003, as a result of theoverwhelming victory of his AK party in November 2002, he again assumed anactivist prime-ministerial role in Turkish foreign policy. Prime Minister Erdoganelevated the office of Ahmet Davutoglu, the prime minister’s chief advisor on foreignpolicy, from the traditional status of a small bureau, which provides day-to-daycounsel to the prime minister, to the source of strategic thinking and ideologicalsupport for the new foreign policy based on the Islamist roots of the currentgovernment. The key role which he plays in Prime Minister Erdogan’s decisionmaking regarding foreign policy issues has been stressed in an article in the dailyVatan, in which he was called ‘one of the important persons [in Turkey] on vitalsubjects, such as Iraq, Cyprus and the EU’.12 Even though he provides strategicadvice to the prime minister, Davutoglu’s avoidance of the press and hisdisinclination to share his views publicly is reflected in one of the rare interviewswith Vatan which commented that Davutoglu ‘has finally broken his silence, whichhe kept for a long time’.13 Since becoming the chief foreign policy advisor, AhmetDavutoglu has utilized the concept of ‘strategic depth’ to guide the foreign policy ofRecep Erdogan’s government. This concept is eponymous with the title ofDavutoglu’s book.14 The origins of this doctrine can be traced to Ozal’s neo-Ottomanism, ‘the muliti-dimensional’ foreign policy of the Erbakan government andDavutoglu’s innovative approach to geopolitics.15 The main thesis of this doctrine isthat strategic depth is predicated on geographical depth and historical depth.Consequently, Turkey, as a result of its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire,possesses great geographical depth. According to Davutoglu, ‘This geographicaldepth places Turkey right at the centre of many geopolitical areas of influence’.

Turkish Foreign Policy 947

The ‘strategic depth’ doctrine calls for an activist engagement with all regionalsystems in the Turkey’s neighbourhood.16

Ahmet Davutoglu is a truly original neo-Ottoman thinker. Until involvement inthe current Turkish government, he served as the head of the international relationsdepartment at Beykent University. Davutoglu obtained a doctorate in philosophyfrom Bogazici University. His interests embrace not only politics and internationalrelations, but also philosophy, history, geography, especially its specialized branchgeopolitics, as well as cultural studies and economics. The nucleus of a new foreignapproach appeared in an article titled The Clash of Interests: An Explanation ofthe World (Dis)Order which appeared in 1998. In this article he calls for thereassessment of the role of the US hegemony in global affairs and for theestablishment of inter-civilizational dialogue in order to prevent future conflagra-tions. It is difficult to overestimate the views expressed in this article for elucidatingthe evolution of the current Turkish foreign policy doctrine. In this article a formerTurkish academic proposes an alternative to the two dominant Eurocentric theories,which attempted to explain the ongoing global processes. This article was devoted toa critique of Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s views of globalization and the post-coldwar era. In response to Fukuyama’s thesis about the ‘End of History’ brought aboutby the end of the cold war global ideological confrontation, he states: ‘Fukuyama’sthesis, which glorifies the universalization of the political values and structures ofwestern civilization, furnished the principal perspective in evaluating the politicalaffairs in the post-Soviet and pre-Bosnian era’. According to Davutoglu, the Bosniancrisis exposed the shallowness of ‘the end of history thesis’; because ‘it revealedthe imbalances of western civilization and also the deformities of the existingworld order’.17 Davutoglu also criticized Huntington’s thesis about the Clash ofCivilizations. He noted, ‘Huntington also neglects the fact that the most destructiveglobal wars of human history were the intra-civilizational wars among the systemicforces of Eurocentric western civilization which were wars fought to decide who willprovide systemic leaderships, whose rules will govern, whose policies will shapesystemic allocation processes, and whose sense or vision of order will prevail’.18 Inthe same article the current Turkish chief foreign policy advisor devotes a significantplace to his views on the contemporary geopolitics. He explains that the strategicbalance promoted by the United Stated during the cold war based upon the Charterof the United Nations ended after the First Gulf War. He cites the example of theconflict over the predominantly Muslim Bosnia, which precipitated the ‘re-adjustment of the geopolitical status quo’.19 The article characterizes this conflictas an ‘intra-systemic conflict between the US and Europe’ and predicted the fiasco ofthe American ‘New World Order doctrine’. He concludes that the western failure toprevent the genocide in Bosnia was caused by ‘the medieval prejudices of Europe’.20

The name of Kemal Ataturk and ideas associated with his vision traditionally hadthe place of honour in the republican historiography and nationalist politicaldiscourse in the Turkish Republic. It is noteworthy that in the whole of Davutoglu’sarticle there is not even one mention of the Turkish Republic or the precepts ofKemalism. By some accounts it is quite a departure from the views expressed by asenior Turkish government official. But what captures the imagination of theTurkish academic is the prominent position of the Muslim world or the Muslimcivilization in the global scheme of things: ‘The Muslim world, which became the

948 A. Murinson

intersectional arena of these two phenomena, civilizational revival and strategiccompetition, becomes the focal point in international relations.’21 In his geopoliticalvision, Davutoglu combines two geographic areas: ‘The region from the NorthernCaucasus in the north to Kuwait in the south’ and ‘the southern flank of CentralAsia’. He stresses their being part of the Islamic civilization ‘provides commonalityto this imagined community’, which is full of inconsistencies between internationallyrecognized territories and de facto realities’.22 Thus he elevates the unity of Muslimglobal umma to the status of the ideal geopolitical structure and deprecates thenotion of the nation-state. In his writings, Davutoglu substitutes umma, a term withreligious connotations, by the more neutral term ‘Islamic civilization’, but hepreserves the emphasis on the religious aspect of civilizational clash. He con-cludes that:

The purported cultural and civilizational clashes are very minor reasons for thischaotic atmosphere because this region is an integral part of the samecivilization, namely the Islamic civilization, with the exceptions of Armenia andthe Christian parts of Georgia. The issue of Karabakh and the invasion of Azerilands by Armenian forces is the only real cultural/civilizational clash in thisregion.23

This article also contained a veiled criticism of the West and Kemalist establishment,especially the army as the self-appointed guardian of the secularist republican orderand a strong proponent of the membership in NATO and the alliance with theUnited States. With reference to military/civilian relations in Turkey Davutogluwrites, ‘a democratic system in the Muslim world may create Islamic regimes withanti-western sentiments . . . The corrupt military/political elite in some Muslimcountries exploited this fear and co-operated with the global systemic forces of thedemocratic West in order to destroy democratic processes in the Muslim world’.24

The author pays special attention to the critical geographical location of the stateswhich share this Islamic civilization. Widely borrowing from Alfred Thayer Mahan,the father of American geopolitics, Davutoglu emphasizes the importance of the so-called ‘chokepoints’.25 He notes that, ‘this geographical location brought about agreat advantage to the Muslim world enabling it to control the choke points whichdivide the warm seas of the world, while also bringing an extensive risk of attractingintra-systemic competition’.26 He points to the fact that eight out of the sixteenstrategically most important choke points – the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb (the exitfrom the Red Sea), the Strait of Hormuz (the exit from the Persian Gulf), the Straitof Malacca, the Sunda Strait (between Sumatra and Java), the Lombok Strait(between Bali and Mataram), and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles (exits from theBlack Sea) – are under the full control of Muslim countries, while one of them (theStrait of Gibraltar) separates a Muslim state (Morocco) and a European state(Spain). He dismisses Huntington’s contention that the Muslim world presents achallenge to western core countries: ‘it is very difficult to argue that the Muslimworld can develop an independent global strategy as an anti-systemic force whichenjoys some sort of power of choice in its involvement in the world system. Muslimstates, in general, rank close to the bottom in the pecking order of the worldsystem’.27 As a result of the new constellation of geopolitical, geo-economic and

Turkish Foreign Policy 949

strategic realities or ‘[sic] potentialities’, Davutoglu suggests that the West, and inparticular the United States, has created a myth of the Muslim threat to provide anideological justification for ‘strategic and tactical operations in order to have controlover these potentialities’.28

Davutoglu criticizes the American ‘New World Order’ strategy for itsinconsistency and the lack of resolve to uphold the United Nations principlesof collective security. In particular, he chooses the example of ethnic cleansing inBosnia-Herzegovina. The polemist criticizes Western-led globalization andaccuses it of being an attempt to homogenize diverse cultures, if not completelydestroy non-western civilizations, and calls instead for dialogue of civilizations.He writes:

The first and the most important prerequisite of the first condition is therecognition of the right to survival of several different civilizational identities inan atmosphere of coexistence. The existing civilizational crisis could only beovercome by a civilizational dialogue and a free exchange of values. Uni-cultural monopolization has been the main dilemma of modern westerncivilization and has led to the destruction of traditional civilisations. Thecurrent revival of traditional civilizations is a reaction against this uni-culturalmonopolization.29

He suggests that in order for Turkey to become a Muslim regional power it needs topractise caution and to calibrate Turkish foreign policy within ‘strategic parameters’set by the great powers. In the article he counsels the United States against ‘theconfrontational categorizations based on the provocations of civilizationaldifferences, such as West versus Islam or West versus Rest’.30 He proposes thatthe United Nations needs to be restructured and the collective security mechanismought to be revised to enable it to respond adequately to ‘global strategicadventurism’. Finally, he concludes that the United States needs to cooperate withMuslim and Confucian countries to prevent virulent nationalism of ‘[sic] Europe andRussia from threatening global stability’.31

For 70 years since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalistleadership extended tremendous efforts to maintain a pro-western orientation andthe secular character of the Turkish state. Kemalists defined modern Turkey as awestern society in juxtaposition to its Islamic, Asian or Middle Eastern alternatives.The strict nationalist and secularist dogmas of Kemalism were institutionalized inthe dominant bureaucratic-authoritarian apparatus of state.32

The first assault on the Kemalist ideology was undertaken under the leadership ofTurgut Ozal. Ozal reintroduced into political discourse in Turkey the concept of the‘Turkish–Islamic synthesis’.33 The Turkish-Islamic synthesis school of thoughtemphasized Turkish nationalism and Islam as key contributors to the internationalstanding of Turkey. It emphasized the historical legacy of the Ottoman past andflourishing Islamic culture as a source of the ‘soft power’ of the modern Turkishstate.

All these themes found their way into a novel foreign policy doctrine, whichanimates the foreign policy vision of the current Turkish government. AhmetDavutoglu’s intellectual antagonism to the process of westernization in Turkey and

950 A. Murinson

its philosophical critique found their expression in his reinvigorated neo-Ottomanism. The academic anti-western rhetoric is coated in anti-colonialistphraseology. He made a general claim that ‘the process of secularization can be seenas a direct threat to the self-perception of non-Western societies’.34 He blamed thenationalist pattern of modernization and secularization imposed by the Kemalistelite on Turkish society for the social phenomenon of the ‘divided self’. He provideda periodization for the evolution of non-western (i.e. Muslim) societies in thetwentieth century. Davutoglu distinguished between the period of early moderniza-tion in the first half of the twentieth century and the period of civilizational revivalcloser to the end of the twentieth century. The first period was marked by the pre-eminence of the ‘early modernizers’ who ‘tried to achieve national or civilizationalself-preservation against the attacks of colonial powers’.35 The second period ischaracterized by the predominance of ‘civilizational revivalists’ who ‘are attemptingto revive their authentic stance in order to re-define their ontological and historicalexistentiality’ as a result of the crisis of the western secular ontology. He describedthe transnational character of the Muslim civilization that produced a universalsystem and surpassed the nation-state paradigm as a fiction of the western mind. Inhis theorizing he stressed the importance of the universalism of Muslim communityor umma:

The main factor of this universality of the Islamic civilization is an ontologicalconsciousness which directly penetrates each individual human’s mind regard-less of his ethnic and regional origin. Common cultural and political responsesto colonialism and modernity in different parts of the Muslim World arethemselves the indicators of this consciousness. The rise of Islamic identity andits socio-cultural reflections in the lands which were recently governed by atheistSoviet authoritarianism serves to confirm the impact of this ontologicalconsciousness.36

As a general solution to the inter-civilizational tensions he called for acceptance andcoexistence of plurality of civilizations.

These trends of thought eventually crystallized in Ahmet Davutoglu’s StratejikDerinlik (‘Strategic Depth’) doctrine. This conception of foreign policy is eponymouswith the title of Davutoglu’s book, which was published in 2000.37 One Turkish DailyNews editor observed that the book ‘aims to fully define Turkey and its immediateneighbours’ and it differs from other books on the subject due to its ‘localviewpoint’.38 In his book the author proposes a new geo-strategy for Turkish policymakers. Prime Minister Erdogan’s chief foreign policy advisor criticizes the Kemalistforeign policy for its failure to appreciate the advantages offered by the country’srich history and geographic space. The main thesis of this doctrine is that thestrategic depth is predicated on historical depth and geographical depth. Davutogludefines historical depth as a characteristic of a country that is ‘at the epicentre of[historical] events’.39 He identifies eight former empires Britain, Russia, Austro-Hungary, France, Germany, China, Japan and Turkey as countries with historicaldepth. In his comparative analysis, he comes to the conclusion that these countriesexperience similar problems of ethno-nationalism, separatism and general anti-imperialist dissension in their respective regions. As a result, Turkey, due to its

Turkish Foreign Policy 951

historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, possesses a great geographical depth. Withreference to Turkey, he notes:

Geographical depth is a part of historical depth. For instance, Turkey is not justany old Mediterranean country. One important characteristic that distinguishesTurkey from say Romania or Greece is that Turkey is at the same time a MiddleEastern and a Caucasian country. Unlike Germany, Turkey is as much aEuropean country as it is an Asian country. Indeed, Turkey is as much a BlackSea country as it is a Mediterranean one. This geographical depth places Turkeyright at the centre of many geopolitical influences.40

Regarding membership in the European Union, Davutoglu argues that Turkeycannot wait forever at the EU door, and needs to develop a genuinely multi-directional foreign policy by utilizing its geostrategic advantages.

Davutoglu advances a proposition that Turkish involvement both in the Balkancrisis after the end of the cold war and the continuing Middle East crises was deemednecessary because of Turkish embeddedness or, as he defines it, the historic depth inboth regions. In his book Davutoglu identifies several areas of the ‘cross-borderspheres of influence’. He uses a concept of Turkey’s contiguous ‘land basins’ thatinclude the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East to describe Turkey’s potentialspheres of influence. He enumerates the Black, Eastern Mediterranean, Caspian seasand the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Basra as a natural extension of Turkey’s maritimebasin. He also stresses a shift in geopolitical status of Turkey from a barrier,predicated on its NATO membership during the cold war, to a bridge to a newregional system, which extends beyond Erzurum Plain and includes states ofCaucasus and Eurasia. He also notes that the concept of the ‘continental basin’ allowsTurkey to gain ‘strategic depth in Asia, and projection into Europe and Africa’.41

Prime Minister Erdogan’s foreign policy advisor explains why historical andgeographical aspects are so important during periods of transition such as the post-cold war period: ‘It is important to make a rational evaluation from a historical andgeographical perspective when it comes to evaluating a country or society’s potentialand its ability to adapt to new conditions’.42 He points to the critical significance ofthe historic period in the life of a nation when strategic thinking is being formulated(in the case of Britain it was the period of the English Civil War in the middle ofseventeenth century; in the case of Germany it was during the first unification after1870, the American Civil War period in the case of the United States). In order toassess the Turkish place in the world, he recommends a look back to Turkey’sOttoman past. He proposes, ‘We are a society with historical depth, and everythingproduced in historical depth, even if it is eclipsed at a certain conjuncture in time,may manifest itself again later’.43 He calls upon Turkish leadership take into account‘the historical responsibilities’ towards the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle Eastwhen formulating foreign policy. Davutoglu criticizes the Kemalist establishment formissed opportunities during the past 50 years to redirect Turkish foreign policytowards these ‘land basins’. He stresses that as a result of an increased rate ofglobalization with the concomitant effects of advanced communications, andeconomic and social interdependency, Turkey now has a new opportunity to engagein these sub-regions. In this book Davutoglu particularly criticizes the failures of

952 A. Murinson

Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union inthe early 1990s. He refers to this policy by the pan-Turkist slogan ‘From the Adriaticto the Great Wall [of China]’ enunciated by Prime Minister Suleiman Demirel in hisTurkic world speech in 1992. Davutoglu points to the wrong-headedness of thisapproach based on Turkist sentiments.44 He blames the Turkish foreign policyestablishment of the 1990s for its inability to formulate ‘all-embracing’ policiestowards all regional issues. He notes also the dearth of academics in Turkey withknowledge in geopolitical regional balance as well as the absence of appropriateintellectual understanding of this foreign policy failure.

The ‘strategic depth’ doctrine calls for an active engagement with all regionalsystems in Turkey’s neighbourhood. In his book he argues that Turkey needs torediscover its historic and geographic identity and reassess its own position vis-a-visregional and global issues. In an interview with the Turkish daily Vatan, Davutoglusaid, ‘2003 was the year of ‘‘making up for a loss’’ in foreign policy’. In the sameinterview he claimed that ‘2004 will be a year when Turkey will be brought onto theinternational agenda’.45 This would allow Turkey to lead an assertive foreign policyand form its ‘own’ axis. Davutoglu called for re-engagement with the Middle Easternregion, in particular with Iran, Syria and the Gulf States. In the Balkan region hestressed the importance of Greece and Bulgaria, while in Caucasus he pointed torobustness of Georgian–Turkish relations.46 In view of the transatlantic split in thewake of the second Gulf War, the architect of Erdogan’s foreign policy adviseddeveloping a balanced approach towards all global and regional actors. Heemphasized the importance of economic interdependency in the globalizing worldand the need to build strong economic linkages with all regional states. In the finalanalysis, he envisioned that Turkey would transform itself into a global actor.47

Since the AK party government came to power in November of 2002, the Turkishgovernment pursued the realization of the neo-Ottoman doctrine in its foreignpolicy. The contemporary Turkish leadership attempts to assume a more assertiverole of regional player and to mediate regional conflicts. One of important goals ofErdogan’s government is to preclude further intervention of the United States inMiddle Eastern affairs (in particular Turkey objects along with European Unioncountries to the American ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’). In order to accomplishthis Turkey calls upon its neighbors to undertake political and economic reformsthemselves. Foreign Minister Gul warned Arab countries in an interview with aLondon Arab-language daily Al-Hayat, ‘If we don’t take the reins . . . and prefer tocover up and ignore them [our problems], then others [the United States] will try tosolve them their way and interfere in our affairs’.48 He criticized the potentialAmerican approach to solving problems in the region: ‘And this interference willtake place in the wrong way because they don’t understand our sensitivities, ourhabits, our cultures and our social structure’.49

Turks used the neo-Ottoman discourse in projecting the image of a just andimpartial arbiter in foreign policy towards the Middle East. In particular Turkeyextended new diplomatic efforts to bringing peaceful resolution to the Syrian–Israeliand Israeli–Palestinian conflicts. Turkey has undertaken bold steps to mediateregional conflicts in the Middle East. The new Turkish government demonstrated its

Turkish Foreign Policy 953

willingness to reconcile with the Muslim world. In particular, the Erdogangovernment took an activist approach in its relations with its neighbours to theeast (Iran) and south (Iraq, Syria), while the bilateral relations with Israel entered acooler period.50 The war in Iraq served as a political opportunity for the new Turkishforeign policy. One Turkish commentator observed, ‘Iraq is becoming a unifyingfactor in the region. Turkish diplomacy is trying to mobilize public opinion in theregion now. This gives Turkey the opportunity to play the role of a regional power’.51

The first important test of Turkish dynamism, inspired by the new spirit inTurkish foreign policy, was the crisis in Iraq in the winter of 2003. The possibility ofwar in Iraq and its dismemberment raised the spectre of the creation of anindependent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and separatist demands among theTurkish Kurds. Turkey pursued all avenues to prevent this occurring. During theSaddam Hussein regime’s stand-off with Western weapons inspectors, who sought toidentify and demolish Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Turkishleadership took the initiative to convene Iraq’s neighbours in Istanbul on 23 January2003. The objective of this meeting was to prevent hostilities in the wake of theSecond Gulf War. The foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Egyptand Turkey were invited to Cirag Palace Hotel to call on Iraq’s former presidentSaddam Hussein to cooperate with arms inspectors from the UN Monitoring,Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic EnergyAgency. The symbolism of a convention of representatives of Muslim states in anOttoman-era Palace52 was not lost on the Middle Eastern audience. The LebaneseDaily Star commented, ‘Turkey’s prime minister, Abdullah Gul, may look like abudget version of Rafik Hariri, but he hosted an old-fashioned Ottoman parley onWednesday at Istanbul’s Ciragan palace’.53 The Muslim neighbours urged Iraq tocontinue cooperating with the arms inspectors from the UN Monitoring,Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic EnergyAgency. At the conclusion of this conference Turkish Foreign Minister Yasar Yakisstated ‘We call solemnly on the Iraqi leadership to move irreversibly and sincerelytowards assuming its responsibilities in restoring peace and stability in the region’.54

The timing and place of the Istanbul conference with Turkey as a convener indicatedrenewed dynamism in Turkish attempts to become a regional leader and mediator ofthe conflicts in the region, which was a patrimony of the Ottoman Empire.Addressing his counterparts, Yasar Yakis warned about the impending war: ‘Thereis a fire which is moving towards our homes. Praying to Allah to spare us from a waris an approach, but exerting all our efforts to prevent war, knocking on all doors andexploring every possible means that could prevent a war is another approach’.55

The earnestness and consistency with which the AK government pursued its policyto avert the military action in Iraq was attested to by the last-ditch attempt atunconventional diplomacy. Iraqi Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan was secretlybrought to the meeting at the Cirag Palace hotel, but he did not accept the demandfor ‘political restructuring in Iraq’ and this caused the failure of Ankara’s initiative.56

The behind-the-scenes influence of Ahmet Davutoglu on political developmentsrelated to the foreign policy in Turkey was underlined by the rejection of a bill toallow American troops to pass through Turkey on their way to Iraq in Milli Mejlison 3 March 2003. The chief foreign policy advisor to the Turkish prime ministerobjected to the American troops’ deployment through south-eastern Turkey.57

954 A. Murinson

In post-war Iraq the attention of Turkish foreign policy makers was brought tobear on the former Ottoman possessions in the modern Iraq.58 The inability of theTurkish army to curb Kurdish rebellions in these territories and British pressureforced Ataturk’s government to withdraw claims on oil-rich Mosul and Kirkuk in1926. As Omar Taspinar succinctly concluded, ‘Imbued with the painful memory ofWestern powers partitioning Ottoman-Turkish lands, the Kurdish question came tobe seen as the last chapter of a conspiracy written in Western capitals’.59

Turkish activism in the post-war Iraq put Turks on a collision course with USinterests.60 In particular, contention erupted regarding the fate of Mosul and Kirkukprovinces. These two provinces in northern Iraq are predominantly populated byKurds. The crux of this issue is the presence of major Iraqi oil fields of Mosul andKirkuk provinces, which could potentially provide an economic foundation for aKurdish autonomous entity.61 Turkish military and civilian decision makers perceivesuch an eventuality as a direct threat to the stability of the Turkish state.62 Americansare concerned about the emergence of an additional focus of violence and instability,if Turkish troops were to engage Peshmerga, the Kurdish militia, on Iraqi soil.Turkey expresses vocal support for increased influence of the Turcoman minoritywhich also populates the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. Turkey has raised internationalalarm that the Kurdish leaders might conduct ethnic cleansing of Turcomans from theprovincial urban areas.63 On the eve of the first democratic elections in Iraq inJanuary 2005, the Turkish authorities openly threatened that it would intervenemilitarily, if the Iraqi Kurdish authorities would attempt to change the ethnic make-up of Kirkuk by artificially increasing the city’s Kurdish population.64 In order toprovide a plausible explanation for their military posture vis-a-vis Kirkuk, the Turkishgovernment accused the city government, controlled by representatives of the KurdishDemocratic Party (KDP), of harbouring PKK guerrillas in the city.65 The Turkishside perceives these attempts at population changes in the Kurdish favour as a policyto integrate Kirkuk into the Kurdish autonomous region which would serve as aterritorial base for the creation of an independent Kurdish state. Suppressing thepainful memories of the division of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish political elitepromotes Turkey as the guarantor of peace in contemporary Iraq.66 Following withgreat anxiety the Kurdish assertiveness in the northern Iraqi provinces, Turkey objectsto the upcoming referendum in 2007 that will determine if Kirkuk will join theKurdish autonomy or will stay with the rest of Iraq. In January of 2006, YigitAlpogan, secretary-general of Turkey’s National Security Council, remarked thatTurkey views these developments as extremely dangerous – ‘a threat to Iraq’s security,territorial integrity, and long-term existence. Kirkuk is Iraq’s lynchpin; if the city isattached to a specific region of the country, it will be difficult to hold Iraq together’.67

In congruence with the new foreign policy doctrine the Erdogan government ispursuing a dramatic improvement in its relations with neighbouring Syria. After adecade of animosity, which peaked with the Ocalan affair and the trans-bordermilitary build-up in 1998,68 the Erdogan government initiated a diplomatic offensiveto reach a new understanding with the Syrian government, among other Arabcountries.69 Over the last few years relations between the two countries drasticallyimproved. In Ankara in July 2003 the two countries signed a significant number of

Turkish Foreign Policy 955

bilateral agreements in the Sixth Turkish–Syrian Protocol, which covers theeconomic sphere, duty-free trade, tourism and educational exchange.70 In December2003 a Turkish parliamentary delegation visited Syria to restart a bilateral dialogueon the contentious issue of Hatay province and terrorism.71 This exchange wasfollowed by a state visit by President Bashar Assad in January 2004. In was the firstvisit to Turkey by a Syrian head of state in 57 years. Both heads of states declaredtheir intention to forge an alliance against terrorism and agreed on a common visionas ‘allies’ on how to ensure peace in the Middle East. Bashar Assad described thisdramatic improvement after meeting with Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezerduring this three-day visit: ‘Our relations are ready to reach the highest level’. TheSyrian leadership also recognized the international legal framework of theacceptance of Turkish borders and the territorial integrity of Iraq.72

Such a precipitous departure in Turkish foreign policy from the decades ofsuspicion and animosity is also driven by pragmatic regional considerations. Bothcountries share a deep concern over the Kurdish aspirations for autonomy innorthern Iraq and the possible negative repercussions for Turkish and Syrian Kurdishminorities. According to the daily Zaman, the newly obtained shared regionalperspectives caused the Arab press to describe the Turkish–Syrian rapprochement asthe ‘Strategic Convergence’.73 The Lebanese Daily Star reported on the visit with theheadline ‘Is it a new era between two states?’ The article commented that there werewar clouds between the two states until 1998 but Turkey is now prepared to play asignificant role in Syrian politics with the political convergence developed betweenAnkara and Damascus alongside the free trade agreement.74

In particular, the most recent visit by Turkish President Sezer to Damascus inApril 2005 became a source of controversy. As American and European pressuremounted on Syria to withdraw its troops and intelligence forces from Lebanon,President Sezer announced that he would proceed with his state visit to Syria. The USambassador in Ankara, Eric Edelman, then publicly called upon Turkey to join the‘international consensus’ on Syria. This was widely understood in Turkish diplomaticcircles as an American warning to cancel the Syrian trip. The Turkish president madea visit that caused consternation on the part of the American administration and washailed by Syrian President Bashar Assad as ‘evidence that NATO member Turkey isready to stand up to the United States on issues of national interest’.75 Ahmet Sezerconveyed a message to Bashar Assad that Syria must implement the United Nationsresolution and pull out all its troops from Lebanon by the end of April 2005. Turkishand Syrian sides underline their common interests and historical links as the basis fortheir new relationship. They share unanimity about the preservation of the territorialintegrity of Iraq. At a press conference held in Damascus, the Syrian presidentpointed out that they had also reached a consensus about Iraq, ‘We want Iraq toexercise its right of national self determination’. Shortly after the visit, in order tomend fences with its American NATO ally, Turkey approved the long-pendingdecision to extend the use of the Incirlik base by the NATO forces involved in theoperations in Iraq and Afghanistan.76

The Erdogan administration also attempted to open a new era in Turkish–Iranianrelations. During the AK government this relationship experienced a turnaround.

956 A. Murinson

It was just in May 2001 that a former Turkish prime minister, Tansu Ciller, describedthe bilateral relations as ‘neither black nor white, but a shade of gray’. In particularshe cited Iranian support for terrorist activities of the PKK inside Turkey andpursuit of WMD as persistent causes for tension in Turkish–Iranian relations. Shesaid that, ‘Turks are approaching these latest developments [with Iran] verycautiously’.77 Ciller reiterated the necessity for the US-imposed policy of ‘doublecontainment’.78

Over three years the rhetoric of the Turkish leadership changed significantly. Afterthe Second Gulf War, Turkey and Iran found a common enemy in the Kurdishmilitancy, in particular the PKK, which found a safe haven in Kurdish-dominatednorthern Iraq. In July 2004 Prime Minister Erdogan visited Teheran and signed amulti-dimensional cooperation scheme that included a joint commitment to securitycooperation with Iran in the struggle against the PKK and a series of economicagreements. Economic cooperation involved agreements about deliveries of Iraniangas to Europe through Turkish territory and of a pricing dispute over natural gassupplied by Iran to Turkey. In response to American diplomatic warnings thatbusiness contracts with Iran were punishable by sanctions under US law, the Turkishprime minister said: ‘Just as all other countries in the world develop relations withtheir neighbours, so too will Turkey develop its relations with its neighbours. And it isdetermined about this’.79 In a broad reference to the Strategic Depth doctrine headded at the press conference in Teheran: ‘Before we came to power, we promisedthat we would develop relations with our neighbours and included this in our actionplan. We did not make any discrimination among our neighbours. The regional peacewill be set up in this way. Just like how all the world’s countries develop relations withtheir neighbours, Turkey will also develop its relations with its neighbours. It isdetermined about this’.80 In fact trade between the two countries reached $2.3 billionin 2004. But there were some drawbacks to further development of bilateral trade andfriendly relations between the two countries. Turkcell, the largest Turkish mobilephone operator, led a foreign consortium that concluded the largest commercial dealwith Iran worth more than $3 billion over 15 years to provide digital cellular phoneservice based on the Global System for Mobile (GSM) technology. This deal wasblocked by the Iranian parliament because of the alleged ‘Zionist links’ of Turkcell.Another important business venture, the operation of Tehran’s Imam Khomeiniinternational airport by the Turkish Tepe-Akfen-Vie (TAV) consortium, collapsedwhen the Turkish operator was blocked by Iranian tanks over suspicions of Israeliinvolvement in the project. During the 2004 visit Prime Minister Erdogan waslectured by Iranian Foreign Minister Kharazi about burgeoning Turkish relationswith Israel and the United States. In particular, the Iranian official accused Israel ofstirring Kurdish separatism in northern Iraq.81

Turkish–Iranian security cooperation flourished as both countries joined efforts todefeat Gol Congress (the former PKK) insurgency. Iran’s ambassador to TurkeyFirouz Dowlatabadi even indicated that Iranian and Turkish military forces couldparticipate in joint operations against the PKK if planned in advance and if certainprotocols were signed. On this occasion, Dowlatabadi again tried to turn his Turkishhosts against Israel. He stressed: ‘Israel’s final objective is the establishment of anindependent Kurdish government in Iraq’s Kurdistan Province and although suchreports are being broadcast today, the Israeli regime, in collaboration with the CIA

Turkish Foreign Policy 957

and the Intelligence Service, has been pursuing that objective for 20 years’.82

In February 2006, Turkish and Iranian security forces signed a memorandum ofunderstanding to cooperate on counter-insurgency issues to promote furthercoordination and security measures against the PKK.83 At the end of May 2006Iranian forces entered Iraqi territory and shelled Kandil Mountain, the allegedlocation of the headquarters and military camps of the PKK. The Iranian InteriorMinister Mustafa Pur Mohammadi explained this action as a part of the Iraniancampaign to prevent PKK infiltration into Turkey. Turkey’s ambassador to Tehran,Gurcan Turkoglu, praised the Turkish–Iranian security cooperation. He denied thatTurkey amasses its troops on the Iraqi border as a show of force to Iran, rather thanto fight against a possible threat to Turkey and Iran.84 Over allegations that TurkishSpecial Forces also conducted a cross-border ‘hot pursuit’ operation in northernIraq, the Iraqi government sent a note of protest to the Turkish authorities. As astronger response, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani warned Iran and Turkey againstintervention in Iraq’s domestic affairs.85

The AK government gave a new impetus to Turkish efforts to mediate conflictbetween Syria and Israel. The conflict dates back to the Six Day War of 1967, whenIsrael occupied the Golan Heights. The Syrian government intends to exchangepeace for the return of the Golan Heights.86 The Erdogan administration madeseveral attempts to mediate between the warring parties. During the first summit inJanuary 2004 between Erdogan and Bashar Assad, Israel used the good offices ofPrime Minister Erdogan to pass a message to the Syrian leader.87 Prime MinsterErdogan personally got involved in the diplomatic effort. After Bashar Assad’s visit,he met the Israeli ambassador to Ankara, Pinhas Avivi and relayed that, ‘SyrianPresident Bashar Assad said he is serious in his intention to renew peace talks withIsrael, and intends taking all the necessary steps to reach a peace agreement in theMiddle East’.88 Furthermore, Israel itself might be very interested in Turkey’sintercession with Syria. With reference to an emerging reality in the post-SaddamMiddle East, a former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netaniahu commented onthe prospects of the Syrian track: ‘I think there is the opportunity today to explorepossible contacts with Syria’.89 However, very soon Turkey exhausted its diplomaticefforts over divergence of positions on both Syria and Israel. The Turkish ForeignMinister commented in February of 2004: ‘Turkey will not play the role of mediatorbetween Syria and Israel, though it is a state with excellent relations with bothparties’.90

From the beginning of the Peace Process at the Madrid Conference in 1991, andespecially after the Oslo Accords of 1993, Turkey advocated an even-handedapproach to the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. However, the strategicaxes with Israel which evolved from 1996 derogated the Palestinian cause to asecondary consideration. In 2000, when al-Aqsa intifada started, the Turkishgovernment was forced by domestic pressures to distance itself from Israel.91 Whenthe AK party came to power in Ankara the attitude towards the plight of thePalestinians in the West Bank and Gaza became a prominent factor in Turkishforeign policy and this inevitably affected Turkish–Israeli ties. Initially in spring2003 Prime Minister Erdogan delayed his visit to Israel for an indefinite period.Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul suggested upgrading diplomatic relations with thePalestinian Authority to an ambassadorial level. But a drastic deterioration in

958 A. Murinson

relations occurred in May 2004 as a result of extreme Israeli military actions in Gazawith numerous civilian deaths. Erdogan expressed open criticism of Israeli policiesand called Israel a ‘terrorist’ state.92 He also temporarily recalled the Ankaraambassador in Israel to express his protest. However, economic and militarycooperation between Turkey and Israel continued. Turkey and Israel signed a multi-million water deal for 20 years. Turkey had bought US$3 billion worth of Israeliweapons from 1996. In May 2004 a contract worth $800 million was signed by PrimeMinister Erdogan for Turkish companies to build three gas plants in Israel.

In a reversal of his earlier rejection of the invitation to visit Israel and an attemptto improve the climate of US–Turkish relations, Erdogan made his first official visitto Israel with a large delegation of state ministers and businessmen on 1 May 2005.He discussed with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon a possible participation of Turkey inthe solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the regional situation in the MiddleEast and an agreement on Turkish air force modernization by the Israeli militaryindustry. Another important discussion was a joint Turkish–Israeli project to build apipeline to deliver Russian gas to Israel through Turkish territory and underMediterranean waters. Sharon offered to convene an international peace conferencein Turkey at a future date, and offered to allow Erdogan a role in the Gaza Strip’seconomic development after the Israeli pullout. Erdogan and Sharon made acommitment to strengthen Turkish–Israeli intelligence cooperation to combatterrorism. The establishment of a ‘hot line’ between the two leaders to discussurgent regional developments was a highlight of the visit.93

After the election victory of Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) ofJanuary 2006 in the Palestinian territories, Israel faced the prospect of thePalestinian leadership composed of the members of the Palestinian Islamistorganization openly committed to the destruction of the Jewish state. The first taskof Hamas was to find international recognition, especially because it wasdesignated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the EU. TheTurkish leadership made an unexpected faux pas by inviting Khaled Mashal, theofficial representative of Hamas in Damascus, to visit Turkey for a meeting withTurkish officials, including Abdullah Gul. The avowed goal of Turkey was tomediate between Israel and the Hamas leadership. But this attempt at unsolicitedmediation was seen as hostile and deleterious to Turkish–Israeli relations. Israelwas deeply concerned by Turkey’s holding talks with Hamas as this providedHamas with undeserved legitimacy. Raanan Gissin, the spokesman of the IsraeliPrime Minister’s Office, commented during an interview on Turkish television: ‘Itis a serious mistake; this visit could have consequences for our links that could behard to repair’. He asked what the Turkish reaction would be if Tel Aviv hadinvited Abdullah Ocalan, the now imprisoned leader of the pro-Kurdish terroristgroup the PKK, to Israel for talks. The Turkish Foreign Ministry described thecomparison as ‘completely groundless and wrong’. Turkish officials explained thatin their talks they urged Hamas to renounce violence and adopt a conciliatoryattitude towards Israel. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said the meetingwith Hamas ‘fulfilled the government’s international responsibilities in trying tosteer the Palestinians towards peace’.94 The meeting by Turkish officials with aHamas representative caused grave consternation within the Bush administrationand the Israeli government.

Turkish Foreign Policy 959

Since the eruption of the international crisis regarding the violations by Iran of theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iranian intentions to create nuclear weaponsin 2004, Turkey initially defended the Iranian nuclear programme as a pursuit of thepeaceful development of nuclear energy.95 As the United States and Europeanpowers started to raise the alarm about Iranian evasions of the monitoring of itsnuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Turkish diplomatsattempted to convey messages of concern to their Iranian counterparts. However,under international pressure the Erdogan government began to change its attitudetowards the Iranian nuclear programme. In January 2006 at a press conference inAnkara, the Turkish prime minister exerted diplomatic pressure on Iran. He calledfor adoption of a more ‘moderate and amenable’ approach in the diplomaticnegotiations over its nuclear programme. ‘The continuation of Iran’s nuclearprogramme for peaceful ends is a natural right, but it is impossible to support it if itconcerns [the development] of weapons of mass destruction’.96 At the same time, theTurkish prime minister did not want to antagonize its main natural gas supplier andimportant trade partner. As the debate about policy towards Iran reached a criticalpoint in the Turkish foreign policy establishment, a rift occurred among theKemalist politicians, military and security community on the one hand and theIslamist circles in the government on the other. Turkish diplomats publicly expressedtheir opinion that the Turkish approach is ‘in line’ with Europe, i.e. seeking thediplomatic solution to this crisis. But in the end, as Sami Kohen concludes,

There is an understanding between the US and Israel and Turkey on theperception that Iran may become a threat if it develops nuclear weapons. Thereis also a common understanding with the rest of the world that [IranianPresident Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad is becoming a dangerous leader with hisvery provocative and aggressive statements.97

Meanwhile, Turkey decided to seek its own nuclear power to counterbalance Iranand prevent an increasing dependence on gas as a source of energy.98

As Ahmet Davutglu admits, since the AK party became the party of the governmentwith the dominant position in the Turkish parliament in November 2003, ‘a newparadigm’ emerged in Turkish foreign policy. Using the Islamist discourse, thisinfluential policy advisor advances a new vision of Turkey as playing a decisive role asa participant in an emerging multi-dimensional world order, being still in a positiverelationship with the United States and Israel, but also an active player in Europe, theMiddle East and Central Asia. Reflecting the neo-Ottomanist trend in Turkishintellectual life, Davutoglu proposed a deliberate revival of the Ottoman past, ‘bothas a matter of cultural enrichment, but also as a source of an enriched Turkish identityas a political actor’.99 According to Richard Falk, Davutoglu emphasizes the‘accommodative’ character of the Ottoman Empire at its height.100 The Erdogangovernment’s foreign policy under Davutoglu’s guidance seeks ‘a zero conflict’foreign policy for Turkey, as well as a balance between relations with Europe, theMiddle East, Asia, and with the United States. Erdogan’s energetic drive towards theEuropean Union in spite of cautionary signals by the military indicates the increased

960 A. Murinson

autonomy and critical role which the current prime minister has come to play over thedomain of foreign policy. This new foreign policy course has caused a deep splitwithin the foreign policy establishment in Turkey itself.101 The recognition of thevalidity of this new approach by the military establishment emboldened the currentTurkish leadership to deviate from blindly following the American line. This growinggap between positions of the United States and Turkey on the Middle East drewcriticism from some American analysts associated with the Bush administration.Former assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Michael Rubin wrote, ‘The damagedone by Erdogan’s positions extends far beyond hurt diplomatic feelings. Hisgrandstanding has done lasting damage to Turkey’s security’.102 According to thesame source, some regional actors were irritated by the neo-Ottoman discourseadopted by the current Turkish leadership. Neo-Ottomanism, as manifested in theStrategic Depth doctrine, has become a significant feature of Turkish foreign policy.But Turkey’s attempt to reassert its historical role as the ‘bridge’ between the Westand the Muslim world has its share of influential adherents and critics. So Turkey willproceed haltingly in this old–new role in deference to the Ottoman tradition.

Notes

1. Ozal attempted to revive the Ottoman ‘millet’ system in order to give recognition to separate religious

and ethnic identities, including a Kurdish identity. He intended to redefine the character of the

modern Turkish nation on the Ottoman multi-ethic model. M. Ataman, ‘Ozal Leadership and

Restructuring of Turkish Ethnic Politics in 1980s, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.4 (October

2002), pp.127–8.

2. See R.D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International

Organization, Vol.42 (1988), pp.427–60; C. Kegley, N. Richardson and G. Richter, ‘Conflict at Home

and Abroad: An Empirical Extension’, Journal of Politics, Vol.40 (1978), pp.742–52; Z. Maoz,

‘Joining the Club of Nations: Political Development and International Conflict, 1816–1976’,

International Studies Quarterly, Vol.33 (1989), pp.199–231; T.C. Morgan and K. Bicker, ‘Domestic

Discontent and the External Use of Force’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.36 (1992), pp.25–52.

3. G. Fuller, ‘Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities’, The Washington Quarterly (Summer

2004), p.59. See also A. Tasgetiren, ‘Davudo�glu’nu okumak’, Yeni Safak, 28 January 2003.

4. A. Han, ‘The World of Business Now Spearheads Foreign Policy’, an Interview with Ahmet

Davutoglu, Turkish Times, April–May 2004.

5. M. Ataman, ‘Leadership Change: Ozal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy’,

Alternatives, Vol.1, No.1 (Spring 2002), p.12.

6. See a discussion of these movements in M. Ataman, ‘Ozal and Turkish Ethnic Policy’, Middle

Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.4 (October 2002), p.133.

7. Ibid.

8. A. Bayramoglu, Yeni Safak. Quoted in M. Rubin,’Shifting Sides? The Problems of Neo-

Ottomanism’, National Review Online, 10 August 2004, available at http://www.meforum.org/

article/628

9. Ataman, ‘Leadership Change’, p.13.

10. Anavatan Partisi II, Olaðan Buyuk Kongresi Faaliyet Raporu, 18–19 Haziran 1988, Ankara Ataturk

Spor Salonu.

11. The Turkish word adalet has its historical precursor in the Arabic concept of adala, that is the central

function of the ruler or sultan to guarantee justice for his subjects. This political ideal provided

legitimacy for sultans in the Ottoman Empire. This concept was widely held in Islamic political

theory and has roots in Arabic and Persian traditions. See ‘The Ottomans: Origins’, available at

http://www.wsu.edu:8080/*dee/OTTOMAN/ORIGIN.HTM

12. ‘Turkey expects to obtain an important trump card relating to Cyprus after the talks between

Erdogan and President Bush’, Vatan, 7 January 2004.

Turkish Foreign Policy 961

13. Ibid.

14. A. Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik/Turkiye’nin Uluslararasi Konumu [The Strategic Depth: The

Turkish International Location] (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2000).

15. According to Philip Robins, ‘multi-dimensional’ foreign policy doctrine during the Erbakan period

(1996–97) constituted a pursuit of improvement bilateral relations with Asian countries such as Iran,

Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and African countries such as Egypt, Libya and

Nigeria. The conceptual content of this policy was to ‘build ties with significant middle powers to the

east, without jeopardising Ankara’s traditional ties with the West’. P. Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy,

Madeleine Feher Annual European Scholar Lecture, publication of Begin-Sadat for Strategic

Studies, August 1999, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan.

16. Vatan, 7 January 2004.

17. A. Davutoglu, ‘The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order’, Perceptions

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Dec 1997–Feb 1998), p.1. See also W. Thompson, On

Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics (Columbia: University of South

Carolina Press, 1988), p.7.

18. Davutoglu, op. cit.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid. This perceptional frame is poignant in view of clashes between Muslim Shiites, Kurds and

Sunnis in the contemporary Iraq.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid. Cf. Mahan’s conceptualization in A. Westcott, Mahan On Naval Warfare (Boston: Little,

Brown, 1948), p.77.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid. The earlier American entanglement in Sudan and the current occupation of Iraq certainly

provide substance to this argument.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ataman, ‘Leadership Change’, p.17.

33. B. Yeþilada, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East’, in A. Eralp et al. (eds.), The Political

and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), pp.169–92.

34. A. Davutoglu, ‘It’s only natural’, Al-Ahram Weekly, No.564, 13–19 December 2001.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Stratejik Derinlik.

38. See ‘The ‘‘Strategic Depth’’ that Turkey Needs’, An Interview with Ahmet Davutoglu, The Turkish

Daily News, 15 September 2001.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid. Others criticized the Turkish policy towards newly independent Turkic states as opportunistic

and short-termist. Nilufer Narli characterized this policy as a ‘de facto (reactive) foreign policy’.

In J. Naegele, ‘Turkey: Foreign Policy Objectives – Part Two’, 13 August 1998, available at http://

www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/98-08/aug13b.rfe

45. Vatan, 7 January 2004.

46. Ibid.

47. Han, op. cit.

48. ‘Gul says Arab states should press on with domestic reforms’, Al-Hayat. As quoted in Al-jazeera,

18 February 2004.

49. Ibid.

962 A. Murinson

50. J.C. Helicke, ‘Turkey’s closer ties with Syria, Iran highlight changing regional role’, Associated Press,

Istanbul, 17 January 2004, available at http://www.Turks.us

51. Ibid.

52. Ciragan Palace was completed in 1857, after Abdulaziz acceded to the throne. Sultan Abdulaziz

demanded his palace to be built in Arab style as a memorial to his reign.

53. M. Young, ‘Lebanon: Clueless on Iraq’, Daily Star, 25 January 2003.

54. ‘Iraq told to actively cooperate with UN: Regional conference in Istanbul’, Dawn Internet edition,

24 January, 2003, available at http://signs-of-the-times.org/signs/signs70.htm

55. Ibid.

56. Vatan, 7 January 2004.

57. Ibid.

58. The territorial settlements that followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World

War, apportioned these two former Ottoman villayets to the British-dominated Iraqi Mandate.

When the British found oil in the early 1920s, Turks attempted to obtain some reparations for the

loss of the oil-producing provinces. In compensation, Turkey was to receive a portion of the oil

revenues – including those from transportation and other petroleum products – out of Mosul for 25

years, but instead Turkey agreed to a £500,000 buyout. The post-war settlement also denied Turkish

claims to large parts of northern Iraq, which holds substantial populations of Turcomans, ethnic

Turks. See also D. Pipes, ‘Hot Spot: Turkey, Iraq, and Mosul’, Middle East Quarterly, September

1995; Back-to-Iraq website, http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/000129.php

59. ‘Turkey’s Kurdish question’, Daily Times, 4 June 2003.

60. ‘Dangers in Northern Iraq’, The New York Times, 2 March 2003. United States and Great Britain

made a commitment to support the Kurdish regional autonomy in northern Iraq. See Guardian,

7 January 2004.

61. D. Filkins, ‘Turkey Assesses Question of Kurds’, The New York Times, 21 February 2003. See also

‘Turkey Wants Say Over Kirkuk’, Agence France Presse, 14 October 2004.

62. J.-C. Peuch, ‘Turkey: Ankara Moves To Vote On Second U.S. Motion In Hope Of Containing

Kurds’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 19 March 2003.

63. Ibid.

64. The Turkish deputy head of the General Staff, General Ilker Basbug, warned in a televised news

conference that if that the significant change in the demographic structure of the oil-rich city of

Kirkuk should occur, ‘Such a development would pose an important security problem for Turkey’,

27 January 2005, available at http://www.Turks.us

65. ‘Turkey’s accusations is an introduction for invading Kurdistan’, Al Hayat, 26 July 2005.

66. See in particular the articles of the Sevres Treaty related to the status of the Kurdish peoples, Articles

62–64, Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey signed at Sevres,

10 August 1920, available at http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres/part3.html#89

67. Y. Alpogan, ‘Turkey: Between the West and the Middle East’, PolicyWatch, No.1074: Special

Forum Report, The Washington Institute for the Near East Policy, 31 January 2006. It is unlikely

that Turkey would get involved militarily in northern Iraq, if only for the reason that such

involvement would endanger its officially touted pursuit of the membership in the European

Union.

68. See ‘Turkey Warns Syria Again Not To Support Rebel Kurds’, International Herald Tribune,

6 October 1998; ‘Syria Calls Turkish Threat a Plot’, The Washington Post, 2 October 1998; S. Kinzer,

‘Syria Agrees to Stop Supporting Kurds, Defusing Crisis With Turkey’, The New York Times,

22 October 1998; and ‘Turkish-Syrian Discussions’, Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi), 30 October 1998.

69. ‘Very daring ideas’, Al-Ahram, 9–15 January 2003.

70. See the Protocol of the Sixth Session of the Turkish–Syrian Joint Commission for Economic,

Scientific, Technical and Commercial Cooperation, Ankara, 24–29 July 2003.

71. ‘Suriye’de ilk kez ‘‘Hatay’’ denildi’, Zaman, 11 December 2003.

72. H. Koylu, ‘Suriye ile mutlu gun’, Zaman, 7 January 2004.

73. ‘Strategic Convergence’, Zaman, 26 December 2004.

74. Quoted ibid.

75. ‘Turkish President, Ahmed Cezer, Visits Syria Amid U.S. Unease’, Al-Jazeerah, 13 April 2005. It is

noteworthy that Turkey did not raise objections to the sale of Russian short-range missiles to Syria

in March 2005. These missiles were purportedly to be used against Israel with which Turkey signed

Turkish Foreign Policy 963

the military cooperation treaty in 1996. The Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov denied that

anti-aircraft Strelets missiles can threaten Israel. See ‘US–Turkish Relations Go Wobbly Now Over

Syria’, 23 March 2005, available at http://www.Turks.us

76. ‘Turkey: Period for Usage of Incirlik Base Extended’, 25 April 2005, available at http://

www.Turks.us. The Turkish government imposed severe restrictions on the use of the Incirlik base

facilities, including ‘the right of control for each flight and if any operation is seen as being against

the national interests of Turkey’. ‘No Incirlik blank cheque for US’, 3 May 2005, available at http://

www.Turks.us

77. T. Ciller, ‘Turkey: Today’s Political and Economic Realities’, PolicyWatch, No.534: Special Forum

Report, WINEP, 15 May 2001.

78. Ibid.

79. ‘Turkey’s Iranian Relations Unaffected by US’, 29 July 2004, available at http://www.Turks.us

80. ‘Iran, Turkey set to boost cooperation’, IRNA (Iran News Agency), 30 July 2004.

81. ‘Turkey, Iran seal cooperation’, 30 July 2004, available at http://www.Turks.us

82. ‘Iran’s envoy: Tehran-Ankara security cooperation expanding’, IRNA, 21 July 2004.

83. ‘Iran, Turkey Sign Security Pact’, Middle East News online, 25 February 2006, available at http://

www.menewsline.com/stories/2006/february/02-26-1.html

84. ‘Iran Strikes PKK Camp on Mt. Kandil’, 2 May 2006, available at http://www.Turks.us

85. ‘Iraq president Talabani warns Turkey and Iran’, 30 May 2006, available at http://www.Turks.us

86. See S.G. Hajjar, ‘The Israel–Syria Track’, Middle East Policy, Vol.VI, No.3 (February 1999),

pp.22–3.

87. Hilal Koylu, op. cit.

88. A. Benn and A. Harel, ‘Turkish PM to Israel: Assad serious about renewing talks’, Haaretz, 8

January 2004.

89. Ibid.

90. ‘Turkey won’t be Israel–Syria peacemaker’, Al-Jazeera, 18 February 2004.

91. L. Martin, ‘Turkey’s Middle East Foreign Policy’, in L. Martin and D. Keridis (eds.), The Future of

Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), p.185.

92. ‘Turkish PM: Israel a ‘‘terrorist’’ state’, Al-Jazeera, 27 May 2004. The timing of this diplomatic attack

against Israel was not accidental. At the time of the crisis in Gaza, a Turkish candidate was considered

for nomination to the post of the secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

The vigorous verbal attack by the Turkish prime minister on Israel swayed the OIC’s vote in

Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu’s favour. This was the first time that Turkish representative was elected to be

the leader of the largest Islamic intergovernmental organization. This position significantly enhanced

the status of the Turkish republic in the Muslim world. Comments by an unidentified Turkish state

official, Personal interview. See also ‘Emergency Meeting of OIC: Turkish State Minister Atalay: We

Should Use our Influence to Resume Talks’, Anadolu Agency, 22 April 2004.

93. ‘Prime Minister of Turkey Arrived in Israel’, Mignews.com, 1 May 2005; A. Benn, ‘Visiting Turkish

PM sees Role in Peace Process’, Haaretz, 2 May 2005.

94. ‘Turkey Rejects Israeli Criticism’, BBC News, 17 February 2006.

95. ‘Erdogan Terms Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Iran’s Right’, IRNA, 30 July 2004.

96. Quoted in Y. Schleifer, ‘Caught in the Fray: Turkey Enters Debate on Iran’s Nuclear Program’, The

Christian Science Monitor, 2 February 2006.

97. Ibid.

98. ‘WP: Iranian Crisis Forces Turkey to Resort to Nuclear’, 8 March 2006, available at http://

www.Turks.us

99. R. Falk, ‘Reconsidering Turkey’, Zaman, 6 October 2004.

100. Falk describes this neo-Ottomanist foreign policy as based on ‘the willingness to appreciate and

respect civilizational and ethnic diversity, and to deal with political conflict in a spirit of compromise

and reconciliation’. Ibid.

101. ‘You can see a split between the people who run the foreign ministry and the people who run foreign

policy for the AKP and that’s really a struggle for the future course of Turkish foreign policy’, said

an Ankara-based western diplomat, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the

issue. Quoted in Y. Schleifer, ‘Turkey Aims to Bridge West and Middle East’, Eurasianet, 6 April

2006.

102. Rubin, op. cit.

964 A. Murinson