94 THE BITTER END

Marine Corps Historical Collection

The desolation ofPhu Quoc island is reflected in this scene of the site selected to depositthousands of MR 1 refugees. The island was known for its production ofnuc mam sauce.

pany D led by Second Lieutenant Charles K. "Ken-neth" Curcio was placed on board the SS Transcolorado(MSC ship) which was already loaded with approxi-mately 8,000 refugees. Following embarkation of theMarines, the ship weighed anchor for Phu Quoc. Justbefore it got underway, the Durham, which had con-tinued to pick up refugees as the amphibious forcesailed southward along the coast, transferred its 3,500people to the Transcolorado. This was only one of themany unstable, transient conditions.'6

Almost overnight, control of the original task or-ganization became decentralized. The success of theoperation now depended upon the young platooncommanders' leadership skills and their Marines' ex-pertise and judgement in the controlled applicationof force in crisis situations. Exercising restraint undersome very adverse conditions, the Marine securityforces achieved their goal despite the fact that theywere on board ships scattered over a 500-mile area,from Phan Rang to Phu Quoc Island.

The organization of this task group, TG 79.9, waspredicated on flexibility. In the space of 10 days, thetask group's squadron, HMM-165, conducted numer-ous crossdecking troop lifts, provided airborne recon-naissance of the Vietnamese coast, and resuppliedrefugees with food and medicine. HMM-165 also per-

formed "separate missions," including locating a C-5Aflight recorder belonging to a U.S. Air Force transportwhich had crashed on takeoff from Saigon on 4 Aprilwhile carrying hundreds of Vietnamese orphans andtheir American escorts.'7 A post-evacuation Air Forcesummary reported, "Early on the morning of 5 April, acrew member on the Durham heard the "Mayday" sig-nal . . . . Directed to the vicinity of the signal, a Ma-rine helicopter from the Blue Ridge spotted therecorder floating in the water and notified theReasoner which had a swimmer on board."18

Also during this period, the helicopter squadron'sstaff began to draft detailed timetables to use in theevent of the evacuation of Saigon. The maintenanceproblems inherent in a squadron consisting of fourseparate detachments conducting around-the-clockoperations did not prevent Lieutenant Colonel Kizer'sHMM-165 from maintaining a 100-percent availabili-ty rate throughout the dangerous and demanding ten-day period. Yet despite having every helicopter avail-able, the task group soon discovered that its resourceswere stretched to the limit and it could not handlethe seemingly endless supply of refugees.'

Its ability to evacuate the fleeing South Vietnamesewas further confounded by the threat posed by the

..

THE EVACUATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S NORTHERN PROVINCES 95

advancing North Vietnamese Army and the indecisionof the South Vietnamese government. As one of theparticipants, Captain CharlesJ. Bushey, related in aletter to his wife, "I overheard one radio call late thisafternoon asking Saigon where they wanted the refu-gees taken. Would you believe Saigon said they didnot know where they could be taken?"20

Operating off the coast of Vietnam, the task forceeventually deployed to the vicinity of Phu Quoc asevacuation efforts off Phan Rang and Phan Thietceased with the renewed North Vietnamese onslaught.The island of Phu Quoc offered the task group a newchallenge. The group's arrival there coincided with thearrival of the Military Sealift Command's refugees.21

The events which had occurred earlier on board thePioneer Contender overshadowed a less dramatic, butstill important incident at Phu Quoc. No one there

would take responsibility for unloading the refugeesfor fear they would riot and possibly kill South Viet-namese already on the island. Out of necessity, theAmphibious Evacuation RVN Support Group becameheavily involved in this phase of the refugee operation,providing protection and an orderly transition. Ma-rine security forces were on several Military SealiftCommand ships in the harbor, and in each instance,Marine lieutenants led the reinforced rifle platoonsprotecting these vessels. They had full responsibilityfor their embarked refugee's welfare and that securityextended to getting them safely to the island. This re-quired maintaining close control of the evacuees un-til every last one of them had reached Phu Quoc.

Despite the apparent dangers involved in this task,the clearing of a ship represented a far easier challengethan the initial securing of a vessel. Each Marine unit

Three of the thousands of MR 1 refugees evacuated during the first 10 days of April1975.Marines of BLT 1/4 and sailors ofARG Bravo conducted Operation Fortress Journey whichlifted evacuees from the sea to MSC ships which then took them to Phu Quoc island

Marine Corps Historical Collection

I,

ri

began its mission by entering a hostile environmentwith no prior intelligence or reconnaissance, always fac-ing thousands of armed and starving people. Immedi-ately after boarding, the Marines had to secure theship's vital areas, establish law and order, and thenand only then, could they begin the humanitarianwork. While the Pioneer Contender was an extremecase, all the MSC ships with refugees on board were indistress. Each security force entered its respective shipprepared for combat with the armed refugees alreadyon board. The expected deadly confrontation betweenthe Marines and the evacuees never materialized, butthe ever-present threat constantly demanded the secu-rity force's attention. In order to preserve human lifeand avoid major casualties, a delicate balance had tobe established quickly through a prompt and solidshow of force, tempered by good judgement and res-traint. The first few hours on board each ship were

the most critical and, as a consequence, the platooncommanders relied heavily on the expertise of theinterrogator-translators. These highly trained Marineswere responsible for communicating to the refugeesthe Marines' purpose. Having accomplished this, theinterpreters then identified refugee leaders who couldprovide information on the internal situation, statusof food, medical attention required, and potentialtroublemakers. Armed with this knowledge, the Ma-rines then could respond more effectively to theevacuees.

The chaotic state of affairs in which the Marines ofthe Amphibious Evacuation RVN Support Groupoften found themselves was best reflected in CaptainBushey's diary entry of early April: "The scene hereis tragic. There are thousands of people fleeing beforethe North Vietnamese. Many are being picked up byboat but as they are being evacuated, they have no

96 THE BlUER END

Photo courtesy of Col Carl A. Shaver, USMC

The staff of Amphibious Evacuation RVN Support Group lays plans for Operation For-tress Journey. Seated at rear are the commanding officer LtCol Charles E. Hester right,and the operations officer Maf Carl A. Shaver of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines.

1"/I

THE EVACUATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S NORTHERN PROVINCES 97

place to go. As an example many have been fleeingsince Hue fell weeks ago. First to Da Nang, then toNha Trang, and finally Cam Ranh and Phan Rang.Some of the areas south of here are already in enemyhands. Only Saigon and some areas in the Delta areopen. But the South Vietnamese do not want the refu-gees to come to Saigon. In fact at 2030 tonight, thereare probably over 50,000 people on various ships withno place to go."22

Meeting the Needs

To assist the South Vietnamese government in re-solving this crisis and mitigating somewhat the chaos,the United States had called upon the task force toprovide for the needs of the thousands of starving refu-gees under its care. Food and medical attention werethe most obvious areas and the Navy responded byproviding large quantities of supplies which it hadgathered from all over the Western Pacific. One of themost readily available supply sources was ARG Alpha,relatively nearby in the Gulf of Thailand and despitepreparations for the impending evacuation of Cam-bodia, this force readily assisted in the massive effortto relieve the evacuees' suffering.23

Getting provisions into the hands of the Marinesecurity force was one thing, distributing them to therefugees was quite another. Interpreters would an-nounce the serving of meals and their designated dis-tribution points. Armed Marines delivered the food tothese locations where refugee leaders then helped dis-tribute it. The sheer weight of numbers continued topresent a problem, but this system relieved some ofthe pressure and, more importantly, made control ofthe crowds easier and food distribution safer becauseMarines were able to fulfill their role as security guardsinstead of acting as food servers.

Medical attention was another critical requirement.Each security force assigned to a ship had its own Navycorpsman. These overworked Samaritans were soonoverwhelmed by the scale of the medical problems.To assist them, the doctors attached to the task groupfrom 3d Medical Battalion were quickly pressed intoservice. Carrying as many medical supplies as couldbe spared, these doctors ran a traveling MedCap (Med-ical Civic Action Program) dispensing medical carewhile rotating between ships. They were confrontedwith every sort of medical problem; many refugeeswere simply beyond help, but most benefited signifi-cantly from this medical attention. Two Navy doctors,Lieutenant Richard Williams and Lieutenant JohnOakland, worked around-the-clock, yielding eventu-

ally to exhaustion, but not before they had reducedsubstantially the amount of suffering.

Improvement of sanitary conditions was one of themajor tasks undertaken by the doctors. Using Marinesto assist them, the doctors organized the Vietnameseinto clean-up squads. To rid the ship of filth and hu-man waste, the Marines supervised the South Vietnam-ese and when the refugees had completed their partof the task, the Marines used the high-pressure, high-capacity waterhoses to blast the waste from the ship'sdeck.

There were many demonstrations of ingenuity,creativity, and compassion in dealing with the refu-gees. In one case, on board the American Challenger,the security force commander, Second Lieutenant JoeFlores, Jr., organized the South Vietnamese Army sold-iers into a clean-up force. Using cooperation as a ticketoff the ship, he was able to create an enthusiasticresponse. (In truth, all the refugees would get off theship, but they did not know when or where, and asa consequence Flores could use this issue as leverage. )24

The total humanitarian and security effort of thetask force involved the evacuation, control, and pro-cessing of well over 30,000 refugees. Operating froma command center set up on board the Dubuque,Major Carl A. Shaver, the battalion operations officer,coordinated and controlled all commitments involvingthe 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. Logistical support wasa mammoth task of coordination handled by CaptainWilliam Harley, the S-4, who seemed equally adeptat finding supplies, arranging transport of those sup-plies, and in anticipating new demands. One of hismen, Lance Corporal Ricardo Carmona, an ammuni-tion technician, literally lived in the well of the Du-buque. He remained on board throughout theoperation, continuously breaking out supplies to sup-port the evacuation.

HMM-165's noteworthy aviation support throughoutthis operation also was the result of a team effort.Despite the adverse effects from saltwater corrosionand high usage, the Marine maintenance crews andNavy supply clerks combined forces to achieve a re-markable record, no helicopters down for parts ormaintenance.* Incredible under any circumstances,this achievement can only be attributed to closely coor-dinated teamwork. At the conclusion of this phase ofthe evacuation, when all of the refugees had finally

*Marine Corps aviation squadrons are supported chiefly by theNavy Supply System, from which they obtain their spare parts.

98 THE BlUER END

been unloaded at Phu Quoc, everyone in the task forceknew that the challenge had been met and that theyhad taken part in a truly "all hands effort."25

With its work done at Phu Quoc, the task force re-turned on 10 April to the vicinity of Vung Tau whererefugees were still arriving by boat. At this time, Colo-nel Alexander, formerly 9th MAB's chief of staff andmost recently commander of the Marine security force(TG 79.9), reassumed his duties with Brigadier Gen-eral Richard E. Carey's brigade and returned commandof TG 79.9 to Lieutenant Colonel Hester. Evacuation

operations then became the sole responsibility ofHester's 1st Battalion, 4th Marines.

As Lieutenant Colonel Hester prepared to assumecommand of the Amphibious Evacuation RVN Sup-port Group, the news from Phnom Penh turned frombad to worse as friendly forces lost another battle tothe Communists. Once again, events in that city domi-nated the minds of every military planner and opera-tor. Barring another miracle, the Government ofCambodia faced certain defeat. Operation Eagle Pullwould not be postponed again.

PART III

OPERATION EAGLE PULL

CHAPTER 7

The Evacuation of Phnom PenhThe Khmer Rouge —The Khmer Communists' Last Dry Season Offensive —The Marines Move into Position

Final Preparations Ashore — Final Preparations at Sea —The Execution of Eagle Pull

The Khmer Rouge

Throughout the years of major United States in-volvement in South Vietnam, Cambodia was officiallyneutral. The nonbeiligerent status was, however, a one-sided affair. Cambodian territory served as a vital linkin the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Not surprisingly, Cambo-dia also became a convenient haven for North Viet-namese and Viet Cong (NVA/VC) forces worn outfrom the fighting in South Vietnam. Of particular im-portance to the North Vietnamese as sanctuary areaswere the regions to the immediate west and north-west of Saigon. No change in these arrangements oc-curred until March of 1970 when a pro-Westerncoalition under the leadership of then-Marshal LonNol mounted a successful coup against the "neutralist"Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Marshal Lon Nol's coupcreated the Khmer Republic. The following month,U.S. and South Vietnamese forces launched an offen-sive into Cambodia, with the limited objective of des-troying the NVA/VC sanctuaries. They focused theirefforts in the Parrot's Beak region, the easternmost areaof Cambodia that juts into the heart of southern SouthVietnam, at its easternmost point only 50 kilometersfrom Saigon. As a fringe benefit, the offensive servedto bolster the fledgling government in Phnom Penh.Struggling against an internal, Communist-dominatedinsurgency, Lon Nol's government welcomed such as-sistance.

The NVA forces, despite their longstanding differ-ences with the Cambodians, supported the insurgentmovement, and regardless of their ethnic differences,which occasionally erupted into open warfare, theNorth Vietnamese aided and even trained Cambodiancadres in North Vietnam. These cadres later joinedthose already in Cambodia. Their numbers grew to60,000 hard-core guerrillas. Although their ranks con-tained a number of smaller factions, they collectivelycame to be known as the Khmer Rouge or KhmerCommunists. Supplied with weapons from Com-munist China and the Soviet Union, the Khmer Com-munists for the most part lived off the land.1

During the first three years of its existence, the Armyof the Khmer Republic was an ill-equipped band ofsoldiers. The Air Force and the Navy proved them-

100

selves to be the republic's elite forces. Yet despite itslack of equipment and funds, the Cambodian Army,called the FANK (Force Armee Nationale Khmer), wasable, with U.S. air support, to hold at bay the better-trained, and initially better-equipped, Khmer Com-munists.2

The five-year conflict in Cambodia, like the war inSouth Vietnam, took its cues from the Southeast Asianweather. The southwest monsoon season annually in-undated the lowlands adjacent to the governmentpopulation centers, thereby effectively precluding orat least limiting any offensive action from Junethrough December. During the dry season, January toJune, virtually the same scenario occurred each year.At the start of each calendar year, the Khmer Rougeattacked the government enclaves, interdicted the linesof communication and attempted to draw sufficientCambodian government forces from Phnom Penh inorder to strike a mortal blow before the onset ofanother monsoon season. Neither side gained a clearupper hand during the first years of dry season fight-ing. Equilibrium was maintained in this see-saw bat-tie of seasons by the American presence. U.S. airsupport provided the difference between victory anddefeat for the Khmer Republic. It initially bought timefor the government troops to improve their combatcapabilities, particularly the government troops' fire-support coordination. American air support also al-lowed the Khmer Rouge time to improve, particularlyin the area of coordinated offensive actions. Hamperedby the confusion attendant to an army composed ofdiverse factions, the insurgents remedied their defi-ciencies through trial and error. As each new rainy sea-son began, it became increasingly more difficult toignore the ominous, inescapable fact that the Com-munists were gradually gaining control of the river androad network. As each new dry season came to a close,the noose around Phnom Penh shrunk ever tighter.

To address this issue, the U.S. Congress sent a fact-finding commission to Cambodia in April 1973 to de-termine if continued American aid was warranted. Twoof the Congressional staff members who made the trip,James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, authoredthe report to the chairman of the Subcommittee on

U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad,Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri. In it they statedthat "the immediate concern of U.S. officials [in Cam-bodia] was simply to find a way to insure the govern-ment's survival and . . . to achieve that immediateobjective the United States had greatly increased U.S.air operations in support of Cambodian governmentforces . . . ." Moose and Lowenstein contended thatthe fighting would not stop because there was ".no indication that the Khmer insurgents . . . and theirNorth Vietnamese supporters were interested in acease-fire" and even if they did ". . . eventually agreeto a cease-fire they [would] insist on a role in thegovernment, a cessation of U.S. air operations andeither tacit or formal acquiescence to continued NorthVietnamese transit of Cambodia in support of theirforces in South Vietnam." These words sent arrowsthrough the hopes of those who had been seeking toarrange a truce in Cambodia similar to the one con-cluded at Paris for the war in South Vietnam. Cam-bodia represented a key piece in the Nixon-Kissingerattempt to bring peace to Southeast Asia. The Mooseand Lowenstein conclusion would have far-reachingconsequences: "Thus, in the last analysis the key toa cease-fire may be Phnom Penh's willingness to ac-cord the insurgents a role in the government. If themilitary situation should continue to deteriorate,however, Lon No! and his colleagues may have nochoice but to accept a cease-fire on whatever termstheir opponents set."

On 29 June 1973, two months after the senatorsreceived the report, Congress placed a rider on the1974 budget bill requiring a halt to combat air oper-ations in Southeast Asia. The Case-Church Amend-ment would prove the staff report's assessments correct:without U.S. air support the Cambodian governmentcould not survive and if Cambodia ceased its strugglewith the Communists, South Vietnam would face itsworst fear, North Vietnamese troops on its flank withno U.S. air support. In the words of the South Viet-namese military and civilian officials with whomLowenstein and Moose talked, ". . . if this possibility[Cambodia out of the war] were to materialize, SouthVietnam would be faced with a serious if not untena-ble situation on its western flank." Few suspected atthe time of the conversation that nothing but a totalcease-fire in Cambodia would remove U.S. combat air-craft from Indochina. They were wrong. The Case-Church Amendment and subsequent Congressionalappropriations bills removed U.S. combat aircraft fromSoutheast Asia, permanently.

On 15 August 1973, the day the congressionallymandated halt to air support went into effect, theCambodian government forces began a slide into ob-livion. With each new day of fighting, the strugglebecame increasingly more violent. The already heavi-ly congested population centers overflowed with newrefugees fleeing the advancing Communists. The in-surgents held over 80 percent of the countryside, butcontrolled only 35 percent of the population.

THE EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH 101

Photo courtesy of Col Peter F. Angle, USMC (Ret)

Various types of transport aircraft are parked on the ramp of Pochentong airfield whilea UH-1 helicopter approaches the airfield Pochentong was the heart of the resupply effort which sustained Phnom Penh when the Khmer Rouge laid siege to the city in 1973.

-.Li J It -. &

.4 -. -

102 THE BlUER END

Interdicting the highways, the Khmer Rouge even-tually controlled all but two of them. The fact thatonly two reliable routes of supply into Phnom Penhremained — by air into Pochentong airfield or by shipor barge via the Mekong River and the South ChinaSea—meant the life of the Khmer Republic hung inthe balance. In jeopardy were the government-controlled province capitals which were being resup-plied by the numerous "fly anything, anywhere, any-time" airlines operating from Pochentong Airport.Flying supplies in Bird Air Company aircraft (a U.S.contract airline) through Pochentong not only addedconsiderable cost to the supply process, but also sig-nificantly reduced the probability of delivery. Underthese difficult conditions, the continued survival ofthe outlying towns was doubtful and, at best, extreme-ly tentative. Day-to-day existence now depended uponPhnom Penh's air and river resupply system.6

Thus, almost by default, the Mekong River, alwaysa significant part of Cambodia, took on even greaterimportance. Navigable year round by coastal steamerand barge from Phnom Penh to the South China Sea,the river became the country's lifeline. As the Com-munists strenghtened their hold on the overland linesof communication, including the LOC linking PhnomPenh with the country's only seaport, Kompong Som,and with aviation support becoming more costly andinconsistent, the Mekong River became the only prac-tical means of supplying the government forces andfeeding the swollen population centers. Even ricegrown in western Cambodia was supplied to PhnomPenh by way of the Mekong. Because the Communistscontrolled the highways, the Cambodians first shippedthe rice to Thailand where it was loaded on shipsbound for Phnom Penh.7

At least weekly in the South Vietnamese port ofVung Tau, Mekong convoys formed for the journey tothe Cambodian capital. They were comprised of char-tered coastal steamers and barges, laden with militarysupplies and civilian cargo of every variety. After ausually peaceful two-day journey through South Viet-nam, they were met at the Cambodian border byKhmer Navy escort craft for the hazardous final day'ssteam to Phnom Penh. The FANK lacked the man-power to secure the 62 miles of riverbank stretchingfrom the South Vietnamese border to Phnom Penh.It did, however, possess enough strength to providesufficient strongpoints and fire bases along this dan-gerous portion of the waterway to enable them to denythe Khmer Rouge easy access to key chokepoints

around river islands and narrows. The CambodianArmy reinforced this coverage with interlocking ar-tillery fire.8

During the monsoon season the convoys were rare-ly threatened. The rains would inundate the foliagedriver banks where the Khmer Rouge units always builttheir gun emplacements. As a consequence the flood-ing effectively neutralized the Communists' 12.7mmmachine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launch-ers (RPGs) for nearly six months out of the year.

The Communist dry season operations of 1973 weresuccessful in periodically interdicting the lines of com-munication into Phnom Penh. For a short period, allsupply routes were cut. In order to continue to blockthese lines, the Khmer Rouge had to mass its forces,and whenever the Communists did, they usuallysuffered heavy casualties. FANK counterattacks usingU.S. close air support (until August 1973), effectivelyneutralized the massed Communist forces. Whetherthe same Khmer Rouge tactic of massing its forceswould have worked in 1974 remains a matter of con-jecture. The Communists in 1974 altered their tactics.Instead of concentrating their forces in an effort tobreak or block the lines of communication into PhnomPenh, the Khmer Rouge attempted to terrorize thecapital with artillery fire and 107mm rockets, prin-cipally the latter. It appeared for a while that theseattacks by fire against the civilian population wouldsucceed. But once again the Cambodian Governmentconfounded the experts and the capital held.

That dry season came to a close in June 1974 withthe Khmer Rouge still maintaining a tight strangle-hold on Phnom Penh, but without a victory. By notattempting to block the river in 1974, the KhmerRouge gave the Lon Nol government at least anotheryear's longevity. An inference could be made that be-cause of the mauling the Khmer Rouge units receivedduring the 1973 campaign, their manpower resourceswere insufficient to mount an offensive on the samescale in 1974. Regardless of the reason, the Cambodi-an republic had weathered another storm and the sym-bol of its strength, Phnom Penh, still housed theAmerican Embassy and its staff.

The Khmer Communists' Last Dry Season Offensive

The Khmer Rouge opened their 1975 offensive onthe last day of 1974. The Lon Nol government hadexpected a resumption of hostilities sometime injanu-ary of 1975 and the Communists did not disappointthem. The Khmer Rouge attack on 31 Decemberseemed to be right on schedule. It immediately ex-

THE EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH 103

Map adapted from IrGro Sak Sursakkao. The Khmer Republic di fbr and the Final PollaJrae (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military Hrarorry I9SS)

River controlledby enemy

Prey Veng

—

— —

/",---,-

The Khmer Communists'Last Dry Season Offensive Can Tho

104 THE BITTER END

erted pressure on the government positions in andaround Phnom Penh, and on the cities located in thesurrounding provinces. At first glance, the attackseemed to indicate that nothing had changed in theCommunist plan. Capture of the capital was still theultimate objective and all offensive efforts centeredaround that purpose. Then gradually over the next fewdays subtle changes began to emerge. As combat ac-tivity intensified, government outposts guarding theMekong River supply line also came under fire.

On 12 January, the Communists attacked NeakLoung, strategically the most critical outpost, located38 miles downriver from Phnom Penh. Fighting esca-lated in the battle for the town, for its loss would seri-ously jeopardize and possibly end resupply by river.'°

The vital convoys using the Mekong to transit fromSouth Vietnam'to Phnom Penh quickly began to feelthe effects of the escalation. They suffered from ever-increasing amounts of ground fire directed at themfrom the riverbanks. During the third week of January,two small convoys reached Phnom Penh. The ships hadsuffered considerable damage from insurgent firereceived during the 62-mile trip from the Vietnameseborder to the capital. On 27 January, two tankers andfive ammunition barges made it to the docks ofPhnom Penh. These ships, the only ones of a 16-vesselconvoy to survive the deadly fire incurred during theirjourney up the Mekong, bore battle scars attesting tothe feat. Their superstructures and hulls displayedmarks caused by rockets, bullets, and shells.

While the river outposts and convoys endured thisharassment, the Communists subjected Phnom Penhand its vital Pochentong Airfield to rocket and artilleryfire. Although the volume was considerably less thanthat experienced during the 1974 offensive, it seemedto confirm that once again a frontal assault on PhnomPenh would serve as the centerpiece of the 1975 offen-sive. Gradually, the Lon Nol government realized thatthis assessment was incorrect. The Communists hadintentionally reduced the amount of artillery and rock-et fire directed at Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rougehad aimed its latest offensive not at the capital, butinstead at its supply lines. Specifically, the Com-munists had decided to attack the convoys which car-ried 80 percent of the city's supplies. Siege warfare hadreturned.

To the government forces a siege did not seem tooffer a serious threat because since the short-livedCommunist interdiction of 1973, at least three riverconvoys had always reached the Cambodian capital inany one-month period. Unfortunately, the government

experts were wrong. The convoy which limped intoPhnom Penh on 27 January would be its last.

Less than a week later, the Khmer Rouge inflictedthe mortal blow. Returning empty to South Vietnamfrom Phnom Penh, a convoy of supply ships struck aminefield, sown days earlier by Cambodian insurgents.The explosions ripped the ships apart creating a sceneof death and destruction which literally made the riverimpassable. Thus 46 miles from Phnom Penh, in thevicinity of Phu My where the Mekong narrows to gainits strength before a long journey to the sea, a

weakened and hungry Khmer Republic suffered acasualty from which it would not recover. The Com-munists had ended resupply by convoy.1'

The laying of mines across a river in and of itselfcould not have ended convoy resupply. Minesweepingoffered an excellent means by which to counter thisthreat and eliminate the potentially damaging effectsof a blockade. Yet in this instance Cambodia becamethe exception, not the rule, because sweeping theMekong of mines presented the Cambodian Navy witha formidable task. Normally a complex and dangerousmaneuver, Communist control of the riverbanks mademinesweeping nearly impossible and, at best, verycostly. The Republic's navy did possess a limited abilityto sweep minefields, but the Khmer Rouge's use ofcommand-detonated mines significantly reduced thatmarginal capability. The method of sweep used toeliminate these type mines entailed dragging theriver's shallow water near its banks. This action wouldexpose the command wires, allowing them to be se-vered. Once the wires were cut then the mine couldbe disarmed. In order to conduct this type ofminesweeping operation, it was necessary to have con-trol of the areas adjacent to the river. Without it, theminesweeping forces risked the prospect of beingblown out of the water or captured. Neither optionwas a tactically sound alternative. Left with few choices,the government forces discontinued minesweepingoperations. This decision guaranteed the convoy oper-ators an extremely hazardous and nearly impossiblejourney. The sunken supply ships at Phu My stood asa stark testament to the futility of trying to run theblockade.

The ensuing government attempts to reopen theriver only served to diminish its forces and were toolittle, too late. The isolated garrisons throughout thecountryside, already seriously undermanned, sufferedadditional losses when many of their men were re-deployed and ordered to join the battle to keep theMekong open. Not only did these actions weaken the

THE EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH 105

garrisons, but the force constituted to conduct thecounterattack was so meager that its attack did noteven disrupt the Communists' defenses, let alone over-run them.

On 17 February, the Cambodian Government gaveup its effort to reopen the Mekong supply line toPhnom Penh. By the end of the month, the govern-ment forces controlled only a small segment of theriver. The rebels held all of the Mekong except for asmall area in the vicinity of Banam, and the adjoiningnaval base at Neak Loung, a major military facility andstrongpoint, less than 40 miles south of the capital.Daily, these two outposts, now isolated, felt the pres-sure, enduring repeated attacks from the insurgent

2

With Phnom Penh under siege, the Khmer Rougestepped up its attacks. On 5 March, the rebels for thefirst time effectively used artillery to attack Pochen-tong Airfield. Until then, they had missed their mark,but on this day their artillery barrage hit and slightlydamaged an American aircraft. The plane had justcompleted ferrying rice in from South Vietnam,providing the Cambodians with a much needed resup-ply of food. Ten days later, the FANK recaptured thetown of Toul Leap, northwest of Phnom Penh. Whileunder their control, the Communists had used ToulLeap as a location from which to shell Pochentong Air-field. Its recapture, if only temporarily, ended theshelling. During the remainder of March, the KhmerCommunists continued to increase the pressure onPhnom Penh, particularly in the sectors north and westof the city. These attacks again placed the airfield injeopardy, which allowed the rebels to interdict by firethe daily supply flights.

Government forces tried but could not stop this newphase of shelling. Consequently, the Communists firedat the exposed airdrome almost at will. On 22 March,they fired rockets at two American supply planes forc-ing the Embassy to announce the following day thatthe airlift of supplies would cease until the militarysituation around the airport improved. Apparentlyrecognizing the conflict of objectives contained in thisannouncement, the United States resumed the airlifttwo days later. Instead of improving the situation, the48-hour suspension of flight activity had had the op-posite effect. The Khmer Rouge, instead of waitingfor the government forces to follow the American ad-vice an& counterattack, went on the offensive. Ratherthan fall back, they instead made significant groundgains in the vital northwest sector near PochentongAirfield. The acquisition of this objective by the Com-

munists took on added importance because of its stra-tegic location. When last under their control, thisvantage point had served as the location from whichthe rebels had mounted their most successful rocketattack on the airfield. It would again.'

Despite this fact and possibly because of it, the U.S.increased the number of daily airlifts to Phnom Penh.To avert final disaster and defeat due to a lack of sup-plies, the United States added three DC-8s to its fleetof C-130s. Bird Airways, a private company under con-tract to the American government, operated the C-130sand the airlift. The addition of three more aircraft ena-bled Bird Airways to double its daily flights from 10to 20. By this means, the Cambodian Government'sminimum daily resupply requirements were met.

The increased effort of the American airlift notwith-standing, it became painfully obvious to all concernedthat if the Khmer Republic was to survive, the Mekonghad to be opened. Resupply by air would not ensuresuccess, because each flight encountered an ever-increasing volume of rocket and artillery fire, makingthe entire process too costly and extremely vulnerable.Any remaining vestiges of hope that the republicwould weather another wet season ended on the firstday of April 1975.'

On that Tuesday, the insurgents overran the onlyremaining government strongholds on the river, Ban-am and Neak thung. Almost immediately the saggingmorale of the government forces plummeted, knowingthat the five enemy regiments previously engaged atNeak Loung were now free to attack them in PhnomPenh. As these units moved north towards the capital,the Cambodian Government simply waited for the in-evitable while the American Embassy waited for theMarines, who themselves had been waiting since thefirst week of 1975.

The Marines Move into Position

Beginning on 6 January 1975, the United States hadreacted swiftly to the Khmer Communist offensive.That Monday morning, CinCPac, Admiral Noel A. M.Gayler, via CinCPacFlt, Admiral Maurice F. Weisner,directed Commander Seventh Fleet, Vice AdmiralGeorge P. Steele, to place the 31st MAU/ARG Alphain an increased state of readiness in anticipation ofexecuting Operation Eagle Pull. Admiral Steele or-dered the MAU and ARG Alpha to assume a 96-hourresponse time to the Gulf of Thailand and KompongSom, Cambodia. The following day, LieutenantColonel James L. Bolton's HMH-462 was alerted fordeployment to Subic Bay to replace Lieutenant

106 THE BlUER END

Photo courtesy of Capt Russell R. Thurman, USMC (Ret)

Co/John E Roche III, 31st MAU commanding officerawaits orders to execute Operation Eagle Pull. TheMAU ground combat element departed the Okinawaon board HMH-462 helicopters at 0607 on 12 Aprilto provide security for the Phnom Penh evacuation.

Colonel Dwight R. Allen's HMM-164 on board theTholi(LPH-10). On 8January, HMH-462's 16 CH-53sflew to Cubi Point adjacent to Subic Bay by way ofTaiwan Air Force Base, Taiwan, from Marine Corps AirStation, Futema, Okinawa. The 31st MAU was recon-figured once again with a "dry season" mix of helicop-ters for the pending evacuation (heavy CH-53s, vicemedium CH-46s, providing greater lift capability andrange in the event of an evacuation). While the "heavyhaulers" were enroute, BLT 2/4 moved back on boardship from the MAU camps at Subic. The 31stMAU/ARG Alpha was prepared to get underwayshould the situation in Cambodia deteriorate further,but with the Okinawa (LPH 3) inbound to relieve theThpoli (LPH 10), the amphibious ready group re-mained at Subic. After completion of the turnover ofLPHs on 28 January, ARG Alpha got underway im-mediately. The MAU's assignment was to respond toevents in Cambodia and execute Operation Eagle Pullwhen directed. In order to accomplish this, the am-phibious ready group with its embarked MAU had tooperate within a 96-hour radius of Kompong Som.Underway and attempting to maintain the proper dis-tance from Cambodia, Okinawa carried 14 CH-53s,

3 CH-46s, 4 AH-lJs, and 1 UH-1E from Marine Air-craft Group 36, all of them assigned to HMH-462.'5

By the last week in January, Lieutenant GeneralJohnJ. Burns, USAF, Commanding General, USSAG,decided it was time to host another planning confer-ence at his headquarters in Nakhon Phanom. ColonelSydney H. Batchelder, Jr., the ground security forcecommander; Lieutenant Colonel Curtis G. Lawson, hisair liaison officer; Colonel John F. Roche III, the MAUcommander; and key members of the MAU staff at-tended the conference. In addition to these Marines,III MAF and 3d Division staffs sent representatives.With all of the key Eagle Pull commanders present,the conference allowed Colonel Roche and ColonelBatchelder, exercising overall operational control, thesingular opportunity of discussing in detail the oper-ation's timing, number of evacuees, use of landingzones, and the tactical situation in Phnom Penh. Afteran on-site reconnaissance of Phnom Penh, the Marinesreturned to their respective units except for LieutenantColonel John I. Hopkins who remained in PhnomPenh to assist on the Military Equipment DeliveryTeam, Cambodia, responsible for coordinating evacu-ation plans.*16

On 2 February, as the remainder of ARG Alphasteamed west toward the Gulf of Thailand, the Peoria(LST 1183) headed east, bound for the San BernardinoStrait and thence to the Trust Territory, Mariana Is-lands. Prior to its departure, members of BLT 2/4 wenton board the Peoria. These elements included: Com-pany E, commanded by Captain Matthew E. Broder-

ick; the amphibian tractor platoon, led by SecondLieutenant Joseph C. Lotito; and elements of LSU 2/4.They were to participate in Operation Quick Jab II,a combined civic action-amphibious exercise on the

island of Tinian during the period 9-15 February.'7

The U.S. reaction to the Communists' mining of theMekong placed the evacuation force in a higher stateof responsiveness. On 6 February, Admiral Steelereduced the reaction time of the 31st MAU/ARG Al-pha to 48 hours. The same day General Burns request-ed that the Eagle Pull command element report tohis headquarters as soon as possible.

*Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Grimm, the USSAG Plans Ac-tion Officer, recalled the normal routine at the end of each EaglePull planning conference: The USSAG Eagle Pull action officercustomarily took the new participants to Phnom Penh for an on-the-ground recon of the LZs and to meet embassy planners. TheJanuary 1975 on-site recon became particularly important as it in-cluded many who would become key players in the actual opera-tion." Grimm Comments.

THE EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH 107

Colonel Batchelder's command group departedKadena Air Force Base, Okinawa, at 0520 on 7 Febru-ary on board a Navy T-39 aircraft, arriving at NakhonPhanom at 1235 the same day. In addition to ColonelBatchelder and Lieutenant Colonel Lawson, the partyincluded Major George L. Cates, III MAF liaisonofficer, and First LieutenantJames L. O'Neill, landingzone control team officer. The group brought with itPRC-75 and -77 radios and one piece of special equip-ment, a glide angle indicator light (GAIL). The GAILwas designed to enable helicopter pilots to land underconditions of reduced visiblity by adjusting their rateof descent and approach angle to a glide path indi-cated by the lights. The remainder of the commandelement, six Marine communicators carrying addition-al communications equipment, arrived at NakhonPhanom on board a Marine KC-130 the next day.Shortly after arrival, an Air Force medic augmentedthe command element to provide a degree of medicalassistance and expertise.18

While Batchelder's command element continued itspreparations, the ARG, less the Peorii, began maneu-vers off the coast of South Vietnam. On 20 February,the 31st MAU, with participating elements of BLT 2/4and HMH-462, conducted HeliLEx 1-75. Designed totest HMH-462's ability to execute a helicopter employ-ment and landing table (1-IEALT) specifically deve-loped by Colonel Roche and his staff, this exerciseproduced excellent results and provided valuable ex-perience. Based upon HMH-462's performance and itssuccessful execution of the HEALT, the 31st MAUadopted the same helicopter employment and landingtable for use in Operation Eagle Pull.'

Thinking that the Cambodian Government wouldat least weather the immediate crisis, the mining ofthe river, Admiral Steele relaxed the response time. On22 February, he directed the Eagle Pull forces to as-sume a 96-hour posture. This permitted the amphibi-ous ready group to return to Subic for minor repairsand replenishment and meet its LST, the Peoria.

The respite, however, was shortlived. In less thana week, as the fortunes of the Khmer Republic wentfrom bad to worse, the response time was dramaticallyreduced. Effective 28 February, Amphibious ReadyGroup Alpha assumed a readiness posture of 24 hourswhich required a significant modification to its oper-ating area, basically restricting it to the Gulf ofThailand. (These modified locations of the operatingarea acquirecLthe acronym MODLOC.) For the ensuing43 days, the Marines of the 31st MAU and the sailorsof ARG Alpha became intimately familiar with the

Marine Corps Historical Collection

LtColJohn I. Hopkins, pictured here as a major gener-al, was in Phnom Penh from late January to April. Hewas a member of the Military Equipment DeliveryTeam Cambodia responsible for supporting and sup-plying the Cambodian government and its army.

term 'MODLOC liberty" while the USSAG staff inNakhon Phanom, when not preparing for the evacu-ation, pulled liberty in the 'ville." Admiral Steelerecalled his concerns with "MODLOC liberty": "It wasa continuing worry to me that we had a MAU/ARGgoing in circles awaiting the execution of Eagle Pull.The amphibious ships were not designed to have somany active young men embarked for such a longtime. The Marines needed exercise ashore whether thatmeant a liberty port or a training exercise. I kept press-ing these considerations on all concerned."20

Although permitted liberty, the Marines in NakhonPhanom found little time for recreation. They facedthe demanding and time-consuming task of refining,in concert with their Air Force counterparts, the oper-ational plans for both a helicopter and a fixed-wingevacuation of Phnom Penh. Although excellent in con-cept and thorough in preparation, the original planlacked the details to make it completely current. Dur-ing the draft stages as many as 18 separate courses ofaction were outlined for helicopter lifts alone. When

108 THE BITTER END

these planners published USSAG/7AF OPlan 2-75 on3 March, the helicopter courses of action had beenreduced to four. The published plan for fixed-wingevacuation also listed four options. Both plans speci-fied the use of three possible sources for ground secu-rity forces. Tactical air and fixed-wing airlift scheduleslisted the available ground forces: a 50-man Air Forcesecurity police detachment from the Seventh Air lkrceSecurity Police Squadron; two reinforced rifle compa-nies from the 3d Division on Okinawa; or two rein-forced rifle companies from 31st MAU. Helicopterplanning factors were limited by the available assets:12 Air Force CH/HH-53 aircraft at Nakhon Phanomand 16 Marine Corps CH-53 aircraft from the 31stMAU. In every scenario, the Marine command ele-ment, augmented by the Air Force Combat ControlTeam, was tasked to provide overall command and con-trol of the activities at the evacuation sites.

At Nakhon Phanom, First Lieutenant O'Neil andLieutenant Colonel Lawson conducted instructionaltraining exercises for the Air Force helicopter crews inthe use of the GAIL and standard night lighting andhand signals in the event night operations became anecessity. Additionally, the Marine officers in the com-mand element visited Phnom Penh to confer with Em-bassy personnel and inspect designated landingzones.2'

Two factors militated against the use of just onehelicopter carrier and its 14 Marine helicopters and12 land-based Air Force helicopters: First, the num-ber of potential evacuees continually fluctuated. At

Col Batchelder and his command group at Ubon AirBase on 3 April, just prior to their insertion intoPhnom Penh. They were the last to be evacuated fromthe city and rode to safety on Air Force HH-53s.

Photo courtesy of Col Curtis G. Lawson, USMC

times, the projected total exceeded the entire lift capa-bility of the combined USAF/USMC helicopter inven-tory in Southeast Asia. Second, the contingency at firstglance appeared to be a minimum time operation, butupon reexamination, the Eagle Pull command staffclassified this assumption as fallacious. They decidedthat due to frequent and rapid changes in the tacticalsituation, the duration of the operation could not bedetermined. Despite unfavorable conditions and a lackof reinforcements, the Cambodians continued to holdthe perimeter around Phnom Penh. With the UnitedStates determined to remain in Cambodia until thelast possible minute, each day that the governmentforces successfully defended the capital guaranteed ad-ditional waiting time and another day on station forthe relief force, 31st MAU/ARG Alpha. With the dateof execution of the MAU's mission continuously be-ing postponed, the need to create a helicopter-capable,relief/rotation force began to grow in importance. Theconcern centered around the fact that the only otherARG in the Western Pacific, ARG Bravo, did not pos-sess a major helicopter platform.

On 16 March, as a result of these concerns, the JointChiefs of Staff directed that an aircraft carrier proceedto Subic Bay with a Marine heavy helicopter squadronembarked, and upon arrival, assume a 72-hourresponse posture for Operation Eagle Pull. The fol-lowing day, CincPacFlt directed the Hancock (CVA 19)to unload sufficient Navy personnel and material toaccommodate 16 Marine CH-53Ds and associatedcrewmen, supplies, and equipment, and proceed toHawaii. Having unloaded the necessary equipmentand men, Hancock departed Alameda, its homeport,on 18 March. Upon its arrival in Pearl Harbor on 23March, Hancock received further guidance and morespecific details on its new mission. Upon completion ofthe loading phase, the carrier received orders to sailas soon as feasible on or after 26 March at a speed of20 knots with Subic as its destination.22

During Hancock's 2,000-mile trip from the WestCoast, Lieutenant General Louis H. Wilson, Jr., Com-manding General, FMFPac, chose HMH-463, a heavyhelicopter squadron of the 1st Marine Brigade, as thedeploying unit. Commanded by Lieutenant ColonelHerbert M. Fix, the squadron embarked in the Han-cock on 26 March and sailed for the Western Pacific.The wisdom of the decision to use the Hancock soonbecame apparent. At this point, the news from SouthVietnam was progressively becoming worse with thelatest reports revealing that the defense of the northernand central regions had collapsed. The ensuing chaos

F

THE EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH

and panic had created a military and political crisisin South Vietnam, and as a result the availableWestern Pacific forces now had two contingencies withwhich to contend, possibly at the same time. Withthe Hancock steaming west and the situation in Viet­nam deteriorating, Eagle Pull planners developed afifth and final option for the fixed-wing plan.

Throughout the planning phase, the anticipatednumber and location of evacuees fluctuated. At onepoint in the planning cycle, 21 March, the Embassyforecast 3,600 refugees, a number far exceeding theoriginal prediction of 400. In the event it became im­possible or unfeasible to evacuate such a large numberby helicopter, especially if the highly vulnerablePochentong Airfield suddenly came under attack, anadditional course of action had to be available. Thefifth option, devised as a "worst case" version, servedthis purpose. It called for the use of fixed-wing, U.S.Air Force aircraft to effect the withdrawal. Under thesecircumstances, a ground security force large enoughto secure the entire airfield would be needed. The ex­tensiveness of the area to be secured would mandatethe deployment of at least two battalions thereby mak­ing the event a multi-battalion operation. For this rea­son, on 26 March, the III MAF Commander, MajorGeneral Carl W. Hoffman, reactivated the 11th Ma­rine Amphibious Brigade.23

General Hoffman selected Brigadier General Harold1. Coffman, Assistant Division Commander, 3d Ma­rine Division, to be the commanding general of the11th MAB. During December 1974, General Coffmanhad commanded the 9th MAB while participating inOperation Pagasa II in the Philippines. Upon beingdesignated Commanding General, 11th MAB, he re­quested that several of the officers formerly assignedto his staff during that exercise be added to the newlyconstituted MAB's roster. The 3d Marine Divisioncomplied with General Coffman's request and tem­porarily transferred the designated officers to the 11thMAB. The newly assigned Marines quickly formed aplanning staff, the nucleus of the new brigade. Staffagencies within the division headquarters readilyprovided administrative support to this nucleus of 10officers.24

The planning for participation by the 11th MAB inthe evacuation of Cambodia began immediately andthe planners used the United States Support ActivitiesGroup/Seventh Air Force's Operation Plan 5060(C) asa blueprint. In the process, the MAB staff resolved thedifferences in assumptions, missions, and courses of

109

action as they arose. The 11th MAB distributed itsoperational plan on 2 April as the combat activity inCambodia reached a new level of intensity. To expe­dite matters and insure immediate delivery to prospec­tive subordinates, the MAB issued the plan in messagerather than standard, more formal, format.

As drafted, the planning concept contained a six­phase operation: Phase I - Movement to Ubon AirForce Base in Thailand on board Military Airlift Com­mand aircraft; Phase II - Air assault movement to

Pochentong on board Marine and U.S. Air Force C-130aircraft; Phase III - Establishment of a defensiveperimeter around Pochentong; Phase IV-Conduct ofsecurity and evacuation operations; Phase V­Withdrawal from Pochentong; and Phase VI-Returnto home stations. The operation entailed the employ­ment of Lieutenant Colonel Royce 1. Bond's BLT 1/9,Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Loehe's BLT 3/9, andforces from the 31st MAU (BLT 2/4 and HMH-462).The plan called for initial insertion of one BLT, 2/4,by HMH-462 helicopters in order to secure the run­way at Pochentong. Immediately after the insertion,BLT 3/9, including its artillery battery, would be flownto Pochentong on board C-130 aircraft. The two bat­talions would then press outward establishing a secu­rity perimeter around the airfield complex. Evacuationoperations would begin approximately 45 minutes af­ter the initial landings. The helicopters would ferryevacuees from Phnom Penh to Pochentong to boardC-130s for the flight to Thailand. An estimate of sevenhours to evacuate and three hours to extract the secu­rity force made this operational plan a complex andinvolved process, requiring tactical Air Force aircrafton station over Pochentong and Phnom Penh. Addi­tionally, the MAB's reserve, BLT 119, would be placedon call at Ubon Air Base, Thailand, for possible in­sertion should the situation dictate.

Precise timing was of the essence. Critical to the suc­cess of the entire plan was the air assault schedule de­veloped by Major Martin J. Lenzini, the brigade airliaison officer, on loan from the 9th Marines. MajorLenzini, an A-4 pilot and former commanding officerof VMA-223, formulated a scheme of movement thatmeshed the flow of amphibious-based helicopters witha stream of fixed-wing transports. His objective wasto achieve a maximum build-up of security forces atPochentong in the shortest possible time. The com­plex, critical time-flow charts that he developed madethis an exceptional plan.

Before the plan could be tested, its reason for im-

110

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A50903

LtCol Royce L. Bond, commanding officer ofBII 1/9,right, attends a briefing with his executive officer, MajBurrel H. Landes, Jr. BII 1/9 servedas the 11th MAB'sreserve for the six-phase operation to evacuate PhnomPenh, cancelled three days after its 2 Apnl inception.

plementation disappeared. Within two days, the per­ceived requirement for a major operation involving the11th MAB had passed. Two factors weighed heavily inthe decision to deactivate the 11th Marine AmphibiousBrigade. First, the estimate of persons to be evacuatedwas decreasing daily. The aircraft resupplying thegovernment forces had begun to speed this process bytransporting increasing numbers of refugees on theiroutbound legs. The second reason hinged on the an­ticipated arrival of the Hancock and HMH-463. Withthe carrier and its embarked squadron only three dayssteaming time from the Gulf of Thailand, the addi­tion of 16 transport helicopters now seemed a certainty,and so without a mission, the 11th MAB had no mili­tary purpose. Effective 0001 5 April 1975, CG III MAFdeactivated it.25

Three days earlier on 2 April, in response to the fur­ther deterioration of the Cambodian government'sdefenses around Phnom Penh, AmbassadorJohn Gun­ther Dean had requested the insertion of the Opera­tion Eagle Pull command element into Phnom Penh.The following day, Colonel Batchelder and his groupflew into Pochentong airfield. On 4 April, the Unit­ed States brought in additional CoBOs to speed thefixed-wing evacuation process. Simultaneously, theMAU/ARG Alpha assumed a six-hour responseposture. During the week of 4 to 10 April, the addi­tional flights extracted hundreds of Cambodiansformer employees of the American Embassy. This mas~

THE BITTER END

sive removal of Embassy personnel left a staff of only50 people to manage both daily business and theevacuation. On the positive side, it decreased the es­timate of Cambodians awaiting evacuation to a muchmore manageable level and nearly eliminated thelikelihood of using anything other than the helicop­ter option.26

As the Embassy, the Marines ashore, and the MAUprepared for that option, events in neighboring Viet­nam forced ARG Bravo, on 9 April, to sail from PhuQuoc back to Vung Tau. Included in the amphibiousready group were Durham, Freden'ck, Dubuque, andthe latest addition to the Western Pacific evacuationforces, the Hancock. Vung Tau, a peninsula insouthern South Vietnam near Saigon, looked like itmight become the site of the next major evacuationas thousands of South Vietnamese fleeing the Com­munist offensive took refuge there. Colonel Alfred M.Gray commanded the combat forces (the 33d MAU)designated to provide security should ARG Bravo beforced to conduct evacuation operations. The Hancock,the ship designated to support the evacuation of Cam­bodia using HMH-463, also carried other units of the33d MAU including elements of Lieutenant ColonelBond's BLT 1/9. Additionally, while in Subic, the Han­cock had taken on board additional helicopters,CH-46s, UH-1Es, and AH-1Js, ferried to Subic by theUSS Midway (CVA 41) expressly for the purpose ofaugmenting HMH-463 and 33d MAU.*27

On 10 April, in order to resolve the conflict in mis­sion, CinCPacFlt detached the Hancock and HMH-463from 33d MAU/ARG Bravo and passed operationalcontrol to 31st MAU/ARG Alpha. Late the followingday, on 11 April 1975, the carrier rendezvoused withARG Alpha in the Gulf of Thailand. Despite its latearrival, less than 24 hours before H-Hour, HMH-463was ready for action?6

From the moment it left Pearl Harbor, the squa­~ron h~d begun preparing for the operation. In par­tIcular, It made modifications to the aircraft to counterthe effectiveness of SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. Main­tenance personnel installed the ALE-29 flare dispenser

*The Midway had been otdeted to the atea in tesponse to thegtowmg crisis in South Vietnam. Enroute from her homeport inYokosuka, Japan, to Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, the Mid­way, as it steamed past Okinawa, embarked the helicopters desig­nated for transfer to the Hancock. Stationed at Marine Corps AirStattOn Futema, they joined Detachment 101 of VMCJ-I alreadyon board the Midway. Under the command of Lieutenant ColonelWilliam A. Bloomer, the detachment consisted of two RF-4s andthree EA-6s.

and gave each CH-53 a fresh coat of low infrared reflec-tive paint. The ALE-29 fired flares whose heat wouldattract, or at least confuse, the homing device of theheat-seeking SA-7. Adding paint to the fuselagereduced the infrared signal transmitted by the helicop-ter, and likewise decreased the probability of a "lock-on." As an additional means of distraction, the gun-ners carried flare pistols to fire at incoming missiles.

Lieutenant Colonel Fix also decided to use the crewconcept. A specific crew was assigned to each aircraft.It flew together anytime its aircraft was launched. Inthis way, it developed into a tightly knit group, eachmember familiar with the others' techniques and waysof operating.*29

Final Preparations Ashore

Before departing from USSAG Headquarters forPhnom Penh after having received a request from the

*Brigadier Genera! Richard E. Carey, the 9th MAB commander,recalled that "in spite of the detailed combat preparations of theunit [HMH-463] I was required on the night before the evacuationto certify in writing to Rear Admiral Whitmire that the squadronwas combat ready and was capable of performing the mission." CareyComments.

Ambassador for their immediate presence, the mem-bers of Colonel Batchelder's command element com-pleted their final stage of planning for Operation EaglePull. Upon their arrival at the Embassy on 3 April,they reviewed and incorporated last-minute changesto the Embassy plan and then began preparing for theactual evacuation. From the outset, beginning withan immediate audience with AmbassadorJohn Gun-ther Dean, Colonel Batchelder and his command ele-ment integrated themselves into the daily routine.They joined the in-country team and assisted it in theexecution of the fixed-wing portion of the evacuationwhich began their second day in Cambodia. Many ofthe Embassy personnel had departed on earlier evacu-ation flights leaving a serious gap in the staff and theMarines quickly filled these positions paying particu-lar attention to evacuation-related responsibilities.Lieutenant Colonel Lawson took charge of the evacu-ation operation at Pochentong Airfield. Coordinatingthe movement and manifesting of refugees at the air-field, Lawson's crew of Marines were subjectedto 80 to 90 rounds of incoming fire a day. The KhmerRouge treated the command element and one of its

THE EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH 111

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A150898

Marine crew of HMH-463 prepares their CH-53 Sea Stallion for Operation Eagle Pull.Since intelligence reports had indicated the presence of SA- 7 surface-to-air missiles inSoutheast Asia, the heavy helicopter receives a coat of infrared low-reflective paint.

4

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— ---I

U

112 THE BITTER END

members, upon arrival, to a taste of what their shortsojourn in Cambodia would be like. The Communistsoffered Corporal James R. Osgood, Jr., a special wel-come, a preview of the daily artillery bombardmenthe would endure while in Phnom Penh. As the lastmember of the command element to exit the Bird AirC-130 after an uneventful landing at Pochentong, Cor-poral Osgood witnessed close-up one of the incomingrounds as it landed between him and a bunker, hisnew home. Slightly distracted and somewhat sur-prised, he made it to safe haven without further in-cident.

Routinely, the rebels would fire 105mm and 107mmshells directly at the airfield, and whenever an aircraftmaterialized they would crank up the volume. Despite

this treament, all the incoming fire did not seem tobother Lawson's airfield Marines, especially Private FirstClass Daniel N. Catania. One of five radio operators,Catania proved unflappable under fire, providing con-tinuous communication service. As the only Americancapable of speaking French, Private First Class Cata-nia also passed instructions and directions to theevacuees, most of whom spoke no English.30

In the ensuing seven days, the week just prior tothe helicopter extraction, Lieutenant Colonel Lawson'steam processed through Pochentong more than 750Cambodians. As a result of the very close relationshipthat developed between members of the commandelement and the Embassy staff, they encountered noproblems in completing last-minute refinements and

Phnom PenhEvacuation Sites

j

-S

—--:z .—• —4

12 April 1975

Embassy/

.1 .

THE EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH 113

Marine Corps Historical Collection

Acting Cambodian President Saukham Khoy arrives on the Okinawa. President Lon Nolhad left on 1 Aprilafter receiving an "invitation to vacation" with the Indonesian president.

modifications to the plans for notification, assembly,and transportation of evacuees.

With each passing day, the situation at the airfieldbecame less tenable. The Communists continued topress their attacks all around the city and with the in-surgent reinforcements arriving from Neak Ioung, thebalance of combat power began to shift. The rebelscontrolled, uncontested, the eastern side of theMekong, and by 10 April they so inundated the air-field with artillery fire that the United States ceasedall fixed-wing evacuation operations.

With this option eliminated, site selection forhelicopter landing zones dominated the commandgroup's planning meetings. Acknowledging Com-munist control of the east bank of the Mekong River,the planners decided not to use the zone closest tothe Embassy because of its proximity to the river. TheseLZs were situated on the Mekong's west bank. Instead,they selected, as, a single landing site, Landing ZoneHotel, a soccer field about 900 meters northeast of theEmbassy. Masked from the river by a row of apartmentbuildings, this LZ could not be interdicted by direct

fire weapons, making it the safest location and there-by the best choice.

The Embassy personnel prepared to depart on 11April, but instead delayed one more day. The deci-sion to wait assumed as accurate and reliable the esti-mated arrival time of the Hancock. With its presence,the Marine Corps would have available HMH-463. Un-til this point, the planners had assumed only one Ma-rine Corps squadron would be available and expectedto employ an equal number of Air Force helicoptersto have sufficient lift capability. The Hancock's arrivalallowed a modification to this scheme of maneuver andconsisted of using HMH-463 in the initial insertionand extraction phase while keeping the Air Force "53s"in reserve. In addition the Air Force helicopters couldbe employed as sea and air rescue. Planned use of theseadditional CH-53s also included adding them to theflow as necessary, and recovery of the commandelemental

On the morning of 12 April, each member of theEmbassy staff and the command element prepared forhis specific evacuation task. At 0730, Ambassador

4

Dean notified the acting Cambodian chief of state,Prime Minister Long Boret, and other Cambodianleaders including Sink Matak, that the Americanswould officially leave the country within the next fewhours and inquired if any desired evacuation. Alldeclined except for Saukham Khoy, successor to LonNol as president of the republic, who left without tell-ing his fellow leaders.*32

The Ambassador then alerted designated Embassypersonnel to marshal the preassigned groups. At thistime, the command element proceeded to its station,

*The Khmer Rouge executed both thng Boret and Sink Matakwithin the next two weeks. On 20 April, the Communists physi-cally removed Sink Matak from the French Embassy where he hadsought refuge, purposefully disclaiming it as French territory. LonNol, who with the help of Sink Matak (his deputy prime minister),had overthrown Prince Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970, alreadyhad departed Cambodia. Under the guise of an invitation from In-donesian President Suharto to vacation with him on Bali, the ail-ing Lon Nol left Pochentong Airport at five minutes after noon onTuesday, 1 April, with his party of 29, thereby escaping the KhmerRouge bloodbath which followed the government's capitulation on17 April. Without Honor, pp. 198-199 and 265-276.

the landing zone. Each of the 10 members of the com-mand group drove a vehicle to the landing zone. Theyparked them so as to block access to the zone fromany part of the city, and then disabled them. The dis-abling process had to be done quickly and pulling thedistributor cap was easy but rendering the tires unus-able was not an easy task. Some way had to be foundto flatten the tires without drawing attention by shoot-ing them out. Major George L. Cares found the prover-bial needle in a haystack when he located six valve stemextractors, seemingly the entire supply in all of PhnomPenh. Their value so exceeded their worth that MajorCates kept them in a plastic bag suspended from achain around his neck until the moment of issue,Saturday, 12 April 1975. The vehicle which MajorCates drove had been designated as exempt from des-truction, because of its accessory equipment. It wasa pickup truck rigged with a winch and cable. It wouldserve as a means to remove from the landing zone anyhelicopter crippled by either enemy fire or a mechan-ical ma1function.

The Embassy's Marine security guards, led by Gun-

114 THE BlUER END

Photo courtesy of Capt Russell R. Thurman, USMC (Ret)

The Marine Security Guard Detachment from the American Embassy in Phnom Penhgathers after its evacuation to the USS Okinawa. On 12 April, HMH-462 CH-53 helicop-ters removed the Marines led by GySgt Clarence D. McClenahan, standing third from left

-I-d

THE EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH 115

of April, the day the command element landed atPhnom Penh, 31st MAU/ARG Alpha recorded its 34thconsecutive day at sea. On station in the Gulf ofThailand during this entire period, the Marines andsailors of ARG Alpha expected to execute their mis-sion each succeeding day. Despite the fact that eachday ended without results, the anticipation of put-ting into practice their acquired skills kept the Ma-rines' and sailors' morale high.

Teamwork and coordination would become the in-trinsic elements of mission success or failure, and par-ticularly in the aviation maintenance effort. The Navysupply system had to provide the necessary parts, andmaintenance personnel had to install them properly orthe number of available heavy helicopters would dropbelow the critical level. Should this occur, either themission would have to be scrapped or Air Force heli-copters would have to be substituted. By prestaging

LtCol George P Slade, commanding officer ofBIT2/4,studies a map ofPhnom Penh in preparation for Oper-ation Eagle Pull. BLT 2/4 pacticiated in both EaglePull and Frequent Wind providing security for evacu-

Marine Corps Historical Collectionation of both capitals, Phnom Penh and Saigon.

Aerial shot catches three Marine CH-53D aircraft in Photo courtesy of Capt Russell R. Thurman, USMC (Ret)

LZ Hotel during Operation Eagle Pull. The lasthelicopter to leave arrived on the Okinawa at 1214 on12 April with Ambassador John Gunther Dean.

nery Sergeant Clarence D. McClenahan, assisted thedrivers in disabling the remaining vehicles whichblocked off the southern accesses to the zone. This leftonly one road open for traffic, the highway leadingdirectly from the Embassy to the airfield. With thezone's access secured by the vehicles, the commandelement turned to the next task at hand, setting upcommunications and laying out marking panels.Almost immediately, they established radio contactwith "Cricket," the airborne command and control air-craft, and then they contacted "King Bird," the 56thARRS HC-130 used to control the helicopters. Lieu-tenant Colonel Lawson provided "King" a landingzone brief and requested that he relay it to the in-coming helicopters. By 0830, everything was in placeawaiting the first elements of the 2d Battalion, 4thMarines whose similar preparations at sea would nowmerge with those ashore.3

Final Preparations at Sea

While the situation deteriorated in Cambodia, the31st MAU continued its preparations at sea. The 3d

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116 THE BITFER END

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 07760875

Capt Thomas A. Keene, Commanding Officer Com-pany I 2dBattalion, 4th Marines, briefs his men be-fore embarking in HMH-462 helicopters to launchOperation Eagle Pull in Cambodia. Capt Keene andhis Marines were located on the Okinawa along withCompany H, commanded by Capt Steven R. Bland

aircraft parts at Utapao Air Base for pick-up by ship'shelicopters, the Navy assured vital spares needed tomaintain the Marine CH-53s in top operating con-dition.

This spirit of preparation and teamwork spilled overinto other areas as well. Especially evident in the juniorofficers, this willingness to prepare for every eventu-ality manifested itself in the daily training programswhich the officers, along with their NCOs, conducted.During these sessions, the small unit leaders dissemi-nated enough information to keep the Marines ap-praised of the tactical situation and aware of theiroperational status. This continuous two-way exchangewent a long way toward sustaining morale and main-taining an edge.36

The constant flow of information also meant con-tinually chatiging data which in turn necessitated al-terations in the final guidance. The helicopteremployment and landing tables (1-IEALTS), developedmonths earlier by the joint effort of the squadron andbattalion staffs, facilitated incorporation of last-minute

changes and provided the ARG with much neededflexibility. This plan enabled the MAU to deliver tothe operational area several different heliteam config-urations. The MAU commander commented yearslater that "the planning considerations concerninghelicopter flow and unit integrity . . . were integralto the plan even prior to the allocation of CH-53 as-sets during February."37

To sustain this flexibility meant quickly acquiringand disseminating the most up-to-date data availa-ble. Colonel Roche's numerous liaison visits to NakhonPhanom provided him an opportunity to access asource of this knowledge. At USSAG Headquarters,an abundance of intelligence, particularly photo cover-age of the landing zones, existed. Colonel Roche con-sidered this the most-current and best-preparedinformation on the tactical situation in Cambodia. Asa result, every unit commander, including the fireteam leaders, received a detailed briefing on his specif-ic landing zone and the lay of the land around it. Inaddition, for each course of action, the Marines re-hearsed their procedures for both helicopter embar-kation and their sector defense deployment. It seemedthat no detail escaped inspection or rehearsal and asa consequence, this well-drilled group of Marinesrepresented an assault unit properly prepared to per-form an operation requiring precise timing and move-ment. At the MAU and battalion staff level, thecommander and his staff discussed anticipatedproblems and worse-case situations with the expecta-tion that nothing would be overlooked. Finally, thisteam effort would be put to the test.38

Beginning 7 April, the 31st MAU went to a one-hour readiness posture, which meant by 0400 each day,all heliteams had to be assembled in their assignedarea, fully outfitted and ready to go. At this time,staged ammunition marked with a team's number wasbroken out for issue. Pending the signal to execute,the flight crews and heliteams waited and the actualissuance of ammunition was placed on hold.39

On the afternoon of 11 April, the MAU received theorder to execute Operation Eagle Pull. General Burnsestablished L-Hour as 0900 the following morning.The option selected involved the use of a single land-ing site, Landing Zone Hotel. At 1930, 11 April onthe Okinawa, Colonel Roche called a meeting of hissubordinate commanders. For the final time, the MAUS-3, Major James R. Brown, Jr., briefed the selectedplan of action'°

The use of Landing Zone Hotel would require a360-man security force. To balance the principle of

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THE EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH 117

Mp dpd from U.S. Air Form, (JSkF G/obol Nor'rg.oüoo od Pk.rrrirrg CAiro, Soothmot A,th. (10 Jonr 1959); harohod ar000 rod orhrr land norarronr ron parr of rim orrgnal map.

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