MCWP 3-23 Offensive Air Support.pdf

MCWP 3-23

Offensive Air Support

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 143 000086 00

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Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes thatwill improve it. Recommendations may be sent directly to Commanding General, MarineCorps Combat Development Command, Doctrine Division (C 42), 3300 Russell Road, Suite318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021 or by fax to 703-784-2917 (DSN 278-2917) or by E-mail [email protected]. Recommendations should include the following information:

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Additional copies: A printed copy of this publication may be obtained from Marine CorpsLogistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600,Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from theDoctrine Division, MCCDC, world wide web home page which is found at the following uni-versal reference locator: http://www.doctrine.usmc.mil.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

30 May 2001

FOREWORD

Marine aviation traces its origin to 1912, when First Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunninghamreported for naval aviation training. By 1914 Marines had started using aircraft andwould see Marine aviation flying its first combat missions during the ending months ofWorld War I. Through operations in Nicaragua, Haiti, China, World War II, Korea,Vietnam, and Southwest Asia, Marine aviation has distinguished itself as a formidablecontributor to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) combined arms team.

This publication focuses on the Marine Corps philosophy of command and control,planning, operations, and emerging concepts and capabilities for commanders and staffofficers who are responsible for planning and executing offensive air supportoperations. Offensive air support doctrine first began within the Marine Corps in 1935when the Tentative Landing Operations Manual was published and has developed overthe past 65 years into today’s Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-23,Offensive Air Support. This doctrine does not discuss the specifics of unit-level tacticsand procedures. It provides insight as to how Marine aviation is used to shape the deep,close, and rear battlespace as an integrated combat arm of the MAGTF.

This publication supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-40, Offensive AirSupport, dated 27 March 1992.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

DISTRIBUTION: 143 000086 00

B. B. KNUTSON, JR. Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding GeneralMarine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

Offensive Air Support ______________________________________________________________________________________ iii

OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT

Table of Contents

Page

Chapter 1. Historical Perspective of Offensive Air Support

Chapter 2. Offensive Air Support in Marine Aviation

Offensive Air Support in MAGTF Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1Effects of Offensive Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Neutralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2Deep Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Requirements for Effective Offensive Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3Air Superiority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Cooperative Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Effective Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Effective Marking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Effective Weaponeering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Capable Platforms/Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5Flexible Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5Prompt Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Mission Classification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5Preplanned Missions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Immediate Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Chapter 3. Command and Control

Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Airspace Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Terminal Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Marine Air Command and Control System Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Airspace Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Airspace Control Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Airspace Control Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Special Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Command and Control Required to Phase Control Ashore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4Joint Force Command and Control Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

iv __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

Chapter 4. Planning

Planning Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1Future Plans Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2Future Operations Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2Current Operations Section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2Operational Planning Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

MAGTF Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3Aviation Combat Element Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Targeting Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7Four-Step Process (USMC, USA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

Step 1. Decide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8Step 2. Detect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8Step 3. Deliver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8Step 4. Assess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9

Six-Step Process (Joint, USN, USAF). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9Step 1. Objectives and Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9Step 2. Target Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9Step 3. Weaponeering Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10Step 4. Force Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10Step 5. Execution Planning/Force Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11Step 6. Combat Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11

Air Tasking Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11MAGTF Air Tasking Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12Joint Air Tasking Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18

Chapter 5. Operations

Intelligence Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1Threat Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1Support Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Fighter Escort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3Tankers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4Reconnaissance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4Operations Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

Capabilities and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Reactive Weaponeering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

En Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7Ingress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7Egress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Deep Air Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8Basing Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9

Offensive Air Support _______________________________________________________________________________________ v

Military Operations Other Than War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9Joint and Multinational Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10Offensive Air Support in Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10

Amphibious Assaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10Amphibious Raids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11Amphibious Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11Amphibious Withdrawals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Chapter 6. Emerging Concepts and Capabilities

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1Joint Strike Fighter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Target Location Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2Reasonable Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2Nonfixed or Mobile Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Theater Battle Management Core System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2Target Location, Designation, and Hand-Off System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Appendices

A Ordnance Selection Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-1B Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1C Joint Tactical Air Strike Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1D Damage Criterion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .D-1E Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1F References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1

CHAPTER 1. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT

Although the Marines started using aircraft as early as 1914, technology advancesleading to offensive air support (OAS) did not come about until World War II.The ending months of World War I saw the Marine Corps flying combat missionsfrom France. A shortage of Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots and surplus of RAFaircraft led to a beneficial partnership between the RAF and the Marines. TheRAF and Marine squadrons operated along side each other in support of theBritish and Belgian ground forces that were gathering momentum against thecrumbling German army. Their general mission assigned by General Pershingwas to attack any rear-area targets that might hinder the Germans retreat. By theend of the war, 1st Marine Aviation Force, in its brief period of action, had lost4-dead, shot down 12 Germans, and flown 57 bombing missions.

During the interwar years, OAS began to becomeintegral to Marine Corps operations. In the air overHaiti, the Dominican Republic, China, and Nicaragua,Marine aviation assisted the ground operations, notonly in combat, but also in reconnaissance, trans-portation, and supply. Close air support (CAS) becamemore effective due to dive bombing techniques andweaponeering. By trial and error, Marine aviationworked out basic tactics for CAS. By the end of the1920s, the Marine air-ground team had become areality. Major Roy Geiger and Colonel Rowelloversaw aviation operations as the Tentative LandingOperations Manual was published in 1935. In thathistoric document, Marine aviation’s doctrine forreconnaissance, fighter escort, protection of thelanding forces, artillery spotting, and CAS wasformally established as the aviation units’ respon-sibilities. The General Board of the Navy restated theMarine air’s mission in 1939 to support the FleetMarine Force (FMF) in amphibious landing operationsand to support the troops once they had passed thebeachhead. Marine aviation was to provide backupsquadrons for the Navy’s regular carrier squadrons.

When the United States entered World War II, theaviation doctrine developed at Quantico was usedduring the amphibious landings throughout thePacific. OAS was performed time and again byforward-based aircraft of the Cactus Air Force onGuadalcanal in support of Marines on the ground.Unfortunately, Marine aviation resources (aircraft,aircrews, and support) had become so heavilyinvolved with antiair warfare (AAW) and airinterdiction (AI) missions of land-based air power that

their original purpose, providing CAS for the men onthe ground, had been subordinated if not completelyforgotten. Marine aviation involved in action againstground targets during the early stages of action,seemed to be used against selected targets, as opposedto ground liaison-directed attacks against Japanesetroops or fortifications immediately impeding anadvance. Marines were given their targets beforeleaving the ground, v ice rece iv ing a i rborneinstructions characteristic of CAS missions.

In February 1945, Marine CAS finally arrived duringthe drive to the Philippine capital of Manila, where theMarine SBD Dauntlesses were directed to provideCAS 20 to 30 miles ahead and behind the Sixth Army.These patrolling aircraft were available to support im-mediate CAS missions requested by the advancingground forces. Development in CAS TTPs continuedduring the Philippine campaign with the use of radiocommunications to call in napalm attacks. A singlevery high frequency (VHF) channel could not carry allthe traffic and the Marines switched to medium-fre-quency channels and napalm became one of the mostsuccessful weapons in the Philippines.

By 1950, Marine aviation was experiencing two majordevelopments that would shape its foreseeable future:the advent of the jet and the helicopter. Carriers fromwhich the fighters operated allowed more fuel andmore on-station time; however, the short-legged jetscould not loiter above the battlefield as compared to thepropeller driven F4U Corsairs. AI missions werebeginning to be dominated by the jet aircraft because oftheir range and speed. CAS and armed reconnaissance

1-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

(AR) missions were still primarily tasked to theCorsairs due to their capability to remain on station forlonger periods of time.

Korea saw the maturation of OAS both in the Pusanperimeter and operations in the landing at Inchon.Rockets and napalm were an effective combination forCAS missions ahead of Marines and Army troops onthe ground during these early operations. As the actionshifted inland and met stiffer resistance, antitankstrikes with napalm, bombs, and rockets inundated theNorth Korean T-34 tanks.

During the Chosin Reservoir campaign, Marine CASunder forward air control had become an acceptedtool. Forward operating bases reduced response timesand allowed greater time on station for CAS and ARmissions. Deep air support (DAS) missions cut offChinese resupply routes and bridges and disruptedenemy concentrations and supply areas vital to thesuccess of the ground forces.

Vietnam introduced the attack helicopters for use inOAS missions. AH-1 Hueycobras, the first designed-for-the-purpose gunships to be placed in production,initially flew fire-support and armed reconnaissancemissions. The Cobras later operated from amphibioustransport docks (LPDs) against enemy ferry and bargetraffic, providing both forward air controller (airborne)(FAC[A]) and CAS sorties.

The Marine tactical air direction center (TADC)established at DaNang, with subordinate organizationsof the tactical air operations center (TAOC) and directair support center (DASC), represented a quantumleap in command and control (C2) of aircraft for theMarines. “Hot pad” alert and airborne alert CASaircraft with tanker support provided the ground com-manders a continuous supply of aircraft through theMarine air command and control system (MACCS).

Other additions to OAS capabilities that came near theend of Vietnam were the introduction of the EA-6AProwler, A6-A Intruder, and precision-guidedweapons. The Prowlers became vital to OAS missionsby suppressing new threat systems like the SA-2 toprovide suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) forthe s t r ike packages . The In t ruders providedcommanders a true all-weather, day and night AIcapability. The introduction of electro-optical and

laser-guided bombs (LGBs) aided in economy offorce. These highly accurate weapons increasedmission success rates while reducing the number ofaircraft required to destroy or neutralize targets.

Significant technological advances since the end of theVietnam era have contributed to more effective andefficient capabilities in Marine aviation. The use ofthis new, sophisticated technology: air-to-groundradar, forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensors,precision-guided munitions, Airborne Warning andControl System (AWACS) and targeting platforms,demonstrated new OAS capabilities available tocommanders for shaping the battlespace. Improvedcommunication systems have allowed the commanderto obtain real- or near-real-time information forformulating decisive actions to create an environmentin which the enemies either lose their physicalcapability or their will to resist.

Marine aviation performed different types of OASmissions during Desert Storm. For example: AH-1WCobras provided CAS by knocking out Iraqi tanks andarmored personnel carriers; F/A-18Ds performed“Fast FAC” missions by marking targets in “killboxes” for other OAS aircraft; and other F/A-18s,A-6Es, and AV-8Bs performed long range strikes, AR,and CAS missions.

Since the end of the Gulf War, Marine aviationcont inues to provide OAS to the jo in t forcecommander (JFC) and MAGTF commander inmilitary operations. The continuing advance of smartweapons technology and tactics provides greateraircraft standoff ranges to the enemy’s surface to airthreat while minimizing ordnance inaccuracies to hitthe target. Operations Restore Hope in Somalia in1992, Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995,Operation Desert Fox in Iraq in 1998, and OperationAllied Force in Kosovo in 1999 are all militaryoperations other than war (MOOTW) where MarineCorps OAS has been applied.

OAS missions in Operation Desert Fox saw the firstemployment of global positioning system (GPS)weapons such as the joint standoff weapon (JSOW) byMarine aviation. The joint direct attack munition(JDAM) was successfully employed for the first timeas recently as February 2000 by Marines whileoperating in Operation Southern Watch over Iraq.

Offensive Air Support _____________________________________________________________________________________ 1-3

As one of the six functions of Marine aviation, OASprovides the JFC and MAGTF commander theflexibility to conduct operations when and where theychoose to shape the battlespace. Even though more

recent conflicts have supported MOOTW whereground forces are not employed, Marine aviation isstill used as it was envisioned in 1914, to provide a fullspectrum offensive capability.

CHAPTER 2. OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT IN MARINE AVIATION

Modern tactics facilitate the use of combined arms. They combine the effects ofvarious arms-infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation to achieve the greatestpossible effect against the enemy. The strengths of the arms complement andreinforce each other. At the same time, the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of eacharm are protected or offset by the capabilities of the other. (Extracted from MarineCorps Doctrinal Publication [MCDP] 1-3, Tactics)

OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORTIN MAGTF OPERATIONS

Combined arms operations are central to the MarineCorps’ maneuver warfare philosophy. The MAGTF’sorganization exploits the synergy inherent in closelyintegrated air and ground operations, generatingmaximum combat power in the area of operations.Combined arms present the enemy not merely with aproblem, but with a dilemma—a no win situation. Thecommander combines supporting arms, organic fires,and maneuver in such a way that any action the enemytakes to avoid one threat makes him more vulnerableto another.

Single battle concept allows the commander toeffectively focus the efforts of all the elements of theforce to accomplish his mission. Under the singlebattle concept, the area of operations consists of threemajor areas - deep, close, and rear. To orchestrateactions throughout the area of operations, thecommander must determine what, where, when, andhow to apply OAS in MAGTF operations.

OAS involves “those air operations conducted againstenemy installations, facilities, and personnel todirectly assist in the attainment of MAGTF objectivesthrough the destruction of enemy resources or by theisolation of the enemy’s military forces” (MarineCorps Reference Publication [MCRP] 5-12C, MarineCorps Supplement to the Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms). TheMAGTF commander uses OAS to shape thebattlespace for future operations, create windows ofopportunity for decisive action, restrict the enemy’sfreedom of action, and disrupt the cohesion and tempoof the enemy’s operations.

The MAGTF exemplifies a balanced combined armsteam. For example, during Desert Storm, 1st MarineDivision began a series of “roving gun” artillery raids,firing on suspected enemy positions in Kuwait. Theseraids were designed to provoke an enemy reaction,with aerial observers, tactical air on station, andartillery waiting to engage the Iraqis should they comeout of their fortified positions.

EA-6Bs protected Marine arti l lery from Iraqicounterbattery fire by providing jamming. As Iraqiartillery returned fire, their positions became exposedto aerial observers, who then marked the target forMarine artillery, F/A-18s, and AV-8Bs. These raidswere very successful in keeping the Iraqis off balanceand presented them a dilemma—a no win situation—return fire and become exposed to OAS aircraft andartillery counterbattery fire or do nothing.

As one of the six functions of Marine aviation, OASprovides the MAGTF commander the capability toproject firepower to shape the events in time and spaceto influence the battle. See figure 2-1, page 2-2.

EFFECTS OF OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT

OAS allows the commander to shape the deep, close,and rear battlespace and ultimately results in the pro-tection of the forces by delaying enemy reinforce-ments, degrading critical enemy functions, andmanipulating enemy perceptions. OAS operations de-liver firepower against selected enemy targets and ca-pabilities to directly assist in the attainment ofMAGTF objectives by destroying enemy resources orisolating the enemy. Neutralization and destruction arethe principal effects achieved by OAS operations.

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Neutralization

Neutralization effects of OAS missions render areasand weapons ineffective or delay enemy forces for aspecified period of time. These missions provide tem-porary neutralization of hostile fires and can protectfriendly forces during movement. Other missions caninclude attacks against installations or areas the enemyuses to support his combat activity.

Destruction

The destructive effects of OAS missions destroy ene-my forces, equipment, supplies, and installations.They are of primary interest to the MAGTF command-er. Due to the number of sorties and amount/types ofordnance required, total destruction of enemy forces,equipment, supplies, and installations is hard toachieve. Destruction missions are therefore reservedfor high priority targets.

CATEGORIES

The MAGTF’s single-battle concept exploits thecombined-arms nature of MAGTF operations. The ca-pabilities of OAS, including its speed, range, and mo-bility, provide the necessary aviation based fires tosupport committed maneuver units and shape the bat-tlespace to enable decisive MAGTF operations. Its pri-mary support of warfighting functions is providedthrough CAS and DAS. The degree of coordinationwith MAGTF units determines the OAS categories.

Close Air Support

CAS is air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraftagainst hostile targets that are in close proximity tofriendly forces and which require detailed integrationof each air mission with the fire and movement ofthose forces (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02). This de-tailed integration is accomplished using positive con-trol . Posit ive control is provided by terminalcontrollers, i.e., FACs or FACs (airborne) (FAC[A]s).

Deep Air Support

DAS is air action against enemy targets at such a dis-tance from friendly forces that detailed integration ofeach mission with fire and movement of friendly forc-es is not required. Deep air support missions are flownon either side of the fire support coordination line; thelack of a requirement for close coordination with thefire and movement of friendly forces is the qualifyingfactor (MCRP 5-12C). DAS missions include AI, AR,and strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR).See figure 2-2.

Air Interdiction MissionsAI missions destroy, neutralize or delay the enemy’smilitary potential before it can be brought to bear ef-fectively against friendly forces. These missions re-

Figure 2-1. Six Functions of Marine Aviation and Subcategories of OAS.

Figure 2-2. DAS Missions.


spond to known targets briefed in advance. AI usuallyinvolves the employment of large strike packagesagainst targets such as command, control, and commu-nication (C3) nodes, bridges, railways, etc. AI deniesthe enemy the use of a particular area, route or facility.AI can neutralize, destroy, or even delay the enemy’smilitary potential before it is brought to bear againstfriendly forces. The particular mission will determineAI support requirements. AR, electronic warfare(EW), SEAD, airborne early warning (AEW), and tac-tical air-launched decoys (TALDs) are support re-quirements that may be involved in the planning andexecution of a successful AI mission.

Armed Reconnaissance MissionsAR missions locate and attack targets of opportunity(i.e., enemy materiel, personnel, and facilities) in as-signed areas. AR differs from AI because AR target’slocations are not known or briefed in advance. ARprovides the MAGTF commander an economy offorce to cover and defend terrain not suited to otherforces and—

l Identifies enemy forces and engages them beforethey can threaten MAGTF forces.

l Denies the enemy undetected movement and use ofkey terrain.

l Provides timely warning of enemy intentions orattacks.

l Prevents or degrades the enemy’s mobility.

l Collects and reports high-value information on theenemy’s disposition.

l Covers large areas of open terrain by observationand fire.

Fire support coordinating measures protect armedreconnaissance aircraft from friendly fire. Armedreconnaissance missions do not exclude othersupporting fires from the sector in which they operate.If supporting arms are necessary, the DASC, firesupport coordination center (FSCC), and/or the forcefires coordination center (FFCC) conduct thenecessary coordination.

Strike Coordination andReconnaissance MissionsSCAR missions are closely linked with AR missions.SCAR missions acquire, report, and coordinate the de-

struction of targets. SCAR aircraft may discover ene-my targets and provide a target mark or talk-on forother AR missions or accurately locate targets for AImissions. SCAR missions can be flown by any AR air-craft that has been assigned an area to coordinate theattacks of other DAS flights. During Desert Storm, F/A-18Ds served as SCAR platforms by coordinatingAR missions to attack targets in “kill boxes.”

Some planning considerations for SCAR missions are:

l Does not require a FAC(A) qualification or terminalcontrol.

l SCAR missions can be performed by any type ofaircraft capable of executing AR missions.

l May provide target, location, description, threat,and area weather.

l Prevents redundant targeting.

l Confirms or locates surface to air threats.

l Assist with bomb or battle damage assessment(BDA).

l Assists the MACCS in the flow of aircraft throughradio relay.

l Generally different from a reconnaissance missionin that SCAR missions locate and coordinate targetdestruction and will typically be armed withmunitions and systems that better enhance targetdesignation.

See MCWP 3-23.1, Close Air Support, and MCWP3-23.2, Deep Air Support, for more information.

REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT

Effective OAS planning and execution revolve arounda few basic requirements to achieve desired missionresults. When any one or any combination of theserequirements is omitted, mission results may not be aseffective. For example, an OAS aircraft may be shotdown or may miss the target due to the inability tosuppress the enemy’s air defenses. The aviationcombat element (ACE) may be conducting OAS, butat what risk or to what effect? The requirements foreffective OAS are as follows.

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Air Superiority

To attain air superiority, efforts must be made to createan operating area that allows attack aircraft toprosecute targets without prohibitive interference fromenemy fighter aircraft. This can be achieved byconducting an aggressive antiwar warfare (AAW)operation prior to conducting OAS or by taskingaircraft as fighter escort during OAS operations. It isimperative that the MAGTF ground combat element(GCE) understands why air superiority is important. Ifthe enemy can interfere with our attack aircraft bylaunching fighters, then they can potentially launchattack aircraft against our GCE.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SEAD is important in that it can create a “relativesanctuary” that enables attack aircraft to concentrateon killing targets vice self-protection. Traditionally,the perception of SEAD responsibilities have fallenupon artillery. While artillery is well suited in thisrole, ACE planners must plan for SEAD requirementswhen indirect fire assets may not be available, i.e.; in-terdiction missions beyond the range of organic artil-lery/mortars. High-speed antiradiation missiles(HARMs), imbedded suppression, joint weapons(J-weapons), and jamming (EA-6B) should all be con-sidered when addressing the SEAD effort.

Cooperative Weather

The greatest air superiority and SEAD campaign canbe executed, and prohibitive interference or unaccept-able attrition can still be experienced if low ceilingsforce attack aircraft to prosecute targets “under theweather.” From 1950 to the present, 85 percent of air-craft combat attrition can be directly attributed to anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Aircraft forced to low altitudeare in the heart of the AAA envelope. Inclementweather can negatively influence more than friendlyattrition. Target acquisition, aircraft sensor perfor-mance, laser attenuation, and terminal control can beaffected by inclement weather. Planners must look atavailable OAS assets, be knowledgeable of their capa-bilities and limitations, and optimize the way in whichthey employ them.

Effective Targeting

By their very nature, fixed targets are generally lessdifficult to effectively target, mark, and attack thanmobile targets. Whether attacking fixed or mobiletargets, a detailed pre-mission targeting effort iscritical to the effectiveness of the attack. This isespecially critical for mobile and time-sensitivetargets. Based on the nature of mobile targets,collection assets must be optimized to provide themost updated and quality location information on atarget. The overall MAGTF collection plan mustencompass and be integrated with the overall MAGTFtargeting plan and priorities. Priorities of MAGTForganic and nonorganic collection assets must focuson the targeting priorities within the MAGTFbattlespace. Focusing the collection assets targetingpriorities also focuses the terminal control assets andmarking capabilities across the MAGTF battlespace.The MAGTF will always plan to use FAC(A)s andSCAR aircraft to optimize the effects of the attackaircraft on a target.

Effective Marking

Effective marking aids in the proper identification andlocation of targets to prevent fratricide, and greatlyincreases the probability of a hit/kill. For fixed targets,the availability of imagery, photographs, detailedmaps, and precise coordinates will increase thelikelihood of mission success. This type of data maybe provided by organic assets within the Marine Corpsor may require the use of joint or national assets.Reactive targeting will usually require a mark to aid intarget acquisition. To facilitate strike aircraft targetacquisition, a number of marking methods arecurrently available. FACs, FAC(A)s, and SCARaircraft should strive to provide the most accurate andreliable marking method for the situation. The use ofredundant marks is highly recommended. In additionto the use of traditional marks (e.g., smoke, whitephosphorous), recent developments have made use oflaser, infrared, and GPS technology to acquire targets.

Effective Weaponeering

Effective aircraft and weapon to target match must beevaluated and implemented to achieve an economy offorce in attacking targets in the battlespace. Seeappendix A, Ordnance Selection Guide.


Capable Platforms/Sensors

To increase the probability for a successful targeta t t a c k , t h e d e l i v e r y p l a t f o r m n e e d s t o b etechnologically advanced. Historically, the mostdifficult task associated with the majority of OASmissions has been target acquisition. Attack platformsneed accurate weapon systems and sensor equipmentto aid in target acquisition/designation in day andnight operations. These new systems include nighttargeting FLIRs, infrared (IR) pointers, generation IIInight vision devices (NVD’s), 10-digit GPS targetingaccuracy, precise laser designators, trackers, rangefinders and precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Seeappendix B, Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities Guide.

Flexible Control

A responsive C3 system is required to ensure thatproper OAS customers get what they need and whenthey need it. Tactical airborne controllers (TAC[A]s),FAC(A)s and deep reconnaissance and targetingplatforms should be provided whenever possible andtactically feasible. The increased situational awarenesswill yield great dividends. Positive information flow,both ways, with a simple and redundant back-up planis the key to successful control.

Prompt Response

OAS must be timely to be successful. The techniquesavailable to reduce response time can be grouped intothree categories: basing posture, alert states, and mis-sion classification.

Forward BasingForward basing reduces the transit time to and fromthe battlespace, and also allows attack aircraft moretime on station. Forward basing will, however, incurboth logistical and security requirements.

Alert States This is a “queuing” system that directs aircraft to beable to take-off in 60, 30, 15 or 5 minutes. As the C3system receives requests for OAS, the alert states canbe upgraded to provide OAS as requi red bybattlespace conditions. Airborne alerts may beutilized. This represents the fastest response time, butalso potentially the greatest wear on assets.

Mission Classification

The classification of the OAS mission will directlyimpact the timeliness of the support. Preplannedscheduled missions will occur at the planned time ontarget (TOT). On-call missions will be dependent onthe alert state from which the asset was launched.Immediate mission response times will vary based onthe distance the asset was diverted from the target area.

MISSION CLASSIFICATION

The ACE executes OAS missions as either preplannedor immediate air support. The ACE executes bothtypes of support in response to specific requests.Requesting units submit a joint tactical air strikerequest (JTAR) via the FSCC for preplanned missions.Requests require approval at each level. Afterapproval, the FSCC sends the request to the ACE (viathe Marine TACC) for planning and execution. Asample JTAR is provided in appendix C. Forimmediate missions, requesting units normally contactthe DASC directly by radio on the tactical air requestnet/helicopter request net. Silence by the FSCCsindicates consent for immediate missions. Tominimize response time to the MAGTF’s direct airsupport requirements, the TACC may delegate launch/divert authority to the DASC. The type of requestdetermines the type of support. The ACE also executesOAS missions based on direction received from theMAGTF FFCC through the TACC.

The battlespace shaping matrix and the reactive attackguidance matrix are two tools produced by the FFCCthat a id the TACC in process ing JTARs andimmediate mission requests. These missions resultfrom the MAGTF current fires section and the TACCexecuting reactive targeting on primarily mobiletargets identified in planning. These targets arepredominately in the deep battlespace and have a moreclearly identified location based on current collectiondata. In this way, the MAGTF uses OAS in a flexibleenough manner to attack the appropriate targets basedon the current situation. See MCWP 3-25.5, Direct AirSupport Center Handbook, for more information onprocessing JTARs and immediate air support requests.

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Preplanned Missions

Preplanned air support is in accordance with aprogram and planned in advance of operations.Preplanned missions are either scheduled or on-call.

Scheduled Prepared scheduled missions are executed at a specifictime against a specific target at a known location.Scheduled missions allow aircrew to conduct detailedplanning. Weapons loadout, flight composition, andflight profiles are optimized to maximize missionsuccess. Scheduled missions provide the mosteconomical use of aircraft and ordnance.

On-Call Preplanned on-call missions involve aircraft that arepreloaded for a particular target or array of targets andtarget area and placed in an appropriate ground/airalert status. Aircrew can conduct mission planningbased on the information that is available, but not tothe same detail of a scheduled mission. On-callmissions allow the requesting commander to employOAS assets as the tactical requirement arises based onprior mission analysis.

Immediate Missions

Immediate missions meet requests that arise duringbattle, strike unanticipated targets, and are generallyurgent in nature. Immediate missions cannot be identi-

fied far enough in advance to permit detailed missioncoordination and planning. Aviation assets are divert-ed from other missions via the MACCS to execute im-mediate requests. Although the diverted aircraft maynot be carrying the optimal ordnance load to prosecutethe specific target set, a swift attack can exploit an un-expected enemy weakness or maintain the momentumof an attack.

SUMMARY

OAS is one method MAGTF commanders can employtheir MAGTF combined arms team to shape thebattlespace (deep, close, and rear). Its primary supportof the warfighting functions is to provide the MAGTFfires and force protection through neutralization anddestruction. OAS is subdivided into two categories;CAS and DAS. CAS missions require detailedintegration of each air mission with the fire andmovement of friendly forces. DAS missions lack therequirement for detailed integration with the fire andmovement of friendly forces and comprise of AI, AR,and SCAR missions. OAS missions can be affected byone or any combination of requirements discussed inthis chapter. Preplanned and immediate air support aretwo types of OAS mission classifications that canaffect the timeliness of support.

CHAPTER 3. COMMAND AND CONTROL

MAGTF commanders will retain operational control of their organic air assets.The primary mission of the MAGTF aviation combat element (ACE) is the sup-port of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air as-sets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTFcommander will make sorties available to the JFC, for tasking through the jointforce air component commander (JFACC), for air defense, long-range interdic-tion, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct supportrequirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC for thesupport of other components of the joint force or the joint force as a whole.

Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the theater or JFC in the exerciseof operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts (e.g., the reapportion-ment and/or reallocation of any MAGTF tactical air [TACAIR] sorties when it hasbeen determined by the JFC that they are required for higher priority missions),and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of ef-fort in accomplishment of his overall mission or to maintain integrity of the force.(Extracted from JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces [UNAAF])

In OAS operations, as with all MAGTF operations, theC2 system is used to build a comprehensive picture ofthe battlespace. The principal objectives of theMACCS are to enhance unity of effort, integrate ele-ments of the C2, and help maintain the commander’ssituational awareness. From this situational awareness,commanders and operators involved in the planningand execution of OAS operations are able to make de-cisions regarding the actions needed to force the ene-my to do our will. This chapter reviews C2 methods,resources, and measures used to facilitate the MAGTFand ACE commander in making decisions needed foreffective and efficient conduct of OAS operations.

COMMAND

MAGTF commanders are the individuals responsiblefor the conduct and operations of forces under theircommand. A MAGTF consists of a command element,ACE, GCE, and combat service support element(CSSE), each with its own commander.

The ACE commander is responsible to the MAGTFcommander for the conduct of OAS operations. Otherelement commanders provide support to the ACEcommander in the form of planning, resources, andlogistic support necessary to conduct OAS operations.

The involvement of all element commanders in theplanning and conduct of OAS operations is necessaryto lend unity of effort to the MAGTF.

ACE commanders normally delegate authority for thedetailed planning and execution of OAS operations totheir MACCS. From their command post at the tacticalair command center (TACC), ACE commanders ortheir designated authorities provide centralized com-mand and decentralized control over the execution ofOAS operations.

CONTROL

Varying degrees of control and operations can existwithin OAS and are dependent on each particular situ-ation. The MAGTF commander’s guidance establishesprecise guidelines for control. The MACCS uses airdirection and air control to control OAS aircraft withina designated area.

l Air direction is the authority to regulate the employ-ment of air resources. Air direction balances an airresource’s availability against its assigned prioritiesand missions.

l Air control is the authority to direct the physicalmaneuvering of aircraft in flight or to direct an air-

3-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

craft to engage a specific target. Air control is com-posed of airspace control and terminal control.

Airspace Control

Airspace control directs the maneuver of aircraft to useavailable airspace effectively. Positive control, proce-dural control or a combination of positive and proce-dural control is used when conducting OAS operations.

Terminal Control

Terminal control directs the delivery of ordnance inthe target area for OAS aircraft and facilitates the de-tailed integration with the fire and movement offriendly forces. The two types of weapons release au-thority during the final attack portion of OAS missionsare positive control and reasonable assurance.

Positive Control Positive control will be used to the maximum extentpossible. Two forms of positive control used by groundcommanders during CAS missions are direct and indi-rect control prior to aircraft employing ordnance.

Reasonable Assurance Reasonable assurance is a circumstance in which thesupported ground commander assumes an acceptablelevel of risk in allowing aircrews to attack targets byreleasing ordnance without positive control duringCAS missions. Having the target in sight and identi-fied may be one of the requirements to operate underreasonable assurance. The MAGTF commander estab-lishes the procedures for situations where reasonableassurance may be used.

Marine Air Command and Control System Coordination

The ACE commander uses the MACCS to plan and di-rect ACE operations and to employ aviation assets in aresponsive, timely, and effective manner.

The MACCS gives the ACE commander the ability toexercise centralized command and decentralized con-trol of MAGTF air assets and operations. The MACCSallows interface of MAGTF air with joint or combinedoperations. The MACCS is an air C2 system, which

provides the ACE commander the means to command,coordinate, and control air operations within an as-signed sector as directed by the JFC or MAGTF com-mander. It also allows the ACE commander tocoordinate air operations with other Services.

The MACCS consists of various air C2 agencies de-signed to provide the ACE commander with the abilityto monitor, supervise, and influence the application ofMarine aviation’s six functions. The Marine air con-trol group (MACG) is responsible for providing, oper-ating, and maintaining principal MACCS agencies.

The ACE commander plans, directs, and coordinatesall aspects of aviation employment to exercise central-ized command. Decentralized control is the control ofaviation assets by MACCS agencies responsive to theACE commander and the dynamic changes in the bat-tlespace. Those MACCS agencies that OAS missionswill usually interface with are the DASC, the tacticalair control party (TACP), and the TAOC.

Dependent on the situation, OAS aircraft may inter-face with airborne control agencies such as the tacticalair coordinator (airborne) TAC(A), assault support co-ordinator (airborne) ASC(A) or FAC(A). Seefigure 3-1. A detailed description of these controlagencies and the philosophy of control of aircraft andmissiles are found in MCDP 6, Command and Con-trol, MCWP 3-23.1, MCWP 3-23.2, MCWP 3-25,Control of Aircraft and Missiles, MCWP 3-25.3,MACCS Handbook, and MCWP 3-25.5.

AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES

Airspace control measures increase operational effec-tiveness. They also increase OAS effectiveness by en-suring the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace.Airspace control measures speed the handling of airtraffic within the area of operations.

Air C2 systems use airspace control measures to helpcontrol the movement of OAS aircraft over the bat-tlespace. Airspace control measures are not mandatoryor necessary for all missions.


The airspace control authority (ACA) is delegated bythe JFC or MAGTF commander to assume overall re-sponsibility for the operation of the airspace controlsystem in the area of operations (AO). The MACCSexecutes the positive and procedural control of aircraftas published by the ACA in the airspace control plan(ACP), airspace control orders (ACOs), and special in-structions (SPINS).

Marine doctrine stresses blending positive and proce-dural control as appropriate to control its airspace.Where positive control relies on positive identifica-tion, tracking, and direction of aircraft within an air-space by electronic means, procedural control relies ona combination of previously agreed upon and promul-gated orders and procedures (extracted from JP 1-02).The three important control documents are depicted infigure 3-2.

Airspace Control Plan

ACP is a document that provides specific planningguidance and procedures for the airspace control sys-tem for the area of responsibility/joint operations area.

Airspace Control Order

ACO is an order implementing the ACP that providesthe details of the approved requests of airspace controlmeasures. ACO is published as part of the air taskingorder (ATO) or as a separate document.

Figure 3-2. Air Control Documents.

Figure 3-1. MACCS Organization.

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Special Instructions

SPINS are published with the ATO and contain infor-mation reflecting specific time periods throughout theATO cycle in which the air control measures identi-fied in the airspace control plan and ACOs are to beactivated. It can also contain updates to the rules of en-gagement, standard conventional loads, and identifica-tion criteria.

OAS operations require different forms of airspaceand terminal control measures that are unique to CASand DAS. Procedures for CAS are going to be differ-ent than those required for AR or SCAR missions. Formore detailed information on airspace and terminalcontrol measures specific to OAS missions, refer toMCWP 3-23.1, MCWP 3-23.2, and MCWP 3-25.

COMMAND AND CONTROL REQUIRED TO PHASE CONTROL ASHORE

Phasing control ashore is the passing of authority toC2 certain functions from the amphibious task forcecommander to the landing force commander. Opera-tional maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) concepts callfor a minimum footprint ashore. C2 functions are ini-tially accomplished from the sea, therefore, reducingthe footprint ashore. However, some C2 agencies maybe established ashore when required. Current doctrinestates that the DASC is normally the first principal aircontrol agency established ashore during amphibiousoperations. The DASC is normally collocated with thesenior FSCC.

The development of current Marine Corps conceptsmay evolve to make the DASC the only Marine avia-tion agency to be located ashore. Its responsibility forthe direction of air operations in direct support ofground forces and its inherent mobility make it thelogical choice to be the ACE’s expeditionary agencyashore. Current doctrine regarding the phasing of con-trol ashore in expeditionary operations are detailed inMCWP 3-22, Antiair Warfare , MCWP 3-23.1,MCWP 3-25.3, and FMFM 1-7, Supporting Arms inAmphibious Operations.

JOINT FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS

Joint air operations are those air operations performedwith air capabilities/forces made available by otherService components in support of the JFC’s operationor campaign objectives or in support of other compo-nents of the joint force. The JFC may designate aJFACC to apportion those air capabilities/forces thatthe MAGTF makes available to the joint force. TheJFC has the authority to exercise operational control,assign missions, direct coordination among subordi-nate commanders, redirect and organize his forces toensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of theoverall mission. These same rules apply to forces as-signed to the MAGTF.

The JFACC will use the JFC’s guidance and authority,and in coordination with other assigned or supportingcommanders, to apportion air sorties to various mis-sions or geographic areas. As a result, the MAGTF injoint and multinational operations may have OASfrom both organic Marine Corps direct support capa-bilities/forces and those capabilities/forces allocated toit by the JFACC.

Successful use of joint air resources to support theJFC’s campaign requires unity of effort, centralizedplanning, and decentralized execution. The JFC maydesignate a JFACC to coordinate joint air operations.The processes and framework used are consistentacross the range of military operations.

The JFC integrates the actions of assigned, attached,and supporting forces into unified area of responsibili-ty (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA)-wide joint airoperations. The JFC orchestrates the actions of as-signed, attached, and supporting capabilities/forces intime, space, and purpose to create synergism andavoid duplication of effort. This is done through theuse of control measures and coordinated plans. Whendesignated, the JFACC, ACA, and area air defensecommander (AADC) will integrate joint air operationswith joint airspace control and joint air defense opera-tions in support of the JFC’s campaign. Althoughthese functions may be performed by different individ-uals, joint doctrine states that normally one individualis assigned to be the JFACC, ACA, and AADC to en-sure seamless integration of these functions.


The JFACC’s command post is the joint air operationscenter (JAOC). The JAOC is structured to operate as afully integrated facility and staffed to fulfill theJFACC’s responsibilities. The two organizations orfunctions that should be common to all JAOCs arecombat plans (future joint air operations) and combatoperations (execution of the daily joint ATO). TheJAOC includes senior component liaisons who serveas conduits for direct coordination between theJFACC and their respective component commanders.The liaisons help integrate and coordinate their com-ponent’s participation in joint air operations and coor-dinate and deconflict component direct support airoperations with joint air operations.

The Marine Corps forces (MARFOR) ACE and othercomponents should provide the JFACC with a descrip-tion of their direct support plan through the Marine li-aison officer (MARLO) to allow for coordination anddeconfliction of targeting efforts between each compo-nent and within the JFC staff and agencies. In addi-tion, the MAGTF’s direct support sorties that are notavailable for joint air tasking must still comply withthe ACP, ACO, and SPINS. Refer to JP 0-2, JP 3-0,Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP 3-09, Doctrine forJoint Fire Support, JP 3-56.1, Command and Controlof Joint Air Operations, MCWP 3-2, Aviation Opera-tions, and MCWP 3-25 for information about com-mand relations for air support in joint force operations.

The JFC may not always appoint a JFACC when jointair operations are the only operations or the durationand scope of air operations are of a very limited na-ture. The JFC may elect to plan, direct, and controljoint air operations. When a JFACC is not assigned, astaff section or individual will be assigned the missionof planning, coordinating, and executing joint air oper-ations. The JFC normally assigns missions and issuesmission-type orders to all components. With receipt ofthe mission goes the authority for each Service com-ponent commander to conduct operations in accor-dance with the JFC’s intent and operational concept.

Each component brings unique capabilities to a jointoperation. Successful theater operations require effec-tive synchronization of ground, air, naval, space, andspecial operations forces. Coordinated air operationspermit JFCs to rapidly develop the battlespace to meet

their operational objectives by dominating the airspaceand striking the enemy in depth. The theater air-ground system (TAGS) is a system of systems, a syn-ergy of the various component air-ground systems,which orchestrate the planning and execution of air-ground operations.

Component C2 elements are combined to form theTAGS. Figure 3-3 shows the equivalent functionalagencies/elements/centers in terms of similarity oftasks accomplished by the MACCS. Joint force com-ponents must work together in planning and executingjoint air operations that accomplish JFC-assigned ob-jectives, comply with JFC guidance, and satisfy vari-ous component commanders’ requirements. TheJFACC structures the TAGS based on capabilities pro-vided by various components.

Figure 3-3. Component Air C2 AgencyFunctional Equivalents.

U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. Army

U.S. Navy

U.S. Air

Force

Special Operations

Forces (SOF)

TACC/TADC

BCD TACC/TADC

AOC JSOAOC

TAOC ____ AWC CRC ____

DASC ____ ASCS/HCS

ASOC SOCCE

FSCC FSE/A2C2

SACC ____ ____

TACP ____ ____ TACP SOLE

FAC(A) ____ FAC(A) FAC(A) ____

TAC(A) ____ TAC(A) TAC(A) ____

FAC ____ ____ FAC SOTAC

LegendA2C2 = Army airspace

command and control

FSE = fire support element

AOC = air operations center (USAF

HCS = helicopter control section

ASCS = air support control section

SOCCE = special operations command and control element

AWC = air warfare commander

SOTAC = special operations terminal attack controllerCRC = control and

reporting center

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SUMMARY

During joint operations, the UNAAF policy for C2 onMarine tactical air in sustained operations ashore willbe followed. The MAGTF’s air assets will normally bein support of the MAGTF mission and MAGTF com-manders retain operational control of their organic airassets. The JFC may appoint a JFACC. The JFACCwill use the JFC’s guidance and authority to apportionMAGTF air sorties to various missions or geographicareas in coordination with other assigned or support-ing commanders. As a result, the MAGTF in joint andmultinational operations may have OAS from both or-ganic Marine assets and those capabilities/forces allo-

cated by the JFACC. The MACCS allows thecommander the ability to exercise centralized com-mand and coordination and decentralized control ofMAGTF air assets. The capabilities of the MACCS al-low the synchronization of MAGTF air assets intojoint operations. The positive and procedural types ofaircraft control are published in the ACP, ACO, andSPINS and are executed by the MACCS. The airspacecontrol measures will vary for different types of OASoperations. CAS and DAS operations have uniquecontrol requirements necessary for each one. The air-space and terminal control measures will increase theoperational effectiveness and safety of aircraft operat-ing in the AO.

CHAPTER 4. PLANNING

Planning encompasses two basic functions—envisioning a desired future and ar-ranging a configuration of potential actions in time and space that will allow us torealize that future. Planning is thus a way of figuring out how to move from thecurrent state to a more desirable future state—even if it does not allow us to con-trol the transition precisely. (Extracted from MCDP 5, Planning)

The MAGTF is task-organized to exploit the combatpower inherent in closely integrated air and groundforces. Due to its expeditionary nature, the MarineCorps has been structured so that a large percentage ofits fire support is provided by organic aviation assets.Considering this fact, it is imperative that every effortis made to ensure these assets are utilized effectively.In varied threat conditions and/or “target rich” envi-ronments, tactical air assets will rarely be sufficient tomeet every demand. The MAGTF and ACE staffsmust understand the requirements for effective OASand tailor their plans to meet these requirements.

The MAGTF commander’s intent and guidance areessential in the creation of OAS plans. Each step of theplanning process ensures clear understanding of hisvision and desired end state, while ensuring the plan isbuilt to support the MAGTF’s single battle.

Within the MAGTF, OAS planning supports deep,close, and rear operations to shape the battlespace. Thekey to p lanning OAS is through appropr ia terepresentat ion of warf ight ing funct ions; C2,maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and forceprotection. Planners consider and integrate thewarfighting functions when analyzing how toaccomplish the mission. When all the warfightingfunctions are harmonized the maximum impact isobtained to accomplish the desired objective withinthe shortest time possible and to maximize theefficient use of limited OAS assets. See MCWP 5-1,Marine Corps Planning Process, for more detaileddiscussion on the warfighting functions.

To gain and maintain tempo, commanders and theirstaffs must be involved in all modes and levels ofplanning by ensuring a constant flow of informationvertically within the chain of command and laterallyamong staff sections. At the small-unit level, thisinformation exchange can be simple and direct—commander to commander or operations officer to

operations officer. In larger-sized units, such as thecomponent or Marine expeditionary force (MEF), amore formal arrangement that uses liaison officers anda distinct planning organization is necessary due to thescope and detail involved. The requirement to alignwith higher headquarters planning organizations andto properly address the entire planning continuum willalso be a factor in determining the size and complexityof the planning organization.

Planning is an event-dominated process. Therefore,planning organizations should be designed to enhanceplanning for significant events such as changes inOAS missions. Conversely, time-driven processes arenecessary, yet subordinate, aspects of planning.Planners must address both time- and event-drivenprocesses while maintaining the proper perspectivebetween the two. For example, the ATO is critical tothe planning and execution of OAS operations, and itis produced in a cycle that requires timely input fromsubordinates. Nevertheless, the ATO is produced insupport of the plan—it is not the plan.

This chapter will focus on the MCPP for OASoperations. The targeting cycle and the air taskingcycle will also be addressed as to how they supportand are linked with the planning process for OAS inMAGTF operations.

PLANNING ELEMENTS

The MCPP is scalable from the component level downto the squadron level. Typically, resources, infor-mation, and time available for planning are limited atthe lower levels; therefore, planning organizationsmust form or adapt to meet these limitations.Command and staff relationships are established andfunction within a defined organizational structure.

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These relationships are key to providing the C2necessary to effect OAS operational success.

Lower command levels, like squadrons and air groups,adapt and consolidate certain MCPP planningresponsibilities and functions within their limitedstructures. Normally at these command levels, mostMCPP procedures are performed by the commandersand their primary staff officers and selected specialstaff officers.

Only at higher levels of command (MEF or wing) arespecialized planning staff elements and organizationsformed. The MCPP at the component and MEF levelsis primarily conducted by three planning organiza-tions: future plans, future operations, and current oper-ations. Their efforts must be coordinated for thesmooth transition from the long-term planning to exe-cution. To ensure integrated planning, these agenciesmust have warfighting function representation fromwithin the command, as well as subordinate and adja-cent commands. Manning limitations may requireplacing some of this expertise in general support of theplanning effort as a whole.

Future Plans Section

The future plans section focuses beyond the immedi-ate next battle or next phase that is being planned toprovide a link between higher headquarters and the fu-ture operations section. The future plans sections plansthe command’s next mission. Upon receipt of a mis-sion from higher headquarters, this section initiates theplanning process and develops an outline plan. De-pending on the situation, it may focus on a phase of thecampaign, develop reconstitution requirements or plandeployment. This section’s responsibility is to get themission correct with regard to the MAGTF’s/ACE’scapabilities, command relationship requirements, andbattlespace geometry. The future plans section may al-so develop sequels, support relationships for the nextphase, and develop plans to ensure that the force doesnot reach a culminating point. It transitions to the fu-ture operations section the outline plan that providesthe prominent features of a mission that precedes de-tailed planning.

Future Operations Section

The future operations section is the focal point of theplanning process. It usually forms the nucleus of theoperational planning team (OPT) and coordinates withboth the future plans and current operations sections tointegrate planning of the next battle. The futureoperations section fully integrates the other staffsections’ plans officers, warfighting functionrepresentatives, and subordinate unit liaison officersinto the planning process. It takes the outline planfrom future plans section and uses it as the basis forfurther planning. The future operations section focuseson changes to MAGTF or major subordinatecommand (MSC) missions, develops branch plans andsequels, and recommends potential commander’scritical information requirements (CCIR). This sectioninteracts with intelligence collection and the targetingprocess to shape the next battle. The current operationssection may provide a representative to the futureoperations section to guarantee that the transitionprocess is continuous.

Current Operations Section

During operations, the current operations sectionreceives the operation order (OPORD) at the transitionbrief. The current operation section—

l Coordinates and executes the OPORD.

l Prepares and transmits OPORDs.

l Monitors operations of the force.

l Tracks CCIRs and immediately reports relevant in-formation to the commander.

l Analyzes battlespace information.

Branch plans are normally passed to the currentoperations section during the transition brief. When anunforeseen enemy action begins to develop, the currentoperations section will refine already existing branchplans or develop a branch plan. To support thecommander, the current operations section maydevelop new courses of action (COAs), allocateresources, and prepare fragmentary orders (FRAGOs)to modify the current OPORD. This section assessesshaping act ions and the progress toward thecommander’s decisive actions, monitors the status offorces and materiel, monitors rear area operations,coordinates terrain management, maintains essential


maps and information, and provides the futureoperations section with situational awareness.

Operational Planning Team

An operational planning team (OPT) may be formedto focus the planning effort and gather relevant plan-ning expertise. Normally, the OPT is built around acore of planners from either the future plans section orthe future operations sections. See figure 4-1. TheOPT may also be augmented by warfighting functionrepresentatives, liaison officers, and subject matter ex-perts needed to support planning. See MCWP 5-1 formore information on OPTs. The OPT serves as thelinchpin between future plans, future operations, andcurrent operations sections.

Not only does the MAGTF use integrated planningwithin the staff, but it uses the OPT as a vehicle tointegrate planning among MSCs. See figure 4-2. TheMSC command elements and their respective OPTspass information to their common higher headquarters,the MAGTF, while integrating and coordinating theirown efforts among themselves.

The subordinate command’s OPT liaison officers arekey contributors to the planning process and the futureoperations plan. These liaison officers provide timelyand accurate movement of information between theOPT and their commands. Normally, this officer’sprimary responsibility is to the planning effort.

MAGTF PLANNING

The MAGTF begins the planning process throughmission analysis. See figure 4-3. It reviews andanalyzes orders, guidance, and other informationprovided by higher headquarters and produces a unitmission statement. Intelligence preparation of thebattlespace (IPB) begins immediately and continuesthroughout MAGTF planning. During missionanalysis it produces an initial cut on high-value targets(HVTs). Intelligence and IPB products support thestaff in identifying or refining centers of gravity(COGs) and to determine critical vulnerabilities.

During COAs development , planners use theMAGTF commander’s mission statement (whichincludes the higher headquarters commander’s taskingand intent), commander’s intent, and commander’splanning guidance to develop COA(s). This providesfurther clarity and focus of the targeting effort toachieve the commander’s purpose and the desired endstate. During COA development the mutuallysupporting concepts of maneuver and fire identify

Figure 4-1. Appropriate Representation.

Figure 4-2. Staff Planning Relationships. Figure 4-3. Marine Corps Planning Process.

4-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

HVTs. In the COA development, the supportingconcept of shaping the battlespace is materialized. Thetargeting effort refines those HVTs identified andbegins to develop specific high-payoff targets (HPTs).HPTs are those targets that give planners the greatesteffect for the least expenditure of time and resourcesand lead them to decisive action to achieve theirpurpose. The MAGTF commander makes decisions onOAS with recommendations for HPTs from the GCE,ACE, and CSSE commanders. See MCWP 3-16A,Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the TargetingProcess, for more information on target development.

COAs wargaming assists planners in identifyingf r i e n d l y a n d p o s s i b l e e n e m y s t r e n g t h s a n dweaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls foreach COA. When we wargame COAs, plannersdetermine what specific conditions need to be set thatwill lead them to defeat the enemy COGs. It is duringthis stage of the planning that HPTs are finalized andthe fire support plan is modified.

In COA comparison and decision, the commanderevaluates all friendly COAs against establishedcriteria, then evaluates them against each other. Thecommander then selects the COA that will bestaccomplish the mission. After the commander selectsthe COA, targeting objectives and priorities aresubmitted to the targeting board to support the plan. Ifthe plan is joint or sequential to an ongoing operation,the targeting board inputs may be required earlier tomeet deadlines of the ATO process. Based on theselected COA, the MAGTF commander will apportionaviation assets to achieve the effort required for OAS.The MAGTF commander may request additionalaviation assets from the JFC to meet MAGTFobjectives through recommendations from the ACEcommander and MAGTF force fires coordinator. SeeMCWP 3-2 , Avia t ion Opera t ions , f o r moreinformation on apportionment of MAGTF aviationassets.

During orders development, the staff uses thecommander’s COA decision, mission statement, andcommander’s intent and guidance to develop ordersthat direct unit actions. Orders serve as the principalmeans by which the commander’s decision, intent, andguidance are expressed. It directs actions and focusesthe ACE’s and other subordinate’s tasks and activitiestoward accomplishing the mission.

Transition is an orderly handover of a plan or order asit is passed to those tasked with execution of theoperation. It provides those who will execute the planor order with the situational awareness and rationalefor key decisions necessary to ensure there is acoherent shift from planning to execution. Duringexecution, the plan is continuously updated andmodified as necessary to ensure the desired effectsmeet MAGTF objectives.

AVIATION COMBAT ELEMENT PLANNING

The TACC is the operational command post fromwhich the ACE commander and staff plan, supervise,coordinate, and execute OAS operations. The ACEplans concurrently with the MAGTF and aircrew insupport of OAS operations. The constant flow of in-formation flows vertically within the chain of com-mand and horizontally within the ACE. An OPT mayalso be formed at the ACE level to facilitate coordina-tion between MAGTF and subordinate commands.See MCWP 3-2 for more information on the TACCand ACE staff organization for aviation planning.

The ACE supports the MAGTF commander’s conceptof operations and helps determine which attackoptions are best suited for prosecuting OAS targets.Aviation assets organic to the ACE provide theMAGTF commander lethal and nonlethal fires tolimit, disrupt, delay, divert, destroy, and damage theenemy for mission success.

Targets assigned to the ACE for OAS operations arebased on the MAGTF’s mutual supporting concepts ofmaneuver and fires. From the ACE commander’sinterpretation of the MAGTF commander’s missionand intent, the ACE staff will develop specified andimplied tasks to quantify the effects of OAS in supportof the MAGTF’s concept of fires. This section willfocus on OAS planning at the ACE level.

During mission analysis, the ACE staff analyzes theMAGTF commander’s objectives and guidance asfollows:

l Objectives are the MAGTF commander’s opera-tional goals to be achieved. They provide a means


to determine priorities and they set the criteria formeasuring mission success.

l Guidance sets the limits or boundaries on objectivesand how they are a t ta ined. I t provides theframework to achieve the objectives and establishesforce employment scope and restrictions. Rules ofengagement (ROE) are an example of guidance.

The ACE reviews and analyzes orders, guidance, andother information provided by the MAGTF. The ACEcommander’s intent guides the ACE staff throughoutOAS planning and execution. Intelligence supports theACE from the beginning of planning phase throughthe execution of OAS operations. IPB is a systemic,continuous process of analyzing the threat and theenvironment. The IPB process helps the ACEcommander selectively apply and maximize his OASpower at critical points in time and space. IPB of thebattlespace for OAS is focused on the following:

l Current enemy situation, previous enemy actions,and enemy doctrine.

l Locate HPTs in the battlespace. l Identify critical components of HPTs. l Are HPTs point or area targets? Specifically, do po-

tential HPTs have small critical components or arethe critical components spread over a large area?

l Aid the targeting cell, with the help of the G-2 andJMEM/AS, in the determination of the probabilityof damage (PD) required to meet MAGTF fires ef-fects. Specific recommendations for suitable PD onindividual targets are provided in chapter 6 of theJMEM/AS Weaponeering Guide and appendix D.

The TACC’s future plans section prepares an initialest imate of aviat ion requirements as soon aspreliminary guidance and information about theassigned mission or operation is available. It mayinclude only the number and type of OAS aircraftrequired and is deduced from the ACE’s estimate ofthe MAGTF’s general mission and enemy capabilities.The initial estimate is presented to the MAGTFcommander during the MAGTF’s mission analysis.

During COAs development, the TACC’s future planssection uses the ACE commander’s mission statement(which includes the MAGTF commander’s taskingand intent), commander’s intent, and commander’splanning guidance as to how OAS can best be em-ployed to influence and support developing COA(s).

This provides further clarity and focus of the planningeffort to achieve the commander’s purpose, and thedesired end state. HPTs identified for OAS by theMAGTF are planned by the ACE staff to achieve thedesired PD for the least amount of time and resourcesin achieving the MAGTF commander’s objectives.

The following considerations affect the ACE staff indeveloping the level of effort required by the ACE tosupport each COA:

l What are the types of aircraft and ordnance avail-able to achieve the required PD on target?

l What are the requirements of subordinate unit mis-sions and their need for support?

l Support requirements (e.g., SEAD, fighter escort,aerial refueling).

l Does the level of effort for the PD required ontarget directly relate to the MAGTF commander’sobjectives?

l Factors that may restrict the types of ordnance anddelivery options available; such as target locationerror, distance to the target, weather, visibility, ter-rain, and target area defenses.

l Target acquisition probabilities for selected weaponsystems. See JMEM/AS Target Acquisition Manualfor detailed information on target acquisition.

l Is the desired time of attack on target focused insupport of the MAGTF’s concept of operations?

l Are restrictions imposed by National leaders andROE to prevent an undesirable degree of escalationdue to theater conditions?

l Proximity of non-targets to avoid unwanted collat-eral damage to friendly forces, infrastructure, civil-ians or prisoners of war.

l Ability of the MACCS to monitor the battlespace toprovide OAS operations proper cueing and threatwarning, specifically ingress routes, target areas,and egress routes. If the MACCS is unable to pro-vide the surveillance required to support DAS oper-ations, the ACE needs to coordinate through theMAGTF commander to request joint or combinedearly warning assets to provide the surveillancecoverage required.

When planning for the use of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft for continuous combat operations, it isimportant that planners know the daily sustained andsurge sortie rates for each aircraft. Aircraft require

4-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

maintenance cycles and a minimum amount of time toload, arm, fuel, and service. A planner will determinethe turnaround time (time to load, arm, fuel, and ser-vice) and the total number of sorties each type aircraftcan fly per day. See MCWP 5-11.1, MAGTF AviationPlanning, for more information.

The weapon system planning document is availablefor each aircraft and provides the planned sustainedand surge combat rates for a particular aircraft. It isused for planning logistic and maintenance require-ments for specific aircraft. It may be used as a guide,but planners should be familiar with actual aircraft ca-pabilities and sustained requirements. The weaponsystem planning document is classified and can be ob-tained from Headquarters, United States Marine Corps(APP) or NAVAIR, via the chain of command.

COAs wargaming assists ACE planners in identifyingf r i e n d l y a n d p o s s i b l e e n e m y s t r e n g t h s a n dweaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls foreach COA. When HPTs tasked for OAS operations areused in a war game, specific conditions are set leadingto the achievement of the MAGTF commander’sdesired effects from aviation fires. Wargaming mayreveal additional logistical and aviation supportrequirements to support MAGTF deep operations forselected COAs. It is during this stage in the planningprocess that OAS force requirements are finalized andthe plan is modified for each COA. The aviationestimate of supportability for OAS is provided to theMAGTF commander prior to the MAGTF’s course ofaction comparison and decision step. At a minimum,the aviation estimate of supportability—

l Provides the COAs that can best be supported bythe ACE.

l Outlines advantages and disadvantages of possibleCOAs.

l Identifies significant aviation limitations and/or prob-lems of an operational or logistical nature.

l Highlights measures that can be taken to resolveexisting aviation problems including requestingadditional theater assets.

In COA comparison and decision, the ACE planningstaff evaluates all COAs against established criteria.The COAs are then evaluated against each other. TheACE commander selects the COA deemed most likelyto accomplish OAS missions in support of the

MAGTF commander’s concept of operations. TheACE commander makes decisions and recom-mendations with the MAGTF force fires coordinator,GCE commander, and CSSE commander to theMAGTF commander. The TACC’s future planssection constructs a detailed estimate of aviationsupport requirements. Requirements provided to theMAGTF commander will include:

l Do the number of aviation assets meet the level ofeffort required to achieve the MAGTF commander’sobjectives?

l Will surge or sustained OAS operations limit theACE’s ability to support other current or futureMAGTF and/or joint operations based on aircraftavailability, ordnance availability, and logisticalsupport requirements?

l Is the level of risk acceptable?

The MAGTF commander uses the recommendationsof the ACE commander and staff and the MAGTFforce fires coordinator to make OAS targeting andapportionment decisions. They may recommend to theMAGTF commander that joint aviation assets orweapon systems are required to support MAGTF deepbattle operations. From the selected COA, theMAGTF’s apportionment of the aviation effort towardOAS is translated by the ACE into allocation of sortiesfor CAS and DAS missions. See MCWP 3-2, MCWP3-25.4, and the ATO process, in this chapter, for moreinformation on the apportionment and allocation ofaviation assets.

During orders development, the TACC’s future opera-tions section takes the commander’s COA decision,intent, and guidance to develop orders that direct theactions of the unit. Preparing aviation documents var-ies with the nature and complexity of the operationand can include air allocation requests or air supportrequests. The ATO serves as the principal means bywhich the ACE commander expresses his decision, in-tent, and guidance for OAS missions. The ATO trans-lates the allocation of OAS assets into an allotment ofsorties tasking specific squadrons assigned to OASmissions and support requirements. Concurrent withthe ATO development, the ACE staff coordinates withprospective squadrons that will be assigned OAS mis-sions. This facilitates continuous information sharing,maintains flexibility, and makes efficient use of time.See MCWP 3-2, MCWP 3-25.4, and the ATO process,


in this chapter, for more information regarding theACE commander’s allotment of sorties.

Transition is the orderly handover of a plan or order asit is passed to those tasked with execution of theoperation. The ATO provides OAS mission executorswith the situational awareness and rationale for keydecisions necessary to ensure a coherent shift fromplanning to execution. The TACC’s current operationssection supervises and coordinates the ATO execution.

TARGETING CYCLE

As discussed during the planning process, targetingbegins during the mission analysis as the commanderidentifies the enemy COG during the battlespace areaevaluation. An intelligence estimate should haveproduced an initial cut of HVTs, which can be astarting point for enemy COG analysis. At the end ofmission analysis, the final determination of COGs andassociated CVs give a focused point of departure forfollow-on targeting effort.

In COA development, further clarity and focus to thetargeting effort by identifying specific OAS goals andobjectives are achieved. Wargaming determines whatspecific conditions need to be set that will lead to thedefeat of enemy COGs. The targeting effort refinesthose identified vulnerabilities and begins to developspecific HPTs that have the greatest effect for the leastexpenditure of time and resources and lead to theachievement of purpose.

Many of these targeting products will be passed to thetargeting board or joint targeting coordination board(JTCB) if conducting joint operations. See figure 4-4for targeting links to the MCPP. Targeting inputs maybe required earlier in the planning process to meetinput deadlines of the ATO process. The targetingboard has both an inward and outward focus. Thetargeting board is the principal tool of the MAGTF toensure that the fires and targeting efforts of theMAGTF and its major subordinate commands arelinked and mutually supporting a single battle.

The targeting cycle was developed as an aid todecisionmaking. It provides for a logical progressionin the development of targeting solutions needed forOAS operations. It proceeds from the definition of theproblem to an assessment of the solution. The cycleallows the targeting officer to test multiple solutionpaths and to refine both the understanding of theproblem and the proposed solutions. The cycle adaptsto circumstances. It can be used from global warplanning to micro-contingency operations. The cycleis not tied to any particular weapons system, theater oroperations, level of conflict or automated operationalsupport systems.

There are two targeting cycle models that the differentServices use in their individual targeting process. Thefirst has a four-step process and is used by the UnitedStates Army (USA) and United States Marine Corps(USMC). See figure 4-5. The second process is sixsteps and is widely used by the United States AirForce (USAF) and United States Navy (USN), and isalso the cycle used at the joint level. Although the two

Figure 4-4. Targeting Links to MCPP. Figure 4-5. D3A and Joint Targeting Cycle.

4-8 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

processes appear different they each cover the sameinformation. These cycles are absolutely central to tar-geting as a discipline for the following two reasons:

l They provide a structure for the targeteer to use indeveloping warfighting recommendations for thecommander.

l Nothing that is done in targeting makes any senseunless it is done in a logical process.

FOUR-STEP PROCESS (USMC, USA)

Normally, targeting within the MAGTF commandelement is performed by the FFCC targeting cell. In aMAGTF, the focus is on deep operations withnecessary transition to close operations. The MAGTFmust integrate decide, detect, deliver, and assess(D3A) with the air tasking cycle since the MAGTFcommander’s primary tool for OAS operations isaviation. For additional information on the MAGTFtargeting cycle, see MCWP 3-42.1, Fire Support inMAGTF Operations, and MCWP 3-16, TTP for FireSupport Coordination.

Step 1. Decide

Decide is the most important step because it providesthe overall focus and prioritizes attack planning. Ithelps the targeting team decide which targets must beacquired and attacked, which attack option to use, andwho will engage the target at the prescribed time. It al-so determines requirements for combat assessment.This step covers the activities found in the joint(six-step) cycle of: Objectives and Guidance, TargetDevelopment, Weaponeering Assessment, and ForceApplication. The decide step begins with the com-mander’s mission analysis and considers IPB, the ene-my situation, and potential enemy COAs. FriendlyCOAs are established and wargamed. Once a COA isdetermined, OPORDs are issued to subordinate units.Objectives and guidance are determined by the unitmission, commander’s intent and concept of opera-tions, and commander’s initial planning guidance. TheDecide phase covers target development through thegeneration of target value analysis (TVA). TVA en-tails a detailed analysis of enemy doctrine, tactics,equipment, organizations, and expected behavior for aselected COA. TVA methodology provides a relative

ranking of HPTs through wargaming that achieves thecommander’s mission. After wargaming, a clearer pic-ture is established of: which target acquisition assetswill be tasked, how information will be processed,which means will be used to attack, and what require-ments exist for combat assessment. To select an attackmeans, targeting officers must perform a weaponeer-ing assessment and consider force application ques-tions. The targeting outputs from these efforts are:

l High-payoff target list (HPTL)—HPTs identified inthe order of priority whose loss to the enemy willcontribute to the success of the friendly COA.

l Attack guidance matrix—which targets will be at-tacked, how, when, and the desired effect.

l Target selection standards—accuracy and otherspecific criteria that must be met before targets canbe attacked.

l Requirements for BDA.

Step 2. Detect

Detect is conducted during the execution of anOPORD, target acquisition assets gather information.From this information, targets are validated andtracked. Not all information gathered is useful from atargeting perspective; however, it does develop thecommander’s situational awareness of the battlefield.Targets may be impossible to attack (out of range) orundesirable to attack (in range but moving to a moreadvantageous location for attack). Critical targets thatcannot or are not attacked must be tracked to ensurethey are not lost. Tracking targets may make assetsunavailable for acquiring other targets. As targets aretracked, appropriate attack systems are tasked. Theseduties lie roughly parallel to the joint cycle step ofexecution planning/force execution.

Step 3. Deliver

Deliver is the main function of attacking targets inaccordance with the commander’s attack guidance.The tactical situation drives a technical solution,including specific attack unit, ordnance, and time ofattack. This means a target scheduled to be hit at longrange may not be acquired until it is in close. Thelong-range asset that was scheduled to hit this targetmay not be flexible enough to bring weapons to bearon it when it is in close. Therefore, another unit orordnance (technical solution) may be brought to bear.


This step is equivalent to the joint cycle step ofexecution planning/force execution.

Step 4. Assess

Assess provides feedback on the question: “Has thecommander’s guidance been met?” If the command-er’s guidance has not been met, then the detect and de-liver functions of the targeting cycle must continue tofocus on the targets involved. Just as in the sixth stepof the joint cycle, combat assessment, the feedbackmay also result in changes to decisions made duringthe decide step.

SIX-STEP PROCESS (JOINT, USN, USAF)

The MAGTF also maintains an up and out focus byinterfacing with the JTCB to push MAGTF supportrequirements up and ensure they are given dueconsideration by higher headquarters. The targetingboard also is a check to ensure MAGTF targetingefforts support JFC goals and objectives.

An effective and efficient target development processand air tasking cycle are essential for the JFACC/JFCstaff to plan and execute joint air operations. This jointtargeting process should integrate capabilities andefforts of national, unified, joint force, and componentcommands, which possess varying capabilities anddifferent requirements. The process is also the same inwar and MOOTW. See JP 3-56.1.

Step 1. Objectives and Guidance

Objectives and guidance provide the purpose for therest of the targeting process. Objectives drive thetargeting and determine the target priori t ies .Objectives and guidance should be both quantifiableand unambiguous in order to be effective. Damagecriteria are resolved and collection requirements set.Restrictions, such as no-fire areas (NFAs), areestablished. Objectives and guidance begin at thenational level as broad concepts and should end asshort-term, well-defined mission objectives at theappropriate command level.

ObjectivesObjectives are goals that give targeting officers ameans to determine targeting priorities and provide thecriteria for measuring mission success. Objectivescome from our national security objectives, nationalmilitary objectives, and command objectives. Objec-tives should be observable, measurable, and achiev-able ultimately leading to a “desired end state.”

GuidanceGuidance consists of the ground rules or policies thatgovern how objectives are pursued. It provides theframework to achieve objectives and establishes theforce employment scope and restrictions. Guidancecomes from national guidance, principles of war, lawof armed conflict, ROE, and command guidance.

Step 2. Target Development

Target development is the systematic evaluation ofpotential target systems. It is the process by which wedetermine which targets are most likely to satisfy theobjectives and the specific nature, extent, and durationof damage we need to inflict on those targets. Thegoals of target development are as follows:

l To compile a prioritized list of installations, forces,etc. that if attacked will have the greatest likelihoodof accomplishing the commander’s objectives.

l To determine the necessary level of damage and theprecise locations for the damage on each targetwhich will affect that target to the degree necessaryto contribute to accomplishing the commander’sobjectives.

Once the commander’s objectives are known, the tar-geting officer determines what enemy activity must bedefeated to achieve economic, political, and militaryobjectives. Target development evaluates which ele-ments should or could be attacked. It focuses on HPTsthat support the objectives.

HPTs are those that are relevant to objectives andguidance and suitable for disruption, degradation, neu-tralization, exploitation or destruction. Critical nodes(points where system components or elements arelinked—dependent on one another) within HPT sys-tems must be identified. This requires detailed infor-mation and is no small task. Once critical nodes areidentified, target validation must be performed.

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A valid target is one that complies with objectives andguidance, contributes to the enemy capability to wagewar, is operationally significant, permissible underlaw of armed conflict (LOAC), and complies withROE. Restricted and protected targets must beseparated from those approved for attack. The outputof the target development phase is a prioritized list ofpotential targets.

This prioritized list must be unconstrained as to weap-ons or resources required to affect it. Even if a validtarget is impervious to any weapon, it is still a valuabletarget. New weapons that hold the target at risk or theROE for employing a previously restricted weaponmay change. Once target development is completed,the next step is choosing the best weapon that achievesthe objective, to the target.

Step 3. Weaponeering Assessment

Weaponeering assessment quantifies the expected re-sults of nonlethal and lethal effects. The number oneconcern is to select the weapon that promises to inflictthe kind and extent of damage required by the objec-tives, understanding the target system, and the effecton the enemy. Weaponeering solutions give an esti-mate of the expected performance of a nominal weap-on in an infinite number of identical trials.

The estimate for nonlethal weapons (electronic attack)is usually more qualitative (ability to harass, deceive,jam, suppress, disrupt, and deny access) than quantita-tive. For lethal effects, a specific objective stating thedesired level of damage is necessary (destroying thefunction occurring in a building versus destroying thebuilding structurally). To achieve a specific level ofdamage, one must consider target vulnerability, weap-ons effects, delivery errors, weapon reliability, weap-ons system capabilities, and weapon quantities.Alternate weapons, weapons systems, and deliverytactics must be investigated. Weaponeering is not ameans to validate or justify target development.

Collateral damage, the damage to objects that are not aprimary target, must be calculated. Collateral damagemay be positive (more than one target/target elementaffected) or negative (unintentional damage to otherassets). Weaponeering calculations may reveal theneed to seek changes to guidance regarding the desired

level of damage, employment tactics or restrictions onweapons employment.

Time constraints may not allow for weaponeering ofall targets. Therefore, calculations must proceed in aprioritized manner. The end result of the weaponeer-ing step is a list of targets based on vulnerability.

Step 4. Force Application

Force application involves matching the responsivetargets, which satisfy the objectives, to a deliverymethod and munitions. The intent is not to reach solu-tions that favor a weapon, but to select the most appro-priate tool to perform the work. If a decision is madeto employ a specific weapon as part of the objectiveformulation process, then all of the steps of the target-ing cycle that follow are corrupted because solutionswill be derived to accommodate the weapon and notthe objective.

At the operational level, force application estimatesare extensively used in developing long range plans,outlining time to complete particular phases of an op-eration, depicting how targets may be attacked, andproviding a way to integrate and use various weapons.The expected damage desired to meet the objective isbased on command guidance and target susceptibility.Force application planning concentrates on optimizingforce sizing and support requirements. The reality ofscarce resources dictates that the required force (strikepackage) must be balanced against logistical capabili-ties and operational realities. Therefore, the prioritizedtarget list may not be implemented exactly in order.

Targeting officers must understand weather, threats,logistics, and friendly tactics and employment proce-dures to select the optimum weapon/weapons system.Attrition and penetration analysis must be weighed.These analyses will point out tradeoffs to the com-mander. In situations where time and resources are in-sufficient, decisions and recommendations may bemade with incomplete information.

Standard conventional loads (SCLs) are optimized foruse against targets sets that will be targeted repeatedlyduring OAS operations. In most theaters, ATOs willhave prede te rmined SCLs deve loped by theweaponeers on MAGTF, joint or multinational staffs.These SCLs reduce planning time and ease reactive

Offensive Air Support ___________________________________________________________________________________ 4-11

weaponeering during the force execution phase of CASand DAS missions. The force application phase resultsin the recommendation of which type of OAS aircraftand type of munitions to be utilized.

Step 5. Execution Planning/Force Execution

This step involves the preparation of inputs to theATO/OPORD/operation plan (OPLAN) and immedi-ate target tasking. It provides all information subordi-nate units require, such as aim point coordinates,weapon load/SCL, fuzing, attack timing (for decon-fliction), and combat assessment tasking. Tasking maydirect actual routing, axis of attack, and weapons re-lease settings. Units expect and require target materi-als (maps, charts, imagery) and must be informed ofspecific requirements needed up the chain for accuratecombat assessment. At the unit level, commanders re-view changing threat and weather data and may modi-fy the weapon selection. This may force units to useweapons and weapon systems unlike those the target-ing officer has planned on during weaponeering andforce application. Predicted conditions may havechanged since orders were generated. Weather may bebetter (or worse), driving a change to the scheduledmunitions. Weapons with greater capability may havebeen delivered, etc. These changes may require chang-ing the BDA plan.

Step 6. Combat Assessment

The combat assessment (CA) encompasses combatoperations, strike effectiveness, enemy repair and re-constitution capabilities, impact on enemy, and reli-ability of friendly equipment-munitions-tactics.During target development, weaponeering assessment,force application and execution planning/force execu-tion, further inputs were made to provide the frame-work necessary to conduct accura te combatassessment. CA provides the commander with infor-mation on the status of the course of the war, helps for-mulate subsequent battle plans, serves as a benchmarkfor validating objectives, and collects valuable empiri-cal data on weapon and weapon system performance.Assessment objectives must be determined before dataanalysis begins. CA provides information for begin-ning the next targeting cycle. The three major compo-nents of CA are:

l BDA is the evaluation of a strike against an individ-ual target. BDA is composed of physical damageassessment, functional damage assessment, and tar-get system assessment.

l Munitions effect assessment (MEA) determinesweapon effectiveness and reliability. MEA isconducted concurrently and interactively withBDA. MEA identifies deficiencies in weapons,fuzing, and related materials. The output from MEAis used in recommendations for new requirementsand identifying tactics to overcome degradedweapons functioning.

l Reattack recommendations (RR) address the effec-tiveness of overall strike operations againstcommand objectives (total impact on the enemy’swar-fighting/war sustaining capability). It examineseffectiveness of tactics, penetration aids, andenemy/friendly countermeasures. RR has also beencalled re-strike and mission assessment.

CA must be done in a timely manner so that other as-sets may be directed to targets not sufficiently dam-aged by the first attack. However, it must be doneaccurately or destroyed targets will be reattackedwhile undamaged targets will escape attack. Imageryhas usually been the primary source for determiningCA, but all source data must be used, especially inlight of the growing number of hardened targets.

AIR TASKING CYCLE

The MAGTF commander must synchronize the actionof air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces toachieve operational objectives in joint and major oper-ations. The concept of operations, phasing, and sus-tainment, which must support all higher campaignplans, will most likely be developed in parallel with,or subsequent to, the JFC’s and commander in chief’s(CINC’s) campaign plan. Air assets provide a formi-dable variety of OAS capabilities to the MAGTF com-mander. Air-delivered weapons, and other strikeoperations conducted in the execution phase of the tar-geting cycle, provide a MAGTF with the opportunityto exploit all aspects of an enemy’s structure fromclose actions to rear areas, including infrastructure andwar supporting industries. Before execution can begin,

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however, all of these capabilities and assets must bemolded into a coherent and integrated plan.

Aviation planning within the MAGTF is a continuousprocess that takes into account the current situation,previous actions, and future requirements. The ACE isactively involved in the air planning process at threelevels: the aviation combat element, the MAGTF com-mand element, and the joint force headquarters. TheGCE and CSSE conduct their own planning; they ad-dress aviation requirements and submit requests foraviation support to the MAGTF commander, who con-siders them for inclusion into the ACE operation orfrag order.

The air tasking cycle is an integral part of the MAGTFplanning process. It provides the effective and effi-cient employment of the air capabilities/forces madeavailable. The cycle provides a repetitive process forthe planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking ofair missions/sorties within the guidance of theMAGTF commander. It provides a concept of aviationoperations for a 24-hour period. By using and com-pleting the cycle, planners can ensure that finite avia-tion assets are used to achieve their maximum effectwith correct prioritization based on the main effort.The precise ATO tasking timeline from commander’sguidance to the start of ATO execution is specified bythe JFC but normally spans a 36- to 72-hour period.

When operating as a component of the joint force,MAGTF air operations planners must consider the ef-fect of joint air operations requirements on the ACE’sability to support MAGTF operations. Therefore, theMAGTF commander must consider the interrelation-ship between the MAGTF air tasking cycle and thejoint air tasking cycle relative to apportionment ofavailable sorties. The MAGTF commander may issuespecial instructions that address the JFC’s apportion-ment guidance for MAGTF-provided air sorties to thejoint force.

Prior to the MAGTF commander apportioning and al-locating sorties for the MAGTF, up-front sorties areprovided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC (ifdesignated) for air defense, long-range interdiction,and long-range reconnaissance. The MAGTF com-mander provides excess sorties of MAGTF direct sup-port requirements to the JFC. These excess sorties arefor the support of other joint force components or the

joint force as a whole. JP 0-2 describes the preferredmethod of employing MAGTF aviation in joint opera-tions and the policy for C2 of MAGTF TACAIR insustained operations ashore.

During joint operations, MAGTF air assets willnormally be in support of the MAGTF mission.However, nothing will infringe on the authority of theJFC to assign missions or redirect the efforts ofMAGTF sorties to ensure unity of effort or to maintainintegrity of the force.

In addition to offering sorties in excess of MAGTF di-rect support requirements to the JFC, the ACE com-mander should identify additional requirements for airoperations and determine whether they can be sourcedfrom within the MAGTF or if they require joint air as-sets. In the later case, the MAGTF commander mayrequest the needed assets from the JFC.

For operations that involve joint or combined forces,the six-step joint air tasking cycle is used to plan jointair missions. It begins with the JFC’s air apportion-ment process and culminates with the combat assess-ment of previous missions. In joint operations, theMAGTF will conform to the joint air tasking cycle.The MAGTF and joint air tasking cycles are depictedin figures 4-6 and 4-7. Refer to JP 3-56.1 for more in-formation on the joint air tasking cycle.

The JFACC or ACE commander generates the ATO totask and disseminate the plan to components,subordinate units, and C2 agencies the targets andspecific missions of projected sorties, capabilities, andforces. It normally provides both general and specificinstructions for OAS missions. The ATO also includesspecial instructions and may also include the ACO.See MCWP 3-2, MCWP 3-25.4, Marine Tactical AirCommand Center Handbook, and JP 3-52, Doctrinefor Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone, forfurther discussion of the ATO.

MAGTF Air Tasking Cycle

As previously stated, the ultimate goal of the airtasking cycle is to produce an organized and integratedair execution plan in the form of an ATO. Because theair tasking cycle is continuous, multiple ATOs aregoing through various stages of the air tasking cycle atany single moment in time. MCWP 3-25.4 describes a


notional number of four ATOs that would normally beat various stages of completion within the air taskingprocess. Respectively, these would be the ATOundergoing assessment (yesterday’s), the ATO inexecut ion ( today’s) , the ATO in product ion(tomorrow’s), and the ATO in planning (the day aftertomorrow’s). Depending on the theater of operations,the number of ATOs in planning may vary greatlydepending on such factors as the size and scope of theoperations, available staff personnel, and expectedduration of the contingency.

The air tasking cycle is the key tool used by aviationplanners to plan air operations that support the

MAGTF’s mission and produce the MAGTF ATO orair plan. The six-phase MAGTF air tasking cycle iscompatible with the six-phase joint air tasking cycle.The six phases of the MAGTF air tasking cycle arecommand aviation guidance, target/air supportmission development, allocation and allotment,tasking, force execution, and CA.

The MAGTF air tasking cycle requires detailedplanning and resources allocation by the MarineTACC’s future operations section. The futureoperat ions sect ion coordinates with the ACEheadquarters staff and the ACE’s subordinate unitsand agencies to accomplish its planning and tasking

Figure 4-7. Joint ATO Cycle.

Figure 4-6. MAGTF Air Tasking Cycle.

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requirements. The MAGTF ATO is the final productof the MAGTF air tasking cycle.

Command and Aviation GuidanceThe MAGTF air tasking cycle begins when the com-mander assigns a mission to the ACE commander. Thecommander’s guidance and objectives identify target-ing priorities, procedures, joint fire support coordinat-ing measures, ROE, and a definition of direct supportsorties. The development of the concept of fires andtargeting guidance is the responsibility of the MAGTFforce fires coordinator and is based on the command-er’s intent and input from the major subordinate ele-ment commanders. The MAGTF commander uses therecommendations of the ACE commander and staffand the MAGTF force fires coordinator to make ap-portionment decisions. These decisions identify the to-tal level of effort that should be dedicated to OAS toaccomplish the assigned mission. As the battleprogresses, the MAGTF commander revises appor-tionment decisions to meet the requirements of thecurrent situation. Apportionment is usually expressedas a percentage of the total aviation effort and helps toensure the efficient use of limited aviation resources.If the MAGTF is part of a joint force, the MAGTFmission statement may include the JFC’s apportion-ment guidance for Marine aviation if Marine sortiesare to be provided to the joint force. Figure 4-8 is anexample of the MAGTF commander’s apportionmentfor an amphibious operation.

Note: Excess sorties are those sorties available fortasking, but are not needed by the MAGTF. Sortiesprovided for air defense, long-range interdiction, andlong-range reconnaissance are not excess sorties andwill be provided up front to the JFC as required. SeeJP 3-56.1 for more details.

Target/Air Support DevelopmentThe specific objectives described by the commanderare used to focus specific target and air support mis-sion development. All potential targets and air supportrequests are processed through the appropriate staffsections, which will identify, prioritize, and select spe-cific targets/air support missions that meet the com-mander’s objectives and guidance and support theconcept of operations.

The ACE commander and staff assist the MAGTFforce fires coordinator in the overall target planning by

providing guidance in the evaluation and selection ofaviation targets. Targets are selected from joint targetlists (JTLs) (if any), requests from all elements of theMAGTF, intelligence recommendations, EW inputs,and current intelligence assessments.

Air support mission requests are generated, evaluated,and prioritized in the same manner as targets. Since allof these missions require the allocation of ACE assetsand those assets are usually finite, the ACE commandand staff play a central role in their evaluation. TheMAGTF commander will ultimately approve the pri-oritization of both the target list and the air supportmission list.

Allocation and AllotmentAfter receiving the commander’s apportionment direc-tive and understanding the targeting/air support mis-sion requirements, the ACE commander allocates the

Figure 4-8. Apportionment and Guidance.


planned effort. Allocation is the translation of the airapportionment decision into the total numbers of sor-ties (by aircraft type) available for each operation ortask. Allocation includes the submission of all air sup-port requests (CAS, DAS, AAW, assault support, andC2). The ACE commander presents the allocation re-quest to the MAGTF commander. Once the allocationrequest has been approved, the allocated sorties aredistributed or allotted to support the MAGTF and itselements. Allotment decisions allow MAGTF ele-ments to plan and coordinate the integration of OASsorties into their fire and maneuver efforts. The GCEand CSSE commanders determine the appropriate dis-tribution of these sorties.

Tasking

Tasking is the process of translating allocation andallotment decisions into an ATO or air plan and thenpassing the tasks to the units involved. The MAGTFATO or air plan assigns missions and mission supportresponsibilities to specific squadrons.

If a Marine headquarters is designated as the ACAand/or JFACC, ATO interoperability with otherServices depends to some degree on the contingencytheater automated planning system (CTAPS). CTAPSis a hardware and software system that is used to dis-seminate the ATO to operational units to fly specifiedOAS and OAS support missions, as well as maintainaircraft and aircrew at specified alert states. CTAPSfunctions are currently scheduled to be replaced by theUSAF’s Theater Battle Management Core System(TBMCS) program. TBMCS is an umbrella programthat assimilates the ATO’s production, dissemination,and execution that currently reside in the CTAPS.Chapter 6 contains more information on TBMCS.

Force Execution

Aircraft squadrons assign individual aircrews and air-craft to specific mission numbers and issue squadronflight schedules once they receive the ATO or air plan.Actual mission planning and coordination with theMAGTF command element, ACE, GCE, and CSSEstaffs are performed by the designated mission com-mander. Task-organized flights of aircraft then exe-cute assigned OAS missions. During execution, theACE commander exercises C2 of OAS missions fromthe TACC through the MACCS, including the dynam-ic retasking of assets to meet the challenging situation.

Combat AssessmentEffective campaign planning and execution require thecontinuing evaluation of the impact of OAS operationson the overall campaign plan. CA is focused at theMAGTF level; however, it is done at all levels.Normally, the ACE G-3/S-3, assisted by the G-2/S-2,is responsible for coordinating combat assessment ofACE missions.

CA evaluates OAS operation’s effectiveness inachieving command objectives. The ACE staffcontinually evaluates the results of air operations andprovides these evaluations to the MAGTF commanderfor consolidation and overall evaluation of currentoperations. CA assesses the effects, relative to friendlyobjectives and strategy, of specific OAS missions andOAS operations in general against the specific targetsattacked, whole target systems, and remaining enemywarfighting capabilities. It should include BDA, MEA,and RR. It must take into consideration the capabilities,forces, munitions, and attack timing employed.

Assessors should weigh future enemy COAs and re-maining enemy combat capabilities against establishedtargeting/air support mission priorities to determine fu-ture objectives and RR. The ACE staff assessment is for-warded to the MAGTF commander to determine overallmission success and to recommend changes regardingCOAs. CA marks the end of the air tasking cycle, but italso provides the inputs for the next air tasking cycle andsubsequent command guidance, target/air support mis-sion development, allocation and allotment, tasking,force execution, and CA.

Joint Air Tasking Cycle

JFC/Component Coordination JFC/component coordination ensures that air opera-tions are supporting the JFC’s overall concept of oper-ations, planning guidance is provided by the JFC in theform of air allocation. Air allocation is the determina-tion and assignment of the total expected effort by per-centage and/or by priority that should be devoted tothe various air operations and/or geographic areas fora given period of time. (Extracted from JP 3-56.1)

This guidance is nothing more than a general state-ment by the JFC as to how air assets are to be em-ployed in support of the overall campaign effort. Thisguidance is often provided in the form of a percentage

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breakdown of the various missions that can be per-formed by air assets (e.g., interdiction, CAS, SEAD,AR). This guidance provides the ability for the JFC toensure that air assets are supporting the effort in thecorrect way. For example, if the JFC is planning a ma-jor ground offensive, a higher percentage of CASmight be directed in the apportionment decision.

While the apportionment decision is JFC guidance, theJFC does not create this guidance. In reality, theJFACC and the JAOC staff prepares a recommendedapportionment decision for the JFC’s approval at theinitial coordination meeting between the JFC and thefunctional component commanders. Obviously, theJFACC has numerous duties within the air tasking cy-cle and cannot create all of the required decisions anddocumentation without the support of the JAOC staff.The primary staff element within the JAOC that coor-dinates the initial steps of the air tasking cycle is theguidance apportionment and targeting (GAT) cell.

The GAT function cannot be specifically defined sinceits members, location, and methods of meeting willvary from JAOC to JAOC depending on the theater.Ultimately, the GAT cell and its associated functionscan be viewed as a group of people, a location withinthe JAOC, a series of meetings or any combination ofall of these things. What is important to understand isthat GAT is one of the core staff work forces forproducing the hard products and decisions that fuel theair tasking cycle. The GAT functions as surroundingthe air tasking cycle steps to ensure that the work getsdone. See figure 4-9.

Target Development Target development begins while the JFC, JFACC,and other component commanders formal izeapportionment guidance. At the same time the JAOCstaff is receiving requests (i.e., JTAR) from com-ponent and service staffs for potential targets andgathering information on available assets to applyagainst these targets.

The GAT staff takes the air support request messagesand begins to form a draft of the joint integratedprioritized target list (JIPTL). The JIPTL is a subset ofthe JTL indicating which targets will be activelyconsidered for air strikes. Once JFC apportionmentguidance is provided, the draft JIPTL is completed andprepared for presentation to the JFC at the JTCB.

The target development step of the air tasking cycleculminates when the JFACC/JAOC staff present thedraft JIPTL at the JTCB. The JTCB is normallycha i red by the depu ty JFC and a t t ended byrepresentatives from all affected components andService staffs. Once the draft JIPTL has been modifiedas directed by the deputy JFC, the actual JFC approvesthe JIPTL for further planning.

Weaponeering AllocationWeaponeering allocation begins once the JIPTL isapproved by the JTCB. The targets are compared totheir individual target folders to determine weaponsrequirements. This step should simply requireaccessing weaponeering work that was alreadyaccomplished in the larger joint targeting cycle. At thispoint, the difficult process of matching available assetsto specific targets begins in the master air attack plan(MAAP) meeting within the JAOC. The GAT staffprovides the necessary manpower and expertiserequired to formulate the overall air employment plan.

The MAAP is an overview picture of actual targetsand the air assets that will be used against them. Inaddition to mission information, it also contains JFCand JFACC guidance, support plans, target updatesand a variety of other supporting documentation. TheMAAP is simply the raw information that must beconverted into a useful document for dissemination tothe field.

Figure 4-9. GAT Interaction.


Joint ATO Development

Joint ATO development begins once the MAAP iscompleted. The MAAP is then converted into an ATOthrough automated systems. These automated systemsare used throughout the air tasking cycle to steadilybuild and mold asset, target, and guidance informationuntil it has reached a stage of processing referred to asthe MAAP.

CTAPS is the overall system for planning, directing,monitoring, and executing the air tasking cycle. TheATO is produced within this system along with othermessages required for C2 of large numbers of aircraft.CTAPS is in the process of being replaced by theTBMCS. The tools available within CTAPS are asnumerous as they are varied in publishing the ATO.

Force Execution

Force execution starts with disseminating the ATO tothe field. The responsibility for overseeing the ATO istransferred from the GAT staff and JAOC plansdivision to the operations side of the JAOC structure.The TAGS is a supporting structure that facilitates thefinal two steps of the air tasking cycle. See figure4-10. The TAGS is comprised of field units, hardwareand software, and command relationships.

From the beginning of JFC apportionment to the timethe ATO is disseminated to the field units, theoperations side of the cycle is kept informed of theprogress of the ATO. The first way this occurs isthrough a sortie allotment message sent from the JFCto the components after the apportionment decisionhas been made and compared to the air support requestinformation provided by the components. The basicpurpose for this message is to allow the operationalcommanders to begin preparations for how they willfill the taskings of the upcoming ATO.

Combat Assessment

CA evaluates combat operations effectiveness toachieve command objectives. Effective campaign plan-ning and execution require a continuing evaluation ofthe impact of joint force combat operations on theoverall campaign.

The CA concept of operations should include BDA,MEA, and RR. It must take into consideration the capa-bilities/forces employed, munitions, and attack timingin assessing the specific mission and joint air operationssuccess and effects against the specific targets attacked,target systems, and remaining enemy warfighting capa-bilities relative to the objectives and strategy.

Future enemy COAs and remaining enemy combat ca-pabilities should be weighed against established JFCand JFACC targeting priorities to determine future tar-geting objectives and reattack recommendations. Al-though CA marks the end the air tasking cycle, it alsoprovides inputs for process re-initiation and subsequenttarget development, weaponeering and/or allocation,joint ATO development, force execution, and CA.

Restrictions may be due to ROE, an unacceptable levelof collateral damage or cultural features restricting adelivery profile for the optimum weapon. Somechallenges that planners may be faced with during theplanning process may have never been encountered orweaponeered before and may require a creative andimaginative solution for these and/or other restrictionslike the following example.

During Operation Deliberate Force in 1995, missionplanners were tasked with targeting a radar control vanin an urban environment. The radar control van wasbeing used by Bosnian-Serbs to track and target North

Figure 4-10. TAGS Interaction.

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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft withsurface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

Besides being located in an urban environment, aneven greater challenge for mission planners was thatthe radar control van was operating next to a hospital,further restricting munitions and attack options due toROE. Due to the high probability of collateral damageand high risk assessment for aircraft, the commander’sapproval was required on mission planning prior toforce execution.

The mission planned for an inert 2,000 pound warheadto be equipped with a laser-guided control assembly.The laser-guided weapon would minimize the chancesfor collateral damage due to its high accuracy, as wellas the inert warhead.

The time of the attack also minimized the probabilityfor collateral damage and the attack tactics reduced thethreat to aircraft from enemy air defenses. In an earlymorning strike, the radar control van was hit with pin-point accuracy during the force execution. CA re-vealed after sunrise that the impact of the 2,000-poundwarhead had destroyed the radar control van andmoved it one-half mile down the street while inflictingminimal collateral damage and none to the hospital.

SUMMARY

The MAGTF’s inherent combat power is enhancedthrough the application of combined arms. TheMAGTF integrates aviation assets with organic firesupport assets to effectively support the scheme of ma-neuver. The MAGTF commander uses OAS through-out the operational spectrum to assist in attainingobjectives. The firepower, mobility, and flexibilityprovided by OAS are critical to establish favorableconditions for close, deep, and rear operations.

OAS operations must be carefully planned tomaximize OAS’s principal effects of neutralizationand destruction. The MCPP is used by the MAGTFand ACE and integrated vertically and horizontallythrough the OPT.

Commanders organize their staffs to gather, manageand process information critical to decisionmaking.The targeting cycle (D3A) provides a logical progres-sion of targeting solutions, while the MAGTF air task-ing cycle produces an organized and integrated airexecution plan in the form of an ATO. For operationsthat involve joint or combined forces, the six-step jointtargeting and air tasking cycles are used to assist inplanning joint air operations. In joint operations, theMAGTF will conform to joint cycles.

CHAPTER 5. OPERATIONS

The Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy emphasizes an integrated combined-arms approach that employs rapid, flexible maneuver. Maneuver warfare seeksto shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, andunexpected actions to gain a relative advantage. The advantage can be positional,temporal or psychological and creates a turbulent and rapidly deterioratingsituation for the enemy.

Marine aviation operates as an integral part of theMAGTF. The ACE is task-organized to specificallyprovide the MAGTF with the necessary mobility, flex-ibility, force protection, and fires. OAS, either fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, provides the MAGTF atrue combined-arms capability. The MAGTF com-mander uses his combined arms team to create a di-lemma for the enemy. If the enemy counteracts one,the enemy makes himself vulnerable to another. If theenemy cannot move or employ its forces or is unableor unwilling to sustain losses, the enemy’s initiativeand tempo are lost. For example, a DAS mission istasked with destroying a C2 facility. This target is col-located with a Fan-Song radar that supports SA-2s(SAM). The target is 450 miles from the forward oper-ating base and requires aerial refueling from KC-130s.As the strike package (AV-8Bs, F/A-18s, and EA-6B)approaches the target area, the Fan-Song radar targetsan AV-8B in the strike package. The EA-6B directsjamming and F/A-18s fire HARMs at the Fan-Song ra-dar. The enemy is now faced with a dilemma, continuetracking with the Fan-Song radar to support thelaunched SAM and have HARMs impact radar, havethe Fan-Song radar neutralized by jamming or shutdown the radar and be pulverized by precision-guidedweapons (PGWs) aimed at the C2 facility.

Both mission requirements and aircraft capabilitieswill drive the mix of aircraft required to accomplishcertain OAS missions. From the example above, theATO listed the respective units, aircraft, weaponeer-ing, support requirements, and designated the missioncommander to accomplish this mission. The KC-130provided the aerial refueling to get the aircraft to thetarget; the AV-8Bs destroyed the target with PGWs;and the F/A-18s and EA-6B provided SEAD withHARM and jamming. Appendix B lists different air-craft’s capabilities.

This chapter discusses fundamentals in the executionof OAS operations. See MCWP 3-23.1 and MCWP3-23.2 for detailed information on OAS operations.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Intelligence provides continuous updated informationto OAS operations during planning as well as priorto and during mission execution. These crucial inputsupdate target development by assessing enemy capa-bilities, centers of gravity, force dispositions, relation-ships, intentions, operations, vulnerabilities, defenses,enemy warfighting sustainability, passive defensemeasures, and possible enemy COA. Intelligence alsosupports OAS operations by providing environmentalassessments (such as effects adverse weather, dark-ness, and seasonal and temperature effects).

Intelligence through inflight reports and BDA may al-so provide us with the enemy’s location. Certainweapons require very specific target coordinates, suchas the JSOW and JDAM, to be effectively employed.These two types of munitions are GPS guided weap-ons and are only as accurate as their coordinates fromthe World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84) datum.The target location error (TLE) for these individualweapons needs to be within 7.5 meters for JSOW and7.2 meters for JDAM. The TLE is the combination oflinear (elevation) and circular (latitude and longitude)errors combined.

THREAT LEVELS

Threat levels determine OAS feasibility. The threethreat levels are low, medium, and high. There is no

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clear dividing line between the threat levels. Air de-fense systems that present a low or medium threat lev-el for one type of aircraft may present a high threatlevel for another type of aircraft. A medium threat lev-el during the daylight hours may be a low threat levelat night.

Current intelligence updates the threat levels for OASoperations. C2 requires accurate and timely intelli-gence updates to ensure effective OAS execution. Achange in threat level may force a DAS mission’s risklevel to be too unacceptably high without fighter es-cort or SEAD support. An immediate CAS missionmay be better suited for rotary-wing aircraft based ona lower threat level and use of economy of force, ascompared to a medium threat and more sorties re-quired if fixed-wing aircraft were utilized.

A change in threat level may also require a change intactics. For example, an OAS aircraft aborts his targetattack due to being targeted by a ZSU 23-4. Other air-craft in the strike package are able to flex from the pri-mary low altitude to a secondary medium altitudetarget attack to avoid the ZSU 23-4. This change inmedium altitude tactics has taken the ZSU 23-4 from ahigh threat to a low threat. Inversely, however, findingand destroying the target may be more difficult due tothe increase in altitude making target acquisition moredifficult and increasing weapon’s ballistic error.

Threat levels alone do not determine if an OAS mis-sion should be flown. See Air Force Tactics, Tech-niques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1, for a discussionof threat air defense assessment and planning.

l A low threat level allows OAS operations to pro-ceed without prohibitive interference. Aircrews arefree to select tactics that ensure effective use ofweapons systems and ordnance. A low threat im-plies that a sanctuary exists from which aircrew canoperate. This can be a vertical sanctuary fromwhich aviation assets can operate above the threator a lateral sanctuary from which aircraft can oper-ate using standoff.

l A medium threat level allows acceptable exposuretime of friendly aircraft to enemy air defenses. Thisthreat level can restrict OAS flexibility in the imme-diate target/objective area.

l A high threat level exists when the enemy has an airdefense system that includes integrated fire control

systems and electronic warfare capabilities. Thisthreat level severely affects the ability to conductOAS operations. In a high threat environment, air-craft are exposed to the threat throughout their timeof flight in the target area.

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

The ACE is tasked with providing MAGTF operationswith the six functions of Marine aviation. Both missionrequirements and aircraft capabilities will drive thetypes and numbers of aircraft required to accomplishOAS missions. During OAS operations, aircraft maybe tasked in direct support of AI missions or to providean airborne alert in a general support role for CAS andAR missions. Aircrews, as well as commanders andtactical air controllers, need to know how support re-quirements affect the performance of OAS missions.Mission planning identifies the threats and support re-quirements for OAS operations. Support requirementsare tasked through the ATO and executed by theTACC. The TACC provides functional interface foremployment of MAGTF aviation with joint and multi-national support assets. Support requirements duringOAS operations can consist of the following.

Fighter Escort

Since there is no way intelligence can predict where orwhen enemy fighters may attack, fighter escort aircraftprovide protection for OAS missions. Fighter escortaircraft provide prestrike sweeps, close escort, andcombat air patrols.

Prestrike sweeps clear a path free from enemy fightersthrough the target area for the OAS aircraft. The rangeat which the prestrike sweep is in front of OAS aircraftis dependent on the threat and commander’s guidance.

Close escort fighters maintain contact with OAS air-craft. This type of escort provides better situationawareness for both fighters and OAS aircraft as toeach other’s location, as well as the threat’s positionrelative to them, in the battlespace.

Combat air patrols (CAPs) provide OAS aircraft afighter escort, normally from a roving or fixed location


in the battlespace. The CAP is positioned to act as abarrier between OAS aircraft and enemy fighters.

Classified tactical manuals contain the strengths andweaknesses when utilizing these different types offighter escort tactics when performing OAS opera-tions. The following are employment considerations.

Offensive Air Support AircraftSelf-Defense CapabilityAlthough many of today’s OAS aircraft have a self-defense capability, providing a fighter escort will al-low more time for OAS aircrew to concentrate on air-to-ground tactics, while the fighter escort aircraft fo-cus on sanitizing the battlespace for air-to-air threats.When OAS aircraft provide their own self-defense,they are typically less effective due to higher fuel con-sumption rates, decreased maneuverability, and re-duced air-to-air ordnance loads while carrying air-to-ground ordnance.

Enemy Surveillance CapabilityClose escort aircraft may highlight the position of thestrike package; however, they have better situationalawareness on OAS aircraft. A prestrike sweep mayprovide an early warning to enemy air defenses butmay divert the enemy fighters away from OAS aircraft.

Enemy Air DefensesIf OAS aircraft are exposed to enemy air defense sys-tems, it is more than likely that the fighter escort air-craft may be exposed to the same threat. SEADsupport may only be sufficient to provide OAS aircraftprotection from the threat.

Rules of EngagementROE may limit or prohibit the circumstances underwhich beyond visual range (BVR) missiles may beemployed against enemy aircraft . Under veryrestrictive ROE, mission commanders and plannersneed to weigh the advantages and disadvantages ofhaving a prestrike sweep or close escort to providefighter support.

Electronic Warfare

EW aircraft protect OAS aircraft through electronicjamming and deception. Electronic jamming denies ordisrupts the enemy’s ability to detect or track OAS air-craft electronically. Electronic deception sends mis-

leading information about the OAS aircraft’s speed,altitude, size, and direction.

EW requires detailed integration and coordination toprotect OAS aircraft exposed to enemy threat air de-fenses. AI is typically the only OAS mission where de-tai led mission planning and coordination areconducted between EW and OAS aircrew. DuringCAS, AR, and SCAR missions, EW aircraft may betasked with an airborne alert to provide on-call or re-active EW support for OAS aircraft.

The following are some considerations for EW sup-port during OAS operations:

l Preemptive EW is superior to reactive EW.

l Tactics and electronic countermeasures for unantic-ipated threats.

l Tactics and standing operating procedures tosimplify EW coordination in OAS mission’s otherthan AI.

l The length of time EW support is available for OASaircraft.

l Enemy fighters capability to degrade EW support.

l EW interference with communication, aircraft weap-on systems and EW suites, and weapons.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SEAD reduces attrition of OAS aircraft by degradingthe effectiveness of enemy air defense systems. SEADuses supporting arms (i.e., artillery, naval gunfire,J-weapons, and aircraft) and other available means(i.e., GCE or EW) to deter, suppress, or destroy the en-emy. SEAD is integrated with not only OAS aircraft,but also supporting aircraft during OAS missions.SEAD aircraft integrated into OAS missions may beenough to change the enemy’s normal air defense op-erating procedures. HARMs and antiradiation missiles(ARM) can suppress or destroy radar sites. The fol-lowing are some SEAD fundamentals required to sup-port OAS aircraft:

l SEAD effects are short-lived, and OAS aircraftneed to minimize their time exposed to enemyair defenses.

l Adhere to OAS aircraft’s routing of flight and tim-ing to maximize SEAD effects.

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l SEAD is a suppression tactic not a destruction tacticfor enemy air defenses.

l Preemptive SEAD provides the best protection forOAS aircraft.

l Limited SEAD weapons may require reactiveSEAD tactics.

Tankers

OAS support requirements depend upon the mission.Aerial tankers are required when targets and operatingareas are far from the OAS operating bases. Tankersmay also be required to provide an airborne alert insupport of OAS missions.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance can provide BDA and target locationsfor OAS missions. It may satisfy requests forinformation (RFIs), intelligence requirements per-taining to targets, target areas, threat capabilities,terrain, and weather.

Deception

Deception techniques can be used against enemy ra-dars, communications intelligence (COMINT) sites,and other enemy assets. Effectively executed decep-tion tactics draw the enemy’s interest and forces awayfrom OAS aircraft and its intended target area. Somedeception techniques are listed below:

l Chaff corridor to deny enemy radar operator’s cov-erage.

l EW techniques to present false targets to enemy ra-dars.

l Use aircraft to make misleading transmissions todeceive enemy COMINT sites.

l Decoy aircraft or drones are used to pose a threatfrom a different direction than the actual threat.

l Preemptive changes in altitude and heading to avoidenemy air defenses.

Confusion

Confusion can deny or delay the enemy’s ability to an-alyze the OAS threat and to take appropriate action.OAS aircraft use EW, chaff, aircraft maneuvering, de-

ception, and concurrent ground operations to maskOAS objectives.

Operations Security

The less information the enemy has concerning OASoperations, the easier it is to conduct successful decep-tion and confusion. Operations security (OPSEC) maybe compromised by the use of the following:

l Radios, radars, radar altimeters or other emissions.l Flight profiles which place OAS aircraft in enemy

search or early warning radar coverage areas.l The inability for OAS aircraft to use secure voice

communication capabilities.l Predictable flight profiles which place OAS aircraft

in danger of enemy air defense systems.

Support requirements can greatly affect the success ofany OAS mission. These supporting elements allowOAS aircraft to arrive in the target area and safely re-turn to base. Supporting elements degrade the enemy’sair defense capability and reduce the number of air-craft exposed to the threat. They also enhance air-crew’s target acquisition, ordnance delivery accuracy,and target area tactics.

The combination of OAS aircraft and support aircraftrequires close coordination to be effective. AI mis-sions may have the luxury of detailed planning and co-ordination prior to the execution of their mission;however, SCAR, AR, and CAS missions are morethan likely going to have to coordinate airborne, rely-ing on tactical procedures or SOPs to suppress or de-stroy the enemy’s air defense threat.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

OAS is an integral part of the MAGTF combined armsteam. The MAGTF performs OAS missions duringday, night, and all-weather conditions. Dependence onOAS increases when—

l Targets are beyond the range of other supportingarms.

l Air attack is more appropriate.l Other supporting arms are not available.


An aircraft’s capability to perform OAS is determinedby the aircraft’s weapon systems and ordnance load.By matching the best aircraft and ordnance capable ofdestroying, delaying, disrupting or diverting the ene-my forces, economy of force is ensured in MAGTFoperations. One aircraft may have a far superior on-board weapon systems capability to detect enemyforces; however, it may not have the best ordnanceload for the desired effects against the enemy.

The following is an example of using economy offorce to determine which aircraft is best suited to ac-cept an immediate CAS mission against a convoy ofenemy armored personnel carriers (APCs). The DASChas two sections on station, one section of F/A-18s andone section of AH-1Ws. Both sections have checkedin “as fragged” from the ATO. The ATO tasked the F/A-18 section to be loaded with MK-82s and the sec-tion of AH-1Ws to be loaded with PGMs. By match-ing the appropriate ordnance load to the target, thesection with PGMs would be the first choice due tothis type of ordnance being better suited against ar-mored vehicles.

Sometimes the best aircraft weapon system or ord-nance load will not be available for immediate em-ployment in CAS or AR against time sensitive targets.However, from the example above, if all that wasavailable was a section of F/A-18s with MK-82’s, theenemy may still be disrupted, neutralized or delayed insupport of the ground commander’s scheme of maneu-ver or MAGTF commander’s targeting priorities forAR missions.

C2 seeks to optimize the use of limited OAS assets tomeet the commander’s objectives. See appendix A andappendix B for more information.

Capabilities

OAS’s principal advantage is the ability to attack tar-gets other supporting arms cannot. Aircraft delivergreat destructive power and can neutralize or destroyheavily fortified positions and point targets. OAS of-fers the following capabilities.

Variety of AttackAircraft can perform a variety of attacks. This allowsaircrews to perform attacks suited for target acquisi-tion and employment of ordnance against the target.

An aircraft’s ability to attack a target from any direc-tion increases OAS flexibility. Aircraft can carry awide variety of ordnance, allowing them to neutralizetargets that interfere with MAGTF operations.

Observation Aircrews performing OAS missions can observe largeareas and relay information concerning enemy activityin areas hidden from ground observation. This capabil-ity aids MAGTF units in locating the enemy. An OASaircrews’ ability to find, observe, and attack the enemyis a significant advantage over other firepower systems.

ResponsivenessAn aircraft’s ability to mass rapidly at the desiredpoint provides surprise, shock, and violence out ofproportion to actual numbers. Aircraft can concentratein the objective area from dispersed locations, allow-ing a commander to bring overwhelming firepower tobear on the enemy. Diverting OAS aircraft from onemission to another allows the MAGTF to take advan-tage of fleeting battlefield opportunities.

FlexibilityAircraft control is highly flexible. FACs or FAC(A)scan provide terminal control of OAS missions. If re-quired, control can shift from one agency to another.Aviation’s ability to integrate with other supportingarms enhances the MAGTF’s combined arms options.

Radius of ActionAircraft can operate from forward operating bases(FOBs), aircraft carriers or amphibious platforms. In-flight refueling, rapid ground refueling or forwardarming and refueling point (FARP) operations extendthe normal combat radius of support aircraft.

Firepower and MobilityAircraft firepower and mobility permit a wide spec-trum of attacks. Attacks can range from a single air-craft against many targets to many aircraft against asingle, vital target. Independence from terrain obsta-cles, such as rivers, hills, etc., and speed provide air-craft with a mobility advantage over surface-bornesupporting arms.

AccuracyModern aircraft systems and weapons allow accuratelocation and delivery of firepower. Flight computers,precision navigation equipment, and other aircraft sys-

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tems allow accurate delivery of unguided ordnance.Precision-guided weapons (laser-guided weapons,electro-optical-guided weapons, and GPS-guidedweapons) allow for pinpoint accuracy. Accuracy al-lows aircraft to attack moving targets and targets closeto friendly troops without endangering personnel. Theability to locate and deliver accurate firepower greatlyreduces the number of aircraft and sorties required toneutralize or destroy a target.

AvailabilityAviation should provide the maximum number of air-craft required to support MAGTF operations. Main-taining aircraft in an alert status during the assaultpermits parts or all of an aviation unit to be directedagainst a critical target with minimum delay. Avail-ability also depends on basing considerations (seabas-ing, FOB operations) and location.

Morale FactorAircraft can improve the morale of friendly troops anddestroy the morale of enemy forces. The MAGTFcommander should exploit the psychological effectsof OAS efforts to greatly reduce the will of enemyforces to continue, especially when faced with theprospects of having to also defend against subsequentmaneuver operations.

Limitations

OAS limitations must be considered during operationsto maximize its effectiveness. The following are someconsiderations specific to OAS.

Limited VisibilityDarkness and periods of limited visibility (smoke,haze, sunrise, and sunset) present the greatest limita-tions to OAS. FLIR, radar, NVDs, and GPS are avail-able, but cannot duplicate unlimited visibility anddaylight conditions.

WeatherWeather may drive a typical low threat-level missionto a high threat-level mission. Weather is a limitingfactor that many commanders have overlooked in pasthistory. OAS needs favorable weather for proper, effi-cient, and safe execution. The true all-weather capabil-i ty that OAS aircraf t provide to the MAGTFcommander may be limited to AI missions due toGPS-guided weapons being the only viable ordnance

employment opportunity. CAS, AR, and SCAR maybe prohibited for days due to poor weather conditions.Weather can inhibit aircrews’ ability to positivelyidentify targets, employ ordnance or avoid terrain.

Target IdentificationTarget identification, especially targets close to friend-ly forces, is one of the most difficult problems forOAS aircrews. Targets must be identified visually,with maps, aerial imagery, aircraft sensors or systems(FLIR, radar, NVDs, laser), accurate target coordi-nates and elevation (GPS-guided weapons) or accuratetarget description (talk-on). Use of target marking willenhance rapid and positive target identification.

Time On StationAn aircraft’s time on station depends on many factors(e.g., distance from base to target area, fuel consump-tion, ordnance load, fuel reserves). Aircraft operatingat low altitude burn more fuel, so in an attempt to re-duce fuel use and increase time on station, aircraft mayorbit or hold at high altitudes (dependent on threat lev-el) or conserve fuel by landing or ground turning if re-quired (rotary-wing) while awaiting a mission.

Radius of ActionFuel on board limits radius of action. Increasing theordnance load beyond a certain point reduces theamount of fuel an aircraft is able to carry. Refueling,while airborne or at FOBs, reduces this limitation butrequires additional coordination and logistical support.

CommunicationsCoordination of OAS missions with the fire and ma-neuver of MAGTF forces requires reliable, secure, andredundant radio communications. Real-time informa-tion is crucial and cannot be overemphasized. Withoutprompt and accurate information, OAS missions maynot achieve the desired effect on the enemy.

ResourcesAircraft and aircrew need turnaround time for OASmissions. This time includes the requirement to get in-telligence updates, brief, coordinate with other units,aircraft turnaround (refuel, load ordnance, and ser-vice), and crew rest. As a general rule, it typicallytakes about one squadron worth of aircrew and aircraftto perform a 24-hour mission, assuming that the mis-sion only requires a section (two) of aircraft on stationat any given time.


Enemy DefensesEnemy defenses can affect the range and effectivenessof OAS missions due to additional fuel requirementsand support aircraft required for self-defense. SEADmay be required against enemy SAMs and AAA. Aprestrike sweep, combat air patrol (CAP), or close es-cort of fighters may be required against enemy fighters.

REACTIVE WEAPONEERING

Precise planning has always been a critical part of anyattack mission, but such planning takes time that isnormally in short supply. During OAS operationsFACs, FAC(A)s, and aircrew may have to quickly re-act to exploit success on the battlefield.

Reactive weaponeering improves the air-deliveredordnance effectiveness during CAS and AR missions.Generally, weaponeering for CAS and AR is not tai-lored for a specific target but is designed based on theeffectiveness against a variety of target sets. OAS air-craft may be tasked with SCLs listed in the ATO in an-ticipation of certain target sets they are likely toengage in the battlespace. The overall objective of re-active weaponeering is to optimize the use of air-delivered ordnance, minimize effort and exposure tothe threat, and maximize target destruction.

TACTICS

OAS missions revolve around en route, ingress, attack,and egress tactics. These tactics are dependent uponseveral conditions (e.g., weather, threat, visibility,range, timing, terrain, night). During the execution ofOAS operations, the mission commander or flightleads may determine it is more beneficial to changethe game plan or alter tactics to increase the probabili-ty for mission success.

En Route

En route tactics can be high, medium or low altitude.The tactical considerations as to which altitude shouldbe flown depend on the enemy’s air defense capabili-ty, range, weather, enemy radar detection, aircrew’s

workload, and radio communication, etc. En route tac-tics are normally associated when aircraft cross theforward edge of the battle area (FEBA) until they ar-rive at the contact point.

Ingress

Ingress tactics apply from arrival at the contact pointor until the target attack phase begins at the initialpoint. Ingress tactics take into account the sameconsiderations as en route tactics. Timing, easilyidentifiable terrain and cultural features, andnavigational update points are other essential concernsfor easing the transition from the en route phase to theattack phase.

Attack

Attack tactics for OAS missions are typically thephase that encompasses the initial point or battle posi-tion to munitions impacting the target. Attack tacticsvary according to the type of OAS aircraft and type ofairborne ordnance being employed. Tactics range fromlow altitude pops, medium altitude dive deliveries, andhigh altitude level deliveries for fixed-wing aircraft,and hover and fire from battle positions for rotary-wing aircraft. The overriding factor that drives attacktactics is target acquisition. If aircrews are unable toidentify the target, either positively or through reason-able assurance, they will not be able neutralize or de-stroy the target. More discussion on GPS-guidedweapons (JDAM and JSOW) and future employmentconsiderations is in chapter 6. Other factors that willaffect attack tactics are terrain, weather, enemy air de-fense capabilities, and visibility, etc.

Egress

Egress tactics reduce OAS aircraft exposure to enemyair defenses and provide for mutual support betweenelements. Egress tactics deny engagements by enemyair defenses and provide self-defense capabilities, andmutual support between formations through hostileterritory. Other factors that will affect egress tacticsare terrain, weather, enemy air defense capabilities,visibility, etc. More information on OAS tactics aredetailed in the MCWP 3-23.1, MCWP 3-23.2, individ-ual aircraft tactical manuals, and Strike Leader AttackTraining Syllabus (SLATS) Notebook.

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DEEP AIR SUPPORT

DAS allows the MAGTF commander to shape the bat-tlespace. DAS disrupts the enemy’s operational cycle,forces premature deployment of forces, and deniessanctuary. It also may delay enemy reinforcements;degrade critical enemy functions or capabilities (C2,air support, logistic); manipulate enemy perceptions;attack enemy formations, lines of communications,and C2 centers. By itself, DAS is ineffective. DAS iseffective when integrated with other MAGTF opera-tions that force the enemy to accelerate the consump-tion of his essential resources and forces him out of hisobserve, orient, decide, act; observation, orientation,decision, action (OODA) loop. The following are con-siderations during DAS execution:

l Timing. A common reference time is essential foraccomplishing the high degree of coordination nec-essary for effective DAS, especially when conduct-ing AI missions.

l Security. Standard cryptologic and authenticationprocedures are contained in the OPORD, ATO, andSPINS. These procedures ensure the safe conductof DAS operations.

l Check-in. Check-in procedures establish the requiredflow of information between aircrews and controlagencies.

l Deconfliction. DAS missions are deconflictedthrough positive and procedural controls. Armed re-connaissance areas (ARAs), minimum-risk routes(MRRs), and timing and target areas are a fewmethods for deconflicting aircraft in the AO.

l Target marking. Although not required for DASmissions, SCAR platforms may be able to mark tar-gets or verbally “talk-on” AR aircraft onto targets.This will expedite both target acquisition and air-craft attacking the target.

l Attack control. The approval to deliver airbornemunitions during DAS missions from the supportedFSCC is not required, obtained prior to takeoff or insome cases obta ined pr ior to en ter ing thecontrolling FSCC’s AOR. SCAR platforms are notqualified FAC(A)s and, therefore, do not issueclearance to drop/fire. Positive identification orreasonable assurance is required guidance foraircrews to deliver ordnance.

l BDA. Accurate BDA is critical for determining iftargets should be reattacked and also updates theenemy order of battle.

l Night/limited visibility DAS. Aircrew require ahigh degree of proficiency when conducting DASunder night or adverse weather conditions. Theseconditions depend heavily on systems and sensors.There are three general categories of night/limited-visibility employment:

n Visual employment must rely on lower ambientlight conditions, battlefield fires or artificial illu-mination to successfully target attacks.

n System-aided relies on radar, laser, FLIR, andtelevision (TV) systems for target acquisitionduring night and in adverse weather conditions.

n NVDs allow aircrew to detect and attack targetsat night.

l DAS with laser-guided systems. Laser-guidedsystems provide the MAGTF with the ability tolocate and engage high-priority targets with anincreased first-round hit probability. While laser-guided systems provide additional capabilities, theydo have distinct limitations.

For additional information on DAS operations, seeMCWP 3-23.2.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

CAS provides the MAGTF with flexible, responsivefire support and is able to accurately employ a widerange of weapons. CAS can surprise the enemy andcreate opportunities for the maneuver or advancementof ground forces. CAS is equally suited to support of-fensive and defensive operations to include MOOTW.More importantly, CAS may at times be the only sup-porting arm available to the commander. The follow-ing are considerations during CAS execution:

l Timing. A common reference time is essential foraccomplishing the high degree of coordination nec-essary for effective CAS.

l Security. Standard cryptologic and authenticationprocedures are contained in the OPORD, ATO, andSPINS. These procedures ensure the safe conductof CAS operations.


l Check-in. Check-in procedures establish the requiredflow of information between aircrew and controlagencies.

l CAS briefing form. This form is better known asthe “nine-line brief.” It is the U.S. standard brief forall aircraft conducting CAS. The NATO CAS brief-ing consists of a ten-line briefing format.

l Target marking. The aircrews ability to locate thetarget is aided by the supporting units ability tomark the target.

l Final attack control. Terminal controllers providethe following functions during the final attack:

n Corrections from the mark to locate the target.

n Clearance to drop/fire.

n Reasonable assurance.

n Reattacks.

n Abort procedures.

l BDA. Accurate BDA is critical for determining iftargets should be reattacked and also updates theenemy order of battle.

l Night/limited visibility CAS. Terminal controllersand aircrew require a high degree of proficiencywhen conducting CAS under night or adverseweather conditions. These conditions depend heavi-ly on systems and sensors. There are three generalcategories of night/limited-visibility employment:

n Visual employment must rely on lower ambientlight conditions, battlefield fires or artificial illu-mination to successfully attack targets.

n System-aided relies on radar, laser, FLIR, andTV systems for target acquisition during nightand in adverse weather conditions.

n NVDs allow aircrew to detect and attack targetsat night.

l CAS with laser-guided systems. Laser-guided sys-tems provide the MAGTF with the ability to locateand engage high-priority targets with an increasedfirst-round hit probability. While laser-guided sys-tems provide additional capabilities, they do havedistinct limitations.

For additional information on CAS operations, seeMCWP 3-23.1.

BASING MODES

OAS aircraft may be operationally based in a numberof ways. The more traditional basing modes includemain operating bases on land and seabasing aboard na-val ships afloat. Fixed-base and shipboard deploymentgenerally offers the widest range of available ord-nance, mission equipment, logistic support, etc., butthese locations are often well removed form the battlearea. As a result, aircraft may have farther to fly toreach OAS target areas and have a longer turnaroundtime between missions. In addition to using main oper-ating bases and ships, aircraft can be deployed toFOBs and FARPs.

Forward deployment of OAS aircraft offers severaladvantages. Operating from locations close to the bat-tle area can increase loiter time in the objective area,extend effective combat radius, and, perhaps most im-portantly, make the OAS firepower more responsive tothe MAGTF commander by shortening the responsetime. Preplanned logistic support is vital to ensure thatsufficient ammunition, fuel, and servicing equipmentare in position and ready for use when needed. FARPsare one method of employing FOBs.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Modern military operations are becoming increasinglyinvolved in MOOTW. OAS operations in MOOWTinvolve situations other than large-scale, sustainedmilitary operations. MOOTW focuses on deterringwar, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and support-ing civil authorities in response to domestic crises. Asin war, MOOTW’s goals are to achieve national objec-tives as quickly as possible and to conclude the opera-tions on terms that are favorable to the United Statesand its allies.

As in all military operations, commanders will focuson a center of gravity in MOOTW. OAS missions willbe oriented to exert influence on the center of gravity.The MOOTW environment is unique in that it cantransition quickly from combat to noncombat and back

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again and often has constraints on the forces, weapons,tactics employed, and the level of violence.

Depending on the environment, mission, and locationof MOOTW operations, the degree of control mayneed to be more rigorous, and the ROE may need to bemore restrictive than for higher scale operations. Con-sequently, in MOOTW environments prone to suchdynamic change, all air missions, including bothfixed- and rotary-wing of all components, must appearon the appropriate ATO and/or flight plan. In addition,aircraft may have to monitor a common frequency andoperate on designated identification, friend or foe(IFF) modes and codes.

Aircraft may operate without an ATO mission numberin high-density aircraft environments, such as in aproperly designated high-density airspace control zone(HIDACZ) or amphibious objective area published onthe ACO. This type of rigorous control is necessaryduring such MOOTW because the mix of friendly, en-emy, and neutral aircraft and mission constraints re-quires the commander to strictly control flights in theAOR/JOA (i.e., peace operations).

To achieve their objectives in MOOTW, commandersmay utilize OAS. See JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Mili-tary Operations Other Than War, for more specific in-formation on different types of MOOTW that arelisted below:

l Arms control. l Combatting terrorism. l DOD support to counterdrug operations. l Enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept opera-

tions. l Enforcing exclusion zones. l Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight. l Humanitarian assistance. l Military support to civil authorities. l Nation assistance, support to counterinsurgency. l Noncombatant evacuation operations. l Peace operations. l Protection of shipping. l Recovery operations. l Show of force operations. l Strikes and raids. Support to insurgency.

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Joint air operations are performed with air capabilities/forces made available by other service components insupport of the JFC’s operation or campaign objectivesor in support of other components of the joint force.The JFC has the authority to exercise operational con-trol, assign missions, direct coordination among sub-ordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces toensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of theoverall mission. The JFACC will use the JFC’s guid-ance and authority in coordination with other assignedor supporting commanders. As a result, the MAGTF injoint and multinational operations may have OASfrom both organic USMC direct support capabilities/forces and those capabilities/forces allocated to it bythe JFACC.

More information about air support in a joint force canbe found in JP 0-2, JP 3-0, JP 3-56.1, JP 3-09, andMCWP 3-25. Marine aviation forces capable of OASin the joint environment are not exempted from JFCup-front tasking. The JFC may redirect MAGTF sor-ties for air defense, reconnaissance, long-range AI, aswell as for AR or SCAR if the JFC determines thatthey are required for higher priority missions than forCAS. The JFACC is the supported commander for theJFC’s overall AI effort. Detailed information on AIand CAS in the joint environment is contained inJP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations,JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Close Air Support (CAS), Air Force DoctrinalDocument 2-1.3, Counterland (Draft), and JP 3-56.1,Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Amphibious Assaults

The principle supporting arms in amphibious opera-tions are aviation, naval gunfire, and artillery. OASoperations needed to support an amphibious assaultwill be outlined in the air plan annex of the OPLAN.Because amphibious OAS missions are usually in high


demand, the fire support plan should complement theuse of aviation, naval gunfire, and artillery fires.

Prior to D-day, OAS will largely be responsible forshaping the battlespace. Missions that OAS aircraftmay perform in advance of the amphibious task forcelanding are neutralization or destruction of enemyforces within the landing area, interdiction of enemyforces capable of interfering with the assault landings,and airborne delivery of mines.

On D-day, OAS aircraft will be the primary supportingarm for the landing force while artillery is movingashore. Naval gunfire may be limited by its rangewhen employing ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM)tactics from over the horizon. Missions that OAS air-craft may perform on D-day are pre-H-hour neutraliza-tion of beaches, drop zones, and helicopter landingzones, preplanned and immediate CAS, SCAR, AR,and AI. Post D-day, OAS operations will most likelyconsist of CAS missions in support of tactical objec-tives, and DAS missions that shape the battlespace forsubsequent operations.

OAS missions will be from aircraft capable shipswhen using OMFTS concepts. The air plan will be ori-ented toward missions that have the aircraft returningto the sea base for turnaround maintenance and crewchanges, with the possibility of using FARPs ashore.The distance from the sea base to the objective and theaircraft endurance must be balanced against the re-quired response time. OAS missions may be augment-ed by joint and coalition aircraft that are both land-based and sea-based on an aircraft carrier. Their inclu-sion places responsibility on the MAGTF for ensuringgood communications and coordination with OASaugmentation forces.

Amphibious Raids

Amphibious raids are conducted as independent opera-tions or in support of other operations, such as anotherlanding, land operations or air or naval operation. De-pending on the purpose of the raid, they may be con-ducted by stealth or appropriately supported so thatthey resemble the early stages of an amphibious as-sault. An amphibious raid is planned and executed inthe same general manner as an amphibious assault, ex-cept a raid always includes provision for withdrawalof the raid force. Surprise is essential for the success of

an amphibious raid. Therefore, OAS missions prior toa raid will most likely be either absent or limited tothose few that are essential for success. Amphibiousraids are well rehearsed, with limited objectives and ofshort duration. Therefore, fire support planning can bemore detailed and of less volume than for that requiredfor an amphibious assault. The need for surprise andthe distance to the objective may conspire to make avi-ation fires the primary fire support for a raid.

Using OMFTS concepts, STOM tactics lend them-selves to amphibious raids, especially when employ-ing assault support aircraft from over the horizon.OAS missions in this environment will be most usefulwhen planned to interdict critical targets just prior tothe raid, and provide fires on the landing zone/objec-tive for the landing force. OAS missions should beplanned to be available for the duration of the raid, in-cluding the withdrawal.

Amphibious Demonstrations

The amphibious demonstration is intended to confusethe defender as to time, place or strength of the mainoperation. An amphibious demonstration normally in-cludes the approach of demonstration forces to thedemonstration area, at least a part of the ship-to-shoremovement, and employment of supporting fires. Abrief but intense preliminary bombardment by navalgunfire will usually be the preferred fire support for ademonstration. Because of the requirement for thedemonstration force to execute supporting fires of anature and scope that ensures credibility, OAS mis-sions may be conducted. However, the danger of los-ing an aircraft and crew or capture of aircrewsupporting an amphibious demonstration may curtailOAS missions in support of those operations.

Amphibious Withdrawals

Amphibious withdrawals are conducted to disengageforces for employment elsewhere. They may be con-ducted under enemy pressure or voluntarily. With-drawal begins with establishment of defensivemeasures in the embarkation area and ends when allelements of the force have been extracted and em-barked or re-embarked on designated shipping. Withrespect to OAS planning, amphibious withdrawals arecharacterized by having abridged planning processes,curtailed fire support means, and circumstances that

5-12 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

may render it advisable to conduct the operations un-der adverse weather and limited visibility conditions.

During an amphibious withdrawal, OAS missions willbe instrumental in interdicting deep targets, and cover-ing the withdrawal of the heavy elements such as artil-lery and tanks. The withdrawal of heavy elementsusually will take place under cover of darkness. Theprimary difference for fire support in an amphibiousassault versus an amphibious withdrawal is that in theassault, supporting arms and control facilities are pro-gressively built up ashore, whereas, in a withdrawal,supporting arms and control facilities are progressive-ly decreased ashore until all functions are performedafloat. Sea-based OAS assets will be vital in providingcover to the dwindling forces ashore.

SUMMARY

Effective OAS operations begin with accurate andtimely intelligence. This information is critical for tar-get development as well as situational updates onthreats and the environment. Support requirements can

vary from one to any combination of: fighter escort,electronic warfare, SEAD, tankers, reconnaissance,deception, confusion, and operations security.

OAS has the capability to reach targets beyond therange of other supporting arms or when supportingarms are not available. OAS also has its limitations toinclude number of assets, availability, time on station,and ability to operate in adverse weather conditions.

DAS provides the MAGTF commander the ability toshape the deep battlespace. CAS provides flexible andresponsive fire support in coordination with friendlyground units in the close and rear battlespace. Forwardbasing allows OAS aircraft to reduce their responsetime and increase their time on station in support ofMAGTF objectives.

Since the end of the Gulf War, Marine OAS continuesto support joint and multinational operations inMOOTW around the world. The future warfightingconcept of expeditionary maneuver warfare (EMW)will take OAS doctrine well into the 21st century insupport of the MAGTF.

CHAPTER 6. EMERGING CONCEPTS AND CAPABILITIES

Seabasing of OAS aircraft requires detailed advance planning. Due to limiteddeck space, the planning staff will need to determine the number and type of air-craft required to accomplish a mission prior to assembling the time-phased forceand deployment data (TPFDD). OAS assets may compete with assault support as-sets for deck space in a sea-based scenario. Using the EMW concept, OAS aircraftmay operate exclusively off an aircraft carrier or other amphibious platform.

Future developments concerning fighting in built-upor urban areas will change OAS tactics. Newequipment may be developed to minimize collateraldamage of both infrastructure and people. Newweapons may be introduced to solve this problem oruse of precision-guided munitions may be employed.Advances in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) mayevolve to the point where Marines fighting in urbanareas will direct fires from an uninhabited combat airvehicle circling in an overhead station instead ofcalling for manned aircraft.

Experiences in Mogadishu and Chechnya have shownthat the urban environment is especially dangerous forrotary-wing aircraft operations. The lethality of enemyfires employed from concealed locations may preventrotary-wing assets from prosecuting urban targets witha reasonable margin of safety. Fixed-wing OAS air-craft may be more difficult to target by enemy air de-fenses in an urban environment due to their greaterspeed and altitude capability. However, these abilitiesby fixed-wing aircraft to avoid the threat also make itmore difficult for them to identify targets.

EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE

EMW is the Marine Corps capstone operationalwarfighting concept for the 21st century. EMWapplies the philosophy of maneuver warfare and ourexpeditionary culture to Marine Corps operationsacross the spectrum of potential 21st century conflict.This capstone concept specifies necessary capabilitiesto organize, deploy, and employ Marine forces acrossthe spectrum of conflict and enables a single,integrated force in conjunction with the Navy. Itprovides for more effective strategic agility byexpanding our current capabilities to a more scalable,

expeditionary, forward presence, combined arms forcethat is organized, trained, and equipped to projectsustainable power ashore without reliance on host-nation infrastructure or support.

EMW will also expand our operational reach from ex-peditionary sites to objectives further within the the-ater of operation and increase tactical flexibility tosequence from one mission profile to another withoutneeding to reorganize, re-equip or retrain.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

The joint strike fighter (JSF) program will provide theMarine Corps’ next generation aircraft, replacing theAV-8B and F/A-18C/D with a single STOVL plat-form. It will solve the tactical aircraft age and attritionproblems and meet Marine aviation’s goal to neck-down to a single type of fixed-wing aircraft. But moreimportantly, the JSF program will provide the MarineCorps with a superior performance, stealthy, state-of-the-art, multimission jet aircraft that can operate withfull mission loads from amphibious class ships or aus-tere expeditionary airfields. To maintain the MarineCorps’ force-in-readiness responsibilities, Marine avi-ation must sustain the OAS capabilities of its legacyaircraft until they are replaced. The JSF’s combinationof stealth, basing flexibility, and superior performancewill revolutionize OAS.

WEAPONS

The road map for precision weapons leads to JDAMs,JSOWs, and future improvements to the family ofJDAM and JSOW variants. JDAM and JSOW have

6-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

GPS/inertial navigation system (INS) guidance thatprovides the capability of an accurate weapon in allweather, day or night, giving it a true precisioncapability. With the introduction of these GPS-guidedweapons (GGWs), ground commanders can nowschedule preplanned OAS missions, either on-callor scheduled, and not be restricted by previousweather limitations that were imposed on MAGTFOAS aircraft.

JDAM is a variant of the 1,000 and 2,000-pound gener-al purpose bomb. JSOW has variants of antiarmor andantipersonnel cluster munitions, as well as a variant ofthe general purpose bombs. Both types of GGWs pos-sess the capability for aircrews to release the ordnanceand have the ordnance successfully guide to the targetwithout the aircrews ever seeing the target.

These two families will replace laser-guided weaponsand complement cluster and general-purpose muni-tions. As these GGWs continue to increase the capa-bilities for OAS employment, their new capabilitieshave some of the following limitations:

Target Location Error

These weapons require a TLE of less than 55 feet inthe horizontal plane and 75 feet in the vertical plane tobe effectively employed. Until the target location, des-ignation, and hand-off system (TLDHS) is fielded byTACPs, GPS/INS-guided weapons will be limited toAI and preplanned CAS missions. Immensurated coor-dinates within the TLE for GGWs are currently ob-tained for AI and CAS mission planning throughimagery obtained on targets or target areas in the bat-tlespace. CAS, AR, and SCAR aircraft currently donot possess the capability to accurately locate targetswithin the maximum TLE for these weapons.

Reasonable Assurance

These weapons are only as accurate as the target coor-dinates that the weapons receive from the host aircraft.The inaccuracy of the coordinates that JDAM andJSOW receive reflects the circular error probable(CEP) that these weapons may miss their target. Dur-ing conditions that preclude aircrew from positivelyidentifying the target, supported ground commandersonly available option for CAS may be through the em-ployment of GGWs with reasonable assurance on the

TLE. The supported ground commander assumes theacceptable risk level in allowing aircrews to attack tar-gets by releasing ordnance without positive control.Reasonable assurance is not a routine procedure. Pre-cise guidelines for the use of reasonable assurancewhen employing GGWs will need to be establishedand distributed throughout the MAGTF and support-ing forces. One of these guidelines will be the require-ment to establish GGWs risk estimate distances tofriendly ground forces when employing these weaponsin close proximity to friendly ground forces duringCAS operations. See MCWP 3-23.1 for more informa-tion on positive control and reasonable assurance.

Nonfixed or Mobile Targets

GGWs are currently employed on fixed targets. Tar-gets that have the capability to move during the timeof flight of the weapon may not be affected by GGWs.GGWs currently are targeted at precise coordinatesand guide terminally to that point in the battle space.Until GGWs possess the capability to track movingtargets during the terminal phase of the weapon toimpact on the target, other munitions are better suitedfor employment against mobile targets. PGMs likehelicopterborne fire-and-forget missile (HELLFIRE);tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire command-linked guided missile (TOW); IR maverick; laser mav-erick; and LGBs, as well as nonprecision weapons likethe MK-20 Rockeye and general purpose bombs, willhave a better CEP (more effective), pose less of a riskfor fratricide, and be a more efficient use of limitedMAGTF aviation assets at engaging nonfixed ormobile targets.

THEATER BATTLE MANAGEMENT CORE SYSTEM

TBMCS is the follow-on program to the contingencyCTAPS. It is composed of a 27-workstation host sys-tem located in the TACC, with remotes locatedthroughout the MAGTF. Employed at the force andunit level, TBMCS provides the JFACC and subordi-nate staffs with a single point of access to real or nearreal time information and planning data necessary.TBMCS software can be divided into five functionalcategories: planning, execution management, resource


management, reporting and analysis (intelligence) andcommon tools.

TBMCS will provide the JFACC and subordinatestaffs with an automated spectrum of C2 capabilities,enabling the planning and execution of air operations.Within the MAGTF, TBMCS provides the ACEcommander the tools necessary to generate, dissemi-nate, and execute the ATO in a joint, coalition, andUSMC-only contingency. It is modular and scalable,allowing the commander the ability to supportATO requirements for any size MAGTF, to includeJFACC capability.

TARGET LOCATION, DESIGNATION, AND HAND-OFF SYSTEM

The TLDHS is a modular, man-portable equipmentsuite that will provide the ability to quickly acquiretargets in day, night, and near-all-weather visibilityconditions. When used in conjunction with the digitaladvanced communication terminal, operators will beable to accurately determine their own locations aswell as that of their targets, digitally transmit (hand-off) data to supporting arms elements, and designatetargets for laser-seeking, precision-guided munitions(PGMs) and laser spot trackers (LSTs). The TLDHSwill be fielded to FO teams, naval gunfire (NGF) spotteams, tactical air control parties (TACPs) and recon-naissance teams.

The TLDHS is composed of two subsystems: the tar-get locator, designator subsystem, which is the light-weight laser designator range-finder (LLDR), andtarget hand-off subsystem (THS). The LLDR and THScan be used independently or together as the TLDHSto provide the target location, designation, and hand-off capability.

TLDHS provides increased accuracy and timeliness offire support and improved effects of fires on target forsurface and air-delivered munitions. It also providesincreased operator mobility due to the reduction insize, weight, and modular design over existing sys-tems and reduction in fratricide due to accuracy of en-emy target location.

TLDHS is currently in the engineering, manufactur-ing, and development phase. IOC is scheduled forFY03 with FOC in FY05.

SUMMARY

The inherent flexibility of the Marine Corps combinedarms doctrine, maneuver warfare philosophy, expedi-tionary nature, and versatile C2 system create aMAGTF that is well prepared for the 21st century. Tomeet the challenges of the future, OAS doctrine con-tinues to evolve with new MAGTF operational capa-bilities. Changes to equipment bring an enhancedcapability to project power when and where it is need-ed, while new tactics enable the employment of OASaircraft and ordnance with maximum advantage.


APPENDIX A. ORDNANCE SELECTION GUIDE

This annex details associated families of weapons and preferred types of ordnance fortargets. For more detailed information on weapon capabilities, see JMEM/AS Weap-oneering Guide and individual aircraft tactical manuals.

Family Types of Ordnance

Aerial Mines MK-52MK-55MK-56

Antiradiation Missiles (ARMs) AGM-88 HARM

CBUs MK-20 RockeyeCBU-78 GatorAGM-154A/B JSOW (cluster versions)

GP Bombs MK 82, 83, 84

Incendiary Bombs FAE

Rockets and Guns 2.75” and 5” rockets20, 25, 30, 40, and 105 mm cannons

PGM AGM-65 IR & Laser MaverickAGM-84D HarpoonAGM-84E SLAMAGM-114 HellfireAGM-154A/B/C JSOW (C model is unitary version)BGM-71 TOWCALCMGBU 10, 12, 16, 24GBU-31 JDAM

Target Preferred Ordnance

Personnel CBUs and GP Bombs

Armored Vehicles PGMs, CBUs, GBUs

Field Artillery PGMs, GP Bombs, CBUs

Rockets and Surface-to-Surface Missiles PGMs, CBUs, GP Bombs

Antiaircraft Artillery (fixed-sites) PGMs, CBUs, GP Bombs

Antiaircraft Artillery (mobile) PGMs, CBUs, GP Bombs

Antiaircraft Artillery (mobile) PGMs, CBUs, GP Bombs

Runways GP Bombs

Aircraft in the open and revetted PGMs, CBUs, Guns, Rockets, GP Bombs

Aircraft shelters and bunkers Penetrating PGMs, GP Bombs, CBUs

Air-launched missile support facilities PGMs, GP Bombs

Air-launched missile support facilities PGMs, GP Bombs

Fortified fighting positions and concrete pillboxes

PGMs and GP Bombs with penetration capability

A-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

Target (Continued) Preferred Ordnance (Continued)

Simple log bunkers PGMs and GP Bombs with penetration capability

C3 centers and other hardened underground targets PGMs with penetrating warheads

Bridges PGMs, GP Bombs

Dams PGMs and GP Bombs with penetration capability

Locks PGMs and GP Bombs

Trucks and tracked prime movers CBUs, PGMs, GP Bombs

Route segments (highway and railroad) PGMs and GP Bombs for cratering

Railroad equipment and railyards PGMs and GP Bombs

Tunnels PGMs with penetration warheads

Ships ARMs, Harpoon, PGMs, CBUs

SAM systems (with central guidance radars) PGMs, ARMs, CBUs, GP Bombs

SAM systems (with standalone radars) PGMs, ARMs, CBUs, GP Bombs

SAM support facilities PGMs, GP Bombs

Radar sites PGMs, CBUs, GP Bombs, ARMs

Communication facilities (above ground) PGMs, GP Bombs

Communications vans and vehicles PGMs, CBUs, GP Bombs

Antennas GP Bombs, PGMs

Supply and POL facilities (supply storage) GP Bombs and CBUs with incendiary capability

Supply and POL facilities (in the open/buildings) GP Bombs and CBUs with incendiary capability

Supply and POL facilities (POL storage) GP Bombs, PGMs

POL pumping station GP Bombs, PGMs

Ports and naval bases PGMs, GP Bombs

POL refineries PGMs, GP Bombs

Ammunition production installations PGMs, GP Bombs

Light manufacturing and repair installations PGMs, GP Bombs

Above ground buildings PGMs, GP Bombs

Composite ground forces (CP, vehicles, fuel supply, ammo, support vehicles, etc.)

PGMs, CBUs

Power plants PGMs, GP Bombs, CBUs


APPENDIX B. AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND CAPABILITIES GUIDE

Aircraft Service Ordnance Laser Tracker

Laser Designator GPS Marking

CapabilityOther

Systems Comm

AV-8B USMC GBU1 GP Bombs CBU AGM-65 IR & Laser Maverick 2.75"/5.0”Rockets25mm Cannon LUU-2 Flares LUU-19 Flares

Yes 2 Yes3 Yes IR3 Rockets

FLIR NVG Radar4

UHF/VHF

A/OA-10A USAF GBU1

GP Bombs CBU Aerial Mines AGM-65 IR & Laser Maverick 2.75” Rockets 30mm Cannon LUU-1/-2 Flares LUU-5/-6 Flares

Yes No No Rockets NVG UHF/VHF

AC-130H/U USAF 105mm Howitzer 40 mm Cannon20 mm Cannon

No Yes5 Yes GLINT 105mm WP 105mm HE 40mm LTD

Beacon FLIR LLLTV Radar

UHF/VHF HF SATCOM

B-1B USAF GP Bombs No No No None Radar UHF/VHF HF SATCOM

B-52H USAF GP BombsAGM-142 CBU Aerial MinesTALCMAGM-84 Harpoon

No No Yes None Beacon FLIR LLLTV NVG Radar

UHF/VHF HF SATCOM

F-14 USN GBU GP Bombs CBU20mm CannonLUU- 2 Flares

No Yes No Laser Rockets

FLIR NVG Radar

UHF/VHF

F-15E USAF GBU GP Bombs AGM-130 AGM-65 IR Maverick AGM-154 JSOW CBU20mm Cannon

No Yes Yes Laser FLIR Radar

UHF/VHF

F-16 C/D & C/J

USAF GBU 6 GP BombsAGM-65 IR & Laser Maverick AGM-154 JSOW CBUAGM-88 HARM7

20mm Cannon

Yes Yes8 Yes9 Laser Rockets

LATRIN NVG Radar

UHF/VHF

B-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

Aircraft Service Ordnance Laser Tracker

Laser Designator GPS

Marking Capability

Other Systems Comm

F/A-18 A/C/D

USN A/C USMC A/C/D

GBU GP BombsAGM-65 IR10& Laser MaverickAGM-154 JSOW10 CBU-99GBU-31 JDAM11

2.75”/5.0” RocketsAGM-88 HARMAerial Mines20mm CannonLUU-2 FlaresLUU-19 FlaresAGM-84D Harpoon

Yes Yes Yes IR Pointer Laser Rockets

FLIR NVG Radar

UHF/VHF

S-3B USN GP Bombs CBU 2.75"/5.0” Rockets Aerial Mines LUU-2 FlaresAGM-84D Harpoon

No No No Rockets FLIR Radar

UHF/VHF

UH-1N USMC 7.62mm MG50cal MG2.75" Rockets

No No Yes IR Pointer Rockets

FLIR LRF NVG

UHF/VHF

AH-1F USA BGM-71 TOW 2.75” Rockets 20mm Cannon

No No No Rockets NVG UHF/VHF

AH-1W USMC BGM-71 TOWGM-114 Hellfire 2.75"/5.0” Rockets 20mm Cannon LUU-2 Flares

No Yes12 Yes IR Pointer Laser Rockets

CCDTV FLIR NVG

UHF/VHF

AH-64 A/D USA AGM-114 Hellfire 2.75” Rockets 30mm Cannon

Yes Yes 13 Yes Laser Rockets

DTV FLIR IDM NVG Radar

UHF/VHF

OH-58D USA AGM-114 Hellfire Yes Yes No Laser Rockets

FLIRNVGTVS

UHF/VHFHF

1 Though these aircraft can carry and release GBUs, only AV-8Bs with Litening II have an onboard designation capability for terminal guidance.

2 Only AV-8B night attack have this capability.3 Only AV-8B with Litening II capability.4 Only AV-8B with radar upgrade have this capability.5 AC-130H can only designate laser code 1688.6 F-16 without LANTIRN capability require off-board designation for terminal guidance.7 Only F-16 w/HTS (HARM targeting system).8 Only F-16 w/LANTIRN capability.9 GPS on some aircraft (Blocks 40/41; 50/52).10 Only FA-18 Lot 11 and above have this capability.11 Some FA-18 Lot 16 and all FA-18 Lot 17 and above have this capability.12 AH-1W can designate codes 1111-1788, but has maximum effectiveness from 1111-1488.13 AH-64s can not designate codes 1711 to 1788.

Offensive Air Support ____________________________________________________________________________________ C-1

APPENDIX C. JOINT TACTICAL AIR STRIKE REQUEST

All U.S. Armed Forces use the JTAR Request Form (DD Form 1972) to requestCAS. The use of this form is mandatory unless otherwise authorized by a higherauthority. A sample JTAR request form is shown in figure C-1. (The paraphrasedinstructions starting on page C-3 are included for reference only.)

Figure C-1. Joint Tactical Air Strike Request Form.

C-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

Figure C-1. Joint Tactical Air Strike Request Form (continued).


Section I. Mission Request

Line Title and Elements Explanation

1. UNIT CALLED Identifies the unit designation/call sign/preassigned number.

THIS IS Identifies the request originator by unit designation/call sign/preassigned number.

REQUEST NUMBER For preplanned missions, indicates the originator’s request number in series. For immediate missions, this number is assigned by the air support coordination section (ASCS)/DASC.

SENT Indicates the time and the individual who transmitted the request.

2. (Mission categories)

PREPLANNED:A. PRECEDENCE For preplanned requests, enterB. PRIORITY precedence (block A) or priority (block B).

Precedence is stated numerically in descending order of importance, as determined by the requester. Priority is expressed as shown below.

IMMEDIATE:

C. PRIORITY For immediate requests, enter priority (block C). A precedence entry is not required for immediate requests because, by definition, all immediate requests have a precedence of 1.

Use the numerical designation below to determine priority (e.g., define the tactical situation) for preplanned (block B) or immediate (block C):

1. Emergency: Targets that require immediate action and supersede all other categories of mission priority.

2. Priority: Targets that require immediate action and supersede routine targets.

3. Routine: Targets of opportunity. Targets that do not demand urgency in execution.

C-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23


3. TARGET IS/ Describes the type, approximate size, and mobility NUMBER OF of the target to be attacked. It is necessary to

specify, even if a rough estimate, the number of targets (i.e., 10 tanks) or the size of the target area (i.e., personnel on a 500-meter front). Otherwise planners cannot accurately determine what force is required—aircraft numbers/type and ordnance amount/type.

4. TARGET LOCATION IS Locates the target by using the military grid reference system (MGRS) prescribed for the area concerned.

A. COORDINATES Locates a point target or starting point.

B. COORDINATES When used together with A, provides from ____ to ____ coordinates.

C. COORDINATES When used together with A and B, provides a route.

D. COORDINATES When used together with A through C, provides a route or describes a target area.

E. TARGET ELEVATION Target elevation in feet above sea level.

F. SHEET NUMBER Self-explanatory.

G. SERIES Self-explanatory.

H. CHART NUMBER Self-explanatory.

CHECKED Indicates with whom target information has been cross-checked.

5. TARGET TIME/ Indicates the time/date when the air strike is DATE requested.

A. ASAP As soon as possible.

B. NLT The target is to be attacked before, but not later than (NLT) the time indicated.

C. AT Indicates time at which target is to be attacked.

D. TO Denotes the end of the period of time in which support such as airborne alert or column cover is required. When D is used with C, B is unnecessary.



6. DESIRED ORDNANCE/ Indicates the requester’s desired results. This is RESULTS essential information for the planner and must be

carefully considered by the requester.

A. ORDNANCE Desired ordnance.

B. DESTROY Self-explanatory.

C. NEUTRALIZE Self-explanatory.

D. HARASS/ Self-explanatory.

INTERDICT

7. FINAL CONTROL Identifies the final controller (FAC, FAC[A], etc.) who will conduct the briefing and control the release of the ordnance.

A. FAC Transmits the type of terminal control.

B. CALL SIGN Call sign of terminal controller.

C. FREQUENCY Recommended tactical air direction (TAD) frequency that is usable on the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

D. FIX/CONTROL POINT Military grid coordinates and/or navigation aid (NAVAID) fix of a control point that is the furthest limit of the attack aircraft’s route of flight before control by the final controller.

8. REMARKS Allows incorporation of briefing information not included elsewhere in the request. Enter data for the standard CAS brief.

1. IP/BP ____________________________________________

2. HEADING _______________MAG: OFFSET LEFT/RIGHT

3. DISTANCE ______________

4. TARGET ELEVATION ____________________FEET MSL

5. TARGET DESCRIPTION _________________________

6. Target LOCATION _______________________________

7. MARK TYPE __________________CODE ___________

8. FRIENDLIES _______________________________

9. EGRESS ___________________________________

C-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

Section II. Coordination


9. NGF Now known as naval surface fire support (NSFS).

10. Artillery Artillery coordination.

11. AIO/G-2/G-3 Air Intelligence Officer, G-2, G-3, or other Service equivalent coordination.

12. REQUESTA. APPROVED Indicates the approval or disapproval of the request.B. DISAPPROVED

13. BY Indicates the individual who approved or disapproved the request.

14. REASON FOR Self-explanatory.DISAPPROVAL

15. AIRSPACE The ACA establishes airspace that is reasonably COORDINATION safe from friendly, surface-delivery, nonnuclearAREA fires.A. IS NOT The ACA provides a warning to aircraft of the B. NUMBER parameters of surface-delivered fire in a specific

area. A plan number or code name is issued, as appropriate.

16. IS IN EFFECT Establishes the time period that the applicable ACAA. FROM TIME __ plan will be in effect.B. TO TIME __

17. LOCATION Grid coordinates of the start/end points of the A. FROM COORDINATES ACA’s centerline.B. TO COORDINATES

18. WIDTH (METERS) Defines the ACA from either side of the centerline.

19. ALTITUDE/VERTEX ACA altitude given in feet above mean sea levelA. MAXIMUM/VERTEX (MSL). (Use A for VERTEX only entry).B. MINIMUM


Section III. Mission Data

NOTE: Mission data information transmitted to the requesting agency may be limitedto those items not included in the request.


20. MISSION NUMBER Indicates mission number.

21. CALL SIGN Call sign of mission aircraft.

22. NUMBER AND TYPE Self-explanatory.AIRCRAFT

23. ORDNANCE Type of ordnance either by code number or actual nomenclature.

24. EST/ACT TAKEOFF Estimated or actual time the mission aircraft will take off.

25. EST TOT Estimated TOT.

26. CONTROL POINT/ The furthest limit of the attack aircraft’s route ofRENDEZVOUS flight before control by the final controller. Same(COORDINATES/ as Line 7, item D, when designated in the request.NAVAID FIX

27. INITIAL CONTACT Indicates the initial control agency the flight is to contact.

28. FAC/TAC(A) Call sign and frequency of final control agency.CALL SIGN FREQUENCY

29. ACA Refer to lines 15 through 19 for this data.

30. TARGET DESCRIPTION Self-explanatory.

31. TARGET COORDINATES/ Self-explanatory.ELEVATION

32. BDA Report This optional space is used to record BDA for each mission.

LINE 1/ Call sign of the reporting aircraft.CALL SIGN

LINE 2/ Mission number of the CAS mission for which MISSION NUMBER results are being reported.

C-8 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23


LINE 3/REQUEST Requesting unit’s request number.NUMBER

LINE 4/LOCATION The location of the target when it was attacked.

LINE 5/TOT The time the aircraft began attack on the target/the time the aircraft completed the mission and departed the target.

LINE 6/RESULTS The specific results of the mission. (e.g., “10 tanks destroyed, 150 killed in action (KIAs), enemy unit neutralized, mission successful”).

REMARKS Other information appropriate to the tactical situation or as requested.


APPENDIX D. DAMAGE CRITERION

Target Type Damage Criteria Pd Preferred WeaponPersonnel Harassment

NeutralizeDestruction

0.1.3-.4.5-.7

CBU/GP BombsCBU/GP BombsCBU/GP Bombs

Armored Veh. K-Kill (Single)K-Kill (Area)

.7-.9

.5-.7PGM/CBUCBU/PGM

Field Artillery F-Kill .7-.9 GP/PGM (single)Rocket/SSM K-Kill .7-.9 PGM/CBUAAA K-Kill .7-.9 CBUMobile AAA K-Kill .5-.7 PGM/CBU/GPAirfields MOS/MCL .7-.8 GPAircraft K-Kill .7-.8 PGM (single A/C)

CBU/GUN/Rocket (Mult A/C)

A/C Bunkers Breach Bunker &A/C Inside K-Kill

.7-.8 PGM /GP

Harden Targets Damage inside which causes complete breakdown of position

.7-.9 PGM

C3 Sites K-Kill .7-.9 PGMBridges Collapse Span .7-.8 PGMDams Rupture/Collapse .7-.9 PGM/GPLocks Buckling of gates .7-.9 PGM/GPTrains/Trucks K-Kill .5-.7 PGM/CBU/GPTunnels Damage to tunnel linings .7-.8 PGMShips SAM/SSM systems

Sea worthiness.7-.9.5-.9

ARMPGM/CBU/GP

SAM Systems K-KillSuppress

.7-.8

.7-.8PGMARM

Buildings Damage structural .5-.7 PGM/GPComm Vans None defined .7-.9 PGM/CBUAntennas None defined .5-.7 PGM/GPPOL Supplies in open

Render unusable.3-.5.3-.5

GPGP

POL Heavy damage to critical components

.7-.9 PGM/GP

Ammo Storage Catastrophic .3-5 Open.5 Bldg..5-.7 Igloos

GPPGM/GPPGM/GP

Ammo Storage Catastrophic .3-.5 Open.5 Bldg..5-.7 Igloos

GPPGM/GPPGM/GP

Ports Destruction of piers .5-.7 PGM/GPNote: The table in this appendix is only a quick reference guide for DAS planners. JMEM/AS should be utilized for detailed DAS operation planning.

APPENDIX E. GLOSSARY

SECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . attack aircraft (Intruder)AAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antiaircraft artilleryAADC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . area air defense commanderAAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antiair warfareABCCC . . . . . . . . . airborne battlefield command and

control centerACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . airspace control authorityACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aviation combat elementACI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air combat intelligenceACO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . airspace control orderACP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . airspace control planAEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . airborne early warningAGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air-to-ground missileAH-1W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .attack helicopter (Cobra)AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air interdictionAO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . area of operationsAOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . air operations center (Air Force)AOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . area of responsibilityAPC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . armored personnel carrierAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . armed reconnaissanceARA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . armed reconnaissance areaARM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antiradiation missileASC(A) . . . . . . assault support coordinator (airborne)ASLT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air support liaison teamASOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air support operations centerATARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .advanced tactical airborne

reconnaissance systemATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .air tasking orderAV-8B. . . . . . . . . . . V/STOL attack aircraft (Harrier)AWACS . . . . .Airborne Warning and Control System

BDA . . . . . . . . . . . bomb or battle damage assessmentBVR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .beyond visual range

C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command and controlC3 . . . . . . . . command, control, and communicationsC4I. . . . . . . . . . . command, control, communications,

computers, and intelligenceCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat assessmentCAP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat air patrolCAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . close air supportCBU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .cluster bomb unitCCIR . . . . . . . . . . . . commander’s critical information

requirementsCEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .circular error probableCINC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .commander in chiefCOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of actionCOMINT. . . . . . . . . . . . .communications intelligence

COS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . current operations sectionCRC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . control and reporting centerCSSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service support elementCTAPS . . . . contingency theater automated planning

system

D3A. . . . . . . . . . . . . decide, detect, deliver, and assessDAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . deep air supportDASC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .direct air support centerDASC(A) . . . . . . . direct air support center (airborne)DOCC . . .deep operations coordination center (Army)E-2C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AWACS aircraft (Hawkeye)EA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .electronic attackEA-6B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . all-weather electronic attack

aircraft (Prowler)EMW. . . . . . . . . . . . .expeditionary maneuver warfareEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . electronic warfare

F4U . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fighter aircraft (Corsair)F/A-18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . fighter/attack aircraft (Hornet)FAC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward air controllerFAC(A) . . . . . . . . . . . forward air controller (airborne)FARP. . . . . . . . . . forward arming and refueling pointFEBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward edge of the battle areaFFCC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .force fires coordination centerFLIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward looking infraredFMF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fleet Marine forceFMFM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fleet Marine Force manualFOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward operating baseFOC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . full operational capabilityFOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . future operations sectionFRAGO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fragmentary orderFSCC. . . . . . . . . . . . . fire support coordination centerFSCL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fire support coordination line

GAT . . . . . . . . guidance apportionment and targetingGCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground combat elementGCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground controlled interceptGGW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GPS guided weaponGPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . global positioning system

HARM. . . . . . . . . . . . high-speed antiradiation missileHELLFIRE . . . helicopterborne fire and forget missileHIDACZ . . . . . . . . high-density airspace control zoneHPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high-payoff targetHPTL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high-payoff target listHST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . helicopter support teamHTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HARM targeting system

E-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

HVT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high-value target

IFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . identification, friend or foeINS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inertial navigation systemIOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . initial operational capabilityIPB. . . . . . . intelligence preparation of the battlespaceIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . infrared radiation

JAOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint air operations centerJDAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint direct attack munitionJFACC . . . . . . . joint force air component commanderJFC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint force commanderJIPTL . . . . . . . . . joint integrated prioritized target listJMEM/AS . . . . joint munitions effectiveness manual/

air to surfaceJOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint operations areaJSOW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint standoff weaponJTAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .joint tactical air strike requestJTCB . . . . . . . . . . . joint targeting coordination boardJTL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint target listJST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint strike fighter

KC-130 . . . . . . . . . . aerial refueling/transport aircraft(Hercules)

KTO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kuwaiti theater of operations

LAAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . low altitude air defenseLANTIRN . . . . . low-altitude navigation and targeting

infrared for nightLGB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . laser-guided bombLGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . laser-guided missileLGW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . laser-guided weaponLOAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . law of armed conflictLOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lines of communicationsLPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . amphibious transport dockLST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . laser spot tracker

MAAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . master air attack planMACCS . . . . Marine air command and control systemMACG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine air control groupMAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine aircraft groupMAGTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task forceMARFOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps forcesMARLO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine liaison officerMCDP . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps doctrinal publicationMCPP . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Planning ProcessMCRP . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps reference publicationMCWP. . . . . . . Marine Corps warfighting publicationMEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . munitions effect assessmentMEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine expeditionary forceMETT-T . . . . . . mission, enemy, terrain and weather,

troops and support available-time availableMISREP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mission reportMOOTW . . . . . . . . military operations other than warMOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military occupational specialty

MRR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . minimum-risk routeMSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .major subordinate command

NATO . . . . . . . . . North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNFA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . no-fire areaNVD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . night vision deviceNVG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . night vision goggleNWP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . naval warfare publication

OAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . offensive air supportOIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . other intelligence requirementOMFTS . . . . . . . . .operational maneuver from the seaOODA loop . . . . . . . . . . . observe, orient, decide, act;

observation, orientation, decision, actionOPLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operation planOPORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operation orderOPSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations securityOPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .operational planning team

PD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . probability of damagePGM . . . . . . . . . . . precision-guided missile/munitionPGW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . precision-guided weaponPID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . positive identificationPIR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . priority intelligence requirementPk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . probability of kill

RAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Royal Air Force (UK)RAOC . . . . . . rear area operations center; regional air

operations centerRFI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . request for information; request

for intelligenceROE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rules of engagementRR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . reattack recommendation

SAAWC . sector antiair warfare coordinator (USMC)SAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .surface-to-air missileSBD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . attack aircraft (Dauntless)SCAR . . . . . . strike coordination and reconnaissanceSEAD . . . . . . . . . . suppression of enemy air defensesSERE . . . . . . survival, evasion, resistance, and escapeSLAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .standoff land attack missileSPINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . special instructionsSTOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ship-to-objective maneuver

TAC(A) . . . . . . . . . . tactical air coordinator (airborne)TACAIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical airTACC . . . . . . . tactical air command center (USMC);

tactical air control center (USN/USAF)TACP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical air control partyTADC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical air direction centerTAGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . theater air ground systemTALD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical air-launched decoyTAOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical air operations centerTARPS . . . . . . . . . . . tactical airborne reconnaissance

POD system

Offensive Air Support_____________________________________________________________________________________ E-3

TBMCS . . . .Theater Battle Management Core System THS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . target hand-off subsystemTLDHS . . . . . . . . . . . target location, designation, and

hand-off systemTLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . target location errorTOT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .time on targetTPFDD . . . . . time-phased force and deployment dataTRAP . . . . tactical recovery of aircraft and personnelTSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . target selection standardsTV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . televisionTVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . target value analysis

UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . unmanned aerial vehicleUH1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . utility helicopter (Huey)UHF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ultrahigh frequencyUSA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States ArmyUSAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United States Air ForceUSMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States Marine CorpsUSN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States Navy

VHF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .very high frequencyVMFA. . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine fighter/attack squadron

WGS-84 . . . . . . . . . . . . World Geodetic System 1984

E-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-23

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

air interdiction—Air operations conducted to de-stroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military poten-tial before it can be brought to bear effectively againstfriendly forces at such distance from friendly forcesthat detailed integration of each air mission with thefire and movement of friendly forces is not required.(JP 1-02)

air operations center—The principal air operationsinstallation from which aircraft and air warning func-tions of combat air operations are directed, controlled,and executed. It is the senior agency of the Air ForceComponent Commander from which command andcontrol of air operations are coordinated with othercomponents and Services. Also called AOC. (JP 1-02)

airspace control authority—The commander desig-nated to assume overall responsibility for the opera-tion of the airspace control system in the airspacecontrol area. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02)

airspace control order—An order implementing theairspace control plan that provides the details of theapproved requests for airspace control measures. It ispublished either as part of the air tasking order or as aseparate document. Also called ACO. (JP 1-02)

airspace control plan—The document approved bythe joint force commander that provides specific plan-ning guidance and procedures for the airspace controlsystem for the joint force area of responsibility/jointoperations area. Also called ACP. (JP 1-02)

air superiority—That degree of dominance in the airbattle of one force over another which permits the con-duct of operations by the former and its related land,sea and air forces at a given time and place withoutprohibitive interference by the opposing force.(JP 1-02)

antiair warfare—A US Navy/US Marine Corps termused to indicate that action required to destroy or re-duce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missilethreat. It includes such measures as the use of intercep-tors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, electronic attack, and destruction of theair or missile threat both before and after it islaunched. Other measures which are taken to minimize

the effects of hostile air action are cover, concealment,dispersion, deception (including electronic), and mo-bility. Also called AAW. (JP 1-02) AAW is one of thesix functions of Marine aviation.

antiradiation missile—A missile which homes pas-sively on a radiation source. (JP 1-02)

armed reconnaissance—A mission with the primarypurpose of locating and attacking targets of opportuni-ty, i.e., enemy materiel, personnel, and facilities, in as-signed general areas or along assigned groundcommunications routes, and not for the purpose of at-tacking specific briefed targets. Also called AR.(JP 1-02)

aviation combat element—The core element of aMarine air-ground task force that is task-organized toconduct aviation operations. The aviation combat ele-ment provides all or a portion of the six functions ofMarine aviation necessary to accomplish the Marineair-ground task force’s mission. These functions areantiair warfare, offensive air support, assault support,electronic warfare, air reconnaissance, and control ofaircraft and missiles. The aviation combat element isusually composed of an aviation unit headquarters andvarious other aviation units or their detachments. Itcan vary in size from a small aviation detachment ofspecifically required aircraft to one or more Marineaircraft wings. The aviation combat element may con-tain other Service or foreign military forces assignedor attached to the MAGTF. The aviation combat ele-ment itself is not a formal command. Also called ACE.(MCRP 5-12C)

battle damage assessment—The timely and accurateestimate of damage resulting from the application ofmilitary force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a pre-determined objective. Battle damage assessment canbe applied to the employment of all types of weaponsystems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weaponsystems) throughout the range of military operations.Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligenceresponsibility with required inputs and coordinationfrom the operators. Battle damage assessment is com-posed of physical damage assessment, functional dam-age assessment, and target system assessment. Alsocalled BDA. (JP 1-02)


close air support—Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in closeproximity to friendly forces and which require detailedintegration of each air mission with the fire and move-ment of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1-02)

combat service support element—The core elementof a Marine air-ground task force that is task-organized to provide the combat service support nec-essary to accomplish the Marine air-ground task forcemission. The combat service support element varies insize from a small detachment to one or more force ser-vice support groups. It provides supply, maintenance,transportation, general engineering, health services,and a variety of other services to the Marine air-ground task force. It may also contain other Service orforeign military forces assigned or attached to theMAGTF. The combat service support element itself isn o t a f o r m a l c o m m a n d . A l s o c a l l e d C S S E .(MCRP 5-12C)

combined arms—The full integration of combat armsin such a way that to counteract one, the enemy mustbecome more vulnerable to another. (MCRP 5-12C)

command and control—The exercise of authorityand direction by a properly designated commanderover assigned and attached forces in the accomplish-ment of the mission. Command and control functionsare performed through an arrangement of personnel,equipment, communications, facilities, and proceduresemployed by a commander in planning, directing, co-ordinating, and controlling forces and operations in theaccomplishment of the mission. Also called C2.(JP 1-02)

command element—The core element of a Marineair-ground task force that is the headquarters. Thecommand element is composed of the commander,general or executive and special staff sections, head-quarters section, and requisite communications sup-port, intelligence and reconnaissance forces, necessaryto accomplish the MAGTF’s mission. The commandelement provides command and control, intelligence,and other support essential for effective planning andexecution of operations by the other elements of theMAGTF. The command element varies in size andcomposition and may contain other Service or foreignmilitary forces assigned or attached to the MATF.Also called CE. (MCRP 5-12C)

concept of operations—A verbal or graphic state-ment, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptionsor intent in regard to an operation or series of opera-tions. The concept of operations frequently is embod-ied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the lattercase, particularly when the plans cover a series of con-nected operations to be carried out simultaneously orin succession. The concept is designed to give an over-all picture of the operation. It is included primarily foradditional clarity of purpose. (JP 1-02)

direct air support center—The principal air controlagency of the US Marine air command and controlsystem responsible for the direction and control of airoperations directly supporting the ground combat ele-ment. It processes and coordinates requests for imme-diate air support and coordinates air missionsrequiring integration with ground forces and othersupporting arms. It normally collocates with the seniorfire support coordination center within the groundcombat element and is subordinate to the tactical aircommand center. Also called DASC. (JP 1-02)

direct support—A mission requiring a force to sup-port another specific force and authorizing it to answerdirectly to the supported force’s request for assistance.See also general support. (JP 1-02)

electronic warfare—Any military action involvingthe use of electromagnetic and directed energy to con-trol the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the ene-my. Also called EW. The three major subdivisionswithin electronic warfare are: electronic attack, elec-tronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a.electronic attack. That division of electronic warfareinvolving the use of electromagnetic energy, directedenergy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel,facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading,neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capabilityand is considered a form of fires. Also called EA. EAincludes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an ene-my’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum,such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and2) employment of weapons that use either electromag-netic or directed energy as their primary destructivemechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particlebeams). b. electronic protection. That division of elec-tronic warfare involving passive and active means tak-en to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment fromany effects of friendly or enemy employment of

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electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroyfriendly combat capability. Also called EP. c. electron-ic warfare support. That division of electronic warfareinvolving actions tasked by, or under direct control of,an operational commander to search for, intercept,identify, and locate or localize sources of intentionaland unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy forthe purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting,planning and conduct of future operations. Thus, elec-tronic warfare support provides information requiredfor decisions involving electronic warfare operationsand other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, tar-geting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic war-fare support data can be used to produce signalsintelligence, provide targeting for electronic or de-structive attack, and produce measurement and signa-ture intelligence. (JP 1-02)

fire support coordination center—A single locationin which are centralized communications facilities andpersonnel incident to the coordination of all forms offire support. See also supporting arms coordinationcenter. Also called FSCC. (JP 1-02)

fire support coordination line—A fire support coor-dinating measure that is established and adjusted byappropriate land or amphibious force commanderswithin their boundaries in consultation with superior,subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders.Fire support coordination lines (FSCLs) facilitate theexpeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity be-yond the coordinating measure. An FSCL does not di-vide an area of operations by defining a boundarybetween close and deep operations or a zone for closeair support. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land,and sea-based weapon systems using any type of am-munition. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCLmust inform all affected commanders in sufficienttime to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide.Supporting elements attacking targets beyond theFSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce ad-verse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of anFSCL all air-to-ground and surface-to surface attackoperations are controlled by the appropriate land oramphibious force commander. The FSCL should fol-low well defined terrain features. Coordination of at-tacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical tocommanders of air, land, and special operations forc-es. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to con-duct this coordination will not preclude the attack of

targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do somay increase the risk of fratricide and could wastelimited resources. Also called FSCL. (JP 1-02)

forward air controller—An officer (aviator/pilot)member of the tactical air control party who, from aforward ground or airborne position, controls aircraftin close air support of ground troops. Also called FAC.(JP 1-02)

forward air controller (airborne)—A specificallytrained and qualified aviation officer who exercisescontrol from the air of aircraft engaged in close airsupport of ground troops. The forward air controller(airborne) is normally an airborne extension of the tac-tical air control party. Also called FAC(A). (JP 1-02)

forward arming and refueling point—A temporaryfacility, organized, equipped, and deployed by an avia-tion commander, and normally located in the main bat-tle area closer to the area of operation than the aviationunit’s combat service area, to provide fuel and ammu-nition necessary for the employment of aviation ma-neuver units in combat. The forward arming andrefueling point permits combat aircraft to rapidly refu-el and rearm simultaneously. Also called FARP.(JP 1-02)

forward looking infrared—An airborne, electro-optical thermal imaging device that detects far-infra-red energy, converts the energy into an electronic sig-nal, and provides a visible image for day or nightviewing. Also called FLIR. (JP 1-02) See night visiondevice.

forward operating base—An airfield used to supporttactical operations without establishing full support fa-cilities. The base may be used for an extended time pe-riod. Support by a main operating base will berequired to provide backup support for a forward oper-ating base. Also called FOB. (JP 1-02)

general support—That support which is given to thesupported force as a whole and not to any particularsubdivision thereof. (JP 1-02) See also direct support.

ground combat element—The core element of aMarine air-ground task force that is task organized toconduct ground operations. It is usually constructedaround an infantry organization but can vary in sizefrom a small ground unit of any type, to one or more


Marine divisions that can be independently maneu-vered under the direction of the MAGTF commander.It includes appropriate ground combat and combatsupport forces and may contain other Service or for-eign military forces assigned or attached to the Marineair-ground task force. The ground combat element it-self is not a formal command. Also called GCE.(MCRP 5-12C)

immediate air support—Air support to meet specificrequests which arise during the course of a battle andwhich by their nature cannot be planned in advance.(JP 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—An an-alytical methodology employed to reduce uncertaintiesconcerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for alltypes of operations. Intelligence preparation of the bat-tlespace builds an extensive data base for each poten-tial area in which a unit may be required to operate.The data base is then analyzed in detail to determinethe impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain onoperations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligencepreparation of the battlespace is a continuing process.Also called IPB. (JP 1-02)

joint air operations center—A jointly staffed facilityestablished for planning, directing, and executing jointair operations in support of the joint force command-er’s operation or campaign objectives. Also calledJAOC. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander—The jointforce air component commander derives authorityfrom the joint force commander who has the authorityto exercise operational control, assign missions, directcoordination among subordinate commanders, redirectand organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the ac-complishment of the overall mission. The joint forcecommander will normally designate a joint force aircomponent commander. The joint force air componentcommander’s responsibilities will be assigned by thejoint force commander (normally these would include,but not be limited to, planning, coordination, alloca-tion, and tasking based on the joint force commander’sapportionment decision). Using the joint force com-mander’s guidance and authority, and in coordinationwith other Service component commanders and otherassigned or supporting commanders, the joint force aircomponent commander will recommend to the joint

force commander apportionment of air sorties to vari-ous missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC.(JP 1-02)

joint force commander—A general term applied to acombatant commander, subunified commander, orjoint task force commander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority) or opera-tional control over a joint force. Also called JFC.(JP 1-02).

list of targets—A tabulation of confirmed or suspecttargets maintained by any echelon for informationaland fire support planning purposes. (JP 1-02)

maneuver warfare—A warfighting philosophy thatseeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a vari-ety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions whichcreate a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situationwith which the enemy cannot cope. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine air command and control system—A sys-tem which provides the aviation combat element com-mander with the means to command, coordinate, andcontrol all air operations within an assigned sector andto coordinate air operations with other Services. It iscomposed of command and control agencies withcommunications-electronics equipment that incorpo-rates a capability from manual through semiautomaticcontrol. Also called MACCS. (JP 1-02)

Marine air-ground task force—The Marine Corpsprincipal organization for all missions across the rangeof military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of re-sponding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in theworld. The types of forces in the MAGTF are func-tionally grouped into four core elements: a commandelement, an aviation combat element, a ground combatelement, and a combat service support element. Thefour core elements are categories of forces, not formalcommands. The basic structure of the MAGTF nevervaries, though the number, size, and type of MarineCorps units comprising each of its four elements willalways be mission dependent. The flexibility of the or-ganizational structure allows for one or more subordi-nate MAGTFs to be assigned, and other Service and/orforeign military forces, to be assigned or attached tothe MAGTF. Also called MAGTF. (MCRP 5-12C)

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night vision device—Any electro-optical device thatis used to detect visible and infrared energy and pro-vide a visible image. Night vision goggles, forward-looking infrared, thermal sights, and low light leveltelevision are night vision devices. Also called NVD.See also night vision goggle(s); forward looking infra-red. (JP 1-02)

night vision goggle(s)—An electro-optical image in-tensifying device that detects visible and near-infraredenergy, intensifies the energy, and provides a visibleimage for night viewing. Night vision goggles can beeither hand-held or helmet-mounted. Also calledNVG. See also night vision device. (JP 1-02)

offensive air support—Those air operations conduct-ed against enemy installations, facilities, and person-nel to directly assist the attainment of MAGTFobjectives by the destruction of enemy resources orthe isolation of the enemy’s military forces. Alsocalled OAS. (MCRP 5-12C) OAS is one of the sixfunctions of Marine aviation.

preplanned air support—Air support in accordancewith a program, planned in advance of operations. Al-so called air support. (JP 1-02)

reasonable assurance—During each close air supportmission, an acceptable level of risk under which thesupported ground commander allows aircrews to at-tack targets and release ordnance without positive con-trol. (MCRP 5-12C) See fire support coordinationcenter.

rules of engagement—Directives issued by compe-tent military authority which delineate the circum-stances and limitations under which United Statesforces will initiate and/or continue combat engage-ment with other forces encountered. Also called ROE.(JP 1-02)

seabasing—The employment of aircraft from navalplatforms, to include carriers and amphibious ship-ping. Applies only to aircraft organizations.

sortie—In air operations, an operational flight by oneaircraft. (JP 1-02)

strike coordination and reconnaissance— A mis-sion flown for the purpose of acquiring and reportingdeep air support targets and coordinating armed recon-

naissance or air interdiction missions upon those tar-gets. Also called SCAR. (MCRP 5-12C)

supporting arms coordination center—A single lo-cation on board an amphibious command ship inwhich all communication facilities incident to the co-ordination of fire support of the artillery, air, and navalgunfire are centralized. This is the naval counterpart tothe fire support coordination center utilized by thelanding force. Also called SACC. (JP 1-02)

suppression of enemy air defenses—That activitywhich neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degradessurface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. Also called SEAD. (JP 1-02)

tactical air command center—The principal UnitedStates Marine Corps air command and control agencyfrom which air operations and air defense warningfunctions are directed. It is the senior agency of the USMarine air command and control system which servesas the operational command post of the aviation com-bat element commander. It provides the facility fromwhich the aviation combat element commander andhis battle staff plan, supervise, coordinate, and executeall current and future air operations in support of theMarine air-ground task force. The tactical air com-mand center can provide integration, coordination, anddirection of joint and combined air operations. Alsocalled Marine TACC. (JP 1-02)

tactical air control center—The principal air opera-tions installation (ship-based) from which all aircraftand air warning functions of tactical air operations arecontrolled. Also called Navy TACC. (JP 1-02)

tactical air control party—A subordinate operationalcomponent of a tactical air control system designed toprovide air liaison to land forces and for the control ofaircraft. Also called TACP. (JP 1-02)

tactical air coordinator (airborne)—An officer whocoordinates, from an aircraft, the action of combat air-craft engaged in close support of ground or sea forces.Also called TAC(A). (JP 1-02)

tactical air direction center—An air operations in-stallation under the overall control of the tactical aircontrol center (afloat)/tactical air command center,from which aircraft and air warning service functions


of tactical air operations in an area of responsibilityare directed. Also called TADC. (JP 1-02)

tactical air operations center—The principal air con-trol agency of the US Marine air command and controlsystem responsible for airspace control and manage-ment. It provides real time surveillance, direction, pos-itive control, and navigational assistance for friendlyaircraft. It performs real time direction and control ofall antiair warfare operations, to include manned inter-ceptors and surface-to-air weapons. It is subordinate tothe tactical air command center. Also called TAOC.(JP 1-02)

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel—A mis-sion performed by an assigned and briefed aircrew forthe specific purpose of the recovery of personnel,equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situationprecludes search and rescue (SAR) assets from re-sponding and when survivors and their location havebeen confirmed. Also called TRAP. (MCRP 5-12C)

target list—The listing of targets maintained and pro-mulgated by the senior echelon of command; it con-

tains those targets that are to be engaged by supportingarms, as distinguished from a “list of targets” that maybe maintained by any echelon as confirmed, suspect-ed, or possible targets for informational and planningpurposes. (JP 1-02)

time on station—The time that an aircraft can actual-ly spend performing its assigned mission. It does notinclude the time transiting to and from the operatingsite. Also called TOS. (MCRP 5-12C)

time on target—1. Time at which aircraft are sched-uled to attack/photograph the target. 2. The actual timeat which aircraft attack/photograph the target. 3. Thetime at which a nuclear detonation is planned at aspecified desired ground zero. Also called TOT.(JP 1-02)

weaponeering—The process of determining the quan-tity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weaponsrequired to achieve a specific level of damage to a giv-en target, considering target vulnerability, weapon ef-fect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage criteria,probability of kill, and weapon reliability. (JP 1-02)


APPENDIX F. REFERENCES

Joint Publications (JPs)

0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations3-01.4 JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD)3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations 3-02.1 Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations 3-03 Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations 3-60 Joint Doctrine for Targeting

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting2 Intelligence5 Planning6 Command and Control

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

0-1 Marine Corps Operations3-2 Aviation Operations 3-22.2 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses3-23.1 Close Air Support3-23.2 Deep Air Support3-25 Control of Aircraft and Missiles3-25.2 Multi-Service Procedures for Theater Air Ground System (TAGS)3-25.3 Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook3-25.4 MarineTactical Air Command Center Handbook3-25.5 Direct Air Support Center Handbook5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

3-16A Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process(dual designated as FMFRP 6-90-2/FM 90-16)

3-16B Joint Targeting Process and Procedures for TargetingTime-Critical Targets

5-12C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM)

6-18-1 Procedures for the Marine Corps Fire Support System

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Naval Warfare Publications (NWP)

3-09.11 Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations55 Series Aircraft Tactical Manuals (renumbered as 3-02 series)

Air Force Doctrinal Document

2-1.3 Counterland (draft)

MCWP 3-23 Offensive Air Support.pdf

Documents

Transcript of MCWP 3-23 Offensive Air Support.pdf