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Can Our Understanding of Old Texts be Objective?Author(s): C. Behan McCullaghSource: History and Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Oct., 1991), pp. 302-323Published by: Wileyfor Wesleyan University

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2/23

CAN

OUR UNDERSTANDING

OF

OLD

TEXTS

BE

OBJECTIVE?

C.

BEHAN

MCCULLAGH

I. INTRODUCTION

Some

people

today

would

deny

the

possibility

of

achieving

an

objective

under-

standing

of a

contemporary

ext,

and

thenargue

hat there

s even less

chance

of achieving

such an

understanding

f a

text from

the

past.

Such

wholesale

skepticism

needs to

be

rejected,

I

shall

argue,

as

quite

often

objective

under-

standing

of

historical

exts is

possible. By

an

objective

understanding

f a

text

I

mean both

one which

is rationally

ustifiable

and

one

whichwould

generally

be acceptedas correct.

Sometimes

here

s

no rational

way

of

choosing

between

two or

morealternative

nterpretations,

ut

this

is by no means

always

he

case.

First let

me explain

my use

of a

few keyterms.

We understand

text when

we can say

what

it means. I

have no

comprehensive

heory

of meaning

o

de-

fend

here, but will generally

assumethat

the

meaning of

sentences

ncludes

their llocutionary

orce

together

withthe

conditions

which

makethem trueor

correct.

There

are often several

different

ways

of expressing

one's

understanding

f

the meaning

of a sentenceor

text.

Any statement

by

a

person

of

his or

her

understanding

f its meaning

is what

I

call his

or her

interpretation

of

its

meaning.

If

there

are several

ways of

understanding

he

meaning

of a text,

then

each of

those

ways

of

understanding

t is

an

interpretation

f

its

meaning

as

well. So an

interpretation

f a text

can be

eitherone

of several

different

ways

of

understanding

text, and/or

one of several

differentways

of

expressing

ne's

understanding

f

a

text. Generally,

however,

when

I

refer

to

an

interpretation

of a text

I

refer

to

a

statement

of its meaning.

It is my

belief

that

there

are conventionally

accepted

criteria

by which an

interpretation

f a textcan be

justified

as correct.

Those

who

are

skeptical

about

the

objectivity

f

understanding

ometimes

gnore

he existence

f these

criteria,

focussingupon

the subjective

determinants

f an interpretation

lone. But a

glance

at any debate

over the

correct nterpretation

f

a

text

soon

revealsboth

the

presence

and the importance

of these criteria.

Examples

of them

will

be

given

below.

If

an

interpretation

atisfies

the relevant

criteria,

t

is

not only

justified

but

also

correct.

I

prefer

o

use the

word true

ust

of statements

which

correspond

o

some

reality. nterpretations

f

the

meaning

of

a

text

are

generally

not

true

in

this sense.

They

do

not

necessarily

correspond

o

any

particular

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3/23

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE? 303

reality. To call an interpretation f a text correct s to say that it would be

acceptedas the meaningof the text by the majorityof educated peakers

of

the

language n which it is written, were they to know the literaryand historical

contexts relevantto its subject matter and the intentionsof its author. No

individualmight have such an understanding f the text, because ndividuals

are occasionally mistaken about

the

conventional meaning

of words and

phrases,and may be ignorantof the contextof the text and of the intention

of

its author.Nor is the author's ntendedmeaning he correctmeaning,as authors

sometimes

ail

to say

what

they

intend.

Before considering he possibility

of

objective understanding

f old

texts,

let me addressJacquesDerrida'sattack upon the possibility

of

an objective

understanding f any text, old or new. Following Saussure,Derrida nsists

that the meaningof

words is to be found in their role in a

language,

n their

implications, ssociations,and contrasts. He goes beyondSaussure

n

allowing

that the

meanings

which

words have for

any

readerare also

to

be

found in

whatever iteraryand logical significance hey may

have

for

that reader. So

Derrida

inds a profusion

of

meanings

or the texts he

analyzes,

a

profusion

which he

says

is without

limits. For

him,

a text is henceforthno

longer

a

finished orpus

of

writing, omecontent

enclosed

n

a book or its

margins,

but a

differential etwork,a fabricof tracesreferring ndlessly o somethingother

than

itself,

to other differential

races.

Thus the text overrunsall the

limits

assigned

o it so

far. 2

He

dismisses he suggestion hat the meaningof a text corresponds o the

author's ntention

by pointing

out that texts exist

independent

f their

authors,

anddo not

dependupon

a

knowledge

f

theirauthor o be meaningful.Similarly

he denies hattheymustbe understoodby reference o the context

n

which hey

were

written,

or

they

can

normallybe

understoodwithout

any reference

o

that

context.3Theonly thingwhichhe admitsas determininghemeaningof a text

is thelanguage

n

whichit is written,togetherwiththe literaturen whichthat

languageappears.

Derrida's

heory

of

meaning

s of some

value,

but it is far from

adequate.

He

rightly

describes he

meaning

of

words as

a

function

of

their relation

o

other

words

associated

with

them

in

one way

or

another, hough

he

shouldalso have

recognized

he

importance

f theirassociation

with

other

hings,

suchas

objects

in

the

world,experiences eoplehave, and changespeoplewantto bringabout.

The fact that manytexts can be understoodwithoutknowledgeof the circum-

stancesof

their

composition

does not mean that the words

they

use

have no

association

with

the world.

Many

wordsare

commonly

and

regularly

ssociated

1. See the essay Differance

in

Jacques

Derrida, Margins of Philosophy,

transl.

Alan Bass

(Brighton, Eng.,

1982).

2.

Jacques

Derrida,

Living On,

in Deconstruction and

Criticism,

ed.

Harold

Bloom et

al.

(London,

1979), 84.

3. Jacques Derrida, Semiology and Grammatology: Interview with Julia Kristeva, in Posi-

tions,

transl.

Alan

Bass (London, 1972).



4/23

304 C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

with things in the world, things to which they refer or bring about. However,

even

if

Derrida's heorywere augmented o include

associations uch as these,

it still would not be adequate.For surelya theory

of meaningshould explain

how we know the meaningof texts. Derrida's heoryfails to explainhow we use

language

o

communicateas clearlyand precisely

as we do. It simply gnores

the conventions

by

whichwe

decidewhich,among

he variouspossiblemeanings

wordscan have, we shouldunderstand hem to

have in the case of a given text

or utterance.

It is difficult o formulate hese conventionsprecisely.Generally peaking,

the correct

nterpretation

f

a

text is that which (1) does not violate any of the

semantic

and

syntactic

rulesof the

language

n which t is

written; 2)

resolves

any obscuritiesof referenceand ambiguitiesof meaning arising from these

rules;(3) provides

a coherent

body

of

information; 4) performs he first hree

functions o a muchgreaterdegree han any other

nterpretationwhich he text

warrants; nd perhaps 5) convincingly xplains

away any failures o perform

the first

hree

functions

(that is, any

inconsistencies etween he

interpretation

and the rules of the

language,any remaining

obscuritiesand

ambiguities,

and

any

inconsistencieswithin he information t

provides).

f

an interpreter annot

meet these requirements

rom

a study

of

the

text alone, then he or she may

examine he context n whichthe text wasproduced.This willoften locate the

text

in

a widerframe of discourseand

in

an historicalcontext

which

will clear

up uncertainties

f

reference

and

meaning.

If an

adequate nterpretation

s still

not

available, he interpretermay then try

to reconstruct he author's

ntention

in

order to resolve

remaining

uncertainties.

Sometimeseven

recourse

o

the

author's ntentions

will

not remove

all

uncertainties, mbiguities

nd

inconsis-

tencies romone's

nterpretation

f a text. These

may

n

fact havebeen

ntended,

as

in

the case of some

diplomatic etters,

and

in

some

poems.

Or

they may

not

havebeen noticedbythe author.In cases suchas these,the readerappreciates

an

explanation

of

remaining nadequacies

n

the

interpretation

whichaccounts

for

theirpresence

here. The

interpretation

f

a text

which s

arrived

at

in

this

way,

and whichsatisfies

he five criteria isted

above,

is

generally

deemed

o

be

the

correct

nterpretation

f the text.

If

the language

of

the text

is not

very

well

known

by

the

interpreter,

nd the

text

provides

a

significantlyargepart

of

the evidence

of that

language,

hen the

criteria

are

a bit different.The

interpreter

till

wants

to find

an

interpretation

of the text which s as unambiguous ndcoherentas possible.But it must also

be

consistent

with

the rules

of

language

which

he

or she

judges

to make

best

sense

of all

the evidence

of

that

language

available.

Thus,

for

example,

if

a

scholar

wereunfamiliar

with

Plato's

Greek,

he or

she

would ook

for

interpreta-

tions

of the Platonic

dialogues

onsistent

with he besttheoriesof Plato's

general

semantics

and

syntax,

as well as

interpretations

which

are

as

unambiguous

nd

coherent

as

possible.

Derrida

mightargue

hat

any suchconventions

annotbe justifiedas yielding

a correctunderstandingf a text withoutviciouscircularity. f wewereto say

thattheseconventions re

appropriate

ecause

n

conforming

o them

we

always



5/23

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING

OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE? 305

arrive at a correct understanding of texts, that would

indeed be circular, as-

suming that there is no independent check of their

correctness. But if we say

that

in

our community conformity to these conventions

is what we mean by

calling an interpretation of a text correct, then circularity has been avoided.

The claim that a correct

understanding of a text is

one which satisfies certain

conventional

criteria does not

necessarily entail any vicious circularity of rea-

soning.

Does it invite a

charge

of arbitrariness nstead? This question is more difficult

to answer. But perhaps it is enough to say that, as Saussure

has taught us, many

linguistic conventions are

arbitrary. Saussure noted

that the relations between

signifiers (words)

and

signifieds

(things), though

fairly regular, are usually arbi-

trary. It would be no great surprise, then, if the relations between texts and their

meanings

are somewhat

arbitrary

too.

They

involve,

at

a

minimum,

rules of

semantics and

syntax

which seem

largely arbitrary,

varying

as

they

do from

language to language.

Whether they are arbitrary or

not, the rules for interpre-

ting texts generally enable

quite effective communication

of precise ideas, and

that is what justifies them.

II. BASIC

AND

SECONDARY

INTERPRETATIONS

Another common reason

for denying the possibility of an objective under-

standing

of the

meaning

of a

text is the observation that

people's interpretations

generally vary

with

their culture and interests. This was a major argument

of

Hans-Georg

Gadamer. He noted how the interpretations

of great historians

such

as

Mommsen, Treitschke,

and

Sybel

differed

in

accordance

with their

society,

and went

on

to

say:

No one disputes he

fact that

controlling

he

prejudices

f our own

present

o

such

an

extent hatwedonot misunderstandhewitnesses f thepast s avalidaim,butobviously

such

controldoes not

completely

ulfill

he

task

of understanding

he

pastand

its trans-

mission.

Indeed,

t could

very

well be that

only insignificanthings

n historical cholar-

ship permit

us to

approximate

his ideal of

totally extinguishing

ndividuality,

whilethe

greatproductive

chievements

f

scholarship lwayspreserveomething

f

the

splendid

magic

of

immediately

mirroring

he

present

n the

past

and

the

past

in

the present.4

It is not

entirely

clear what insignificant things

in

historical scholarship

Gadamer allowed can be

objective.

A

close

look

at

historical

practice, however,

reveals that there is frequently complete agreement among historians about the

basic

meaning

of

a

text,

though considerable disagreement

about

it

secondary

meaning. Perhaps Gadamer meant

that historians can

get

individual facts

about

the

past right,

but

that

their

understanding

of constellations

of

facts is

much

more

subjective.

When

it

comes

to

the

interpretation

of

texts,

what is

certain

is

that the

variety

of

interpretations

of the kind Gadamer has

noted exists

4. Hans-Georg

Gadamer, Philosophical

Hermeneutics,

transl.

and

ed. David

E.

Linge

(Berkeley,

1976),

6. Compare Hans-Georg

Gadamer,

Truth

and

Method (New

York,

1975),

465-466.



6/23

306

C.

BEHAN

MCCULLAGH

predominantly

mong

the interpretations

f the secondarymeanings

of

texts.

Understanding

f the basicmeaning

of a text

is much essfrequently

ontested,

so

there is less reason to

doubt

that

it

can

be

rationally

ustified. However,

sometimesan interpretation f the secondarymeaningof a text is so well sup-

ported

that

it is undisputed

oo, and so

one

may assume that it is

rationally

justified.

Gadamer's

wn essays on Plato's Lysis

and Phaedo

illustrate

what

has

just

been

said quitewell.

The

literalmeaning

of Plato's text is

never

n

doubt,

so

well

s his

Greekunderstood.

Any

ambiguities re

seen

to havebeendeliberately

introduced

s a play on words.5

What

s uncertain

s the point

of thesedialogues.

The

Lysis, an inquiry

nto the natureof

friendship,

eems o be

entirely

nconclu-

sive, the discussion umpingfrompointto point, with eachsuggestedanalysis

of friendship

being

shown

to be

quite

unsatisfactory.

The Phaedo

presents

arguments

bout

the

immortality

f the

soul,

but all

of

them

are

plainly

nade-

quate

so that

it

is

hard

to

see any point

to the dialogue.

Gadamerdiscusses

the force of

thesedialogues,

and suggests

what Plato might

have

intended

n

presenting

hem as he did.

To help

fix

the intent

of thesedialogues,

Gadamer

onsiders

heir

genre.

The

Lysis,

he concludes,

s not

a systematic

nquiry

but

a discussion,

a

form of

conversationn which wemove within the live play of riskingassertions,of

taking back

what we have said,

of

assuming

and

rejecting,

all

the while

pro-

ceeding

on our

way

to

reaching

an

understanding. 6

ince Socrates'discussion

in

the Lysis

is

with two boys, Lysis

and

Menexenos,

Gadamer uggests hat

it

is appropriate

o

find t

inconclusive,

forchildren

do

not

yet

knowwhat

friend-

ship

is

and how

complex

a relationship

n

enduring riendship

reates

between

the

friends. IThe inconclusive

arguments

have

a

point though.

When

Menex-

enos

cannot tell

whether

a lover becomes

a friend

of

the beloved

or vice

versa,

Gadamer aysthatPlato certainlywants us to sensethat in actualfriendship

it

is impossible

o distinguishhe

lover

from

the

beloved

n

this

way

and

to

say

who

is the lover

andwho the beloved. 8 his,

in Gadamer's yes,

is

characteristic

of the force

of the

discussion,

and

he

goes

on to

find

similar

ignificance

n

other

apparently

nconclusivearguments.

Gadamer

also detects implicit

significance

n

the Phaedo.

For

example:

WhenPlato

has

Socrates,

n

the

hour

of

death,

enter

into conversation

with

'Pythagorean'

epresentatives

f contemporary

cience,

hat

is

obviouslymeant

to showthatPlato sawit as his own task to unite the moralintrospection or

which

Socrates

tood

with

the scientificknowledge epresented

y

the

Pythagor-

eans. 9

Gadamer's

entral hesis

s

that

the

Phaedo's

poetic

power

to

convince

5.

For examples,

Hans-Georg

Gadamer,

Dialogueand Dialectic:

EightHermeneutical

tudies

on Plato

(New Haven,

1980),

9, 11.

6.

Logos

and Ergon in Plato's Lysis,

bid.,

5.

7. Ibid.,

6.

8.

Ibid.,

10.

9. Ibid., 32.



7/23

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD

TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

307

is stronger than

its arguments'

logical power to prove. '0He

sums up his discus-

sion

with

these words:

Plato certainlydoes

not

want

to say that he has proved

he same mmortality f the soul

which sbasic o thereligious radition.Butwhathe doeswant o say s thatthe spreading

skepticism esulting

rom

the scientific

nlightenment

oes not at allaffect he sphere

of

our

human ife andour

understanding

f

it. The

growing

cientificnsight

nto the

causes

of coming-into-being

ndpassing-away,

nto the

courseof natural

processes,doesnot

obviate

the need

for

thinkingbeyond

the

reality

of

this world,

and it has no authority

to

contest

religious

convictions.

Thus

the pointof the demonstrations,

t

seems to

me,

is

that

they

refute doubts and

not that

they justifybelief.

For proof

of the uncertaintyof secondary

interpretations

of the Lysis and the

Phaedo one need only glance at books about them. David Bolotin has given a

detailed

account

of the

long dispute

between

Max Pohlenz and Hans

von

Arnim

about

the

significance

of

the

Lysis.

12

Pohlenz

argued

that it was meant to

show

that friendship

is related to

erotic love

in

that it

always

includes an element

of

desire;

whereas

Arnim

produced

reasons

for

thinking

Plato

regarded

true

friendship as

existing only between good people

who

are

quite

self-sufficient,

possessing the

good already and so not desiring

it. It

is

interesting

to see

how

texts can be

found

to

support

both

interpretations.

As for the Phaedo, compare the following fairly recent interpretations:

The

subject

of the discussion s the desirability

f death.'3

It willbe wellto askwhat s thefundamental urpose

f the dialogue.

It is

not,

of

course,

to

prove

that the

humansoul

is

immortal,

houghmuch of

it is

devoted

to

arguments

for thatthesis; t

is

not to pay

a

tribute

of

admiration

o a

beloved

friendand

master,

though

hattribute s

undoubtedly aid;

t is not to

expound

or

propagate

metaphysical

doctrine,

hough

the

doctrine

of

Forms

(Ideas)

bulks

arge;

t

is,

I

would

say,

to

extend

and

deepenthrough

the mouth

of

a

consciously

Platonized

Socrates,

the essential

teaching

of

Socrates

himself,

namely

hat man's

upreme

oncern

s

the

tendance f his

soul,

or

(in

more

modern anguage)

he furthering

f his

insight

nto moraland

spiritual

values and the

application

of that

insight

n

all

his conduct.'4

The

Pythagoreans,Aristotleargues,

differfrom Plato only

in

denyingany separation

between

irst

principles

which hey dentify

withnumbers ather

han

ideas -and

the

things

said to be their

imitations;

he

Pythagorean eaching

on

reincarnation,

n

the

other

hand,

presupposes

he separability

f the

psyche

from

the

body.

The

attempt

o

reinterpret

he

meaning

of

separation,

nd

in

so

doing

to reverse

he

Pythagorean

position, is,

one might say, the

fundamental ntention

of

the Phaedo.'5

With such a variety of secondary interpretationsit is tempting to suppose that

each

represents

a

subjective

viewpoint

and

that none can

be

judged

to be

superior

to

any

other.

But that is not

what the commentators

believe,

as the

quotation

10. Ibid.,

22.

11.

Ibid.,

37.

12. David Bolotin,

Plato's

Dialogue on Friendship

(Ithaca, N.Y.,

1979).

13.

R. S.

Bluck, Plato's Phaedo

(London,

1955),

1.

14. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Cambridge, Eng., 1955), 3.

15.

Rome Burger,

The Phaedo:

A Platonic

Labyrinth

(New Haven,

1984),

7.



8/23


from Hackforth ndicates. CertainlyGadamerdefends his

interpretations y

suggesting

hat

they

accountfor more featuresof the

dialogues

han

previous

interpretations id.

In

particularhe believes they account for the inconclu-

sivenessof the Lysis, and the obvious inadequacyof the arguments n the

Phaedo.

The distinction havejust madebetween he basic

meaningof a text and the

text's

secondarymeaningneeds

to be

explained.The secondarymeaningof a

text

dependsupon its basic meaning,but the basic

meaning

of a text

depends

on no other

meaning

t

has.

The

basic meaningdoes,

of

course, dependupon

the

meaning

of

the wordsand phrasesused

in

the text, but not upon anyother

meaning

of the text

as

a

whole.

It is not

quite

the same

as

the literal

meaning

of the text, for the latter is sometimes aken to be a functionsimplyof the

semantics

and

syntax

of the

language

used

in

the

text,

and not of the context

in

whichthe text appears.The basic meaningof a text is sometimes

a

function

of its context.

In

discussions f the meaning

of

texts,

t

is

common

o

distinguish

he

meaning

of

the

sentences,according

o the rulesof

language;

he

meaning

of the utter-

ance, taking

nto accountthe

context

n

which

the

text was

produced;

and

the

meaningof the utterer, hat is the meaningwhich he author

ntended o convey

in writing he text. How does the basic meaningof a textrelate o these alterna-

tives?

From what

I

have

observed,

our

practice

s to decide

the

basic

meaning

of

a

text

by following

the

procedure

described

above. First we

considerthe

meaningof the sentences,drawing olely upon our

knowledgeof the language;

if

this is

unambiguous,we go no further.

If

it is ambiguous,however,we refer

to the context

in

the

hope

of

clearingup

the

ambiguity.

The

sentence There

are

bats

in

the

belfry meansonething

f

addressed

o the local

pest controller,

and another

f

spoken

to the

churchcricket

eam

looking

for

their

equipment.

If a

careful

study

of

the contextfails

to

resolve

he

ambiguity,

we then turn

our

attention

o the

speaker,

and

try

to

discover

what he

or she

probably

ntended

in

saying

what he or

she did. Thus the meaningof a text

may dependupon

the

meaning

of the

corresponding tterance,and even the

meaning

of

the

utterer,

but it

neednot do

so.

Indeed,

f

the

meaning

of a text is

unambiguous ccording

to the rules of

the

language,

t

may differ rom

the

meaning

which

the utterer

intended o

convey. Interestingly nough, precisely

he

same

procedure

s

fol-

lowed to determine

he secondarymeaningof a

text as well.

I

have

suggested hat one can sometimes ustify one's

understanding

f

the

basic

meaning

of

a text

by

reference

o

rules

of

semantics

and

syntax

alone.

In

practice,however, providinga completejustification

of an

interpretation

n

terms

of these

rules s

virtually mpossible,

as

the

rules

nvolved

defy complete

formulation.

Competent anguageusers

know how to

apply

hese

rules,

but not

how to state them.

In

practice, therefore,

we

regard

an

interpretation

f a

sentence

as

justified

f

most educatedusers

of

the

languageudge

t

to be correct.

Sometimes he

meaning

of

a

sentence,

taken on

its

own,

is

ambiguous.

To

resolve he

ambiguity

t

is conventional

o

choose

a

reading

whichbest

fits

the



9/23

CAN

OUR UNDERSTANDING

OF OLD

TEXTS

BE OBJECTIVE?

309

context.

Derrida

asserts

hat

there

are no absolutely

determinable

ontexts

by

which

o justify

an

interpretation.6

But

once againhe overlooks

he

conventions

we use

to

determine

meaning.

We

always

choose

the meaningwhich

fits

best

withthe surroundingext, thatis a meaningwhicheitherentailsor is entailed

by

what is said

elsewhere

n the

text, or

at least

which

s

not incompatible

with

what

is said elsewhere.

This

usually

resolves

he ambiguity

quite

quickly.

If

it

does

not,

then

we commonly

draw

upon

our

knowledge

of the literary

and

historical

ontext

n which

he sentence

was uttered.

And

if this fails to

resolve

the

issue,

we turn

our

attention

to

the author

and the

circumstances

f her

composing

or

uttering

he

text to determine

what she

probably

ntended

t

to

mean.

Derrida

ries

to preclude

hese

movesby

denying

that the meaning

of

texts depends n any way upon the presenceof a contextof utteranceor the

presence

of the

author,

but

in that

he

is just

mistaken.

Often

it does

depend

upon

those things.

Certainly

we sometimes

come

upon

texts

in places far

re-

moved

from

the context

of

theirproduction,

and

that

fact sometimes

makes

t

difficult

o be sure

that we

have

understood

them correctly.

Historians

are

particularly

onscious

of this

difficulty,and

do what

they

can to overcome

t.

II. CRITERIA FOR JUDGING SECONDARY INTERPRETATIONS

As

has been

shown,

the secondary

meaning

of

texts

is much

more frequently

debated han

their

basic meaning,

but

that does

not mean

there is no

way

of

justifying

a

secondary

nterpretation.

A

secondary

nterpretation

f a text

is

often

an act

of

colligation,

n

which various

features

of the basic meaning

of

the text are

shown

to have

a certain

significance

when considered ogether.

Secondary

nterpretations

ake

a

variety

of forms. Theymay

simply

be

state-

mentsof the additionalllocutionaryorceof atext,

and

perhaps

f its secondary

field

of

reference.

A

secondary

nterpretation

might

ake

the formof a

statement

of

the author'sgeneral

ntention,

which

would

help

account

for the features

of

the

text which

could

be seen

as

helping

to fulfillit. We

have

already

seen

an

example

f

this

kindof

interpretation

n

Gadamer's

iscussion

f Plato's

general

intentions

n

writing

he

Lysis

andthePhaedo.

A

secondary

nterpretation

might

also consist

of a

general

summary

of the

content

of

the

text,

or a

summary

of

itsessential

deas

or

thesis. It could

even

be a

statement

f someoverall

tructure

of the text. Thekeycriterionusedin judgingthe adequacyof suchinterpreta-

tions

s

theirscope:

we

prefer

nterpretations

hich

colligate

he

greatest

number

of facts about

the text.

But

they

must

also be

not

very

complex,

and

coherent.

General ummaries

re

expected

o

satisfy

additional

equirements

ppropriate

to

their nature:

hey

must

be

accurate,

nformative,

and

comprehensive.

Texts

sometimes

llustrate

a

number

of

general

ruths,

as

the discussion

of

16.

Jacques

Derrida,

Margins

of

Philosophy,

310.



10/23


the Lysis and the

Phaedo has

shown.

All

of these might be interesting, so

the

search

for

one

reading superior to the others could appear

pointless.

It

has a

point, however, which is to

provide

a

reading which somehow explains

all

the

major parts of the text, if possible, and thus to representthe whole text fairly.

That is

why the scope of

secondary interpretations is so important.

It is possible for a text to have

a significance

for

its

author's contemporaries

which the author did not intend. And it

is possible for a

text to have a significance

for modern

readers which neither the author

nor

the

author's contemporaries

would have known

-the Freudian interpretation of

The Turn of the Screw is

a

case

in

point.

Whose

secondary interpretation is the

correct one?

I

believe

that current conventions are

captured

by

the

following

distinctions.

I think

we

judge the most comprehensive interpretation to be the correct one, whether or

not it accords

with

the

author's

intended reading, or the reading of the author's

contemporaries.

The

historically

correct

interpretation

is

that

of the

majority

of

the author's educated

contemporaries, which might well be that intended

by

the

author. The intended

interpretation

is

simply that

intended by

the author.

1. The

dangersof anachronism

The best

secondary

interpretation of a text is usually also the historically correct

one, because modern theories often have implications which do not apply to an

old

text,

and so

frequently misrepresent

them.

Indeed, the

appropriateness

of

summarizing

texts

in

modern terms which the

author would never have used

has been

questioned. Quentin Skinner

has

shown

that this

practice, by historians

who have

not

carefully

understood the

basic

meaning

of the texts first,

can

lead

them to

misrepresent them. For example, those

who have interpreted the

political

views of the

Levellers

in

seventeenth-century Britain as a

philosophy

of

liberal

democracy, simply because the Levellers

were concerned

with

an

extension of the right to vote, have completely mistaken their views.

First the

paradigmmakes it unnecessarily ifficult o

account for some of the most

characteristic

eaturesof

Leveller

deology.

For

if

we areprogrammedo

think

n

terms

of

the

republican

ecularism f the

movement,

t

is not

surprising

hat

their

agonizings

over the

Monarchy

and

their

appeals

to

religioussentiment

begin

to

look

somewhat

baffling.

And

second, the paradigmof

democracy

will

tend to lead the historical

investigation

n

rather

nappropriate irections.Some anachronistic oncept

of

the

welfare

state

has to be

found in Leveller hought, as well

as a belief

in

manhood

suffrage,

which

they

never

n

fact

held.17

To

describe

the

Levellers as

presenting

a

theory

of

liberal democracy

is thus not

only

unfair,

in

that it

fails to accommodate

many

of their

important

concerns

about the crown and

religion,

but it is also

misleading

in

that

it

implies

concerns

for a welfare state

and manhood

suffrage

which

were

not theirs

at

all. Such

17. Quentin kinner, Meaning ndUnderstandingnthe Historyof Ideas, Historyand heory

8

(1969),

27.



11/23

CAN

OUR

UNDERSTANDING

OF

OLD TEXTS

BE OBJECTIVE?

311

mistakes

can be

avoided,

however,

if the

historian

carefully

checks

whether

the

basic

meaning

of a

text

warrants

the modern description

of

it.

Despite

the

dangers

of summarizing

old texts

in modern terms,

John

Dunn

suggests that such summaries are useful in showing the modern relevance of

these

texts.

He therefore

applauds

the practice,

while

remaining

concerned

about

their accuracy:

To present

a

complex

argument

from the

past

in

terms

of

its significance

for us

may often

seem

mendacious

and

to present it

with

the

greatest

concern

for historical

specificity

but without

exploring

its significance

is

likely to seem

trivial.18

The history

of philosophy,

like

the history

of science,

must

needs

be Whig

as

to subject-matter

. .

. [and]

.

.

.

Tory

as to

truth. 19

The

process

of

carefully

judging

the

justification

of a

modern

summary

of

an old text is well illustratedby J. W. Gough's discussion of Willmore Kendall's

thesis

that

Locke's

theory

was

not

individualist,

as has

been

commonly

thought,

but

that

it gives

an authoritarian

and collectivist

account

of political

power.20

To judge

the

adequacy

of these

descriptions,

Gough

interprets

them

and

then looks

for

evidence

relevant to

them

in

Locke's

writing.

An

individu-

alist

theory,

it

seems,

is

one which

presents

government

as severely

limited

by

the

rights

of individuals.

An

authoritarian

theory

insists upon

the govern-

ment's

authority

over

individuals,

unless

the government

is so bad

that

the

people are entitled to revolt. There are passages in Locke which support both

views,

so

how does

Gough

decide

the issue?

First,

he carefully

examines

the

crucial passages

in context

to see

whether they

do

support

the

interpretation

suggested

for them.

He

finds that

some which appear

to support

the

individualist

interpretation

do not

really

do

so,

when

studied

in

their

context.2

Second,

he

points

out

that there

is evidence

for and

against

both readings,

and that

each

can only

be defended by ignoring

as

insignificant

those

passages

which

tell

against

it.

As

Gough

puts

it:

Many

critics

have

noticed

features

of

Locke's

theory

which

seem

inconsistent

with

the

usual

individualist interpretation

of

him.

The critics

have

varied,

however,

in the

degree

of

emphasis

they have

laid

on such discrepancies,

and

have

generally

tended to

treat

the

individualism

as fundamental,

and

to

minimize

what

is

inconsistent

with this,

either

ignoring

it

in

their

final verdict

or dismissing

it as

ill-considered

and unrepresentative

of

Locke's

real

view.

Mr.

Kendall,

in

effect,

reverses

this

tendency.

It is

the

individualist

passages

which are

inconsistencies

for

him,

and he

emphasizes

instead the

points

-and

they certainly

amount

to a

considerable

array-on

the

other

side.22

Finally, Gough concludes that the truth about Locke lies somewhere between

the

two extremes.

His

theory

does

not

neatly

fit either

modern model,

though

it contains

important

elements

of

both.

18.

J. Dunn, The

Political Thought

of John Locke (Cambridge,

Eng., 1969), 208.

19.

J. Dunn, Political

Obligation n

Its HistoricalContext:

Essays

in Political Theory Cam-

bridge,

Eng., 1980),

26.

20. J. W.

Gough, John Locke's

Political Philosophy (Oxford,

1956), chap. 2.

21. Ibid., 29-30.

22. Ibid., 28.



12/23

312

C. BEHAN

MCCULLAGH

WasLocke

then,

after all,

an

individualist?

think

we

can sayhe

was, but

he

wasnot

a thorough-going,

xtreme

ndividualist....

He standsmid-way

between

wo

extreme

positions

n

politics....

Wemay

conclude,

hen,

that Locke

wasan individualist

n

a

qualified

ense.

Hedid not

imagine

he

state

to be an

artificially

abricated

ombination

of naturally

eparate

ndividuals;

e didnot championhe individual gainst hecommu-

nity,and

barely

onsidered

hepossibility

of conflict

between

hem.

Butthe

government

he recommended

was in

effect

he parliamentary

imited

monarchy

approved

of

by his

Whig

contemporaries,

nd this

meant hat

it

would

be constitutional

nd

not absolute,

and that

it would not invade

the

liberties

of

the subject.23

Old

theories seldom

fit modern paradigms

neatly,

but

they

sometimes

have

important

ideas

and

values

in

common.

These

are

highlighted

by

modern

sum-

maries

of them. The

extreme

interpretations

of Locke were

neither accurate,

comprehensive, nor fair. They implied positions contrary to those Locke

adopted

or

they

ignored

important

parts

of

his

theory,

thus giving

a

misleading

impression

of

the whole.

That

is why they

were

finally rejected

by

Gough.

2. The

illocutionary

force

of

texts

The historically

correct

interpretation

of a text usually

coincides

with

the

au-

thor's

intended

meaning,

as

authors are usually

well

aware of how

their

texts

will be

read

by

their contemporaries.

Interestingly

enough, historians

frequently

take the identity of the two for granted. Skinner, for example, has shown

that John

Locke,

in

his

Two Treatises

of

Government,

was rejecting

and

repudiating

one

of

the

most

widespread

and

prestigious

forms

of

political

argu-

ment

at the

time,

simply by

noting

the

prevailing

conventions

of debate

about

political

obligation,

the role

of

the

ancient

English

constitution

in those,

and

Locke's

failure

to

mention

it.24

Similarly

he has

shown

that

Machiavelli

in

places

challenges

the

prevailing

assumptions

of the

mirror-for-princes

writers,

by

comparing

what

those

writers

said

with certain

passages

in The

Prince.25

Skinner

assumes that these implications of the texts were intended by their authors,

which

is

probably

true,

though

nothing

need

be known

about their

intentions

to

identify

them.

These

are

conventional

secondary

meanings

of the texts

justi-

fied

by

the context

of the writing together

with

the rules of

language

which

warrant

the statements

reporting

them.

There

are times,

however,

when

the

further

illocutionary

force

of

a

text

cannot

be inferred

from the

context,

and

can

only

be

known

by

discovering

the

author's

intentions.

For

example,

to decide

whether

Thomas

Hobbes

and

Pierre

Bayle

meant their

pious

utterances to be taken ironically, historians have to

judge

their

intentions,

as there

is

no

hint of

irony

in their

texts.26

23.

Ibid.,

51.

24.

Quentin

Skinner,

Some

Problems

n the

Analysis

of

Political

Thought

and

Action,

Polit-

ical

Theory

2

(1974),

286.

25.

Quentin

Skinner,

The Foundations

of

Modern

Political

Thought.

Volume

1:

The

Renais-

sance

(Cambridge,Eng., 1978),131.

26. See

Quentin

Skinner,

Meaning

nd

Understanding

n the History

of

Ideas,

33-35.



13/23

CAN

OUR UNDERSTANDING

OF OLD

TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

313

An

author's

ntention

can

be

stated

n

modern

words,

I think,

so long

as

the

author

would

have

consented

o an

appropriate

ranslation

f

them

as

accurately

representing

is or her

intention.

Skinner,

or

example,

has said

that:

During

theeighteenth entury, he enemiesof the rulingoligarchynEngland ought o

legitimate

heir

attacks

on

thegovernment

y insisting

hat they

were

motivated

entirely

by

reverence

or the constitution,

and thus

that

their actions

deserved

to

be commended

as patriotic

rather

han

condemned

as factious. 27

t is very

doubtful

hat

eighteenth-century

ritishpoliticians

would

have

recognized

heir

explanations

s

legitimations.

egitimation,

s Skinner

himself

has

acknowl-

edged,28

s

a Weberian erm,

and

derives

ts

modern

meaning

from

Weber's

theory

of legitimation.

Eighteenth-century

oliticians

would

have

said

they

were

justifyingtheirattackson the government,not legitimating hem. But if the

meaning

of

Weber's

erm

were

explained

o them,

then they

probably

would

agree

hat

n

justifying

heir

attacks hey

were ndeed

egitimating

hem,

making

them politically

acceptable

according

o

recognized

authorities.

Because

the

best

interpretation,

he

historically

correct

nterpretation,

nd

the

author's

nterpretation

f

a text

are usually

he same,

historians

requently

fail

to distinguish

hem. Thisis

the case

in the

commonly

accepted

reading

of

Gulliver's

Travels s

a

political

atire.

This

s

an

excellent

xample

of

a

secondary

interpretationf a text, one whichstates ts additional llocutionary orceand

its secondary

ield

of reference.

Gulliver's

Travels

an

be understood

at a

basic

level as

a story

about

the adventures

of

Gulliver.

That,

indeed,

is

how

most

people

understand

t today.

To Swift's

contemporaries,

owever,

amiliar

with

the details

of

political

ife

in

Britain,

ts

forceand

its references

ppeared

quite

different.

They

took

it to

be not

just

a story,

but

also

a satire;

t

referred

not

just

to Gulliverand

the imaginary

ands

he

visited,

but

also

to

political

figures

of his day

with

the intention

of

ridiculing

hem.

A. E.

Case

has pointed

out,

for example, hat whencontemporarieseadthat theEmperorwhomGulliver

encountered

n

his

firstvoyagewas

strong

nd

masculine,

with

anAustrian

Lip

and

arched

Nose,

his

Complexion

olive,

his

Countenance

rect,

his Body

and

Limbswell

proportioned

..

His

Dress

was

very

plainand

simple

..

His

Voice

wasshrill,

but veryclear

and

articulate,

hen

they

thought

of George

I's

thick

and ungainly

form,

his bad taste

in

dress,

and

his

guttural

and unintelligible

pronunciation

f

the

little

English

he knew. 29

The

interpretation

f

Gulliver's

Travels s

a political

satire

has

the strongest

possiblesupport.Itaccounts or a very argenumberof thedetailsof thestory.

(The

third essay

in

Case's

book

explains

he political

allegories

n detail.)

It

is

an

example

of

a

genre

amiliar

o Swift's

contemporaries,

nd so readily

denti-

fied

by

them.

And

the

interpretation

s

consistent

with what s

known

of

Swift's

intentions

n

writing.

Similarustification

an

be provided

or the interpretation

27.

Quentin

Skinner,

The

Idea

of a

Cultural

Lexicon,

Essays

in

Criticism

29

(1979),

216.

28. Quentin Skinner, Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action, 292.

29.

Arthur

E. Case,

Four

Essays

in

Gulliver's

Travels

(Gloucester,

Mass., 1958),

71.



14/23

314

C. BEHAN

MCCULLAGH

of Cervantes'

Don Quixote

as

a

parody

of both the

aims and

means

of knightly

chivalry.

A. J.

Close,

in

defending

his

reading

of

the

story,

wrote: The

aims,

like the

acts, are

a

madly literal

mimicry

of

the stereotype

behaviour

of

the

heroesof chivalric omance, ndwouldhavebeenimmediately ecognizedas

such by contemporary

eaders.30

Sometimes

he

further force

of a text

is not to

be identified

with a

genre

such

as satire

or

parody,

but

with a

conventional

mplication

of the text in

its

particular

ontext.

For example,

when

a piano

teacher

tells

a

pupil that

she

played

a piece

beautifully,

she is

not only

describing

he

playing,

but by

doing

so

she is

praising

he

student,

and by

doing

that she is encouraging

her.

These

further

descriptions

are warranted

by

the

rules

of

language

andthe

context.

3. Summaries

f

the basic meaningof

a

text

A

very

common

form

of

higher

understanding

f the meaning

of

a text is

that

achieved

by

producing

n

adequate

ummary

f

what t says,

that

s,

of

itsbasic

meaning.

A

common

reason

for

summarizing

n author's

views

is to compare

them

with those

of others.

J. G.

A. Pocock

has

made a

special

study

of

the

writing

of

James

Harrington.

n

an essay

entitled Machiavelli,

Harrington

nd English

EighteenthCentury deologies, he produceda summary f Harrington's olit-

icalthought,quoting

him

only

for the

sakeof

illustration.

His summary

s often

quite

terse: Harrington's

ntire

theory

of

monarchy

can

be

reducedto two

propositions:

irst,that

theKing's

agents

and servants

must

be

supported

ither

upon

the land, as a

feudal

aristocracy,

or about

his person

as praetorians

or

janissaries; econd,

that whichever

of these

methods

s

adopted,

relationsbe-

tween hemilitary lass

and

theKing

will be so prone

o

tensions

hat

monarchy

can

neverbe a

stable

form

of

government. '

ocock

provided

his

summary

of Harrington'sheory in order to compare t with that of the first Earl of

Shaftesbury.

This

practice

s

repeated

hroughout

he

essay.

For

example

he

used summaries

o

compare

what

he

called

the 'County'

vision

of

English

politics

with

Harrington's

iew:

If we

now summarize

he

main outlines of

the 'County'

vision

of

Englishpolitics

as

it

appears

n a

multitude

of

writings

in

the

century

hat

follows 1675, we

may

attempt

o see

what

is Harrington,

or

rather

neo-Harrington,

bout

it. 32

Historians

aim

to

produce

summaries

which

are

accurate,

nformative,

and

comprehensive.A summarys accuratef the statementsn the text instantiate

it and are not

inconsistent

with

it. Informativeness

ecreases

as

generality

n-

creases,

as a

very general

summary

ould

be instantiated

by

a

large

number

of

diverse

exts.

So

historians

prefer

a

summary

which

is

no

more

general

than

30. A.

J. Close,

Don Quixote

and 'The Intentionalist Fallacy, '

British

Journal

of

Aesthetics

12 (1972),

13.

31. J.

G. A.

Pocock, Politics,

Language

and Time:Essays

on

Political

Thought

and

History

(London,

1972),

116-117.

32.

Ibid.,

124.



15/23

CAN

OUR UNDERSTANDING

OF OLD

TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

315

they require.

The level

of generality

s that

atwhichcomparisons

f interest

an

be

mademost

clearly.

A summary

hould

be comprehensive

nthatit covers

he

variousaspects

of the

basicmeaning

of the text

in

question,

so that each

signifi-

cant partof the basictext instantiatespartof the summary.Let me illustrate.

C.

B.

Macpherson's

Marxist

nterpretation

f Locke

in ThePolitical

Theory

of

Possessive

Individualism

as earned

much

respectbut

also some

criticism.

Alan Ryan

has

argued hat

it is

not accurate.

For example,

Macpherson aid

that Locke

denied

that laborers

without

property

could

be

full citizens,

as

citizenshipwas

reserved or

those

with

property.

Ryan

objects

hat some

plainly

unambiguous

statements

by Locke

.

. .

flatly contradict

this summary

of

Locke's

views.

Locke

n fact maintained

hatallrational

adults

couldbe

citizens,

and deniedcitizenshiponly to Lunaticks nd Idiots. 33Macphersonwas also

mistaken n thinking

hat Locke

restricted

property

o

goods, for

Locke

de-

scribed

property

s

that which

othershave

no

right

o take

without he person's

consent,

and

specifically

ncluded

such personal

things as

life, liberty,

and

health.

Ryanconcludes

hat

the

orce of Macpherson's

ccount

challenges

ne

to

produce

some

alternativepicture

hat fits

the text better

than this. 34

Dunn's

criticism

of

John

Plamenatz's

nterpretation

f

Locke reveals

the

importance

of

summaries

being

comprehensive

f

they are

to be acceptable.

Plamenatz,seeingLocke as a greatliberal philosopher,assumedthat Locke

based

political

obligation

upon

the consent

of

the

governed.

But,

Dunn

points

out,

this

interpretationgnores

the

theological

dimension

of Locke's

hought.

Referring

o a large

rangeof

Locke's

writings,

Dunnshows

hat

Lockegrounded

political

obligation

in

man's

duty

to God

of

self-preservation.

Since

people

cannot

subsist

without

society,God,

who

wills them to

subsist,

also wills

them

to use their reason

to discover

he rules

by

which

a

society

can be

maintained,

and to follow

them.

People

consent to

others

havingauthority

over

them,

so

that consentis a necessaryconditionof politicalobligation.But what is also

necessary,

o drive

them to obey,

is duty

to

God.35

By ignoring

he theological

dimension

of

Locke's

hought,

Plamenatz

and

othershad

produced

a

summary

which said

nothing

about

large

and

important

parts

of

Locke's

writings

on

political

obligation.

Whenan

important,

relevant

part

of

any

author's

work s

ignored

by

a

sum-

mary

description,

he summary

s

prone

to

give

a

misleading

mpression

of

the

whole.

Pocock has

explained

how the

habit

of

commentators

n

ignoring

books

IIIandIVof Hobbes'Leviathan,whichdiscussreligioushistory,hasledpeople

to

believe

that

Hobbes'

thought

was

unhistorical

o a

degree

which

it

was

not.36

ndeed

he

practice

has

even

fuelled he

belief

thatHobbes

acked

religious

33. Alan Ryan,

Locke

and the Dictatorship

of the Bourgeoisie,

Political

Studies

13 (1965),

223.

34. Ibid., 227-228.

35. J. Dunn, Political Obligation in Its Historical Context, 29-33.

36. J. G.

A. Pocock,

Politics, Language

and

Time,

149-150.



16/23

316

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

convictions

and was, perhaps,

an atheist.37

ocock condemnssuch

interpreta-

tions

of Hobbes'

writing

and

of

his convictions

as

seriously

misleading.

4. The key dea

of a text:

a tertiary nterpretation

Anotherkindof

higherunderstanding f

the meaning

of a text whichhistorians

sometimes

eek involves dentifying

he key dea

of an author'swork.

A

key

idea, itseems, s one

uponwhich he other

principle deas

o someextentdepend.

Once a

work

has been

summarized,

t is then sometimes

possible

o identify ts

key idea. For this

reason,

an interpretation f the

key idea of

a text could be

regarded

as a tertiary

nterpretation f the

meaning

of the text, depending

as

it does upon a secondary

ummaryreading

of the text.

In a thoughtfuldiscussionof the fundamentaldeain Harrington's olitical

philosophy

Pocock discusses

C. B. Macpherson'sbelief

that Harrington's

system

will not

work

unless

entrepreneurial

ehaviour

n

land owners

is

pre-

sumed

o be at its basis. 38

Macpherson

rgued

hat

changes

n the

social

distribu-

tion

of

power

in

seventeenth-century

ngland

were seen

by

Harrington

o be

the result

of

changes

n

patterns

of wealth,particularly

and

ownership.

Pocock

thinks

Harrington

aw it

as

the result

of

changes

n

the

legalobligations

which

went

with

land tenure.

Feudal

obligations

o

serve an overlordgave place

to

independent enured freeholders. Pocock arguesthat Macpherson'sunder-

standing

of

the

key

idea

in

Harrington's ystem

is

wrong

because

certain

m-

portant

featuresof his system

do not

depend

upon

it.

Harrington's

otion

of

the

power

whichthe

man

who

has

property

exerts

over the man

who has

none

does

not entail

any

particular

escription

f

the economicrelations

between he

two men,

or

of

the

economic

process

n

which

the two are

engaged.

All

that is

necessary

o know is

that

the one is independent

and

the other dependent

on

him. s39

Inanotheressay,on Burke nd theAncientConstitution, Pocockexplains

how Burke's onservative olitical

heory

s an

expression

f

a

theory

about

the

nature

of

English

awdevelopedby Sir

EdwardCoke

and

SirMatthew

Hale

in

the seventeenth

entury.

This

theory

maintained

hat

English

common

aw was

based

upon

custom, interpreted

nd

applied

n

courts,

from time

immemorial,

and

that it enshrined

he

practical

wisdom of

ages

and so deserved

he utmost

respect.

This theorywas applied

o the

English

constitution

n

what was called

the doctrine

of the

ancient constitution,

o defend the constitution

against

reform.That doctrinewasrespectedby many n Burke's ime,and wasusedby

him

in

1782 o

oppose

movesto reform

t. Instead

of

talking

about

a

key

dea

Pocock

here

refers

o

a

root

dea :Burke

roots

his

argument

n the idea that

the

law is

immemorialand

customary. 40

37. Ibid., 161.

38. Ibid.,

111.

39. Idem.

40. Ibid.,

229.



17/23

CAN

OUR

UNDERSTANDING

OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

317

5. Cases of underdeterminationf

a secondary

nterpretation

In describing

ach kindof secondary

meaning

of a text I have drawnattention

to criteria

which historians

espect n deciding

whethera secondary

nterpreta-

tion of a text is acceptable r not. It sometimeshappens,however, hat two or

more different econdary

nterpretations

meet these criteria

equally well,

and

thenthere

s no rationalground or

saying hatone interpretation

s morecorrect

than another.

For

example,according o Christopher

Butler,

there are several

differentmodern summary

accounts of

Emily

Brontd's

WutheringHeights

whichareequallywarranted.

He accepts

hat theyall meet

nternalcriteria

of

accuracy,

consistency,scope,

simplicity, and fruitfulness. 41

erek

Traversi,

for

instance,

sees

it

as

contrastingbasic human

emotions

with the superficial

graces of civilized ife; TerryEagleton arguesthat Catherine tradesher au-

thenticselfhood

for

social

privilege,

howingan ideological

contradiction

e-

tween

the

individualand

the family;whereas

Patsy Stoneman

ees

it

as

demon-

strating

the pressures

o conformityput upon

women

in

Victoriannuclear

families.42

utler ays

hat the ext aloneunderdetermines

ur nterpretation, 43

and

suggests

we should accept

the

diversity

of readings

n

this

case.

Similarly

Paul

B.

Armstrong as

discusseddifferent econdary

nterpretations

of EdgarAllan Poe's

The Turnof

the Screw.EdmundWilson

observed

hat as

only the governesssees the ghost of Peter Quint, the storycan be seento be

about the

fantasies

of

a

thwarted

Anglo-Saxonspinster -an

interpretation

basedupon

Freudian

heory.

For

Wayne

Booth, on the other

hand, the ghosts

are

real,

and it is

just

a

frightening host story.

Finally, Robert

Heilmannhas

read it as a struggle

f evil to possess

the humansoul. 44

Armstrong

draws

attention

o the way

a critic'sview

of

life

informshis or her

interpretation.

He

acknowledges

hat

minimum

tandards

have

to

be met for

an

interpretation

o

be

acceptable.

It must

demonstrate

nternal coherence

and

effectiveness

n

meetingunexpectedchallenges, 45e says, meaningthat the interpretation

should coherewell

with

the

basic

meaning

of

the

text,

though

even this is

not

alwaysunambiguous.46

rmstrongargues hat,

in

this case

at

least,

an

appeal

to the historyof

the

book's composition,

to Poe's intentions,

will

not resolve

the issuebecause hese

can

be variously nterpreted

s

well.47He finds

no rational

groundsfor preferring

ne

of these interpretations

o

another.

It

is

interesting

o

notice

that the

Freudian

nterpretation

f

The

Turn

of

the

Screw

nearly

succumbed

o

the

criticism

by

A.

J.

A. Waldock that

it

could

41. Christopher

Butler, On the Rivalry of

Norms for

Interpretation, New Literary

History 20

(1988-1989),

133.

42. Ibid., 129-130.

43.

Ibid., 132.

44. Paul B. Armstrong,

History

and Epistemology:

The Example

of the Turn of the Screw,

New Literary History

19

(1987-1988),

697-698.

45.

Ibid., 700.

46. Ibid., 701-702.

47.

Ibid., 707-708.



18/23

318

C. BEHAN

MCCULLAGH

not

explain

the

governess'saccurate

description

of Peter

Quint, whose

ghost

according

o this theory

she

had never

seen. Armstrong

notes

that a

single

failure

o

fit

may thus

have devastating

epercussions

or the entire

nterpretive

configuration. 48s it turnedout, the Freudian heorywas saved, at least to

some

extent,by

John Silver,

who identified everalways

n

which

the

governess

could

have learned

of Quint'sfeatures,

including

reports

from

people

in the

village

nearby.

IV. THE PROBLEM

OF

PAST

CULTURES

I have argued

that there

are

objective

criteria

for

deciding

which

basic

and

secondary nterpretations f a text are acceptable,and which are not. In the

case

of

the

basic meaning

of a text,

these criteriaare normally

decisive.

When

it

comes

to secondary

nterpretations,

here is

more

room for equally

well

supported

alternative

eadings.

Now

I mustraise

a

problem

which

confronts

historians

nterpreting

ld

texts.

Historians

want

to know

what old

texts

meant

when

they

were irstpublished.

Historians

do not

merely

ook for

an

interpreta-

tion

of the

text which

will

fit it

well.

They

look

for

a

reading

whichwill do

that

and

which

is also

likely

to

have been

historically

correct that

is, a

reading

which hemajorityof educated eaderswouldhaveacceptedat the timethetext

was written.

But are

they

ever

justified

n

thinking

hat

their

interpretation

f

an

old

text

is historically

orrect?

Hans-Georg

Gadamer

has argued

at length

in

his book

Truthand

Method

that

it is never reasonable

o

suppose

that

we have

an

accurate

knowledge

of

whattextsreally

meant

n

the past.

Gadamer

presents

he

process

of

interpreta-

tion

as one

of

trying

o

findan

interpretation

hich

willmake he textmeaningful

to

oneself.

He likens

it to the

process

of

trying

to

understand

what another

person s saying n conversation.Onebeginswith thephysical ounds,or in the

case

of

texts,

the marks

on a

paper,

andtheseare

nterpreted

n

accordance

with

the

interpreter's

xisting

knowledge

of the

language

and

of the

subject-matter.49

If one's

initial nterpretation

f

a

text

does

not

fit

it

exactly,

if

it

is inconsistent

withsome

featuresof

the

text,

or

makes

no

sense

of

them,

then

different

nterpre-

tations

are

tried to see

whether

hey

are

more

comprehensive.

At

every

stage,

Gadamer

points

out,

the

possible

interpretations

re

drawn

from one's

own

prior

knowledge

of likely

meanings,

one's prejudices,

s

he calls them.50t is

no surprise,Gadamer oncludes, hat interpretationshange romtimeto time.

They

are inescapably

relative

to the knowledge

of

the

interpreter.

You,

for

example,

know

immediately

when

you

read

a

classic

essayby

Mommsen

he

only

time

when it could

have been

written. Even

a master

of the

historical

method s

not able to

keep

himself

entirely

ree

from the

prejudices

f his

time,

48.

Ibid.,

701.

49. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 349-352

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