Max Weber's /

Interpretation /

of Karl Marx* /

BY CARL MAYER

]VtoRE than thirty years ago, Albert Salomon published an essay 1

in which he asserted not merely that Max Weber's work could be understood only if seen against the background of Karl Marx but also that Weber's work itself was the product of an intense, life-

long preoccupation with Marx. This assertion is not literally cor- rect. In the first phase of Weber's scientific work - prior to his ill- ness of 1899-1902 - Marx's work meant little to him. What he did, before 1900, was to utilize the categories in Marx's system in a

unique manner for his own investigations (for examples, in the

fascinating little study of the social causes of the decline of the ancient world). Beyond this, he spoke of the shattered scientific

system of Marx, which was then being hammered dogmatically into the minds of the German workers.

There is no trace of an actual critical analysis of Marx. Weber was influenced by other sources: Mommsen in the field of Roman

agrarian history; Meitzer for the history of the Germanic agrarian structure; the exponents of historical economics for his socio-

political essays. However, this changed completely in the second

phase of his productivity, when he started to develop the theoreti-

cal-methodological foundations for his further work, simultane-

ously throwing himself into the immense materials for his investi- gations into the sociology of religion. The beginnings of this work made it necessary for him to deal with Marx. His biogra- pher, Marianne Weber, reported that in 1918 he presented the

i References seem to be to two essays written by Salomon in 1934 and 1935--- "Max Weber's Methodology," Social Research, I (1934), 147-168, and "Max Weber's So- ciology," Social Research , II (1935), 60-73.

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results of his studies in the sociology of religion in Vienna under the title "The Positive Critique of the Materialist Conception of

History." What is the result of this critical discussion of Marx? Not the only, but the predominant opinion of the interpreters

of Weber's work is the following: On the one hand, in spite of all differences in detail, there is no refutation of Marx by Weber in terms of basic methodological-theoretical positions. On the other

hand, there exists far-reaching accord in the substantive analysis of the themes identical in both: the structure of what has been called the modern world; its development; and its consequences. To cite two entirely different writers who have expressed radical

opinions in this regard: Schumpeter, in his book Democracy , So- cialism and Capitalism , writes: "The whole of the facts and the

arguments of Max Weber fit perfectly into the system of Marx."

Another author, Lichtheim, insisted a few years ago that Max Weber's work could easily be transposed into the terminology of

Marx's system. It is important that the same thesis has been advanced by Gerth

and Mills, whose views largely dominated the Weber interpreta- tion in the United States and, as far as I can see, also exercised a

great influence in the postwar interpretation of Weber in Ger-

many. To be sure, in recent years Weber has been further inter-

preted, not only in regard to Marx but also to Nietzsche. But the

basic thesis, as for example by Baumgarten and Mommsen, re-

mains: Whether the problems of Weber coincide with those of

Marx - that is, whether in the interpretation of modern capitalism there is identity in principle.

I shall attempt, by a comparative analysis of the key positions of Weber and Marx, to make this thesis the subject of my discus-

sion. It seems to me that there are two possible ways to achieve this

goal. The first way is the exact comparison between Marx's and

Weber's respective analyses of the origin of the character and the

consequences of modern capitalism. This has been done in an

exemplary manner by Karl Lowith. It would be pointless to

WEBER'S INTERPRETATION OF MARX 703

simply repeat his investigations here. Nor would this be particu-larly fruitful if one does not accept all of Lowith's assertions. The other possible method is a comparison of those fundamental

methodological-theoretical principles which we find in Marx's and Weber's work respectively. This is what I wish to do today, and I shall develop my position in five points. Before I enter upon the analysis itself, however, I wish to make a prefatory comment, lest what I am about to say be misunderstood.

Such a comparative analysis makes sense only if we take Weber's

explicit or implicit interpretation of Marx as its basis. We must

relegate to the background the question of whether Weber's inter-

pretation of Marx is adequate. I shall deal with this question briefly at the end of these considerations. Now to the five points which will serve to articulate my topic.

The Problem of Ideology

The first point concerns the structure of social systems and the

problem of ideology. We approach this from the simplest vantage point: We all know that Marx (whether or not this was a particu-larly happy choice of expression) differentiated between the so- called substructure and the superstructure of a social system. By substructure, he designated both the so-called productive forces and the social relations of production built upon them. The term "productive forces" has to be understood in its broadest

sense; not merely in the sense of the technology of a given society, but also as embracing nature, science, technique, and the division of labor. By social relations of production, again, Marx under-stands the social relationships which develop among the different members of the society on the basis of these productive forces. To

put it briefly (and juridically) he means by this the conditions of

ownership on which the class structure, ultimately the political order, and the solutions of the power problem are based. For

Marx, the substructure or basis - occasionally also called "real-

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i ty" - is specifically a combination of productive forces and social relations of production of a very complex nature.

On the other side, there is the phenomenon of the so-called

superstructure, which Marx divides into two levels. The first is the low level of conceptions or theories which people develop in

regard to the social order. The second is the higher, abstract level of ultimate conceptions of the nature of man, the nature of the

world, metaphysics, religion, the symbolic world, and the like. The decisive problem I am aiming at is the question of the rela-

tionship between the substructure and the superstructure. To

express Marx's point of view, we may say that the superstructure, in relation to the substructure, consists of ideology. We have the

opposition of two concepts: reality, as represented by the substruc-

ture, and ideology, as represented by the superstructure. It is

important, in the face of the very complex and heterogeneous use of the concept of ideology, to clarify what Marx means by it. He understands two things by this conception, which, it seems to me, he denotes with great precision.

On one hand, ideology means that the notions people have, on the upper or lower levels of thinking, do not have autonomous sources but are dependent upon the substructure. To quote Marx's famous dictum: It is not consciousness which deter- mines existence, but existence which determines consciousness. How Marx conceives this in detail is problematic. We find

concepts such as "product," occasionally even "expression of be-

ing" (Ausdruck des Seins). However, it is clear that ideology means the absence of any autonomy of man's ideas.

There is, however, also a second significance to Marx's concept of ideology: Ideas (that is, consciousness in the broadest meaning of the term) are not only dependent upon existence but they reflect this existence inadequately and, as a result, there comes about what we know as "false consciousness" - that is, ideologies. In other

words, the superstructure does not rest securely upon the sub- structure. The reason for this can, of course, be found in the

special antinomic structure of social reality which is expressed in

WEBER'S INTERPRETATION OF MARX 705

classes and the class struggle. Let us take examples of Marx's use of the concept of ideology. Marx's own thinking was much influenced

by the then classical British economists - consider the great influ- ence of Ricardo on the Marxian system. Marx is perfectly will-

ing to admit that classical economic theory represents the appro- priate, theoretically accurate expression of the given social rela-

tionships. What he criticizes and unmasks as ideology is that, in his opinion, classical economics made an absolute out of cate-

gories which were appropriate to a specific social system, and dis- torted them into "natural" categories of timeless validity. Here, according to Marx, the ideologization of theoretical economics talces shape. Or, to take a second, even more important example, which already played a role for the early Marx: the problem of

religion or of metaphysical systems. Marx does not claim that the conceptions men have of the ultimate meaning and purpose of life are necessarily false. What he does say is that such con-

ceptions (which we may find, for example, in the Christian reli-

gion or in idealistic philosophy) can be false wherever they trans- form temporally valid categories into eternally valid categories. To put it another way, they have succumbed to the fallacy of hypos- tatization. It is this hypostatization which forms the basis for Marx's conception of the nature of religion, especially the essence of Christianity and its critique (Feuerbach).

Now the conclusions from this very brief first consideration. For Marx, science is in the position not only to describe the struc- ture of social systems but to determine and explain this structure in its particular combination; that is, to demonstrate especially that what is accepted as an externally valid viewpoint is merely transcendental illusion. But just as Kant can reveal the tran- scendental illusion of metaphysics, Marx too accepts that science can unmask the transcendental illusion of ideologies. But it can- not get rid of them, because they are a necessary element whose function resides in the dominating classes' need for ideology in order to conceal their interests. The obliteration of ideology is the task of revolutionary action. The demonstration of the ideo-

706 SOCIAL RESEARCH

logical character of the superstructure is the task of scientific

theory. Marx believed he had solved this scientific problem. What is Weber's position in this regard? Needless to say, it is

evident that Weber recognized the problem of the sub- and super- structure (as well as the relationship between them). Weber too, in his substantive analyses, thinks in such concepts as "real" and "ideal" factors; Weber too is familiar with the problem of the

ideologies - that is, the embellishment of originally adequate ideas, their distortions in the transcendental illusion previously men- tioned. But here we come to the first point of disagreement. The decisive difference for Weber is this: For all his acknowledgment of the relation between the sub- and superstructure, for all his

acceptance of the significance of ideologies as expressions of special interest, the ultimate sources of the ideas forming the super- structure are autonomous and cannot be derived from "social existence."

Weber does not accept Marx's assertion that social existence de- termines consciousness. To be sure, he does not claim that con- sciousness determines existence. But he says that the final and ultimate source of metaphysics, of religions and mythologies, can-

not be derived from social existence; they are of autonomous

origin. If this is so, then Weber is confronted by a very serious and

difficult problem: How to explain the connection between sub- structure and superstructure, between real and ideal factors. At

any rate, he cannot revert to monocausality, to merely causal inter-

pretation which is not removed when one speaks of "reciprocal effects" (Wechselwirkung) in Marx. This does not mean a thing. How can Weber solve this problem after he closed the path Marx

had opened up, the path of causal and direct derivation? Weber provides no systematic treatment of this problem. But

in his general sociology of religion, there are hints of attempts to deal with it. The fundamental concepts of his approach appear in various sections of his work, without giving us any certainty

WEBER S INTERPRETATION OF MARX 707

as to what he means. However, it finds its real significance in the systematic sociology of religion in the concept of elective affin-

ity ( Wahlverwandschaft ). Weber does not think in terms of mutual causalities but in concepts of elective affinities - that is, in most general terms, elective affinities between existence and consciousness. This is, of course, not the place to deal with this

problem in a detailed and adequate way. But let us say this much: In his systematic sociology of religion, Weber makes the following construction. He takes social groups and strata, asks what their

special interests are. Then he inquires, in a second process of his investigations, what naturally adequate world view, what gen- eral view regarding the nature of the world and of man, follows from them. So for the peasant, the worker, the positively or nega- tively privileged middle classes, etc. And then he takes a final, third step, and asks to what extent (to use one of Max Scheler's

expressions) these relatively natural aspects of the world conform to or conflict with the autonomously evolved religious system and the theological constructions of philosophical-metaphysical specu- lation, how much they help or hinder these, etc.

The concept of elective affinity, furthermore, is known in litera- ture. You will find it in Goethe's works; interestingly enough, you will also find it in the beginnings of chemistry with its notion of attraction and repulsion among the elements. Weber makes this concept productive for the solution of the problem of the rela-

tionship between super- and substructure, of the real and ideal

spheres, which Marx seems to have solved in his concept of ideol-

ogy. However one regards this Weberian solution, it differs funda-

mentally from that of Marx. We can approach this difference in

yet another way: We can say that Marx's system is characterized

by a monism of access (Zugang); Weber's by a fundamental dual- ism. For Weber, to use a more current expression, there is an

"ontological difference" between the real and the ideal sphere.

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The Problem of Social Action

The second point I wish to consider concerns the problem of the explanation of social change and the problem of action in

general and social action in particular. Just as, for Marx, eco- nomics determines the structure of the society, so too it determines the changes which appear in this area. The economic changes are the ones (according to Marx in his famous passage in the introduction to the Critique of Political Economy) which, slowly or rapidly, pull along the enormous superstructure of ideologies and transform it. To be sure, Marx was cognizant of the fact that economic structures and changes are the results of human action. He was equally aware of the fact that economic changes by themselves do not bring about changes in the social body, but that this is possible only by means of human action. But - and this I believe to be the crucal point in the comparison with Weber - for Marx, human actions, however necessary, are merely a de-

pendent, not an independent, variable. They are organs, means, methods to bring about changes.

How does Weber approach this point of the explanation of what we today designate by the somewhat colorless term "social

change"? Weber is of course aware of the tremendous significance of economic changes, if one takes this expression only in the broad sense of changes in a specific society. He knows as well as Marx -

there is no difference here - that changes, of course, can only be

brought about by action, the actions of people or of groups of

people. The decisive difference: For Weber, action cannot be de- rived from existence. It represents an independent variable. Ac- tion is not merely the product of the conditions and their changes; the action, so to speak, stands on its own feet. This, again, is not to say that social changes can be explained exclusively by the actions of people, as perhaps in the "great men" theory of history. It means, rather, that Weber sees the problem as a dualistic one, as an interplay of objectively given economic facts (in this case of social changes) and the reactions of people to them in the most

WEBER'S INTERPRETATION OF MARX 709

differing ways. We have two groups of factors, and we must take both in their relative independence and then attempt to explain their interrelation.

Weber does not give us any substantive answer to the question, how does this interplay take place? There are, however, various modifications. First of all, Weber's theory tells us that social

change is to be understood as the product, the result of the dialec- tic between objective givenness and subjective action. But this is not all. We still have to consider a second point. There is, for

Weber, in regard to the problem of social change, an extraordinary form of action. There is the common, natural, normal action, and then there is an extraordinary, abnormal, unusual action. For this form of action Weber coined the term "charisma" (in a different

context, to be sure, but this isn't the place to go into that). There are people who act in an extraordinary manner. It is Weber's thesis that essentially qualitative changes, historically, take place in differing social systems if there is something like "charismatic" - that is to say, extraordinary - action.

Whether the exponents of this extraordinary action are adven- turers (the significance of the adventurer for the development of

capitalism is one of Weber's special subjects) or whether they are

prophets or founders of religions (and this is very carefully ana-

lyzed by Weber) who introduce a new law beyond the limits of the traditional - this is irrelevant. What is decisive is the signifi- cance of the extraordinary action for the phenomenon we call

"social change." Why is this the case? Weber, in contrast to Marx, sees the

change of social systems not as normal, natural, and matter-of- course but as unnormal and problematic, because in all social sys- tems the element of tradition has a decisive place. This creates the problem of how traditionally similar, repetitive actions can be interrupted.

In the place of determinism of action, Weber puts indetermin- ism. This means, however, that science is not in a position to

directly make prognoses regarding whether and in what manner

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social change can take place. This is in contrast to Marx, who believed that science cannot tell whether and in what direction men actually act but, on the basis of his theory of social change, that science can tell what form this action must take in order to be correct. For Weber, it is impossible to explain the problem of correct action scientifically. For Marx, it is possible. This is one of the basic positions of his entire system.

The Problem, of the Dialectic

A brief word with regard to the third point I wish to consider. It concerns the question of social dynamics and the problem of the dialectic. In contrast to the questions I have dealt with in the second point, it is not here a matter of the causes of social

dynamics but of the law of social dynamics. In English we refer to it as "patterns of social change." As far as Marx is concerned, the basic feature of his system is the factor of internal and external

contradiction, or the mutual conflicts of the diverse social elements

ensuing from conflict. The law of development is nothing other than dialectic ( die im Konflikt angelegte Dialektik). This dialec- tic expresses itself in the following way: First, the conflict is only latently and potentially present and hidden by a relative harmony of interests. Then it becomes actual. It continues to rise, finally reaching a point where it puts the existence of the society in

question. That is the revolutionary situation which can only be solved by the creation of a new social system. Whether or not this

transformation from one social system to another takes place ex-

ternally, in a revolutionary form, is of little importance. Weber too saw the problem of social conflict in its significance

for the social dynamic. If one wishes to classify, Weber belongs, with Marx, to the group of theorists of conflict, not to that aggre-

gation of theorists of harmony. To that extent, there is agree- ment with Marx. The difference between Marx and Weber be-

gins with the significance which is ascribed to the fact of conflict.

WEBER'S INTERPRETATION OF MARX 711

First, it is by no means taken for granted by Weber that the con- flict itself develops an inner dialectical dynamic in the manner I have described. A society, in other words, can very well con- tinue to exist, no matter how much it is shaken by conflict, if the traditions continue to carry their greater weight. Second, the the conflict may be solved within a social system. That is at least a theoretical possibility. Only in rare cases comes about that tran- sition to a new social system which Marx regarded as normal.

Naturally, this has far-reaching consequences for the interpre- tation of the theory of the dynamic of social systems. Summariz-

ing, we can place the positions of both men in opposition to each other: Marx's theory of the dialectic of conflict, Weber's theory of the different possibilities of resolving a given conflict.

The Problem of Evolution

The fourth point I wish to deal with is the most difficult among these considerations. It concerns the relationship of the different social systems to one another within the dynamic process of his-

tory. Here we do not occupy ourselves with the question of the inner dynamic of any social system, but with the question of the

dynamic connection of the differing given types or stages of society. This includes the problem of evolution.

It has been claimed that Marx could not possibly have been a theorist of evolution because he preaches revolution. It has also been said that Marx, in principle, cannot be a theorist of evolution because he teaches the dialectic of conflict. Both objections, how- ever plausible they seem, do not appear to be correct to me.

The contrast between evolution and revolution is not a genuine antinomy. The process of evolution may well make use of revolu- tion as an organ. As concerns the second point, I believe a sharp division must be made between Marx's teachings regarding the inner dynamic of a social system and the dynamic interconnections

among different social systems. My thesis is - and on this I am

712 SOCIAL RESEARCH

in agreement with Schumpeter - that Marx used the dialectic as a principle of explaining the inner dynamic of a society, but in order to explain the sequence of different social systems he used the scheme of evolutionary theory. This, at least, applies for the

following decisive considerations which constitute evolutionary theory.

First, every social system is potentially preformed in the ante- cedent social system. Marx, as you know, used the image of the womb of the old society from which the new society is born. Sec-

ond, each system follows the antecedent one necessarily, for the antecedent system not only creates the conditions for its successor but is also its cause. Third, every system in the evolutionary se-

quence is a higher form than its antecedent, not only in its degree of technical differentiation but definitely in a general sense: it

represents a higher stage of development morally, intellectually,

politically, economically, and technically. Marx is indeed the most

severe critic of the modern capitalist system. But do not forget that no one else has spoken of it in such positive terms. It is

absolutely impossible to separate this positive element from the

critical element. The criticism refers to the fact that capitalism is not yet socialism, containing merely its potentiality. The praise consists in the assertion that capitalism, so far, represents the high- est stage of development in the history of social systems.

It is interesting to see that Weber, too, occasionally uses the

evolutionary scheme. Thus, in a fascinating study of the struc-

ture of late antiquity, he traced the emergence of the feudalism that came to full flower in the Middle Ages. But it would be

erroneous to conclude from this that Weber was an evolutionist.

He was not an evolutionist in the same sense in which Marx was.

In fact, he radically rejected the three decisive characteristics of

evolutionary theory, to the extent to which they are used in the

social domain. That is, he rejected the thesis of the preformation of a later society in the society immediately preceeding; he re-

jected the thesis of the necessity of developmental stages; and he

emphatically rejected the notion that technically more differen-

WEBER'S INTERPRETATION OF MARX 713

tiated societies are of higher value in other spheres too - politi- cally, intellectually, and morally. How, Weber asks, could one

possibly value the modern world more highly than the world of classical antiquity? This, for him, is simply impossible - at any rate, impossible on the basis of a scientific analysis. For Marx it is possible, because he is an evolutionist.

The Scope of Science

And now let us come to the final point. I shall attempt to put it as briefly as possible. This concerns the meaning and purpose of historical-social development and the scope of scientific analysis. The word "development" here is to be taken in an entirely color-

less, formal sense. For Marx, these concerns took the form of the

problems of the ultimate goal toward which history is heading and the ultimate meaning which manifests itself in historic de-

velopment. We know that he believed he could answer both these questions, not in the manner of speculative philosophers or

Utopian socialists but with the authority of science. Science, he

believed, could give clear and objectively valid answers to the

questions of the ultimate aim and meaning of history.2 Why? For Marx, it was established that the history of the hu-

man species has its immanent aim and realizes its own purpose innately. It is, I believe, important that Marx found the final

stage and the crowning of history to be socialism: this is the appli- cation of the theory for the specific situation of the present. The decisive aspect here is that Marx does not preach socialism but

represents it as the necessary ultimate goal of history.

2 It must be assumed that Mayer here simplified the Marxian scheme of the "last stage" of history in order not to take up more time. Marx distinguished, first of all, a political transitional stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a stage- that would pass with the "withering away" of the state. Socioeconomically, this stage was dis- tinguished as socialism; it was to be followed by the stage of communism, the difference being that between formal equality and complete freedom. This picture, of course, is a concession of Marx to Utopian socialism.

714 SOCIAL RESEARCH

In this area he differs from evolutionism, which proclaims an ever increasing, infinite progress. He gives history a definite termi- nal point: What characterizes socialism is, in the end, that essen-

tially nothing further happens. Similarly, Marx answers con-

cretely the problem of the purpose of history. This problem is answered in the confrontation of the essential freedom of man with alienation, or in the confrontation between domination and freedom from domination.

The decisive difference between Weber and Marx is not in the details but in the fundamentals. It lies in this: Quite aside from the question of socialism vs. capitalism, domination vs. free-: dom from domination, Marx asserts on principle what Weber

totally rejects - that science is in a position to answer the question of the ultimate aim of social history and its meaning. For Weber, this lies beyond the province of science. Here, of course, is the

origin of the famous principle of value neutrality in Weber's

sociology and in science in general. (I shall not deal with this

distinction here.) For Weber, science is not qualified to answer

questions concerning the aim and meaning of history. One can

approach this problem only speculatively. In this respect, Weber does not see a difference between Marx and the other speculative

systems but only a formal identity. Marx did not answer, with

scientific authority, questions the Utopian socialists had posed spec- ulatively. The difference between Utopian and so-called scientific socialism disappears.

Results and Sociological Perspective

The thesis which has dominated the Marx-Weber discussion asserts that there may be differences in detail but no differences in principle. Speaking negatively, it seems to me that this thesis

has to be reversed: Aside from the fact that the way the problem is put is similar, it is correct to say that there is agreement in many essential details, but there is a fundamental difference in regard

WEBER S INTERPRETATION OF MARX 715

to the decisive methodological positions with which we are con- fronted in the social sciences.

In this short address I have attempted to represent the problem, not to elucidate it critically or to ask who was right, Marx or Weber. Must we deceide in favor of one or the other? One could

perhaps make an attempt, as Peter E erger has done in an interest-

ing but, I believe, ultimately impossible way, to combine Marx's and Weber's sociology of religion. Or is there perhaps a third

way out of this thicket? The question of a critical comparison of Marx and Weber lies beyond the scope of these considerations. I merely wish to prepare the ground for such a critical analysis, and then to make two negative observations suggesting how I believe this problem must be approached.

It has often been said by Marxists, especially in our time, that whatever Weber may have said and whatever he may have thought of his position, Weber fundamentally misunderstood Marx. Weber's analysis, it has been said, is a criticism of vulgar Marx- ism. Or rather, Weber's critique concerns the "vulgar," not the

"genuine," Marx. This position was particularly developed when, after Weber's death, Marx's early writings became increasingly accessible to us, and particularly after the discovery of the famous / notorious Paris fragments on "Political Economics and Philoso-

phy." It has been said that only the interpretation of this manu-

script can give us a genuine understanding of Marx, whereas Weber's interpretation, together with many interpretations from the Marxist camp itself (consider Kautsky, Plekhanov, Labriola,

etc.) all concern vulgar Marxism and do not represent the genuine Marx.

In this connection, two things are interesting: First, there is no doubt that the rediscovery of Marx's early writings has given the study of Marx a new impetus. The question is, however, whether this impetus has put us in a position to find the key to an understanding of Marx. The editors of Marx's early writings, in 1932, expressed the hope that now, finally, there was the possi- bility of understanding Marx as he understood himself, and that

716 SOCIAL RESEARCH

now the completely sterile controversies of the later Marxists were obviated.

If one considers the literature in this field, one must regretfully admit that these expectations have not come true. There is, first of all, the greatest difference of interpretation concerning the

young Marx. Consider those who interpreted the young Marx as nothing more than a reverse Hegelian, or the attempts to bring the young Marx into the vicinity of phenomenology, as Marcuse did. The fact is that today there is still no unity regarding the correct interpretation of the early writings of Marx. Even less is there agreement on the decisive problem, namely, the relationship between the early and the later Marx. To a large extent, only the latter was Max Weber's basis.

Opposed to the notion that there is a unity in Marx's life work to which the early writings give us a key, there is for example Althusser's thesis that there is a fundamental contradiction be- tween the younger and the older Marx. The older Marx is not the continued development, the articulation of the younger Marx, but totally supersedes him. In Althusser's view, for example, it is possible to interpret Marx in terms of modern structuralism. However, I cannot go into those questions here.

A word must be said regarding the extent to which these dis- cussions, these new aspects of Marx studies have affected Weber's

understanding of Marx. Let me render my opinion in three statements. First, I am of the opinion that there is an inner con-

tinuity between the early and the late Marx. I cannot prove this

here; I am merely communicating it. I am also of the opinion that a fundamental problem is always present, like a red thread, throughout all of Marx's analyses: How does the unavoidable alienation of man come about, and how is it overcome again? This is the basis of the problem of alienation which is so much under discussion.

Second, there is no doubt that Weber did not see this aspect of Marx's scientific theory - at least not sufficiently. This is hardly surprising, since the decisive works were not accessible at the time,

WEBER'S INTERPRETATION OF MARX 717

and the few comments regarding the fetishistic character of mer- chandise in capitalist society neither dealt with the problem suffi-

ciently nor clarified it. But is that to say, as those who accuse Weber of vulgar Marxism often do, that Weber's implicitly or

explicitly stated theses regarding the most essential principles of Marx's methodology are fallacious? They require shoring up; they need the support of a philosophical anthropology, such as that found in Marx. But they are essentially correct.

Third, a further objection with which the exponents of Marx- ism reproach Weber goes in the exactly opposite direction. They do not claim that Weber misunderstood Marx. Rather, they re- sort to the so-called "sociology of knowledge" in the conventional sense of the term - that is, the sociology of ideas, including those ideas which find their theoretical expression in science. They look for proof that Weber's position does not represent any science at all but was rather, Marxistically speaking, an ideology. Can it be that Weber's work represents an enormously complex expres- sion of his bourgeois limitations (since he, as you know, described himself as bourgeois)? Does he merely express the typical obtuse- ness of the modern middle-class citizen who cannot recognize the truth? It is impossible to treat here the problem of the sociology of knowledge in this area. But I would like to mention two points with which sociology of knowledge must occupy itself. First, is it possible that, from the social origins of a scientific work, one can draw conclusions regarding its objective validity? And two, if this is the case, what are the social conditions under which sci- ence ( Wissenschaft ) is at all possible?

Conclusion

These are the two questions which I believe must be posed if we wish to consider this objection to Weber specifically. Weber himself developed the counterthesis that the problem of the social

genesis and the question of the validity of scientific investigation

718 SOCIAL RESEARCH

are totally different questions. It seems certain to me that the

question, what are the social conditions which make science pos- sible in the first place, requires an answer quite different from the Marxist one.

There remains the problem "Marx and Weber" - that is, "Marx or Weber" - to be answered factually on the basis of their work. There are two problems. One, if I understand it correctly, it is the task of the social sciences in general and of sociology specifi- cally to explain and describe the surrounding social reality. Thus, the question is: Who gives us the better key to the description and understanding of social phenomena, Marx or Weber? It is certain that we can learn very little from Marx as regards the

descriptive part. For description is at home in the realm of a social phenomenology. Weber has a tremendous amount to tell us in this area, even though I haven't treated this at all. As con- cerns the question of explanation (the origins, nature, or conse-

quences of a social reality) in its different aspects, we ask ourselves whether Weber's or Marx's categories are more helpful to us in

grasping our surrounding social reality, be it in its historic origins or its present condition. Who gives us better information as to the origin of those historic consequences of the modern world,

especially of modern capitalism? Who gives us better information

regarding the question of the better explanation of those social

problems directly involving us, such as the problems of the capital- ist and socialist social systems? This is the question which, I believe, must be posed, and the answer to which depends on how one relates to Marx or Weber.

Finally, one must pose a methodological question, or to use Weber's phrase, a question which concerns methodology as theory of science ( Wissenschaftslehre ). What are those philosophical- cpistomological principles upon which science may be established? For Marx, undoubtedly, these principles were definitively laid down by Hegel. Marx, throughout all his transformations, method-

ologically remains a Hegelian. One could demonstrate this very neatly on the basis of his evolutionism and his dialectic. Weber,

WEBER'S INTERPRETATION OF MARX 719

on the other hand, is a Kantian. Weber believes that the funda- mental philosophical-epistemological problems which social sci- ence poses can be solved only on the basis of Kant's epistemology, that is, his critique of knowledge. Kant asked, how is science

possible, referring to natural science. Weber asked, how is science

possible - referring to social science. Both answer the question positively, by presenting the possibility and the limits of science. The fundamental problem on this level, which is posed with the confrontation of Marx and Weber, is the problem of Hegel vs. Kant, or Kant vs. Hegel.3

3 This alternative may be puzzling to an American reader. In pre-Hitler Ger- many, a student of the social sciences had to get involved in philosophy, and he was presented with the only academic alternative available: to become a Hegelian or a Kantian. It is somewhat amazing to see that, apparently, present-day German students are still offered the same choice. At least, Mayer was confident that his hearers understood it well enough to save himself any further explanation.

* This essay is the translation of a guest lecture that Carl Mayer gave at the Uni- versity of Constance in January 1973. In December of the same year, he repeated this lecture at the University of Darmstadt. At the time of his death in 1974, he was working at an extended version of it for publication. The German text of the essay was published, by Professor Richard Grathoff of

the University of Constance, under the title "Die Marx-Interpretation von Max Weber," in Soziale Welt, XXV (1974), 265-277.

Lore Wagner translated the lecture into English. The English version omits an initial paragraph of personal remarks. Since Mayer had spoken without manu- script, editorial changes of the text have been necessitated by the transition from the German style of oral presentation to the requirements of written English exposi- tion. At one or two points, ambiguities in the German text have been resolved by adopting formulations consonant with the sense of the lecture.

Occasionally, Mayer referred to authors and publications without proper identi- fication. The editor of the German text did not furnish the bibliographical in- formation, and the English translator was not in a position to rectify his omissions. The basic argument of the lecture is in no way affected by this minor flaw.