Maeve Cooke

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Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of RecognitionAuthor(s): Maeve CookeSource: Political Theory, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 258-288Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191948 .Accessed: 04/03/2011 17:16

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AUTHENTICITYANDAUTONOMYTaylor, abermas, ndthe olitics f Recognition

MAEVECOOKEUniversity ollegeDublin

M DISCUSSIONOF THE POLITICSOF RECOGNMION dealsprimarily ith he ssay f the amename yCharles aylor, ndJurgenHabermas'sesponseo this n hisarticle, StrugglesorRecognitionnConstitutionaltates."' aylor istinguishesetweenwo inds f oliticsfrecognition,he olitics f equaldignity nd he olitics f difference;eassociateshese, espectively,ith he deals f utonomynd uthenticity.I focus nparticularnhis ccount f he oliticsfdifferencend he ink

heasserts etweenhis nd he deal f uthenticity.argue hat he onnec-tion s not traightforwardlyvidentnd hat aylor imselfquivocatesnthis oint. ore enerally,heresanunacknowledgedensionnTaylor'sessay etweenhe deals f utonomynd uthenticity,nd his esultsncontradictionsnd onfusionsn his account f the olitics f difference.Furthermore,aylor's eadingf he olitics fdifferencesmarred yhisfailureodistinguishufficientlyarefullyetweenariousnterpretationsfthe demand or ecognitionf specific dentity. suggest ivepossiblereadings f his emand. onetheless,aylor's iscussionf he olitics fdifference,espite arioushortcomings,oesdraw ttentionoa problemencounteredyall forms f iberalismn their ttempt orespond o thedemandor ecognitionf pecificdentity:he roblemhatiberalism,oo,is a "fightingreed" nd husnevitablyxcludesertain inds fdifference.

Indealing ith abermas's esponseoTaylor,focusnparticularn hedemand or ecognitionf pecificdentity.askwhether abermas'son-

AUTHOR'SNOTE: This textwas first resented t a meeting f AxelHonneth nd MartinFrank's olloquiumt the reie Universitat erlin. thank he articipants nthe iscussion,nparticular artmut osa,for their onstructiveomments. also wish o thankMartin auterfor careful eading f andhelpful uggestions elating o, he evised ersion.

POLMCALTHEORY,ol. 5No.2,April 997 258-288? 1997 agePublications,nc.258



Cooke AUTHENTICITY NDAUTONOMY 259

ception f the constitutional tate can accommodate his demand. Thisnecessitates onsideration f Habermas's istinction etweenmorality ndethics, n particular is recent ttempts o relax this distinction hroughallowing or thical iscourses s an mportant trand fpolitics, nd hroughacknowledginghe thical atterning f the onstitutional tate. show hatHabermas's onception f law and politics s sensitive othe problem frecognition f difference, roviding framework hat eems o havemanyadvantagesn the ttempt odealwith his roblem; alsoargue, owever,that is conception oes exclude ertain inds f difference. oreprecisely,Habermas's isionof law and

politics rioritizeshe deal of

autonomy,thereby nevitably xcluding ertain onceptions f the elf nd ts relationto the good. conclude hatHabermas-despite hemerits f his concep-tion-is opento criticism orneither xplicitly cknowledginghe nevita-bility f exclusionnor confronting heproblems aised hereby. aylor'sperspectives superior n this egardn that t sees the nevitable xclusionsof iberalism s a problem ith otential oral ignificance.

1

Taylor ells us that he politics f recognition-itself distinctivelymodern henomenon-has ome o mean wo ather ifferent hings: n theone hand, politics f universalism, mphasizing heequal dignity f allindividuals nd, on the other and, politics f difference hat, oo,has auniversalist hrust: veryones to berecognized or is orher nique dentity(p. 38).2Nonetheless, hereas hepolitics f equaldignity ocuses n whatall human eings hare n common, he olitics f equal) difference ocuseson eachperson's or group's) istinctness rom very ther. he former sbasedon the dea that ll human eings re worthy f respect, hereby hebasisfor espectsa universal uman otential uch s human eings' tatusas rational gentswhoare capableof directing heir wn ives. The latter,Taylor laims, icks ut n alternative niversal uman otential: he oten-tial or ormingnddefining ne'sown dentityp. 42).This s Taylor's nitial(weaker) pecification f he olitics f difference. esoon rgues, owever,that he politics f difference asrecently eengiven stronger ormulationthat akes t beyond he emand or ecognitionf universal uman otential(p. 42). Taylor uggests hat he olitics f difference, t east n the ntercul-tural ontext, owdemands otmerely hat he potential qualvalue of allhuman eings e recognized, ut hat he qual valueof what hey ave nfactmadeofthis otential eacknowledged.



260 POLITICALTHEORY/ April 997

Taylor ssociates hepolitics f equal dignity ith particular eading fliberalism referred oasproceduraliberalism), ccording owhich he tateguarantees qual rights nd the protection f individual reedoms, ndabstracts rom ndividual ndcollective ubstantive iews bout he nds oflife p. 51 ff.). One of the mainphilosophicalssumptions nderlying hisview of iberalism s that uman ignity onsists argely n autonomy, on-ceived f s the bility f achperson odetermineor erself rhimself viewof he ood ife p. 57).Thepolitics fdifference,ncontrast,sassociated iththe dealof uthenticity, hereby ach ndividual sthought ohave uniqueidentity, noriginal ay fbeing uman, owhich he rhemust etrue p. 38).

Taylormaintains hat he olitics f qualdignity omes nto onflict iththepolitics f difference p. 43). It ater ranspireshat t sonly particularversion f thepolitics f equal dignity hat ives ise o such onflict: his sthe version f the politics f equal dignity hatTaylor ssociates withproceduraliberalism ndthat, s we have een, nterprets uman ignity nterms f autonomy. n the fourth art f his discussion aylor roposes"more hospitable" ariant f liberalism hat llowsfor he promotion fstrong ollective oalsand that s, accordingly, eemedmore espectful fdiversity p. 52 ff.).But this version f iberalism-as Habermas onvinc-ingly rgues3-is problematic, or t appears oundermine hevery nder-standing f individual reedom n which iberalism tself s premised.Furthermore-as shall ontend-its ncritical ffirmation f trong ollec-tive goals seemssusceptible o Taylor's wn critique f "subjectivism."However, ven f Taylor's ttempt o work ut more ospitable ersion fliberalism s not uccessful, hismaynotbe cause formajor oncern. or tcouldbeargued hat here ssomething rong ith is hesis hat he oliticsof equal dignity onflicts ith he politics f difference-even here heformer s interpreted n terms f procedural iberalism ith ts underlyingviewofhuman ignity s autonomy.n seeing hese womodes f politics sconflicting, aylor ppears o make number f crucial ssumptions. eassumes, first, hat he politics f equal dignity or more precisely, heproceduraliberalism losely, fnot nextricably, ssociatedwith t) requiresthatwe treat eople n difference-blindashionnd, econd, hat he olitics

of difference alls for ecognition f unique dentity nd that his demandshould e nterpretednterms f he dealof uthenticity. abermas-in myview, orrectly-has hallenged aylor's ssumption hat rocedural iberal-ism suppresses ifference: shallhave more o say about his n the hirdsection. or he moment, shall oncentrate nthe econd et f ssumptions:that s, shall ook t Taylor's mphasis nunique dentity ndonauthenticityas opposed oautonomy, hichhe seemsto reject s the deal of humanagencymotivating roceduraliberalism.



CookeAUTHENTICITYNDAUTONOMY 261

Taylor's ssociation f the politics f equaldignity or moreprecisely,procedural iberalism) ith utonomy nd the politics f difference ithauthenticity s misleading or t east woreasons. he first s that he dealunderlying heweaker ormulationf the olitics f difference s not learlydistinct rom hat nderlying he olitics f qualdignity: t couldbearguedthat oth inds f politics mphasize utonomy ather han uthenticity. hesecond s that ven n ts tronger ormulation,he olitics f qualdifferencehas no necessary onnection ith he deal of authenticity: he onnectionresults rom aylor's elective eading f the demand or ecognition hatunderlies his olitics.

Taylor's nitial weaker) ormulationf the olitics f difference sthat taffirms heequalpotential f every ndividual and culture) o form nddefineher or his own identity p. 42). The politics f equaldignity-asinterpreted yproceduraliberalism-affirms the bility f each person odetermine orhimself r herself viewof the good ife" p. 57).The atterability s referred oby Taylor s individual utonomy p. 57). It seems,however, o be scarcely istinguishable rom hepotential ffirmed y thepolitics f difference. he latter, dmittedly, oes not confine tself o theindividual ubject nd ts mphasis s somewhat ifferent; onetheless,n tsinitial ormulationhe olitics fdifference, o essthan he olitics f qualdignity, elects utonomy s that which s worthy f recognition: t, too,focuses n the ndividual's ower odetermineorherself particular nder-standing f he ood ife, atherhan n the alue f ny uch articular nder-standing. urthermore,n ts nitial ormulationhepolitics f difference-like the politics f equaldignity-does not presuppose istinctiveness:t

leavesopenthe uestion f whether he dentity ormed, nd ife ived, yeach ndividual s unique;nordoes t mply hat niquenesss normativelysignificant. o this xtent, n ts nitial ormulation,he olitics f differenceis not onnected ith he dealof uthenticity. or his deal ttributes oralvalueto ndividual istinctiveness:t emphasizes ach ndividual's apacityto ive a life nd form n dentity hat sdistinct rom very ther nd hat s,by virtue f its very distinctiveness, orthy f recognition. wo further(interconnected) oints houldbe noted here:4 irst, hat he notion f

authenticity mplies ot nlydistinctiveness;t s basedon the further deathat his must be inwardly enerated p. 32).For distinctiveness ay, fcourse, e inauthentic. uthenticity-at easton Taylor's nterpretation-requires hat he ndividual s true o herself, hat he istens o her innervoice"-which has something nique o say-and directs er ife ccord-ingly. he second point ollows rom hefirst: istinctivenessn tself oesnotrepresent moral deal;only certain ind f distinctivenesss worthyofrecognition. hemoral ignificance f ndividual istinctivenesssdefined



262 POLITICALHEORYApril 997

byreference o other ormative tandards. arious ossibilities reconceiv-able here: although aylor elates t to the deal of authenticity, n turninterpreted hrough eferenceo the deal of originality, his s not he onlyconceivablenormative asis for recognition f uniqueness. or instance,individual istinctiveness aybe seen as valuable hrough eferenceotheidealof functional ifference r, lternatively,hrough eferenceo an dealof uthenticity hat s not groundedn the deal oforiginality.' ince t eemsclear hat, t east n ts nitial ormulation,hepolitics f difference asnonecessary onnection ith he dealof authenticity, his onnectionmustobtain if at all) only n the ase of ts stronger ormulation. he strongerformulation f he olitics fdifference allsfor ecognition ot nly f achindividual'sutonomy, ut fwhat he hasmade f his utonomycf.Taylor'saccount, . 42-3). t affirms otmerely ach ndividual's otential o workouther wn conceptions f thegood ife, ut, ver nd bove his, he qualvalueofeach ndividual'sdentity s formed yher onceptions f he goodlife nd of her ife s lived n accordance ith hese. s there connectionbetween uch position ndthe deal of authenticity?t seems o me,onceagain, hat here s no necessary onnection. hisbecomes lear f we thinkabout ossible ases for udgments f value hat ertain o ndividualdenti-ties and ives as oriented oward onceptions f thegood ife.Wecan referto such udgments s ethical udgments in the narrow ense of "ethical"preferred yHabermas).6here re twoways f responding o the uestionof the basis for this kind of evaluative udgment. he first ejects hepossibility f anybasis rreducible osubjective ills nd desires nd thusdenies he dealsboth f utonomy nd uthenticity. he econd eeks basisthat s irreducible osubjective ills nddesires;

gain,arious

ossibilitiesare onceivable ere: shall riefly iscuss wo.Oneresults n naffirmationof ndividual utonomy; he ther ffirms he dealof uthenticity.

Thefirst esponse o the uestion f he asisfor thical udgments sonethat enies hat he notion f value has any meaning n this dimension fjudgment. ince there an be no objectivity n udgments f this kind, hevalue of each person's dentity nd life may be deemedequal. Taylordismisses uch response s a form f ubjectivismp. 68-9),which s shot

through ith onfusion. aylor'smain oint ere, take t, s that o attributeequalvalue o what ndividualsor collectives) avemade f their otentialfor working ut their wnconceptions f the good ife s to deny heverymeaning f ethical valuation. thical valuation resupposes ormativestandards hat re ontext-transcendent,nthat hey o beyond he ontext fan individual r collective ife. That s, attribution f ethical value likeattribution f moral value) makes senseonly on the basis of evaluativedistinctions hat ave ome ndependencerom ubjective ills nd desires.




Where hepossibility f such evaluative istinctions s denied, heverynotion f ethical or moral) aluebecomesmeaningless. husthe positionthat xiomatically ttributes qual value to what people individually rcollectively) avemade f heir espectiveives s incoherent, or t sin factpremised n the upposition hat he notion f valuehas no relevancen thedimension f ethicaludgment. urthermore,t s clear hat position f hiskind lsodenies he deals f utonomy nd uthenticity, or oth hese dealspresuppose hepossibility f ethical valuation hrough eference o stan-dards that re not reducible o subjectivewills and desires. The idea ofrecognition f utonomy, nderstoods eachperson's bility owork ut herownconception f the good ife, s rendered eaninglessf conceptions fthegood ife re een s mere ubjective references. he deaofrecognitionof authenticity, nderstood or nstance s correspondence etween n indi-vidual's beliefs r actions or identity r life) and her "inner ature," ssimilarly endered eaninglessf he istinction etween inner ature" ndmere ubjective reference sdenied.Wemight ote npassing hat aylor'sdefense f the Quebec government's ollective oalof "survivance" p. 51ff.) an be criticized nprecisely hese rounds. aylor ppears oaccept heview of the Quebecgovernment hat t s axiomatic hat he survival ndflourishing fFrench ulture nQuebec sa good" p. 58).He thus ttributesvalue to the collective oal of "survivance" rrespective f whether hiscollective oal proves tselfworthy f recognition n the basis of criticalevaluation hrough eferenceo ontext-transcendentormativetandards.ndoing o,he runs p against is own critique f ubjectivism.7

A secondresponse o the question f the normative asis for thicaljudgment s to seek a standard hat s not educible osubjective ills anddesires. f wepursue his ath, owever, esoon ee that he nly ntelligibleposition s one that ffirms, ot he qualvalueofeachperson's dentity ndlife, but rather, t most, merely heequalpotential alue of these. For,uncritical ffirmation f the ctual qualvalueofeachperson's dentity ndlife s, as shown bove, ncoherent. t most we can presume qual worth.Indeed, nterestingly-in iewof his own apparently ncritical ffirmationof heQuebecois oalof survivance"-this swhat aylor imself oncludes

(p. 66). The presumption f equal worth equires processof criticalevaluation hrough eferenceocontext-transcendenttandards f ome ortorother efore tcan become judgment f bynomeansnecessarily qual)worth.Whatkind f standards re availablehere?Broadly peaking, t spossible odistinguish etween wokinds, orresponding o two ntercon-nected but distinct spects of the concept f (postconventional) thicalvalidity. he first f these points n the direction f an affirmation fautonomy; he econd oints oward he dealof authenticity.



264 POLITICALTHEORY /April 997

From the point f view of the postconventionalelf, laimsto ethicalvalidity ave a number f nterconnected utdistinguishable spects.8 heindividual horaises claim o ethical alidity or er ctions, or nstance,asserts t east he following hree hings: he claims a) that he s actingautonomously;b) that he s acting naway hat sright or er s a concretebeingwith specific ife-history hrough eferenceo tandards f valuationthat re not reducible o her will and desires; nd c) that her ctions reauthentic, n some sense of being true o her,"whereby uthenticity, oo,presupposes ontext-transcendentormative tandards. or our mmediatepurposes, b) and c) aremost elevant.n eachcase,context-transcendentnormative tandards re nvolved, ut he ocus s somewhat ifferent.n thecase of b), the focus s beyond he elf, oward hose trongly valuativeinterpretations hat orm henecessary orizon or ny udgment f ethical(or moral) value. In the case of (c), the focus s on the nner elf, heappropriate xpression f which s the recondition or uthentic ction.

It is important o note that ach of these aspectsof ethical validitypresupposes ritical valuation. n the case of (b), the focus s on thesubstantive onceptions f the goodaroundwhich he ndividual orms eridentity nd ives her ife. Howmay uch onceptions eevaluated? ener-ally speaking, onceptions f the good are udged through eference oalternative onceptions, orwhichgreater r lesser ationality s claimed;thus, or xample, he elf-definition nd ctions or,more enerally,dentityand ife)of an ndividual hodefines er elf nd orients er ife ccordingto n deal f elf-abnegation ay onceivably ecriticized hrough eferenceto a conception f the good that akes ndividual elf-realization s its

fundamentaldeal.Here, he udgment akes he form hat he ontent f agiven dentity r life s not worthy f recognition or is less worthy frecognition) ecause t s basedonconceptions f thegood hat re miscon-ceivedor wrong. n the ase of c), the focus s on the ndividual's innernature." er elf-definitionsnd ctions or,more enerally,dentity nd ife)canbe criticized n the basis of authenticity-as owhether r not hey retrue o her, or nstance,nthe enseof genuinely xpressing er riginality.Herethe udgment akes heform hat given dentity r ife s not worthy

ofrecognitionor s lessworthy f recognition) ecause t s inauthentic. obe sure, lthough oth esponsesnvolveudgments f valueonthebasisofstandards hat re not purely ubjective, oth iverise o different inds fproblems elating o the tandards owhich hey ppeal.

Inthe ase of b),the roblem rises hat, napostmetaphysical orld, ometastandardsppear o beavailable or djudicating etween ival oncep-tions f the good ife.Although rom hepoint f view of the ndividualsinvolved, omeconceptionseem learly etter han thers, here ppear o



Cooke AUTHENTICITYNDAUTONOMY 265

be no universally cceptable tandards or ssessing he ontent f substan-tive onceptions f he good ndfor valuating ompeting onceptions. hisis one mportant easonwhy ertain orts f modem ocieties, n particularthose hat cknowledge hat hey perate nder onditions f ethical lural-ism,9 estrict ecognitionn the public phere orecognition f autonomy,understood s each person's bility o form er wn conception f thegoodlife and abstain rom valuation f the content f specific onceptions.'0Indeed, valuation y he tate in ts aws,policies,nstitutions, rpractices)of the ontent f specific onceptions f the good ife s seen s a denial fthe ery deaof utonomy, o he xtent hat tdenies ndividualshe reedomthemselves ocritically valuate nd reach udgment hat orms he ore fthis dea." This kind of response o the question f the basis for thicalevaluation, herefore, ay give rise to a politics f difference onnectedsolelywith he deal of utonomy. shallhavemore o say bout his ersionof thepolitics f difference n the hird ection.

In the ase of c), theproblem rises hat he deal of authenticity as tsroots n a philosophy f nature-specifically, n understandingf nature ssource-that, s even Taylor imself dmits, ests n foundations hat revery nclear nd problematic.12 or who s this inner elf' to whosevoiceeach ndividualmust isten f he s to actauthentically?n particular, hatguarantee s available hat what t says s right r good?Although he dealof uthenticity oes, sTaylor ays, ppear obe a powerful oral deal, t sfar rom lear hat t anbedisentangled rom hemetaphysical aggagewithwhich t has been ntimately oundup from he beginning. his holdsforeven hose roponents f the deal of authenticity hoattempt o dissociate

it from he deal oforiginalityand orresponding nderstandingfnature ssource, nd expressivist iewof the elf).Alessandro errara, or nstance,defines uthenticitynterms f four imensions-coherence, itality, epth,and maturity-rather han n terms f the notion f originality. owever,Ferrara's roject, oo-although ertainly eserving f serious ttention-seems to run nto problemswhen t comes to the question f context-transcendent ormativetandards: ritical valuation f uthenticity equiresthe guidance f reflective udgment "phronesis") n order o select the

combination f values n the various imensions hat est suits who we,individually r collectively, re.'3But, f werelinquish he dea of a reliableinner oiceor faculty f udgment hat ells swhat sright r true, hen t shard o ee how phronesis" an ead ndividualsndgroups noneparticularcontext o produce tatements r norms hat re universal, n the enseofpossessing ctual elevance or ndividualsndgroups nother ontexts.14 tseems o me, herefore,hat lthough omenotion f uthenticity s a moralideal might onceivably e worked ut as part of the notion f ethical




selfhood,t s extremely nreliable s an evaluativetandard roviding basisfor ecognitionn the public phere.We can thus onclude hat his econdwayofresponding othe uestion f he asis for thical valuation ay iverise to a politics f difference hat s closely onnected ith he dealofauthenticity, ut hat his onnection enderstproblematic.

2

It thus ppears hat he olitics f difference as no necessary onnectionwith he deal of authenticity ndthat, here uch connections asserted,it runs nto ifficulties. urthermore,lthough hepolitics f difference lsohasnonecessary onnection ith he deal f utonomy,t s at east s closelyconnected ith he atter s it s with uthenticity, nd, his onnection s,arguably, essproblematic. oregenerally, emight aythat arious ead-ings of the politics f difference re conceivable, orresponding ovariousreadings f ts underlying emand or ecognition f specific dentity. ven

if we restrict urselves o those nterpretations hat re universalist i.e.,maintain hat veryone s to be recognized-at east, otentially-for heirspecific dentity), ecan dentify hefollowing nterpretations:"5

1. recognition f (the potential quality f) individual and group) distinc-tiveness, nderstood s originality;16

2. recognition f ndividuals' and groups') qual capacity o form nd definetheir pecific dentities nd ives;

3. recognition f the pecificity f ndividual andgroup) eeds;4. recognition f he potential quality f he) istinctivenessf ndividualandgroup) chievement; nd

5. recognition f the potential quality f the) pecific onceptions f thegoodaroundwhich ndividuals and groups) rient heir elf-understandingsndlives.

From he oregoingt hould e clear hat aylor's eading f the olitics

of difference akes he irst nterpretations its nterpretation f thedemandfor ecognition nderlying his olitics. his nterpretationf he emand orrecognition f specific dentity s closely ied to the deal of authenticityand-as we have een-runs up against he ifficulty hat tsbasisfor riticalevaluation s unreliable nd uncertain. owever, lthough aylor's iscus-sionstrongly uggests his irst nterpretation, aylor's nitial weaker) or-mulation f the politics f difference oints n the direction f the econdinterpretation; o too doesanalternative eading f his tronger ormulation



Cooke/ AUTHENTICITYANDAUTONOMY 267

of the politics f difference-one hat ocuses n individuals' ubstantiveconceptions f the good,rather han n their inner ature." aylor imselfdoesnot cknowledge ither f these possible eadings, utwe haveseenthat, n eachcase,they oint n thedirection f an affirmation f autonomyrather han uthenticity.17he other hree ossible nterpretations re notmentioned yTaylor t all. They hus equire rief iscussion.

The third nterpretations an interpretation f the politics f differencefrequently ncounteredncontemporary ebates, nparticularnthe ontextof feminism nd,more enerally,nconnection ith he emands or ecog-nition f various disadvantaged roups. his is the nterpretation f thedemand or ecognitionfdifference n which abermas ocuses.18 ikethesecond nterpretation,his hird nterpretations closely onnected ith heideal of ndividual utonomy. his s evident nHabermas'sustification fthe mportance fpublic ebate n the ppropriatenterpretationf needs. nthe context f feminism, or nstance, e sees debateon the appropriateinterpretation f needs s necessary or womain easons: irst, n order ohighlight hediscrepancy etween quality de ure" ndactual iscrimina-tion gainstwomen; econd, norder o void he

vergeneralizedlassifica-tions used to label disadvantagedituations nd disadvantaged roups fwomen hat iverise o new forms f discrimination.n both ases,what sat ssue nthis truggle or ecognitionfdifferencesnneeds s the chieve-ment f not ust "de ure" but "de facto" utonomy.19 omen and othersocially isadvantaged roups) rehindered nthe xercise f their apacitytopursue heir wn onceptions f thegood ife yfalse erceptions f theirneeds,based on ignorance f their pecific xperiences nd ife ituations.

Thus Habermas writes: It is necessary o establish n the public phereclearly herespects n which ifferences etween he xperiences nd ife-situations f certain) roups f women ndmenbecome ertinent oequalopportunities oexercise ndividualiberties."20n otherwords, his ersionof the politics f difference alls for recognition f the specific eedsofsocially isadvantaged roups, hich esult rom heir pecific xperiencesandsituations, n order opermit hemembers f these roups o operate sautonomousndividuals.

Thefourth nterpretation allsfor ecognition f thedistinctive chieve-ments f each ndividualandgroup) n a society. his dea that istinctiveachievementshould e valued an be found, or nstance,nthewritings fGeorg immel ndG. H.Mead.2"immel nd Mead,who hare aylor's iewthatwe seek o be recognizednourdifferences rom ther ersons, uggestthatwedistinguish urselves rom ther eople ydoing omething ell hatother eople annot o,orcannot oas well.Onthis onception, herefore,the istinctivenessf he ndividualsfoundednfunctional ifference. hus



268 POLITICAL HEORYApril 997

Simmel peaks pprovingly f thedivision f abour, ndMead tells s thatthe distinctiveness f the ndividual s rooted in distinctions f functionaldifference hatput him n relationship ith others nstead f separatinghim."22 unctional ifference hus rovides henormative tandard gainstwhich he worth f the ndividual or group) an be assessed.However,functional ifference, ike all other ttempts oprovide standard or hecritical valuation f chievement without hich he dea of recognition fachievementsmeaningless),uns nto he roblem hat tpresupposesomeoverarchinget f goods rvalues.The notion f functional ifference aisesthe questions:who or what ecides which unctionsre valuable goodoruseful) or given ociety, ndhow re hey o be ranked norder f value?To this xtent, hedemand or ecognition f distinctive chievements noless problematic han he demand or ecognition f distinctivenessn thesenseof originality.

The fifth nterpretation alls for ecognition f differences etween hesubstantive onceptions f the good ife hat nform he dentities nd ivesof specific ndividualsndgroups. nlike he econd ndthe hird nterpre-tations, owever,tdoesnot ocus nthe apacity oform ne's dentity ndliveone's ife ccording o one's own onception f hegood ife; t focuses,rather, n actual differences etween eople'sfundamental thical ommit-ments nd convictions. nlike ither hefirst r the fourth nterpretation,moreover, t doesnotviewdistinctivenesss something ositive n tself; tsees ndividualandgroup) ifference s afact hat btains nmany ontem-porary ocieties nd sapotential roblem or ontemporary olitics. n thisreading f thepolitics f difference, any ontemporaryocieties re ethi-cally and often lsomorally) luralist,n hat here re ignificant ifferencesin the fundamental thical and moral) commitments nd beliefs f thedifferent ndividuals nd groups.23here re significant ifferencesn thesubstantive onceptions f he ood ife hrough eferenceowhich ndividu-als and groups orm heir dentities nd ive their ives;furthermore, hereappear obe no universally cceptable tandards hatwouldpermit ontext-transcendent ritical valuation f, or adjudication etween, hese variousconceptions. here s thusno generally cceptable asisfor ecognition fthe worth f

these onceptions;his, s we saw n section above,has eadmany olitical hinkers o call for ecognition, ot f the onceptions hem-selves, ut f he apacity owork ut ndpursue uch onceptions-that s,for ecognitionf ndividualutonomy. ccording othis ifth eading f hepolitics f difference, owever,his s not n option. ecognition f ndivid-ualautonomy,t rgues,may tself ntail uppression fdifference. omeonewho s fundamentallyuided y n dealof elf-sacrifice r elf-abnegation,for nstance, s likely oreject he picture f selfhood hat roponents f



Cooke/ AUTHENTICITY ANDAUTONOMY 269

autonomy akeas fundamental. urthermore, ven in the case of thoseindividuals nd groupswhodo share conception f selfhood hat aluesautonomy, heymaynot ank t relative o other alues n the ame wayas,for nstance, efenders f the econd nterpretation:hat s,theymaynot eeautonomy s central o elfhood r s a value hat verrides ther alues, uchas the ealization f substantive thical oods.Thus, or nstance, omeonemay think f herself s possessing capacity o determine nd pursueparticular onception f he ood ife ut may ee that apacity s subordinatetoher ommitment o he rinciple f he anctity fhuman ife at east omeof theparties n the ontemporary onflicts ith egard o abortion eem ohold viewof this ind).

Does thefact hat onflicting onceptions f selfhood andof ts relationto substantive onceptions f the good)exist n a given ociety ecessarilyentail uppression f difference n that ociety? ivergences f thiskind onot necessarilyead to suppression f difference, or ven conflicting on-ceptions f elfhoodand ts elation osubstantiveonceptions f he good)conceivablymaygiverise o visions f a goodsociety hat o not onflict.For nstance, conception f elfhood uided y n dealof elf-abnegationmaygiverise otheview hat ocietymust romote hegeneral elfare, ndthus o a utilitarian ision f the goodsociety; et conception f selfhoodguided y he ompetingdealof ndividual utonomy ay ive ise o verysimilar tilitarian ision. erek arfit's ook,Reasons nd Persons, estifiesto the ormer; . . Mill's argumentnOnLiberty, s a famous xample f helatter.24 owever, lthough ompeting onceptions f selfhood nd ts rela-tion o the goodneed not give rise to competing onceptions f the goodsociety, here s a strong ikelihood hat heywilldo so. Utilitarianismsnotcompatible ith ll conceptions f selfhood nd ts relation o the good,forinstance;ndeed, ts ompatibility ith onceptions undamentallyuided ythe deal of ndividual utonomy asbeen ontested. urthermore, funda-mental oncernwith ndividual utonomy s most requently xpressed n apreference or omeversion f iberal olitics, nd no version f iberalismis compatible ith ll conceptions f selfhood nd ts relation o the good.More generally, hedifficulty rises because all proposals or tructuring

public ife xpress omevision f human lourishingndhuman xcellence,evenwhere hey xplicitly trive ot o do so.As such hey nevitablyxcludethosewhodo not hare he ominant ision.25hedifficulty scompoundedby the fact hat he aws of the tate, ven where hey spire o absoluteneutrality mong ubstantive onceptions f the good, re ntimately on-nected o nstitutions ndpractices hat renotneutral tructures, ut atherthemselves xpress articular iews f he elf nd he ood. Lawsregulatingdivorce, or nstance,nescapablyncorporatepecific iews f marriage nd




the family; or t would be impossible or egislators o determine hat hegrounds or ivorce hould e, or how to divide he family ssets, withoutsomeparticular nderstanding f the ole played y marriage n human ifeandof what men nd women hould espectivelyontribute o t. Or again,the nstitution f the market eflects particular iew of selfhood nd thegood, n that t emphasizes hevalueof economic fficiencya valuechal-lenged by deep ecologists, or nstance), nd of characteristics uch asself-sufficiencythus discriminating gainst hosewho do not ee this simportant rwhofail o ttain tdue ocircumstanceseyond heir ontrol).26

Sincenoproposal or tructuring ublic ife s neutral ith egard osubstan-tive isions f he ood ife and he onceptions f elfhood ithwhich heseare connected), t seems ikely-if not nevitable-that ny suchproposalwill exclude certain oices. The likelihood ncreases nder onditions fethical luralism. hus o acknowledgehenonneutrality f llproposals orstructuring ublic ife s to acknowledge he ikelihood f exclusion fdifference. hat re the mplications f this or hepolitics f recognition?If ll conceptions f he tate nd politics otentially xclude ertain ictures

of the elf and ts relation othe good,then here s an important hift nemphasis.The problem s now not how to prevent xclusion althoughminimizing xclusion ertainly an be aimedfor); ather, t s how to dealwithwhat onaldMoonrecently asreferred oasthe tragic" imension fpolitical ife: he fact hat ven those onceptions f politics hat spire oremain pen o all voices n societymay nevitably xclude omeof these.27I shall return o this point riefly n my concluding emarks. ere shallsuggest hatTaylor oes at least take eriously he problem f inevitable

exclusion.Unfortunately, he ensions nd contradictions hat esethis ac-count f he olitics fdifference-in articular, is mbivalence ith egardto the dealof utonomy ndhisfixation n the dealof authenticity-meanthat is contribution othis roblem ends oo easily o be overlooked.

3

I shall not deal in detail with Habermas's ightly rgued esponse oTaylor's iscussion f the politics f recognition. is criticism f Taylor'soverly arrow nterpretation f he olitics f qual dignity sconvincing; otoo s hiscritique fTaylor's roposed lternative eading f iberalism hat,though t upposedly epresents serious lternative o so-called roceduralliberalism, n fact undermines principle t the heart f all versions fliberalism: he dea of ndividual utonomy. y concern, nstead, hall be




withHabermas's wn onceptions f he onstitutional tate nd deliberativepolitics, rom he point f viewof the demand or ecognition f specificidentity hat underlies he politics of difference. o what extent anHabermas's onception ccommodatehevarious inds f demand or ec-ognition f specific dentity hat identified n section ? As we have seen,twoof he ive eadingshat proposed nterpret he emand s ademand orrecognition f unique dentity; hat s, they iew ndividual istinctivenessas something o be promoted: hefirst, hrough eference o the deal ofauthenticity; hefourth, hrough eferenceo the deal of functional iffer-ence. These interpretations unup against heproblem hat he basis forcritical valuation n which hey ely s, respectively, nreliable r conten-tious.Thus, lthough hedemand or ecognition f unique dentity houldnot be dismissed ut of hand,28 e can leave it aside in the followingdiscussion f Habermas. he remaining hree eadings egard ndividualdistinctiveness ot s something o be promoted ut s a fact f ife n manycontemporaryocieties nd s a potential roblem or ontemporary olitics.Ofthese hree, further wo ocus n ndividual utonomy s that hichmustbe recognized n the public phere, f differences etween hefundamentalethical ommitments nd convictions f citizens re to be taken eriously:the ne nterprets he emand or ecognitionf pecificdentity s a demandfor ecognition f differencesn needs whereby uch ecognition,n turn, sseen s a precondition or ecognitionf utonomy; he ther maintains hatrecognition f utonomys the nly cceptable asis for olitical ecognitionin a postmetaphysical orld nder onditions f ethical luralism, herebythis osition s,once gain, ltimatelyustified hrough eferenceothe dealof utonomy. ehave lready eenhowHabermas cknowledgeshe

mpor-tance f the recognition f the pecificity f needs;we shallnow considerwhether e seesrecognition f autonomy s the only cceptable asis forpolitical ecognitionn contemporaryocieties. houldhedo so, he runs pagainst heproblem eencounteredn connection ith hefifth eading fthe emand or ecognitionf pecificdentity: hat f dealingwith iscrimi-nation gainst hosewho do not valueautonomy, r who do not see theautonomy f the ndividual s more mportant han he ealization f certain

substantive oods.Asalready ndicated, he laim hat ecognitionf uton-omy s the only cceptable asis for olitical ecognitionn contemporarypluralist ocietiessfrequentlyalthough ot lways29)inked o the iew hatthe tate must bstain rom valuation f the ontent f pecific onceptionsof thegood ife, hat s, that he tate must emain eutralwith egard o thesubstantive thical ommitmentsnd onvictions f ts itizens. n consider-ingHabermas's osition ith espect oautonomy, shall hus lso addressthe question f whether r not he affirms he ethical neutrality f the




constitutional tate nd, f so, the ense n which he affirms' t. Even briefconsiderationf his ssue,however,scomplicated y he act hat abermashas modified isposition n recent ears. n particular, abermas asnowrelaxedhis originally igid istinction etweenmorality nd ethics,whichaffects nturn isviews n the riority f utonomy nd he thical eutralityof the tate. shall hus reface his art f mydiscussionwith sketch fthe most mportant odifications hatHabermashas undertaken n thisregard.

It could beargued hat fundamental oncern ith romoting he uton-omyof the ndividual aspervaded abermas'swritings rom is earliestpublications p to, and ncluding, herecent ublication f Between actsand Norms30 cannot onduct uch n argument ere, lthough think hereis plenty f evidence n favour f t. Nor can I heredeal adequatelywithHabermas's onception f autonomy, or t s complex nough orequire nessayof ts own. shallmerely arn hat abermas's onception hould otbe confused ith he tandard iberal onception f autonomy, hich ooksonly t the ndividual uman ubject oncerned orealizeher wnparticularconception f he ood ife.Although abermas, oo, efines utonomyinteralia)in terms f the apacity o work ut one's own conception f thegoodlife, n contrast omany iberal onceptions isconception f autonomy sintersubjectivistnddialogical: he ndividual ains utonomy nly hroughher nvolvement n a network f communicativeelations ith thers. erautonomy, emight ay, s defined nterms f her ational ccountabilityoothers or he alidity f he moral nd thical laims he raises.3'naddition,at least since the argument n Between acts and Norms, utonomy orHabermas s a multidimensionalonception, orHabermas ow asserts nintrinsic onnection etween rivate utonomy the ndividual's apacity opursue erownconception f the good ife) nd civicor public utonomy(the citizens' apacity o participate n processes f democratic ill andopinion ormation);urthermore,oth ivic utonomy ndprivate utonomyare connected-in waysthat find ar from lear-with moral utonomy,understoodn the Kantian enseof obedience o self-imposedaws.Finally,Habermas roposes notion f egalautonomy, hich omprises ach ofthese hree

lements:moral utonomy, ivicautonomy, nd private uton-omy.32nthe ollowing,twillbeuseful o bear he omplexity fHabermas'sconception f autonomy nmind.

There re also somegrounds or rguing hat Habermas as not implybeen concerned o promote utonomy, ut that he has prioritized t: hiswell-known istinction etweenmoral uestions nd ethical uestions anbeseen s symptomatic f his. or Habermas, oral eliberations ealwiththenormative egulationf ntersubjectivection-conflictsrom n mpartial,




universalist oint f view;ethical eliberations eal with ontext-specific,substantive uestions f thegood ife. or ourpresent urposes, wo spectsof his istinction reparticularly elevant: irst, orrespondingohisdistinc-tion betweenmorality nd ethics,Habermas sserts distinction etweenautonomy nd self-realization.33utonomy prior o Between acts andNorms) s conceived yHabermasn both stronger nd weaker ense. nits tronger ense t efers omoral utonomy nd omprises wo omponents:moral nsight nd rational ccountability. oral nsight s internally on-nectedwith he dea of discursively chieved niversal onsensus; ationalaccountability efers o the willingness nd ability o orient ne's actionstoward riticizable alidity laims n discursive eliberation. n its weakersense utonomy sconceived nly s rational ccountability, ithout eces-sary reference o the dea of discursively chieveduniversal onsensus.Habermas's otion f elf-realization efers othe ndividual uman ubject'sconcern odevelopher wn unique dentity ndto ivea life riented o herownparticular ubstantive onceptionsf he ood ife,whereby he ssumesrational ccountability o others or hevalidity f the ethical laims sheraises. Thus, for Habermas, utonomy n the weaker s opposedto thestronger ense s also a component f self-realization.34econd, furthersignificant spect f Habermas's istinction etweenmorality ndethics sthat, p toBetween acts nd Norms, abermas's ersion f discourse thicswas not imply theory fmoral alidity ut imultaneouslytheory f egalandpolitical alidity. he ategory f justice" mbraced ll three imensionsofvalidity. owever,t xcluded thical alidity-the phere f ontext-specificsubstantive uestions f he good ife.Questions f ustice that s, questionsof moral, egal, nd political alidity) eredefined n terms f "themoralpoint f view"; he atter as understood s a standpoint f mpartiality romwhich nterests ouldberegulated nthe asis of universalizableonsensusattained npublic rocesses fdiscursive eliberation. thical uestions adnoplace nsuchdeliberations. n this onception,ust norms nd principlesare those that both reflect he autonomy in the stronger ense) of theindividual nd safeguard er ntegrity whereby integrity" r "dignity" sfor Habermas synonym or utonomy n the weaker ense of rational

accountability).35ccordingly,ust norms ndprinciples ot nly mbodydiscursively chieved niversal onsensus n the validity f moral norms;they lso respect ach individual's ational apacity o orient er actionstoward riticizable alidity laims,without egard othe ubstance f hat orwhich validity s claimed. For our purposes what s important s that,according o the original ersion f discourse thics, thical uestions reexcluded rom eliberations n ustice, nd ust norms nd principles ecog-nizethe utonomy f ndividuals, rrespective f the ontent f their thical




commitments ndconvictions. ne could lso say:the tate n formulatingprinciples f usticemust emain eutral ith egard o citizens' ubstantiveconceptions f the good life. Habermas's nsistence n the neutrality fjustice with egard o citizens' thical ommitments nd convictions asbasedin part n pragmatic easons: nder onditions f ethical luralism,significant ivergences etween he articipants' ubstantive onceptions fthegood ife, ogether ith iverging eeds esulting rom iffering xperi-encesand ife-situations, ouldprevent ny consensus n universalizableinterests eing eached. ut at east part f the eason or xcluding thicalquestions rom eliberations n ustice erived rom abermas's onceptionof autonomy tself: utonomy understood n its weaker ense as rationalaccountability)equires espect or ach person's apacity odetermine orherself conception f he ood ife r-in the egative ormulationreferredbyHabermas-respect or achperson's apacity oreject nygiven ubstan-tive conception f the goodlife on the basisof publicly efendable oodreasons; f the tate were o privilege nyparticular ubstantive onceptionofthegood ife, twould e a form f disrespect or his apacity.ndeed, orHabermas, espect or autonomy emands espect oreach individual'srational apacity owork ut for erself er wn onception f hegood ife,for woreasons: t requires espect or his apacity ot nly ecause t s theexpression f human ignity ut lso because he ndividual uman ubject,inexercising his apacity, evelops er pecific-in sense, rreplaceable-identity. or Habermas, he postconventional)ndividual uman ubjectdevelops er pecific, rreplaceabledentity hrough er bility orespond ovalidity laimswith "yes" r "no."Thereasonwhy he xercise frationalaccountability romotes he

specific dentityf

the ndividual s that hereasons he provides n defending er position, r in challenging hat fothers, ust lways e her easons,nthe ense hat hemustwork hem utforherself ndno onemay without er onsent) peak onherbehalf. hisis the ense n which he s irreplaceableunvertretbar).36or this eason,recognizing he utonomy f ndividuals, ather han he ubstance f theirspecific onceptions f the good ife, s not ust a pragmatic ecessity;t sitself form f recognition oth of a universally hared apacity nd of

specificity.nce

again,his

estifies o the fact hat hepolitics f equaldignity, n callingfor recognition f autonomy, y no meansnecessarilyconflicts ith he olitics f difference; ather-contra aylor-it hould eseen s a serious ttempt orespond othe emand or ecognitionf pecificidentity. t would eem, herefore,hatHabermas's iscourse thics in itsoriginal ormulation), lthough t accordspriority o autonomy ver therealization f substantive onceptions f thegood ife, s not usceptible oTaylor's critique hat, n doing so, it necessarily uppresses ifference.




Nonetheless, t remains pen to criticism n this egard.t could be arguedthat ts self-professed eutrality ith egard o citizens' ubstantive thicalcommitments nd convictions isguiseswhat s in fact lack of neutrality:itsprivileging f those onceptions f he ood ife hat ffirm he riority fautonomy ver he ealization f ndividual r collective ubstantive oals.

Criticism f Habermas eremaybe overhasty, owever; orHabermashas, over he years, radually elaxed is distinction etweenmorality ndethics, ith resumablemplications or he uestions f he rioritization fautonomy nd state eutrality ith egard o substantive onceptions f thegood ife.Before eaching final onclusion s to Habermas's esponse othedemand or ecognition f difference, herefore, e must ookcarefullyat his present, ewposition. he threemost ignificant evelopments ereare i) his ntroduction f category f ethical iscourses,ii) the nsistenceon such discourses s an important trand f politics, nd iii) the cknow-ledgment f the thical haping f the onstitutional tate.Notsurprisingly,both he dea ofethical iscoursesndthe hird dea-the idea that onstitu-tional rinciples re nevitablynterpretednthe ight f ollective oals ndself-understandings-playprominent olenHabermas'sesponseoTaylor.

(i) Habermas'sntroductionf category f thical iscourses epresentsa first mportant tep oward elaxing is nitially igid istinction etweenmorality ndethics. n The Theory f Communicativection abermas adrestricted he term discourse" o forms f argumentation hat eal withuniversal alidity laims, nderstood s claimswith egard owhich iscur-sively chieved niversal onsensuss (inprinciple) ossible; inceHabermasfurther aintained hat nly laims o truth ndmoral alidity ell nto hiscategory, nly discussion f such claims classified potentially) s dis-course.37n an essaywritten t the nd of the 1980s,however, abermasextended he ategory f discourse ocoverdiscussion f ethical uestions(and, ndeed, ragmatic) uestions.38n ethical iscourses,ontext-dependentquestions f the good life can be discussed ationally nd adjudicated.Habermas urther istinguished etween thical iscourses hat ertain oquestions f ndividual dentity nd the good ife, nd those hat ertain oquestions fgroup r collective dentity ndthegood ife. he atter ind f

discourse smost nteresting o us in the resent ontext: n such discourses(usually eferred oby Habermas s ethical-political iscourses),39artici-pants clarify ow they want to see themselves s citizens f a specificrepublic, s inhabitants f a specific egion, s heirs o a specific ulture,which raditions heywish o perpetuate r discontinue, ow they want odeal with heir istorical estiny, ith ne nother, ith ature, nd o forth.'Ethical-political iscourses re thus orums or he hermeneuticxplicationof shared alueorientations uided ythenorm f uthenticity; articipants




aim t chievingnunderstandingf hemselvesromhe oint fview ftheir pecificdentities,hrougheferenceo he pecificubstantiveoncep-tions f he oodife hat nformhesedentitiesnd ives.4"

(ii)Asecondmportanttep nrelaxinghe istinction etween oralityand thics as aken ith he rgumentnBetweenacts ndNorms. abermasnow istinguishesetween oral,egal, nd olitical ormsnd rinciples.Instead f single heoryfdiscoursethics, abermasow uts orwardthree interdependent)heories: discourse heory f rights, discoursetheory fdeliberativeolitics,nd discourse heoryfmoral alidity.42nthepresent ontext, he econd s particularlyelevant:n his theory fdeliberativeolitics,fwhich is heoryf he onstitutionaltate samajorpart, abermas o onger xcludes ublic iscussionf ethical uestions.Indeed, thical iscourses together ithmoral iscourses,ragmaticis-courses,nd argainingrocesses)re een s an mportanttrand f olitics.Here, t hould e noted hat abermas's heoryfdeliberativeoliticss a"twin-track"heory,n hatt uns long wo racks:tdistinguishesetween,and rovidesnormativeccountf, i)politicaleliberationhatsregulatedthrough emocraticroceduresnd s orientedowardecision aking,nd(ii)informal rocessesf will-formationnthe ublic phere.43abermassees thical iscoursess mportantnboth imensions: ublic iscussionfethical uestionsf he oodife, f ollectivedentity,nd f he nterpre-tation fneeds hould ake lacenot nly n he anarchictructures"f hepublic phere ut lso n hemore ormallyrganized,emocraticallyegu-lated rocessesf politicalegislation." hus he atter rocesseshouldincorporateontributionsromhe elevantebatesn he ublic phere, or

instance hen egallyegulatingiolence ithin arriage.therwise,oliti-caldiscourse ould ose ts apacityor ationallyringingbout hangesnprepoliticalttitudes,nterpretationsfneeds, nd alue rientations.45

(iii)Habermas'scknowledgmentf he thical atterningf he onsti-tutionaltatemay e seen s a third mportanttep nrelaxing is riginallysharp istinctionetween oral nd thical uestions.resumablyt eastpartly nresponseoattemptsuch sTaylor's oaccommodateollectivegoalswithin versionf iberalism,abermasow cknowledgeshe thical

shaping f he onstitutionaltate.46e sees t s an unavoidableact" hateveryegal ommunitynd very emocratic rocessf mplementingasicrights sethicallyatterned.47hepersons homake p nation f itizensat anygiven ime re always mbeddedn a network f traditionsndintersubjectivelyhared ontexts f experiencend ife. hus very egalsystemsalways lso he xpressionf particularife ormndnotmerelya reflection f the universalisteaturesf basicrights.48or this eason,constitutionalrinciples ill lways e nterpretedromhe oint f view f




a nation's istorical xperience: he nterpretation annot e ethically eu-tral.4' n llustration, abermas efers o the nstitutional uaranteesnjoyedby the Christian hurches n Germany, r the constitutional rivileges c-corded o the amily sdistinct rom ther ypes f ife-long ompanionships,in Germany nd, ndeed, nmany ther onstitutional tates.50

Habernas's ccount f ethical iscourses ndhis cknowledgmentf heethical atterning f the onstitutional tate an be seen as evidence f hisconcern o ncorporatehe thical imensioninhisnarrow ense f ethical")into he pheres f aw and politics, nd nto ublic rocesses fdeliberation.According o his modified onception, he constitutional tate does notsimply ecognizehe utonomy f itizens ithout egard otheir ubstantiveethical ommitments nd convictions: abermas ow argues hat hese nprinciple hould e open othematizationnpublic rocesses fdeliberationand that onstitutional rinciples nd the egal system re nevitably nter-preted n ight f some ubstantive onceptions f thegood ife.Habermas,we might ay, o onger traightforwardlyffirms he thical eutrality f heconstitutional tate: irst, e nsists hat thical uestions orm n mportantpart f political iscussion, oth t the evel ofpolitical egislation nd t thelevelof nformal ublicwill-formation;ontroversial thical uestionsmaynot imply e bracketed nd hereby rivatized, ut ather ust e discussedpublicly f political hange s to be possible. econd,he acknowledgeshatconstitutional rinciples illbe interpreted ifferentlyndifferent tates, sa result f differing istories, eographicalr conomic ituations, nd o on,that give rise to different ollectiveneeds and self-understandings. hemodern onstitutional tate s thusnot thically eutral n two enses.Here

it s important o note hat, hereas abermas's rgument ith egard othefirst f these enses s normative, isargument ith egard o the econd sanempirical ne.Habermas oes not rgue hat he onstitutionaltate houldbeethically atterned ut hat his navoidablys the ase; to this xtent isargument s empirical ather hanprescriptive. urthermore, is acknow-ledgment f the act f he onstitutional tate's thical atterning oes handin hand with commitment o the dealof state neutrality ith egard osubstantiveonceptionsf he ood ife.Hisempirical rgument ust e seen

in the context f a normative onception f the constitutional tate hat,despite he bove-mentioned odifications,ontinues o ffirm he eutralityof he aw with egard odifferencesnethical ommitmentsnd onvictionswithin given ociety.5"hecitizens f a constitutional tatemaynotgrantprivileges o one ife-form t the xpense f others ithin state.52

According o Habermas'snormative onceptions f the constitutionalstate nd deliberative olitics, nly hose ollective oals on which here scollective greement re acceptable.Collective greement rovides he




framework ithin hich thical ifferences ust e accommodated. ollec-tive agreement ay be either acit r explicit. t maybe a kind of ethicalsubstance,53r common orizon f interpretation,54hat s fundamentallyshared y llcitizens; lternatively,t an be the esult f consensus eachedin political iscourse." n either ase, however, he rucial uiding resup-position56sthat t s genuine greement, nthe ense f genuinely hared yall citizens. n the modern onstitutionaltate, nly hose ollective oalswillfind enuine ollective greement hat o not iscriminate gainst articularself-understandingsnd ife-forms, hat s, that re neutral ith egard ocompeting laims or ecognitionf ubstantiveonceptions f he ood ife.AsHabermas uts t: the thical ubstance f political ulture hich nifiesall citizens must emain neutral" is-a-vis he differences etween . .sub-political ommunities ithin he state, ach of whichhas based itsintegration n ts wn onception f he good."57ecause mpartialitynthissensefrequently oesnotobtain, he thical nterpretation f constitutionalprinciples ill often iverise to "cultural truggles n which isrespectedminorities efend hemselvesgainst n nsensitive ajority ulture."58neimportant orum or uch truggles re thical-political iscourses.ncertainkinds f ethical-political iscourses, itizens re oncerned ith he validity(inthe ense f general cceptability)f ollective elf-understandings.59orinstance, he article n the Constitution f the Republicof Ireland hat"recognises hat y her ife within he home,womangivesto the Statesupport ithout hich he ommon oodcannot e achieved"' may e andhas been) challenged y those rish itizens who do not share ither heinterpretation f "woman" or of collective dentity o which t appeals.Speaking enerally, hatHabermas efers oas"struggles or ecognition"6"may ecome ecessary hen he elf-understandingsfparticular roups renotreflected n the fficial r dominant ollective elf-understandings. c-cording o Habermas's onception f the onstitutional tate, uch trugglesshould-normatively peaking-lead omodification f existing ollectiveself-understandingsn order o accommodate hosewho see themselvesexcluded ythem. espite heunavoidable act f ethical atterning, here-fore, n the modern onstitutional tate the official r dominant elf-

understandings re lways nprinciple usceptibleocriticism nthe roundthat hey re not neutral ith egard ocitizens' thical ommitments ndconvictions ut rather ffectively rivilege ertain f these. Habermas'sacknowledgmentf thefact hat he modern onstitutional tate s ethicallypatterned s thus losely inked o a normative rgument hat mphasizes heimportance f hallengingpecificnstances f uch thical atteminghroughethical-politicaliscourses. owever,lthough abermas imself oesnot tatethis xplicitly, e dealsonlywith hose truggles or ecognitionhat hallenge



Cooke/ AUTHENTICITYAND AUTONOMY 279

the existing ollective elf-understandingshrough ppealto the deal ofindividual utonomy. oreover, eassumes hat nly hosekinds f chal-lenge o existing ollective elf-understandingsre ustified hat espect heindividual's apacity o determine orherself conception f the good ife.This s made lear yhisrejection f fundamentalism." abermas riticizesthe unreasonablenessf fundamentalistsnd argues hat he onstitutionalstate an tolerate nly hose ife-forms hat re guided y spirit f olerancefor ompeting thical ommitmentsndconvictions.62

We maynow return o the uestion uiding hispart f the discussion:how does Habermas's heory f the constitutional tate nd deliberativepolitics respond o the demandfor recognition f specific dentity hatunderlies hepolitics f difference,n particular o the fifth f thepossiblereadings f this demand proposed n section ? How does Habermas'stheory espond o demands or olitical ecognitionhat ely n a picture fthe elf nd ts relation o the goodthat ither eject he deal of ndividualautonomy r see it as subordinate o the realization f other ubstantivegoods? From heforegoing t is clear that Habermas's onception annotaccommodate uchdemands.His view of the

modern onstitutional tatepermits qual political ecognition nly n the case of those groupswhoaccept ts underlying ommitment o the ideal of individual utonomy,interpreted s the apacity f ach ndividualowork ut nd pursue er wnconception f thegood ife.63 he modern onstitutional tate, s conceivedby Habermas, s thus nevitably xclusionary f certain orms f ethicaldifference-its bility oaccommodate emands or ecognition f specificidentity s limited. or this reason,Habermas's nsistence n the ethical

neutrality f law is misleadingwithout he following ualification: heconstitutional rinciples nd the egalsystem f the modern onstitutionalstate re neutral nlywith egard o those thical ommitmentsndconvic-tions hat ltimately ccept he riority f he dealof ndividualutonomy.'M

4

I have rgued, ontra aylor, hat abermas's ccount f he onstitutionalstate resents version f he olitics f qualdignity hat akes eriously hedemand or ecognition f specific dentity nd s sensitive o many f theissues involved n this regard.Nonetheless, lthough abermas's heoryarguably rovides ne of the best onceivable rameworksor ecognizingdifference, t too sets certain imits. t cannot ccommodate emands orpolitical ecognitionhat re basedonaconception f he elf nd ts elation



280 POLMCALTHEORY /April 997

to the good that oes not value ndividual utonomy r regards t as lessimportant han he realization f certain ubstantive oods. ronically, t sTaylor ather han abermas ho xplicitly cknowledgesheneed or imitsin accommodating ifference. hereasHabermas, s we have seen, ome-whatmisleadinglynsists hat he itizens f a constitutional tatemaynotgrant rivileges oone ife-form t the xpense f others, aylor dmits hatsome xclusions renecessary. s he puts t: liberalism an't nd houldn'tclaim complete ultural eutrality. iberalism s also a fighting reed"(p. 62). All forms f iberalism-even aylor's roposed morehospitableversion-have o draw he ine omewhere;herewill nevitably e certainfundamental rinciples, heviolation f which annot e tolerated.

Taylor's uggestion hat iberalisms notneutral ith egard ocompetingconceptions f thegood ifebut "fighting reed" sbyno means enerallyaccepted n contemporary iscussions f iberalism andrelated roposalsfor tructuring ublic ife).John awls,for nstance, ontinues o maintainthat t s possible odeviseustpolitical rinciples hat re neutral ith egardto all citizens' ubstantive onceptions f thegood;65 abermas, s we haveseen, ontinues o affirm hedesirability ndpossibility f the neutrality fthe awwith egard o itizens' thical ommitments nd onvictions, ithoutmaking xplicit he mportant ondition owhich his s subject. onetheless,there oes appear o be increasing eadiness o acknowledgehat iberalism(and its associate doctrines) ets certain imits s far as the recognitionof-and indeed, oleration f-difference s concerned. nce this s admit-ted, t becomes ossible oaddress he uestion f the ppropriate esponseto iberalism's enial f equal political ecognitionocertain ocialgroups.

Thisquestion ssurely nurgent ne.Fordemands or ecognitionf he ypethat hallenge he priority f the value of individual utonomy ver therealization f certain ubstantiveonceptions f thegoodcontinue opersistin the modern orld-and cannot, s I have hown, e accommodatedvenby Habermas's onception f the onstitutional tate. his s evident n thestrong nti-abortionobby hat lourishes odayntheUnited tates, espitethe atter's ong-standingradition f ommitmentofundamentalespect orindividual utonomy ndto state eutrality ith egard o substantive on-

ceptions f thegood ife.Moreover, emands or ecognitionf his ype renot ikely odie away, s immigrants ndrefugees rom adically ifferentcultures ove nto he ensely opulated paces f stablished onstitutionalstates.How shouldwe respond o such demands? n particular, o theypresent problem or he liberal) onstitutional tate hat s essentiallypragmatic r onethat as a moral imension? pinion ppears o bedividedhere. or ome ontemporary riters, he mportance f espect or ndividualautonomy s so indisputable hat ontemporary onflicts f the ype have




described oseproblems f strategy ather han rinciple. .Kymlicka, orinstance, rgues hat n the ase of group emands or minority ights hatreject hevalueof ndividual utonomy, e must imply ndorse he radi-tional iberal elief n his alue. Although eregards uch emands sgivingrise to a genuine onflict hat eeds o be confronted onestly, e sees theproblem f mposingiberal rinciples sprudential ather hanmoral.66orHabermas, oo, he deal of ndividual utonomy eems ffectivelyndisput-able: for hose who have beensocializedwithin he radition f Europeanmodernity,trepresents level f nsight ehind hich heymay egress nlyat grave xistential-and ocial-cost; for hose whohavedeveloped heiridentity ithin his ultural radition, ommitment othe alue of ndividualautonomy imply annot e circumvented.67

Habermas's laim has a certain orce: ejection f the deal of ndividualautonomy oes not appear o be a real option or hoseof us who havedeveloped ur dentities ithin he radition f Europeanmodernity. t thesametime, owever,t could be argued hat ven our xistentially navoid-able commitment othe verridingmportance f ndividual utonomy oesnot elieve s ofmoral esponsibilityo hose ocialgroups owhomwe mustdeny qual political ecognitionecause hey o not hare his ommitment.68Indeed, t ould beargued hat he enial f qualpolitical ecognitiono uchgroups osesamoral roblem recisely ecause wehold uch n deal. f weaccept hat he deal f ndividual utonomy equiresespect or achperson'scapacity o form er wn conception f thegood ife,without egard or hecontent f uch conception,69hen hedenial f equal political ecognitionto some persons n the basis of the content f their ubstantive thicalcommitments nd convictions

osesa

problemwith moral imension.have lreadymentioned hework fDonaldMoon nthis egard:Moonseesthe nevitable xclusions f proposal or tructuring ublic ife hat ims obenonexclusionarys the ragedy f iberalism. ith his ormulation, oonassociates imself ith ne trand ithin he radition f iberalism, fwhichIsaiahBerlin s perhaps he best-known epresentative.70

However, lthough cknowledgmentf tragedy s itself form f moralrecognition, t also suggests hat othing an be done.Perhaps othing-or

little-can be done.Otherwriters, owever, re ess fatalistic. n a recentessay,JaneMansbridge, or nstance, rgues hat nydemocratic olity, otjust for ragmatic easons, ut lso for ormative easons,must oerce omepeople nto cting s theywouldnot therwise oand ccepting hings heywouldnot therwise ccept.However, coercions always ontestable, ndoften ighly nfair nd substantively njust."71 ansbridge nsists hat heinjustices hatwe nevitably ommit s we act ollectivelyhould ot implybeforgotten ndput ehind s. Shesuggests hat emocraciesneed ofoster



282 POLITICAL HEORY/pril 997

and value enclaves f resistance n which hosewho ose in each coercivemovecan rework heir deas and their trategies, athering heir orces nddeciding n a more rotected pace n what wayor whether o continue hebattle."72o be sure,Mansbridgeeavesopen he rucial uestion f howtodistinguish etweenust andunjust orms f political oercion." t could beargued hat oercion f those groupswho do not acceptthe priority findividual utonomys a form f ust oercion-although t s not t all clearwhat kinds of arguments ight e brought o bear here. Furthermore,Mansbridge'senclave"model f democratic eliberationnd ction-as sheherself ecognizes-generatests wn difficulties: or nstance, hemembersof a groupwhospeakonly o one another mayproduce nsights, ut heseinsights re also protected gainst easonable riticism; ansbridge lsopoints ut hat acilitatingppositions not he nly emocratic alue: tmustbebalanced gainst ther nes74-although, nce gain, he eavesopen hecrucial uestion f the basis on which uch a balanceshouldbe sought.Mansbridge's roposal s also open o the bjection hat t s not o differentfrom Habermas's onception f deliberative olitics nd that, ndeed, isproposal or thical-political iscourses rovides better odel or ealingwith hevoicesof those gainstwhom njustices avebeencommitted. naddressing heproblem f the ppropriate esponse o the nevitable xclu-sions75 f liberalism and associated doctrines), herefore, ansbridge'sproposal eavesopen oomany uestions obeof oncrete se. Nonetheless,her ontribution as the merit f thematizing n ssue hat as received ittlesustained ttention ithin he radition f iberalism: hat lthough xclusionmaybe inevitable,ts nevitability oes not make t morally cceptable.76

Itseems

o me that here retrong rguments

nboth ides of the ebateas to the moral ignificance f iberalism's xclusions, ut s yetnocompel-

lingones.This s in tself n argument or ontinuing hediscussion.77neof hemerits fTaylor's reatmentf he olitics frecognitionsthat e doesthis.As we have een, ather han imply gnoring he act hat here re imitsto the apacity f even hemost ospitable ersions f iberalism o accom-modate qually ll forms f difference, aylor cknowledges hat here illbe unavoidable xclusions. or does he lightly ass over he problems o

which his ivesrise:Taylor dmits hat e finds his onclusion isturbing.He thinks here s something rude nd nsensitive bout imply eplying,"This s how we do things ere," or he ttitude mplied y such reply soften erceived s one of contempt. here here s a substantial umber fcitizenswhoseculture alls into uestion hephilosophical oundaries fliberalism, aylor ees a need to deal with heir enseof marginalizationwithout ompromising n basic iberal olitical rinciples p. 63). To meetthis hallenge, e calls for change n attitude: rom ne of contempt r




rejection o n attitude hat resumes qualworth. his presumptionf worthis not n uncritical ffirmation f thevalueof anygiven ulture ut ather"starting ypothesis ith whichwe ought o approach hestudy f anyculture"p. 66). t s a way f ngaging ith thers hat tarts rom he remisethatwemay earn omething hrough he ngagement: rom he ssumptionthat ur wayof perceiving heworld, ur tandards, ur vocabularies, aybe transformed s a result f the dialogical ncounter. n effect, aylor's"presumption f equalvalue" eems orefer o no more han heneedforkind f dialogical penness hat satthe entre f Habermas's onception fcommunicativeationality. abermas's isparagementf Taylor's mphasisontheneed or presumptionf qualvalue sthus ot nly nfair oTaylor,78it s at odds with he ommunicative virtues" n which isownvision fdeliberative olitics epends.

Habermasmayhavestrong easons or ejecting fundamentalism,"n-deedfor roposing conceptionf he onstitutionaltate hat enies oliticalrecognition o so-calledfundamentalist orldviews.n insisting n theirunreasonableness,owever, isattitude oward fundamentalism"eems oborder n contempt.79ut surely ven iberalsmay earn rom fundamen-talists." o dismiss uch possibility ut of hand s, to paraphrase aylor,crude nd nsensitive-and ompromiseshe ower fHabermas's ision fa deliberative olitics hat s, nfact,muchmore ensitive odifference hanTaylor's ritique f proceduraliberalism llows.Tobe sure, heproblem finevitable xclusion, nd the enseof marginalizationt frequently ngen-ders,will probably otbe solved imply y a change n attitude: aylor'spresumption f qual worth eavesopen he uestion f whether t hould econnected ith ny concrete

oliticalmeasures-such s

laws,policies, rinstitutions-and, f so, what these would ook like. Moreover, espiteTaylor's seful mphasis n the mportance f ttitude, n he nd he uestionremains f where nd on what asis he imits f recognitionandtoleration)of difference houldbe drawn. t also leavesopenthe further uestion fwhether nd on what basis varying egrees f political ecognition rejustifiable: hether ifferentiations etween ocial groups hat re deniedequal political ecognition ightustify arying egrees f political ecog-

nition, anging rom imited olitical ecognition, otoleration, ocompleteexclusion.80 hen and on what basis may iberals and their ssociates)justifiably ayto groupswithin heir ocieties: Your views ndyour rac-tices re unacceptablend cannot e afforded qualpolitical ecognition"?Andwhen ndon what asis may hey ifferentiate etween roups hat redenied qual political ecognition? s I haveargued, rawing imits n thisway and making ifferentiationsf his ind)may e troubling or iberals,either ecause t poses pragmatic roblems r because t s cause for moral




concern. neof he ims f his ssay asbeen o allfor ontinued ebateon he ature f he ilemmasnvolvedndhow odealwith hem.n allingattentiono he eed o et imits o iberal ecognitionfdifference,nd nregardinghis s a problem ith otential oral ignificance,aylor's allfor presumptionf qualworthsastep n he ight irection.

NOTES

1. Charles aylor, ThePolitics f Recognition,"nMulticulturalismnd the Politics fRecognition", d. Amy GutmannPrinceton, J: rinceton niversity ress, 992); henceforthPR.Juirgen abermas, Struggles orRecognitionnConstitutional tates," uropean ournalofPhilosophy ,no.2 (1993): 128-55;henceforth RCS.

2. Pagenumbers nparentheses efer o PR.3. SRCS, p. 129.4. Both points re given more xplicit reatment y Taylor n C. Taylor, heEthics f

AuthenticityCambridge,A: Harvard niversity ress, 992).5. For nstance, . Simmel ndG.H. Meadsee ndividual istinctivenesss something o

be promoted, ut heir asis for his s an deal of functional ifference ather han uthenticity(seebelow).Or again,A. Ferrara s currently ngaged n the ttempt owork ut normativeconception f authenticity hat s not asedon the notion f originalityseebelow).

6. As s well known, abermas istinguishesetweenmoral uestions nd thical uestions.The former eal with he normative egulation f ntersubjectiveonflicts rom n impartial,universalist oint fview; he atter eal with ontext-specific,ubstantiveuestions f he oodlife. havemore o say about Habermas's istinction etween thics nd morality n section .

7. To be sure, aylor imself nsists hatwhat s at ssue n the emand or ultural urvivalis not ecognitionf qualvalue, or t snot demand o cknowledge heworth f Quebecoisculture 63-4).But t s difficult omake ense f he emand or survivance"-which allsforpolicies hat ctively eek o reatemembers f he ommunity-without ome ort f valuativestancewith egard oQu6becois ulture. ould the urvival f Nazi culture e regarded ssomethingobepromoted, or nstance,rrespectivefone's tance nNazism? cf. Habermas'sargument n SRCS, pp.142-3).

8. For fuller iscussion f his, ee MaeveCooke, Realizing he ost-Conventionalelf,"Philosophy nd Social Criticism 0,nos. 1/2 1994):87-101.

9. By "ethical luralism"-more ommonly eferred o as "moral luralism"-I meansituation n which here re significant ifferencesn the fundamental thical and frequentlyalsomoral) ommitmentsnd convictions f ndividuals nd groups, hereby follow Haber-

mas's distinction etweenmoral uestions ndethical uestionssee note above).10. This position, rguably, s opento the kinds f objections hat an be raised gainstattempts oground heprinciple f toleration n moral r religious kepticism: hat he attercannot rovide moral efense f toleration ut t most pragmatic ne, nd that, istorically,ithas ed torepressionsoften s tolerationcf. he ssays nS. Mendus, d., Justifying oleration(Cambridge, K:Cambridge niversity ress, 988).For his eason, he rgument ften eeksfurther upport hrough ppeal othevalueof ndividual utonomy-although his alue snot,of course, ncontestable.



Cooke/ AUTHENTICITYAND AUTONOMY 285

11.W. Kymlickamakes his oint articularly orcefullyn W. Kymlicka, Liberalism ndCommunitarianism,"anadianJournal fPhilosophy 8, no. 2 (1988):181-204.

12. C. Taylor, ourcesof the elf Cambridge, K: Cambridge niversity ress, 1989),p. 384.13.A.Ferrara, Authenticitynd he roject fModernity," uropean ournal fPhilosophy

2, no. 3 (1994):252.14. Ferrara's otion f uthenticityssupposed obeuniversalistn this ense seeibid., p.

250-1).15. This s not ntended s an exhaustive ist f possible nterpretations utmerely odraw

attention oa number f ignificantly ifferent ays f nterpretinghe emand or ecognitionof specific dentity.

16. Or through eferenceo someother dealof uthenticity.17. f the econd nterpretations interpreted s thedemand or ecognitionf ndividuals'

(or groups') apacity oform heir wn unique dentities,t s connected ith he dealsofbothautonomy nd uthenticityandthe roblems o which he atter ives ise).

18. Seeespecially RCS, pp. 132ff.19.SRCS, p. 133.20. Ibid.21. SeeG.Simmel, as Individuum nd ie Freiheit Berlin: lausWagenbach, 984), nd

G.H. Mead,Mind, elf nd SocietyChicago:ChicagoUniversity ress, 934).22.Mead,Mind, elf nd Society, . 318.

23. What refer o s ethical luralism an hus onceivablymbrace oth ultural nd thnicpluralism although t neednotdo so).Cultural nd ethnic emands or ublic ecognition fgroup dentity aybe demands or ecognitionn any of the enses have outlined bove.Accordingly,heymay noccasion e construed s a quest or ecognitionf he alue f givenconception f thegood ife. n her discussion f the o-called hador ase,Elizabeth aleottisuggests hat o construe emands or publicrecognition f collective dentity n this wayrepresents misreadingfwhat s at take.Whatever bout he pecificity f he ase n uestion,Galeotti's rgument eems orest n an overly ndividualisticnterpretationfwhat t s tohavea conception f thegood ife E. Galeotti, CitizenshipndEquality. he Place for oleration,"Political heory 1, no.4 (1983):585-605). or n account f he ollective imensions f deasof the good ife, ee MaeveCooke, Selfhood nd Solidarity," onstellations ,no. 3 (1995):337-57.

24. D. Parfit, easons nd Persons Oxford, K: Clarendon ress, 984); J. S. Mill, OnLiberty," nJ. S.Mill "On Liberty" nFocus, d. J. Gray ndG. W. Smith London:Routledge,1991).

25. Thishas, f ourse, een trongly isputed,nparticular yproponents f iberalism. uteven within iberal hought, here eems obe a recent endencyoward cknowledgmenthatits view of ustice nd the good s notneutral. ee mydiscussion f Habermas's osition ithregard o the ssue of "neutrality" n section . See also D. Moon,Constructing ommunity

(Princeton, J: Princeton niversity ress, 1993) for a convincing emonstration f thenonneutrality f ven hose ersions f iberalism hat xpressly esire o achieve t.26. SeeMoon,Constructing ommunity, . 63 ff., n thenonneutrality f ocial nstitutions

andpractices. ome of my xamples redrawn rom is xcellent iscussion.27.Ibid., . 10.28.Despitemy riticism f Taylor's, errara's, immel's, nd Mead'srespective ttempts

torespond o his emand, agree hat tdoes eem o xpress genuinemoral ntuition-perhapsevenonethat as an mportant olitical imension. owever, he rucial uestion, nmyview,



286 POLMCALTHEORY/ April 997

concerns he evel t which, r sphere nwhich, his emand anbe accommodated. lthoughrecognition funique dentity ay onceivably epossible, otmerely mong aniily nd riends

but lso mong trangers,t s far rom lear hat t an beachievednproblematicallyt thelevel f aw and politics, t east n modem luralistocietiescf.Cooke, SelfhoodndSolidarity").

29.Joseph az, ornstance,mphasizesoliticalecognitionf utonomyhiledvocatingaperfectionistonceptionf he tate hats ccordinglyot eutral ith egardo thical alues.J.Raz, heMorality f Freedom Oxford, K: Clarendonress, 986).

30.J.Habermas,aktizitat ndGeltung Frankfurt: uhrkamp,992), etween acts andNorms, rans. .RehgCambridge,A:MITPress, 995). age umbersn he ollowingeferto heGermanriginal.

31.SeeMaeve ooke, Habermas, utonomynd he dentityf he elf," hilosophy ndSocial Criticism 8,no. (1992):69-91.

32.Seeespeciallyhaps. and of Habermas,aktizitat ndGeltung, etween acts andNorms, nd .Habermas,Postscriptto aktizitat ndGeltung," hilosophyndSocialCriticism20,no. (1994): 38-9.

33. See J. Habermas,achmetaphysischesenken Frankfurt:uhrkamp,988), p.187-241, ostmetaphysical hinking, rans. . HohengartenCambridge,A:MITPress, 992),pp.149-204.

34.SeeCooke,Habermas,utonomy,nd he dentityf he elf."35.See,for xample, .Habermas,rlduterungen ur DiskursethikFrankfurt:uhrkamp,

1991),pp. 70, 149, 172-3, or the English ersion, ustification nd Application. emarks nDiscourseEthics, rans. . CroninCambridge,A:MITPress, 993]). agenumbersn hefollowing efer o the German riginal.

36. See Cooke, Selfhood ndSolidarity," . 343.37. J. Habermas, heorie eskommunikativenHandelns,d. 1 Frankfurt: uhrkamp, 981),

p.71,TheTheory fCommuncafiveAction,, rans. .McCarthyBoston: eaconPress,984), .42.38.Habermas, rlduterungen urDiskursethik,p.100-18.39.Ibid., . 123.40.SRCS, p. 139;Habermas, aktizitit nd Geltung, . 126; see also bid., p. 100-18.41. For reasons hat cannot xplore n the present ontext, do not find Habermas's

descriptionf thical-politicaliscoursess forums or ermeneuticelf-explorationuided ythe orm f uthenticityonvincing.or ne hing, is istinctionetweenhe arious inds fpolitical iscoursese dentifiesstoo harp; urthermore,is ccountuffers rom failure odistinguishetweenhe arious unctionsulfilledy thical-politicaliscourses;inally,hehermeneuticxplicationf hared alue-orientationssguided s a rule ot y henorm fauthenticityut y concern ith ruthnd y he orm f utonomy.

42.SeeHabermas,aktizitat nd Geltung, etween acts and Norms, speciallyhaps.3 and 4.

43.Habermas, aktizitat ndGeltung, . 369 ff.

44.Ibid., p.380-1.45.Ibid., . 376.46.SRCS,pp. 137 ff.47. Ibid., p. 139 and 144.48. Ibid., . 138.49. Ibid., . 144.50.Ibid., . 139.51.Ibid., p. 144-5.52.Ibid., p. 140and 146.




53. Ibid., . 146.54. Ibid., . 144.

55. Ibid., . 140.56. By "guiding resupposition" take Habermas o mean that t is part of the self-understandings f the itizens f the modem onstitutional tate hat, or xample, either heconstitutional rinciples hemselves or the egal and political nterpretations f these maydiscriminategainst articularndividuals ndgroups.

57. SRCS, p. 146.58.Ibid., . 139.59. It seems mplausibleosuppose hat ll ethical-politicaliscourses re concerned ith

discussion f ollective elf-understandings.s indicated bove note 1), believeHabermas'saccount f ethical-politicaliscoursesuffers rom failure o distinguish etween hevariouskinds f functions uchdiscoursesmay ulfill.

60.The Constitution f reland, rticle 1,2:1.61. In his response oTaylor, abermas-drawing n the ecent ork f Axel Honneth-

makes xtensive se of this Hegelian erm often bbreviateds "struggle"). ee, for xample,SRCS, pp. 128,133, 134, 138, 139.

62.Ibid., p. 143-4.63.Asalready ndicated, abermas imself oesnot tate his xplicidly.ndeed, is ccount

of struggles or ecognitionuffers rom failure o distinguish learly etween emands orrecognition hat ltimatelyppeal othenorm f ndividual utonomy ndthose hat o not o

so. W. Kymlicka's istinction etween wo kinds f demand or ollective ights: hose hatdemand nternal estrictions n the iberty f groupmembers nd those hat emand xternalprotections or he roup is-a-vis he arger ociety, ight avebeenhelpful oHabermas ere.SeeW.Kymlicka, ulticultural itizenship. LiberalTheory f Minority ights Oxford, K:Clarendon ress, 995), specially hap.3.

64. There re, f course,many ersions f he deal of ndividual utonomy. venwithin heconstitutional tate, struggles or ecognition" ay urn in part) n conflictingnterpretationsof this deal. For nstance, any eministhallenges oexisting ollective elf-understandingsare-at least, n part-based on the rejection f certain raditional onceptions f autonomy.However, nly omeof these eminist hallenges ouldwish oreject henorm f respect orthe ndividual's apacity o determine erown conception f the good ife, r see it as lessimportant han he ealizationf certain ubstantive oods;others ouldwish o hold onto hisnormative oreof the deal of utonomy, owever ifferent heir ision f utonomy ltimatelymaybe from onceptions avoured itherto. f my rgument s correct, nly hallenges f theformer ype annot e accommodated ithin he rameworkfHabermas's onstitutionaltate.

65.J. Rawls,Political iberalismNewYork: olumbia niversity ress, 993).66.Kymlicka, ulticultural itizenship, .163 ff.67. Cf. Faktizitat ndGeltung, p.536-7.68. The objection ould be raised hat n setting p a category f socialgroups hat o not

share commitment othe riority f he deal of ndividualutonomy, obscuremany elevantdifferences etween he groups hatmight it his ategory. would certainly gree hat hecategory propose onceivably omprises multiplicityfvery isparate ocialgroups. ut farfrom onstitutingn objection omy rgument, his oint n fact upports t. Forthe mportantdifferences etween uch socialgroups-which have n common nly heir ejection f thepriority f the dealof ndividual utonomy-suggests n urgent eed for erious eflection ntheproblems f when, ndon what asis, hedenial f equal political ecognitions ustified.

69. This, admittedly, s disputed y Joseph Raz who argues hat he deal of personalautonomy emands espect nly for hosewhochooseconceptions f the good ife hat re




(morally) aluable see Raz, TheMorality f reedom). az'sassertion f n ntrinsic onnectionbetween utonomy nd the goodseemsprima acie onvincing; onetheless,n the bsence f

generally cceptable tandards or eterminingthical alue an absence hat az himself oeslittle o alleviate), t s hard o see how t might sefully eapplied ncontemporary ebates nrecognition ndtolerance f difference.

70. I. Berlin, our EssaysonLiberty Oxford, K: Oxford niversity ress, 969).71.J. Mansbridge, Using ower/Fighting ower," onstellations ,no. 1 1994):53.72. Ibid.73. Mansbridge's iscussion n this egard s hampered y a lack of llustrative xamples.

Shedoesseem opresume, owever,hat ome forms fpolitical oercion re ust-but withoutexplaining henormative asisfor er ositionseeher eference otheKu KluxKlan s a formof opposition hat ught not to be facilitated ithin democracy, UsingPower/FightingPower," .64).

74. Ibid., p. 64-5.75. I use this ormulation erely s a shorthand or he uestion hat oncerns me n these

final pages: the ncapacity f liberalism and associatedoctrines) o afford qual politicalrecognition o ll social groups. smy emarksn his ectionmake lear, do not ee the roblemsimply s one of exclusion.

76. The debate eems o havebeen argely onfined odiscussion f the grounds or, ndlimits o,toleration. lthough hequestion f toleration s closely elated o the question fpolitical ecognition,he atter s not imply ynonymous ith he ormer ndrequires reatment

as a separate ssue. would iketo suggest see note 7) that oleration arks ne point n aspectrum f degrees f political ecognition;o this xtent he dea of political ecognitionsbroader han he rinciple f oleration. f course, ontinued ebate n thenotoriously ifficultquestion f toleration ill lso be helpful nclarifying he roblem f the ppropriate esponseto iberalism's enial f equalpolitical ecognition o all socialgroups.

77. One of themany roblems hat re raised ythe uestion f he ppropriate esponse oliberalism's xclusions s what t means o deny olitical ecognitiono some ocialgroups. nthis egard would ike o ingle ut ne ssue s particularly ressing: hether,ndenying qualpolitical ecognitiono ertain ocialgroups nthe asis of heir ackof ommitmento he dealof ndividual utonomy,tis desirable o distinguishfurtherbetweenuch roups nd he egreeof political ecognition llowable n each case. It might e useful o conceiveof politicalrecognitionn erms f spectrum ermitting arying egrees f recognitiono excluded" ocialgroups, anging romimited olitical ecognition,o oleration,o omplete xclusion. owever,thisnot nly eadsto the urther uestion f what uch varying egrees f political ecognitionwould actually ook ike n practice; t also raisesthe crucial uestion f the normative rpragmatic) easons hatmight ustify arying egrees f political ecognition.

78.SRCS, pp.141-2.79.Ibid., p. 1434.80.Seenotes 6 and 77.

MaeveCooke sstatutory ecturer nGerman t University ollegeDublin. he s authorof Language nd Reason: A Study f Habermas's ragmatics MITPress, 1994)andeditor fToward Pragmatics fCommunicationMITPress, 997).She has publisheda number f rticles ncontemporary olitical nd socialtheory er current roject s

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