Marcos v Manglapus - Estrada v Arroyo _ Executive _ Sept 5

8/4/2019 Marcos v Manglapus - Estrada v Arroyo _ Executive _ Sept 5

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Marcos v. Manglapus

FACTS:

February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent

“people power” revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared

President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But

Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the

stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning

to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and

his family.

Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under

the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, norshall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall

not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be

impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be

provided by law.

Furthermore, they contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of

the Marcoses because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor may the

President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance

the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the

government, there must be legislation to that effect.

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family

to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders

of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the

Philippines, provides:

Article 12

1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to

liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.



2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are

provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public

health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights

recognized in the present Covenant.

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from

returning to the Philippines.

• Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose’s to the

Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

HELD:

SC well-considered opinion that the President has a residual power which justifies her act of

banning the return of the Marcoses and she did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of

discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present

time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and

in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the

Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would

normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one’s country, a totally

distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel.

Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state,the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one’s country as separate and distinct rights.

The Declaration speaks of the “right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of

each state” [Art. 13(l)] separately from the “right to leave any country, including his own, and to

return to his country.” [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the “right to

liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence” [Art. 12(l)] and the right to “be free

to leave any country, including his own.” [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such

laws as “are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter

qqqs own country” of which one cannot be “arbitrarily deprived.” [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore

be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one’s country in the same

context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of

Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-

considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of

international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the

Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different



protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being

“arbitrarily deprived” thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the

President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive

power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific

powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of

specific powers so enumerated.

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good

against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President’s residual

power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as

steward of the people.

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that “[t]he prime duty of the Government

is to serve and protect the people” and that “[t]he maintenance of peace and order, theprotection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for

the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.” [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the

peace. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the

commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and

internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in

times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining

peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the

horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the

commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration

of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-

Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order

and security.

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged

from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao,

rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men,police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts

of the Marcose’s and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this

ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only

exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.



The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action

against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become

serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The

preservation of the State the fruition of the people’s sovereignty is an obligation in the highest

order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful

execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the

hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their

close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to

destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in

its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.

Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the

excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development

and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting

precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of

judicial notice

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In Re Bermudez

Facts:

This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the petitioner Bermudez seeking for the

clarification of Sec. 5, Art. 18 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, as quoted:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the

February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to

noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall

be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

Petitioner sought the aid of the Court to determine as to whom between the incumbent

Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel and elected Pres. Marcos and VP Tolentino the said provision refers

to.

Issue: Whether the Court should entertain the petition for declaratory relief?

Held:

It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.

(Note: ROC provides that the jurisdiction for petitions for declaratory relief is with the RTC )

More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of

the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent



Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their

incumbency and tenure.

It being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the

Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-

President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their

term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of election

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Soliven v. Makasiar

FACTS:This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional TrialCourt of ManilaISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were

filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still underreview by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President

2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were

violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personallyexamining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause

3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate

criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavitDECISION:Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of thepublic respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is LIFTED.RATIO:Background of the first issue

• MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration• APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran wasdenied by the Secretary of Justice

• MAY 2, 1988: On appeal , the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed theresolution of the Secretary of Justice

• MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive SecretaryPetitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a “Motionto Declare Proceedings Closed”, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint by filingcounter-affidavits.Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually filehis counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. Allthat is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-

affidavits if he is so minded.Second issueThis calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest:Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effectsagainst unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be

inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause tobe determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to besearched and the persons or things to be seized.



Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine thecomplainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrantsof arrests.-However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of theissuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is notrequired to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personallyevaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding theexistence of probable cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’sreport and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him inarriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.Third issuePetitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of hercomplaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing herunder the trial court’s jurisdiction. àThis would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit , as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself topossible contempt of court or perjury.-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be

invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf.-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the President’s prerogative.It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothingin our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).Additional Issue:Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chillingeffect” on press freedom.-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the

“chilling effect” point.

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Clinton v JonesBrief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Paula Jones Corbin (Respondent), filed a complaintcontaining four counts against the Petitioner, President Clinton (Petitioner), alleging thePetitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The United States Constitution (Constitution) does not automaticallygrant the President of the United States immunity from civil lawsuits based upon his privateconduct unrelated to his official duties as President.

Facts. The Respondent filed a complaint against the Petitioner alleging that the Petitioner madeunwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas. The Petitionerfiled motions asking the district court to dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunityand to prohibit the Respondent from re-filing the suit until after the end of his presidency. The

district court rejected the presidential immunity argument, but held that no trial would take placeuntil the Petitioner was no longer president. Both parties appealed to the United States SupremeCourt (Supreme Court), which granted certiorari.

Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his presidency for actions thatoccurred before the tenure of his presidency and that were not related to official duties of thepresidency?



Held. Affirmed.The President of the United States can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure for actions notrelated to his official duties as President.It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to order a stay of this lawsuit until after thePresident’s tenure. The District Court’s decision to order a stay was premature and a lengthy andcategorical stay takes no account whatsoever of the Respondent’s interest in bringing the suit totrial.Concurrence. It is important to recognize that civil lawsuits could significantly interfere with thepublic duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that ordinary case-managementprinciples were likely to prove insufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits, unless supplementedwith a constitutionally based requirement that district courts schedule proceedings so as to avoidsignificant interference with the President’s ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities.

Discussion. A sitting President of The United States does not have immunity from civil lawsuitsbased on the President’s private actions unrelated to his public actions as President. The doctrineof separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against thePresident until he leaves office. The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with theallocation of official power among the three co-equal branches of government.

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Neri v. Blue Ribbon Committee

April 21, 2007 – DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and servicesfor the NBN Project amounting to P16 Billion. The project was to be financed by the People’sRepublic of China

Petitioner was summoned by respondents to appear and testify in the investigation on the NBNProject on a number of dates, however, he attended only on the Sept. 26 hearing.

Sept. 18, 2007 – businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officialsand power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the Project initiallyapproved as a Build-Operate-Transfer project, but on March 29, 2007, NEDA acquiesced to

convert it into a government-to-government project to be financed through a loan from theChinese government.

Sept. 26, 2007 – petitioner testified before respondent Committees for 11 hours. He disclosedthat COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approvalof the project, and he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt. When probed furtheron what they discussed, petitioner refused to answer 3 questions, invoking “executive privilege”:

- WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project- WON she directed him to prioritize it- WON she directed him to approve

Respondents issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, requiring petitioner to appear and testify onNov. 20, 2007. However, a Letter (Nov. 15, 2007) by Executive Secretary Ermita requested

respondents to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of “executive privilege” thatcovers above questions, maintaining that the confidentiality of conversations of the President isnecessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process and for theprotection of the public interest – disclosure of information might impair our diplomatic andeconomic relations with China.

Nov. 22, 2007 – respondents issued the Show Cause Letter requiring him to explain why heshould not be cited in contempt.



On Nov. 29, petitioner replied that it was not his intention to ignore the hearing and he thoughtthe only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. Hefurther requested to be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify. In a letter byhis counsel, it was stated that it was upon the order of the President that he did not appear, andthat the conversation with the president dealt with delicate and sensitive national security anddiplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal.

Jan. 30, 2008 – respondents found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory, and withoutresponding to his reply, issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his arrest anddetention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he gives his testimony.

The parties were directed to manifest to the Court if they were amenable to the Court’s proposalof allowing petitioner to immediately resume his testimony before the respondents to answerother questions without prejudice to the decisions on the merits of this petition Senatedisagreed.

OSG – Motion for Leave to Intervene:- Communications between petitioner and President are covered by the executive privilege.- Petitioner was not summoned by respondent in accordance with the power to inquiries in aid of

legislation as laid down in Sec. 21, Art. 6, Constitution and Senate v. Ermita

March 6, 2008 – President Arroyo issued Memorandum Ciruclar No. 151, revoking EO 464 andMemorandum Circular N. 108, advising officials and employees to abide by the Consitution,existing laws and jurisprudence (Senate v. Ermita) when they are invited to legislative inquiriesin aid of legislation.

*Sec. 21, Art. 6 of Constitution – Legislative powers of Congress – relates to the power toconduct inquiries in aid of legislation – aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation– can compel the appearance of executive officials*Sec. 22, Art. 6 of Constitution – Oversight powers of Congress – relates to the power toconduct a question hour – to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function –cannot compel the appearance of executive officials

*Principle of Separation of Powers- executive branch cannot frustrate power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with itsdemands of information- power of judicial review is available – right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislationis susceptible to abuse subject to certiorari (Sec. 1, Art. 8, Constitution)

Issues and Ratio:

1. WON the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by Executive Privilege. (YES.2 reasons)

*Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation – broad – legislative cannot legislatewisely/effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is

intended to affect/change compulsory process to enforce it – limitations – validity: done inaccordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and the rights of personsappearing/affected be respected. Such power extends to executive officials and exemption canonly be through a valid claim of executive privilege.

a. There is a recognized claim of executive privilege despite revocation of EO 464.

Concept of executive privilege has constitutional underpinnings.



US v. Nixon – public interest: preserve confidentiality of conversations that take place in thePresident’s performance of his official duties (presidential communications privilege) –President’s generalized interest in confidentiality – provide him and those who assist him withfreedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions.In Re: Sealed Case – 2 kinds of executive privilege: (1) Presidential communications privilege –communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making anddeliberations which President believes should remain confidential – decision making of thePresident (separation of powers) (2) Deliberative process privilege – advisory opinions,recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmentaldecisions and policies are formulated – decision-making of the Executive Officials (common lawprivilege). The officials covered by the former are those functions that form the core of presidential authority that are “quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power” (commander in chief power, appointment/removal power, power to grant pardons/reprieves, etc)Courts ruled that Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal military/statesecrets, identity of government informers, information related to pending information and foreignrelations. Chavez v. PCGG – secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters.Chavez v. PEA – Presidential conversations, correspondences in closed-door Cabinet meetings

SC: Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that thecommunications elicited by the 3 questions fall under the conversation and correspondence

between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-makingprocess – disclosure might impair diplomatic & economic relations with People’s Republic of China (Presidential Communications Privilege and Executive Privilege on matters relating toDiplomacy or Foreign Relations)- communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power (enter into an executive

agreement w/ other countries w/o concurrence w/ Legislature)- communications are received by a close advisor of the President (operational proximity test –

petitioner is a member of the cabinet)- no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege. No

categorical explanation from respondents to show a compelling need for the answers to thequestions, and veer more towards exercise of legislative oversight function (Sec. 22, Art. 6)

Respondents: a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible disclosure of a

crime/wrongdoing (US v Nixon – specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial outweighsPresident’s interest in confidentiality)SC: information in this case is elicited not in a criminal proceeding but a legislative inquiry. Thevalidity of exectuve privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but also on the proceduralsetting/context which the claim is made.

Respondent: the grant of executive privilege violates constitutional provisions on the right of thepeople to information on matters of public concern (Sec. 7, Art. 3, Constitution)SC: Petitioner made himself available to them during the Sept. 26 hearing, questioned for 11hours, and expressly manifested willingness to answer more questions except the 3 covered byexecutive privilege. People’s right to information is limited by law (RA 6713, Sec. 7; RPC, Art.229; RA 3019, Sec. 3(k); and Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 24 (e)). The information in this caseis classified as confidential wherein there is public interest in its confidentiality. Not every

legislative inquiry is an exercise of people’s right to information.

b. The claim of executive privilege is properly invoked.

The letter (Nov. 17, 2007) of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement for a formalclaim of executive privilege (a precise and certain reason for preserving confidentiality). It servesas the formal claim of privilege: “this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege (Secretary v. Ermita), and the Office of the President has advised Sec. Neriaccordingly… The information if disclosed might impair diplomatic and economic relations withPeople’s Republic of China.” The grounds were specific enough so as not to leave respondent in



the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. Congress must notrequire the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compeldisclosure of information which the privilege sought to protect – respect to a co-equaldepartment.

2. WON respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the ContemptOrder.

YES. 5 reasons:- There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege therefore the Order suffers from

constitutional infirmity- Committees did not comply with the requirement (Senate v. Ermita) that the invitations should

contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the inquiry”, “the usual indication of thesubject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof”. Compliance isimperative, both under Sec. 21 and 22 of Art. 6 of Constitution, to ensure rights of personsappearing and affected by the inquiry are respected.

- It is revealed in the transcript that the proceeding on Jan. 30, 2008 had only a minority of themembers of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee present during the deliberation (7 only). Sec.18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that a vote of majority of its members may punish any witness for contempt. Members who did not actuallyparticipate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order, and its validity isdoubted. Sen. Pimentel insisted that the quorum of the committee was only 2 and that the willof the lead committee prevails over all the other.

- The Court finds merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent violated Sec. 21, Art. 6 of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure”, which the respondents failed to meet therefore its hearings were procedurallyinfirm.

- Respondents’ issuance of the contempt Order were arbitrary and precipitate because it did notpass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform the petitioner of their ruling, curtlydismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order. Petitioner wasnot an unwilling witness and manifested his willingness to testify. Respondents denied him dueprocess of law.

Court was also accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty when it required partiesto consider a proposal that would lead to a possible compromise it was only to test a tool thatother jurisdictions find to be effective in settling similar cases to avoid a piecemeal considerationof the questions for review. Much of this spirit of compromise is reflected in the generality of language foundi n the Constitution (US v. American Tel. & Tel Co.).

Judgment: Petition Granted. Contempt Order Nullified.

Dissent: Puno, J.

- The principle of separation of powers is not absolute –a hermetic sealing off of the 3 branchesof government from one another would preclude the establishment of a nation capable of governing itself effectively.

-System of checks and balances – the power of congressional oversight – to enhance itsunderstanding of and influence over implementation of legislation it has enacted review/investigation of executive branch action by legislature’s corollary power of investigation.Standard justification: presumed need for new/remedial legislation (investigations in aid of legislation)

- Legislative power of investigation includes power of contempt or process to enforce (Arnault v.Nazareno) – incidental to/implied in legislative function –cannot legislate wisely/effectively inthe absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended toaffect/change



- 2 requirements for the valid exercise of power of investigation and contempt of witness forcontumacy: existence of a legislative purpose (in aid of legislation) and pertinency of thequestion propounded.

- Validity of the claim of executive privilege depends on the ground invoked to justify it and thecontext in which it is made.

- Presidential communications are presumptively privileged. To overcome the presumption, there

must be sufficient showing/demonstration of specific need for the withheld information. 2standards: evidentiary and constitutional.- Function Impairment Test – the Court weighs how the disclosure of the withheld information

would impair the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duties more than nondisclosurewould impair other branch’s ability to perform its constitutional functions.

- The SC cannot assess the validity of the claim of the Executive Secretary because paucity of explanation on on how diplomatic secrets will be exposed at the expense of our nationalinterest if petitioner answers disputed questions. SC cannot determine whether there isreasonable danger if petitioner answers – Court cannot engage in guesswork.

- It is self-evident that the assailed questions are pertinent to the subject matter of legislativeinvestigation and have direct relation to the subject and pending Senate bills.

- Petitioner: respondents were seeking to establish the culpability of the President or theanomalies in the NBN-ZTE Contract. SC: motive of the Senate Committees in conducting theirinvestigation is beyond the purview of the Court’s power of judicial review – questions arepertinent and there is no effective substitute for the information sought.

- Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is assailed as invalid for

failure to be republished – not a continuing body – membership changes every 3 years(election) Senators have traditionally considered the Senate as a continuing body despite thechange of part of its membership after an election – does not cease its labor, Committeescontinue their work. By tradition, custom and practice, the Senate does not republish its rulesespecially when the same has not undergone any material change. Existing rules which havealready undergone publication should be deemed adopted and continued regardless of electionof new members. Internal rules – respect for co-equal branch.

- Respondent Senate Committees have good reasons in citing Neri for contempt for failing toappear on Nov. 20 hearing. There is no basis for petitioner and Executive Secretary to assumethat petitioner’s further testimony will be limited only ton the 3 disputed questions.

[SEE ORIG COPY, 1ST PAR. OF HIS DISSENT ONPUNO’S NORTH STAR…]- The doctrine of executive privilege is tensionbetween disclosure and secrecy in ademocracy. Its doctrinal recognition in thePhilippines finds its origin in the US politicaland legal system and literature. At the outset,it is worth noting that the provisions of the USConsti say little about government secrecy orpublic access. In contrast, the 1987 Consti isreplete with provisions on governmenttransparency, accountability and disclosure of info. This is a reaction to our years under

martial rule when the workings of governmentwere veiled in secrecy.- The boundaries established by the Constidelineating the powers of the 3 branches mustbe fashioned according to common sense andthe necessities of governmental coordination.This Constitutional design requires an internalbalancing mechanism by which governmentpowers cannot be abused. We married all these



ideas in Angara v. Electoral Commission(1936).- There are 2 requirements for the validexercise of the legislative power of investigation and contempt of witness forcontumacy: 1st, the existence of a

legislative purpose, i.e., the inquiry must be

in aid of legislation, and 2nd, the pertinencyof the question propounded.There is legislative purpose when the subjectmatter of the inquiry is one over whichthe legislature can legislate, such as theappropriation of public funds; and the creation,regulation and abolition of governmentagencies and positions. It is presumed thatthe facts are sought by inquiry, becausethe legislative body cannot legislatewisely or effectively in the absence of inforespecting the conditions which thelegislation is intended to affect or

change. The Court (in Arnault v Nazareno)noted that the investigation gave rise toseveral bills recommended by the SpecialCommittee and approved by the Senate. Sounder the first requirement, the dualrequirements of authority are that the powerexercised by the committee must be bothwithin the authority delegated to it and withinthe competence of Congress to confer upon thecommittee.The test of pertinency is whether a questionitself is in the ultimate area of investigation; aquestion is pertinent also if it is a usual and

necessary stone in the arch of a bridge overwhich an investigation must go. In determiningpertinency, the court looks to the history of theinquiry as disclosed by the record. Arnaultstates the rule on pertinency, viz :Once an inquiry is admitted or established tobe within the jurisdiction of a legislative bodyto make, we think the investigatingcommittee has the power to require awitness to answer any questionpertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his Constitutional right against selfincrimination.The inquiry, to be within the

jurisdiction of the legislative body to make,must be material or necessary to theexercise of a power in it vested by theConsti, such as to legislate, or to expel aMember; and every question which theinvestigator is empowered to coerce awitness to answer must be material orpertinent to the subject matter of theinquiry or investigation. So a witness maynot be coerced to answer a question that



obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not followthat every question that may bepropounded to a witness be material toany proposed or possible legislation. Inother words, the materiality of the

question must be determined by itsdirect relation to the subject of theinquiry and not by its indirect relationto any proposed or possible legislation.The reason is, that the necessity or lackof necessity for legislative action andthe form and character of the actionitself are determined by the sum totalof the info to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fractionof such info elicited from a singlequestion.- The US (and Phil.) Consti does not directlymention “executive privilege,” but

commentators theorized that the privilege of confidentiality is Constitutionally based, as itrelates to the President’s effective discharge of executive powers. The Founders of theAmerican nation acknowledged an impliedConstitutional prerogative of Presidentialsecrecy, a power they believed was at timesnecessary and proper.[PUNO WILL THEN DISCUSS HISTORY ANDSCOPE & CONTEXT OF EXEC. PRIVILEGE IN THEUS-PLS. SEE ORIG]- Adjudication on executive privilege in thePhilippines is still in its infancy stage, with the

Court having had only a few occasions toresolve cases that directly deal with theprivilege:Almonte v Vasquez (1995) No military ordiplomatic secrets would be disclosed by theproduction of records pertaining to thepersonnel of the Economic Intelligence andInvestigation Bureau. Nor was there any lawmaking personnel records of the EIIB classified.Thus, the Court concluded that theOmbudsman’s need for the documentsoutweighed the claim of confidentiality of petitioners.

Chavez v PCGG (1998) It was incumbentupon PCGG and its officers, as well as othergov”t representatives, to disclose sufficientpublic info on any proposed settlement theyhad decided to take up with the ostensibleowners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Suchinfo, however, must pertain to definitepropositions of the government, notnecessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications duringthe exploratory stage. At the same time, the



Court noted the need to observe the samerestrictions on disclosure of info in general,such as on matters involving national security,diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence andother classified info. Again, the subject info didnot fall under Presidential communications.Senate v Ermita (2006) Court again alludedto US v Nixon and also recognized thatPresidential communications fall under themantle of protection of executive privilege inthe setting of a legislative inquiry. But sincethe issue for resolution was theConstitutionality of EO 464 and not whether anactual Presidential communication was coveredby the privilege, the Court did not haveoccasion to rule on the same.[Start of US v Nixon discussion]- US v Nixon came about because of a breakinat the Democratic Nat’l Committee (DNC)headquarters in Watergate Hotel. In the early

morning of June 17, 1972, about 4 ½ monthsbefore the US Presidential election, policediscovered 5 men inside the DNC officescarrying electronic equipment, cameras, andlarge sums of cash. These men were operatingas part of a larger intelligence gathering planof the Committee to Re-elect the President,Pres Nixon’s campaign organization for the1972 election. Their mission was to fix adefective bugging device which had beenplaced a month before on the telephone of theDNC chairperson. Their orders came from thehigher officials of the CRP.

A subpoena duces tecum was issued requiringNixon to produce for the grand jury certaintape recordings and documents enumerated inan attached schedule. President Nixon partiallycomplied with the subpoena, but otherwisedeclined to follow its directives. In a letter tothe Court that issued the subpoena, thePresident advised that the tape recordingssought would not be provided, as he assertedthat the President is not subject to thecompulsory process of the courts. The Courtordered the President or any appropriatesubordinate official to show cause why the

documents and objects described should notbe produced as evidence before the grand jury.The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction todecide the issue of privilege, and it hadauthority to enforce the subpoena ducestecum by way of an order requiring productionfor inspection in camera.Nixon appealed = Nixon v Sirica. Issue is WONthe President may, in his sole discretion,withhold from a grand jury evidence in his



possession that is relevant to the grand jury'sinvestigations. Court overruled the President’sinvocation of executive privilege coveringPresidential communications and upheld theorder of the District Court.Grand jury investigation = US v Mitchell(Former Atty. General and head of CRP) TheSpecial Prosecutor filed a motion for asubpoena duces tecum for the productionbefore trial of certain tapes and documentsrelating to precisely identified conversationsand meetings of President Nixon. ThePresident, claiming executive privilege, movedto quash the subpoena. The District Court,after treating the subpoenaed material aspresumptively privileged, concluded that theSpecial Prosecutor had made a sufficientshowing to rebut the presumption and that therequirements for a subpoena had beensatisfied. The Court then issued an order for anin camera examination of the subpoenaedmaterial. The Special Prosecutor filed in the USSupreme Court a petition for certiorari whichupheld the order in US v. Nixon.- For the first time in 1974, the US SupremeCourt recognized the Presidentialcommunications privilege and thequalified presumption in its favor in US v.Nixon. The decision cited 2 reasons for theprivilege and the qualified presumption:1) the necessity for protection of the publicinterest in candid, objective, and evenblunt or harsh opinions in Presidential

decision-making and 2) it is fundamental tothe operation of Government andinextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Consti.In support of the first reason, the Nixon Courtheld that a President and those who assist himmust be free to explore alternatives in theprocess of shaping policies and makingdecisions and to do so in a way many wouldbe unwilling to express except privately. Itpointed to 2 bases of this need forconfidentiality. 1st is common sense andexperience. The importance of this

confidentiality is too plain to require furtherdiscussion. Human experience teaches thatthose who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor witha concern for appearances and for theirown interests to the detriment of thedecision-making process. The 2nd is thesupremacy of each branch in its ownsphere of duties under the Consti and theprivileges flowing from these duties.



As for the second reason, while the Constidiffuses power to secure liberty, it alsocontemplates that practice will integratethe dispersed powers into a workablegovernment. It enjoins upon its branchesseparateness but interdependence,

autonomy but reciprocity.

- The scope of Presidential communicationsprivilege covers communications in theperformance of the President’sresponsibilities of his office and made inthe process of shaping policies andmaking decisions.- There is a qualified presumption in favor of Presidential privacy. To overcome this, theremust be sufficient showing of specific need forthe withheld info on the branch of governmentseeking its disclosure. 2 standards must bemet to show the specific need: evidentiaryand constitutional.

US v Nixon -relevance, admissibility andspecificity.In re Sealed Case -there must also be ashowing that evidence is not available with due diligence elsewhere or that theevidence is particularly and apparentlyuseful.The claim of executive privilege must then bebalanced with the specific need for disclosureof the communications on the part of the otherbranch of government. In the “functionimpairment test”, the Court weighs how thedisclosure of the withheld info would impairthe President’s ability to perform his

constitutional duties more than nondisclosurewould impair the other branch’s ability toperform its constitutional functions.- In excising materials that are not relevant ornot admissible or covered by executiveprivilege because of their nature as military ordiplomatic secrets, the High Court emphasizedthe heavy responsibility of the D.C. DistrictCourt to ensure that these excised parts of thePresidential communications would beaccorded that high degree of respect due thePresident, considering the singularly uniquerole under of a President’s communications

and activities, related to the performance of duties. A President's communications andactivities encompass a vastly wider range of sensitive material than would be true of anyordinary individual. It was necessary in thepublic interest to afford Presidentialconfidentiality the greatest protectionconsistent with the fair administration of

justice. Thus, the High Court sternly orderedthat until released by the judge to the Special



Prosecutor, no in camera material be revealedto anyone, and that the excised material berestored to its privileged status and returnedunder seal to its lawful custodian.[end of US v Nixon discussion]- Senate v. Ermita: only the President or theExecutive Secretary, by order of the President,can invoke executive privilege. Thus,petitioner, himself or through his counsel,cannot expand the grounds invoked by thePresident through Sec Ermita. In his letter, SecErmita invoked only the Presidentialcommunication privilege and, suggested aclaim of diplomatic secrets privilege. Buteven assuming arguendo that petitioner Nerican properly invoke the privilege covering

“national security” and “military affairs,” still,the records will show that he failed to providethe Court knowledge of the circumstanceswith which the Court can determine whether

there is reasonable danger that his answersto the 3 disputed questions would indeeddivulge secrets that would compromise ournational security.- The Presidential communicationsprivilege attaches to the office of thePresident; it is used after carefulconsideration in order to uphold public interestin the confidentiality and effectiveness of Presidential decision-making to benefitthe Office of the President. It is not to beused to personally benefit the personoccupying the office.

- The function impairment test begins withrecognition that Presidential communicationsare presumptively privileged. SenateCommittees’ argument that the burden is onpetitioner to overcome a presumption againstexecutive privilege cannot be sustained.- Given the qualified presumption in favor of the confidentiality of Presidentialcommunications, the Court should proceed todetermine the strength of this presumption asit varies in light of various factors. The moreconcentrated power is in the President, thegreater the need for confidentiality and the

stronger the presumption. Other factors to beconsidered in determining the strength of thepresumption of confidentiality of Presidentialcommunications pertain to the nature of thedisclosure sought, namely: (1) time of disclosure, whether contemporaneousdisclosure or open deliberation, which has agreater chilling effect on rendering candidopinions, as opposed to subsequent disclosure;(2) level of detail, whether full texts or whole



conversations or summaries; (3) audience,whether the general public or a select few; (4)certainty of disclosure, whether the info ismade public as a matter of course or uponrequest ; (5) frequency of disclosure; and (6)form of disclosure, whether live testimony orrecorded conversation or affidavit. The type of info should also be considered, whetherinvolving military, diplomatic or nationalsecurity secrets.- It is self-evident that the 3 assailedquestions are pertinent to the subjectmatter of the legislative investigation beingundertaken by the respondent Committees.More than the Arnault standards, the questionsto petitioner have direct relation not only tothe subject of the inquiry, but also to thepending bills thereat. There is also noeffective substitute for the info sought.The 3 questions demand info on how the

President herself weighed options and thefactors she considered in concluding the NBNZTEContract.- On one end of the balancing scale is thePresident’s generalized claim of confidentiality of her communications, andpetitioner’s failure to justify a claim that hisconversations with the President involvediplomatic, military and national securitysecrets. Presidential communications enjoy apresumptive privilege but this is weakenedby the fact that the subject of thecommunication involves a contract with a

foreign loan. The power to contract foreignloans is a power not exclusively vested in thePresident, but is shared with the MonetaryBoard (Central Bank). We also consider thechilling effect which may result from thedisclosure of the info sought from petitionerNeri but this is diminished by the nature of the info sought, which is narrow, limitedas it is to the 3 questions. We take judicialnotice also of the fact that in a Senate inquiry,there are safeguards against anindiscriminate conduct of investigation.On the other end of the balancing scale is the

respondent Committees’ specific anddemonstrated need for the Presidentialcommunications in reply to the 3 questions. These questions are pertinent to the subjectmatter of their investigation, and there is noeffective substitute for the info coming froma reply to these questions. In the absence of the info they seek, the Senate Committees’ function of intelligently enacting laws “toremedy what is called ‘dysfunctionalprocurement system of the government’” and



to possibly include “executive agreements forSenate concurrence” to prevent them frombeing used to circumvent the requirement of public bidding in the existing GovernmentProcurement Reform Act cannot but beseriously impaired. With all theseconsiderations factored into the equation,

wehave to strike the balance in favor of therespondent Senate Committees andcompel petitioner Neri to answer the 3questions.- As to respondent Committees’ contention thatexecutive privilege cannot be used to hide awrongdoing: It is after the privilege has beenpierced by a demonstrated need that one candiscover WON the privilege was used to shielda wrongdoing. We should not put the cartbefore the horse.[VALIDITY OF CONTEMPT AND ARREST ORDER]- The legislative purpose of the Senate inquiry

and pertinence of the questions propoundedhas sufficiently been shown. It is worth notingthat the letter of Sec Ermita merely requestedthat petitioner’s testimony on Nov 20, 2007 onthe NBN Contract be dispensed with, as he hadexhaustively testified on the subject matter of the inquiry. Executive privilege was invokedonly with respect to the 3 questions Nerirefused to answer in his testimony beforerespondent Committees on Sep 26, 2007. Butthere is no basis for either petitioner or theExec Sec to assume that petitioner’s furthertestimony will be limited to the 3 questions.

Needless to state, respondent Committeeshave good reasons in citing Neri for contemptfor failing to appear in the Nov 20 hearing.- Section 18 of the Senate Rules GoverningInquiries in Aid of Legislation provides, viz :Sec. 18. Contempt. - The Committee, by avote of a majority of all its members,may punish for contempt any witness beforeit who disobeys any order of the Committeeor refuses to be sworn or to testify or toanswer a proper question by the Committeeor any of its members, or testifying, testifiesfalsely or evasively. Contempt of the

Committee shall be deemed contempt of theSenate. Such witness may be ordered by theCommittee to be detained in such place as itmay designate under the custody of theSergeant-at-Arms until he agrees to producethe required documents, or to be sworn or totestify, or otherwise purge himself of thatcontempt.Even assuming arguendo that ex-officiomembers are counted in the determination of a



majority vote, the majority requirement foreach of the respondent Senate Committeeswas still satisfied, as all the ex-officio memberssigned the Order of arrest.The substantive and proceduralrequirements for issuing an Order of

arrest having been met, the respondentCommittees did not abuse their discretionin issuing the Jan 30, 2008 Order of arrestof petitioner.

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Akbayan v. Aquino

FACTS:Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as congresspersons, citizensand taxpayers, requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-PhilippinesEconomic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).

Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violatesthere right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonableparticipation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making.

Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter soughtinvolves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right toinformation and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA.That diplomatic negotiation are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.

Issue:Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of thesubsequent event that occurred?

Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered bythe doctrine of executive privilege?

Held:On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for isthe disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two Statesparties,” public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during thependency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic.The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has becomemoot and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the “full text” thereof.The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely thetext of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.

Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore,are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception.It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermitaholds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be consideredprivileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is mademay it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desiredinformation, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seekinginformation from the President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations



of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.

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Estrada v. Desierto

Facts:

Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decisionfor adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion thathe has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion thatpetitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneousand posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are factswhich are well-established and cannot be refuted.

On January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent Arroyo. We used theAngara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner. Let it be emphasized

that it is not unusual for courts to distill a person’s subjective intent from the evidence beforethem. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases involving last willsand testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other similar cases. As will bediscussed below, the use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitionermay disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the Court from the facts narrated in theDiary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.

Issue:

Whether petitioner can invoke res ipso loquitur rule to resolve the issue of prejudicial publicity?

Held:

Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or the transactionspeaks for itself) to support his argument. Under the res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, thefact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit aninference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, andpresent a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. It is not a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule. Its mere invocation does not exempt the plaintiff with the requirement of proof to prove negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to present alongwith the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,creating an inference or presumption of negligence and to thereby place on the defendant theburden of going forward with the proof.

We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule usually applied onlyin tort cases, to the cases at bar. Indeed, there is no court in the whole world that has appliedthe res ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of prejudicial publicity. We again stress that theissue before us is whether the alleged pervasive publicity of the cases against the petitioner hasprejudiced the minds of the members of the panel of investigators. We reiterate the test we laiddown in People v. Teehankee, to resolve this issue, viz:

“The court cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due toprejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasivepublicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that theright of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsiblereporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out , a responsible press



has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially inthe criminal field. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards againstthe miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes toextensive public scrutiny and criticism.

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Estrada v. Arroyo

FACTS:

This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic. A short outline of events that precipitatedthe case at bar thus follows:

1. Petitioner won in the May 1998 national elections as president, the respondent as vice-

president.

1. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner and his

family of receiving

millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Such expose ignited several reactions of rage.1. There became a built up of a call for petitioner to resign from office and his officials one

by one resigned

withdrawing their support.1. In November 20 Impeachment Trial of the petitioner was opened, in December 7

Impeachment Trial began.

1. January 19 people lined up in EDSA showing a greater call for the resignation of the

president.

2. January 20 was the day of petitioner's surrender. At 12:00 noon Chief Justice Hilario

Davide administered

oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm petitioner leftMalacanang and issued

a press statement and a letter transmitting the executive power upon him, thepresident to the vice

president becoming the acting president1. The Monday after the oath, Arroyo discharged powers of the President.

1. Criminal cases have been filed against the petitioner after he stepped down into

presidency.

ISSUES:There are several important issues sprouting in this case.

1. WON the cases at bar present a justiciable controversy / political question specifically in

regard the

legitimacy of the Arroyo administration

1. WON Estrada merely resigned as President1. WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President

1. WON Estrada enjoys immunity from suit

1. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

HELD:The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.



1. The question on the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration is subject to judicial

review. It is a legal question, which is justiciable.

At first, it can be said that acquisition of the presidential seat of respondent Arroyo would besimilar to that of former President Corazon Aquino as they were placed into position bymeans of the call of the people in a revolutionary mass demonstration known as EDSA I for

Aquino, and EDSA II for Arroyo.

It has been stressed by private respondents that Arroyo ascended the presidency throughpeople power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic;that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized byforeign governments. Consequently, the grounds of the case show that such is a politicalquestion.

SC read the case Lawyers League vs Pres. Aquino, which decided that the legitimacy of Aquino administration in question was a political question. The Freedom Constitutiondeclared that Aquino's government was a result a successful peaceful revolution by thesovereign Filipino people, hence a political question. In contrast, Arroyo's government wasnot revolutionary in character. Arroyo swore under the 1987 Constitution.

There is a legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA Iinvolves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the wholegovernment; it presented then a political question. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President, presenting a legal and justiciablequestion.

1. It was held that Estrada has resigned as President.

The issue was whether the petitioner resigned as President or should he be consideredresigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of thePublic in view of Art. VII Sec. 8 of 1987 Constitution. It was said that there must be intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. There is no formal requirement as to form of a valid resignation. It can beoral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation isclear, it must be given legal effect. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has tobe determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or bythe totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantialevidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using the TOTALITY TEST, Estrada was held to have resigned as President.

Intent to Resign. There was public pressure for petitioner to resign. In the diary of ExecutiveSecretary Eduardo Angara called "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," an authoritativewindow to the state of mind of the petitioner was provided. On January 20, 2:30 pm he

proposed for a snap election for president in May, emphasizing that he would not be acandidate. This is an indication that he intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

As his support from his officials were withdrawn, he was even advised to have a "dignifiedexit or resignation." Estrada did not object to this suggestion but stated that he would neverleave the country. At 10:00 p.m. he said to Angara "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that Iwould have five days to a week in the palace." This was proof petitioner had reconciledhimself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. Estrada became concerned with peaceful and



orderly transfer of power when he told Angara ""Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayong (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power." The resignation of the petitioner was implied. Acts of Relinquishment. In the press release containing his final statement before he and hisfamily left Malacanang, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as Presidentof the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leavingthe Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin thehealing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kindinability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disabilitydisappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people asPresident (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may comeahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge afteroccupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on hissupporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation andsolidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his finalact of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

1. The law which concerned this issue was Article VII Sec.11 which provides in part:

"Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of theHouse of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powersand duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of theSenate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that thePresident is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shallimmediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President." "If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not insession, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote

of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers andduties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shallcontinue exercising the powers and duties of his office" The operative facts concerning this issue are:*Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent letter claiming inability to the Senate President andSpeaker of the House;*Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;*Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001House Resolution No. 175; followed by House Resolution No. 176 a resolution expressingthe support of the house of representatives to the assumption into office by Vice PresidentGloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, adopted January 24,

2001.

Clearly, from the given facts, both houses of Congress have recognized respondentArroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that theinability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejectedpetitioner's claim of temporary inability. The Court has no jurisdiction to reviewthe temporary inability and to revise thereafter the decision of both houses of Congress recognizing Arroyo as President because this question involves theLegislature's discretionary authority.



1. It was held the Estrada is not immune for liability. His claim that he must the

impeachment proceeding must first be decided before civil or criminal prosecution begin is

untenable for he has been considered resigned from office. Hence the impeachment tribunal

and proceeding has ceased. Hence, as a non-sitting President, he can be tried for civil and

criminal charges filed against him.

Petitioner contended that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting theinvestigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt.He stated that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminalcases violation of his right to due process. It was held that there was not enough evidenceto warrant the Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by therespondent Ombudsman. The evidence given by petitioner that Ombudsman has been biasedby the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him was insubstantial.

Marcos v Manglapus - Estrada v Arroyo _ Executive _ Sept 5

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