International Studies in Philosophy 36:3

THE WILL TO POWER:PSYCHOLOGY AS FIRST PHILOSOPHY

David N. McNeill

What man wants, what every smallest part of a living organismwants, is an increase of power . .. Let us take the simplest case, thatof primitive nourishment: the protoplasm stretches its pseudo-podia in order to search for something that resists it-not fromhunger hut from will to power. It then attempts to overcome thisthing, to appropriate it, to incorporate it. What we call nourish-ment is merely a derivative appearance, a practical application ofthat original will to become stronger. (WP 702; KSA 13:14[174})1

A t various points in Nietzsche's Iate works and througho'ut the.. Nachlass we find claims, like the one above, that the world is char-acterized by what Nietzsche calls the will to power.2 The status ofthese claims in Nietzsehe's work is notoriously controversial, and thediversity of interpretations about them seems to hinge on two onlyprovisionally separable hermeneutical questions. The first questiondeals with the intended scope of the will to power, that iSt what kindof "theory" is the will to power. The interpreter asks: Is the doctrineof the will to power Nietzsche's metaphysics, i.e., a speculativeinquiry into first principles? Is it a Nietzschean 11special science" -hisphysics, cosmology, psychology, or biology? Or is it merely anisolated empirical claim, a proposition within one or across many ofthese different areas of inquiry? The second hermeneutical questionaddresses itself to Nietzsehe's rhetorical and pedagogical activity asauthor and the kind of truth claims we should attribute to the U doc-trine" of the will to power. Here we ask: Was it Nietzsche's intent topropound a theory of the whole (or of the physical world, the organie

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world, or the soul) which he considered more true, more useful, ormore consistent than its theoretical rivals? Or was Nietzsche's aimquite different, and the "will to power" not a doctrine of Nietzsche'sat all~is it an experiment; an ironic stance, part of a reductio adabsurdum; or simply one of Nietzsche's many rhetorical voices?

In the following essay, I will focus on Nietzsche's account of thewill to power in Beyond Good and Evil, in particular the developmentsketched out in aseries of four aphorisms leading up to what isperhaps the most important single aphorism in the published workfor our understanding of the will to power, aphorism 36.3 I will arguethat while Nietzsche presents the will to power as his psychology, hisconception of psychology (or Ilphysio-psychology") occupi~s a posi-tion in his thought analogous to the position which metaphysicsoccupied in the history of pllilosophy before hirn: "queen of thesciences" and "the path to the fundamental problems." Nietzschepresents the will to power, I "'Till suggest, as a meta-theoretical con-straint on our ability to represent to ourselves the world of our .experience; that he describes tllis meta-theoretical constraint in psy-chological terms should indicate to us the limitations in those ac-counts that depend upon a sinlple opposition between "psycholbgi-cal" and "metaphysical" inter}Jretations of the will to power.

I. LIFE AND INTERPRETATION

The first mention of the "viII to power in Beyond Good and Eviloccurs in an aphorism (BGE 9) dealing with the Stoic dictum "liveaccording to nature," which Nietzsche contends is a massive piece ofself-deception.

"According to nature" you w'ant to live? 0 you noble Stoics, whatdeceptive words these are! IInagine a being like nature, wastefulbeyond measure, indifferent beyond measure,' without purposes orconsideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate anduncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as power-how could you live according to this indifference? Living-is notthat precisely wanting to be other than this nature? Is not liv-ing-estimating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wantingto be different? And supposing your imperative "live according tonature" meant at bottom as mLuch as "live according to life"-howcould you not do that? (BGE 9)

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In this aphorism Nietzsche distinguishes between two possible mean-ings of the word "nature" in the Stoic dictum: 1) "a being like nature,"that is, nature conceived in its entirety; and 2) "the nature of a livingbeing"; and he claims that neither of these conceptions of naturecould provide the paradigm for a way of life which the Stoics sought.If "live according to nature" means "live according the whole," thenit illegitimately abstracts from both the necessary partiality of life,and the implicit purposiveness of any living being. If, on the otherhand, it means "live according to the nature of a living thing; live asliving things do," then it is vacuous. Nietzsche is, of course, awarethat the Stoics would have claimed that they found in the order of thecosmos natural "laws" which were the expression of an immanentintelligent first principle and that they viewed themselves as follow-ing these laws, a claim the later Stoics expressed as the "rationalselection of the primary things according to nature." Nietzsche, how-ever, considers these Stoic claims to "read the canon of [their] law innature" to be delusions: the Stoics are in fact imposing their ideal onnature, demanding that "she should be nature 'according to theStoa.'"

While Nietzsche characterizes the Stoic's hope to refashion theworld in their own image "insane," he is not criticizing all suchendeavors. Every philosophy that "begins to believe in itself," Nie-tzsche claims, must share in this attempt. "Philosophy," Nietzschewrites, "is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power,to the 'creation of the world,' to the causa prima." The problem withthe Stoics seems to be that they "see nature in the wrong way." TheStoic interpretation of nature as bound by law is blind to the agonisminherent in nature. This blindness prevents their interpretation frombeing able to provide what they most want it to provide-a supportfor a way of lifei-because, Nietzsche contends, this agonism is afundamental condition for alllife.

Nietzsche's critique of Stoic doctrine in aphorism 9 of BeyondGood and Evil raises the specter of a familiar problem for interpreta-tions of Nietzsche. On the one hand, Nietzsche's critique of Stoicismtakes the Stoic interpretation of nature as symptomatic of a certainkind of life, Stoic. "self-tyranny" generalized to an attempted tyrannyofnature. The tendency to see every philosophical orientation as sucha symptomatic expression of a way of life is dominant throughoutBeyond Good and Evil, where Nietzsche also writes that every great

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philosophy has been the unconscious memoir of its author and that"the moral (or immoral) inteIltions in every philosophy constitutedthe real germ of life from whi(~h the whole plant has grown" (BGE 6).Nietzsche's primary concern seems to be the health or sickness thatsuch an interpretation reveals on the part of the interpreter ratherthan the degree to which this interpretation corresponds to anythingin the world conceived of in alJstraction from this interpretation. Thestrongest, healthiest interpretations are, moreover, the most creative.As opposed to mere philosoI>hic laborers, content with a scholarlyovercoming of the past, genuine philosophers are 11commanders andlegislators ... their 'knowing' is creating, their will to truth is-will topower" (BGE 211). On the other hand, Nietzsehe claims that the Stoicshave gotten something lvron~~ in their interpretation, that they de-eeived themselves about a fUIldamental fact about nature, the inher-ent agonism of aillife. An ade1quate recognition of this fact seems notonly to be a necessary condition for the right kind of interpretation,but it seems to provide groun1ds for calling those interpretations thatconflict with this view of life false.4 This familiar tension-between aradical perspectivism, most famously associated with the claim from .the Nachlass that "there are no facts, only interpretations," and Nie-tzsche's insistence on a certairL view of "life" as the defining criterionby which to evaluate all interpretations-will be central to our under-standing of the developing picture of the will to power in Beyond Goodand Evil.

Each of the next two mentions of the will to power (aphorisms 13and 22) deals with one of the two sides of this opposition. Aphorism13 boldly restates the claim al>out the partiality of life as a principle."A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength-lif~ itself iswill to power." The context for this claim is Nietzsche's repudiation ofthe principle of self-preservation as "the cardinal instinct of anorganie being." Self-preservation, Nietzsehe claims, is only an indi-reet result of the fundamental drive of living things to express them-selves. Therefore, when physiologists posit an instinct for self-preser-vation they are introducing a superfluous teleological principlewhich "method, which must be essentially economy of principles"demands we exclude. In aphorism 22 Nietzsehe, in his role as an "o~dphilologist," reveals that wheIl physicists speak of "nature's conform-ity to law" they are engaging, like the Stoics, in "bad modes of inter-pretation" arising this time from "the democratic instincts of the

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modern souL" This view of nature is, Nietzsche contends, "no matterof fact, no 'text'" and he suggests the possibility of an alternativemode of interpretation, and another kind of interpreter-one who"could read

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synthetically intertwined along with self regulation, assimilation,nourishment, excretion, and metabolism-as apre-form of life.(BGE 36, Nietzsche emphasizes "sufficient''' and "pre-form"; allother emphasis is mine)

It 1S important to note that despite the hypothetical form of thisaphorism,6 the experiment Nietzsche is describing is motivated by aclaim that is asserted as a psychological axiom-thinking is merelythe relation of drives to Olle another. Given this conception ofthought, and the conception of method first adduced in aphorism 13,that of an "economy of principles," the experiment Nietzsche intro-duces takes the form of an imLperative.

In the end not only is it permitted to make this experiment; theconscience of method demands it. Not to assume several kinds ofcausality until the experiment of making do with a single one hasbeen pushed to its utmost limit (to the point of nonsense if I maysay so)-that is a moral of nlethod which one may not shirk today.. . . In short, one has to risk the hypothesis whether will does notaffect will wherever "effeets" are recognized-and whether allmechanical occurrences are not, insofar as force is active in them,will force, effects of will.

The fundamental problem to which Nietzsche's experimentaddresses itself is the questio:n we began With, the Stoic's question ofhow to conceive of nature in its entirety, or 110W to orient oneself towhat iso But unlike the case of the Stoics, whose harmonious view ofa law-governed nature conflicted with the demands of life, Nietzschebegins with his view of life as the principle that guides our orienta-tion to what iso As the language of the aphorism indicates, Nietzschesees his will to power "psychology" as an alternative to two views ofreality he believes to be in so:me sense unava.ilable, materialism andidealism,7 the "down" and tile "up" to which the hypothesis of theaphorism denies us any aCCE~SS. And Nietzsche's rejection of theseviews seems to be bound up with the problem of reconciling "life"with "interpretation." An adequate account of Nietzsche's opposi-tion to idealism would have to deal with his confrontation withSocrates and Plato, a subject outside the scope of this essay, butprefatory to that discussion w'e can say that idealism8 falls prey to themistake of the Stoic conception of nature-it is blind to the necessarypartiality of life. Materialisml, on the other hand, is incomplete ac-cording to Nietzsche. It is no better than idealism in its inability to

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account for primary phenomena ofour world, the phenomena of life.9Nor can it account for the fact of its own status as an interpretation.lO

Nietzsche's thinking about the will to power can be seen as anattempt to reconcile his claims about "life" with his claims about"interpretation" by viewing the problem of "life" and the problem of"interpretation" as one problem, and his attempt to think this prob-lem through in as radical a way as possible. We have seen in someprovisional way why the problem of "life" would lead to the problenlof "interpretation" for Nietzsche. Any adequate recognition of life asa phenomenon in our world seems to include for Nietzsche therecognition of the arbitrary, violent, and unjust character of aillife,and we can see how this recognition could provide grounds fordoubting any claim to a "disinterested" access to the truth by any liv-ing being. We can also see, I believe, how the problem of "interpreta-tion" leads to the problem of "life" for Nietzsche by considering theimplications of his radical theory of interpretation, a theory of inter-pretation which attempts to evade the logic of originals and texts.

111. LIFE AS A PRINCIPLE OF UNITY

Alexander Nehamas, inhis Nietzsehe: Life as Literature, argues thattlle doctrine of the will to power is a consequence of Nietzsche's anti-realism, that is, his denial that the world has a nature independent ofthe interpretations placed on the world by interested subjects. Inparticular, he associates Nietzsche's claim that "a thing is the sum ofits effects" with Saussure's claim that each unit in a linguistic system,whether a phoneme or an idea, is constituted by its systematic differ-ences from other such units. "Prefiguring one of the great intellectualevents of the next century," writes Nehamas, "Nietzsche in effectclaimed that nothingin the world has any intrinsic features of its ownand that each thing is constituted solely through its interrelationswith, and differences from, everything else."n Lacking any positivecharacter "in itself," what character the world has at any moment isdetermined by a conflict between interpretations of that character.

Some kind of anti-realism is doubtless a necessary aspect of atheory of the will to power. But it must be supplemented by an ideathat Nehamas has a tendency to understate. This is the drive Nie-tzsche posits on the part of all (living) things to incorporate thewhole. "The victorious concept 'force,' by means of which our physi-

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eists have ereated God and fhe world, still needs to be completed: aninner world must be aseribed to it, which I designate as 'will topower,' Le., as an insatiable clrive to manifest power." (WP 619; KSA11:36[31])12 It is important to note that according to Nietzsche thepositing of such a drive is not an ad hoc hypothesis without which hisanti-realist views eould stan

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the distinction between an overarching "logie of the system" and theparticular "locallogics irtserted in it./16 Upon reflection, however, itdoes not seem as if a purely structuralist theory has the resources tomake any sense f this distinction. Once we are presented with aclaim like Levi-Strauss's, we seem forced to ask: what gives us accessto the distinction between Iocal and systemic logics? And in askingthis question, we are cnfronted with the determinative role our owninterpretive activity plays in selecting out any particular local"mytheme." In post-structuralist critiques, this recognition of theprimacy of individual interpretive activity is seen as underminingstructuralism's claim to universality and objectivity.

In "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sci-ences," Jacques Derrida points first to Nietzsche's ctitique of "theconcepts of being and truth, for which were substituted the conceptsofplay, interpretationand sign (sign withoutpresent truth)" whenhetries to indicate the cttlcial decentering "event," "whert languageinvaded the universal problematic, when, in the absence of center ororigin, everythirtg became discourse./17 We don't have to followDerrida all the way here, I think, to see that even if we were to grantthat oppositions within a system of differences cduld account for thedeterminacy of the entire system (a claim that it Is by no rrteansobvious we should grant), what they cannot seem to accourtt for isany determinacy within some localized nn-comprehensive part ofthat system. It Seems that the hypothesIs of "a system of differenceSIlmust either deny interpretation any significant role in determiningmeanirtg arid view the deterrrtirtacy of the whole system as determin-ative for all aspects (jf that system, or it must radicalize the nation of

interpretation~asNietzsehe does. As the above passage from theNachlass indicates, Nietzsche contertds that the tinity of the will tpower is the unit)' of an interpretation; in the hypothesIS f the will topower i interp'retatiofi attd dtive to fiiastery are the same phenomenonviewed frm different petspectives, r aS Nietzsehe writes in a notefrom 1885: "(t)he essertte f a thing is nly an opinzon abotit the'thing.' Ot father: 'it is consldered' 1s the feal'it i5,' the sole 'this 1s.'Orte mety hot ask: 'who then interprets?' ft the irtterptetatiort itself isa form f the will t power, exists (but fiot cis Cl 'beingi but as a ptoc.;oeSSi a becomlttg) ciS rt ffetti' (WP 556i KSA 12:2[1~51]).

Ifi ciS IhaVe sugge'stedj the will t pOWet is an attempt to thirtk theptoblem ()f "titell afiGi the'problemof 11int-efpfeftirtiJ 8S' ne problem,

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as an attempt to occupy a fund.amental orientation which sees life asinterpretation and interpretation as life, how are we then to con~eiveof Nietzsche's access to this fundamental orientation? Nietzsche'sdesignation of psychology as "queen of the sciences" in Beyond Goodand Evil 23 is, I believe, an extremely important indication of thedirection in which we should look for an answer to thisquestion. Thetitle of queen of the sciences had been traditionally given to meta~physics.18 Instead of simply dismissing the claim of metaphysics orany science to have this status l Nietzsche appropriates the title for hispsychology. In so doing Nietzsche forces us to try to conceive of apsychology which could have the status of first philosophy, a psy-chology which would be the path to fundam.ental problems-prob-lems of "life" and "interpretation"-to which the other sciences haveno independent access.

Two of Nietzsche's earliest works, The Birth ofTragedy, and On theUses and Disadvantages of His tory for Life, claimed to look at science,art, and history from the perspective of life. Whatever the full scopeof this claim, it seems clear that Nietzsche considered that variouscultural practices disclosed a fundamental orientation to the worldthat could be either "life-affirming" or "life-denying." But it is alsoclear, as we have seen, that wllat Nietzsche means by "life" cannot besynonymous with the continued existence of a biological organism. ~nfact, concern with simple survival seems to be, for Nietzsche, evi-dence of a life in decline. Furth.ermore, the fact that all cultural prac-tices, all modes of "interpretation," always already constitute somefundamentallife-affirming or life-denying orientation to the worldseems to preclude Nietzsche from any naive appropriation of theresults of any of these modes of interpretation. Thus, Nietzsche'sawareness of the problem of "life" precludes any simple access tovarious modes of "interpretation" and Nietzsche's awareness of theproblem of interpretation precludes any simple access to the phe-nomenon of life. Nietzsche's 11psychology" of the will to power seemst() be a kind of phenomenology of types of soul and modes of inter-pretation; it is a psychology v/hose object cannot be given prior to ordetermined externally from that psychology. As such, Nietzsche'spsychology attempts to occupy amiddie ground between a whollyempirical psychology, WhiCtl take its object, the human psyche, asgiven, and what used to be called rational psychology.19 Nietzsche'sattempt to occupy this tenuous middle ground means not only that

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we cannot wholly separate questions of life from questions of inter-pretation, but also suggests that we cannot wholly extricate thequestion of Nietzsehe's doctrine from the question of Nietzsehe'srhetoric.

NOTES

1 All citations are from Kaufmann's translations of WP and BGE.

2 Any discussion of the significance of the will to power in Nie-tzsche's thought must confront the controversy surrounding the use ofmaterials from Nietzsche's Nachlass. Opinions on the place of the literaryremains in interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy run the gamut fromHeidegger's claim that we should see the published works as propae-deutic to Nietzsche's fuHy developed philosophical thought, which we canfind only in Nachlass materials, to interpreters such as Karl Schlechta whoentirely discount the relevance of the Nachlass. In general, I endorse theview that the rhetorical and literary character of Nietzsche's publishedwritings renders questionable any interpretation in which the Nachlassdoes not play an ancillary role to arguments drawn from the publishedworks. That said, I believe that there are cases in which Nietzsche's notescan play an important role in the development of an interpretation of hispublished works. First, in the case of assessing the significance of the willto power in Nietzsche's thought, the sheer volume of notes on the subjectpresent a very strong primafacie argument against those interpreters whowant to claim little or no significant role for the will to power in Nie-tzsche's thought. That is, the extent of Nietzsche's Nachlass devoted to aninvestigation of the will to power seems to mandate an effort on the partof the interpreter to offer an interpretation which attends to the role of thewill to power in Nietzsche's thought. However, as these notes do not, forthe most part, provide anything like a sufficient context to determine theintent with which Nietzsche undertook these investigations, an interpreta-tion of the will to power, no less than any other aspect of Nietzsche's ma-ture philosophy, must orient itself primarily with reference to the pub-lished works. Secopd, in some few cases (notably in the drafts which havecome to be called Nietzsche's Philosophenbuch), the notes in question beginto approach the finished quality of Nietzsche's published works. In thesecases the interpreter seems justified in drawing more extensivelyon theNachlass Jl}aterials. However, even in cases such as these it is necessary toestablish the rhetorical framework within which these unpublishedmaterials should be interpreted, and such a rhetorical framework, I be-lieve, must be established with reference to one or more of Nietzsche'spublished works. On the Nachlass problem in general, see the discussions

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in Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche.. 2 vols. (Pfulligen: Neske, 1961); KarlSchlechta, I'Nachwort" in Nietzsches Werke in drei Bnden (Munieh: Hanser,1954), vol. 3, pp. 1381-1432; Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Impera-tive (Bloomington: Indiana Uni". Press, 1981), pp. 72-88; and WolfgangMller-Lauter, Nietzsche: His Philosophy 0/ Contradictions and the Contradic-tions 0/ his PhiIosophy, trans. David J. Parent, (Urbana: Univ. of IllinoisPress, 1999), pp. 124-26.

3 In selecting out these four aphorisms of BGE for special attention Iwill be following an example set by Maudernarie Clark in her Nietzsehe onTruth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 212-27, but my account of the significance of these four aphorisms differsgreatly from hers. Most significantly, her argument depends on preciselythe kind of radical opposition between "psychological" and "metaphysi-cal" interpretations of the will to power that my argument wishes to callinto question.

, 4 Cf. BGE 186, where Nietzsehe speaks of, and seems to be identifyingwith, those who have feIt deeply "how insipidly false and sentimental this(Schopenhauerian moral) principle is in a world whose essence is will topower." .

5 Nietzsche's admission at the close of this passage that this view isalso"only an interpretation" does not put this latter interpretation on alevel with the interpretation of the physicists, as it is often taken to bycommentators. The view of nature's conformity to law is called "a badinterpretation" and "a naively humanitarian emendation and perversionof meaning," and one measure of the superiority of the "will to power"interpretation is that it can take into account the fact of interpretationwhile that of the physicists cannot.

6 Cf. Karl Schlechta, Der Fall Nietzsche (Munieh: Hanser, 1959), pp.120-22 with Mller-Lauter, pp .. 124-30. In general, my interpretation ofBGE 36 should be compared to :Mller-Lauter's discussion of the disputebetween Baumler and Schlechta on the significance of Nietzsche's use ofthe subjunctive mood in this passage. Despite Mller-Lauter's apparentrecognition of the significance of Nietzsche's esotericism (124-25), hisinterpretation reHes on a simplistic distinction between "Nietzsche'sultimate 'insights'" and the "questioningattitude of the 'ftee spirits,'''without any attempt to discern in Nietzsche's published works a rhetor-ical strategy which might provide a basis for interpreting the distinctionbetween esoteric and ~xotericmodes of expression in Nietz5che's texts.Thus Mller-Lauter claims that "the Nachlass-text, which is an 'earlierstage,' deserves interpretive priority over the published version" (128).

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7 This may be another reason that Nietzsche's argument concerningthe will to power in BGE begins with the Stoics. The Stoic conception ofnature can also be seen as 11 a rival to two powerful alternatives, Aristoteli-an and Epicurean, to which it is related as something of amid-pointbetween two extremes." (A. A. Long, IIThe Stoics on World ConflagrationandEverlasting Recurrence," The Southern Journal ofPhilosophy, Vol. XXIII,Supplement [1985]: 14.) See also BGE 44 and 227 for Nietzsche's identifica-tion with Stoicism.

8 By which I mean, as Nietzsche seems to mean when he discussesidealism, a rational idealism as exemplified by Hegel's famous claim thatIIthe real is the rational," thus bracketing the question whether Nie-tzsche's claims relating truth to the needs of a certain form of life areaccurately characterized as a IIbiological idealism." Cf. Heidegger, pp. 39-48.

9 IIOf all the interpretations of the world attempted hitherto, themechanistic one seems today to stand victorious in the foreground ...Everyone knows these procedures: one leaves 'reason' and 'purpose' outof account as far as possible, one shows that given sufficient time, any-

. thing can evolve out of anything else, and one does not conceal a mali-cious chuckle when 'apparent intention' in the fate of a plant or an eggyolk is once again traced back to pressure and stress; in short one paysheartfelt homage to the principle of the greatest possible stupidity, if aplayful expression may be allowed concerning such serious matters.Meanwhile, apresentiment, or anxiety, is to be noted among select spiritsinvolved in this movement, as if the theory had a hole in it that mightsooner or later prove to be its final hole: I mean the shrill one which onewhistles through in an extreme emergency. One cannot 'explain' pressureand stress themselves, one cannot get free of the actio in distans" (WP 618;KSA 11:36[34]).

10 Without addressing here the question of whether Nietzschean per-spectivism is self-refuting, one can nonetheless see that it has a prima facieclaim to better take into account its own status as interpretation thanmaterialist theories do.

11 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsehe: Life as Literature (Cambridge: Har-vard Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 81-84.

12 Kaufmann translation, but following the KSA's lIinnere WeIt" forKaufmann's lIinner will."

13 Nor is it clear that Nehamas believes hirnself to have solved it; seeNehamas, pp. 177-90. See also Mller-Lauter, pp. 130-47.

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14 Nehamas, p. 81.

15 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsehe and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1983), p. 40: "What defines a body isa relatidn between dominant and dominated forces."

16 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: Univ. of ChicagoPress, 1972) pp. 161-63.

17 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 280.

18 Cf. Kant' s introduction to the Critique ofPure Reason, trans. NormanKemp Smith (London: Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 7.

19 Cf. Hege!'s characterization of the distinction between empiricaland rational psychology in the Philosophy ofMind (Part 111 of the Encyclope-dia of the Philosophical Sciences), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: OxfordUniv. Press, 1971) 378, 378Z.