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Looking for Agreement: an Experiment on Distributive Justice

Marco Faravelli∗

Department of Economics University of Edinburgh Edinburgh EH8 9JY, UK

December 2003

Abstract

We use survey data (n = 1333) to explore distributive justice. We investigate the impact of the context of a distribution problem on the ethical judgements of fresher and senior students of Sociology and Economics. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the extent to which clarifying the context of the distribution favours an agreement between the parties. We concentrate on situations in which there is a trade off between equality and efficiency, examining the extent to which efficiency may account for unequal distributions and the circumstances under which inefficient allocations appear more acceptable. An attempt is made to evaluate the impact of education on the ethical judgements of the subjects. Four distribution mechanisms are taken into account: egalitarianism, maximin, utilitarianism and utilitarianism with a floor constraint.

∗ [email protected]


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1 Introduction One of the most interesting aspects that arise from dictator and ultimatum experiments

is that fairness is a strong concern. Experimental results on the ultimatum game clearly show that a large fraction of players offer a “fair” allocation and that “unfair” offers are systematically rejected. Furthermore, while economists tend to evaluate allocations purely quantitatively, these experimental data also suggest that whether an allocation is seen as “fair” can depend on the context in which it is presented and the way it is framed. Second, the data from dictator experiments suggest that there is significant heterogeneity in what people consider fair, with many people giving nothing as well as many splitting the available resources equally.

In this paper we use survey data to investigate whether and to which extent the context

of a distribution problem influences the ethical judgements of individuals, and to what extent these judgements differ across individuals. We conducted an experiment with fresher and senior undergraduate students of Economics and Sociology. We submitted to them different versions of a distribution problem and asked them to choose the distribution that they considered the most fair. The problem involved distributing resources between two individuals, who obtain from them a different utility. There is, therefore, a trade off between efficiency, which involves handing more resources to the more productive individual, and equality, which might demand an equal division even if that would not maximise total output. We found that, with a context giving minimal information, Economics students were less likely to favour equality than Sociology students and this difference was more marked in senior students. However, when the same question was rephrased to give a meaningful context, there was now significant agreement over which allocation was fairest and there was no significant difference between Economics and Sociology students.

We investigated four versions of the problem, each characterised by a different context.

In the first version no explanation of the difference between the two individuals is provided, while the second and the third versions present two distinct explanations: in one, the second individual is less productive because he is handicapped, in the other, because he works less hard. The same possible allocations are present in all versions of the problem: an egalitarian, a utilitarian and a maximin allocation. The fourth version presents no explanation of the difference between the two individuals, but a floor is introduced in terms of minimum utility necessary for each individual. The tension here is that the efficient allocation does not give the minimum survival utility to the less efficient individual. As well as the previous allocations, a fourth allocation is permitted, deriving from the application of utilitarianism with a floor.

When no explanation of the difference between the individuals is provided the subjects

involuntarily insert the distribution problem into a determined context, filling the lack of information according to their personal attitudes and background. The preference for a particular allocation under this condition will reveal the relative concern of the subject for either the efficiency or the equality of the distribution. We will refer to such a preference as the ideology of the subject. Several experiments have been conducted to check whether economists behave differently. Yet, all of these studies are aimed to check and to analyse different behaviours in terms of propensity to co-operate (through prisoner’s dilemma games), to free ride (for instance, in the provision of public goods) or in the degree of selfishness, while differences in the perception of fairness have been only marginally analysed (Marwell and Ames, 1981). A fundamental (and unresolved) issue is the reason for the (possible) differences between economists and non-economists. They may be the result of a self-


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selection process or they may be the result of training in economics. These two conjectures have been called the selection and learning hypothesis (Carter and Irons, 1991). Comparing the answers of fresher students of Economics and Sociology will allow testing the selection hypothesis. Finding that an ideological difference does exist, we will test the learning hypothesis by comparing the answers given by fresher and senior students of the same course. Interestingly we will find that a learning effect does exist only for the Economics students. Comparing the answers of senior students of the courses we will find that different education increases differences in ideology. When the same distribution problem is inserted into a clear context, the difference between the Economics and Sociology students disappears, and a common solution accepted by the parties can be reached. Notably, this solution will be Pareto-efficient. The introduction of a floor will only partially diminish the ideological differences. As a considerable result, the Utilitarian solution will be abandoned in favour of utilitarianism with a floor.

In section 2 we will consider the extent to which fairness can be modelled by economic

theories. In section 3 we will report the results of the most prominent experiments directed to compare economists and non-economists. In section 4 we will present the distribution mechanisms examined in our analysis, the problems that arise in comparing them and the perspective that we will assume in order to make a comparison possible. In section 5 we will discuss the design of the experiment and the hypotheses that we are going to test. Section 6 displays our results. We will first concentrate on the difference between Economics and Sociology students, testing the selection and learning hypotheses. In the second part of the section we will analyse the effects of clarifying the context of the distribution and the extent to which this facilitates an agreement between the parties. Section 7 concludes.

2 Fairness and Economic Theories There is strong evidence that people are concerned about fairness. Experimental studies

of mutual gift giving indicate that efficiency concerns are dominated by fairness concerns (e.g., see Güth, Kliemt and Ockenfels, 2003). Traditional economic models, in which people are assumed to be self-interested and to care only about their personal payoffs, cannot explain such phenomena. In recent years different attempts to modify the neoclassical rationality assumptions have been made. Particularly influent have been the theories presented by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Both these studies are attempts to build a single model that can explain situations in which people behave according to the rational/self-interested model as well as circumstances in which people show concern for other agents’ payoffs. These theories suppose that, in addition to pure selfish subjects, there are subjects who dislike inequality. Therefore, they assume utility functions depending both on the absolute and relative payoffs of the agents.

Modifying the utility function enables to model altruistic behaviour or inequality aversion. Yet, allocations will still be evaluated from a purely quantitative perspective. The predictions of these models will only depend on the numerical aspects of the situations to which they are applied. Distinct situations may be characterised by the same numerical representation, but completely different contexts. Let us assume a two players game. The first agent has an initial monetary endowment and her utility function also depends on the payoff of her opponent. Giving up part of her money to the other player increments the first player’s utility. Let us think of two situations, both numerically identical. In the first case, the amount of money given to the second player will be used to buy food that will allow this agent not to starve. In the second case, the same amount of money will be used to buy drugs. Let us


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imagine that in both situations the utility of the second player will increase of the same amount. It seems natural that player 1 might behave differently in the two situations. Yet, a quantitative approach cannot discern between the two cases. Because of this limit, economic theories cannot investigate the influence of the context on the perception of fairness.

Philosophical theories have probably faced the problem more successfully. The natural question that arises is why people are concerned with equality. The centrality of this question is pointed out by Sen who argues that “a common characteristic of virtually all the approaches to the ethics of social arrangements that have stood the test of time is to want the equality of something - something that has an important place in the particular theory” (Sen, 1992). Income-egalitarians claim equal incomes, and welfare-egalitarians demand equal welfare levels, but also utilitarians ask equal weights on the utilities of all the individuals and libertarians insist on equal rights and liberties. According to Ronald Dworkin the common aspect to all the theories of distributive justice is indeed equality (Dworkin, 1977). In this way we have to interpret Barry’s words: “In Plato’s time as in ours, the central issue in any theory of justice is the defensibility of unequal relations between people” (Barry, 1989).

Why should we allocate resources unequally among the individuals? An important property of symmetric distribution mechanisms1 is the equal treatment of equals (Yaari and Bar-Hillel, 1984), according to which two individuals who are identical in every respect should receive equal shares. We can even interpret this property in a rather different way and state that two individuals whose observed characteristics do not appear different should receive the same amount. On this interpretation, characteristics of individuals between whom a given bundle is to be divided provide the grounds for departure from equality. Considerations, which provide possible justifications for departure from equality, can be found in philosophical literature2. These considerations always refer to characteristics that differentiate the individuals, which have been classified in terms of broad categories (differences in needs, abilities, effort, productivity, contribution, endowments, etc.). In other way, we are not only sensitive to the subject of what constitutes division but also to the reason why to divide. This is the point of view assumed in this paper. Differences between individuals, which determine justifications for departure from equality, may or may not be explained, clarifying the context of the distribution problem. Different explanations can be provided, determining distinct contexts. A distribution mechanism may be considered more suitable in certain situations than in others. Similarly, a same distribution may be regarded as a just or unjust allocation depending on the context of the distribution problem (see, e.g., Yaari and Bar-Hillel, 1984).

3 Are Economists Different? Marwell and Ames (1981) conducted the first study that compared economists and non-

economists, through an experiment that called for private contributions to public goods. Groups of subjects were given initial endowments of money that could be allocated in two different accounts, one “public”, the other private. Money deposited in the private account was returned to the subject at the end of the experiment. Money deposited in the public account was pooled, multiplied by a factor greater than one and distributed equally among the players. They found that first-year graduate students in Economics are much more likely than others to free ride. Marwell and Ames conjectured that there might be two reasons for why economists might actually behave differently. Yet, they did not check the extent to which this

1 A distribution mechanism is said to be symmetric if the order in which the two individuals are listed is immaterial.

2 See, e.g., Rescher (1966).


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difference is due to the selection or to learning hypothesis (or to both of them). Interestingly, in their work they collected a wide range of information regarding the different perceptions, expectations and explanations for the behaviour of the subjects. Two questions were asked. First, what is a fair investment in the public good? 75 percent of the non-economists answered “half or more” of the endowment, and 25 percent answered “all”. The other question asked whether they were concerned about fairness in making their own investment decision. Almost all non-economists answered “yes”. The answers of the Economics students were more difficult to analyse. More than one-third of them either refused to answer the first question or gave uncodable responses. As Marwell and Ames wrote, “it seems that the meaning of 'fairness' in this context was somewhat alien for this group”. Those who did answer found that little or no contribution was fair. With regard to the second question, economist students were much less concerned with fairness when making their decisions. As mentioned earlier, to our knowledge this is the only attempt to also investigate the perception of fairness of economists and non-economists.

Carter and Irons (1991) investigated the behaviour of students of Economics and students of other disciplines in an ultimatum bargaining game, finding that Economics students behaved more self-interestedly than other students. Interestingly, they tested the selection and the learning hypothesis, finding that “economists are born, not made”. Apparently, therefore, studying economics does not create rational, self-interested homines economici, but subjects who are particularly concerned with economics incentive self-select into Economics. Using a prisoner’s dilemma game, Frank, Gilovish and Regan (1993), found that economists behave in more self-interested ways and are much more likely to defect from coalitions. Further, their data support the learning hypothesis. According to them, “exposure to the self-interest model does in fact encourage self-interested behavior” and inhibit co-operation.

Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen (1996) strongly criticised the results obtained by Frank, Gilovish and Regan (1993) from a methodological point of view. They claimed that the evidence of that paper only implies that Economics students display uncooperative behaviour in specialised games or surveys. They conducted a “lost-letter” experiment, in which envelopes containing currency are dropped in classroom before the beginning of the lectures3. The return rate on lost letters is used as a measure of co-operation. According to their results, the “real life” behaviour of economist students is actually more co-operative than that of subjects studying other disciplines. Similarly, Frey an Meier (2001) claim that “it is possible that students play the equilibrium played in their Economics classes, but don’t apply it to real life situations”. Further, their results indicate that the particular behaviour of economists is only due to self-selection. On the basis of Yezer’s results, Zsolnai (2003) suggests that, being honesty and co-operation two different qualities there might be no contradiction between them and claims that economists’ behaviour is characterised by respect for property rights and self-interest motivation simultaneously. Finally, Hu and Liu (2003) find evidence that Economics students are more likely to co-operate in prisoner’s dilemma games.

In sum, the results are inconclusive and depend on the different settings. Further the experiments that have been designed are aimed to test whether Economics students behave more in accordance with predictions of rational/self-interest model of economics. Yet, despite

3 The “lost-letter” dilemma was part of a survey conducted by Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993) to test

the honesty of economists and non-economists. Subjects were asked to imagine that they had lost an envelope containing money and to estimate the likelihood that a stranger would return it. Further they were asked to indicate the likelyhood that they would return it to a stranger. Interstingly, their results indicate that economists are less honest than non-economists, in contrast with the results obtained by Yezer, Golddfarb and Poppen in a “real-world” experiment. The only explanation for such a discrepancy seems to be that Economics students are not more selfish, but simply more truthfully and acceptant about their behaviour.


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the different approach assumed in this work, it will be useful, in the course of our analysis, to compare the above results with ours, taking into account the different perspectives assumed.

4 Distribution Mechanisms and Welfarist Approach Besides the egalitarian solution we are going to consider three other distribution

mechanisms, whose application determines particular departures from equality. Let us examine these distribution principles.

Many different forms of utilitarianism exist, but we can outline two components that define this theory and characterise all of its forms. As pointed out by Sen and Williams, utilitarianism “can be regarded as the intersection between two different kinds of theory. One is the theory of the correct way to assess or assign value to states of affairs, and it claims that the correct basis of assessment is welfare, satisfaction, or people getting what they prefer. This theory, one component of utilitarianism, has been called welfarism. The other component is a theory of correct action, which claims that actions are to be chosen on the basis of the states of affairs which are their consequences: this has been called consequentialism. Utilitarianism in its central forms, recommends a choice of actions on the basis of consequences, and an assessment of consequences in terms of welfare. Utilitarianism is thus a species of welfarist consequentialism – that particular form of it which requires simply adding up individual welfares or utilities to assess the consequences, a property that is sometimes called sum-ranking” (Sen and Williams, 1982, p. 3-4).

Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice was conceived as an alternative to utilitarianism, in all of its forms, and has become a powerful contestant to utilitarian theory in recent years. As argued by Rawls, his “aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract” (Rawls, 1973, p. 11). Rawls proposes two principles of justice that are meant to rule the basic structure of society, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages of social cooperation. The above principles would result from a social contract made by rational individuals behind a thick “veil of ignorance”, which would guarantee the impartiality of the parties. While the first principle rules the scheme of liberties each person has the right to, the second principle determines which social and economic inequalities are acceptable. We wish to clear up a mistake that is commonly made. The second principle has often been confused either with the difference principle or with the maximin rule4. The difference principle, on the contrary, only provides a particular interpretation of the principles of justice5, and the maximin rule is not a principle of justice that would be chosen below the “veil of ignorance”, but is the rule of choice under uncertainty that, according to Rawls, people would adopt in the original position and that would lead to the two principles. As argued by Rawls, “it is useful as a heuristic device to think of the two principles as the maximin solution to the problem of social justice. There is an analogy between the two principles and the maximin rule for choice under uncertainty.” (Rawls, 1973, p. 152). The maximin rule does not rule economic inequalities, but prescribes to rank alternatives under uncertainty by their worst possible outcomes. What we are interested in is

4 See, e.g., Gaertner et al (2001): “Rawls’s second principle of justice, known as the difference principle or maximin rule, requires to focus on the worst-off (group of) individual(s) in society when considering alternative economic policies and prescribes that policy as the best one which maximizes the welfare of the worst-off.”

5 “I have already mentioned that since the phrases “everyone’s advantage” and equally opened to all” are ambiguous, both parts of the second principle have two natural senses. Because these senses are independent of one another, the principle has four meanings. Assuming that the first principle of equal liberty has the same sense throughout, we then have four interpretations of the two principles.” (Rawls, 1973, p. 65).


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the maximin equity criterion, “I should emphasize that the maximin equity criterion and the so-called maximin rule for choice under uncertainty are two very different things.” (Rawls, 1974). This criterion is the distribution mechanism that we are going to consider in our analysis. It is identifiable with the first part of the second principle that is defined as following:

“Social and economic inequalities are to meet two conditions: they must be (a) to the

greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged members of society (the maximin equity criterion) and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” (Rawls, 1974).

This criterion is clearly opposed to the utilitarian that only cares about the average

utility. Finally, utilitarianism with a floor is a mechanism that prescribes the maximisation of

the average utility with a floor constraint. The solution prescribed by the application of this mechanism has proved to agree with the ethical judgements of the individuals in numerous experiments (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavy, 1987a, 1987b; Lissowski, 1992).

As argued by Sen, “any evaluative judgement depends on the truth of some information and is independent of the truth or falsity of others. The informational basis of a judgement identifies the information on which the judgement is directly dependent ... The informational basis of judgements of justice, thus, specifies the variables that are directly involved in assessing the justice of alternative systems or arrangements” (Sen, 1992, p.73). Rawls’s theory of justice’s informational basis does not coincide with the utilitarian. In the utilitarian theory the informational basis consists only of the utilities of the individuals in the states of affairs under evaluation. Rawls’s theory, on the contrary, ranks the different states of affairs according to the distribution of primary goods, that are defined as anything any rational person wants and will want regardless of his plan of life or his place in the social scheme6. It is therefore extremely complicated to empirically compare the two theories. This is the reason why we are going to consider all of the distribution mechanisms we discussed from a welfarist point of view, the maximin criterion as well. Sen (1992) defines the set of welfarist theories as those theories that take utilities as the only relevant personal features and differ between them in the choice of combining characteristics. Among these theories, Sen recalls the utility-based maximin, as that distribution mechanism that prescribes to maximise the utility of the least advantaged individual. This is the interpretation that we are going to assume and will enable us to proceed to our empirical analysis.

5 Methods In March 2002, a total of 1333 students of the University of Milan took part in the

experiment. 661 of them were Sociology students, 345 freshers and 316 seniors. The remaining 672 were Economics students, 354 freshers and 318 seniors. In each of the four groups women and men were present in approximately equal number. Participation was voluntarily and there was no show-up fee paid. Each student was given a sheet containing on the front the problem with no explanation of the difference between the individuals and on the back, at random, one of the remaining three problems. Thus, each of the four groups was divided into three classes, according to the kind of the second question. Students were asked to read the question on the front and only after answering that they could read and answer the

6 “For simplicity, assume that the chief primary goods at the disposition of society are rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth.” (Rawls, 1973, p. 62).


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one on the back. It was not possible to change the answer to the first problem after reading the second one. The total time for conducting the experiment, including our instructions, varied between 20 and 25 minutes, due to the difference in class sizes.

The four questions are reported in Appendix A. We will refer to them as question 1,

question 2a, question 2b and question 2c. All of the respondents answered question 1. 464 students answered question 2a; of them, 124 were Economics freshers, 115 Economics seniors, 134 Sociology freshers and 91 Sociology seniors. Question 2b was submitted to 451 respondents: 129 Economics freshers, 109 Economics seniors, 95 Sociology freshers and 118 Sociology seniors. Finally, a total of 418 students answered question 2c; of them, 101 were Economics freshers, 94 Economics seniors, 116 Sociology freshers and 107 Sociology seniors. As already pointed out, the four problems are formally identical. Resources are to be distributed between two individuals. Robinson and Friday live on two different islands. Robinson lives on island A and Robinson lives on island B. On each island one can till 12 plants. Utility deriving from the goods is increasing and marginal utility is constant. The two characters obtain different levels of utility from the goods, and are only interested in the utility they get.

“The only reason why both Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce fruit and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be; every additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people.” The respondents are asked to choose a solution among the ones that are provided so that

the distribution is just, recalling that there is no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation. In question 1 no explanation of the difference between the individuals is provided.

“Friday obtains 120 fruits per year from every plant on island B, but he cannot obtain any fruit from island A’s plants. On both islands Robinson obtains 20 fruits per plant.” In question 2a and question 2b the difference between the individuals is explained. In

the former the two individuals differ in their physical abilities. “Both Robinson and Friday put the same amount of work into tilling the plants; the only way to move from one island to the other is to swim. Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he cannot swim and he cannot till any plant on island A. Robinson is a perfect swimmer and he can therefore till plants on both islands, but due to a wound caused by the shipwreck he cannot obtain more than 20 fruits per year from every plant of island A and island B.” In question 2b Robinson and Friday put different efforts in tilling their plants. “Robinson and Friday can till plants and move from one island to the other in the same way, but they do not put the same amount of work into tilling the plants. Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he doesn’t want to go on island A and he will not produce fruits on this island.


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To Robinson moving from one island to the other is all the same, but he does not put as much amount of work into tilling his plants as Friday and he doesn’t produce more than 20 fruits per year from every plant, both on island A and B.” In question 2c no explanation is provided, but a minimum level of utility is introduced:

the individuals cannot survive under this floor. “The minimum quantity needed by every one of them in order to survive is 300 fruits per year.” The distributions are provided in terms of resources as well as in terms of utility; the

sum of utility obtained by the individuals is shown too. Three solutions are provided to question 1, 2a and 2b.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 0 240 Friday 0 12 1440 Total production of fruits 1680 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 8 400 Friday 0 4 480 Total production of fruits 880 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 9 9 360 Friday 3 3 360 Total production of fruits 720 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The first solution derives from the application of the utilitarian principle, the second one

is the maximin solution, while the third one is the Egalitarian. The Utilitarian solution is the fairest in terms of resources, (R: 12-0; F: 0-12): each individual receives all of the plants of his island. Yet, this distribution is the most unequal in terms of utility: (R: 240; F: 1440). Social welfare, though, is maximised. The Rawlsian distribution is much more unequal in terms of resources, (R: 12-8; F: 0-4): Robinson receives 8 of the 12 plants of island B, besides the 12 plants of island A. Welfare distribution is much more equal, though, (R: 400; F: 480). The cost of this greater equity is a much less total welfare. Finally, the Egalitarian distribution gives every individual a utility of 360, distributing the plants as follows: (R: 9-9; F: 3-3). Total welfare is much less than according to the other allocations. Only two of these distributions are Pareto-efficient, the Utilitarian and the Rawlsian, while the Egalitarian solution is not efficient: it is possible to improve the condition of both the individuals (applying maximin criterion, for instance, both the individuals would be better off). Besides these distributions a fourth solution, according to utilitarianism with a floor, is provided to question 2c.


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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 3 300 Friday 0 9 1080 Total production of fruits 1380 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Plants are divided as follows: (R: 12-3; F: 0-9). Robinson gets 300 fruits, just enough to

survive, and Friday gets a utility of 1080. This distribution is also Pareto-efficient and, in terms of utility, stands between the Rawlsian and the Utilitarian. The latter is the only one that does not guarantee the survival of both the individuals.

5.1 Hypotheses

We explore several hypotheses. The first hypothesis that we are going to test is the selection hypothesis. We are

interested in testing whether students choosing to study Economics and students choosing to study Sociology do differ in their ideology. In order to test this hypothesis we are going to compare the answers of freshers of Economics and Sociology to question 1.

The second hypothesis that we are going to test is the learning hypothesis. We are going to test whether education does influence ideology. To test this hypothesis we are going to compare the answers to question 1 given by freshers and seniors of the same course.

The third hypothesis that we are going to test is that education does increase ideological differences. This hypothesis will be tested by comparing the answers to question 1 given by senior students of Economics and Sociology.

The fourth hypothesis that we are going to test is that contexts do affect the moral intuitions of the respondents. To test this hypothesis we are going to consider each class separately and to test the hypothesis of no change in the answer to the first and the second question.

Finally, the last hypothesis that we are going to test is that contexts do affect the differences in ideology that we will have eventually found among the different groups. We will test this hypothesis by comparing the answers of the four groups to questions 2a, 2b and 2c.

6 Results Before proceeding to test the above hypotheses we have to make sure that in each group

the three different versions of the questionnaire have been randomly distributed among the respondents. For each group, we have to check that the answers to the first question follow the same distribution in everyone of the three classes.

For each one of the four groups, let us apply the Chi-square test to test the subsequent hypothesis; the null and alternative hypotheses are the following:

H0: the proportion of subjects in each of the option categories is the same (1) in each of the three classes. H1: the proportion of subjects in each of the option categories differs across the classes.


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For every group we cannot reject the null hypothesis at a 5% significance level7. This allows us to proceed to any type of inferential analysis of the data and to test the hypotheses presented above.

6.1 Ideology

Let us consider the answers to question 1 given by the fresher students of Economics

and Sociology. This will allow us to test the selection hypothesis. The results are presented in figure 1.

Figure 1 We can easily notice a consistent difference between the two distributions. Within the

Sociology and Economics freshers there seems to be a different distribution of preferences. The answers of the Sociology students are much more differentiated than the ones of their colleagues. The answers of the Economics students are, indeed, quite equally distributed among the three options. In both the groups there is a similar percentage of subjects choosing the Rawlsian principle, specifically 38% of the Economics students and 37% of the Sociology students. Meanwhile almost a third of the Economics students choose the Utilitarian solution, whereas Sociology students least prefer this option. Almost half of them choose the Egalitarian principle.

Let us apply the Chi-square test to test our first hypothesis. The null and the alternative hypotheses are the following:

H0: the choice of a particular option is unrelated to the university course. (2) H1: the choice of a particular option is related to the university course. Given that the χ2 value is 15.57, we reject the null hypothesis at a 5% significance level.

Therefore we can conclude that the difference between the two distributions is strongly significant. These results suggest that the selection hypothesis is true. Students self-select themselves into Economics or Sociology on the basis of their generic preference for a particular kind of distribution. Especially these data seem to indicate that the selection process

7 The results of all the tests we will resort to are reported in Appendix B.

35%

47%

38% 37%

27%

16%

0% 5%

10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

E R U

Economics and Sociology, fresh.: question 1

Economics Sociology


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strongly depends on the relative concern of the subjects for either equity or efficiency. Sociology students seem to be more concerned with equity than Economics students and best prefer the Egalitarian distribution despite being inefficient.

6.2 Education: Efficiency and Equity

After having shown the different ideologies of people choosing to study Economics and

people choosing Sociology, let us analyse whether education does influence such ideologies and to which extent. This will enable us to test the learning hypothesis. Let us start by comparing the answers to question 1 given by fresher and senior students of Economics. The results are reported in figure 2.

Figure 2 The answers of the senior students look much more differentiated. The order of the

preferences is different. The Rawlsian solution is the most preferred by both the groups. But, while the Egalitarian solution is the second choice of the fresher students, it is the least preferred by the seniors. Let us test the second of our hypotheses, by applying the Chi-square test. The null and the alternative hypotheses are the following:

H0: the choice of a particular option is unrelated to the university year. (3) H1: the choice of a particular option is related to the university year. The χ2 value is 15.88. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis at a 5% significance

level. Consequently we can conclude that the difference between the two distributions is strongly significant: economic education does affect the ideology of the subjects and their moral intuitions. Besides the selection effect a learning effect in studying Economics is present as well. The percentage of preferences for the Utilitarian principle is almost identical in both the groups, while passing from the freshers to the seniors the preferences for the Egalitarian principle diminish from 35% to 22%, to the advantage of maximin principle. The best explanation of such a trend is that after three years of economic education students learn the value of efficiency. According to such a thesis 4 out of 10, among the students choosing

35%

22%

38%

50%

27% 28%

0% 5%

10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

E R U

Economics fresh. and sen.: question 1

Fresh. Sen.


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the Egalitarian principle, abandon this inefficient solution to adopt the Rawlsian one. Meanwhile who chooses maximin or the Utilitarian principle does not change her judgement.

Let us consider whether ideology of the Sociology students is influenced by their education. Let us look at the results reported in figure 3.

Figure 3 The two distributions look almost identical. Let us test the second hypothesis with

respect to the sociologic education. The null and the alternative hypotheses are the same as in (3). The χ2 value resulting from the Chi-square test is 0.97. We cannot reject the null hypothesis at a 5% significance level. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are identical and that the sociological education does not affect the moral intuitions of the subjects. A learning effect does not seem to exist for Sociology students.

Unlikely Carter and Irons (1991), we can therefore conclude that “economists are not only born, but also made”. Yet, we have to bear in mind the difference between their experiment and ours. As in all the experiments discussed in section 2, Carter and Irons were interested in finding whether exposure to the rational model of economics makes subjects behave in a more self-interested way. Our approach differs in two ways. First, we concentrate our analysis on the ethical judgements of the subjects rather than on their behaviour. Second, these judgements cannot be driven by self-interest, because of the way our questions have been designed. The respondent has to decide how to divide the resources between two hypothetical individuals and not between an opponent and herself. This allows studying the perception of fairness of the subjects independently of their selfishness. The result we obtain is that the presence of a learning effect reflects an increasing concern for efficiency and for the trade-off between equity and efficiency. Pareto-efficiency is a fundamental instrument of analysis for economists, but not for sociologists, who do not acquire such a value through their education.

Part of the dispute between Frank and his colleagues and Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen was on the effect of studying economics, the former (Frank, Gilovish and Regan [1993, 1996]) claiming that training in economics has, among others, negative consequences. Given the approach they adopted, what they consider negative is the antisocial behaviour that might be caused by economic education. Given the approach of our analysis we cannot observe

47% 47%

37% 34%

16%19%

0% 5%

10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

E R U

Sociology fresh. and sen.: question 1

Fresh. Sen.


13

whether or not training in economics inhibits co-operation. What we can check is whether education distorts the prejudices that dictate the preferences for a particular distribution when the context of the problem is not explained. The result is that training in economics does not distort the prejudices that are already present in the subjects before being exposed to the economic theory. It simply provides an ulterior tool to judge the distribution problem and to get a solution.

6.3 Does Education Increase Ideological Differences?

We want to check whether ideological differences between the students of the two

courses increase with the different education or remain stable. Looking at figure 4 we can see that the difference between the two distributions seems to have increased passing from the first to the last year.

Figure 4 Let us proceed to test the third hypothesis. The null and the alternative hypotheses are

the same as in (2). Given the high χ2 value resulting from the Chi-square test, 44.5, we strongly reject the null hypothesis. Moreover, the different education has increased the ideological difference already existent. This is shown by the Cramer coefficient, which measures the degree of relation between two sets of variables. The value of this coefficient almost doubles passing from the freshers sample to the seniors one, from 0.15 to 0.27, indicating a much stronger relation between the moral intuitions of the older students and the course attended. An agreement between the two populations seems even more difficult to achieve when the subjects have received a different education.

6.4 Does Context Affect Moral Intuitions?

We are now going to test the fourth hypothesis. We want to investigate whether the

context of the distribution problem affects the moral intuitions of the subjects.

22%

47% 50%

34%

28%

19%

0% 5%

10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

E R U

Economics and Sociology, fresh.: question 1

Economics Sociology


14

We have three classes for each of the four groups, according to the kind of second question. Let us consider first the subjects who received question 2a. We are going to compare their answers to the first and the second question. We will begin with the freshers and will pass later to their older colleagues.

Let us start with the Economics freshers. As we can see in table 38, passing from the first to the second problem the distribution of the preferences becomes much less uniform. The Rawlsian solution, that in the first problem was almost as preferred as the Egalitarian one, is now by far the most preferred. The order of the preferences has changed: the Utilitarian solution is now the second choice and only 15.32% choose the Egalitarian principle. We can apply the Stuart-Maxwell test9 to test the significance of the change in the answers to the two problems. The null and alternative hypotheses are the following:

H0: there is no change in the preferences of the subjects passing from (4) the first to the second problem. H1: there is a change in the preferences of the subjects passing from the first to the second problem. The high χ2 value, 19.8, allows us to reject Ho: clarifying the context of the problem has

changed the moral intuitions of the subjects. Given the significant difference we can look for those single categories for which the differences are significant. We can collapse the original table into 2x2 tables and apply the McNemar test to three different hypotheses. Let us test the following hypothesis first:

H0: among those respondents who change their judgement, the (5) probability that a respondent will switch from Egalitarian to not Egalitarian will be the same as the probability that a respondent will change from not Egalitarian to Egalitarian. H1: there is a differential change in preference. Afterwards we can test (5) with respect to the Rawlsian and the Utilitarian solution. The

high χ2 values, 14.38 and 15.79, allow us to reject the null hypothesis relatively, respectively, to the Egalitarian and to the Rawlsian principle. Changing the context has significantly lowered the preferences for the Egalitarian solution and raised the inclination for the Rawlsian mechanism. Meanwhile, we cannot reject the null hypothesis relatively to the Utilitarian solution at a 5% significant level.

Let us look at table 4. We notice that 72% of the subjects who had chosen the Rawlsian solution in the first question have maintained their judgement and more than 50% of the respondents who had chosen another option have shifted to maximin. This solution seems particularly attractive for those subjects who had opted for the Egalitarian principle in the first problem. This seems to mean that this mechanism more easily reflects the moral intuitions of the subjects in case of ignorance about the causes of the difference between the individuals.

Let us now consider the Sociology freshers and let us observe table 9. The order of the preferences has changed passing from the first to the second question. The Rawlsian mechanism is the most preferred among the solutions to the second problem, while the Egalitarian option gathers half as many preferences as in the first problem. The Utilitarian solution remains the least preferred. Let us apply the Stuart-Maxwell test to test the

8 All of the tables are reported in Appendix C. 9 The Stuart-Maxwell test is a variation of McNemar’s test appropriate for case-control comparisons

involving 3x3 contingency tables. It can be used to test marginal homogeneity between two raters across all categories simultaneously [see Fleiss (1981) for a general discussion].


15

significance of the change in the answers to the two problems. The null and alternative hypotheses are the same as in (4). Given the high χ2 value, 20.21, we reject the null hypothesis. We can infer that also in this case changing the context of the problem has affected the moral intuitions of the subjects. Let us look for those single categories for which the differences are significant by applying the McNemar test to (5) relatively to the Egalitarian, the Rawlsian and the Utilitarian solutions. Similarly to the previous case we can reject the null relatively to the Egalitarian and to the Rawlsian principles given their χ2 values, respectively17.42 and 16.17, but we cannot reject it relatively to the Utilitarian mechanism. As for the Economics students, clarifying the context of the problem lowers the consent for the Egalitarian principle and raises it for maximin, while there is not a differential change in the preferences relatively to the Utilitarian solution.

Looking at table 10 we notice that 78% of the respondents who had chosen the Rawlsian solution to the first problem have confirmed their choice in the second one. Meanwhile more than 50% of the subjects who had opted for the Egalitarian principle have shifted to maximin, confirming the intuition according to which inefficient solutions are more attractive when no explanation of the difference between the individuals is provided.

Let us now analyse the answers of the Economics seniors and let us look at table 6. The order of the preferences has not changed passing from the first to the second problem, but the preferences for the Egalitarian and the Utilitarian mechanism have decreased to the advantage of maximin, chosen by almost 76% of the subjects as a solution to the second question. Let us test (4) by applying the Stuart-Maxwell test. The high χ2 value, 21.9, allows us to reject the null hypothesis and to conclude that changing the context of the problem affects the judgement of the senior students of Economics. Given the significant difference in the answers to the first and the second problem, let us test (5) relatively to the Egalitarian, Rawlsian and Utilitarian principle by applying the McNemar test. Given the χ2 value, respectively 8.45, 20.1 and 7.3, unlikely the previous cases, this time we reject the null relatively to each of the three options. Clarifying the difference between the individuals lowers not only the percentage of preferences for the Egalitarian solution, but also for the Utilitarian one, while raises the consent for maximin. Actually, observing table 7 we notice that, whatever was the option chosen in the first problem, in the second question the Rawlsian solution has gathered extremely high percentages of preferences, proving to be particularly attractive for the Economics seniors. Among the individuals who had opted for the maximin principle more than 90% have confirmed their choice. Meanwhile more than half of the subjects who had chosen either the Egalitarian or the Utilitarian principle have switched to the Rawlsian solution. The inefficient Egalitarian solution, passing from 19% to 7% of preferences, proves to be a particularly weak way to achieve an agreement when the reason of the difference between the characters of the distribution problem is known.

Some judgement changes in passing from question 1 to question 2a are more understandable than others, given the characteristic of the latter and the difference between the characters of the problem. Both Robinson and Friday put the same effort, but they differ in their physical abilities. It is therefore difficult to understand why someone who chooses the Egalitarian solution to the first problem, showing such a strong interest in equality to accept a highly inefficient distribution, switches to the Utilitarian principle in the second question, punishing the more disadvantaged character. Similarly there is no rational explanation for switching from the Rawlsian solution to either the Utilitarian or the Egalitarian. Observing tables 4 and 7 we notice that this incoherent choices are more numerous among the freshers than among the seniors. Analogously, by comparing tables 5 and 8 we notice that 7 seniors out of 10 among those who have chosen the Utilitarian solution to the second problem have confirmed their judgement, while 15% of them had chosen maximin and the remaining 15% had opted for the Egalitarian distribution. On the contrary, a third of the freshers who have


16

chosen the Utilitarian mechanism in the second question had preferred the Egalitarian principle in the previous problem and almost 30% had opted for maximin. These data can be interpreted as a proof of the smaller ability of the younger students to understand the context in which the problem is inserted. This ability seems to develop with time, as well as through the acquisition of education.

Let us finally consider the answers of the Sociology seniors. Observing table 12 we notice that the order of the preferences has changed passing from the first to the second problem. The Rawlsian principle has become the first choice, followed by the Egalitarian one; the Utilitarian solution remains the least preferred, even if with half as many preferences as in question 1. Let us apply the Stuart-Maxwell test to test (4). Given the χ2 value, 19.52, we can reject the null and infer that changing the context affects the judgement of the Sociology senior students. Let us proceed to test (5) relatively to the Egalitarian, Rawlsian and Utilitarian principle by applying the McNemar test. The χ2 values, respectively 9.48 and 16.96, allows us to reject the null hypothesis relatively to the Egalitarian and maximin principle. Passing from question 1 to question 2a the preferences for the Egalitarian solution diminish to the advantage of the maximin. Meanwhile we cannot reject the null relatively to the Utilitarian principle. These data confirm the inadequacy of inefficient solutions when the circumstances of the distribution problem are clear.

As noticed with respect to the Economics students, there is more coherence in the answers of the senior students than in those of their younger colleagues. Let us compare tables 10 and 13 None of the seniors has switched from the Egalitarian solution to utilitarianism and only 3% of those who had preferred maximin have done this choice. These percentages increase, respectively, to almost 5% and 14%. Looking at tables 11 and 14 we observe a similar trend. Among the seniors more than 85% of those who have preferred the Utilitarian solution to the second problem had followed the same principle in the first one. This percentage decreases to 50% among the freshers, 15% had opted for the Egalitarian principle and 35% had chosen the Rawlsian solution. These data confirm the conclusion drawn with respect to the Economics students: The younger the students, of either courses, the smaller is the average ability to understand the circumstances of the distribution problem. Receiving education, whatever kind, develops this ability. Both the courses provide a method to analyse situations characterised by different circumstances and take into account these differences in order to judge.

Let us now take into account the subjects who received question 2b. We will follow the

same order as above. Let us analyse the answers of the Economics freshers. Observing table 16 we notice that the order of the preferences has changed passing from question 1 to question 2b. The Utilitarian solution that was the least preferred is now the first choice, with more than half of the preferences, while the Egalitarian principle is now chosen by less than 12% of the subjects. Meanwhile the preferences for the Rawlsian option have slightly lowered. Let us test the significance of the change in the answers to the two problems, by applying the Stuart-Maxwell test. The null and alternative hypotheses are the same as in (4). Given the high χ2 value, 25.31, we reject the null and infer that also this change of the context of the problem affects the moral intuitions of the Economics freshers. Let us test (5) relatively to the three different principles by applying the McNemar test. We reject the null hypothesis with respect to the Egalitarian and Utilitarian principles, given the χ2 values equal to 16.68 and 19.59, while we cannot reject it for maximin, χ2 value equal to 0.5. Passing from question 1 to question 2b the preferences for the Egalitarian solution decrease to the advantage of utilitarianism.

Egalitarianism receives in the second question only a third of the preferences gathered in the first. Let us observe table 17. More than half of those who had chosen the Egalitarian


17

solution in the first problem switched to the Utilitarian one, 34% to maximin and only 14% confirm their choice. Even in this case clarifying the circumstances of the problem makes the inefficient solution less attractive.

Let us analyse the answers of the Sociology freshers. Observing table 22 we see that passing from the first to the second problem the order of the preferences is inverted. This is testified by the result of the Stuart-Maxwell test applied to (4). The χ2 value, 40.65, allows to strongly reject the null hypothesis of no change. The Sociology freshers change their moral intuitions passing from question 1 to question 2b. Let us investigate those single categories for which the differences are significant by applying the McNemar test to (5), relatively to the three different mechanisms. Like in the previous case we can reject the null relative to the Egalitarian and Utilitarian solution, whose χ2 values are respectively 27.84 and 28.26, but we cannot reject it with respect to the Rawlsian principle, χ2 value equal to 0.21.

The fall of preferences for egalitarianism is notable, from 50% to less than 14%. As we can see in table 23 though, only 35% of those who prefer egalitarianism in the first problem switch to utilitarianism and 48% to maximin. These percentages are inverted respect to their Economics colleagues and denote the greater interest of the Sociology students in the equity of the distribution. Although both the solutions are Pareto-efficient the Utilitarian is much more unequal than the Rawlsian one.

Let us observe the answers of the Economics seniors as reported in table 19. Passing from question 1 to 2b utilitarianism becomes the most preferred principle, gathering twice as many preferences, while maximin is the second choice, preferred by less than 28%. The Egalitarian solution keeps being the least preferred, but the preferences for it drastically lower. Let us test (4). The χ2 value resulting from the Stuart-Maxwell test, 35.36, allows us to reject the null hypothesis and to infer that passing from question 1 to 2b a significant change in the moral intuitions of the Sociology seniors occurs. Let us test (5) by applying the McNemar test and let us look for those single categories for which the differences are significant. Unlikely the previous cases the χ2 values, 12, 8.76 and 32.59, allow us to reject the null relatively to every mechanism. Not only the preferences for the Egalitarian solution, but also for maximin lower to the advantage of the Utilitarian distribution. Among the Economics seniors the change in favour of the Utilitarian principle proves to be even stronger than among the other students.

As noticed when analysing the answers to question 2a, some changes in judgement passing from question 1 to 2b are more understandable than others, given the different circumstances of the second problem. It is difficult to understand the reason why those who choose the maximin solution to the first problem switch to the Egalitarian principle in the second one and, similarly, why those who opted for utilitarianism in question 1 abandon it in favour of either the Egalitarian or the Rawlsian solution. Robinson and Friday have the same physical abilities, but put forth different efforts. There is no explanation for a greater interest in equality in the second question, especially with regard to those subjects who did not show any concern about it in solving the first problem. These incoherent choices are more numerous among the younger students. Looking at tables 17 and 20 we notice that only 3% of the Economics seniors who choose the Utilitarian solution switch to the Egalitarian or the Rawlsian principle. These percentages rise to 14% and 20% among the freshers. Similar results emerge from tables 18 and 21. Among the freshers a third of those who prefer egalitarianism in question 2b, and 16% of those who opt for maximin, had preferred utilitarianism in the first problem. These proportions lower to 14% and 3% among the seniors. As already noticed analysing the answers to question 2a, these data indicate a smaller average ability of the younger students to understand the circumstances of the distribution problem.

Let us look at table 25 and examine the answers of the Sociology seniors. As for their younger colleagues the order of the preferences is inverted passing from question 1 to 2b. The


18

result of the Stuart-Maxwell test applied to (4) testifies to this trend. Given the χ2 value, 48.17, we reject the null and conclude that the context of the distribution problem strongly affects the moral intuitions of these students. Let us test (5) by applying the McNemar test to the three solutions. We reject the null relatively to the Egalitarian and Utilitarian solutions, but we cannot reject it with respect to the Rawlsian principle, given their χ2 values, equal, respectively, to 30.62, 31.03 and 0.08. The preferences for egalitarianism decrease in favour of utilitarianism.

The same intuition about the greater ability of the older students to understand the circumstances of the distribution emerge from the comparison of these answers and those given by their younger colleagues. Looking at table 26 we notice an important detail: all of the seniors who had preferred utilitarianism in the first question have confirmed their choice and only 5% of those who had chosen maximin have switched to egalitarianism. As we see in table 23, these proportions raise to 7% and 9% among the freshers. Similarly, as reported in tables 24 and 27, 87.5% of the seniors who preferred the Utilitarian solution in question 2b had taken the same decision in question 1. Among the freshers this percentage lowers to 67%.

Let us consider the subjects who received question 2c, following the same order as

above10. Let us analyse the answers of the Economics freshers and observe table 29. The most notable detail passing from question 1 to question 2c is the loss of the consent for utilitarianism to the advantage of utilitarianism with a floor. This is shown by the results of the McNemar test applied to (5) relatively to the three different options provided as solutions to question 1. We can reject the null only with respect to the Utilitarian solution, given the high χ2 value, 19.05, and infer that the preferences for the Utilitarian solution drastically fall when a floor is introduced. Observing tables 30 and 31 we notice some interesting details. Nobody has switched to utilitarianism and only 14% of those who had chosen such principle in question 1 have confirmed it in question 2c, while 41% have switched to maximin and 28% to utilitarianism with a floor. The latter proves to be very attractive for those who opt for maximin principle in the first question, with 37% of switches.

Let us examine the answers of the Sociology freshers, looking at table 35. In this case the loss of consent for utilitarianism is total, as testified by the result of the McNemar test applied to (5). As above we can reject the null only relatively to utilitarianism, given the χ2 value equal to 18.05: the introduction of a floor reduces to zero the preferences for the Utilitarian solution. Even in this case the place of utilitarianism has been taken by the new principle. From table 36 we notice that this mechanism has attracted more than half of those who had chosen the Utilitarian solution, even if 30% of them switch to maximin.

Analysing the answers of the Economics seniors, table 32, we notice the same trend as above. In this case though, applying the McNemar test to test (5) we can reject the null not only relative to the Utilitarian solution but also to maximin, given the χ2 values, 18.05 and 5.26 respectively. Passing from question 1 to 2c the preferences for both the Rawlsian and the Utilitarian principle fall to the advantage of utilitarianism with a floor. This new mechanism, with 36% of the preferences, is indeed the second most preferred distribution and is much more successful than utilitarianism in the first question. Nobody has switched to the Utilitarian solution and only 5% of those who had chosen this distribution in question 1 have confirmed their choice, while 76% have switched to utilitarianism with a floor, table 33. Furthermore this solution also attracts a high percentage of those who had opted for egalitarianism, 24%, and utilitarianism, 25%. This principle meets greater success among the

10 The analysis will be slightly different though. While the first problem presents three solutions, four distinct distributions are provided as possible solutions to question 2c. The Stuart-Maxwell test cannot be used to test marginal homogeneity in this case and, furthermore, no appropriate test for case-control comparisons involving 3x4 contingency tables exists. It will only be possible to test (5) by applying the McNemar test.


19

senior pupils than among their younger colleagues. Yet this seems to be due again to the greater ability of the older students to understand the circumstances of the distribution. Also in this case some changes in judgement are less understandable than others. The only difference between question 1 and 2c is the introduction of a floor, a minimum level of utility under which the characters cannot survive. The only distribution that does not guarantee the survival of both the characters is the Utilitarian allocation. It is therefore difficult to understand the reason for switching from egalitarianism to maximin; since both the distributions guarantee the survival to both the individuals there is no reason for a defender of egalitarianism to abandon it. Similarly there is no reason to switch from the Utilitarian to the Egalitarian distribution. These queer choices are more common among the freshers, as shown in tables 30 and 33.

Let us finally examine the answers of the Sociology seniors, table 38. As in the previous cases nobody switches to the Utilitarian solution and only 14% of those who had opted for this distribution confirm their preference. Yet we assist in this case not only to a drastic fall in the preferences for utilitarianism, but also for egalitarianism. This is verified by applying the McNemar test to test (5). The χ2 values, 17.05 and 7.56, allow us to reject the null hypothesis relative to, respectively, the Utilitarian and Egalitarian distribution: the introduction of a floor significantly decreases the preferences for both the mechanisms. As we see in table 39, most of those who had preferred the Utilitarian distribution switch to utilitarianism with a floor, while 16% of the subjects who had chosen egalitarianism switch to this new principle and 12% to maximin. Among the Rawlsians 74% confirm their choice and 26% switch to the new mechanism. Utilitarianism with a floor, with 30% of the preferences, proves to be more appreciated by the Sociology seniors than by the younger students. This is due, just as with the Economics students, to the greater ability of more mature students to fully realise the circumstances of the distribution problem, as shown by the higher percentage of freshers who switched from utilitarianism to egalitarianism or from the Egalitarian to the Rawlsian solution. We can therefore conclude that an ulterior learning effect, independent on the kind of education, does indeed exist. Acquiring education, no matter what, does increase the ability of discerning the context of the problem and helps getting a solution.

6.5 Does clarifying the context favour social agreements?

Let us conclude our analysis investigating whether clarifying the context of the

distribution favour the achievement of an agreement among the parties. Let us start examining the answers to question 2a. Table 2 reveals an important detail:

unlike question 1 the four classes most prefer the same option. Maximin mechanism provides the most widely accepted solution to this problem, getting the absolute majority of preferences in each of the four classes. This trend can be understood if we consider the characteristic of the problem and the difference between the characters. Both Robinson and Friday put the same effort, but they differ in their physical abilities. Maximin mechanism, maximising the utility of the more disadvantaged, proves to agree with the moral intuitions of most of the individuals, whatever group they belong to. The explanation of the difference between the characters has made an agreement among the subjects possible. The Rawlsian solution is now largely the most preferred. Moreover the definition of the context of the distribution is not only a condition to achieve a social agreement, but also for such an agreement to be efficient.

Let us proceed to test the last of our hypotheses, by applying the Chi-square test to the answers of all the four classes. The null and alternative hypotheses are the following:

H0: the proportion of subjects in each of the option categories is the same (6) in each of the classes.


20

H1: the proportion of subjects in each of the option categories differs across the classes. Given the χ2 value, 29.21, we have to reject the null. Although clarifying the context has

made an agreement among the parties possible, the preferences of the four classes do not follow the same distribution. Let us investigate why by comparing the answers to question 2a in pairs. Let us begin analysing the preferences of fresher students of Economics and Sociology, by applying the Chi-square test to their answers and proceeding to test (6). Given the χ2 value, 4.49, we cannot reject the null at a 5% significance level. This result is of great importance: unlike question 1, in which no explanation about the different results obtained by Robinson and Friday was provided, in this problem we cannot reject the hypothesis that the preferences of the two classes follow the same distribution. We can easily realise this by looking at the results reported in figure 5 and comparing them to figure 1.

Figure 5 Let us now apply the Chi-square test to the answers of Economics fresher and senior

students and test again (6). Even in this case we cannot reject the null at a 5% significance level, given the χ2 value equal to 5.68. Unlike question 1, education does not influence the moral intuitions of the Economics students when the difference between the characters is explained. Let us observe the results in figure 6.

15%

25%

63% 60%

22% 15%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

E R U

Economics and Sociology, fresh.: question 2a.

Economics Sociology


21

Figure 6 Let us now observe the results relative to the Sociology freshers and seniors reported in

figure 7, and let us test (6) with respect to their answers.

Figure 7 Even in the case, given the χ2 value equal to 3.39, we cannot reject the null hypothesis

at a 5% significance level. Let us finally test (6) relatively to the answers of the senior students of Economics and

Sociology. Given the χ2 value equal to 22.9, in this case we have to reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are identical. Let us look at the results in figure 8.

25% 32%

60% 60%

15%8%

0%

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20%

30%

40%

50%

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E R U

Sociology fresh. and sen.: question 2a

Fresh. Sen.

15% 7%

63%

76%

22% 17%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

E R U

Economics fresh. and sen.: question 2a

Fresh. Sen.


22

Figure 8 Let us now proceed to analyse the answers to question 2b, as reported in table 15. The

Utilitarian solution is the most preferred by each one of the four classes. This result is even more striking considering that utilitarianism was the least preferred solution to the first problem by three of the four groups and only the second choice of the Economics seniors. This choice can be understood taking into account the particular characteristic of the problem. Both the characters have the same physical abilities, but they differ in the effort they put. The Utilitarian principle rewards the character that employ himself more and in this particular circumstance proves to agree with the moral intuitions of the subjects, whatever group they belong to, more than the other distribution mechanisms. Even in this case the definition of the context of the distribution has made an agreement possible and, as in problem 2a, this agreement is efficient. The answers to this problem are even more homogenous then those to question 2a. The four classes present the same order of preferences: the maximin solution is the second choice, followed by the Egalitarian. Egalitarianism proves to be a much more successful when the causes of the differences between the individuals are not provided.

Let us proceed to test (6) by applying the Chi-square test to the answers of all the four classes. Given the χ2 value, 8.5, we cannot reject the hypothesis according to which the preferences of the four classes follow the same distribution. This fundamental result points out the importance of clarifying the context of the distribution problem in order to achieve a social agreement. Let us look at the result reported in figure 9.

7%

32%

76%

60%

17%

8%0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

E R U

Economics and Sociology, sen.: question 2a.

Economics Sociology


23

Figure 9 Let us finally examine the answers to question 2c, as reported in table 28. These data are

more difficult to be interpreted. We notice that Economics freshers and seniors and Sociology freshers most prefer the maximin solution, while among the Sociology seniors egalitarianism is still the first choice. The four classes share the same scepticism for the Utilitarian solution. Egalitarianism still proves to be more appreciated by the Sociology students, yet, in this case, even among them the preferences for the Egalitarian solution decrease passing from the fresher to the senior students. As we already noticed, this is due to the particular attraction exerted by utilitarianism with a floor on more mature students, whatever course they attend.

Let us test (6) relatively to the four classes. The χ2 value is 26.5 and we have to reject the null hypothesis. The only case in which we cannot eject the null is comparing the answers of the Economics freshers and seniors, χ2 value equal to 5.62. With respect to them, we can conclude that their preferences follow the same distribution. Let us look at the result reported in figure 10.

12%

6%

13% 14%

34%

28%

38% 36%

54%

66%

49% 50%

0%

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20%

30%

40%

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E R U

Question 2b

Ec.F Ec.S So.F So.S


24

Figure 10 Unlike other experiments (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavy, 1987a, 1987b; Lissowski,

1992), the introduction of a floor did not permit to achieve a solution accepted by all of the parties. Yet we have to recall that an agreement looks closer now than in the first problem. Three classes most prefer the Rawlsian solution and even among the Sociology seniors the percentage of preferences for maximin is very close to the first choice. We have to think about the relationship between the Rawlsian principle and utilitarianism with a floor. The latter permits to go beyond the typical limits of both utilitarianism and maximin. Even maximin can be interpreted as a particular form of utilitarianism with a floor, in which the minimum threshold has not been reached yet. It represents the frontier of utilitarianism with a floor, in which the floor is maximised. The solution we proposed, on the other hand, is the other frontier of the principle that minimises the floor. Guaranteeing only the survival of one of the characters did not look enough to most of the subjects, who instead preferred maximising the utility of the most disadvantaged. What would have happened if we had raised the minimum floor? A series of social experiments of this kind would lead to an agreement among the parties.

7 Conclusions Studies have been conducted to analyse the impact of “frames” and of the wording of

questions on opinions on the welfare state11. To our knowledge, though, this is the first attempt to explore distributive justice analysing the extent to which clarifying the context of a distribution enables to achieve an agreement between the parties. Let us summarise the main results we obtained.

Ideology of students choosing to study Sociology differs from that of students who choose to study Economics, the formers being much more concerned about equality. A selection effect does indeed exist: students self-select themselves into either Economics or

11 See, e.g., Kangas (1997).

30%

19%

41% 36%

41% 44% 44%

32%

4% 1% 0% 3%

26%

36%

15%

30%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

E R U UF

Question 2c

Ec. F Ec.S. So.F. So. S


25

Sociology on the basis of their ideology. Further, acquiring different kinds of education increases difference in ideology, making an agreement between the parties even more difficult to achieve. This because studying Economics presents a learning effect that is absent among the Sociology students. Economics education affects the moral intuitions of the individuals, by teaching students the value of efficiency, while ethical judgements of Sociology students are not influenced by their education. These results can not be directly compared to other attempts to study the differences between economists and non-economists, the existent literature being aimed to study whether students of Economists behave in a more self-interested way than students of other disciplines. Yet, unlikely the results obtained by Marwell and Ames (1981), our results do not indicate a more problematic perception of fairness typical of Economics students. This may be due to the different way design of the question.

Clarifying the context of the distribution, by either explaining the differences between the individuals or introducing a floor, significantly influences the judgement of individuals, whatever group they belong to. Notably, more experienced students, whatever discipline they study, prove to have a greater ability than their younger colleague to understand the context and circumstances of a distribution. Both the disciplines seem indeed to develop this ability and to provide a method to better understand situations in order to elaborate a judgement. A positive learning effect, independent of the kind of education, seems therefore to exist. Whenever egalitarianism is not efficient, Egalitarian principle proves to provide inadequate solutions when the circumstances of the distributions are clear. A remarkable result, when a floor is introduced, is the abandon of utilitarian principle, if the solution it prescribes does not enable every individual to reach the minimum utility.

The most notable result is that clarification of the context of the distribution favours an agreement between the parties. Maximin criterion proves to be an adequate solution to the distribution problem when the individuals, between whom the bundle is to be divided, differ in their physical abilities. The Utilitarian principle, on the contrary, meets a great success when the individuals put different efforts. The introduction of a floor does not seem to be an equally successful way to achieve a social agreement. Yet, only a particular solution corresponding to the utilitarian principle with a floor constraint has been explored. There are several interesting extensions for future research and a series of social experiments should be conducted in order to point out a plausible threshold that would appear just to the parties. Reality always differs from the theory and that is why it is not possible to achieve social solutions that may actually be practised without empirical verifies.


26

Appendix A Question 1 After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two different islands divided by a narrow but deep channel. On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce fruit and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be; every additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people. It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the plants between Robinson and Friday. You’ve been given the following information, which the two survivors also know: Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much fruit they produce depends on the way they are cultivated. Friday obtains 120 fruits per year from every plant on island B, but he cannot obtain any fruit from island A’s plants. On both islands Robinson obtains 20 fruits per plant. There’s no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and there’s also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced. How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just? Choose: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 0 240 Friday 0 12 1440 Total production of fruits 1680 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 8 400 Friday 0 4 480 Total production of fruits 880 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 9 9 360 Friday 3 3 360 Total production of fruits 720 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


27

Question 2a After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two different islands divided by a narrow but deep channel. On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce fruit and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be; every additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people. It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the plants between Robinson and Friday. You’ve been given the following information, which the two survivors also know: Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much fruit they produce depends on the way they are cultivated. Both Robinson and Friday put the same amount of work into tilling the plants; the only way to move from one island to the other is to swim. Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he cannot swim and he cannot till any plant on island A. Robinson is a perfect swimmer and he can therefore till plants on both islands, but due to a wound caused by the shipwreck he cannot obtain more than 20 fruits per year from every plant of island A and island B. There’s no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and there’s also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced. How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just? Choose: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 0 240 Friday 0 12 1440 Total production of fruits 1680 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 8 400 Friday 0 4 480 Total production of fruits 880 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 9 9 360 Friday 3 3 360 Total production of fruits 720 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


28

Question 2b After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two different islands divided by a narrow but deep channel. On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce fruit and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be; every additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people. It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the plants between Robinson and Friday. You’ve been given the following information, which the two survivors also know: Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much fruit they produce depends on the way they are cultivated. Robinson and Friday can till plants and move from one island to the other in the same way, but they do not put the same amount of work into tilling the plants. Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he doesn’t want to go on island A and he will not produce fruits on this island. To Robinson moving from one island to the other is all the same, but he does not put as much amount of work into tilling his plants as Friday and he doesn’t produce more than 20 fruits per year from every plant, both on island A and B. There’s no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and there’s also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced. How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just? Choose: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 0 240 Friday 0 12 1440 Total production of fruits 1680 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 8 400 Friday 0 4 480 Total production of fruits 880 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 9 9 360 Friday 3 3 360 Total production of fruits 720 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


29

Question 2c After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two different islands divided by a narrow but deep channel. On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce fruit and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be; every additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people. It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the plants between Robinson and Friday. You’ve been given the following information, which the two survivors also know: The minimum quantity needed by every one of them in order to survive is 300 fruits per year. Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much fruit they produce depends on the way they are cultivated. Friday obtains 120 fruits per year from every plant on island B, but he cannot obtain any fruit from island A’s plants. On both islands Robinson obtains 20 fruits per plant. There’s no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and there’s also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced. How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just? Choose: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 0 240 Friday 0 12 1440 Total production of fruits 1680 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 8 400 Friday 0 4 480 Total production of fruits 880 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 9 9 360 Friday 3 3 360 Total production of fruits 720 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits Robinson 12 3 300 Friday 0 9 1080 Total production of fruits 1380 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


30

Appendix B In this appendix we report the Chi-square values resulting from the application of the statistical tests we resorted to. The values below are the results of testing (1):

Economics Freshers

a/b/c

Economics Seniors

a/b/c

Sociology Freshers

a/b/c

Sociology Seniors

a/b/c

Question 1

0.55

3.38

0.72

2.98

The following values refer to the Chi-square tests applied to (2) and (3):

Ec. Fr./ Ec. Se./ So. Fr./

So. Se.

Economics Freshers/ Seniors

Sociology Freshers/ Seniors

Economics Freshers/Sociology

Freshers

Economics Seniors/Sociology

Seniors

Question

1

64.95

15.88

0.97

15.57

44.5

Here we have the results of the Stuart-Maxwell tests applied to (4): a b

Ec. Fr.

Ec. Se. So. Fr. So.. Se. Ec. Fr. Ec. Se. So. Fr. So.. Se.

Question 1 /

2

19.8

21.89

20.21

19.53

25.32

35.36

40.65

48.17

The following values refer to the McNemar tests applied to (5): Economics Freshers Economics Seniors Sociology Freshers Sociology Seniors

E /

not E

R /

not R

U /

not U

E /

not E

R /

not R

U /

not U

E /

not E

R /

not R

U /

not U

E /

not E

R /

not R

U /

not U

Quest. 1a/2a

14.38

15.8

0.24

8.45

20.1

7.26

17.42

16.17

0

9.48

16.96

2.28


31

Quest. 1b/2b

16.68

0.5

19.59

12

8.76

32.59

27.84

0.21

28.26

30.62

0.08

31.03

Quest. 1c/2c

0.45

0.11

19.05

0.36

5.26

18.05

1.07

2.23

18.05

7.56

0

17.05

Finally, we report the results of the Chi-square tests applied to (6):

Ec. Fr. / Ec. Se./ So.Fr. /

So. Se.




Freshers


Seniors

Question 2a

29.21

5.68

3.39

4.49

22.9

Economics Freshers / Economics Seniors / Sociology Freshers / Sociology

Seniors

Question 2b

8.5

Ec. Fr./ Ec.

Se./ So. Fr./ So. Se.




Freshers


Seniors

Question 2c

26.5

5.62

11.81

10.14

8.05


32

Appendix C Here we report the tables we referred to and all those that are necessary to develop the tests we resorted to.

Table 1: question 1

Ec. Fr. Ec. Se. So. Fr. So. Se.

E 35,03 % 21,70 % 47,25 % 46,84 %

R 38,14 % 50,00 % 36,52 % 34,18 %

U 26,84 % 28,30 % 16,23 % 18,99 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %

Table 2: question 2a


E 15,32 % 6,96 % 24,63 % 31,87 %

R 62,90 % 75,65 % 60,45 % 60,44 %

U 21,77 % 17,39 % 14,93 % 7,69 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %

Table 3: Economics freshers

1a \ 2a E R U Total

E 7,26 % 22,58 % 7,26 % 37,10 %

R 4,03 % 27,42 % 6,45 % 37,90 %

U 4,03 % 12,90 % 8,06 % 25,00 %

Total 15,32 % 62,90 % 21,77 % 100,00 %


1a \ 2a E R U Total

E 19,57 % 60,87 % 19,57 % 100,00 %

R 10,64 % 72,34 % 17,02 % 100,00 %

U 16,13 % 51,61 % 32,26 % 100,00 %

Total 15,32 % 62,90 % 21,77 % 100,00 %


33


1a \ 2a E R U Total

E 47,37 % 35,90 % 33,33 % 37,10 %

R 26,32 % 43,59 % 29,63 % 37,90 %

U 26,32 % 20,51 % 37,04 % 25,00 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %

Table 6: Economics seniors

1a \ 2a E R U Total

E 4,35 % 12,17 % 2,61 % 19,13 %

R 1,74 % 46,09 % 2,61 % 50,43 %

U 0,87 % 17,39 % 12,17 % 30,43 %

Total 6,96 % 75,65 % 17,39 % 100,00 %


1a \ 2a E R U Total

E 22,73 % 63,64 % 13,64 % 100,00 %

R 3,45 % 91,38 % 5,17 % 100,00 %

U 2,86 % 57,14 % 40,00 % 100,00 %

Total 6,96 % 75,65 % 17,39 % 100,00 %


1a \ 2a E R U Total

E 62,50 % 16,09 % 15,00 % 19,13 %

R 25,00 % 60,92 % 15,00 % 50,43 %

U 12,50 % 22,99 % 70,00 % 30,43 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %


34

Table 9: Sociology freshers

1a \ 2a E R U Total

E 18,66 % 25,37 % 2,24 % 46,27 %

R 2,99 % 29,85 % 5,22 % 38,06 %

U 2,99 % 5,22 % 7,46 % 15,67 %

Total 24,63 % 60,45 % 14,93 % 100,00 %


1a \ 2a E R U Total

E 40,32 % 54,84 % 4,84 % 100,00 %

R 7,84 % 78,43 % 13,73 % 100,00 %

U 19,05 % 33,33 % 47,62 % 100,00 %

Total 24,63 % 60,45 % 14,93 % 100,00 %


1a\ 2a E R U Total

E 75,76 % 41,98 % 15,00 % 46,27 %

R 12,12 % 49,38 % 35.00 % 38,06 %

U 12,12 % 8,64 % 50,00 % 15,67 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %

Table 12: Sociology seniors

1a \ 2a E R U Total

E 26,37 % 24,18 % 0,00 % 50,55 %

R 1,10 % 34,07 % 1,10 % 36,26 %

U 4,40 % 2,20 % 6,59 % 13,19 %

Total 31,87 % 60,44 % 7,69 % 100,00 %


35


1a \ 2a E R U Total

E 52,17 % 47,83 % 0,00 % 100,00 %

R 3,03 % 93,94 % 3,03 % 100,00 %

U 33,33 % 16,67 % 50,00 % 100,00 %

Total 31,87 % 60,44 % 7,69 % 100,00 %


1a \ 2a E R U Total

E 82,76 % 40,00 % 0,00 % 50,55 %

R 3,45 % 56,36 % 14,29 % 36,26 %

U 13,79 % 3,64 % 85,71 % 13,19 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %

Table 15: question 2b


E 11,63 % 6,42 % 12,63 % 13,56 %

R 34,11 % 27,52 % 37,89 % 36,44 %

U 54,26 % 66,06 % 49,47 % 50,00 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 4,65 % 11,63% 17,83 % 34,11 %

R 3,10 % 17,05 % 18,60 % 38,76 %

U 3,88 % 5,43 % 17,83 % 27,13 %

Total 11,63 % 34,11 % 54,26 % 100,00 %


36


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 13,64 % 34,09 % 52,27 % 100,00 %

R 8,00 % 44,00 % 48,00 % 100,00 %

U 14,29 % 20,00 % 65,71 % 100,00 %

Total 11,63 % 34,11 % 54,26 % 100,00 %


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 40,00 % 34,09 % 32,86 % 34,11 %

R 26,67 % 50,00 % 34,29 % 38,76 %

U 33,33 % 15,91 % 32,86 % 27,13 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 2,75 % 7,34 % 13,76 % 23,85 %

R 2,75 % 19,27 % 22,94 % 44,95 %

U 0,92 % 0,92 % 29,36 % 31,19 %

Total 6,42 % 27,52 % 66,06 % 100,00 %


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 11,54 % 30,77 % 57,69 % 100,00 %

R 6,12 % 42,86 % 51,02 % 100,00 %

U 2,94 % 2,94 % 94,12 % 100,00 %

Total 6,42 % 27,52 % 66,06 % 100,00 %


37


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 42,86 % 26,67 % 20,83 % 23,85 %

R 42,86 % 70,00 % 34,72 % 44,95 %

U 14,29 % 3,33 % 44,44 % 31,19 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 8,42 % 24,21 % 17,89 % 50,53 %

R 3,16 % 13,68 % 16,84 % 33,68 %

U 1,05 % 0,00 % 14,74 % 15,79 %

Total 12,63 % 37,89 % 49,47 % 100,00 %


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 16,67 % 47,92 % 35,42 % 100,00 %

R 9,38 % 40,63 % 50,00 % 100,00 %

U 6,67 % 0,00 % 93,33 % 100,00 %

Total 12,63 % 37,89 % 49,47 % 100,00 %


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 66,67 % 63,89 % 36,17 % 50,53 %

R 25,00 % 36,11 % 34,04 % 33,68 %

U 8,33 % 0,00 % 29,79 % 15,79 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %


38


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 11,86 % 21,19 % 11,02 % 44,07 %

R 1,69 % 15,25 % 16,95 % 33,90 %

U 0,00 % 0,00 % 22,03 % 22,03 %

Total 13,56 % 36,44 % 50,00 % 100,00 %


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 26,92 % 48,08 % 25,00 % 100,00 %

R 5,00 % 45,00 % 50,00 % 100,00 %

U 0,00 % 0,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %

Total 13,56 % 36,44 % 50,00 % 100,00 %


1b \ 2b E R U Total

E 87,50 % 58,14 % 22,03 % 44,07 %

R 12,50 % 41,86 % 33,90 % 33,90 %

U 0,00 % 0,00 % 44,07 % 22,03 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %

Table 28: question 2c


E 29,70 % 19,15 % 41,38 % 35,51 %

R 40,59 % 43,62 % 43,97 % 31,78 %

U 3,96 % 1,06 % 0,00 % 2,80 %

UF 25,74 % 36,17 % 14,66 % 29,91 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %


39


1c \ 2c E R U UF Total

E 21,78 % 7,92 % 0,00 % 3,96 % 33,66 %

R 2,97 % 20,79 % 0,00 % 13,86 % 37,62 %

U 4,95 % 11,88 % 3,96 % 7,92 % 28,71 %

Total 29,70 % 40,59 % 3,96 % 25,74 % 100,00 %



E 64,71 % 23,53 % 0,00 % 11,76 % 100,00 %

R 7,89 % 55,26 % 0,00 % 36,84 % 100,00 %

U 17,24 % 41,38 % 13,79 % 27,59 % 100,00 %

Total 29,70 % 40,59 % 3,96 % 25,74 % 100,00 %



E 73,33 % 19,51 % 0,00 % 15,38 % 33,66 %

R 10,00 % 51,22 % 0,00 % 53,85 % 37,62 %

U 16,67 % 29,27 % 100,00 % 30,77 % 28,71 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %



E 14,89 % 2,13 % 0,00 % 5,32 % 22, 34 %

R 2,13 % 39,36 % 0,00 % 13,83 % 55,32 %

U 2,13 % 2,13 % 1,06 % 17,02 % 22,34 %

Total 19,15 % 43,62 % 1,06 % 36,17 % 100,00 %


40



E 66,67 % 9,52 % 0,00 % 23,81 % 100,00 %

R 3,85 % 71,15 % 0,00 % 25,00 % 100,00 %

U 9,52 % 9,52 % 4,76 % 76,19 % 100,00 %

Total 19,15 % 43,62 % 1,06 % 36,17 % 100,00 %



E 77,78 % 4,88 % 0,00 % 14,71 % 22,34 %

R 11,11 % 90,24 % 0,00 % 38,24 % 55,32 %

U 11,11 % 4,88 % 100,00 % 47,06 % 22,34 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %



E 37,07 % 7,76 % 0,00 % 0,86 % 45,69 %

R 1,72 % 31,03 % 0,00 % 4,31 % 37,07 %

U 2,59 % 5,17 % 0,00 % 9,48 % 17,24 %

Total 41,38 % 43,97 % 0,00 % 14,66 % 100,00 %



E 81,13 % 16,98 % 0,00 % 1,89 % 100,00 %

R 4,65 % 83,72 % 0,00 % 11,63 % 100,00 %

U 15,00 % 30,00 % 0,00 % 55,00 % 100,00 %

Total 41,38 % 43,97 % 0,00 % 14,66 % 100,00 %


41



E 89,58 % 17,65 % 0,00 % 5,88 % 45,69 %

R 4,17 % 70,59 % 0,00 % 29,41 % 37,07 %

U 6,25 % 11,76 % 0,00 % 64,71 % 17,24 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 0,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %



E 33,64 % 5,61 % 0,00 % 7,48 % 46,73 %

R 0,00 % 24,30 % 0,00 % 8,41 % 32,71 %

U 1,87 % 1,87 % 2,80 % 14,02 % 20,56 %

Total 35,51 % 31,78 % 2,80 % 29,91 % 100,00 %



E 72,00 % 12,00 % 0,00 % 16,00 % 100,00 %

R 0,00 % 74,29 % 0,00 % 25,71 % 100,00 %

U 9,09 % 9,09 % 13,64 % 68,18 % 100,00 %

Total 35,51 % 31,78 % 2,80 % 29,91 % 100,00 %



E 94,74 % 17,65 % 0,00 % 25,00 % 46,73 %

R 0,00 % 76,47 % 0,00 % 28,13 % 32,71 %

U 5,26 % 5,88 % 100,00 % 46,88 % 20,56 %

Total 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 % 100,00 %

Looking for an Agreement: an Experiment on Distributive Justice

42

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