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MARUBO DEMOGRAPHIC POLITICS

by Javier Ruedas Tulane University

Over a period of one generation, from 1974 to 1998, the relative size of Marubo exogamous groups have remained unchanged whereas the relative sizes of residential groups have changed considerably. The maintenance of relative stability in exogamous group sizes indicates that the Marubo marriage exchange system is a structure of reciprocity that operates to maintain demographic equilibrium among kinship groups over time. However, this does not prevent demographic inequalities among residential groups from developing because exogamous units and residential units are not coterminous. Residential groups can and do develop unequally relative to other such groups. The development of these intergroup demographic inequalities is a political process because it has to do in large part with efforts by headmen to expand their social networks, often by incorporating parts of other headmen’s networks. The construction of demographic inequality is an emically recognized goal actively pursued by Marubo headmen, occasionally in competition with one another over that most limited of indigenous Amazonian resources: people. I looked at three possible explanations for the development of intergroup demographic inequality over the generation in question: unequal access to polygyny, unequal levels of control by headmen over the postmarital residence of their coresidents, and unequal access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people. I conclude that control over postmarital residence and access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people are the most significant factors explaining the unequal success of various headmen in the construction of social networks from 1974 to 1998. This paper consists of three parts. First, I will explain the theory which oriented the gathering of the data to be presented. Then, I will present the data which were gathered in response to the theory. Finally I will present plausible explanations for the data. Data on demographic change through time in Marubo society were gathered, organized, and interpreted under the influence of two theoretical frameworks: Firstly, Lévi-Strauss’ ideas on elementary structures of kinship, and secondly, Rivière and Mentore’s concept of a political economy of people. I wanted to find out if these theoretical frameworks were applicable to the interpretation Marubo social dynamics. Lévi-Strauss informed the gathering of data because it was clear prior to fieldwork that his ideas on kinship, if they should prove to be true, would have great relevance to understanding Marubo social and political organization. In The Elementary Structures of Kinship, Lévi-Strauss built on Mauss’ ideas about reciprocal exchange as a fundamental basis of human social organization. Lévi-Strauss argued that reciprocity is an aspect of what he calls ‘the system of the scarce product’. The system of the scarce product is a means whereby society controls the distribution of products whose scarcity could threaten the survival of the group. The group’s survival would be threatened if any individual or subgroup accumulated an excessive amount of key resources such that the rest of the group was deprived. Hence, the principle of reciprocity is established in rules dictating that one must give away one’s own key resources, and receive instead others’.

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The primary example of this rule is the incest taboo, which establishes supra-familial social organization by forcing the family to give up its own reproductive potential and to seek marriage partners from elsewhere. The very purpose of this rule, according to Lévi-Strauss, is to prevent unequal accumulation of women by any one part of society since the unequal distribution of this fundamental resource would threaten the group’s ability to perpetuate itself. The rule manifests itself as a prohibition of marriage within the social space of the exogamous unit. Conversely, exogamous units establish systems of preferential alliance with one another. These preferences do not have the same force as the prohibition, however. Preferences may shift according to particular historical circumstances. Since the main purpose of the system is to prevent unequal accumulation and to maintain matrimonial equilibrium, likewise any changes in the system of marital preferences serves the demands of that equilibrium. The most basic manifestation of these phenomena in actual social institutions is dual organization. According to Lévi-Strauss, Kariera-type four-section systems are merely elaborations on the principle of reciprocity, but they too serve to prevent unequal accumulation and maintain matrimonial equilibrium. Hence, the Panoan variants on Kariera kinship should display these qualities, particularly where systems of restricted exchange are operational, as they are among the Kaxinawa, Katukina, and Marubo. Since the purpose of my fieldwork was to determine to what extent the Marubo were egalitarian, and since Lévi-Strauss assertion that reciprocity is embedded in much of indigenous Amazonian social structure has been used to argue that these societies have an egalitarian essence (Clastres 1974) I wanted to examine the applicability of Lévi-Strauss’ claims to Marubo society. By gathering complete census data for the Marubo and comparing it to Dr. Melatti’s figures from 1974 I hoped to determine whether unequal accumulation was indeed prevented by the Marubo kinship and marriage exchange system. Standing in many ways in opposition to Lévi-Strauss is the concept of a political economy of people suggested by Rivière and developed by Mentore. The basis of this concept is that people are the scarcest and most valued resource in Amazonia. Village size is the main indicator of both wealth and power; the leader of the largest village has the widest range of influence in human terms and the most resources available for economic production and biological reproduction. Therefore, leaders make active efforts to increase the size of their villages. The main method to do this is by the accumulation of affinal links. In other words, village leaders try to attract in-marriers. Interestingly, this is also a major feature of Nambiquara leadership according to David Price. In a political economy of people, unequal accumulation of personnel is the goal, whereas in a Lévi-Straussian structure of reciprocity it is prohibited. Can both these theories be simultaneously true? The data I gathered on Marubo demographics and social dynamics suggests that they can. Upon my return from the field I first compared the relative proportions among exogamous lineages in 1974-75 with those I found in 1997-98. The Marubo have nine exogamous lineages, one of which is dying out. These lineages are divided in two according to the principle of alternating generations. Thus, each lineage becomes two lineages, with membership transmitted from grandmother to grandchild. Although the two lineages thus formed recognize their close kinship by calling one another kokavo (mother’s brothers) they consider themselves emically to be separate and have no name to cover the lineage consisting of both of them. Nevertheless, etically these are a single

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exogamous unit. It is this etic unit, which Melatti (1977) refers to as a ‘cycle’ by analogy with Kariera systems, that I take as the unit of analysis here. However, I refer to it more neutrally as ‘exogamous unit’.

Dr. Melatti collected census data in 1974-5 including the lineage membership of each individual. I did the same in 1997-8. One generation has passed, and the young people who were marrying and having their first children in 1974-5 are watching their eldest children marry and have children now. A comparison shows what effect a generation of marriages and childbirths has had on the relative proportions among classes. If the system prevents any one group from accumulating more than any other group, then relative demographic proportions among exogamous units must remain the same over time. If the prediction of relative-proportion stability holds, then it may be said that the Marubo system has the characteristics of a Lévi-Straussian structure of reciprocity. If true, it would imply that the system does actually preserve the group as a whole by preventing any one part from taking too big a piece of the pie.

Table 1 shows the changes in number of members by exogamous unit from 1974 to 1998. For convenience, the morphemes –nawa- and –vo are ommitted from the clan-names. Table 2 tabulates the numbers from table 1 as percentages of the total population.

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1974-5 1997-8

Class # members Class # members Shane/Isko 88 Shane/Isko 180 Sata/Rovo 60 Wani/Kamã 149 Wani/Kamã 56 Sata/Rovo 131 Vari/Tama 52 Shawã/Isko 121 Shawã/Isko 48 Vari/Tama 106 Rane/Ni 34 Rane/Ni 72 Txona/Isko 24 Ni/Ino 47 Ni/Ino 19 Txona/Isko 44 Ino/Kana 8 Ino/Kana 4 Total 389 Total 857 TABLE 1 Number of members of each Marubo exogamous unit, 1974-5 and 1997-8.

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Class 1974-5 1997-8 Shane/Isko 22.62% 21.00 % Sata/Rovo 15.24% 15.29% Wani/Kamã 14.40% 17.39% Vari/Tama 13.37% 12.37% Shawã/Isko 12.34% 14.12% Rane/Ni 8.74% 8.40% Txona/Isko 6.17% 5.13% Ni/Ino 4.88% 5.49% Ino/Kana 2.06% 0.47% TABLE 2 Percentages of total Marubo population represented by each clan.

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A chi-square goodness-of-fit test shows whether the hypothesis derived from Lévi-Strauss is acceptable given these data. The hypothesis predicts matrimonial equilibrium, signifying that no one group may grow at the expense of others. If Lévi-Strauss is right, we would expect the relative proportions among Marubo classes to remain invariant over time. Since the issue is proportions rather than absolute numbers, percentages will be used as data. We thus set the 1974-5 percentages as the null hypothesis:

H0: Clan percentages in 1997-8=Clan percentages in 1974-5.

Frequency array

Class fe fo χ² Shane/Isko 22.62 21.00 0.12 Sata/Rovo 15.24 15.29 0.00 Wani/Kamã 14.40 17.39 0.62 Vari/Tama 13.37 12.37 0.07 Shawã/Isko 12.34 14.12 0.26 Rane/Ni 8.74 8.40 0.01 Txona/Isko 6.17 5.13 0.18 Ni/Ino 4.88 5.49 0.08 Ino/Kana 2.06 0.47 1.23 Σ 99.82 99.66 2.57 A glance at the “Distribution of χ²” chart tells us that for df=8, 0.98>p>0.95. If H0

is true, then we would expect the percentages recorded in 1997-8 to be identical to those recorded in 1974-5. In fact, they are not, but you could get observed frequencies as deviant as those observed between 95% and 98% of the time by chance alone. If the dying Ino/Kana unit, no longer a functional exchange unit, is excluded from the equation, we get a Σχ²=1.35 for df=7, yielding 0.99>p>0.98, an even stronger result. I must accept H0. The sample data support the hypothesis that relative demographic proportions among Marubo exogamous units remain the same over time. Lévi-Strauss’ interpretive framework is valid for Marubo data.

These data indicate that the Marubo system is at present a structure of reciprocity as described in Lévi-Strauss (1969). The essential feature of structures of reciprocity—the operation of the system to maintain matrimonial equilibrium—is found among the Marubo. The nine exogamous units exchange marriage partners in such a way that no one group grows disproportionately to the rest. This is precisely the feature that Lévi-Strauss suggested acts to ensure group survival. The system links each unit’s survival to the whole. It ensures that each group will be able to marry its members off, so that under favorable demographic conditions many groups grow large conjointly, thus generating a thriving society.

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The findings just presented would in and of themselves invalidate the political economy of people hypothesis vis-à-vis the Marubo were it not for the fact that Marubo marriage classes are not local, residential groups. The political economy of people concept argues that leadership is based on the accumulation of followers. Leaders and would-be leaders actively endeavor to make their own group grow, if necessary at the expense of others. If the exchange of humans among groups follows a structurally encoded system of reciprocity, then there is no way for any group to grow at the expense of any other. If this is true, then the political economy of people cannot exist. In fact, however, it can, because leaders do not lead exogamous units, they lead residential units, and residential units do not fit the predictions of relative-proportion stability. Some leaders’ groups grow while others’ vanish. Data on fluctuations in leader-centered group populations over time are compatible with the political economy of people hypothesis, not the Lévi-Strauss reciprocity framework. The existence of structural reciprocity in Marubo marriage arrangements does not prevent the existence of a political dimension to intergroup variations in demographic growth.

Each shovo (the Marubo residential unit, called in Portuguese the maloca) has a leader, the shovo ivo, “house-owner”. The shovo ivo is responsible for the welfare of the people in his domain and most of them actively seek to foster the growth of their group membership. Leaders and their shovo have had varying fortunes in terms of demographic fluctuation. Over the period of time covered by Dr. Melatti’s data and mine, their followings have not grown in equal proportions—indeed, not all have grown.

At the time of Dr. Melatti’s first census, there were fifteen Marubo population nuclei, of which ten were shovo. Their varying fortunes are shown in table 3.

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TABLE 3 Populations of Marubo shovo, 1974-5 and 1997-8. Shovo ivo Pop., 1974-5 % of Total Pop., 1997-8 % of Total Paulo 39 10.34 49 5.88 Arnaldo 21 5.57 Broken upN.A. José do Nascimento velho 32 8.49 38 4.56 Raimundo Dionísio 22 5.84 55 6.59 Lauro Brasil 17 4.51 64 7.67 Reissamon 26 6.9 40 4.80 Paulino 20 5.31 33 3.96 Américo 23 6.1 38 4.56 Mariano 27 7.16 24 2.88 Carlos 24 6.36 50 6.00 Domingo 23 6.1 Broken upN.A. João Grande/João Pequeno/ Miguel 59 15.65 79 9.47 Aurélio 28 7.43 9 1.08 Vicente 8 2.12 11 1.32 São Salvador 13 3.45 115 13.79

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Table 3 shows that in contrast to exogamous groups, residential groups have differential success in demographic terms. Of course, these data have a significant difference with respect to the data on exogamous units: the number of residential units increases with every incident of fission so that today there are more aldeias than there were 25 years ago. Because of this, the figures for percentage of total in 1997-98 in table 3 do not add up to 100; this made me somewhat uncertain how to proceed with a statistical analysis. However, by inspection it is possible to see significant changes in the relative proportions of the Marubo population occupied by various residential groups. The prediction of relative-proportion stability does not hold for residential units. This means that even though reciprocity seems firmly embedded in the kinship system, and hence in the social structure, inter-group demographic inequalities can and do develop over time. Thus the data indicate that the political economy of people framework may be valid. Lévi-Strauss and Rivière can both be right. Some of my field methods were geared towards determining how intervillage demographic inequalities could develop among the Marubo. I had genealogies and maps showing where everyone was in 1974, and I gathered my own data for 1998. From there, it was simply a matter of asking people how the observed changes had occurred. From the responses to these questions it became quite clear that Marubo leaders and would-be leaders actively endeavor to construct and expand social networks. This result fit my expectations, based on reading the work of prior researchers, of what I would find. David Price (1987) wrote that Nambiquara headmen are actively involved in the expansion of groups by means of arranging marriages and controlling postmarital residence. Jean-Paul Dumont (1978) described how Marquito became a Panare headman by moving to a village which he inherited, then maintaining and expanding it by controlling the postmarital residence of his offspring. And of course, the political economy of people framework suggests that where people are the primary form of wealth, there are efforts directed towards the accumulation of the resource, efforts seen emporocally as actions aimed at expanding the group. All this literature suggests that inequality of access to resources is a primary goal of Amazonian headmen. Many Amazonian headmen’s efforts are geared towards relating to their social networks in such away that the networks get bigger. I found the Marubo to be no exception. Evidence for a Marubo political economy of people can be seen firstly in the phenomenon of invitations to move. The invitation to move was a recurring feature in explanations for why people moved from place to place. Consider the history of the largest Marubo village, aldeia Maronal. The origins of aldeia Maronal are in the shovo numbered 12 to 14 in figure 1. The main leader of these shovo was João Tuxáua. João Tuxáua’s son was Alfredo. Alfredo moved down from the headwaters of the Igarapé Maronal to the Curuçá River to improve his access to non-indigenous areas. Two of his brothers moved with him and together, these families built shovo and cut swiddens. Once they were established, João Tuxáua and those of his sons who had remained in the headwaters moved down to the Curuçá River to join Alfredo. Alfredo then mobilized labor to cut an airstrip at the new settlement. Once the airstrip was cut, Alfredo invited missionaries to establish themselves. The missionaries established a health care program and a literacy program. At this point, Alfredo’s village had better health care and education than any other settlement on the upper Curuçá. At this point, Alfredo issued an invitation to his brother José to move to the village. José’s brother’s wife was sick and

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FIGURE 1: Location of Marubo local groups, 1974-75 (from Melatti 1977).

LEGEND: Ituí River: --Shovo of Lauro Brasil: (1) --Local group consisting shovo of Raimundo Dionísio (2) José do Nascimento Velho (3) Paulo (4) tapiris of Arnaldo (5) --Shovo of Reissamon (6) --Shovo of Paulino (7) --Shovo of Américo (8) --Shovo of Mariano (9) N.B. Triangle=mission, rectangle=airstrip. Curuçá River: --Local group consisting of shovo of Misael (10) and of Domingos (11) --Local group consisting of shovo of João Grande (João Tuxáua) (12) shovo of João Pequeno (13) shovo of Miguel (14) --Shovo of Aurélio (15) --Tapiris of Vicente (16) --Tapiris of Santiago Peruano (17)

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FIGURE 2: Location of Marubo groups in 1998.

Areas where Marubo dwellings exist are marked on the map in violet. Marubo

dwellings were located in four agglomeraions. On the upper Curuçá was the village of

aldeia Maronal, with 12 shovo. On the middle Curuçá was the village of aldeia São

Sebastião, with seven shovo. On the middle Ituí was the village of Rio Novo, with three

shovo. On the upper Ituí there were seven villages with 15 shovo. Scale: 1 cm=87.5 km.

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Figure 3: Schematic layout of shovo at aldeia Maronal, upper Curuçá, January 1998.

Shovo owners Other structures 1. Ivinĩpapa (Alfredo)—headman. F—FUNAI 2. Vasho (Fernando). M—Mission 3. Anĩpa (Aurélio). P—Pista de pouso (airstrip) 4. Vanẽpa (José Barbosa). 5. Wanõpa (Guilherme). 6. Nakwa. 7. Pekõpa (Jaime). 8. Mashẽpa (Antônio). 9. Ivãpa (Vicente). 10. Mayãpa (Jaime). 11. Wasinawa (Isaac). 12. Sinãpa (Alberto).

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Alfredo went upstream to José’s to help in the healing. While he was there, he told José he should move to the village. There’s no access to health care or evacuation, Alfredo said, and if anything serious goes wrong we will be unable to assist you. José and his brother agreed and they relocated to what was now aldeia Maronal. This move added 15 people to aldeia Maronal. At about the same time, Alfredo’s father João Tuxáua invited Wanõpa to move to aldeia Maronal, and Wanõpa agreed, bringing with him a total of thirteen people. The invitation to move has great time-depth in Marubo culture according to oral histories. João Tuxáua, for example, was credited with gathering together the remnants of the Marubo who had been decimated by the rubber boom. The rubber boom seems to have peaked in the Javari basin from 1888 to 1911, bringing with it massive depopulation. towards the end of the rubber boom, João Tuxáua’s father fled with his family and a few others to the headwaters of the Arrojo River, where the rubber-tappers did not penetrate. Soon after, the rubber boom ended. João Tuxáua then traveled throughout the former Marubo area locating small groups of isolated survivors. he invited each group to move to his home in the remote headwaters. Several groups accepted his invitations. The village thereby formed in the 1920s and 1930s was the only Marubo village, and the current Marubo populaton is entirely descended from these survivors. João Tuxáua is thus credited with saving the Marubo from extinction by his successful invitations to move. Further time depth to the cultural practice of invitations to move is provided by the story of Txoki. Txoki is a Marubo leader said to have lived prior to the rubber boom. A very large old swidden is identified as his. Alfredo’s son told me that Txoki had the largest swidden of any Marubo at that time. He held numerous feasts and invited people to move to live with him. These invitations were accepted until Txoki had a substantial village. The occurrence of invitations to move is strong evidence that Marubo leaders actively endeavor to expand their social networks. It should be kept in mind that the invitation to move creates additions to the social network that are larger than those suggested by the literature I reviewed. Price and Mentore suggest that the main means of adding personnel to Nambiquara and Waiwai villages is by the addition of affinal links. But bringing an in-marrier only adds one person to the group. The invitation to move can add as many as fifteen people at once. It is a more powerful technique of demographic expansion than is control over postmarital residence. Certain statements made to me by Alfredo confirm that demographic expansion is an emic Marubo goal. At one point, Alfredo decided he wanted to obtain a circular board-saw. He said he wanted to cut wood and sell it so as to buy a small bulldozer. With the bulldozer he wanted to expand the airstrip to allow larger airplanes to land. He also said that he wanted to expand the paths between shovo until they were wide roads. Then the youth could buy motorcycles to ride around, he said. Once the paths were expanded he wanted to expand the availability of electricity. Currently, a generator had lines reaching three shovo. He wanted electricity to be more widely available. Once all this was accomplished, his village would be like a city, he said. Visitors from the Ituí River would be impressed and would want to move to aldeia Maronal. This last statement shows that Alfredo was consciously planning how to make his village attractive to potential coresidents.

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Alfredo’s statements and the occurrences of invitations to move combine to convince me that Marubo leaders do want to make their groups bigger, and currently some of them want to be unequally successful relative to other leaders. marubo politics involves the construction of demographic inequality. The concept of demographic inequality is not merely an etic construct based on a mathematical analysis of census data; it is an emic aspect of Marubo politics. I examined several possible explanations for the observed demographic inequalities. Polygyny seemed like an obvious possible explanation. I wanted to know if inequalities in access to polygyny could explain the inter-village variations in demographic success. I first asked myself whether polygyny actually produces larger social networks than monogamy. Logically, it should, but I wanted mathematical confirmation. To compare the demographic potential of polygynous and monogamous families, I compiled data on men whose family growth can be traced from the 1974 census to the 1998 census. To be included, a man must have been married in 1974-75 and still be alive in 1997-98. I counted the number of children of these marriages who were alive and identifiable in 1998. This gave me a sense of the long-term demographic potential of polygyny as opposed to monogamy. I further narrowed the sample to the Curuçá River because difficulties in tracking children from census to census on the Ituí River led me to conclude that my Ituí data would be unreliable for this particular purpose. The end result was a database consisting of 21 men who were married in 1974-75 and are still alive today. Of these, seven have been married to more than one woman simultaneously. The results are presented in table 3. Table 3 shows that polygyny is not produces extremely unequal results at the family level. The most children any monogamous man had was eight, and the least children any polygynous man had was eight, so the largest family a monogamous man can hope to have is the same as the smallest family a polygynous man can expect to have. The men who have the largest families are all polygynous; the men who have the smallest families are all monogamous. The implications are clear: polygyny creates inequalites in size of social network at the family level. Men who have multiple wives simultaneously end up with larger families than men who don’t. The issue now is, are variations in village size explicable by reference to variations in the frequency of polygynous marriage?

To check for correlations between polygyny and relatively high demographic growth, I modified the data compiled in table 2. That table showed the populations of Marubo shovo in 1974-75 and of the same groups in 1997-98, and rendered the population figures as percentages of the total population. As a measure of relative growth, I used the difference between a group’s 1997-98 percentage of the total population and that same group’s 1974-75 percentage of the total population. The results are shown in table 4. Only three of the local groups in existence in 1974-75 have increased their size as a relative proportion of the total population, whereas eleven have increased their absolute numbers.

Table 4 shows that the groups which have grown the most unequally are not the groups with the most polygyny. The group at that was at São Salvador in 1974-75 (at São Sebastião by 1997-98) has grown the most of all. However, this group started out with no polygynous marriages; the two polygynous marriages I recorded in my census—those of Clóvis and of Cassimiro—were demographically insignificant. The growth of this settlement is to be attributed to other factors, which I will discuss below. Likewise,

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TABLE 3: Number of children of polygynous and monogamous men on the Curuçá River, 1974-1998. Name Marital Status # Children Alfredo Polygynous 13 Wanõpa Polygynous 13 Sinãpa Polygynous 12 José Barbosa Polygynous 11 Cassimiro Polygynous 9 Misael Polygynous 8 Carlos Polygynous 8 Joãozinho Monogamous 8 Wasamashẽpa Monogamous 8 Zacarias Monogamous 7 Shetãpa Monogamous 7 Saide Monogamous 7 Võpa Monogamous 6 Aurélio Monogamous 6 Ivãpa Monogamous 5 Panĩpa Monogamous 4 César Monogamous 4 Miguel Monogamous 4 Menẽpa Monogamous 4 Okãpa Monogamous 2 Lauro Monogamous 1

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TABLE 4.: Relative demographic growth correlated with polygyny. Group Change in relative #polygynous #polygynous percentage of population, marriages, marriages, 1974-5 to 1997-8 1974-5 1997-98 São Salvador +10.34 0 2 Lauro Brasil +3.16 1 1 Raimundo Dionisio +0.75 1 2 Carlos -0.36 3 1 Vicente -0.80 0 0 Paulino -1.35 0 0 Américo -1.54 1 2 Reissamon -2.10 2 2 José Nascimento velho -3.93 4 2 Mariano -4.28 0 0 Paulo -4.46 1 1 João Grande/João Pequeno/Miguel -6.18 2 1 Aurélio -6.35 0 0

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the settlement of Lauro Brasil, today a three-shovo village called aldeia Alegria, has grown from 17 people to 64, with only a single polygynous marriage (that of Lauro). The group with the most polygynous marriages, that of José Nascimento velho, is in the bottom half of the proportional growth list. In contrast, two groups without polygynous marriage—those of Vicente and of Paulino—stand in the top half of the list. On the other hand, polygyny has some effect: for example, the four groups which enjoyed the least proportional growth are groups with one or no polygynous marriages; all the groups which have actually enjoyed an increase in relative proportion of the total population are groups with one or two polygynous marriages; and all the groups with at least two polygynous marriages have enjoyed an increase in absolute if not relative numbers. These figures show that polygyny may have some effect in the development of demographic inequalities among Marubo groups, but it is not the only factor, nor even the most important one. Some of the observed variations in demographic success can be explained by reference to variations in control over postmarital residence. This means of producing social networks is the main one pointed out by previous writers on this topic. Given that demographic expansion is a major goal of Marubo leaders, it would be unsurprising if they showed a great deal of concern with the determination of postmarital residence, as do Nambiquara, Panare, and Waiwai leaders. In fact, I found numerous examples of leaders showing great concern with the issue. An exchange system should be either uxorilocal or virilocal so that whatever one gives one receives from elsewhere. But I found that although many people accepted that to receive they must give, some leaders tried to have their cake and eat it too by combining uxorilocality of women with virilocality of men—one of the strategies employed by Marquito in The Headman and I. To understand how some men are able to acompish this requires in-depth analysis of particular cases. What is significant here is not how it is accomplished, but rather the fact that there are indeed variations in control over postmarital residence. It is necessary to determine whether these variations have an effect in producing the demographic inequalities that emerged in Marubo society from 1974 to 1998. To evaluate the extent to which leaders’ varying control over postmarital residence affects their groups’ size, I selected the seven groups which existed on the upper Ituí River in 1974-75 and still remained there in 1997-98. There are several reasons for this choice of sample. First, Marubo groups on the Curuçá River have been subject to other means of production of the social network which I will discuss below; control over postmarital residence will not explain the development, for example, of aldeia São Sebastião on the middle Curuçá nor of aldeia Maronal. Second, the groups of the upper Ituí run the gamut of demographic success (see table 4), from Lauro Brasil’s successful group, now aldeia Alegria (+3.16% change in relative percentage of Marubo population), to Mariano’s unsuccessful group (-4.28% change in relative percentage of Marubo population). And, since many of the marriages on the upper Ituí are with other people in that same area, much (though by no means all) of the variation in control over postmarital residence reflects a zero-sum game being played among leaders vying for control over limited resources. The results of the data analysis are shown in table 5. Table 5 shows that variations in control of postmarital residence have a major impact on the development of demographic inequalities among upper Ituí Marubo groups. The purpose of this table is to tabulate the incidents of reproductive association

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that have occurred in a group and to determine if those associations have resulted in gains or losses for the group. The key figure to note is the difference between RA+ and RA-, which is the difference between the gains and losses through postmarital residence. All the cases of RA+ are cases where a member of the group has attracted a spouse. Next to the figures for RA+ are those for long-term effects of these marriages, which I have abbreviated RA+LTE. This figure represents the results of RA+ in terms of children, children’s spouses and children’s children that have accrued to the group thanks to the marriages represented by RA+. Conversely, the category RA- represents individuals who have left the group to marry elsewhere. Under RA-LTE I have calculated the long-term effect of losses through postmarital residence. This figure represents the total number of children, children’s spouses, and children’s children produced by individuals who have left the group to marry elsewhere. These are gains which have accrued to other groups, but which could have accrued to the group in question if the marriage had resulted in someone coming into the group rather than going out of it. The category of RA0 is more varied than the previous two. Under RA0 are all reproductive associations which have not resulted in the departure or arrival of either of the two people involved. Many of these are women who have had children out of wedlock. These women do not bring in husbands, but they do produce modest demographic gains for the group. Also under RA0 are some natolocal marriages, some of which are very demographically productive. Finally, there are widows and divorcées who have returned to their natal home. Under RA0LTE I calculated the long-term effects of the associations represented by RA0. Thus, after the death of a man in the group of Raimundo Dionísio, his widow returned with her five children and three grand-children to her natal group, that of José Nascimento. This event is recorded as RA0 for both groups, with a +8 to the RA0LTE for José Nascimento and a –8 to the RA0LTE of Raimundo Dionísio, because the children produced by the marriage wound up adding to the population of José’s group. The figures in table 5 show that the groups which have gained the most are those for which ((RA+)-(RA-))>2. These are groups whose gains through postmarital residence are greater than their losses through postmarital residence, and for which this difference is greater than it is for any of the other groups in the sample. Another feature which distinguishes the top two groups is that their RA- is lower than that of groups 3 through 7, and their RA-LTE is small compared to groups 3 through 7. If groups 3 through 7 had been able to control postmarital residence to the degree to which groups 1 and 2 did, then they would not have lost ground in terms of relative proportion of the Marubo population. This tells us that groups which have prospered demographically have managed to maximize the reproductive potential they had in 1974-75 by minimizing the flow of marriage partners out of this group. The total Marubo population can be likened to the market for a particular product such as soft drinks. In the world economy, corporations compete for a market share whose overall size is limited. Each corporation’s market share increases or decreases relative to others, but the total always remains 100%. In the Marubo case, many new coresident groups have emerged over the past generation, and each has come to represent a percentage of the population, which makes it hard for the older groups to hold on to or increase their ‘market share’ of the population. In table 4 the older groups (the only

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TABLE 5: Effects of control over postmarital residence on development of demographic inequalities among upper Ituí Marubo groups. Group #RA #RA+ RA+LTE #RA- RA-LTE #RA0 RA0LTE 1. Lauro Brasil 17/4.51→64/7.67 16 5 +14 2 -3 4 +14 2. Raimundo Dionísio 22/5.84→55/6.59 15 6 +24 2 -2 8 +24 3. Paulino 20/5.31→33/3.96 10 4 +10 3 -10 3 +10 4. Américo 23/6.1→38/4.56 16 6 +22 8 -43 1 +2 5. Reissamon 26/6.9→40/4.8 10 4 +19 4 -24 2 +3 6. José Nascimento velho 32/8.49→38/4.56 11 5 +14 4 -44 2 +10 7. Mariano 27/7.16→24/2.88 12 4 +19 7 -38 1 -10 Abbreviations RA---------------Reproductive associations RA+ -------------Reproductive associations resulting in gain to group RA- -------------Reproductive associations resulting in loss to group RA0 ------------Reproductive associations resulting in neither gain nor loss to group LTE -------------Long-term effects The figures under each group leader’s name represent the total number of inhabitants from 1974-75 followed by the percentage of the total Marubo poulation in 1974-75, then after the arrow the total number of inhabitants and the percentage of the total Marubo population in 1997-98.

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ones for whom data on change in ‘market share’ over time are available) are listed in order in terms of the change in their ‘market share’ from 1974 to 1998. Except for the village of São Salvador/São Sebastião, whose extraordinary growth will be explained below, the only two groups that have gained ‘market share’ were that of Lauro Brasil (later aldeia Alegria) and that of Raimundo Dionísio. Table 5 shows that these two groups share certain characteristics which set them apart from other groups. Both of the groups that have increased their share have (1) controlled postmarital residence of their members to a greater extent than have other groups, and (2) have maximized the potential for growth inherent to their 1974 composition. Characteristic (1) can be seen by calculating ((RA+)-(RA-)), which is >2 only among the two groups that have gained the most, showing that the groups that have gained the most are also those who have exercised greatest control over postmarital residence. Characteristic (2) can be seen by looking at the figures for RA-LTE. Each of the upper Ituí groups had, in 1974, a certain potential for growth. In the case of groups which exercised control over the postmarital residence of their members, most of that potential has remained in the group, contributing to their relatively elevated demographic growth. In the case of groups that have exercised less control over their members’ postmarital residence, much of that potential has wound up elsewhere. This effect can be quantified as a figure I call ‘retention of potential’, or RP. This figure is calculated by first adding up all the long-term effects of reproductive associtions (RA+LTE, RA-LTE, and RA0LTE), all rendered as positive numbers and added together, signifying the total results of growth from the basic potential extant in 1974, then taking the positive numbers as a percentage of the total. Thus, the total long-term effects of reproductive associations of Lauro Brasil’s 1974 group is 14+3+14, or 31. Of these, only 3 have accrued to other groups (negative numbers), while 28 have remained with Lauro (positive numbers). By dividing 28/31, we arrive at a RP (potential retention) figure of 90.3% for this group. Raimundo Dionísio’s group’s RP is 96% (48/50); Paulino’s group’s RP is 66.7% (20/30); Américo’s group’s RP is 35.8% (24/65), Reissamon’s group’s RP is 47.8% (22/46); José Nascimento’s group’s RP is 35.2% (24/68), and Mariano’s group’s RP is 28.4% (19/67). Thus, the only groups in the sample that have gained population ‘market share’ can once again be shown mathematically to share a demographic trait: RP>90%. I conclude that control over postmarital residence is a key factor in explaining the unequal demographic success of upper Ituí Marubo groups over the past generation. The groups that have gained in relative percentage of total population are the only ones with ((RA+)-(RA-))>2 and RP>90%. Although the most demographically successful groups share characteristics when analyzed mathematically, in fact the leaders have employed somewhat different strategies to achieve that success. The shovo of Raimundo Dionísio has been involved in a Kariera-type exchange system with other shovo at aldeia Vida Nova. This system has included several natolocal marriages, several gains to the group, and not many losses. In contrast, the group of Lauro Brasil has not been involved in any strict Kariera-type exchange system; rather, they have successfully combined uxorilocality of women with virilocality of men. These two different strategies have worked very well for both groups, although Lauro’s has been somewhat more successful. The Kariera system tends to distribute people equally among groups, theoretically allowing each group to grow at a rate equal to others’, which is exactly what happened to Raimundo Dionísio (minimal change of

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+0.75% in relative percentage of total population). Combining virilocality of men with uxorilocality of women, in contrast, must result in unequally superior gains for the group which successfully practices this strategy, and that is what happened to Lauro Brasil’s group (gain of +3.16% in relative percentage of total population, one of the largest gains). I conclude that variations in control over postmarital residence is a significant explanation for the development of demographic inequalities on the Ituí River. Other than control over postmarital residence, the variable that has the most value for explaining the data on development of Marubo intergroup demographic differences is that of type of relation to nonindigenous people. There is clear evidence that among the Marubo, access to valued relations with non-indigenous people serves as a means of production of the social network. Such relations are highly sought after by Marubo groups and certain types of relation to non-indigenous people serve as demographic attraction points. Evidence of this comes from: (1) aldeia Maronal, where the headman has used an airstrip and mission to attract a large village; (2) aldeia São Salvador/São Sebastião, which formed around a FUNAI post; (3) aldeia Rio Novo, which also formed around a FUNAI post; (4) aldeia Vida Nova, which formed around a New Tribes mission; and (5) the case of Clóvis’ polygyny. All these are situations in which relationships to non-indigenous people have served as a means of production of the social network. The connection between relations to non-indigenous people and production of social networks has already been established in chapters five and six. Here it is necessary only to recontextualize those data. In chapter six I analyzed Marubo relationships to non-indigenous people, focusing on aldeia Maronal. I described how Alfredo Barbosa had an airstrip built, then invited the New Tribes mission to the village. This brought education and health care to aldeia Maronal. In chapter five I described how Alfredo was able to use the mission’s presence to issue invitations to move and attract more residents to his village. Putting these data together, I must conclude that what propelled the transformation of Alfredo’s settlement from a pair of related shovo to a large multi-shovo village was Alfredo’s ability to attract the mission, which in turn rendered his village attractive to potential coresidents and allowed him to render successful invitations to move. Subsequent to the attraction of his brother José and of his affine Wanõpa, Alfredo continued to make his village more attractive via relations to non-indigenous people. He had the wood cut to buy the generator, and acquired the television and satellite dish. In interviews, Alfredo stated explicitly that one of his goals was to make his village more attractive so that people would want to move there. The establishment of aldeia São Salvador, aldeia Rio Novo, and aldeia Vida Nova followed a pattern similar but not identical to that of aldeia Maronal. In all these cases, types of relationships to non-indigenous people became attractive foci for demographic relocation. These processes were described in chapter five. In the case of aldeia São Salvador, now São Sebastião, the location of a FUNAI post became a focus for the relocation of a number of subgroups from the upper Curuçá and, later, the Ituí River. That is what allowed the village to grow at a rate so unequally fast relative to other Marubo settlements (see Table 8.4.). It was not internal processes such as polygyny and control of postmarital residence that allowed for that growth; it was the fact that FUNAI was promising a never-ending flow of education, health care, and metal goods. Aldeia Rio Novo emerged for similar reasons—the establishment of a FUNAI post. In both

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these cases the FUNAI post was eventually removed, but the villages did not break up. Access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people was the main reason behind the changes of residence which resulted in the formation of both villages. That is also the case with aldeia Vida Nova. Aldeia Vida Nova was formed when the New Tribes mission established itself on the upper Ituí and a number of coresident groups relocated to live near it. These groups became aldeia Vida Nova. The similarity between these three cases and that of aldeia Maronal is that in all four cases relationships to non-indigenous people serve as means of production of the social network. The difference is that in the case of aldeia Maronal the non-indigenous people were brought in by a Marubo leader and then used as a means of attracting others. In the other three cases, the non-indigenous people moved independently, and Marubo groups moved towards them without any invitation by an indigenous leader. Further evidence making relationships to non-indigenous people a means of production of the social network comes from the case of Clóvis’ polygyny. I noted that the way Clóvis entered polygyny was unusual in that he came from a spatially disrupted and socio-demographically poor family group. He was not in an exchange system, had no elders to negotiate for him, and no future marriage partners in the group to negotiate with, anyway. Instead, the father of his two wives was (according to Clóvis) motivated to allow polygyny in order to secure Clóvis’ valuable relations to non-indigenous people. I noted earlier that polygyny is a somewhat rare privilege (only 15.7% of Marubo men are polygynous), and that polygyny confers upon its practitioners unequal ability to produce a social network, as demonstrated by the fact that the largest family a monogamous man can be expected to have is equal to the smallest family a polygynous man can be expected to have. Therefore, since Clóvis accessed polygyny by means of creating relationships to non-indigenous people that are valuable to his wives’ father, those relationships have helped give Clóvis unequal access to the means of production of the social network. From these five cases I conclude that the establishment of valuable relationships to non-indigenous people does serve as a significant means of production of the social network in Marubo society. One of the key data from Table 3 is thereby explained—the relatively explosive growth of aldeia São Salvador into the modern-day aldeia São Sebastião. The emergence of aldeia Maronal as the largest Marubo village also has a great deal to do with the fact that headman Alfredo was able to provide attractive foci of non-indigenous activity, giving greater appeal to his invitations to move. Control over valuable relationships to non-indigenous people thus allows the controller to attract others as coresidents or in some other way to unequally access the means of production of the social network. Before moving on to analyze other means of production of the social network, it is necessary to specify the significance of these results in terms of the effect of an exchange-based kinship structure on the potential for political inequality. In the study of lowland South American groups, the notions of marriage exchange and egalitarian politics have been linked together since the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss. Lévi-Strauss identified the kinship systems of lowland South America as elementary structures of kinship, and argued that they operated to cause exchanges among groups, and that these exchanges had the quality of maintaining equilibrium among groups. But Lévi-Strauss went further. Having established reciprocity as a feature of the kinship system he argued that this was a basic organizational principle of such societies, affecting their economic

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systems, and spreading to the political sphere. This notion is not compatible with the Marubo data, which indicate that reciprocity in the kinship sphere does not correlate with reciprocity in the political sphere. In chapter eight I showed that the Marubo kinship system did have the quality of distributing marriage partners equally among all exogamous units, just as Lévi-Strauss’ theories predicted. However, I also showed that political units did not have the same properties as kinship units. In this chapter, I have sought an explanation for this distinction. I have shown that although kinship units have all had identical levels of success in growth, political units have had very different levels of success and failure. I conclude that just because a society has an elementary structure of kinship generating reciprocity at the kinship level, that reciprocity does not necessarily operate on the political level. Kinship units do not vary their relative proportion of the total population; political units do. Leaders actively endeavor to make their groups bigger than others’. The presence of a reciprocal exchange system among kinship units does not necessarily imply political egalitarianism.