Volume XXXIII 1

The M e r i d i a n Fall 2014-Spring 2015

Journal of International and Cross-Cultural Perspectives

Lewis & Clark College

Volume XXXIII

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The Meridian is funded by the Associated Students of Lewis & Clark College. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the College, the student body, or the Meridian. The editors are independent of the administration, faculty, and staff of Lewis & Clark College.

Submissions for the 2015-2016 issue, as well as questions and comments can be directed to Meridian@lclark.edu.

Cover photo credit Matt Cheng ‘16

Copyright 2014-15 by artists and authors. Printed by Ash Creek Press, Portland, Oregon.

The MeridianLewis & Clark College0615 SW Palatine Hill RoadPortland, Oregon 97219Meridian@lclark.edu

Facebook.com/LCMeridianLCMeridianJournal.com

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We welcome all submissions with an international focus, including essays, reports, poetry, short stories and photography. Accepted submissions will be published on our website shortly after receiving,

reviewing, and editing them, and will be potential candidates for publication in the Spring print journal.

Check out our new website!LcMeridianJournal.com

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The Meridian has reached the multimedia expectations of the digital age by expanding online. With the launch of our website, we have provided our readers permanent and accessible exposure to the scholarly and creative work of Lewis & Clark students without the need to possess a physical copy. The site has already garnered high traffic from people around the world, eager to read the international and cross-cultural perspectives from our student contributors. The Meridian operates all year long, with our devoted editorial team working hard to review, edit, and publish submissions even when the semester ends. While The Meridian’s team is committed to providing an online platform for students to showcase their work year-round, we will continue to publish high-quality journals featuring essays, photos, and creative pieces with an internation-al focus every Spring. This year’s submissions examine themes of a growing consciousness in an increasingly interdependent world ranging from global markets, conflict and security concerns that transcend borders, to the preservation of human rights and individual freedoms. Submissions in this 2015 edition of The Meridian convey intellectual passions, supported with hard evidence and discerning analysis. We are proud to include more photos from students studying and traveling abroad, as well as creative pieces, including poetry and short stories. There are multiple approaches for exploring the world around us, and we recognize the importance of art and literature to enrich our perspectives. The publication of this journal would not be possible without the dedication from The Me-ridian’s editorial and design team, and our faculty advisor, Professor Bob Mandel. Finally, we would also like to give special thanks to the Lewis & Clark Student Media Board and Ash Creek Press. We hope that reading our journal provides you with a sense of broadened horizons and a pursuit to know the world beyond our borders. We will continue to accept and publish Lewis & Clark students’ submissions online throughout the year on our new website, LcMeridianJournal.com.

Qadisha Valley, Lebanon

Letter from the Editor

Dina Yazdani ‘15Editor-in-Chief

Sincerely,

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The Meridian 2014-15 StaffEditorial Board

Dina Yazdani ‘15, Editor-in-Chief

Allie McRaith ‘16, Staff-Editor

Sofia Knutson ‘16, Staff-Editor

Andrew Ellen ‘17, Staff-Editor

Katarina Grohs ‘17, Staff-Editor

Jessica Meyerzon ‘17, Staff-Editor

Jennifer Waldo ‘15, Creative Staff-Editor

Design Board

Cierra Higgins ‘15, Graphic Design Director

Andrea Dean ‘17, Staff-Designer

Sam Shugart ‘15, Treasurer

Bob Mandel Faculty Advisor

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Table of ContentsTitle Page 1

Copyright 2

About The Meridian 3

Letter from the Editor 4

The Meridian Staff 5

Table of Contents 6

Minegolia: the rich and the infamous 8Matt Cheng ‘16 Photo by Matt Cheng 8

Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Drone 12Drake MacFarlane ‘17

To Be Literate 15Sema Hasan ‘18

India: Photos by Cierra Higgins ‘15 22

Frozen Governance: Political Division in the Arctic 24Nathan Ren ‘15

Captive in Rome 28Allie McRaith ‘16

Singapore’s People’s Action Party 30Sam Shugart ‘15 Photo by Allie McRaith ‘16 33

Rhetorica Tellus Hybrida 34Rostam Assadi ‘15

Patriotism 38Rebecca Schulman ‘15

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Photo Spread Ecuador Jennifer Waldo ‘15 39 Mongolia Matt Cheng ‘16 40 India Matt Cheng ‘16 42 China Jennifer Waldo ‘15 43 Greece Allie McRaith ‘16 44

Age of Liberty 45Bradley Davis ‘18

Narahatam Merawi 47Mariam Said ‘15

The Potential for an American Withdrawal from the Gulf 52Connor O’Neill ‘15 Photo by Dina Yazdani ‘15 53

Moving Past the Neoliberal Debate 54Sam Alexander ‘16 Photo by Caterina Zischke-Rincon ‘15 53

Ireland: Photo by Olivia Doyle ‘16 59

Uganda: Photos by Allie McRaith ‘16 60

Resurgence of the Veil in Modern Islam......62Dina Yazdani ‘15 Photo by Dina Yazdani ‘15 62 Photo by Ciarra Simeone D’Onofrio ‘15 64

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement is not a “containment” of China 65Matthew Wong ‘16

China: Photos by Jennifer Waldo ‘15 71

Charlie Hebdo 72Tamar Shuhendler ‘17

France: Photo by Eva Goellner ‘16 73

Table of Contents

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Matt Cheng ‘16

The once idyllic rolling steppes of central Asia with infinite blue marble sky and lush long grass below has once again been marred by turmoil. Endless green pasturelands have been transformed into brown, sludge-filled pits and once coursing slate blue rivers have become poisoned with toxins. Fearsome warriors roam the landscape harassing any who dare encroach on their land while stealthy ninja penetrate secluded rural fortresses. Many may imagine this scene to describe the chaos of Genghis Khan’s Mongol horde or warriors and horses--it is not so farfetched a description. Mongolia in 2014 is in trouble: environmental degradation is at an all time high, environmental neonazis plan heinous attacks on foreigners and ninja miners scour the landscape clandestinely poaching gold from high security mining sites. Mongolia is developing a reputation as potentially one of the most profitable investment locations in history, but also one of the most dangerous. The sad irony is that investors are not being turned away by the violence or the utter

chaos, but rather by new government interventions designed to restore order and propagate develop-ment. If Mongolia fails to restore the confidence of the international community soon, things could get much worse. In 2012, Mongolia’s GDP growth peaked at a whopping 17.3% finally surpassing the growth experienced by its southern neighbor, China. This was a climax decades in the making: since the col-lapse of the USSR and its hold on the Mongolian politics, the country has since opened up to foreign investment opportunities and is poised to become the largest exporter of coal and copper ore in Asia (projections surpass even powerhouse Australia). Some $3 trillion of extractable minerals are thought to lie under a country bigger than France, Germany and Spain combined, equivalent roughly to $1m for each of nearly 3m Mongolians. Oyu Tolgi once completed will become the largest copper mine in the world and will produce 450,000 tons of cop-per per year--enough to account for two-thirds of Mongolia’s $11.52 billion GDP. The implications for Eastern Asian power of course were enormous:

Minegolia: the rich and the infamous

Sainshand, Gobi, Mongolia: A monk of the famed Khamar Buddhist Monastery in Gobi Desert takes time for a friendly cell-phone call. Photo by Matt Cheng ‘16

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China and Russia engaged in political chess to see who held sway over the fledgling democracy’s vast resources while the west sent its large mining firms and technical expertise across the Pacific in attempt to dilute the geopolitical might of Mongolia’s neighbors. It seems like everyone wanted to get a piece of the pie. Yet speculation abounds in 2014 that Mongolia might not be the best place for foreign investment: ninja mining has just been legalized and the newly elected democratic government has imposed landmark tax on all mining sites. The economy has also just contracted down to a lei-surely 6% GDP from the previous year and with that new interventions to shore up the economy. Parliament has mandated strict new environmen-tal regulations and taxes designed to ensure high government revenue over the private sector. New concerns that the government and the people are finally coming to terms with the power they hold over their resource may ironically dissuade full economic development in the near future. Investors and mining firms have been unnerved by the stance that the Mongolia government has taken: three years of public growth-oriented economic policies have led to large economic imbalances. Many are also worried that China’s nationalized firms finally has its hands around Mongolia’s proverbial neck. Mongolia must] take a step back, curb its develop-ment enthusiasm, and reaffirm investor confidence in the short run. Mongolia [must] make a choice: [either develop quickly and risk running out of momentum in 100 years or one way or another find a way to ensure more favorable terms of development that somehow sustains them in the long term.] For now though,they forego the lofty ideals of changing society holistically through economic development and focus instead on their macroeconomic health that is contingent on attracting foreign investment.

Not saving for a rainy day Mongolia has not accumulated savings from resource revenues the past 10 years and they are suffering because of it--it is simple as that. In the mid 1990s rumors were starting to emerge that vast mineral deposits lay under the Mongolian Gobi desert ripe for picking. The newly formed democratic government immediately pounced on the idea and sold off the land rights to what was to become the largest mineral field in East Asia. They asked themselves the question when the first mas-

sive coal field was discovered: what should we do with all this (potential) wealth? This line of inquiry was flawed from the start. They tried to build a hospitable investment climate by offering incen-tives to diversify in manufacturing, textiles--only the mining companies came. They tried building a metropolitan city filled with Louis Vuitton luxuries and grand apartment complexes--no one wanted to live in them. They solicited advice from Ivy League scholars of business and economics about how to invest in the stock market; consensus was in the 2000s that it was a generally safe way to get good returns. Shortly after the Harvard classes finished, it emerged that a clique of young bank-ers had lost 80% of Mongolia’s foreign exchange reserves (about $82 million) speculating on interna-tional money markets. Mongolia should have saved instead. Mongolia’s attempts to develop precious millenium development goals and diversify have resulted in non-mining sectors shrinking while reliance on mining as the primary economic driver grew. In 2011, Mongolia’s government was esti-mated to collect $407 million in revenues from the export of copper and $292 millions from coal. The second largest sector growth came from supple-mentary services associated with mining such as mineral transportation and processing services. Other sectors such as manufacturing have shrunk. With no secondary industry, Mongolia is a country that has balanced its success precariously on the successes of not only mining development but also unintentionally on volatile mineral prices and FDI inflows. Yet Mongolia is currently acting childish as it did in the 1990s--again trying to recommit to arbitrary millenium development goals instead of focusing on the FDI and mining development they so evidently need. When foreign executives complained about unpredictable environmental regulations, Mongolia amended its mining law to include, among other charges, options to acquire interest (nationalized takings) in strategic mineral deposits and 68% windfall profit tax. When the depreciation of tugrik (Mongolian currency) was at its most rampant (especially at the turn of a year, when foreign currencies flow out of Mongolia) they did little to stop the hemorrhaging instead electing to subsidize urban housing projects and legalize artisanal mining. Unsurprisingly in 2014, their FDI index indicated a 55% drop from last year, and with Mongolia seemingly not willing to save

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or cut funding social development programs these downward trend will continue and ironically they will have no economic momentum left to enact such programs in the future. In 2015 lack of FDI involvement perhaps means with no other econom-ic stimulus besides mining, their massive capital and current account deficits will grow and thus they will lose the fiscal autonomy to spend on public programs altogether.

Loyalties and Royalties The politics of Mongolia certainly haven’t inspired confidence either. The foreign influence and expertise of international firms such as Pea-body, Rio Jinto, Ivanhoe and G.E in developing these mining sites was certainly welcomed, but this democratic government really didn’t know what to do with the influx of FDI nor how to allocate it properly. Mongolia open bureaucracy allows for the potential for a considerable sum of foreign investment in the form of PSAs, but also harbors a considerable amount of corruption. Often companies would have trouble obtaining permits and arrangements if they didn’t have an ‘in’ or an intimate social or political connection. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators show that Mongolia’s score for Rule of Law has been trending downwards, from 56 per cent in 2004 to 43 per cent in 2009. It was also ranked the 85th most corrupted country in 2004. This unfortunate trend among lawmakers in Mongolia reinforced outside perceptions of the political instability of investment opportunities depending on who in the government has coin-in-hand. Another haphazard virtue of the newly democratic Mongolia government is their coerced accountability to public whims. Ninja miners rep-resent merely a fraction of the thousands of unem-ployed herders in Mongolia forced off their land by mining exploration or environmental degradation of their pastures. They use dangerous extraction methods: sneaking into large mining sites with little protective equipment, using raw mercury and cy-anide to extract gold ore. While certainly the ninja miners produce significant environmental impact by dumping their runoff, there is not a high eco-nomic incentive to legalize them. Mining executive don’t want them encroaching on their prospecting sites and have vehemently stated that the Mon-golian government take action before it becomes a problem and the gold they produce often goes without being taxed to China via black markets.

They often stir up rural insurrections, damage min-ing equipment, and attack other herding and ninja mining groups. Yet they have the public support of many Mongolians who admire them as folk heroes taking back the land foreign powers have acquired. Thus many politicians are obligated to pass laws to support them and dangerously spurn foreign invest-ments and firms. Yet Mongolian government cannot afford to discourage new FDI anymore with introduc-tion of new protections and taxes. Despite robust mineral GDP growth at over 27 percent, non-min-eral GDP growth dropped to 3 percent in the first quarter of this year, down from 15.6 percent in the previous quarter. Domestic demand is now under growing pressure from high inflation and continued currency depreciation. Annual economic growth is expected to soften to 9.5 percent in 2014 reflecting waning domestic demand. With inflation rising and growth stagnating, the Mongolian government owes it to its citizens to look after them in the long term-- not give into the in-vogue economic and popular development ideals of the day. Legalizing ninja mining and imposing strict environmental codes will do nothing but appease Mongolian soci-ety short term, and if and when the economy slows, people will be left wondering where all the money has gone and why no one is investing anymore. Do not make social justice the primary concern of a growth oriented economy--let NGOS, environmen-tal groups, do that work for you.

All the Autonomy Belong to Us On top of this, Mongolia’s neighbors haven’t been the best influences. Russia and China have fought over control over Mongolian reserves and rights like two temptresses in an odd love triangle--with vulnerable bachelor Mongolia in the middle. Putin, recently hearing about Mongolia’s bogged down attempts to develop their public infrastructure woos them with $5 billion in Mongo-lia’s industries including agriculture, railways, and mining (no word on how that will be distributed yet). China, a 40% consumer of the world’s supply of copper, promises to buy advances on any copper ore produced by Oyu Tolgui’s surrounding field. Xi has promised to provide all of China’s techni-cal assistance and favorable trade terms to buy as much minerals as Mongolia can produce. More subversively, China exerts an enormous amount of buying power over Mongolia mineral exports not only in being the primary consumer of rare

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earth minerals and coal from Mongolia. Since it’s bylaws state that no foreign rolling stock can be used on Chinese soil, Mongolia must first sell its raw minerals to a Chinese shell company which takes care of the logistics but also takes a cut of the profits. Russia has also entered the geopolitical fray offering Mongolia favorable economic incentives if it were to build a railroad to connect newfound Gobi desert mines northwards towards Russia and their major port Vladivostok. Increasingly the U.S and the West have offered technical expertise as well as corporate knowledge in the form of mining engineering packages of equipment sent to Mon-golia. This helps dilute some of the geopolitical power Russia and China have over natural resource extraction in Mongolia. Foreign NGOs such as Mercy Corp and WWF have even offered to set up programs to help assist illegal mining and pastoral degradation. Yet Mongolia has even begun to spurn these propositions of foreign aid to exercise its own autonomy and declare its independence. In a move that mirrors narrow-minded economic nationalism, Mongolia is again trying to nationalize mining op-erations and move away from foreign based entities influencing their direction. Yes, foreign advice and investments have not always been absolutely ben-eficial, yet Mongolians themselves have put up the barriers of intense xenophobia. They have returned to notions of a moral economy--one that values traditional Mongolia social ties rather than the quantity of investment or quality of foreign busi-ness. They don’t listen to macroeconomic advice anymore or let foreign experts intervene in ninja mining. New articles making Mongolian domestic ownership of business far more accessible (than say Han Chinese investments) completely forfeits any benefits Mongolians could gain out of letting in foreign entities. Accelerating growth through foreign contributions is the favorable course to take when you have a plethora of resources. It could be argued that sooner or later, Mongolia’s resources will be extracted, so the question is: why doesn’t Mongolia use the leverage that it possess now to dictate their own terms now instead of being forced under desperation to sell out later?

Development through dependence? As detestable as it sounds, Mongolia must play their international suitors (China, Russia, the West, the US, IMNCs) off each other while never gravitating too closely towards one. It is not selling

themselves out, but it is gaining the most favorable returns out of an exploitative situation. They must stick true to a third neighbor policy: one that entails bringing in countries such as the U.S, India and large mining firms such as Rio Jinto or Peabody to dilute the geopolitical power of China and Russia and create a natural competition over their resourc-es. They must frame Mongolian mineral commod-ities as valuable and accessible to attract foreign investment. With a variety of competing suitors, they can choose from the best offers. If Mongo-lia hesitates and stalls, and China, Russia and the world might grow tired of playing a waiting game. Mongolia has become enamoured with welfare development’s relationship with economic development and neglect mining as the prima-ry engine of their meteoric economic rise. They must for now, jettison their democratic mandate to legalize ninja mining and social programs and wait until a more appropriate time were FDI is not at the crux of growth. Foreign interests cannot be put at risk by Mongolian government research and policy actions that made a case for strengthening mining legislation pertaining to long term community development agreements. Let ninja mining and en-vironmental concerns become the burden of foreign aid and NGOs that are more than happy to provide short term aid. Let China, Russia, and MNCs fight over Mongolian coal, copper, and gold. Perhaps in the future, Mongolia can use its resources reve-nues to help supplement public welfare programs or even find more cooperative ways to create new industry and employment from mining. However, Mongolia needs to look at the long term and re-move cultural, economic and political barriers that stagnate investor confidence in private sectors so they actually have the economic and fiscal founda-tion to survive down a tumultuous road ahead.

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Drake MacFarlane ‘17

Drones, faceless, semi-autonomous and all-seeing, strike fear into the hearts of many as they obliterate targets off the face of the map like the hand of god. But, in this new world of asym-metrical warfare and global conflicts, they are our most cost-effective, viable and surgical weapon we have at our disposal. Asymmetrical wars are political wars, in which the victory conditions are simple: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose and the anti-guerrilla wins only if he wins decisively. Drones may not win an asymmetric war on their own, but that is not the intention of their use in the first place. They don’t win wars—they sustain the status quo why is sustaining the status quo import-ant? What does this do for us/asymmetrical war-fare? The use of drones is a highly disputed and controversial topic. First, using drone strikes against targets is like futilely decapitating the Hy-dra—for every head chopped off, two more grow back. The idea is that blowback from these strikes will create a new generation of anti-American jihadists, who have grown up seeing their families wiped off the face of the map. Also, drones are costlier and more limited than they appear; they require vast amounts of intelligence resources, maintenance, and can only fly when the skies are clear (and fly slowly at that!). Additionally, the le-gality of drone use is blurry, especially after the ex-trajudicial killings of Americans, Anwar al-Awlaki included. After all, what gives the United States the right to be judge, jury, and executioner across the globe, and furthermore, whatever happened to the American right to a trial? Finally, the viability of drones is under question: drones may be able to kill targets, but at the cost of potential intelligence and international legitimacy. However, as we shall see, these arguments, while valid, are either unfounded or do not consider the alternatives to drone use. First, drones are surgical—they provide

greater precision than conventional methods and send a far more powerful political message. Since Obama took office, drones have killed more than 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist oper-atives in Pakistan and Yemen, 50 of which were senior members of those organizations (Byman 2013). These killings have sent a message: wherev-er you are, we will find you, and we will eliminate you. These constant attacks have made it exceed-ingly difficult for new operatives to be trained and have sent many members further underground and incommunicado. Drones may not win the war, but they certainly disrupt the efforts of the guerilla. To highlight their surgical nature, it is estimated that the civilian-to-militant death ratio is between 1:3 and 1:5, or for every 3-5 militants killed, a civilian is as well (Byman 2013). This is partly due to their overwatch ability, allowing them to collect data and watch their target for extended periods of time. Operators are then able to strike at the optimum time, with lower chance of civilian casualties. Comparing that to conventional methods used in the Iraq War, which had higher civilian casual-ties, leading to a civilian-to-militant ratio of 1:2 caused by an indiscriminate cruise missile, one can conclude that drones tend to have less collateral damage.. If drones truly do create new jihadists, it stands to reason that using conventional methods surely make more, thus making drones the better alternative. Drones are cheaper to maintain than a full-fledged fighter jet, not to mention that the payload they carry is smaller ordnance and thus much less costly. Although the intelligence cost may be great, that is also a strength. That intelligence leads to smarter decisions and more discriminate strikes. But, more important than the dollars and cents, is the human element. No drone pilot is in physical danger while they fly. Third, the viability of drones is shown through their exemplification of the Powell Doc-trine. This doctrine in short poses four questions for foreign policy makers: Is there a clear objec-tive? What is the cost? Is there an exit strategy? Is the public with me on this move? Drones prove themselves viable by answering these questions. They have a clear objective: eliminate the target, as cleanly as possible. Their cost is minimal: to com-

Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Drone

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mit to drone use only requires treasure, not Amer-ican blood. The exit strategy is inherent: unlike a full-scale, boots-on-the-ground invasion, drone use doesn’t necessarily entangle one in a region. Once the operation is done, they can fly home. Finally, the most controversial (and arguably important) question is whether the public backs their use. Concerns over international legality and collateral damage plague the drone program, but those negatives pale when set against the alterna-tive: physical raids. Attempting to capture a target is costlier and riskier in terms of American lives than sending a drone to eliminate them. Often, drones can reach targets that a physical team could not, such as Anwar Al-Awlaki himself. In the end, the mass public does not care about collateral damage—what they care about is whether Ameri-can soldiers die. Lastly, the public is not in support of land-based invasions. They’re tired after over a decade of war. Drones do not have the substantial

public morale costs as conventional strategies do, and recognizing that, drone use answers the fourth question of the Powell Doctrine. Drones are not the end-all be-all solution to modern war. However, in the age of asymmetrical warfare, the anti-guerilla must use the assets they have. Drones will only continue to proliferate and as the global hegemon, we have the opportunity to dictate their use, unilaterally. Our superior intelli-gence and technology allows us to see and strike anywhere on the planet. Our physical military has been reduced to the point that it can only fight on one front and hold the status quo on another. Drones allow us to project power in the far reaches of the globe and, hopefully, maintain the status quo. They won’t win the war, but they’ll let us define it.

Works CitedByman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs July/August Issue.

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Sema Hasan ‘18

Professor Carl F. Kaestle of Brown Uni-versity once wrote that “without writing, human consciousness cannot achieve its fuller potentials.” With this statement, Kaestle emphasizes how vital reading and writing are for, as he states, a tool for one to engage in critical thinking and questioning, and offers a way for individuals to “achieve [their] full potentials.” Reading and writing have always been a way to communicate, but for centuries women have struggled for the right to obtain this basic skill. While there is a large proportion of the world that is illiterate, the lowest rates of female literacy and the highest gender gap in literacy are found in Muslim-majority countries including Yemen, Syria and Afghanistan. Yet, rather than blame illiteracy entirely on a patriarchy, religion, or poverty, the explanation for why women con-tinue to be denied access to literacy is rooted in a society’s culture as a whole. Despite pressure from the international community and what most Islamic scholars contend, the culture of Pakistan, specifically its government, language, customs and traditions, continue to limit the access women have to literacy. Literacy is often defined as being able to read, write and comprehend; to understand what is written. Unfortunately, many are unable to do so due to the restrictions put in place by various societies. According to Kaestle (1985), literacy can further be defined as “the ability to decode and comprehend written language at a rudimentary lev-el [and is] the ability to look at written words cor-responding to ordinary oral discourse, to say them and understand them.” Furthermore, writing allows “the replication, transportation, and preservation of messages”. Being most often obtained through education, literacy is a vital component of everyday life, for it allows for the understanding of one’s world “and to securing one’s place in it” (Strom-quist 1992). According to Daniel Wagner, a mem-ber of the Peace Corps who conducted research on illiteracy in the Arab world, literacy is “not an object’ that can be mandated by the government au-thorities, but rather, its acquisition and maintenance are dependent on the cultural beliefs, practices and

history within which it resides” (Magin 2010). The beliefs and practices within the country of Pakistan are examples of how this is prevalent. In its simplest definition, culture refers to the beliefs, customs, and art of a particular society, group, place or time. If examined closely however, one will see that culture consists of seven compo-nents: government, language, social structure, reli-gion, economy, art and literature, and customs and traditions. Societies establish government in order to regulate and bring order to a community, as well as to see that certain values are upheld. Some gov-ernments achieve this better than others. Language is a critical component because it offers individuals a way to communicate, and there is arguably no culture without language. Reading and writing are considered a necessity rather than a privilege in many parts of the world, but in countries such as Pakistan, where less than half of the population is illiterate, illiteracy is the cultural norm. In the Arab world, literacy is traced back centuries and has traditionally been considered sacred in its purposes (Migan 2008). During the expansion of Islamic civilization, centers for higher learning, known as madrasas, were created. These madrasas provided instruction in “Islamic law, Arabic language and literature, and, to a lesser ex-tent, in secular subjects such as philosophy, math-ematics, and science” (Magin 2010). One of the first madrasas was built in Baghdad in the eleventh century C.E., and in addition to a free education, madrasas offered food and free lodging, resulting in their rapid spread throughout the Muslim world. Teachers taught using a lecture format and stu-dents learned lessons from habitual memorization. In most Muslim-majority countries today, madrasas exist “as part of a broader educational infrastruc-ture” where students receive what is considered to be a “quality Western-style education” (Armanois 2003). While literacy came to symbolize power and was “restricted to a small elite” (Olson 2007), meaning a primarily male elite, throughout the his-tory of the Arab world, Muslim women continued to play an important and historic role as scholars and leaders in education. One such woman was Fatima Jinnah, sister of Pakistan’s founding father. Although she looked frail, Fatima was

To Be Literate To what extent do cultural traditions and history affect the access young women have to literacy in Pakistan?

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the “graceful but gritty sister” of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and was later known as “a patriotic heroine” after the creation of Pakistan (Paracha 2014). Un-like most women, Fatima had the opportunity to be educated at the University of Calcutta, and received a degree in dentistry. During her lifetime, Fatima was a social worker, a women’s rights activist, and a trusted confidant to her brother, later writing a book about his life and accomplishments. Despite examples of educated female leaders, in today’s society, there remains to be a large gap between the literacy rates of males and females. Currently, there is a large percentage of the world’s population, regardless of geographic location, that lacks the ability to read and write. The total youth literacy rate globally is an estimat-ed 89.5%, meaning that about 123.2 million people in the world between the ages of 15 and 20 are literate. Of those 123.2 million people, the total lit-eracy rate of female youth is 61.35% (Olson 2007). While the literacy rate for Muslim-majority coun-tries is particularly low, between 1990 and 2011 the adult literacy rate in the Arab world rose from 55% to 77% and youth literacy rate rose from 74% to 90% (Olson 2007). While these numbers may seem satisfactory, an examination of each region reveals that the literacy rate is much lower. For example, the literacy rate in Pakistan for females aged 15 to 24 years is approximately 61.5%; for males it is 79.1% (Unicef ). Furthermore, of the 5.1 million children who are out of school in Pakistan, 3 million of them are girls, and of the 49 million illiterate adults in Pakistan, two-thirds are women (Shaukat 2012). However, in order to fully understand why Pakistan has such a low literacy rate, one must examine the history of Pakistan and events that transpired prior to its creation. Pakistan was origi-nally a part of British India, which was eventually segregated along religious lines in 1947. Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was a scholar and lawyer, who was educated at Bombay Universi-ty in London, as well as a human rights activist, minority activist, and a women’s rights activist. Jinnah said: “No struggle can ever succeed without women participating side by side with men. There are two powers in the world; one is the sword and the other is the pen. There is a third power stronger than both, that of women” (Yousafzai 2013,31). During the 1930s and 40s, as relations between Muslims and Hindus deteriorated, a session was held for the Muslim League during which the first

official demand was made for the partition of India and the creation of the Muslim state of Pakistan. While Jinnah had always believed that peace and unity between Muslims and Hindus was possible, he eventually came to view that partition was nec-essary, and thus the Muslim state of Pakistan was created. In places such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and sections of India, Islam is a primary religion. Islam is practiced by a majority of Pakistanis and governs their “personal, political, economic and legal lives” (University of West Florida 2010). There are five core practices, or pillars of Islam which include: one’s profession of faith, praying five times a day, almsgiving, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and participating in the Hajj, a holy pilgrimage to Mecca. Traditionally, within all Pakistani families there is a patriarchal and hierar-chical system which provides each member a dis-tinct role. Within the patriarchal system, the senior male is expected to make the best decisions for the good of the family. For women, maintaining a good reputation is a lifelong demand.Within the family, however, women have more power and influence when it comes to decision making. In one’s family, a man’s wife is the dominant female who can wield “a significant amount of power over daily house-hold activities and younger household members” (University of West Florida 2010). Despite this, outside of the home, women generally have a lack of power and girls are expected to become wives and mothers rather than attend school. While many girls are unable to go to school, some measures have been taken by the government to increase the quality of education and provide more opportunity for girls to attend school. In 1959 for example, the Pakistani government created a commission on national education in an attempt to provide “equal facilities, in terms of quantity and quality, for the education of boys and girls” and to “preferably employ women as teach-ers for the primary level” (Quershi 2007, 4). While this commission supported equal facilities, it also recommended specific areas of study for young women, including “elementary home craft, child rearing, nursing, [and] home economics” (Quershi 2007, 4). An education policy established in 1970 was created to “establish separate girls’ schools wherever possible to overcome parents’ resistance to girls’ education,” and another policy formulat-ed in 1979 reiterated the goal of providing equal access to basic education to all citizens.

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Despite its support for equal opportunity, author Rashida Quershi states that the 1979 pol-icy presents some contradictory statements. For example, the 1979 policy, like previous policies, recommends support for “acquisition of literacy and certain basic home management skills [which] may be preferred over full scale primary education [for girls] for the time being by typical rural fam-ilies” (Quershi 2007). In addition, the document presents a dilemma in deciding between making an investment in higher education or primary (basic) education. It argues that an investment in higher education “benefit[s] only a small percentage of [the] female population mostly coming from afflu-ent families” while investing in primary education would help a larger amount of people (Quershi 2007). Although opportunities for young women to access education in Pakistan exist, they are ineffec-tive and unsustainable. Today, despite the several educational pol-icies that have been created over the past decades, there are several reasons why girls and young women do not attend school. The Pakistan Integrat-ed Household Survey (PIHS) conducted in 2002 shows that lack of parental permission is the most common reason given by girls for never attending school, both in urban and rural areas. Parents have the authority to decide whether or not to send their daughters to school at all or to withdraw them at puberty, which is the common outcome. The PIHS also reports that distance between home and school is another frequently listed reason for not attend-ing school. Most parents’ decisions regarding the choice not to send their daughters to school is often based on their perception of potential threats to their daughter’s safety on her way to school. This is a particularly common response from families who live in rural areas and in provinces with “scattered populations.” Studies show that when schools are located closer to home, parents are more likely to send their daughters to school. While this is a step in the right direction, access and efficacy of educa-tion continue to be the largest issue. Parents’ perception of the quality of edu-cation available to their children is a major factor that affects their decision to send their children to school. Some of the “minimal quality indicators” that parents look for to determine the quality of a school are: the condition of the building and whether or not there is presence of a boundary wall around the school and if there are toilets and drink-ing water; if there are “able female teachers who

remain present in class,” and if visible improve-ment in children’s behavior can be seen, and if there is evidence of learning (Quershi 2007,20). If a school has some or all of these qualities, parents are more willing to send their daughters to school even if their financial resources are limited. De-spite having all of the “minimal quality indicators,” many schools are taught in different languages, which creates a language barrier, making it difficult to learn. In addition to the coeducation schools, there are several different types of schools through-out Pakistan. These include elite English speak-ing schools, non elite English speaking schools, government Urdu speaking schools, and madrasas. During the British colonial period, a language education policy was created which stated that Urdu, Pakistan’s national language, would be the language for the instruction of the masses while English would be the medium “for the elite” (Cole-man 2010). While this policy faced criticism as ear-ly as 1880, populations of people continued to be taught in other languages, and were thus “divorced from their sociolinguistic roots” (Coleman 2010). Because people were separated from their native languages, they lost contact with the literature of their culture. As of 2014, this linguistic barrier still exists. In a multilingual country such as Pakistan, where several languages compete for supremacy, English is considered to be the “elite” language and many children attend English-speaking schools (Mustafa 2012). British academic Hywel Coleman states that children learning in Urdu as a second language face major obstacles, especially at a young age. These issues can range from making slower progress in reading and writing to a lack of support from parents who also struggle with Urdu. Today, there exists an overwhelming amount of evidence illustrating that children benefit from re-ceiving their early education through the “medium of their home language” (Coleman 2010). One such piece of evidence is that children learn to read and write significantly easier in their home language, a language with which they are already familiar. Fur-thermore, if a child becomes literate in their home language first they are more likely to be successful in learning a second language. In addition to having schools that instruct in different languages, studies suggest that many schools, specifically girls-only schools have fewer resources with which to work. Most girls-only schools have poor facilities, lack science labora-

The Meridian 18

tories and experience high levels of teacher ab-senteeism in secondary schools. According to the Pakistan Task Force report released in 2013, on any given day, 15 to 20 percent of public sector teachers were found absent, leaving children for one day a week without teaching (Inayatullah 2012). It is estimated that out of the 365 days per year in Pakistan, public teaching only takes place on 120 days or so (Inayatullah 2012). Similarly, the school day in Afghanistan is barely three hours long and the quality of textbooks are “notoriously bad” (Oates 2013). Often there are schools where teachers decide not to show up, yet they continue to get paid by the government. There are over 7,000 schools, known as ghost schools that exist through-out Pakistan. According to a report conducted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, most of the ghost schools are “teaching institutions only by name, but virtually no student is being admitted there to seek education” (Redhar 2013). While some teachers remain absent and continue to collect salaries, other schools fail to appoint new teachers. Furthermore, unlike Afghanistan, who is beginning to spend more money on education, according to the Educa-tion for Global Monitoring Report of 2012, Paki-stan spends seven times more money on its military than on primary education and has the second highest number of “out of school children” in the world (Shaukat 2012). In addition to the lack of funding and poor quality of education, poverty continues to be a primary reason as to why there so many children out of school. According to the PIHS of 2001-2002, poverty was the most frequently cited reason for boys and the second most frequent for girls not attending school. The data shows that the rate of enrollment for boys coming from higher income groups is twice as much than boys who come from the lower income groups. Quershi (2007) states that the difference is even larger for girls. According to the PIHS, girls in the lowest income group have three times less access to school than girls in the highest income group. Furthermore, in Pakistan, there is an estimated 37.5% of the population who live in poverty, or 64 million people, and for a family in poverty, where parents have little money, education does not serve as a high priority (Dhakan 2013). Because of this, most girls are often forced to study at home rather than go to school. While some may argue that the poverty ex-ists throughout the world and many other countries are denied necessary resources, in order to under-

stand why certain countries continue to experience poor literacy rates, one must examine how funding and resources are distributed by different govern-ments. Critics may contend that a lack of resources is not to blame for low literacy rates, for evidence suggests that several countries including Japan, Somalia and Vietnam overcame identical obstacles during their initial years. However, according to an article published in the Pakistani newspaper, Dawn, regarding literacy in Pakistan, the only difference between Pakistan and other countries is that the Pakistani government “only laid emphasis on giv-ing policy documents rather than implement them” (Khan 2013). Other issues that contribute to Paki-stan’s low literacy rate include failure to properly monitor checks and balances, particularly in public sector education. Furthermore, some may claim that religion is solely to blame for the limited access that wom-en have to school and literacy, yet there are some Muslim-majority countries that have higher literacy rates than others. Despite popular belief in Western Civilization, Islam is a religion that advocates for women’s rights, including their right to receive an education. Due to certain interpretations of Islam, the role of women varies from region to region, with some areas being more strict than others. Yet, one must be cautious when examining the issues that women face in the Muslim world, for although Islam is a factor in the position of women in Mus-lim societies, it is not the only factor. Author Mitra K. Shavarini states the issues of girls and women in Muslim societies are “often misunderstood in a western context” and that other factors such as “poverty, corruption, geopolitical and regional power struggles, and cultural values also impact that status of women in the Muslim world.” While Islam is the primary religion of Pakistan and has incredible influence over its citizens, it is not the primary reason for Pakistan’s low literacy rate and low access to education. While Pakistan has a low quality of edu-cation, there are certain areas inside the country where the quality of the educational system and literacy rate are higher. In the Hunza Valley, a remote region in northernmost Pakistan, at least 75% of all residents are literate and “virtually all youths, regardless of gender can read and write” (Ghosh 2013). Almost every child in the Hunza Valley attends school up to at least high school, and many others pursue higher education at colleges in Pakistan and abroad. One of the principal factors

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behind Hunza’s high literacy rates traces back to the education advocacy efforts of the Aga Khan II and Sir Sultan Muhammad Shah, who persuaded the rules of Hunza to educate their people. Today, what makes the literacy rate so high is that par-ents in Hunza recognize the value of receiving an education and encourage their daughters to gain an education. Hunza is often described as “an oasis of education” and provides a good example for other regions to follow, and not just in terms of educa-tion. Unlike other regions, Hunza’s culture is not as traditional or restricting, and overall is a much safer region. In Hunza, “women and girls stroll the bazaars after dusk without male relatives and no one dares to bat even an eyelash at them, let alone stare sleazily and make risque comments” (Ghosh). Organizations also exist to help promote the impor-tance of education, such as the Hoshyar Project. The Hoshyar project is one such organi-zation. Based in the United States, the Hoshyar project is designed to “increase girl’s access to ed-ucation in Pakistan and other underserved parts of South Asia.” The organization focuses on providing education to girls specifically in Pakistan because of the alarming rate at which girls usually drop out of primary school, typically because after that age, “girls and boys are prohibited to study together” and there are very few girl-only schools. In addi-tion, the Hoshyar Project believes that secondary schooling provides more opportunity for futures “beyond early marriage and lifelong domesticity.” Executive director Carla Petievich believes that il-literacy and early marriage are connected, but only “if there is a cause and effect.” Petievich contends that the steps that need to be taken in an effort to increase literacy rates are to “make education more widely available” and she believes that the best way to do so is to “open more schools and make it easier for people to attend school.” The Hoshyar project attempts to make education available to as many girls as possible by providing money for tuition, salaries of teachers, books, uniforms and other related costs. Similarly, according to UNES-CO’s director in Pakistan, Dr.Kozue Kay Nagata, Pakistan needs to develop “a strong legal frame-work to ensure the provision of education” under Article 25-A of the Constitution, which mandates “free and compulsory education for all [children] aged 5-16” (Shaukat 2012). If these steps are taken, using Hunza Valley as an example, girls in Pakistan would have the tools available to them to become literate.

While one would think that the right to education and the ability to read and write is one that every young girl should have, this is not the case. Stromquist states most literacy programs do not encourage the promotion of female literacy because their curricula are “still designed along sexually stereotyped lines that emphasize wom-en’s role as mothers and household managers.” Historically, access to education has been used by the dominant group in society to maintain pow-er over a lesser group. Thus, by denying women access to education, men can continue to maintain a superior position over them. Yet, studies show that women who are educated and literate are able to make better decisions about their safety and welfare. Educated girls marry later, which results in lower fertility rates, healthier families, and wom-en are able to educate their own children. Women who are literate are more likely to “register their births of her children” and to have children who are attending school, “who are vaccinated, who are well nourished, and who survive infancy and then childhood” (Oates 2013). Access to literacy and education not only affects the woman, but entire families and communities. In rural areas in Pakistan and India, literacy means more than being able to read, it has a bigger impact. In these rural areas, family members are dependent on others who can read and write. Both rural and urban families rely on “lettered members to to negociate with the outside world” such as “dealing with the telephone and electric companies, medical treatment centres like hospitals or clinics, [and] reading signs on buses and trains when they travel” (Petievich 2014). When the ability to read and write is denied, incidents and in the extreme cases, death, often occur as a result. Pakistani newspapers often report incidents of children dying because their parents are unable to read the instruc-tions on their prescribed medicine bottles, or wom-en dying in childbirth because they are unaware that they need to go to a hospital. Those who cannot read rely on literate members of their community to help them, which are far and few between. Rural communities are generally made up of laborers and people who are non-skilled workers. In addition, people who want to have a number of children generally want them to work rather than go to school. Yet, for the few people who are literate, being able to understand the written word offers them a sense of “dignity and self respect [and] empowers them in many

The Meridian 20

ways” (CNN 2013). Literacy means much more than just being able to read and write, it makes a profound difference for people who cannot com-municate with the outside world. Despite the traditional gender roles that have been established in Pakistan, young women have challenged social norms, and serve as role models. Current examples of Pakistani girls whose right to attend school was threatened, yet managed to overcome adversity and obstacles include Malala Yousafzai and Mukhtar Mai. Born in 1997 in the town of Mingora to a Sunni Muslim family, Malala first caught the attention of the public when she wrote a BBC diary about her life under the Taliban in 2009. Yousafzai would hand write notes about her life and what had transpired during the day, and then passed them on to a reporter. Three years later in October in 2012, Yousafzai was shot in the head by a Taliban gunman because of her campaign for girls’ education. Her survival marked her rise to fame and global recognition. As she describes in her autobiography I Am Malala, Malala was a girl in a land where “rifles are fired in celebration of a son, while daughters are hidden away behind a curtain, their role in life simply to prepare food and give birth to children” (Yousafzai, 2013 13). She and her father both argue that poor “education [is] the root of all Pakistan’s problems” (Yousafzai 2013, 41). Malala received a Nobel Peace Prize in 2014 for her work and activism promoting girls’ rights to education, and continues to be a signif-icant role model for young girls globally. In her home town of Swat, for example, one in every three girls go to school because of the Yousafzai campaign. Similarly, Mukhtar Mai became well known after the horrific incident in which she was gang raped by the order of a local council, and is now a prominent advocate of female education. After being raped, most women would commit suicide to “cleanse herself and her family of the shame” (Kristof 2009), yet her mother and father prevented her from doing so. Instead, she reported the crime and when President Pervez Musharraf heard about the case, sent her $83,000 in compen-sation. Instead of taking the money for herself, Mukhtar decided to “invest it in what her village needed most—schools” (Kristof 2009). She is often regarded as one of Pakistan’s bravest women because she dared to speak out against her attackers and go against the societal norms. Because of the strength and courage of these two women, other

girls have been inspired to do the same. One such girl was Humaira Bachal, who went to school in se-cret, with the help of her mother and unbeknownst to her father. Bahcal hid her uniform and her books at a friends house and continued to go to school un-til discovered by her father. After much dispute, her father unhappily relented and allowed his daughter to go to school. While many consider the issue of illitera-cy to only affect poor, underdeveloped countries, illiteracy and lack of education is a global issue. In America, for example, even though the total per-centage of people who are literate is approximately 99%, one must consider the larger population and access that many children have to education. De-spite this, there remains a large number of people who are illiterate. According to a study conduct-ed by the U.S. Department of Education and the National Institute of Literacy, 32 million adults can’t read and 21% of the population read below a 5th grade level (Huffington Post 2013). Many people take literacy for granted and for those who are unable to, it makes a difference. Most people do not seem to realize that the ability to read and allow is a major tool that allows an individual to commu-nicate and express their opinions or concerns.

Works Cited“Access to Education.” Women’s Islamic Initiative in Spiritu-ality and Equality. WISE. 2014. 13 April. 2014.“Adult and Youth Literacy.” United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. No. 26. Sept. 2013. PDF file.Armanois, Febe. “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Back-ground.” U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. 29 Oct. 2003 Web. 21 April. 2014. “Benefits of Literacy.” READ Educational Trust. n.p. 2010. Web. 15 April. 2014. Brown, Gordon. “Girls Who Risk Their Lives for Education.” The New York Times. The New York Times. 8 April, 2013. Web. 31 March, 2014.Coleman, Hewyl. “Teaching and Learning in Pakistan: The Role of Language in Education.” British Council. n.p. 2010. Web. 20 May, 2014. Davies, Catriona. “Mideast Women Beat Men in Education, Lose Out at Work.” CNN World. CNN. 6 June. 2012. Web. 4 April. 2014.Dhakan, Dr. Ali Akar. “Jump in Pakistan’s Poverty Level.” Dawn.com. Dawn.com. 30 April, 2013. Web. 21 April. 2014. Faisal, Safa. “Muslim Girls Struggle for Education.” BBC News. BBC. 24 Sept. 2003. Web. 4 April. 2014.Ghosh, Palash. “Gordon Brown’s School Days: Actually, Paki-stan’s Literacy Rate Has Been Improving, With One Glittering Model of Excellence.” International Business Times. Interna-tional Business Times. 31 March, 2014. Web. 31 March, 2014.Gunawardena, Chandra. “Problems of Illiteracy in a Literate Developing Society.” International Review of Education. Vol. 43, No. 5/6, Tradition, Modernity and Postmodernity in Com-

Volume XXXIII 21 parative EducationHoshyar Foundation. Hoshyar Foundation, 2014. Web. 14 April. 2014. Inayatullah. “State of School Education in Pakistan.” The Nation. n.p. 21 April. 2012. Web. 10 April. 2014.“India’s Illiterate Population Largest in the World, Says UNE-SCO Report.” The Hindu. The Hindu. 30 Jan. 2014. Web. 15 April. 2014. Joel Perlmann and Dennis Shirley. “When Did New England Women Acquire Literacy?” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 48, No. 1. Jan., 1991: 50-67.Jones, Stephanie. Girls, social class, and literacy. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2006.Kaestle, Carl F. “The History of Literacy and the History of Readers.” Review of Research in Education, Vol. 12. 1985: 11-53. 31 March. 2014.Kalia, Narendra Nath. “Women and Sexism: Language of Indi-an School Textbooks.” Economic and Political Weekly.Kendrick, Maureen, and Shelley Jones. “Girls’ Visual Rep-resentations of Literacy in a Rural Ugandan Community.” Canadian Journal of Education 31.2 (2008): 371-404.Khan, Ghazala Murad. “Literacy and Pakistan.” Dawm.com. Dawn.com. 22 May. 2013. Web. 20 May. 2014. Krishan, Gopal and Madhav Shyam. “Regional Aspects of Ur-ban-Rural Differential in Literacy in India: 1971.” The Journal of Developing Areas. Vol. 12, No. 1. Oct., 1978: 11-21.Kristof, Nicholas D. and Sheryl WuDunn. Half the Sky: Turn-ing Oppression into Opportunity for Women Worldwide. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. Print. Lotbiniere, Max de. “Pakistan Facing Language ‘Crisis’ in Schools.” The Guardian. The Guardian. 7 Dec. 2010. Web. 7 May. 2014. Magin, Shawn. “Illiteracy in the Arab Region: A Meta Study.” Graduate Institute of Applied Linguistics. 2010. PDF file. Metcalfe, Beverly Dawn. “Women, Management and Global-ization in the Middle East.” Journal of Business Ethics.Vol. 83, No 1. Nov. 2008. 85-100.Mussadaq, Maha. “Female Illiteracy: 41 Percent of Pakistani Girls Fail to Complete Primary School.” The Express Tribune. Express Tribune. 20 July, 2011. Web. 15 April. 2014. Mustafa, Zubeiba. “Pakistan Ruined by Language Myth.” The Guardian. The Guardian. 10 Jan, 2012. Web. 20 May. 2014. Oates, Lauryn. “The Mother of All Problems: Female Literacy in Afghanistan.” The Guardian. The Guardian. 21 June. 2013. Web. 23 April. 2014. Olson, David R and Nancy Torrance. “The Making of Literate Societies.” Social Anthropology, Vol. 15, Issue 2. 2007: 189-213.“Pakistan’s Educational Challenges.” CNN. CNN. 9 Oct. 2013. Web. 14 April. 2014. “Pakistan: Low Literacy Rates Hamper Health, Welfare.” IRIN: Humanitarian News and Analysis. IRIN. 2014. Web. 15 April. 2014. Paracha, Nadeem F. “Fatima Jinnah: A Sister’s Sorrow.” Dawn.com. Dawn.com. 4 May, 2014. Web. 19 May. 2014. Parks, Alexia. “This School Lifts Pakistani Girls Out of Pov-erty.” Huffington Post. Huffington Post. 9 Nov. 2011. Web. 14 April. 2014. Petievich, Carla. “High School Senior Project.” Message to Sema Hasan. 17 April. 2014. Email. Quershi, Rashida and Jan F.A. Rarieya. Gender and Education in Pakistan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print.Raney, Laura and K. Subbaro. “Social Gains from Female

Education: A Cross-Nation Study.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 44, No. 1. 1995: 105-128.Redhar, Chancher. “Education: Pakistan’s ‘Ghost Schools’ Threaten Next Generation.” The Express Tribune. The Express Tribune. 13 Dec. 2013. Web. 20 May. 2014. Robertson, Elizabeth. “This Living Hand’: Thirteenth-Century Female Literacy, Materialist Immanence, and the Reader of the Ancrene Wisse.” Speculum, Vol. 78, No. 1. 2003: 1-36.Roudi-Fahimi, Farzaneh and Valentine M. Moghadam. “Em-powering Women, Developing Society: Female Education in the Middle East and North Africa.” PRB. Population Reference Bureau. 2013. Web. 4 April. 2014.“Rural Poverty in Pakistan.” Rural Poverty Portal. n.p. n.d. Web. 8 May. 2014. Santana, Rebecca. “Pakistani Women on a Mission to Educate Children.” Huffington Post. Huffington Post. 6 April. 2014. Web. 14 April. 2014. Shaukat, Aroosa. “Education for All: Literacy Rate Rising, But Pakistan Needs to do More.” The Express Tribune. The Express Tribune. 25 Oct. 2012. Web. 15 April. 2014. Shavarini, Mitra K. and Wendy R. Robinson. Women and Education in Iran and Afghanistan. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2005. Print. “Society and Norms: Gender Roles—Women.” Pakistan. Uni-versity of West Florida. 2010. Web. 13 April 13, 2014.Stromquist, Nelly P. “Women and Literacy: Promises and Con-straints.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 520. 1992: 54-65. Web. 14 March. 2014.“The U.S. Literacy Rate Hasn’t Changed in Ten Years.” Huffington Post. Huffington Post. 6 Oct. 2013. Web. 14 March. 2014.Velkoff, Victoria A. “Women’s Education in India.” US Department of Commerce. United States Census Bureau. Oct. 1998. Web. 8 April. 2014. Yousafzai, Malala and Christina Lamb. I Am Malala. New York: Little Brown, 2013. Print.

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Agra, Uttar Pradesh, India: A woman overlooks the Yamuna river and the Taj Mahal from the Agra fort.Photo by Cierra Higgins ‘15

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Mussoorie, Uttarakhand, India: A young girl pauses on her way home from school. Photo by Cierra Higgins ‘15

Haridwar, Uttarakhand, India: A holy man sits near the River Ganges. The Ganges is considered a godess in Hinduism, and is worshiped everyday through the ganga aarti ceremony. Photo by Cierra Higgins ‘15

The Meridian 24

Nathan Ren ‘15

The Arctic is a mirror, reflecting our interests back at us. Security advisors from the Arctic States of the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway and Denmark see it as a border region with vulnerable and indefensible coasts. Scientists see a doomsday clock, where each tick sounds off the collapse of an ancient ice- shelf or the extinction of a beloved furry animal. Corporations and energy industry oligarchs see it as a treasure trove of fossil fuels, waiting to be extracted. The Arctic illustrates a region rife with issues and opportunities, with only an intergovernmental forum known as the Arctic Council to juggle these challenges. Recently, Asian states have recognized their stakes in the Arctic, and their admittance as observer members of the council have created division in political foray that otherwise champions inclusivity, multi-lateralism and transparency.

A melting winter wonderland What’s even worth fighting over? The Arctic has an estimated 30% of the world’s un-discovered natural gas reserves and 13% of its undiscovered oil reserves. If that isn’t enough economic incentive, since the 1950s, the Arctic has lost 50% of its mass, creating ice-free summers for traders and fishermen. This retreat of permafrost has reshaped the geography of the region, forcing policymakers to redraw their maps. Moreover, new transarctic routes are projected to shorten trade distances from Asia to Europe by roughly 40%.

Dysfunctional family The main cleavage between the two camps rests in their different perspectives on who owns the Arctic. Ideological differences are much harder to reconcile, and creates conflicts colored by irra-tional rhetoric and policy. This sets a dangerous foundation for discussion, and though Russia and Canada have hesitantly allowed observer status to the Asian Five, their concerns have not been dilut-ed in the slightest. This political division is problematic for two reasons. First, it presents an obstacle for further decision-making in a volatile region that sometimes requires rapid responses and limited

discourse. Second, the Arctic Council isn’t consti-tutionally equipped to resolve security or defense concerns. It was formed to provide a voice to in-digenous peoples in the Arctic, rather than mediate state interests. In order for the Council to perform its duty, Russia and Canada must re-examine their behavior, and stop operating on rusted zero- sum logic. Asian states have a legitimate stake in the re-gion, and deserve a seat at the table. When it comes to the Arctic’s stability, the stakes are high, and there is no time for debate over unprecedented fear. It is not Asian interests, but Arctic mismanagement that will lead to global catastrophe.

Dancing on thin ice Is Canada and Russia’s trepidation towards Asian states in the Arctic informed by fictional fears or legitimate concerns? Canada is spearheading a movement to dislodge an Asian presence in the Arctic Coun-cil with a far less friendly partner in Russia. It is quite unlike the liberal, peace-loving, multilateral Canadians to oppose any kind of inclusive action at a regional level. Yet the Canadian government has viewed Asian state inclusion as a threat to existing Arctic state sovereignty. Their concern specifically centered on fears of ‘hidden’ Asian agendas and the possible dilution of existing Arctic ‘voices’. But what does Canada have in common with Russia? One would be very hard pressed to find evidence of their collusion in any other situation outside of the Arctic. Canada and Russia only agree inso-far as they think Asian states will threaten Arctic sovereignty, although they come to this conclusion through very different means.

It takes two to tango Canada is threatened by rhetoric emerging from within Asian states, rather than the official sentiments of the Asian governments. Russia is concerned that Asian investment in their Northern Sea Route (NSR) will give them reason to claim ownership of it. Both states believe that increased Asian involvement in the Arctic will lead to an erosion of their legitimate biased ownership of the region. But while these concerns are founded on potential realities, they are not based on realistic

Frozen Governance: Political division in the Arctic, the last frontier for international cooperation

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circumstances or past behaviors. Moreover, Rus-sian and Canadian rights to the Arctic are enforced by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), leaving no room for legal maneuvering by Asian states. Both Canada and Russia have extremely low investment in their Arctic assets. Canada has put almost no infrastructure or economic develop-ment funds into their northern territo-ries. Russia on the other hand, understands Asian economic intentions, and despite desperately want-ing to improve Sino-Russo relations, is opposed to sharing the NSR. Russia has always had sover-eignty insecurity, yet despite having more landmass bordering the Arctic than Canada, is more con-cerned with practical control than encroachment.

A wounded bear, in pride and finance What grinds Russia’s gears the most is its financial weakness and inability to fund itself. Pre-viously utilized as a Soviet domestic trade route, the NSR has the capability of shortening Asian trade to Europe by the aforementioned drastic 40%. This route is claimed by Russia as part of its sover-eign space, and Asian states completely recognize this. Unfortunately, Russia is completely bankrupt with regard to Arctic investment. Despite setting up multiple expensive projects to develop their Arctic assets, a lack of financing has left most of these developments permanently in the pipeline. Due to their reckless aggression in Eastern Europe and the American shale revolution, what financial burden the Russian energy sector used to alleviate has now returned in full force. The NSR is an economic dream, realized only through massive investment and large-scale infrastructure development. If Russia would accept Asian assistance on a route that they maintain practical control over, it could be hugely beneficial. Russia can’t commit to the overhead for the NSR as it is, and if they bankroll the project through deep Chinese and Japanese pockets, it could become a huge economic crutch in an otherwise perilous time for the Russian economy. Practical control is not sacrificed by foreign investment. The two concepts are not mutually exclusive when you have the legislative power to exert your sovereign-ty. For Canada and Russia to assume that foreign investment will threaten their power base, is quite an ironic sentiment. Western and Soviet powers spent the better half of the 20th century

exerting their influences on Asian states. The fact that they now refuse to attract investment from the same areas they exploited is a notion steeped in hypocrisy and imperialist bogus.

A matter of perspective In order to understand exactly why Ca-nadian and Russian sentiments are outdated and hypocritical, we can compare how the US and her Nordic allies approached the same situation differ-ently. Combined, the United States, Norway and Denmark possess a territorial claimcomparable to that of Russia’s and Canada’s. In fact, Norway herself has the 3rd largest territorial stake in the Arctic. Norway even possesses similar transarctic shipping chokehold points.Why then, did they support inclusivity when Cana-da and Russia scrutinized it? The Nordic states acknowledge Asian in-terest as permanent, and finds it better to integrate them into regional affairs, rather than risk ostraciz-ing them. If the Arctic Council were to leave the Asian states in the cold, there would be a potential for those states to pursue unilateral methods in achieving their ends. The US is more interested in sharing responsibilities and remaining inclusive about the Arctic. They have the most experience with Chi-nese expansionist aggression in the Asia- Pacific. Yet they still recognize that Chinese geopolitical interests have no dangerous implications in the Arctic.

China: Panda or Dragon? China is not without fault in spurring fears within the Arctic Council. Among other rising powers,China has developed a formidable navy. Maritime power and sea wealth has determined geopolitical power differentials between great powers and small powers since boats were created. It should follow then, that despite the best of inten-tions, Asian naval presences would create friction in the Arctic. More often than not, merchant ships are accompanied by some kind of escort, as such is the tradition when navigating the Strait of Malacca or the Suez Canal. This is due to threats of inter-national piracy, and there is very little evidence suggesting pirates would navigate near inhospita-ble waters bordering powerful, militarily competent states like Russia or the US. Russia even suggested that Chinese ships guarding merchant vessels would potentially clash

The Meridian 26

with NATO. Nothing to gain from butting heads with the West. Its nature has been from the begin-ning to extract resources and exploit economic op-portunities. Chinese behavior in Africa is complete-ly indicative of her tendencies to favor economic exploitation over diplomatic favor. However, there is a voice in China being perceived as threatening in the Arctic Council. China has begun to call itself a “near- Arc-tic State”, something every country could claim as sea levels begin to impact them. But this isn’t unique to Asian states, and isn’t the voice that is concerning Canada. Domestic media outlets and citizens in Asia are voicing thoughts like “no one owns the Arctic” and “the Arctic is no one’s back-yard.” Mostly emerging from the Chinese State’s media outlet Xinhua, these voices are challenging existing Arctic sovereignty. These are threats com-pletely unaligned with official sentiment.Chinese officials and other Asian officials continually show deference to existing power structures in the Arctic, echoing only their economic interests.

A matter of precedence If you can count on China for anything, you can count on her unwavering support for “sovereignty”. Again and again China will veto UN Security resolutions to intervene in foreign lands. Whether it’s from Sudan to Syria, China never wants to support or set an international prece-dent of infringing sovereignty. However, China’s aggressive behavior in the South-China Sea and Diaoyu/Senkaku islands signify a changing heart. An examination of those anomalies still indicates a lack of credible threat of Chinese engagement in the Arctic. Modeling Chinese behavior after their odd aggression in the East, we would see two condi-tions emerge in how they tackle the Arctic. China would firstly be laying claim to the area outright. Their claims in the Pacific, though outrageous, are grounded in a map illustrating the furthest reaches of the Qing dynasty. They seek to reclaim what the Qing dynasty had owned, and therefore justify their aggressive behavior. China’s behavior over the island dispute with Japan is completely socio-po-litical. China has not laid claim to any sovereign rights of the Arctic, so that can’t be a legitimate concern. Secondly, China would defy the existing norms, institutions and legislation over the Arctic. Instead, we witnessed China apply for observers

status to a Council that requires one to sign UN-CLOS and behave according to its rules. After rigorous scrutiny, China passed and won their bid. It appears as though China is respecting the insti-tutions and existing governance mechanisms in the Arctic. They can however do more. China needs to formulate an official Arctic policy for transparen-cy purposes, commit to Chinese corporate social responsibility and overall engage deeper in climate change issues.

Lean into it Despite what appears to be legitimate con-cerns about Asian inclusion in the Arctic Council, Canada and Russia are more concerned with irra-tional fears than matters of precedence or reality. Concerns of foreign investment in a region they have not even put effort into suggest a contradicto-ry behavior. Moreover, the NSR, which is so hotly contested due to its economic significance, will not manifest without massive infrastructure projects and investment. This kind of funding can be taken from Asia to bolster security and economic development in Russia, Canada and the US. There would be no reason to refuse money when the law is on their side. Not only is including Asian states benefi-cial to the Council’s legitimacy or opportunities for foreign direct investment, but it’s also true that the Arctic is a global commons. No one state owns a global entity like the Arctic. If Antarctica is a neu-tral body, the main landmass of the Arctic should be considered the same. It would be ignorant to consider the Arc-tic’s volatile climate change as a regional issue. The states most affected by the negative conse-quences of sea level rise are states near the equator or in the global south. Asian states rightfully have a stake in the Arctic, as their future relies on under-standing the significance of global climate change. The Arctic is a global concern with re-gional sovereign claims. This shouldn’t hinder economic assistance or multilateral efforts. Canada and Russia need to grow up and practice what they founded the Arctic Council to preach, principles of multilateralism and inclusivity.

Things are heating up The Arctic will continue melting regard-less of petty squabbles over land rights and prac-tical control. Ignorance in the face of precedence and reality is creating roadblocks to multilateral

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cooperation in the Arctic. As it stands, the region is already destabilized and has past the tipping point of no return. Obstacles to international involvement in a region with international impacts should be shattered and thrown by the wayside. Existing legal and regulatory structures cannot meet the needs for protecting Arctic peoples and environments. Potential pathways for Asian states to contribute to these great challenges in-clude and are not limited to scientific cooperation, public-private partnerships, negotiation of binding agreements that are not limited to oil spill response and search & rescue. Encouraging financial contri-butions from Asian observer states could support indigenous health, education and science.

Bring your A-game The assumption that the Arctic Council will be able to operationally respond to the Arctic crises is also shaky. Though we’ve examined why Russian and Canadian intuitions about Asian inclu-sivity is unfounded, we need to also address wheth-er or not the Arctic Council is a proper medium to funnel international cooperation through. The council was initially created to mul-tilaterally discuss matters of scientific research,

navigation, indigenous rights and circumpolar biodiversity, formulating into two primary goals of promoting environmental protection and bolstering sustainable development. As mentioned at the start, it is not equipped to handle large-scale crises or security issues. Russian and Canadian paranoia was most likely stoked by the Council’s inability to fix any major concerns. The Council can improve its state in three ways. First, the Council can make state finan cial contributions to scientific, environmental and in-frastructure projects mandatory. Second, hard-law implementation can make the Arctic Council a for-midable and necessary force in overseeing Arctic affairs. States cannot be held accountable without a legitimate tangible backlash. Third, formally associating with the United Nations can bolster le-gitimacy and hard power, only if the Council were to remain autonomous from the UN’s bureaucratic tedious- ness. The Council has a ways to go before it can be seriously considered the de-facto decision- mak-ing body it needs to be. Fictional fears born from legitimate concerns still hold great influ- ence, but with greater inclusivity on the horizon and in-creased cooperation, we could yet save ourselves.

The Meridian 28

Captive in RomeAllie McRaith ‘16

The letters appeared as old as the tiles they were etched into, and if Joseph didn’t know better, he thought some of them might have been. Oth-ers were as recent as last week, the tiles the only surface penetrable by the rusted nails lying around the monastery. In its centuries-long history, this building changed hands many times before finally landing in the Italian government’s. It’s present-day use for prisoners of war stood in juxtaposition to its original religious intent. Joseph Fredrick was sitting on the same tiled floor for the two-hundred-eleventh time. On his second day, he had marked a small ceramic plot as his by carving ‘JRF’ in the upper left hand cor-ner. The newer POWs quickly learned where not to sit. Especially on the tile in-between the two of them where the scrawled ‘GFG’ was a constant re-minder of the harsh February that took the lives of so many of their friends. Joe and Andy had formed the type of fast friendship that happens under duress, a situational friendship that they weren’t sure would last longer than the circumstances that brought them together. “Where are we today, Joe?” “I don’t know – you tell me.” “I think it’s sunny – African sun. The Saha-ra sounds like a good place.” “Sure does. There couldn’t possibly be trench foot that close to the Equator,” Joe said, proud he remembered anything from his elementa-ry geography class. Andy craned his neck towards the sun, imagining the grains of sand under his feet instead of the hard tile, and peeked to see that Joe also had his eyes closed, probably lost in a similar fantasy. The distinct sound of military issued, steel-soled boots on the cobblestoned courtyard brought them back to their surroundings, aware they were in Southern Italy but unable to be any more specific than that. “Germany surrendered.” No one moved. Two thousand of them re-ceived this announcement — some held in captive for nearly a year — and no one moved. “Germany surrendered,” the voice re-peated. The news fell on disbelieving ears. No one wanted to ask what that meant and the officer

wasn’t offering any more information. Finally one of the newer prisoners asked. “Does that mean we’re free?” No answer. “No – it means we won the war.” “It means Hitler lost.” “We’ll go home.” A curt nod in their direction indicated it meant all of these things. They were ready in a matter of seconds and practically ran down the hill, giddy from the fresh air and sunlight. A train was there, waiting to take them to Rome where they would be rejoined with civilization.

--- It was a shock. That a semblance of normal life continued while they were away was horrify-ing. Joe could not understand it. In the past two years his life consisted of trekking through Europe with an infantry that was only half remaining while here he was, on May 12, haggling with a Nonna over the price of an orange. “Va bene.” Joe said, practicing the Italian Andy was teaching him. The difference in a few lira seemed insignificant. Numbing these thoughts with cigarettes and alcohol wasn’t working anymore. Personally, he killed one hundred and fifty-seven soldiers — one hundred and fifty-five of them on enemy lines. The other two were accidents, a bullet misdirected and an American in the wrong place at the wrong time. Piling on the guilt, any one of those soldiers could have been second, third or fourth cousins. Born to German immigrants, Joe knew he had distant family in Germany but it was a fact he tried to downplay. This was usually possibly until role call when some officer thought it would be funny to pronounce his name in the German accent and a salute. “Do you feel guilty?” Andy was silent. “I do,” Joe answered his own question. “I never thought I would kill so many people for no good reason.” “It’s part of war,” Andy said. Walking along Lungotevere dei Cenci and the Tiber, Joe was acutely aware of the Jewish Ghetto to his right. Inside those houses, Jews were forced to hide from the German soldiers while even

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more were sent off to concentration camps in far worse shape than this neighborhood. “I even feel guilty for killing the captor,” he said. “I feel sick for killing them, despite staring at this evidence.” They kept walking. “Do you feel anything?” Joe asked. “Not really.” Andy said. “I feel sorta hol-lowed out.”

--- A month later, their battalion still hadn’t been shipped home. There was no word on why not —or when it would eventually happen — but enough conspiracy theories floated around the bar-racks. Nervous soldiers believed the war wasn’t ac-tually over, that it was all a fluke. POWs were more seasoned than that, knowing they wouldn’t have been released if the war wasn’t truly over, yet wary about the fact they were still in Rome. Machismo soldiers claimed they would be ready to fight again tomorrow if need be, claimed they’d be ready to defend America again. Joe stayed quiet when these debates took place. He knew he held the minority opinion. Days wasted in thought were followed by nights he struggled to remember in the morn-ing. Andy seemed to love it. He had never felt so popular, so exotic. He wasn’t just Italian — he was Italian-American. Joe always trailed a few steps be-hind, struggling to stay enthused night after night. “I don’t want to do this anymore. Rome is keeping us in limbo. We need to go home.” “Come home with me,” Andy said. “You’re more than welcome.” Joe hadn’t spoken to his parents in over a year, not even when he was able to write letters from prison, so the idea was tempting. It still didn’t provide the security he needed though. He was fragile and volatile--a lethal condition. He needed assurance and stability in whatever happened next. “What are we gonna do there?” “I hadn’t gotten that far,” Andy said. The second of four siblings, Andy be-longed to a classically large Italian-American family in small town Michigan with an even larger extended community. He was from a small town that, from the sound of it, was all Italian. “Me too.” But he didn’t. He didn’t want to be in Rome, or at home. Nowhere in America felt like home. He didn’t have any siblings wishing for his return, or parents that were excessively concerned

about his well-being, or a childhood home full of fond memories. In a few days, Andy received an umpteenth letter asking how was he doing. What was he do-ing? Was he enjoying some Roman food? Don’t get too comfortable with their pasta — remember your Mama’s cooking too, his father wrote. Don’t be a typical American soldier with those Italian woman, his mother wrote. Treat ‘em nice and maybe you’ll find a bride.Joseph even got mentioned. Tell Joe we can’t wait to meet him. “They won’t if we never fuckin’ get sent home,” Joe said. “I know. The more vague the better with them.” “But I’m done with people being vague with me.” With that, Joe stormed off to their room, stomping as he went. He was an overgrown child not getting his way with his parents — literal or figurative. The army wouldn’t tell them anything and communication with his real parents had been non-existent. Andy never came into the room that night. Maybe he was just giving Joe some space or maybe he went home with some girl. As Joe drifted to sleep, hoping his anger would dissipate overnight, all he saw were the faces of his fatalities. Joe squeezed his eyes closed, imagined a field of dai-sies, counted sheep — anything to erase the bloody faces. They wouldn’t go away. In the morning, a piece of paper on Andy’s empty bed read: We leave tomorrow. And on the nightstand next to his bed was a stack of letters, bound together with twine to form a decent-sized package. There were easily thirty letters, dating back to April 17, 1943 and almost exclusively written by his mother’s loopy cursive. He didn’t open any of the letters, just sat with the parcel in his lap and imagined all the things they could say.

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Sam Shugart ‘15

In the past decade, the world has seen a series of revolutions leading to the fall of over twenty authoritarian regimes. This decade’s youth has grown up watching images of protesters staging mass protests and, sometimes, successful overthrowing of regimes. From the colored revo-lutions of Yugoslavia, Georgia and others, to the Arab Spring of Tunisia and Egypt, the story of the popular uprising is all too familiar. Yet this is not always the story, for every regime that falls to the chants of angry protesters, another quietly soldiers on. It is in this unnoticed space that intelligent authoritarian regimes have adapted and in some cases, even thrived. This is the case in Singapore, an extreme example of a hyper-successful authori-tarian state. Singapore represents an authoritarian regime in which one party has gained and con-solidated power through economic performance, meritocracy, the co-opting of civil society and a unique approach to “calibrated coercion.” This has resulted in the paradox of an authoritarian regime being considered one of the most economically free countries, a concept that runs counter to a number of traditional political theories on regimes.

A brief history of one of the most successful parties of all time Understanding Singapore’s future requires a thorough understanding of the past. Singapore is one of the smallest countries in the world and has few natural resources needed to ensure eco-nomic development. At its founding, few observers thought that the state of Singapore could survive, much less economically prosper. Initially, Sin-gapore’s political sphere was home to variety of groups, including a large communist movement. Over the course of the 1960’s, the People’s Action Party emerged as the sole victor of these struggles. What differentiated the PAP from other authoritari-an parties is that the PAP quickly adopted pragmat-ic values emphasizing multiculturalism as a means to unite the various groups in Singapore into a coherent nation). This led to a series of near abso-lute victories for PAP that has continued to this day. These victories have created a hegemonic one party state, the PAP has overwhelmingly won every sin-

gle election in Singapore’s history and maintained control of all parts of the Singaporean government. The PAP created a governing style that focused on trade and integration to the global economy and prosperity as a means of survival for the regime. This focus on “strategic pragmatism” in encourag-ing development and investment, combined with a strong state, led to decades of sustained economic growth.

Economic and Social Freedom in an Authoritar-ian Nation? This sustained emphasis on trade policy has resulted in Singapore achieving unparalleled economic freedom. In 2013, it was ranked 2nd on the Index of Economic Freedom, a ranking sys-tem that measures government interference and regulation in economies, while theUnited States is ranked 12th on the scale. This counters the tradi-tional theory on authoritarian regimes, which states that ruling leaders and parties will use government interference to reward supporters, punish opposi-tion and enrich themselves. Having one of the most free economies in the world ensures that the PAP cannot use political influence to exert control. In terms of social links, in 2012 over 161,576 citizens of Singapore entered the United States. When compared with other countries, China for example, had 1,756,747 citizens enter the United States; we see that the population of Singapore travels disproportionately frequently for a country of 5.3 million people. Singapore has around 26 people per 100 with broadband internet connections, a number comparable to European countries. In terms of the percentage of total people using the internet, in 2011, 75% of the population had access putting Singapore well on the developed side of the “digital divide” between developed and developing countries. This once again runs counter to the traditional theory on authoritarian regimes, normally assumed to be active in limiting citizens access to technology. Travel to other countries can help open citizens minds, while the internet can help activists share information and organize. By restricting their citizen’s ability to travel and access to alternative forms of information, such as the internet, authoritarian regimes can stifle dissent and opposition.

Singapore and the People’s Action Party

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The failure of structural explanation In political science, these arguments are commonly known as “structural” arguments that claim if a state has certain structural factors it will only be a matter of time before democracy starts to take root. In one of the most well-known books on “Hybrid Regimes,” two scholars, Levitsky and Way (2010), argue that if a state has strong economic and social “linkages” to Western powers, it will inevitably democratize. However, structural expla-nations are not limited to simple economic or social linkages. Other scholars have argued that natural resource wealth and high defense spending lead to the persistence of authoritarian regimes.

Elite Based Explanations: Is it all the people in charge? Now that we have looked at how structural explanations of authoritarian regimes fail to explain the durability of Singapore, we will move on to elite based regime theory. Elite based regime theo-ry argues that authoritarian regimes persist because elites stand to benefit from the status quo. Many scholars such as Ghandi and Lust-Okar (2009)argue that elections in strong party authoritarian regimes primarily serve as a means to distribute patronage and power to elites while serving to iso-late any elites that would stand in opposition to the regime. In the following section we will see that Singapore once again runs counter to these theo-ries. Since its founding, the People’s Action Party has created an ideology structured around an efficient and clean government based solely on merit, rather than the patronage system traditional cited by scholars of elite theory. The PAP pulls from the top tier of society by offering “market val-ue” incentives for high level officials. Singaporean civil service officials are among the highest paid government officials in the world. Cabinet Minis-ter’s salaries are pegged at the median income of the top 1,000 earners who are Singaporean citizens, with a 40% “public ethos” discount. Exceptionally high pay is not only serves to attract the best talent, but to prevent corruption.Singapore has made inte-gration into the global economy a critical part of its national strategy and is considered to be the easiest country in the world to do business in. This is the result of an emphasis on the conduct of govern-ment affairs on a purely rational basis that ensures confidence in predictable and non-biased outcomes

running counter to the idea that a regime must use corruption to reward its elite supporters. Anti-corruption measures are carried out by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), an independent branch of the police force that reports directly to the Prime Minister. The CPIB has the power to investigate any suspect, as well as the suspect’s family or agents, for corrup-tion, or any offense disclosed in the course of a corruption investigation. Rather than serve as a means of political repression, as one would expect in an authoritarian regime, the CPIB has a decade’s long track record of upholding a high standard of transparency and independently applying punish-ment across all levels of public and private sectors As we can see from these unique institu-tions, the regime is not buying elite loyalty and support through corruption or patronage. While civil servants are paid very high compared to others in the world, the entire payment system takes place in clear and transparent system. If structural expla-nations for authoritarianism do not provide a suffi-cient explanation and elite explanations fall equally short, how has the PAP maintained its unbeatable streak?

“It’s the economy stupid” “It’s the economy stupid” is a famous phrase first coined by a Clinton staffer James Carville during Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign. The slogan has since come to represent the importance of economic performance on an in-cumbent party’s election prospects. A study into the link between incumbent reelections and economic performance in the U.S. found that, in states with-out a large farm population or natural resources, there is a causal chain between state-wide macro-economic conditions and incumbent’s reelection prospects. We can clearly see the influence of eco-nomics at work in PAP’s undefeated streak. Upon its separation from Malaysia in 1965, a third of its citizens squatted in slums on city fringes. Over the next four decades, Singapore’s real growth averaged 8.0%. By the 1980’s Lee Kuan Yew, who had served as Prime Minister since independence, could comfortably claim that under his party’s lead-ership over 80% of Singaporeans had now joined the middle class. This combination of massive and sustained economic growth and a reputation for efficiency and clean governance has led to high de-grees of trust in the PAP. This trust has created an

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interesting dynamic in Singaporean civil society’s support for the PAP, which we will explore in the next section.

On Civil Society and Civil Liberties Traditionally scholars, such as Larry Di-amond (1999) have argued that the a strong civil society will act as a democratizing force over time, regardless of the amount of repression the ruling party uses on civil society. Jamal (2007) provides an interesting analysis of civil society and trust in the government by examining how civil society actors support authoritarian regime in the Arab World. She focuses on Palestinian civil society and finds that in many cases, a stronger civil society results in a stronger authoritarian state because citizens are more interested in preserving their state and receiving patronage through civil society orga-nizations. This is perhaps one of the best explana-tions for the persistence of authoritarianism in Singapore. While civil society organizations do not typically distribute patronage, they give their members important access to the PAP and allow the PAP to gauge support for policies. Many Singapor-ean civil society institutions serve in this “consulta-tive” competency, giving their members the ability to provide feedback and input to government structures. While occasional groups may challenge the government, the majority of civil societies are dedicated to an apolitical reciprocal relationship with the government. Instead of providing patron-age, civil society groups allow constituencies to have their voice heard to “correct policy errors by reflecting citizen discontent,” all without the messy process of democracy. In this context, popular civil society in-volvement represents a limited threat to the PAP’s dominance. Instead, we could see the consulta-tive nature as complementary to the party’s goals. These civil organizations can also provide mobili-zation support and help funnel new blood into the PAP, ensuring that PAP organizers have roots in their communities. The success of co-opting civil society has even lead to the President calling for Singapore to develop “social reserves” through vol-unteerism and social entrepreneurship. An excel-lent example of this can be found in a case study of environmental nongovernmental organizations and their interactions with PAP officials by Hobbison. She finds government controls combine with the behind-door consultations “friendly” organizations

to prevent centers of opposition from emerging. Through a variety of channels, the Sin-gaporean government has worked to promote cohesion among the many ethnic groups to ensure regime survival and economic prosperity. The PAP’s legitimacy in managing Singapore from a small island to one of the most powerful trading states has allowed it to conflate political opposi-tion as inefficiency. Rather than openly decreeing the opposition as “enemies of the regime,” the PAP works towards portraying this opposition as detrimental to Singapore’s success. Scholars agree that the exceptionally high standard of living and low crime rate could not be as easily achieved over time without the surrender of civil liberties.

How to rig elections in a free country With its economy solely dependent on trade, any blatant political repression could trigger negative repercussions. The PAP has anticipated this and has created an elaborate system of checks, as Levitsky and Way (2010) would argue to, “tilt the playing field” without actively engaging in po-litical repression. Singapore uses a combination of gerrymandering to disperse opposition districts and a first-past-the-post electoral system to ensure that opposition actors must generate large number of region specific votes to have any hope of electoral victory. In addition to electoral controls, the PAP utilizes a variety of state media outlets and “cal-ibrated repression” to limit the opposition. The PAP ensures denial of permits for forums or rallies and strategic control of local media to ensure that opposition groups cannot effectively organize. Through its power and connections, the PAP is able to coerce everything from the press, to uni-versities to even trade unions to limit challengers. Secondly, the government must be adaptive. Most authoritarian regimes would be content with the scope of power at the PAP’s disposal, yet the PAP treats these basic repressive tools as means of last resort. The PAP is constantly adapting to potential challenges through measures such as the aggressive policing of blogs. Finally, it encourages the use of forces are assumed to be outside the rulers control such as the structuring the internet or newspaper market to ensure control over the possible out-comes.

What then lies in Singapore’s future? While the PAP will likely maintain a

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majority for years to come, a strong grassroots opposition exists that is committed to deepening and expanding nongovernmental and civil society organizations. Opposition groups are beginning to solidify from loosely organized protest coalitions into institutionalized political machines and hu-man rights organizations. Additionally, the online networking has been able to evolve faster than the PAP’s control mechanisms. Earlier we saw the PAP’s domination of the 2011 election and Prime Minister Loong celebrating. Although, they did indeed win, they had little to celebrate. The 2011 election saw the worst ever election result since independence in 1965 thanks to young voters. There have only been three Prime Ministers in Singapore’s history, all of whom worked to train their successors in the art of calibrated coercion. Future leaders will inherit the same system regime the PAP has constructed, but they may not have the long term vision or foresight necessary to strike the delicate balance between control and legitimacy. Despite this new opening, Singapore is still

a strong hegemonic one party state. The combi-nation of the PAP’s ability to deliver sustained growth, manage elections, co-opt civil society and excellent use of “calibrated coercion” means that it could be several generations before we will see regime turnover. Many of these indicators are hopefully however, and the seeds of democratiza-tion are beginning to slowly but surely sprout in Singapore.

Singapore: Tourists gather in the infinity pool on the top of the Marina Bay Sands Hotel and watch the National Day celebrations. Photo by Allie McRaith ‘16

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Rostam Assadi ‘15

If one wished to hold a mantra as to un-derstand the public response of Russia and Iran to-wards the Colored Revolutions, it may be summed up by this Russian commentator: “the day before yesterday: Belgrade. Yesterday: Tbilisi. Today: Kiev. Tomorrow: Moscow.” Indeed, the themes encompassing the discourse of Iranian and Russian political elites reflects a sense of uncertainty, fear, and resentment towards their perception of Western intervention. But the story certainly does not end there. Through precision and attention to context and meaning, one may observe important distinc-tions between the Iranian response and the Russian response. Of course, understanding ‘intention’ and ‘effect’ solely through political rhetoric itself is a risky business. The multidimensional justifications of this endeavor may confound any supposedly val-id theory purporting to draw a causal relationship between rhetoric and action. Nonetheless, this does not imply that a well-crafted interpretation may not provide useful results, when analyzing the overar-ching discourse displayed by Iran and Russia. From a comparative perspective, this paper aims to describe and unravel the meaning of the ongoing rhetoric of the Russian and Iranian politi-cal elites in regards to the Coloured Revolutions. In conjunction to the aforementioned goals, I aim to take into account rhetoric that is aptly characterized by temporal and politically contextual indicators. In other words, the character of discourse is not only affected by the Colored Revolutions themselves, but also by political and social developments that draw a particular framing. To understand this fram-ing, I will employ both a comparative and contex-tual model of discourse so to appropriately describe Iran and Russia’s responses towards the Colored Revolutions.

Discourse Analysis As with any school of methodology, one must first take into account its limitations to understand its potentials. Perhaps the most pro-found restriction upon discourse analysis is the lack of capacity to justify any causal relationships between ‘action’ and ‘words.’ For example, one of

the major themes of this paper encompasses the unified ‘threat perception’ expressed in the rhetoric of both Russia and Iran. As Günes Murat Tezcür aptly notes, “[t]he problem is that it is empirically difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate if threat perception of the ruling elite was genuinely aggra-vated.” I take ‘genuine aggravation’ to mean some institution of defensive or offensive policy that is directly caused by this expression of threat percep-tion. This concern is well founded for a variety of reasons. Any sort of claim in which one intends to draw a causal relationship between rhetoric and policy implementation would find a ‘logically barren area.’ More technically, the amount of log-ical inferences required to deduce the relationship between discourse and policy would be not only grand, but also contestable when forced to present empirical evidence for the claim. A subsequent fault is certainly due to the difficulty of explaining the internal mechanism of a regime and the state’s desire to “present a rationally beneficial popular perception of itself.” This is pertinent, as much of this paper covers rhetoric that is of the ‘reactionary’ sort, or both ‘reactionary’ as well as ‘directive’ in nature. Therefore, drawing any claims about the effect of rhetoric upon policy is out of the ques-tion. Those concerns lie with empirical analysis of both quantitative and qualitative nature. This by no means implies that analyzing discourse is ‘specu-lative.’ Beyond the series of restrictions upon the capacities of discourse analysis, one may nonethe-less draw fruitful conclusions from a contextual model of discourse, as well as a comparative model of discourse. The Colored Revolutions: A Brief Primer Throughout the analysis of this paper, references to the Colored Revolutions, as they are generally understood, and specific references to certain movements are employed. This is mainly because of the ambiguity employed by the sources of the quotes. That said, the majority of specific revolutions referenced in this paper are the Orange Revolution (Ukraine), Tulip Revolution (Kyrgyz-stan), Rose Revolution (Georgia), and the Velvet

Rhetorica Tellus HybridaThe Rhetoric of Iran and Russia Towards the Colored Revolutions

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Revolution (Czechoslovakia). In the overarching sense, scholarly consensus has pointed to the Col-ored Revolutions as referencing these four move-ments. There is some contest from certain camps regarding the legitimacy of these movements. Holding this debate constant, the Colored Revolu-tions are interpreted as a series of movements that happened in relative succession, invigorated by internal discontent, and carried about by the respec-tive states’ populations.

A Comparison: Russia and Iran With the notion of the Colored Revolutions established, one may go about understanding the rhetoric of Iran and Russia towards these monu-mental movements. First, a common theme found between Iran and Russia was the particular framing of the revolutions as ‘Western induced.’ In a speech given by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the height of various street protests related to the Iranian Green Movement, he made an explicit claim about the “infiltration of Zionists” as the cause of the pri-or Colored revolutions. In the statement, Khamenei blamed ‘Zionists’ in direct contact with, or purely composed of, “Western contingents.” Given the context of the Green Revolution, it is not unrea-sonable to interpret his rhetoric as reflecting the regime’s view that the Green Movement is either illegitimate, or induced by ‘outside forces.’ Thus in regards to the Colored Revolution, his perception dictated that:… [Western contingents] began street protests and vandalism, they set fire to public prop-erty, they made shops and businesses insecure, and they are trying to rob the people of their security. This has nothing to do with the people and their preferred candidates. This kind of behavior stems from the ill-wishers, mercenaries and elements working for western and Zionist secret services. Two years prior, during March of 2007, a pro-government organization known as the Nashi Youth began to take reactionary measures in re-sponse to the Orange Revolution. Widely viewed as an organization strongly supported by the Kremlin, the Nashi distributed leaflets with anti-Western sentiments. As Finkel and Burdny describe, “the leaflets depicted the US as a ‘voracious predator’, eager to take advantage of an ‘Orange’ coup...” Months later, the Nashi produced another set of leaflets prior to the Duma election claiming that the revolutions were “cases of Western intervention in the post-communist electoral process.”

Contextually, both these cases occurred in temporal proximity to heated elections—during the “rigged” elections in the summer of 2009 for the case of Iran, and the Moscow City Duma elections during 2007 for Russia. So one may deduct that for both the governing regimes the context provided a ‘high stakes’ environment, with a general frame expressing ‘anti-Western’ sentiment. The frame in this case dictated an environment that held the po-tential for some significant power shift to occur in the stake-holding positions. In other words, fear of a regime change or grave danger to the established regime seemed evident. A couple years prior, during the Rose Revolution of Georgia, the sources supposedly associated with the Russian government advertised the standoff as “the attempt for the dictatorial and puppet regime of [President] Saakashvili to cajole his masters in the United States.” Furthermore, Russian analysts raved of the potential for these supposedly ‘Western-fueled’ movements to spill-over to not only Russia, but to other post-commu-nist states. One noted: Establishing contacts with various interna-

tional foundations and securing the funding hap-pens according to the familiar scenario. One only has to remember how active the Soros Open Soci-ety Foundation is on former Soviet territory. Also take for example the U.S. Ambassador Richard Miles, who managed to do his job both in Belgrade and in Georgia. Further down the line, the streets get engaged in the regime change process, encour-aged by business-persons and oligarchs dissatisfied with incumbent regimes. Indeed, when surveying rhetoric expressed by Russian governmental figures, as well as affil-iates, the blame resides solely on Western-themed ‘oligarchs’ and direct associates of the “Western agenda.” Serg Markov, another commentator, expressed concern that: the ‘orange revolution’ in Moldova is about 80 percent ready … Russia can-not afford to allow defeat in the battle for Ukraine. Besides everything else, defeat would mean velvet revolutions in the next two years, now following the Kiev variant, in Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and possibly Armenia. Not only are there repeated concerns ex-pressed about the nature of the movements spilling over to other regimes, but also the concerns further encompass direct references to ‘Western’ business moguls such as George Soros and other ‘capital-ist subsidiaries.’ Indeed, many esteemed Russian

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commentators view the Colored Revolutions as not only committed by Western agents, but go as far as referencing direct culprits as blameworthy. On the same note, Khamenei’s discourse on the subject seems to put the blame on George Soros as well. Although never referenced by name, Khamenei makes it clear that “[w]hen a political transformation took place in Georgia, which led to a transfer of power, a Jewish American capital-ist - who is famous, but I do not want to mention his name - announced that he had spent ten million dollars in Georgia in order to give rise to a political upheaval.” Thus with the establishment of Soros as a particular example of an enemy against both Iran and Russia, the two regimes seem to take a direct posture against their perceived ‘political enemy.’ In this further regard, the supposed Western influence and ‘political achievement’ of Soros goes as far as a commitment of a “Western Stalingrad” by Gleb Pavlovsky’s view. Similarly, another com-mentator stated that the Orange Revolution: “can be seen as a planned strike against Russia aimed at creating ongoing instability on its southern borders. If this is pulled off, Russia will come up against a whole range of very complex problems.” The commentator even goes as far as to outline the financial, economic, political, and demographic ramifications, if the infiltration were to occur. Iranian political elites reflect similar rhet-oric in this manner, one government spokesperson denounced political groups that “want to prepare the ground for enemy’s infiltration and pave the way for a velvet revolution.” The Islamic regime even went as far as broadcasting a confession of three detained Iranian citizens, all students at Co-lumbia University at the time. This confession was widely believed as fabricated by political scholars and Green Revolution activists. Subsequently one governmental hardliner released a statement accus-ing them of being a “Zionist spy,” and once again encouraging a “velvet coup.” Some of the rhetoric rooted from the Irani-an Regime ranged from the accusatory, to perhaps outright illogical. The same hardliner considered a “spokesperson for the Supreme Leader” wrote accusatory statements in the conservative news-paper Kayhan aimed towards exposing a Western coup. Hossein Shariatmadari, the managing edi-tor, wrote that due to the students’ connection to Columbia University, in logical conjunction with a recent meeting where the President of Colum-bia University insulted then President Mahmood

Ahmedinejad, the meeting had ended in dispute because “[Ahmedinejad] had already exposed Co-lumbia University’s role in orchestrating a velvet coup in Iran.” A short period after this article was published, the Interior Minister released a state-ment asserting, “[t]he Iranian nation would not be deceived by the proponents of velvet revolutions.” So it is clear from these cases that the similarities between the responses from the Ira-nian and Russian camps are vast and conclusive. Although more of the rhetoric from Iranian elites seem to encompass the notion of a ‘military threat,’ many Russian commentators seemed to also reflect the same sentiment. Both the Iranian elites and Russian elites seemed to convey a sense that a ‘spillover’ would occur if there were not necessary precautions put into place. Not only this, but there seemed to be a mutually held belief that none of the colored revolutions were legitimate, as a result of ‘undeniable’ Western involvement. This anti-West-ern sentiment was not only used to delegitimize the movements such as the Velvet, Tulip, and Orange revolutions, but also was claimed as a precaution-ary measure against the same “spread of western virus.” Hence one may hold with certainty that the threat perceptions of Iran and Russia mirror each other in a variety of ways, and are justified through the same mediums. When analyzing the differences, I have concluded that the particularities are somewhat indistinct. There are some cases by the Russian camps where ‘ambiguous respondents’ made more zealous, or specified claims. The implications are unclear in this case. When surveying the cases where particular names are mentioned—i.e. George Soros—it seems that the Russian camp holds more discontent; at least more so than the accusatory rhetoric expressed by Iranian political elites. This may imply that the Russian elites viewed Soros as a more legitimate threat. The Iranian rhetoric mir-rors a lack of directedness towards Soros’ ‘involve-ment.’ Thus one may induce that although many mentions of ‘Capitalist influence’ were made by the part of both Iranian and Russian rhetoricians, Russian claims are direct in pointing out Soros as a threat. As a result, fears of him directly funding a political upheaval in Iran seemed of lesser concern for the Iranian elites. In the case of Iran, another central finding was the lack of rhetoric aimed at the perception of threat to civil society. Perhaps this may be due to the fact that much of the rhetoric was released

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during a time of internal struggle, contextualized by the Green Revolution; on the other hand, there were some cases where this was not the case. These cases referencing the dangers to civil society were almost exclusively found in a propaganda video, starring animations of US Republican Senator John McCain and academic Gene Sharp. As released by the Iranian government, the video to present the no-tion of a Western threat to overhaul Iranian society and instill counter-Iranian values in civil society. References towards the ‘Velvet Revolution’ were also more commonplace in the case of Iran as well. Of course, the cases of Georgia and Kyrgyz-stan are within closer proximity, therefore geopo-litical significance may likely be ruled out. The continued mentions may also come from the notion that the reference was simply a ‘mistake,’ but once again such repeated use of ‘Velvet Revolution’ most likely rule this answer out. After deliberation, I have concluded that either it is the case that there is historical significance of the Velvet Revolution, or the translation from Persian to English may have used ‘velvet’ instead of ‘color’ as a matter of con-vention; there does not seem to be a clear indicator one way or another.

Conclusion This rhetorical analysis has yielded a variety of interesting results. As stated in Section 2, the business of discourse is not meant to provide conclusive findings on causal relationships between factors such as threat perception and policy imple-mentation. Nonetheless it is clear that there are sub-stantive conclusions to be drawn in regards to the posturing tendencies of regimes that view certain events as a dire risk towards their retention of pow-er. As both Iran and Russia released a variety of these statements mainly during times of ‘high risk,’ such as elections and protests, one may induce that heightened rhetoric is induced from regimes of an-ti-Western sentiment most commonly during times when there is a perceived threat to regime stability or retention of power. In closing, I have described the particularly interesting findings that the Iranian and Russian rhetoric mirror each other in a variety of ways. This paper has shown that the rhetoric of Iran and Russia takes a certain ‘tone’—mainly anti-Western and precautionary. This rhetoric is also understood as a response towards perceived threats of military intervention induced by Western infiltration and in-volvement in civil society. Returning to the quote,

“the day before yesterday: Belgrade. Yesterday: Tbilisi. Today: Kiev. Tomorrow: Moscow,” it is clear that in the case of Iran and Russia, this mantra may rear its head again in the future, if conditions dictate its validity once again.

Works CitedAlfoneh, A. “All The Guard’s Men: A Silent Revolution.” In World Affairs. September 2010. Ambrosio, Thomas. "Insulating Russia from a Colour revolu-tion: How the Kremlin Resists Regional Democratic Trends." Democratization, 2009, 232-52.Brown, Gillian, and George Yule. Discourse analysis. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983Coulthard, Malcolm. 1977. An introduction to discourse analy-sis. London: LongmanFinkel, Evgeny, and Yitzhak Brudny. "No more colour! Authoritarian regimes and colour revolutions in Eurasia." Democratization, 2012, 1-14.Finkel, Evgeny, and Yitzhak M. Brudny. "Russia and the co-lour revolutions." Democratization, 2012, 15-36.Herd, Graeme P. "Russia and the 'Orange Revolution': Re-sponse, Rhetoric, Reality?" The Quarterly Journal, Summer 2005, 15-28.Kayhan Newpaper. November 1st 2007. Statement Released by the Minister of Interior.Ortmann, Stefanie. "Diffusion as discourse of danger: Russian self-representations and the framing of the Tulip Revolution." Central Asian Survey 27:363-78.Saari, Sinikukka. "European democracy promotion in Russia before and after the 'colour' revolutions." Democratization, 2009, 732-55.Silitski, Vitali. "'Survival of the fittest:' Domestic and interna-tional dimensions of the authoritarian reaction in the former Soviet Union following the colored revolutions." Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2010, 339-50.Slackman, M., Freed by Revolution, He Speaks for Iran’s Hardliners. 2007.Tezcür, Günes Murat. Democracy promotion, authoritarian resiliency, and political unrest in Iran. In Democratization. 120 -140. 2013.Tucker, Joshua A. "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions." Per-spectives on Politics 5, no. 3 (September 2007): 535-551.Vanderhill, Rachel. "Conclusions." In International Dimen-sions of Authoritarian Persistence: Lessons from Post-Soviet States, edited by Rachel Vanderhill and Michael E. Aleprete. N.p.: Lexington Books, 2013.

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Rebecca Schulman ‘15

It’s hard to imagine a better cityto spend £19 on two packs of importedCoor’s Lightfound sitting cozy next to day-old crumpets and moldy biscuits.

It’s there in that grocery storethat I try and settle into the stream of it all.An import myself,I’m encased in flashy packaging andmarked up ten times over.

It’s an unusually hot summer says the BBCbut you’d hardly know it.While queuing, a favourite British pastime, for quinoa soupand parma ham (isn’t that prosciutto?), half of London,wearing wool scarves and leather boots in July, eyes the sweets and triesto decide if it’s worth spending the extra five minuteson the treadmill at the gym after work.

I feel a nudge.“Your American is showing” he grins, noticing my shopping cart:(I would’ve preferred Budweiser) (But where did he even come from?) Hands me a tiny paper square,pale pinpricks on blue and red and white lines- So familiar, and yet a pattern I haven’t seen in months.

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Biblian, Ecuador: Built into the side of the mountain, La Iglesia de Biblian offers scenic views of the local town and surrounding valley. Photo by Jennifer Waldo ‘15

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Hentii Aimag, Mongolia: A Mongolian herder corrals sheep and goats for marking and sorting in preparation for move to winterpasturelands. Photo by Matt Cheng ‘16

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Western Assam, India: A worker briefly rests in the mid-morning shade on a tea plantation. Tea leaves harvested from the Indian state of Assam is foundational for much of the world’s variety of ‘Black Tea.’ Photo by Matt Cheng ‘16

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Hangzhou, China: A crowd gathers at West Lake to listen to the melodies of traditional chinese instruments. Photo by Jennifer Waldo ‘15

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Zakynthos, Greece: A small fishing boat bobs in the calm Ionion Sea off the coast of Katastari, a sleepy village on the north side of the island. Photo by Allie McRaith ‘16

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Bradley Davis ‘18

On November 6, 2003 President George W. Bush, speaking at the 20th Anniversary Gala for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), outlined a new approach to US foreign policy, cen-tered around the creation of a new “age of liberty.” From the Fourteen Points, to the Four Freedoms, and the 1984 Westminster Address, Bush argued that America has held a strong and historic com-mitment to encouraging freedom across the globe. The concept of promoting freedom first presented in the NED speech would expand into the Bush Doctrine, expanding democracy as a means of promoting trade, liberty, and security. As a foreign policy, the Bush Doctrine was both noble and prag-matic; unfortunately, devotion to this policy ended before it could be most effective. The Bush Doctrine sought justice and great benefits. In Bush’s National Security Strat-egy, the administration acknowledged the threat nondemocratic regimes pose to the United States. The poverty, corruption, and weak governance of these states provide greater opportunities for terror-ist and criminal organization to develop, as well as the ability for uncooperative regimes to interfere with international trade. All of this on top of the oppression and tyranny common in undemocratic states. Furthermore, democratic allies have proven to be far more beneficial than autocratic allies. Free trade and markets among democratic states tend to produce the most wealth and foster peace.In accor-dance with democratic peace theory, no democratic states have ever gone to war against another. The Bush administration acknowledged this need for democracy, deciding to pursue it by promising to actively work towards promoting democracy and supporting any nation that sought pro-democratic reform. In 2001, Freedom House, a non-partisan organization that analyzes freedom among states, found that in the Middle East, Israel was the only free nation, with Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey as the only partially free nations. By the end of Bush’s presidential term, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Moroc-

co joined the list of partially free states. Though not the only factor, the American commitment to spreading democracy and freedom within the Mid-dle East was leading to substantial improvements in the quality of life for these nations’ citizens, with progress beginning in nations such as Egypt. By the end of the Arab Spring in 2011, the number of partially free nations was reduced to three — with the previous year and a half marking the first net decline in democratic freedoms within the region since Bush’s stand for democracy. As Middle East nations began to rise against their states during the Arab Spring, citizens voiced a clear desire and yearning for an increase in freedom and an adoption of democracy. How-ever, those pleas for help were not adequately met. Instead of funds growing over time as intended, the Millenium Challenge Corporation, which was created during the Bush presidency has seen its funding significantly diminished. A no-fly zone was successfully enacted over the skies of Libya, with a coalition of forces launching airstrikes against Qaddafi’s regime, but these were delayed well after assistance became necessary for pro-democratic opposition forces. Monetary, military, and food aid are now starting to be sent to opposition forces in Syria, but a civil war has been raging for years, with entire cities and populations decimated. The Arab Spring has provided the perfect opportunity to promote an Age of Liberty through effectively supporting freedom and democracy in new govern-ments such as Tunisia and Libya, and ensuring that oppressive and tyrannical regimes like Syria are brought to an end.

Opponents of the Bush Doctrine will often argue that pro-democratic intervention adversely affects both Americans and for those intervened upon. American isolationists and non-interven-tionists hold a viewpoint that can be perceived as overly self-interested and misguided. First, Ameri-ca has a moral obligation as a world power to help others and reaffirm its pivotal role in this pursuit, especially in reference to the many tyrannical governments the US installed and backed in the

An Age of LibertyIt’s in the United States’ best interest to reaffirm the Bush Doctrine

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Middle East during the Cold War. Furthermore, the creation of pro-democratic governments has his-torically led to increases in free trade, the creation of new markets, and an increase in security — all of which benefit Americans and the world in the long-run. While US intervention has not always worked perfectly, a messy transition to democracy is far preferable to a dictator who rules via an iron fist and repression of his people through the use of chemical massacres, like the Assad regime. A foreign policy that promotes freedom and democracy around the world is realistic, noble, and pragmatic. While transitions to democracy are never as smooth or as quick as could be desired, the transition is necessary. The current post-Arab Spring environment is one in which the United States should reaffirm the commitments made during Bush’s administration in order to secure an Age of Liberty.

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Mariam Said ‘15

The sound of laughter tinkled like wind chimes through the air. Children ran through the streets unattended, playing street soccer or flying kites or sprinting through alleys to feel their clothes and hair fly behind them. Inside, Ferishta sat on the couch trying to read her book around her cat Charlie’s plopped body. It wasn’t working. Eventu-ally she gave up, as she couldn’t concentrate with her mother back from work “speaking loudly” to their neighbor across the street through the kitchen window. It was always “speaking loudly,” not yell-ing, because her mother didn’t like to sound like an angry person. “Mamy Jaan, do you think you can go and talk to her at her house?” Mamy Jaan waved Ferishta away and con-tinued her conversation with their neighbor. That night they were having a party with one of Kabul’s most famous singers and Mamy Jaan had forgotten to buy a few key ingredients for the dessert. Her conversation with their neighbor wasn’t really a conversation, it was a strategic negotiation for flour and sugar. Ferishta was in medical school and was always trying to find a quiet place to study, but between her cat, her mom, and her father’s almost nightly gatherings, she was having a difficult time getting through one page. Put out, she looked out the living room window just in time to see her brother. Hamid struggled up the walkway with his school bag slung over one shoulder and his tabla drums cradled to his chest. She pushed Charlie off of her book to open the front door. He angrily licked his side. Ferishta was oblivious to her cat’s glare as she stepped outside. “Give one of them to me.” Ferishta reached for the tabla. Hamid quickly stepped back but then relinquished one of his tabla drums. He knew how stubborn his older sister was.

“Thank you.” She said. Ferishta took one of the drums and made her way back inside. She noticed the bones in her hands sticking out in high relief against the drum she was carrying. Carpals, metacarpals, proximal phalanges, intermediate pha-langes, distal phalanges. The names flew through

her head and landed on the tip of her tongue easily. Her walking slowed down as her thinking acceler-ated. Hamid pushed passed her, put his things down inside the door, and came back outside to retrieve the drum from Ferishta. He rolled his eyes at her. She followed behind him, lost in her bone reverie. Ferishta shook her head back into the pres-ent moment as she walked again to the couch she was studying at earlier. Just as she opened her book Hamid began playing the tabla in the corner of the room. He and his uncle were a musical duo. His uncle played the harmonium and sang, and he only expected the best out of Hamid, so Hamid needed to get a little extra practice in for the big party that night. Ferishta looked at the ceiling and blew at her bangs, exasperated at all the noise around her. See-ing the open space, her cat climbed onto her chest, making it harder to breathe and effectively halting any studying she had hoped to complete.

------- There were at least thirty people packed into their living room. Ferishta was being pushed from side to side as people clapped and swayed with the music. These parties were a lot easier when her sister Malika was there, but after she got married she’d moved to Paris with her husband. The sisters were only left with letters to commu-nicate their respective discomfort and excitement over the parties and to convey the gossip that inevi-tably came with a room packed like a sardine can. Their most recent exchange on Ferishta’s side covered their father’s new job as president in the Ministry of Planning, her life as a medical student, Hamid’s upcoming high school graduation, their mother’s newest projects, and the endless parties that their family hosted. Oh, and for some reason the American Embassy didn’t have their Christmas tree up this year! Malika’s most recent letter delivered a sole piece of happy news: she was pregnant. In the midst of the imprisoning party crowd, Ferishta smirked at how her sister always managed to outdo her, even from the other side of the world.

------- The musicians had long ago retired to the sofas lining the walls, their fingers and throats sore from hours of playing. The tabla and the harmoni-um sat abandoned in a dark corner. Still, the party

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continued to thrum with life like every other night of the week at one family's house or another. Baba Jaan was sitting in the corner detachedly observing the dancers. He drummed his fingers on the couch’s arm, smiled at people talking to him, and drummed some more. Finally, he stood up to get away from the what-was-interesting-three-hours-ago small talk. He changed the record and played slower music to encourage people to leave, then returned to his seat. Ferishta watched Baba Jaan doze off a few times. The guests continued to dance around him. They alternately took turns dancing and sitting; one guest sat down with a little too much force next to Baba Jaan and he startled awake, blinking rapidly. Annoyed, he stood up one last time and turned the music off, returned to his seat, crossed his arms, and pointedly stared at the wall. There were mur-murs of "Oh, Aghai Jahani must be getting tired." The first lights of the morning shone through the windows. The conversation began to die down and float out of the front door with the guests. Like wisps of candle smoke they began to disappear, and all the while Baba Jaan began to smile again and wave goodbye to his guests. “See you tomor-row night!” The guests smiled and answered in the affirmative. Baba Jaan closed the door, sighed, and went to sleep.

------- The first bomb shook the city on Christmas Eve 1979. Ferishta startled awake, sweating from the too-high heating system. She heard movement in the house and blearily noticed the first rays of the sunrise peeking through her curtains. Heart beating quickly, she shuffled over to the family room. Hamid, Baba Jaan, and Mamy Jaan were all gathered around the tv, their faces drawn and pale. Ferishta’s heart began beating a steadily increasing rhythm as she looked from her family to the tv. “...a coup d’etat. The Russians invaded this morning, and have begun bombing and shooting at any visible protesters…” Spots began to dot Ferishta’s vision and her knees collapsed beneath her. The news an-chor’s voice was muffled by a black fog of fear that asphyxiated all of her senses. There was nothing. Nothing and bomb tremors. Nothing and gunfire. Nothingness is infinite, and one cannot sit through infinity. Life goes on. Parents go to work. Children go to school. Activity is a blessing that distracts from the hopeless emptiness of nothingness. Ferishta’s only activity was walking to

campus and back. Days crawled by as the situation got worse, the misty damp of nothingness swal-lowing up time like a black hole. Everyone dealt with the turmoil differently. Mamy Jaan brought home three pomegranates. The irregular tapping of the seeds hitting the bowl, and the red, peculiarly pomegranate scent that pervaded the air brought some sense of normalcy back into their home. Parties were no longer possible. The Russians had created a ten o’clock curfew that everyone was to follow. So Mamy Jaan bought fruit. Farms were not attacked as much as the highly populated cities and plants always find a way to flourish in the toughest of situations. Ferisha sat on a stool in the kitchen watch-ing her mother deseed her favorite fruit. Charlie rubbed against her legs, but she was too tired to push him away. She had just gotten back home from basketball practice and was mentally and physically exhausted by her day. Classes were cancelled. There were too many protests. But she could continue to pretend that none of this was real as long as she kept some sense of routine. Her walk home was all whispers and nervous glances; more Russians arrived, toting guns and emitting danger. Hundreds of people were missing, and hundreds more were declared dead. Russian civilians were moving in, but shopkeepers refused to sell to them. Shopkeepers died. Ferishta loved calculating statistics, but this time her calculations didn’t bring her any satisfaction. It was unlikely that her family would go much longer untouched by the war. All of her friends had lost a loved one, and she was either the next to lose a loved one or the next to die.

------- “Help! Help! Please, somebody has got to help me!” Multiple medics rushed eight people in on gurneys. Limbs were missing and blood was spurt-ing. Ferishta no longer grew nauseous at the metal-lic smell or countless deaths. She stepped forward to help. She was there to assist the doctors and had to be strong for the family of the dead. Ferishta and her classmates volunteered at the hospital during their free time since classes were indefinitely cancelled. There was a shortage of doctors, and un-trained medical students were better than nothing. Someone bumped into her and yelled to get out of the way. Ferishta backed up against the wall again. She observed. Looking for something, anything to do.

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It was obvious by looking at them that the most recent patients were not going to survive the hour. Ferishta went to speak with the woman that rushed in with them. They were bombed at a wedding and the woman had already seen three of her daughters die that day. Everyone was running away, but the bombs followed them. They killed or maimed everyone but the lucky few who managed to stay hidden. The bride and the groom were two of the people who were rushed in; the groom’s left hand was no longer there to hold his wife’s right hand. The bride in her blood-stained, green dress was mouthing something to her husband: narahat-am merawi, dooset daram. I’m sad you’re leaving. I love you. Ferishta brought a blanket and a cup of tea for the woman, then stepped outside for some fresh air. She looked up at the sky. She thought detached-ly that it was far more peaceful at night. She looked forward again just as three more bomb victims were rushed into the hospital. She heaved with her head between her knees, then sprinted forward to resist falling. Ferishta ran. She ran from the victims’ pain. She ran for her own pain. She ran to feel something, some semblance of control in her life. She ran home. Home to her family. Home to her mother. She ran and ran and ran, worry lines claiming new homes between and above her eyes. She ran past the abandoned Danish Consulate where her mother used to work. She ran up the hill to her house overlooking the city. She ran through the front door. And she collapsed into her mother’s arms.

------- Baba Jaan wasn’t home yet. Mamy Jaan, Hamid, and Ferishta looked through the window, awaiting his arrival. Mamy Jaan stood up and paced between the phone and the window. Baba Jaan had already quit his job as president in the Ministry of Planning, but he was still the active president in the Ministry of Justice for the next week. Government officials were seized or killed every day. It was not a good time to be late. Mamy Jaan picked up the phone and dialed. There was not a sound in the house as they waited for an answer on the other line of the phone. Gunfire droned on outside, almost a white noise now. Where are you? Please don’t be dead. Please don’t be dead. Please don’t be dead. Ferishta repeated the chant in her head, one for three, over and over. Mamy Jaan breathed a sigh of relief and

gifted a quivering smile and a shaky nod to her children. They returned to their stations at the win-dow, it was almost curfew. No one was safe until everyone was home.

------- Five minutes away from curfew, Baba Jaan returned home from the English language center he founded. Mamy Jaan wasn’t happy. Ferishta and Hamid could hear them arguing through their closed bedroom door. They stood next to each other, arm touching arm, pillars to hold the other one straight. Mamy Jaan stormed out of the room and broke through the two siblings. Hamid looked wounded while Ferishta stood tall, staring into the open door of her parents’ bedroom. She heard a yell, then a thump. She ran through the door and saw her father collapsed on the floor. “Call an ambulance!” “What happened?” “I don’t know, just call!” Everything was a flurry of motion. Hamid running, curtains flying, Mamy Jaan rushing, and Ferishta crying. Baba Jaan woke up clutching his chest. It had been nearly twenty minutes and the ambulance still hadn’t arrived. He winced as he climbed up off the floor and onto the bed with Mamy Jaan’s help. Hamid brought him pain killers and water. Another half hour passed and the ambulance still hadn’t arrived. Baba Jaan hid his pain well. Almost two hours later a military jeep arrived to take Baba Jaan to the hospital, civilian EMTs were not allowed to work after curfew. Hamid and Mamy Jaan joined Baba Jaan in the jeep. Ferishta bit her nails as she watched them leave. She kept watch at the window, occasionally stroking her cat, until Hamid and Mamy Jaan were finally dropped back off at home, after the curfew was over. A few of Ferishta’s nails were bleeding because of how violently she tore at them with her teeth. Ferishta stopped looking, she wasn’t sure if she wanted to see them anymore. They shuffled through the front door, eyes red and noses raw. And Ferishta knew. Another chunk of her heart was ripped out from her chest and through her throat. Tears were an impossibility, and the infinite nothingness that she had just managed to stave off enveloped her once again. She closed her eyes and whispered dooset daram to the smell of him that still lingered on the couch.

------- A year of war. A year of death. A cousin

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mising. A father dead. Ferishta stayed home most days now. She and Hamid sat next to each other rereading their sister’s letters. Malika’s life was so far from theirs. It was normal, a word Ferishta would have scrunched her nose at before. The letters were friendly inquiries into their health and safety, nothing too critical of the Russians. Though the Russians couldn’t read Dari, they had wormed their way into all aspects of Afghan society through the Afghans who truly believed in what they were doing and through the Afghans who had no alterna-tive choice. Ferishta and Hamid were reading their most recent letter from Malika. It had been a month now since their last exchange. This letter was an account of married life like the rest of them: Malika was quickly growing bored of her husband, but his brother’s wife made divine French pastries so he was okay for now. This letter also included pic-tures of Lyra, Malika’s daughter. Ferishta held the pictures tightly in her hands. Normalcy was a rare commodity, and Ferishta grabbed at it when she could. Narahatam merawi. The Afghanistan that Ferishta knew and loved was quickly slipping through her fingers; it slid down the road and into the curbside sewage. Narahatam merawi. With each passing day more people she loved were disap-pearing or leaving. Narahatam merawi. She was no longer the person she was last winter.

------- After Baba Jaan’s death, Mamy Jaan withdrew all of the money they had at the bank and kept the cash under her bed. She knew people who had already escaped and had gotten the contact in-formation of the man who had helped them get past the checkpoints the Russians had set up. She asked endless questions, trying to elucidate every pos-sible scenario. How were they leaving? Who was taking them? How much did it cost? How many people could they take? She carefully planned their escape. The small family continued on with their daily lives as if nothing were wrong, all the while preparing their inner lives for the stormy upheaval that was to come.

------- Three more years passed in violent monot-ony before Mamy Jaan decided that it was the right time for them to leave. And three more months of planning and half of their savings later, Mamy Jaan was able to buy passage for what was left of their

family to escape to Pakistan. The family packed themselves into the back of a cloth covered truck with twenty other people also seeking a better life. In order to slip through the checkpoints, everyone needed to pre-tend that they were villagers returning home. The women donned blue burqas and the men changed into shalwar kameezes. Ferishta, unaccustomed to the small eye holes, lifted her burqa up to see where she was walking. She made her fellow escapees nervous. Lifting her burqa exposed her as someone from the city, someone who wasn’t accustomed to the long, draping cloths. Mamy Jaan scolded her, the driver scolded her. She could get them all killed. Days flew by in the truck, no one slept. The truck jerked the passengers around their respective seats. The man sitting across Ferishta rubbed at his unfamiliar beard with an unsteady hand. His other hand was clasped with a woman’s who was clad in a burqa. Daughter or wife? It was impossible to distinguish any visible aging features. Ferishta noticed the deep circles under his eyes. She wondered if she looked the same. They slipped through their third checkpoint without incident. No one slept. Sleep is for the safe, and they were still as far from safe as they could be. The driver stopped at his house during their journey south when they received news that the truck in front of them had been bombed. The Rus-sians found out that it was full of people who were escaping. Ferishta’s truck could very well be next. The driver offered his home and food to the people for the night and they continued their journey in the morning. “Stop that truck!” The driver immediately halted, jolting all of the people hiding in the back. Those who were able to see through the openings of the cloth no-ticed that it was an Afghan man who stopped them and let their fellow escapees know. Their relief didn’t last long. The man marched to the back of the truck and exposed all of the people. “I need all of the able men to step out of this truck. Join the war against the Russians.” This man was a soldier with the muja-hedeen. A freedom fighter for the Afghan peo-ple. Looks of mixed admiration and shame were directed at him. How could they all just leave their land behind, forgetting everyone and everything they once knew? They felt like cowards. The men stepped off of the truck. The soldier glanced around

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the rest of the truck. His eyes landed on Hamid. “Get out. Fight for your country.” Hamid had just turned twenty the month before, and his mother and sister had protected him from most of the bloodshed since his Baba Jaan’s death. Mamy Jaan stood up; all five feet and two inches of her against the towering soldier. “If he’s not leaving, then neither am I.” There was a strength in her eyes that Fer-ishta had never seen before. Mamy Jaan narrowed her eyes at the soldier and dared him to do some-thing. They had a staring match, each more deter-mined than the other to win. Finally, the soldier backed up and waved the truck forward. Mamy Jaan weakly sat down next to Hamid and embraced him. Her strength was just a façade. They were so close to freedom. She squeezed Hamid a little tighter.

------- Mamy Jaan, Ferishta, and Hamid stayed in Peshawar for one week before they moved to Islamabad. The rest of their savings went towards renting a house with other Afghans who had es-caped. They were among the lucky few Afghans who had had enough money on them to circumvent the refugee camps. They were able to escape the poverty and food and water shortages that are prev-alent in the camps. They were able to escape the voyeuristic eyes of photojournalists who arrived intending to advance their careers by recording grief and loss. And they were able to escape the ever present reminders of what the, thus far, four year war had done and was doing to their people. Narahatam merawi. They were unable to sell their houses in Kabul and Jalalabad because it would have alerted the Russians to their plans, but Ferishta still remembered the smells and sounds of her houses. She left a piece of herself behind in the large creek that ran through the front yard of her house in Jalalabad. She left a piece of herself behind on the snowy mountains that surround-ed Kabul. She left a piece of herself behind with her father, whose grave she knew she’d never be able to return to. Pieces of herself were scattered throughout the escape route to Pakistan, like Hansel and Gretel’s bread crumbs leading them back home. She knew, though, that she wouldn’t be going back to retrieve them. Narahatam merawi. Still, life goes on. Ferishta couldn’t sit in perpetual numbness forever. After a month in Islamabad she ventured out again. She began shad-owing a doctor, clutching at any semblance of the

life she had before. She ate out at restaurants. The chicken kabob in Islamabad was the best that she had ever tasted; she could practically taste the fire and stones that had cooked it to perfection. Every once in a while she thought of the delicious street kabobs she and Hamid used to buy at the markets in Kabul, but she brushed those memories away. They were useless to her now. During this time Mamy Jaan began ap-plying for visas to go to the United States. Her closest friend from Afghanistan had arrived there years before, and had wanted their families to join together once again. After a year of waiting, they were finally able to move to their new home in the United States.

------- Ferishta cut her hair. She switched out the loose-fitting pullovers and comfortable pants from back home for shoulder pads and dresses. She went back to school to learn a new language. She and Hamid only spoke to each other of happy things — in English. Mamy Jaan met with her friends from back home, but Ferishta and Hamid made new ones. Narahatam merawi. Dooset daram. Ferishta lovingly bade farewell to what she knew before, because she knew that the only way to move on was to create new experiences and mold new parts for herself. She forged her way into her new world. Her feet were liquid fire, melting and molding her surrounding environment to fit her. She looked up at the same moon that shone over Afghanistan and whispered a little secret to it dooset daram and continued on her way.

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Connor O’Neill ‘15

Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. has taken on the role of the primary guarantor of global security.. In some respect the internation-al community has been justified in its expectation that the U.S. provide the lion’s share of defense for the international economic order that has made it by far the richest country on the planet. However, the extent of this commitment, and a lack of fiscal discipline and domestic investment on the part of American politicians, will make it impossible for America to maintain its same global security pos-ture. Fortunately for the U.S., its closest allies seem to be awakening to this reality and are rebuilding their aging Cold War era militaries. This process will open opportunities for the U.S. to reduce its commitments around the world without seriously jeopardizing its security position. The first place that the U.S. should consid-er reducing its presence and encouraging its allies to step up is the Persian Gulf. This will obviously be impossible in the immediate term due to the ongoing operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, the two regional threats that initially justified maintaining a large American presence, Iran and Saddam’s regime in Iraq, have largely been neutralized as a threat to America’s Arab allies. The menace of Saddam’s massive military of the 80’s and 90’s has been replaced by a national Iraqi military that is incapable of defend-ing its own territory. Iran’s naval and air forces, mostly made up of Western hardware purchased before 1979, are outdated in in a state of disrepair due to embargoes on spare parts, which has served to extremely weaken its security forces. As the U.S. becomes a net exporter of oil, European and Gulf states have a far greater stake in gulf security. Arab Gulf states have developed capable modern militaries over the past decades. At the same time, European nations, mainly France and the U.K., have begun deploying small, yet capable forces that are a significant contribution to security in the region. It is possible that a multina-tional European force, likely under a NATO banner, could take on much of the responsibility for securi-

ty in the Gulf. In recent years European states have endeavored to build modern expeditionary capable naval and amphibious forces, exemplified by the British decision to operate two large carriers, and the acquisition of several amphibious assault ships by France, Italy, and Spain. For these reasons, it is hardly necessary for the U.S. to maintain a continuous deployment of a carrier strike group, an amphibious ready group (ARG), and numerous installations housing air and ground forces in the Gulf region. These forces cost the U.S. billions of dollars each year and are often unnecessary. They also require a massive logistical effort that necessitates further Ameri-can deployments in Europe. Consider the recent announcement of the deployment of 2,100 Marines to the region as part of a crisis response Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). As the USMC’s capabilities make it undoubtedly the most capable crisis response force in the world, it hardly seems necessary to simultaneously deploy both a land based MAGTF and one embarked aboard the ships of an ARG. It is unlikely a large amphibious force would be needed in this relatively secure region. As the 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrated, the U.S. would be more than capable of rapid deployment if such a need arose. The counterargument to a drawdown of American commitments to the Gulf is the concern that the American intelligence community has been completely incapable of predicting recent events in the region that pose a threat to its citizens and inter-ests, such as, the Arab Spring protests and the rise of ISIS. Proponents of the current American secu-rity policy in the region also argue that the U.S. has military capabilities unmatched in the Gulf, making a large American presence necessary over the long-term to maintain security, especially as Iran begins fielding domestically designed military systems. It is also said that the rift between Qatar and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) over support for radical Islamist movements raises questions about defense cooperation between Gulf Arab governments. The American defense policy in the Gulf region is based on an outdated paradigm that was

The Potential for an American Withdrawal From the Gulf

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meant to help allies defend themselves against Iran and Iraq. Gulf states are now more than capable of defending themselves in the event of a crisis, because of their position against ISIS, which shows that they are capable of cooperating on security issues. As America moves toward energy inde-pendence, there is less to protect energy interests. For decades, the U.S. has fostered the security and prosperity of European and Gulf states, but like any aging parent, it must accept that it is time to allow these countries to take responsibility for securing their own interests.

Dubai, UAE Photo by Dina Yazdani ‘15

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Moving Past the Neoliberal Debate: Examining the Effects of International Free Trade Agreements on Latin American DevelopmentSam Alexander ‘16

In this paper I explore the effects of neolib-eral economic policies on Latin American econom-ic development. Since World War II there has been an exponential rise in liberalized international com-merce, and in the past forty years, Latin American countries have been under disproportionate pres-sure to adopt neoliberal economic policies. These policies revolve around what Klein (2007) calls the “free-market trinity” — privatization, deregulation and large cuts to social spending. I argue that in Latin America neoliberal policy reforms by themselves are only minimally effective, but produce much stronger results when paired with democratization. As states become more democratic they should be more likely to con-clude free trade agreements (FTAs), which tend to benefit international trade more than any domestic economic policies. I explore this topic using time series analyses of the economic conditions of both Mexico and Chile from the implementation of their first neoliberal reforms to the present. The reason for focusing on Mexico and Chile is that they were two of the first Latin American countries to undergo serious economic reforms, and thus offer the longest histories through which to evaluate the policies’ long term effects. I find that neoliberal reforms alone produce mixed results, and that the positive results are often outweighed by the neg-ative ones. Conversely, I find that there are sub-stantial improvements to economic development after a country has democratized, and that the most significant improvements follow the implementa-tion of FTAs.

Previous Literature Much of the existing literature explores the positive and negative effects of neoliberal reforms on economic and, occasionally, political conditions throughout Latin America. Wiarda and Kline (2011) examine the political histories of both Chile and Mexico, and offer a solid foundational background from which to move forward. Huber and Solt (2004) discuss the specific implications of moderate and more radical reforms throughout Latin America, as well as highlighting many of the

negative social repercussions. Klein (2007) focuses specifically on neoliberal policy changes in Chile, and the way in which the reforms unexpectedly af-fected the economy and the population as a whole. Mansfield et al. (2002) analyze the ways in which regime type determines foreign economic policy, and conditions under which FTAs are most likely to be concluded. Despite the valuable contributions of these authors, none of the existing literature explores the effects that democratization has in tan-dem with neoliberal economic models, and more specifically the role that FTAs play in furthering such policies and realizing the combined benefits for economic development in Latin America. My contribution to the literature is an examination of this crucial connection.

Political and Economic Overview of Mexico According to the Polity IV index, Mexico did not become a democracy until Vicente Fox Quesada was elected in 2000 (Polity IV: Mexico, 2011, p. 2). Up until that point, “the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was able to maintain one-party rule and control of the presidency in Mexico for over 70 years (p. 2).” Despite the time it took for Mexico to democratize, the country underwent substantial neoliberal reform some time before that. In the early 1980s Mexico’s foreign debt began spiraling out of hand and, in 1982, the IMF made the government a number of bailout loans contingent on the implementation of a Struc-tural Adjustment Program (Farnsworth, 1982). The program involved decreasing trade barriers, cutting social spending, and in 1989, the country under-went a “massive deregulation of agriculture (Sny-der, 2002, 173).” Then, in 1994, Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada (Wiarda and Kline, 2011, p. 390). Thus, Mexico underwent its first neoliberal reforms between 1982 and 1989, implemented NAFTA in 1994, and became a full democracy in 2000.

Political and Economic Overview of Chile Unlike Mexico, Chile was a low-level democracy throughout the middle of twentieth century until 1973 when the democratic govern-

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Valdivia, Chile: Traveling south on the Pan-American Highway, the flow of traffic was suddenly halted to a stop by a group of local municipal workers who had set up a makeshift protest in the middle of the road. Demanding higher wages and better working conditions, protesters chanted and lit tires on fire for more than an hour before being asked to leave by authorities. This particular protest was part of a nationwide strike that affected more than 300 Chilean municipalities in the fall of 2013, sparking a wave of health and sanitation concerns across the country as uncollected trash littered city streets for more than a month. Photo by Caterina Zischke-Rincon, ‘15

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ment was overthrown in a military coup led by Augusto Pinochet (Polity IV: Chile, 2011, p. 2). Pinochet ran the country under a “strict military dictatorship” from 1974 until 1990 when “authority was returned to an elected president” (p. 2).During the Pinochet regime, economic policy was dictat-ed by a group of neoliberal economists known as the Chicago Boys wielding an extensive package of policy reforms called “the brick” (Wiarda and Kline, 2011, p. 179). These reforms called for increased competition, privatization of enterprise, the removal of price controls and the reduction of tariffs (p. 179). The program was undertaken gradually at first, but then in 1975 the reforms were applied aggressively in what the famous economist Milton Friedman termed “shock treatment” (Klein, 2007, p. 82). Based on Chile’s long and extensive digression from democracy, we will consider Chile to have undergone democratization in 1990, while the country’s radical economic reforms occurred between 1975 and 1981. It wasn’t until 2003 that Chile finally signed an FTA with the United States (Wiarda and Kline, 2011, p. 185).

Effects of Liberalization on Economic Growth and Quality of Democracy Huber and Solt (2004) have shown that moderate economic liberalization has had a posi-tive effect on both economic and political devel-opment when implemented slowly, but that radical policy reforms have the opposite effect. Using the General Reform Index (GRI) they found that countries with more liberalized economies “experi-enced clearly higher average annual growth in GDP per capita” though the countries that implemented their reforms quickly and extensively “experienced six times lower average annual growth rates... than countries that proceeded more cautiously” (Huber and Solt, 2004, p. 154). Huber and Solt also use the Polity IV and Freedom House democracy scores to explore the effect that economic reforms have on a country’s quality of democracy. They found that “countries with more liberalized economies as of 1995 showed greater improvements in the two measures of quality of democracy... than countries with less liberalized economies” (p. 157). Yet, “the more radical reformers improved... to a lesser extent than the more cautious reformers” (p. 157).These results seem to make a case for moderate economic liberalization, however, Huber and Solt also found that the more liberalized countries “suffered higher volatility, saw greater increases in

inequality, and experienced higher levels of pover-ty” (p. 158). Moderate implementation of neolib-eral policies can have positive effects on economic growth and quality of democracy, but there are considerable social and political implications. Relationship between Regime Type and Cooper-ation on Free Trade Agreements In considering the relevance of democra-tization to international cooperation Mansfield et al. (2002) analyzes the way in which regime type affects the likelihood of countries establishing FTAs. Mansfield et al. have found that “a country is increasingly likely to conclude a cooperative trade agreement as it becomes more democratic and that the probability of two or more countries signing such an agreement rises with the level of democ-racy in each country” (p. 493). While the authors are aware that the primary factor in establishing an FTA is the agreement’s economic relevance to each involved party, their research has shown that regime type has a significant effect on whether such agreements are actually concluded. Mans-field et al. argue that this result stems from their finding that “international cooperation in trade can be influenced by the control that voters exert over political leaders” (p. 478). Following this argu-ment, autocracies should be less likely to establish FTAs based on their lower accountability to voters, whereas “the superior ability of elections in de-mocracies to constrain leaders prompts democratic rulers to be more cooperative internationally than their non-democratic counterparts” (p. 478). Thus, the higher the quality of democracy is in a country the more likely that country should be to cooperate with others in establishing FTAs.

Argument Existing literature focuses separately on the effects that neoliberal economic policies have had in Latin America regarding economic development, the relationship between democratic regimes, and their likelihood to conclude FTAs. I argue that the gap created by these two topics having been exam-ined separately in the past is substantial because the establishment of FTAs is the single most beneficial factor in increasing economic and political devel-opment. By analyzing the effect that FTAs have had compared to other neoliberal policy reforms, it will be possible to reframe the debate over whether domestic neoliberal policies have played a positive role in Latin American development. By focusing

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on FTAs, economic conditions become apparent in the international context in which they exist, and scholars can begin to view development as the multilateral undertaking that it is. In order to accurately compare the individ-ual effects of neoliberal policy reforms, democrati-zation and the establishment of FTAs a time-series analysis is the most effective tool. I use Gross National Product (GDP) as my primary evidence because of the consistency of the data available for this measure through the World Bank. I also include the GDP growth rates as an additional mea-sure of economic effectiveness. I use the dates that are cited under each country’s Political and Eco-nomic Overview in the Previous Literature section.

MexicoTable 1: Mexico’s GDP (Data from the World Bank)

Neoliberal Reforms Mexico underwent its first round of neo-liberal reforms between 1982 and 1989. In 1982 Mexico’s GDP was at $173.7 Billion, by 1989 it was at $222.9 B, and in 1994 it was at $421.7 B. That shows a growth in GDP of $198.7 B five years after all of the neoliberal reforms had been im-plemented. The GDP growth rate was at 5.07% in 1990, dropping to 4.22% in 1991 and then 3.63% in 1992. While GDP rose significantly in the years following the full implementation of policy re-forms, the economy was actually slowing down in its overall growth.

Democratization When Vicente Fox was elected president in 2000, GDP was at $581.4 B and it continued to steadily rise for the next five years up to $848.9 B by 2005. However, looking at Table 1 it is appar-ent that GDP was already quite obviously on the rise before he took office. The year after Fox was elected, the GDP growth rate was at -0.16%. In the following two years it went up to .83% and then 1.35% by 2003. This isn’t a very substantial increase, but it is significant nonetheless due to the fact that it is growing.

Free Trade Agreement The North American Free Trade Agree-ment (NAFTA) took effect on January 1, 1994 and that year Mexico’s GDP was at $421.7 B. One year later and it had fallen to $286.7 B, a $135 B drop. However, five years later in 2000 it had grown by $294.7 B, to $581.4 B. The year after NAFTA was established the GDP growth rate was at an all time low of -6.22%. Yet, one year later it had jumped all the way back up to 5.14%, and continued up to 6.78% the following year. In analyzing the effects each of the three factors had on GDP, it becomes clear that neoliber-al policy reforms had a substantial effect in increas-ing the country’s GDP and did so by nearly $200 B over five years. However, following the implemen-tation of NAFTA GDP rose by closer to $300 B and did so while simultaneously increasing the GDP growth rate. Mexico’s neoliberal reforms increased GDP without being able to maintain an increase in growth rate. Trying to determine the effect that democratization had on the Mexican economy is difficult because, as Table 1 shows, GDP was already rising substantially before Fox was elected, yet it must be recognized that it continued to do so for the eight years after as well. The GDP growth rate also began to increase again after the country democratized, even though it had been decreas-ing previously. All in all, the most substantial and drastic improvements in Mexico’s GDP came after NAFTA was established.

ChileTable 2: Chile’s GDP (Data from the World Bank)

Neoliberal Reforms Pinochet and the Chicago Boys implement-ed their neoliberal reforms most aggressively start-ing in 1975 and continued to push these policies until 1981. At the end of these massive reforms, in 1981, Chile’s GDP was at $32.6 B and was higher than it had ever been. By 1986, however, these re-forms had begun to backfire and GDP had dropped $14.9 B to $17.7 B -- almost exactly back to where

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it had been before the coup. The year after these reforms were realized, in 1982, the GDP growth rate was down at -10.32%. This is the lowest that Chile’s growth rate has ever dropped to with the exception of 1975, when Pinochet’s neoliberal experiment began.

Democratization Patricio Aylwin won the Chilean election against Pinochet in 1990, and at that time GDP was at $31.6 B and was begin to recover from the eco-nomic policies that had rocked it a decade before. By 1995, new economic policies had been imple-mented to fine tune the ones remaining from the Pinochet era, and GDP had more than doubled to $71.3 B. The GDP growth rate was at 3.7% when Aylwin was elected, however in the following year it rose to 7.97%, and was up to 12.28% by 1992.

Free Trade Agreement Chile signed an FTA with Canada in 1996, and proceeded to establish one with Mexico in 1998 and finally with the United States in 2003. By the time Chile had signed a bilateral FTA with the U.S. GDP was already at $77.8 B. In the five year period following the implementation of this third FTA, their GDP was the highest it had ever been at $179.6 B. Between 2003 and 2008 their GDP had grown by $101.8 B. By 2003 the country’s GDP had a growth rate of 3.96%, and in 2004 in rose to 6.04% only to drop slightly in 2005 to 5.56%. Looking at Table 2 it is apparent how dramatically the Chilean economy has grown since 2003. In examining the effects of each of the three factors as applied to Chile, it is clear that neoliberal reforms without a democratic gov-ernment had a noticeably negative effect on the Chilean economy, as well as a number of social implications that resulted from the military coup. The country’s growth was also the absolute lowest it has ever been in 1775, directly after the military coup, and then again in 1982, directly after neolib-eral reforms were fully carried out. In Chile, de-mocratization was the second most beneficial factor in positively improving the country’s economy. Following 1990 the country’s GDP more than dou-bled, and the economy has continued to grow ever since. GDP grew more in the two years after Chile returned to democracy than it did after either of the other two factors. And finally, the most positive factor in increasing economic development was the implementation of FTAs and most specifically the

one agreed to with the US. Comparing results from both Mexico and Chile paint a very clear picture of the economic benefits that result from establishing FTAs. In both countries, I find that economic growth was the most substantial following the construction and imple-mentation of FTAs. I additionally find that the most detrimental effects on economic development come from the implementation of neoliberal reforms be-fore democracy has been established. Once democ-racy was established in both countries, economic growth rose significantly, and while the timing of democratization in Mexico doesn’t make it very easy to isolate it apart from the effects of NAFTA, it is still clear that it does not have a negative effect on the economy. In conclusion, I find that in the cases of Mexico and Chile, neoliberal reforms that were undertaken by non-democratic regimes had mixed effects on economic development. In both countries these reforms were the least effective at spurring economic development, and that their implemen-tation directly led to decreased growth rates. I find that democratization is not a clear catalyst for economic growth, yet in both cases it had positive effects and consistently led to higher economic growth rates than before. And ultimately, I find that FTAs spark the most substantive economic growth, and are by far the most effective factor in increas-ing economic development.

Works CitedChile Data. (2012, December 31). The World Bank. Farnsworth, C. H. (1982, December 24). I.M.F. Loan To Mexi-co. New York Times. Huber, E., & Solt, F. (2004). Successes and Failures of Neolib-eralism. Latin American Research Review, 39(3), 150-162.Klein, N. (2007). States of Shock. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (pp. 75-95). New York, NY: Met-ropolitan Books/Henry Holt.Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Rosendorf, P. (2002). Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and Interna-tional Trade Agreements. International Organization, 56(3), 477-513. Mexico Data. (2012, December 31). The World Bank. Polity IV Country Report 2010: Chile. (2011, June 1). Polity IV Project. Polity IV Country Report 2010: Mexico. (2011, June 1). Polity IV Project. Snyder, R. (2002). After Neoliberalism: The Politics of Regu-lation in Mexico. World Politics, 51(4), 173-204. Walton, M. (2004). Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good, Bad, or Incomplete. Latin American Research Review, 39(3), 165-181.Wiarda, H. J., & Kline, H. F. (2011). Latin American Politics and Development (7th ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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County Clare, Ireland: Poulnabrone Dolmen is an example of an ancient portal tomb and now is one of Ireland’s most-frequented tourist attractions as it is on the road to the Cliffs of Moher. Photo by Olivia Doyle ‘16

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Jinja, Uganda: Children play at the park while waiting for their lunch. Photo by Allie McRaith ‘16

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Jinja, Uganda: Other children forgo the park equipment for the drums. Photo by Allie McRaith ‘16

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Dina Yazdani ‘15 The resurgence of the Islamic veil over the past century emerged largely as a result of modern-ism in the Muslim world, and not as a consequence of the rise of militant Islam. While some in the West may view the veil as a symbol of oppression, many Muslim women would argue that it is liber-ating. Throughout the Muslim world women are choosing to wear the hijab, burqa and niqab as a form of symbolic action in response to patriarchy and domineering Western influence. In this regard, the veil for many Muslim women represents agen-cy, and not a lack thereof. The freedom of move-ment and ability it provides to reclaim a national identity in the wake of Western colonialism and hegemony is just two major factors that explain the sudden resurgence of the veil in Muslim societies. However, While revivalism of the veil can be large-ly attributed to symbolic action, it would be wrong to ignore the instances when veiling is indeed involuntary, and done out of necessity, societal pressures and legal compulsion. For those who choose to cover, veiling creates a space for women to operate in the histor-ically male-dominated public sphere. It provides freedom of movement largely unprecedented for women in traditional societies. The emergence of modernization that de-emphasized agriculture and prompted an urban migration into the cities (Bruce 2000, 18) marked a shift where women were no longer confined to their homes to perform house-hold duties, and could work among men in public. This is especially important for lower-middle-class families, in which it is imperative for women to work and provide an additional income (Macleod 1991, 117). However working in the public space carried the risk of mingling with non-mahrams, or men unrelated to them, which was discouraged by the Prophet Muhammad, who was reported as say-ing “no man is alone with a woman, but shaytaan will be the third among them” (Al-Tirmidhi 3:374). The veil allows women to maintain separation from men in the public space. The veil thus serves as a “portable seclusion” that permits women to operate in public space while still observing the moral obli-gation to not mingle with non-mahram men (Abu-Lughod 2002, 785). For working-class Muslim women, the veil created an entrance into the public

The Resurgence of the Veil in Modern Islam

Damavand, Iran Photo by Dina Yazdani ‘15

space. Re-veiling is not only a phenomenon among low-middle class Muslims, but also among the educated and wealthy elite. As a result of mod-ernization, an increasing rate of women are earn-ing college degrees and entering the professional workforce. This, however, creates a moral dilemma for upper-class Muslim women because of the im-portance of reputation and image. Arlene Macleod (1991) writes that the “focus on the woman’s body as the locus of morality for the entire family high-lights the importance of the dress symbol in main-taining the structure of familial institutions and the morality that supports it” (100). Working alongside non-mahram men could thus threaten the moral integrity of the Muslim woman’s family. Wearing the veil similarly resolves this dilemma by main-taining a barrier between men and women in the

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public space, as it does for lower-class women. The veil has the same effect outside of the workplace. While traditionally women in Muslim societies were often secluded to their homes, adorning the veil enabled women to venture outside in public. In the Egyptian novel-trilogy Palace Walk, Naguib Mahfouz describes how the main character Aminah put on her servant’s veil so that she could leave the house without fear of judgment by her neighbors to demonstrate how veiling can be liberating, and actually encourage freedom of movement (99). In addition to symbolizing the new-found-ed freedom of movement for Muslim women, the veil also represents a rejection of the West, and the reclaiming of a national identity. The movement to re-veil emerged in a post-colonial context for many Muslim societies. The end of colonialism facilitated a new pattern of Western dominance that provoked an Islamic revivalism throughout the Muslim world (Ahmed 2011, 218). The new pervasive experiments of secularism practiced by post-colonial governments and adopted by society repelled many Muslims (221). Muslim women engaged in Islamic revivalism by rejecting West-ern fashion and wearing the hijab (Macleod 105). These women who chose to re-veil, or muhajjaba, refused to emulate Western women, who they “…tend to perceive as bereft of community, vulnerable to sexual violence and social anomie, driven by individual success rather than morality or strangely disrespectful of God” (Abu-Lughod 2002, 788). As illustrated by the PBS documentary Muslims, the muhajjabas refused to be distracted by over-sexu-alized and materialistic Western culture and instead focused on their professional careers and fulfill-ing da’wah by volunteering in their communities (2012). Dressing modestly signaled to their male co-workers that they are not sexual objects, and should be treated as equals (Macleod 1991, 101). Not only did re-veiling force respect from men, but it also demonstrated their devotion to Islam and rejection of Western influence. Re-veiling for this group of women also served as a mode of feminism and a reclaiming of a national Islamic identity. However for some Muslims, the deci-sion to re-veil was made out of necessity, societal pressures and even legal compulsion. While the resurgence of the veil was most potent in Egypt, many Muslims were compelled to cover not out of religious conviction, but to subsist through the rampant epidemic of sexual violence fueled by a culture of misogyny and patriarchy. However the

initial resurgence of the veil was arguably not in response to this contemporary widespread sexual abuse. Rather, it elicited a new wave of muhajjabas over the past few decades. According to a 2008 report published by the Egyptian Center for Wom-en’s Rights, 83% of women interviewed said they had been sexually harassed at least once, and 50% experienced it on a daily basis (Al Aswany 2013). Wearing the veil, and subsequently dressing mod-estly, shields women from being subjected to this abuse. In addition, societal pressure—especially potent in Egypt—compelled even the more secu-lar, and irreligious Muslim women to veil. Women who voluntarily veil send a message to society that they are pious and should be respected (Macleod 1991. 101). However, what social message are women who do not veil sending to society? Some would insinuate that by not veiling, these women are displaying their promiscuity. The resurgence of the veil in places like Egypt creates a polarity between those who veil and do not veil. While the claim that women who do not veil are shaytan, or with bad intentions, is absurd, veiling has become synonymous with one’s level of religiosity. In order to avoid social condemnation, many Muslim women would opt for social conformity and choose to veil (Ahmed 2011, 152). The decision to veil in these instances is made out of societal pressure and necessity, not because of religious conviction. Many Iranian women also involuntarily wear the veil, or roosari, a loose scarf. Iran, which is an Islamic Republic, mandates women to cover their hair as prescribed by the Qur’an. Some Iranian women veil out of legal compulsion, and not out of protest to Westernization or religious devotion. While the resurgence of the veil can be attributed to a certain extent by necessity, societal pressure and legal compulsion, it largely serves as a movement for women’s rights and independence. After all, The involuntary decision for some Muslim women to veil was mostly in response to the initial resur-gence. The veil’s resurgence in the Middle-East should not be equated with a rise in Islamic funda-mentalism, but instead as a social movement made by women to participate in the region-wide protest against pervasive Western influence and as a form of freedom of movement in historically patriar-chal societies. Contrary to Western public figures like former French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s assertion that the veil is subservient and former

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U.S. First Lady Laura Bush’s call for freeing Mus-lim women from the veil, many Muslim women would argue that the veil is liberating. The women who are compelled to veil out of pressure however should not be ignored. Countries like Egypt need to take the necessary reforms in order to liberalize their conservative societies to the point where all women—veiled or not—are not only respected, but also accepted. In Iran and Saudi Arabia—the latter representing another state that mandates veiling—should allow women to make veiling a choice. Re-ligious conviction should come as an organic and independent process, not out of fear and compul-sion. For the majority of Muslim women who wear either the hijab, niqab or burqa, wearing the veil perhaps not only signals rejection of the West and establishes a barrier with men in the public space, but also symbolizes a physical demonstration of the pride they hold in their Muslim identity.

Works CitedAbu-Lughod, Lila. "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others." American Anthropologist 104.3 (2002): 783-90. Print.Ahmed, Leila. A Quiet Revolution: The Veil's Resurgence, from the Middle East to America. New Haven: Yale UP, 2011. Print.Al Aswany, Alaa. "Egypt's Trouble with Women." New York Times, n.d. Web. 8 Dec. 2013.Bruce, Steve. Fundamentalism. Cambridge: Polity, 2000. Print.Macleod, Arlene Elowe. Accommodating Protest: Working Women, the New Veiling, and Change in Cairo. New York: Columbia UP, 1991. Print.Mahfouz, Naguib. Palace Walk: The Cairo Trilogy I. London: Black Swan, 1994. Print.Muslims. PBS Frontline, 2003. DVD.Tirmidhi, Muhammad Ibn ‘Īsá, Abu Khali, and Abu Tāhir Zubayr Alī Za’i. English Translation of Jami At-Tirmidhi. Vol. 3. Riyadh: Darussalam, 2007. Print.

Photo by Ciarra Simeone D’Onofrio, ‘15

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Matthew Wong, ‘16

The US policy of pivoting to Asia has seen substantial steps, from strengthening military alli-ances to being more active in regional institutions such as ASEAN, APEC and the East Asia Summit. The most defining mark that the US seeks to leave in order to hallmark this policy is, of course, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). How-ever, the creation of this giant free trade agreement leaves out a conspicuous power in the Asia Pacific region: China. Some commentators opined that this is an illustration of US attempts to “contain” China. To them, a trade bloc that excludes the biggest economy in the region surely is not a sound economic move. Does the exclusion of China from the TPP really illustrate US intention of “contain-ing” China? Given that the TPP in its conception is plainly a trade agreement and that trade diversion affecting China is expected to be low, I argue that the TPP is not an economic mean to “contain” Chi-na. To illustrate this argument, I will point to the fact that the motive of the TPP is purely com-mercial – that the US seeks to improve its trade standing vis-à-vis Asia Pacific countries. Secondly, I will show that even if the TPP comes into being, which is an arduous task, the exclusionary effects against China is negligible. In addition, China’s trade linkages with TPP members are substan-tial so TPP members will have to continue trade relations with China. Lastly, I will elucidate the inclusiveness of how joining the TPP makes it a benign agreement. China’s potential involvement in the TPP depends on its priorities – and there are reasons to believe that China will likely hold out. Introduction of the TPP The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),a proposed regional free trade agreement (FTA) aimed at deepening economic ties between member nations, is expected to eliminate or substantially reduce tariffs on the trade of goods and services be-tween member nations, and boost investment flows (Pandey 2014). The TPP initially had four members (Singapore, Brunei, Chile and New Zealand) when it was first mooted in 2004 (Gordon 2012). Over

time other countries joined in negotiations and now there are currently 12 member countries, which in-clude Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Sin-gapore, the United States of America and Vietnam (Trans-Pacific Partnership). In late 2008, the Bush administration expressed the United States’ interest in joining the TPP negotiations. In 2009, the US formally entered negotiations and has since taken the lead in the TPP negotiations. On the surface the TPP looks like another trade agreement, but its negotiators envision the TPP to be a ‘comprehensive and high-quality’ Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that aims to liberalise trade in goods and services, encourage investments, promote innovation, economic growth and de-velopment and support job creation and retention (Das 2013). The 29 chapters in the TPP include intellectual property rights (IPR), state-owned en-terprises (SOEs), government procurement, labor, environment, rules of origin (ROO), and regulatory coherence (Das 2013).Because the TPP aims to be the most comprehensive and highest standard multilateral trade agreement to date, negotiations have been intense and slow. The finished product will require members to abide by those chapters and will be held accountable by a binding dispute resolution mechanism. In terms of numbers, the TPP will be a massive and important trade bloc. The total GDP of current TPP countries is approximately US$ 27.5 trillion, comprising 40% of global GDP and one third of global trade (Meltzer 2014). Total trade between TPP countries and the US is worth US$ 1.7 trillion (DePilis 2013). US Motives It is against this backdrop that the US is looking to tap into this potential economic bloc. The liberalization of trade will inevitably raise the total volume of trade. This is particularly important to the United States because over recent years, the US has been suffering trade deficits vis-à-vis many Asia Pacific countries. The US Department of Commerce reported that after the Great Recession of 2008, US trade deficits with Asia Pacific coun-tries began to increase again from US$ 300 billion

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) is not a “containment” of China

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in 2009 to US$ 370 billion in 2010, and is expected to increase further (Ruch 2011). Of course, the US has a few goals for the TPP, such as creating a comprehensive, modern template for economic partnerships involving the United States, promoting deeper integration in the Asia Pacific, and provid-ing a model for consolidating existing trade agree-ments (Petri 2011) . However, the opportunity of expanded trade is the biggest motivation. When US Trade Representative Susan Schwab expressed US involvement, the intention of the TPP only regarded trade. America’s concern was that many trade partners in Asia were reori-enting themselves to trade more with Japan, S. Korea and China. After the creation of a substan-tial number of FTAs by ASEAN, China and Japan now exclude the United States and could divert trade and investment from it (Petri et al. 2011, 6). Hence, the TPP would create an equal level play-ing field for US exports to TPP members’ markets. According to one government study,, the cumula-tive US GDP gain from the TPP will be 0.03% by 2025 (37). Thus, US involvement in the TPP is not an effort to “contain” or China by reducing Asia Pacific countries’ trade with China. Rather, it is an American effort to reinvigorate US trade presence in the Asia Pacific region (Gordon 2012). It is also important to highlight that the US led the TPP in 2009, before two significant policy shifts. One of which is President Obama’s pivot to Asia policy heralded by his Secretary of State Hil-lary Clinton in a piece in Foreign Policy magazine in 2011 (Clinton 2011). The other is China drop-ping its charm diplomacy in favor of a more asser-tive foreign policy. Although not formally a foreign policy formulation, China’s more “assertive” for-eign policy can be traced to 2008 but became more palpable in 2010, with a spike in maritime tensions and more strident diplomacy (Matsuda 2014).Proponents of using the TPP to contain China would have to understand that the TPP, due to it preceding China’s policy adjustment and Obama’s strategic rebalancing, cannot feature in the efforts to sideline China , since the TPP is not a reaction to any geopolitical maneuverings. Of course, some may argue that a trade relationship can sustain more than just an economic relationship. As ob-served by some scholars, the motives for trade can be categorized into three groups: economic gain, diplomatic, and security. In a study on why some Southeast Asian countries go to great lengths to secure a distant yet economically marginal trade

partner, it was discerned that the motives for doing so could be to raise its diplomatic profile abroad or could be a security strategy (Hoadley 2007, 303-325). That is definitely true. But member coun-tries and the US are solely focused on trade at the moment. If security purposes were intended in the TPP, an exclusion of China from this trade agree-ment is necessary. However,China is free to join if it wants to, provided they commit to the stipula-tions and obligations of the TPP. In addition, trade provides the most feasible explanation as to why TPP members such as Japan, Singapore and Ma-laysia are still part of the China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership negotiation. A purported TPP with aims to “contain” China would not work if members continue to engage with China. Therefore, the motive of the TPP is – at the moment – purely economics. The complexity of the TPP It is important to note that the “high standards, eliminating market access barriers to goods and services, addressing new, 21st century trade issues and respect for a rules-based econom-ic framework” that is at the heart of the TPP, has many points of contention (Flora 2013). To reiter-ate, there are 29 chapters in the TPP that cover very sensitive economic areas of member countries. Some of the sticking points in the negotiations have been politically sensitive ones to member countries, such as agriculture, intellectual property rights, service, and investment, among other things. The TPP negotiation has been extended time and time again, despite expected dates for completion. Negotiators are aware of the political implications trade liberalization has on various domestic sectors. In addition, TPP members have been reluctant to accept new rulemaking obligations that require changes to or new disciplines on their new poli-cies in the absence of clear signals that the United States and others will change existing policies and liberalize longstanding trade barriers in key sectors (Schott et al. 2013, 17-40). For a comprehensive and mutual deal to be realized, the US has to sub-stantiate the requirement of the chapters by making concrete policy changes at home. This is the major stumbling block not just for the US but other TPP members as well who will have to face domestic opposition. Another sticking point is the different stages of economic development TPP countries are at. Malaysia, Vietnam, Chile, Mexico and Peru are

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all developing countries, whereas the US, Cana-da, Singapore, Japan, Brunei, Australia and New Zealand are developed countries. This disparity is not reconciled fully in the TPP. Regardless of members’ stage of economic development, once the TPP is agreed upon and signed, equal commitment and implementation of TPP’s chapters are required. Even if the TPP may hurt the export sectors of Malaysia and Vietnam due to stringent labor and environmental regulations, standards must be met. An important thing to note is that despite trade advocates stating that trade benefits everyone, the gains of free trade and the TPP are uneven and affect different sectors of the economy differently. In a study done by the Peterson Institute of Interna-tional Economics, it is predicted that the US would make huge gains in the agricultural sector but will fare poorly in its apparel sector if protectionist measures on its apparel sector were dismantled. New Zealand, which is the biggest dairy producer in the world, hopes that the TPP will dismantle tar-iffs and quotas in the US and other markets. New Zealand will ultimately dominate member coun-tries’ dairy markets. These are the sort of dynamics at play in the TPP. Leaders of TPP countries hoped that the TPP negotiations would be completed by 2012, but was pushed back to October 2013, and as of yet, in 2014, negotiations are still ongoing (Schott et al. 2013, 17-40/ Das 2013, 2). This illustrates the complexity and the challenges of this FTA. Hence, negotiations are still ongoing and it uncertain whether this trade agreement will come to fruition. The TPP’s effects on China In the event that the TPP is signed into agreement, the TPP’s detri-mental effects on China are very neg-ligible. In a numerical simulation, the National Bureau of Economic Research in the US predicts the effect of the TPP on China and other non-TPP members. Understandably, non-member coun-tries will face trade diversion from TPP countries due to less trade barrier and greater market access within the TPP countries. According to the study, “simulation results reveal that China will be hurt by TPP initiatives, but the negative effects are relatively small given the geographical and commodity

composition of China's trade” (Li & Whalley 2012) The trade diversion, even if the amount is marginal, nonetheless stirs up those who hold that the TPP is a “containment” tool. Li Xiangyang of the Institute of Asia-Pa-cific Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argues that, “the TPP is based on eco-nomic and geopolitical-security considerations and China "containment" is an undeniable target of the agreement (Li 2012). To him, beyond economic detriments, the TPP constitutes sidelining China’s geopolitical presence in the Asia Pacific. Addi-tionally, Shen Minghui, Associate Professor at the National Institute of International Strategy of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, argues that the economic gain for large countries such as the United States and Japan in the TPP are very little. The TPP is only a tool for the US to respond to East Asia cooperation and obtain non-tradition-al economic benefits (Shen 2012). Efforts of the United States to drive a wedge between China and Asia Pacific countries under the guise of the TPP are widespread among skeptical Chinese commen-tators. Of course, those suspicions are not un-warranted. But as argued above, the US and TPP members’ motive of the TPP are purely economic. Given China’s pervasive economic ties with the United States and TPP members, TPP members have a tremendous stake in keeping China in-

Table 1: China’s Bilateral Trade Linkages with current TPP Members, 2011 (US$ billion)

Source: UN Comtrade Database

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cluded in their trade relationships. It is important to remember that it will be foolish for the US to undermine China, whose economy and exports the US relies heavily upon (Das 2013, 6). Even when the TPP is signed, TPP members’ relationship with China will not assume any difference because of the extensive trade linkages between China and the TPP members (6). These linkages are too interwo-ven and robust to initiate a drive to sideline China. In reality, China is indispensable from the TPP arrangement because it is a central component in the global supply chain that the TPP is also a part of. Admittedly China may experience the ex-clusionary effects of not being in the TPP. Projec-tion results from a study by the East-West Center in the US found that “the trade diversion effects of the TPP fall mainly on China, although they are small (0.09%) compared to the Chinese economy” (35 Petri et al. 2011). Chinese goods and services will lose its competitive edge in countries that are TTP members, but its trade balance with many TPP members will continue to be in surplus, albeit a re-duced surplus. Based on the data of this table, Chi-na’s trade with TPP members constitute a third of its total trade surplus. Although at first a decrease in China’s trade surplus with TPP members, even if very marginal one such as 0.09%, may result in a substantial decrease in trade surplus in absolute terms, it is important to note that this decrease still has to be offset by other regions reorientation to the TPP. Countries in regions such as the European Union, South America, Africa and the Middle East will inevitably be affected by the less competitive nature of their products in TPP countries and would be inclined to look for other markets to offset the trade diversion and may turn to China. Thus, a decrease in trade surplus with TPP members is likely to be offset by reorientation of trade by other countries. As a result of this shift, China’s trade would not be adversely affected by the TPP. In addition, the “containment” intention of the TPP will be futile if TPP members contin-ue to engage with China in various multilateral cooperation and negotiations. TPP members are doing just that, illustrating that “containment” is not an option. The virtue of TPP members being able to pursue different talks and initiatives renders arguments that the TPP as grounded in geopoliti-cal-security considerations are very hollow. TPP members are not bound by any political or strategic consideration. As mentioned earlier, Japan and

South Korea’s participation in talks with China regarding a trilateral free trade agreement dispels arguments that the TTP ushers the limitation of China’s efforts to foster East Asian cooperation. In order for the TPP to effectively “contain” and diminish China’s geopolitical power, the regional countries not included in existing TPP members are needed. Currently, significant players in the region such as Indonesia, the Philippines and South Korea have expressed no desire to enter the TPP talks (Gordon 2012). Is that an indication that they do not wish to join the plot to “contain” China? Or was their hiatus in talks due to economic consid-eration? The latter argument seems to make more sense and underscore the economic orientation of the TPP. Perhaps the most obvious indication that the TPP is benign to China is the open yet condi-tional membership of the TPP. As Meriya Solis (2013) from the Brookings Center for East Asia Policy Studies points out, “China, like any other APEC economy, has the right to request entry into the TPP. Whether the Chinese leadership will judge TPP membership to be in their country’s national interest and whether TPP members can be persuad-ed that China is prepared to abide by the negotiated disciplines is a separate matter. But it is important to dispel the notion that the TPP precludes Chinese entry” (Solis 2013). China was and is still free to join TPP negotiations, but due to reasons to be discussed below China has opted not to. In this sense, if the “containment” narrative is taken up, it appears that China’s “containment” was chosen by itself. TPP does not feature in China’s plans, for now It is on the grounds of due to technicality that China is not part of the TPP. Technically any Asia Pacific country can join the TPP but stringent conditions must be met. US officials say that China is free to join, but its current policy on state-owned enterprises, the pervasiveness of subsidies in certain areas such as agriculture, and the low probability of China enforcing environmental standards hinders China from participating. The TPP requires altering illiberal structures that China at present is not willing to do. This is of course anticipated as China is still developing. To main-tain regime stability, the Chinese Communist Party will be occupied with guaranteeing continued and high level economic growth. It may not be ready to implement the types of obligation currently negoti-

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ated in the TPP. Participating in the TPP may cause a disruption in various spheres of Chinese society (e.g. soaring unemployment due to higher labor costs, retrenchment of workers due to closures of SOEs, political elite fragmentation, etc.). The TPP is a major and unprecedented commitment. If China still maintains its goal of catching up to the rest of the world, not joining the TPP may be the best option. Sanchita Basu Das, from Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, also points out that the Chinese government has the capability to implement changes required by the TPP, but does not intend to do so because of incompatibility with its domestic economic development. But China certainly has the capability. “Given the ability of China to carry out extensive reforms leading to the joining of the WTO in 2001, its membership to the TPP will just be a matter of time” (Das 2013, 7). While it is uncertain that even in the distant future China’s accession to the TPP is inevitable, gaining membership into this potentially premier trade bloc accords many benefits. Indeed, studies point to the benefit of China joining the TPP. As a TPP member, Chinese goods and services will not be subjected to discriminatory practices in members’ markets. This could increase China’s exports substantially, especially to the US. Imports of foreign technology and advanced service will also increase, exposing China to better and more accessible technology. Beyond economics, adher-ing to the TPP standards would also augur well for China’s environment, laborers and government budget. Although trade offs will include the end of extraordinarily cheap labor and disregard of the environment for the sake of low-cost production, the living and environmental quality of China will improve. All these changes will take place in somewhere in the distant future when China has developed substantially and decides it is more ad-vantageous to be in the TPP. But for the time being the TPP accession is just a step too far. Implications on US-China relations The TPP is an ambitious trade agreement with the stakes of many countries. But it has now been placed under the US’ umbrella of pivot to Asia strategy. It is important for negotiations or the potential trade agreement not to be held hostage by the geopolitical reorientation of order in the Asia Pacific. Apart from the US, aspiring ASEAN countries have a stake in keeping the TPP purely business-oriented and reflect their aspiration for

continued development. The US should be careful in leading TPP discussions. The United States has to think hard about implications of the TPP, not only for member countries but also in regards to China. Issues such as trade diversion and its reper-cussion to other entities must be thought of before pushing ahead with talks. Jie Huang, associate pro-fessor of law at Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade Law School, points out how a potential TPP may actually undermine cross-strait relations between Taiwan and Mainland China. She opines that the economic framework called the Mainland-Taiwan Economic Cooperative Framework Agreement (ECFA) agreed upon by Beijing and Taipei has strengthened relations between the two entities (Jie 2012, 86). The TPP has the potential to undermine the economic importance between China and Tai-wan, and perhaps ominously halt rapport of cross-strait relations by offering Taiwan an opportunity to join the TPP. Although this is a untested viewpoint, this may inadvertently aggravate relations between the United States and China. The United States should take nothing to chance and be thorough in its assessment of the TPP negotiations. The intention of the TPP at the onset is just about trade. That much is true. However economics is inextricably linked and easily tied to politics. Re-member how containment of the USSR occurred? Economic meddling was fundamental to isolating the USSR, which included American assistance to allies and sanctions against the USSR and its allies. The situation today is much different. But Chinese fears that the TPP can easily morph into a political tool is not unrealistic. Assertions such as the United States would like to use the TPP to increase in-volvement in Asia-Pacific politics and replace Chi-na’s and Japan’s influence in the region is common-place in Chinese academic scholarship (Jie 2012, 88). To that end, the United States should continue to act in a manner that places trade as the only motive in the TPP. It is only by conducting nego-tiations that take into account other TPP members’ consideration and keeping the TPP process open and observable that the US can assuage China’s fears. It would be utterly counterproductive if the United States sought to turn the TPP into anything other than a high standard trade agreement it set out to be. Perhaps the best way of assuaging Chi-nese leaders’ and their people’s fear that the TPP is a “containment” effort is for the United States to continue to build trust with the Chinese govern-

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ment. This is of course not easy given the periodic volatility of the region and the two states constant suspicion of each other. But having each govern-ment’s officials continue to consult with one an-other and conducting foreign policy that takes into account each government’s position and interests could lay the foundations for greater trust between the US and China. How the TPP progresses will set the tone for US-China relations in the Asia Pacific region. At the moment it seems like there is a competi-tion in the sense that each the US and China are putting forth their own free trade agreements for the region. While the US is putting impetus into the TPP, China has not been quiet about it; China is also proposing a less rigorous free trade agree-ment, as mentioned above, called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP is envisioned to enhance market ac-cess with due consideration given to its members’ stages of economic development. This is likely to be appealing for ASEAN and other developing countries in the region, as opposed to the ‘no gold standard, no deal’ approach adopted by the WTO and the TPP (Pakpahan 2012). Although two types of trade agreements may give regional countries a choice to decide which agreement best aligns with their domestic aspiration, this “friendly competi-tion” between the US and China can easily morph into a real competition if regional conflicts surface. In addition, too many different trade agreements in the Asia Pacific region exacerbate the so-called ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect that is already inherent in the region and diminishes the prospect of Asian economic integration. It is hoped that either the US or China will drop their own initiative to give some focus to a single agreement, but this situation is naturally un-likely. Both want the most influence on how those free trade agreements transpire. Again, perhaps having alternatives would best serve the needs of other Asia Pacific countries. However,the US and China should not forget that other countries in the region are equally capable of making their presence and interests known, so as to not get enveloped in US-China - power struggles. What will happen in the region, one can only speculate. But this we should know: the TPP is not an effort to “contain” China. China and the US should see the Asia Pa-cific region not as an arena for competition, but an arena of cooperation.

Works CitedClinton, Hillary, America’s Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, (October 11, 2011). Das, Sanchita Basu, The Trans-Pacific Partnership as a tool to contain China: Myth or Reality?, ISEAS Perspective, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, (May 17, 2013). DePilis, Lydia, Everything you need to know about the Trans Pacific Partnership, The Washington Post, (December 11, 2013). Gordon, Bernard K., The Future of the Trans-Pacific Partner-ship, Council on Foreign Relations, (November 7, 2012). Flora, Liz, Complete Transcript: Thomas Donilon at Asia Soci-ety New York, Asia Society, (March 11, 2013). Hoadley, Stephen, Southeast Asian Cross-Regional FTAs: Origins, Motives and Aims, Public Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, East Asian Cross-Regionalism, (University of British Columbia), (Summer, 2007). Jie, Huang, TPP versus ECFA: Similarities, Differences and China’s Strategies, China Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, (China Uni-versity Press), (Fall, 2012). Li, Chunding, and Whalley, John, China and the TPP: A Numerical Simulation Assessment of the Effects Involved, The National Bureau of Economic Research, (NBER), (May, 2012). Li, Xiangyang, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A Major Challenge to China’s Rise, International Economic Review, (February, 2012).Matsuda, Yasuhiro, How to Understand China’s Assertiveness Since 2009: Hypotheses and Policy Implications, Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS), (April 2014).Meltzer, Joshua P., The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the environment and climate change, Brookings Institute. Pakpahan, Beginda, Will RCEP compete with the TPP?, East Asia Forum, (November 28, 2012).Pandey, Avaneesh, What Is The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Why Does it Matter?, International BusinessTimes, (November 10, 2014). Petri, Peter A., Plummer, Michael J., and Fan, Zhai, The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific Integration: A Quantitative Assessment, East-West Center, (October 24, 2011).Ruch, Grace, It Takes Two: Imports Increase As US Trade with Asia Grows, East-West Center, (July 25, 2011).Schott, Jeffrey. J, Kotschwar, Barbara, and Muir, Julia, Chapter 4: Sticking Points in the TPP Negotiations, Understanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Peterson Institute for International Economics, (January 1, 2013). Shen, Minghui, A Cost Benefit Analysis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP): A Chinese Perspective, Interna-tional Economic Review, (January, 2012). Solis, Mireya, The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP, Brookings Institute, (May 24, 2013). Trans-Pacific Partnership, Office of the United States Trade Representative.UN Comtrade Database, http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx.

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Guilin, China. Women at a tea plantation work hard under the hot sun picking leaves to produce high quality organic tea China. Photo by Jennifer Waldo ‘15

Shanghai, China: Tourists and locals congregate by the waterfront to admire the bright lights of The Bund. Photo by Jennifer Waldo ‘15

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On the morning of January 7, 2015, two gunmen forced their way into the office of the Parisian satirical weekly magazine Charlie Hebdo and shot and killed 12 people, injuring 11 others. Police later identified the two gunmen as Islamist terrorists, who targeted the staff of Charlie Hebdo in response to the magazine’s satirical content on Islam. The attack immediately led to national and worldwide panic and outrage, as people feared fur-ther violence, and were furious about the civilians that were killed. Demonstrations around the world identified with the slain reporters under the catch-phrase “Je Suis Charlie”. People from the West believe freedom of speech as a fundamental right, which must be protected, and that violence is not an acceptable response to any kind of perceived discrimination. However, there is another side to the story. While the attack on Charlie Hebdo was horrif-ic, there is a need to understand the roots of the conflict that kindled it in order to prevent future violence. The magazine has been notorious for publishing provocative images and articles that offend some of its readers. Previously, it was at the center of a controversy over its issue No 1011, titled “Charia Hebdo”, which featured a cartoon depicting the prophet of Islam Muhammad, and while this might be written off as edgy satire in most places, many Muslims perceived it as being a blasphemic insult and felt that their religion was being parodied. There is a very thin line between satire and offense, and Charlie Hebdo has toed - and possi-ble crossed - this line for years. From the view of many people the content of the magazine has taken a critical look at issues of culture and used satire as a civil form of protest against religion, politics and culture. However, not everyone shares this view of the magazine. Almost 10% of the French popula-tion is Muslim, and are often the target of satirical articles. This leads to the ongoing discussion of whether free speech should be constrained if it causes offence or harm. This problem goes far past issues of free speech however, and has also begun to extend into politics. The issue of Muslim faith in France, has been highly politicized for many years, and has recently become even more controversial. Islam-

Charlie Hebdo ophobia has emerged as a major problem in the country, as reflected by the increase of the vandal-ization of mosques and desecrations of Muslim graves. The wearing of the veil (hijab) by Muslim women and girls is prohibited under the French law that forbids any visible sign of religion in public schools. France’s extreme secularism comes into direct conflict with all religions within the coun-try, and especially with many Muslim’s desire to demonstrate their faith outwardly in public. In the last few years France has begun to undergo a shift in politics, with the far right Front National Party winning seats in the Senate. The party expresses extreme anti-immigration views and has even gone so far as to attempt to block construction of any new mosques. The stereotyping of Muslims in France is widespread as evidenced by a 2013 survey con-ducted by the French newspaper Le Monde which found that three out of every four respondents believed Islam was an ‘intolerant’ religion. Despite this negative attitude towards Muslims, “[t]he majority of Muslims feel a huge solidarity with the people who were killed, and they’re saying we feel this way as French [people], not only as Muslims,” said Amel Boubekeur, a researcher with the Ger-man Institute for International and Security Affairs who specializes on Islam in Europe. Muslim communities around the world have been targeted because of their religion. There have been gross stereotypings of people who prac-tice Islam in the media by people like the promi-nent American author and philosopher Sam Harris who believes that Islam is a religion that promotes violence. This stereotype is an extreme mispercep-tion of the religion based on the actions of a few radical extremists. As a result of attacks like the one on Charlie Hebdo, millions of peaceful Mus-lims have been equated with the few people who have caused violence. This attack has painted the entire Muslim community of France as one that will use violence as a means to an end. In times of fear, the most extreme actions become the norm, and in this case, the actions of a few have stigmatized the percep-tions of many. An entire religious community has been stereotyped, and this has and will lead to more fear, which could incite even more tension and hatred. It is time to take a deeper look at these prej-udices and begin a meaningful dialogue in order to live together in peace and with respect for one another.

Tamar Shuhendler ‘17

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Nice, France: The view that awaits those who make the hike up to the top of Parc de la Colline du Chateau. Photo by Eva Goellner ‘16

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