Lt Col Raymond Lane Officer Commanding Ordnance School ... · International EOD Co-operation The...
Transcript of Lt Col Raymond Lane Officer Commanding Ordnance School ... · International EOD Co-operation The...
Lt Col Raymond Lane
Officer Commanding
Ordnance School
Defence Forces Training Center
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
EOD Spectrum of Operations
Explosive
Ordnance
Disposal
C-IED/IEDDConventional
Munitions
Disposal CBRNeIDD
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
International EOD Co-operationThe Ordnance School has trained EOD/CIED/IEDD/CBRNe
personnel (CIV-MIL) from the following countries: (Students from 33 Countries since 2010)
Spain Denmark Germany
Romania Malaysia USA
Netherlands Luxembourg Italy
Finland Russia Switzerland
Kazakhstan Estonia Austria
Canada Sweden Belgium
Israel UAE Poland
Turkey Jordan Checz Republic
France
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Portugal
Norway
Lithuania
United Kingdom
Estonia
Malta
•
NATO/PFP unclassifiedUnclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
VNCF by Luxembourg
Ireland/Germany/Netherlands/Estonia/Austria/Italy/Sweden/Belgium
Multi-Agency/Multi-Disciplinary and Multi-National Comprehensive
response - VNCF (Luxembourg)
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
MTA - Terrorist(s) fully armed –
wants to inflict maximum casualties
and wants to die
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Course Objectives:
•Develop relevant operational/tactical knowledge involving MTA Threats (future
proof)
•Prioritise effective and flexible responses to the MTA threat
•Develop dynamic/resilient CIV-MIL structures at the Strategic /Operational and
Tactical levels to support the development of timely and effective Courses of Action (COA)
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Students/Staff – Military (EOD, Air,SOF,Medical) Police
(Firearms,SOF,Medical,Search) Fire Service, Airport police
Course included academic/theoretical and operational inputs
Detailed lessons learned process was undertaken throughout week
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Marauding Terrorist Attack
(MTA)• Increasing frequency as a tactic by Terrorists
– Complex Assault – Brussels , Belgium – 22/3/16
– Complex assault - Jakarta, Indonesia – 14/1/16
– Complex assault – St Bernardino ,USA - 2/12/15
– Complex assault - Paris , France – 13/11/15
– Single shooter – Sousse, Tunisia 2015– Twin shooter – Paris, France 2015
– Multiple shooters – Westgate, Kenya 2013
– Complex assault – Mumbai, India 2008
• Weapon options
– Simple – acid, car, knife, fire– Firearms – pistol, SMG, assault rifle
– Explosives – Grenades, RPG, IED (Suicide Belts -TATP),
• Tactical impact
– Dynamic situation – difficult to coordinate, poor situational awareness
– Mass casualties – catastrophic injuries, large crowds, panic/fear
– Media focus – immediate and global, social media, political pressure
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Probable components of MTA
• Well trained terrorists ,tactically competent and
willing to die (possibly drugged)
• Multiple attackers working in small tactical units
• Effective internal and external coordination
• Deliberate attack on first responders to inflict
maximum casualties
• Use of fire (smoke) to complicate first responder
operations and cause more damage
• Use of high powered military weapons and
explosives (HME-TATP) and (suicide belts)
Countering Adversary
threat Networks(CAtN)
From C-IED AtN Lessons Learned use similar
approaches in Countering Adversary threat
Networks
Narcoterrorism
Human Trafficking
Criminal Gangs
C-MTA
Illicit Arms Trade
Illicit Substances
IED Network
Piracy
C-IED AtN
Evolution
Countering
Adversary
threat
Networks
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Counter Adversary threat Network
Strategy
Defeat the Marauding terrorists(C –MTA) Protect
Prepare the Force (PtF)Doctrine, Training, Interoperability
Inte
llig
en
ce
Attack the Networks (AtN)Predict, Prevent, Pursue
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Planning AssumptionsDevelop Effective Interagency response (Synergies)
• MTA may cause many casualties
• Assault will have been planned and rehearsed– Friendly Force Response tactics predicted
• Police tactics generally aimed at containment not neutralisation (not suppression)
• Difficult for emergency services to operate in semi-permissive areas
• Delay to deploy SOF units for intervention
• Most casualties will die from blood loss within first 10 -15 minutes
• Terrorists will consider options for barricaded final action– Prolonged operation for greater media/political impact
– Hostages/siege
– Drugs
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Civilian and Military Approach
Requirement: To integrate holistically
(Comprehensive Approach)
• Principles of War
– Selection of the aim
– Maintain morale
– Offensive action
– Security
– Surprise
– Concentration of
force (suppressing
fire)
– Economy of effort
– Flexibility
– Coordination
– Sustainability
• Policing by consent
– Prevent crime &
disorder
– Public respect
– Public cooperation
– Minimum force
– Impartiality
– Public relationship
– Persuasion
– Legal actions
– Unobtrusive
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Counter Terrorism Capability Relationships
‘Comprehensive Approach’
Emergency Services
Military
Public
Police
Conventional
response may be
ineffective due to
threat from Small
Arms, IEDs, CBRN and Fire
Hybrid Military
support to the
Police will enable
effective
emergency service response
and provide a
tactical capability
for extreme
situationsPublic and private
sector need
information,
training and
emergency equipment to
improve
survivabilityUnclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Requirement to develop a coordinated Inter-Agency
Resilient Task Force response with following components
recommended:
•Unified Command and Control structure
•Tactical/Operational SOF (Military/Police) capability (incl: Search)
•Tactical /Operational Medical capability (10-15 minutes) to include
medical treatment for possible PBIED perpetrator
•Tactical/Operational EOD Capability( IED Defeat/assault)
•Tactical/Operational Fire fighting response (Fire used as tactic by
terrorists)
•Force protection
Significant Lessons Learned
(TAC-COM-MED)
Multi-agency Command and
Control (Hot/Warm/Cold Zones)• Unified Command
(Police/Fire/Medical/SOF/Military/EOD
– Establish Incident priorities/ ROE
– Joint decision making
– Dynamic risk assessments
– Situational Awareness (Intelligence sharing)
– Dynamic operational groupings
• Interoperability
Communications/equipment/TTPsUnclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Incident Response Team(Scalable)
• No 1 - SOF –Fire support
• No 2 - SOF –Fire support
• No 3 - Assault IEDD Operator
• No 4 - Assault IEDD Operator
• No 5 - IRT Leader
• No 6 - Tactical Medical Operator
• No 7 - Tactical Fire Operator
• No 8 - SOF Force Protection
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
•Public awareness programme (designed not to
generate fear)
- State/Government /Security apparatus must never
lose confidence of their citizens/public during a crisis
•Private security sector engagement (first responder)
- Must be integrated into the planning process from
the start
Significant Lessons Learned
Whole of government and whole of society approach
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
- Use of less than Lethal technologies to attack PBIED e.g. Acoustic devices
- Devices for Quick effective communications
- Advanced situational awareness training
- Dealing with MTA incident with addition of CBRN component
- Forensic evidence collection from casualties at scene
- Medical response in non permissive environment
Lessons learned
Search/Assault IEDD
• What do we mean by IEDD assault
• Military/police role?
• Philosophy /MNT
• ROE
• TTPs
• Equipment
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
Unclassified Releasable to
NATO/PfP
•We need to be Pro Active as opposed to Reactive (CC-MTA
developed over 14 months ago) – Agile/Flexible response
•Very poor response to CC-MTA course from NATO/PFP
nations?
•Possible future collaboration with EU ?
•Develop CC –MTA programme of work 2016 and beyond
including LIKELY future threats -VNCF ???
COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS