Manpreet Sethi, Ph.D ICSSR Senior Fellow

at Centre for Air Power Studies

New Delhi

Manila, 02 June 2013

NPT RevCon 2010: 64 action items

New START ratified – Feb 2011

1st NPT PrepCom in Apr-May 2012

◦ Perfunctory meeting, healthy atm

◦ Adoption of agenda for 2nd meeting

2nd NPT PrepCom in Apr- May 2013

◦ Issues get thornier

Other developments

◦ No Conference on Middle East WMDFZ

◦ Oslo Conference

◦ DPRK nuclear saber rattling

•Half Way point in Review Cycle

•Assessment of Action Items on 3 pillars

• RCW Reports & State of Play

• Full implementation of 2 items • NWS commit to fully respect their existing

commitments on NSA

• No discussions in CD on ‘effective int arrangements on

NSA

• NWS commit to refrain from nuclear testing

pending CTBT’s EIF

• No steps to being CTBT into force

No progress on 9 items ◦ No undertaking to eliminate NW/ No commitment

to steps leading to disarmt

◦ No change in doctrine

US Jan 2012 “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” commits US “to field nuc forces that can under any circumstances confront an adv with prospect of unacc damage”

China 2013 White Paper – No mention of NFU

◦ No agreement to establish subsidiary body in CD

◦ No process to dismantle/convert FM facilities

◦ Nuc modernisation continues

Some progress on 12 items ◦ Overall reduction in global stockpile of NW

◦ P-5 discussions on transparency, CBM &

verification

Met 4 times

China chairing the Definition of nuclear terms

Standard reporting form - Accepted idea in

principle but no official endorsement to PDNI

proposal

◦ What will NWS report to 3rd PrepCom in 2014?

Full implementation – Zero items

No progress – One item ◦ Application of IAEA safeguards to peaceful nuc

facilities in NWS

◦ CTBT & FMCT – status unchanged

GGE on FMCT formed; Work to finish after next RevCon

Significant Progress – 8 items ◦ Focus on role & resources of IAEA

◦ Implementation of XCs

◦ Multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle

IUEC at Angarsk operational

BoG endorsement to IAEA run LEU bank

• Compliance concerns – Iran

–P5 + 1; Uranium enrichment current sticking point

–End enrichment, ship stocks out, get fuel plates for

TRR, nuc security assistance, spares for civ aircraft

– Iran – ease sanctions, right to enrich

–Need for transparency, trust and CBMs

• No consensus on Article X

Standoff between NWS & NNWS

◦ “Nobody should assume that any regime structured on a

have/have not principle can be sustained forever”

-- UN High Rep for Disarmament Affairs at NATO Conf

Significant Progress on 9 items

◦ Cooperation in transfer of peaceful use of nuclear energy

◦ Strengthen IAEA technical cooperation prog

◦ Encourage national, bilateral and int efforts to train

nuclear workforce

◦ Follow int stds for transport of radioactive materials

Some Progress on 9 items

◦ Strengthen IAEA resources for tech cooperation

◦ Encourage states to abide by nuc safety and security

conventions

◦ Promote sharing of best practices

Major plank of NPT consensus in 1995

Commitment to make progress in 2010

Intention to hold conference

Appointment of facilitator and host country

70 mtgs with stake holders in the region

– “need to adopt an open & forward looking approach”

– “engage with each other in constructive dialogue &

cooperation”

Complications as result of Arab Spring, Libya and

Syria – general tension in region

No conference in Dec’12

Never any clarity on conduct of conference ◦ When, duration, agenda, level of participation…

◦ Participating states…

No forthcoming leadership from USA

Unhappy Arab states threatened to boycott

2nd PrepCom

127 countries + NGOs

5 NWS not present – “distracting” (!!!)

India & Pakistan present

Joint statement

Focus on humanitarian consequences of use of NW

No agency/govt can handle nuclear use

Delegitimize use and possession of NW

◦ “Use of NW incompatible with international humanitarian

law”

Rules of distinction, precaution & proportionality

3rd nuclear test in Feb 2013

Unanimous UNSCR sanctions

Saber rattling by DPRK; tense months

Return to talks? Then???

What does this episode demonstrate?

◦ Nuclear brinkmanship a viable policy

In employment - Nuclear thinking in Japan &

South Korea; US response

In results – no major gains

BMD ◦ Threat perception

◦ Possibility of cooperation

On BMD or other arms control

Challenge of space security ◦ Recent developments

◦ Will militarisation spill into weaponisation?

Inter-state Equations ◦ China’s assertiveness

◦ US rebalancing

◦ Russia’s ‘me too’

Lot of concern over non-pro, but over

different issues ◦ Divide between NWS and NNWS

Need for pol leadership with clear vision ◦ Will Obama realize the Prague vision??

Need for understanding that the sum of

international security is bigger & more

useful than narrow, individual interests