Long-MACLAS 2012 Paper

7/31/2019 Long-MACLAS 2012 Paper

1/40

1

Tom Long

American University

MACLAS Conference

Convincing the Colossus: Latin American Leaders Face the United States

Whether measured by economy, trade, or military spending, the United States dwarfs any

country in Latin America. In fact, it even dwarfs the region taken in its entirety, as has been the

case at least since the turn of the twentieth century. This simple factoverwhelming

asymmetryhas defined both relations between the United States and Latin America and the

study of those relations. It is reflected in the names of some of the subfields most popular texts:

SchoultzsBeneath the United States, Smiths Talons of the Eagle,Blasiers The Hovering

Giant, or GrandinsEmpires Workshop.

1

The focus on asymmetry has constricted the study ofinter-American relations, creating a gap in our understanding of key issues. Two sets of blinders,

one empirical, one theoretical, have led much of the work on U.S.-Latin American relations to

understate the agency of Latin American actors. An important current of recent works has begun

to explore this area, looking at how Latin American leaders have been able to maneuver around

U.S. policies. If the United States were so dominant and Latin American leaders so helpless, we

should expect to see great U.S. success in determining outcomes in Latin America. This often

was not the case. During the Cold War, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba sought to

exert influence throughout Latin America. More important, however, was the role of Latin

Americansoftentimes the conservative elitein shaping how history unfolded on their own

turf.2 The treatment of Latin American leaders as the puppets of external actors missed howmuch latitude these leaders actually exercised.3

However, this paper goes one step further. I argue that not only do Latin American

leaders preserve important freedom of action in their own foreign and domestic policies, but they

have at times been able to influence the United States foreign policy. This article will briefly

examine the literature on U.S.-Latin American relations, with a focus on how different strands of

literature have dealt with (or more often ignored) the agency of Latin American leaders. It will

then draw on work in international relations theory and foreign policy analysis to propose a

framework and a typological theory that helps us understand when and how Latin American

leaders are able to influence U.S. policies. That framework examines how the level of LatinAmerican and U.S interest in the issue, the degree of policy divergence, and the clarity with

which a problem is understood affect both the likelihood and strategies of Latin American

influence. Finally, it uses that framework to deal briefly with two cases, both of which draw on

archival work and elite interviews in Latin American and the United States. The first examines

the negotiation of the Torrijos-Carter treaties on the Panama Canal, while the second looks at the

initial formation of Plan Colombia.


2/40

2

A one-sided story: The literature on U.S.-Latin American relations

Early works on U.S. policy to Latin America stressed the dominance of U.S.

policymakers and often offered justifications for U.S. decisions. For example, Bemis examined

Latin Americans reactions to U.S. policy; as actors they had minimal roles.4 During the Cold

War, a body of critical scholars offered a harsh reappraisal of U.S. policies, especially the periodof frequent interventions stretching from the late 1890s to the late 1920s.5 Scholars identified a

split between establishment and radical authors, the latter strongly influenced by Marxism

and dependency theory.6 Though Marxism and dependency have lost much of their sway, the

divide remains. Russell Crandall recently described the literature as split between an

establishmentitself divided along U.S. partisan linesand an anti-imperialist critique.7

Establishment authors frequently have policymaking experience. While more critical of U.S.

policies than the previous generation of scholars, they tend to criticize specific issues within

U.S.-Latin American relations rather than the foundations of those relations. On the whole, the

United States is a beneficial presenceor at least does not behave worse than any other great

power.8 Anti-imperialists dominate the field. Some stress dependent economic conditions, while

others examine policymakers prejudices and assumptions about Latin Americans.9

Much of the work in both of these camps suffers from a pair of blind spots. The

establishment and anti-imperialist scholars wear different theoretical blinders that result in a

similar inattention to Latin American agency. Anti-imperialists theoretical blinders lead them to

believe that what matters in inter-American relations is U.S. aggression and how the exercise of

U.S. power creates tight and binding constraints on Latin American foreign policy choice.

Establishment scholars see the inside baseball story of how U.S. policy is made as the most

important and interesting question. They tend to organize their studies according to the terms of

U.S. presidents and characterize those presidents policies under broad themes and eras.

Secondly, the subfield as a whole suffers from empirical blinders, relying overwhelmingly on

sources from the United States, and from the U.S. government in particular. It is perhaps

unsurprising that works built on U.S. sources reflect a U.S.-centric perspective.10

However, a subtler option existsone that has been overshadowed by the emphasis on

power asymmetry. In 2003, historian Max Paul Friedman noted an incipient trend of retiring the

puppets, ending the treatment of Latin American leaders as marionettes guided by a northern

master.11 A growing group of political scientists and diplomatic historians argue that Latin

Americans possess important leeway. U.S. intentions rarely determine outcomes. Robert Pastor

posits an interactive focus, which incorporates both U.S. and Latin American actions.12 Hal

Brands has recently, and persuasively, argued that U.S., Soviet, and Cuban designs for Latin

America all largely failed. The actions of Latin American elites, many of whom exhibited

profound anti-communism, mattered more, most of the time.13 Empirical and theoretical blinders

have led to a general neglect of the Latin American side of U.S.-Latin American relations. But

what exactly have we missed?


3/40

3

For one thing, the general literature on Latin American foreign policymaking is

surprisingly thin. While this is especially true for works in English, it even extends in large part

to works published in the region. Descriptive works on legal processes exist,14 and specific

episodes are explored in foreign relations histories. Latin American works on foreign policy tend

to borrow and adapt theories rather than creating new ones that apply nationally or regionally.15

This seems to reflect, at least in part, the long shadow that dependency theory continues to cast

over the social sciences in much of the Latin American academy, and the focus on economic

development issues.16 There is a relative dearth of empirical material on Latin American foreign

policythat is, carefully constructed case studiesthat could facilitate broader comparison and

theory building.17 While volumes of work have been done in the fields like comparative politics

in Latin America, the study of foreign policy seems to have mostly slipped into the chasm of the

foreign-domestic divide.

The inattention to Latin American agency has also had a deleterious effect on IR theory

as it concerns the Western Hemisphere. There are a handful of overarching theoretical paradigms

that seek to explain hemispheric relations. None of them is satisfactory. For realists, the Western

Hemisphere has long been considered the exclusive hegemonic zone of the United States. Under

realism, there is almost no interest in the motivations or actions of Latin America. They are not

great powers. This dominant view exaggerates the U.S. power to control outcomes in the

hemispherealways a dubious proposition where the Southern Cone is concerned. The second

body of theory is dependent foreign policy, in which the foreign policy choices of Latin

American leaders are almost entirely constrained by the United States. While the international

system of core and periphery is an object of study, the theory emphasizes constraints on Latin

American leaders and not their actions. A third group of theories aim to examine international

relations from a third world perspective. For example, Carlos Escuds theory of peripheralrealism argues that because Latin American states are confined to follow the hegemon, they

should make the best of it by avoiding confrontation with the United States and hoping to enjoy

the benefits of favorgreater economic development. Escuds theory is largely prescriptive,

and his counsel gives little freedom for foreign policy choice to Latin American leaders.18

It is not the aim of this paper to craft a new, overarching IR theory for the hemisphere.

However, an understanding of how Latin American leaders can preserve freedom of action and

even shape U.S. policies will call the above theories into serious doubt. Before proposing a

framework for understanding when and how Latin American leaders might exercise this

influence, we first look at some of the broader theoretical underpinnings that explain the actionsof small states under asymmetry.

Influence under asymmetry

This is not the first study to suggest that there are foreign influences on U.S. foreign

policy decisions. However, almost all of the work on the subject has ignored Latin America,

following the dominant perspectives offered in the literature of the hemisphere. Those blinders


4/40


5/40

5

countries are massively different in size, which would seem to make Brazil a more self-evident

priority to the United States. In this section, however, I seek to offer to general concepts about

how asymmetry might shape the choices open to Latin American leaders.

Many of the options open to larger alliance partners (especially in multipolar systems)

would not seem to offer much leverage during the Cold War. This is perhaps the most traditionalunderstanding of how asymmetry constrains optionsin addition to making direct military

action impractical. The actual affect on the balance of power of a small Latin American republic

switching sides would be minimal, though as with Cuba, the symbolic and strategic importance

could be much larger. Regardless, the costs of taking this route are quite high, and more so for a

country geographically close the United States. The option of allying with a foreign power has

largely been removed since the end of the Cold War, though alternate economic agreements

might be available without drawing much opposition from the United States. Given that in most

cases the costs of openly challenging the United States (during the Cold War) or the international

system it shaped and continues to lead (after the Cold War) will nearly always outweigh the

benefits, the options for most leaders exist within a broad spectrum of cooperation. However,

cooperation does not mean compliance. Leaders are not puppets simply because they do not seek

to overturn the international order. There is a large and meaningful middle ground in which Latin

American leaders can pursue their own priorities. At times, they can gain acquiescence or even

considerable assistance from the United States for those goals.

To understand the options open to Latin American leaders who seek to influence the

United States in this meaningful middle ground, we need to assess what type of case we are

dealing with.28 We can sort out the likelihood of change and the possible effective Latin

American strategies by analyzing cases along four dimensions: Latin American interest in the

issue, U.S. interest in the issue, the degree of divergence between Latin American interests and

U.S. policy, and the level of clarity with which the problem is defined. First, we need to

understand the level of interest the Latin American country has in the problem. Second, we

should assess the U.S. interest in the problem. Is the Latin American countrys issue on the U.S.

agenda? Third, we need to understand the degree and nature of the divergence between Latin

American interests and U.S. policy. Finally, we need to examine, through the actors eyes at the

time, how well defined the problem is.

One consequence of asymmetry is that policy change is unlikely if the Latin American

leader is not extremely interested in the issue. Because changing U.S. policy is likely to be

difficult and involve political costs, we should not expect to see Latin American leaders pursuing

change on issues of little importance, even if policy divergence is high. For many leaders in

Latin America, this might apply to the U.S. embargo on Cuba. They are happy to make rhetorical

statements on the issue, but unlikely to put their own political capital on the line (by boycotting

meetings with U.S. leaders, for example). Therefore, we can take Latin American interest as a

precondition for examining the case, allowing us to focus on the three remaining conditions. A

visual depiction, stripping away much important nuance, gives us the following scorecard:


6/40

6

Case A

U.S. priority Policy divergence Problem clarity

High

Low

Broad generalizations like high and low are not intended to deny the myriad shades of gray,but to give us a sense of how we might compare cases. Depending on how cases score, there are

different pathways to producing change. In addition, there are different likelihoods of change for

different types of cases, though I do not think that coding and quantifying cases is likely to be a

productive approach for several reasons. One is empirical, given the dearth of case studies that

incorporate the Latin American perspective. Another is that an approach focused strictly on

causal outcomes will not give us much insight on the process of change, which will make it very

difficult to have confidence that it was Latin American influence and not some other factor that

explains the shift. This rubric allows us to hypothesize about whether we will see change and

how that change might occur. At this early point of theory development, cases are treated as

theoretically oriented narratives, in which process-tracing allows both for testing and refining the

framework. Perhaps most importantly, this approach is needed to better understand processes and

mechanisms of influence. The conditions should not be understood as deterministic structures. In

fact, Latin American agency is crucial to case outcomes. The strategies Latin American leaders

adopt and the skill with which they execute them will determine success or failure, just as much

as U.S. actions might. Before looking at how combinations on the scorecard are likely to affect

Latin American strategies and final outcomes, I will briefly visit each of the columns.

Though I am treating the level of interest from Latin American leaders as a precondition,

I do not wish to exclude Latin American interests and goals as an object of study. We must first

understand the political context of the Latin American leader to explain why interests diverge in

from U.S. policies, what goals are, and what domestic political constraints he are involved.

Therefore, we need to assess the interests of the Latin American leader, as defined by his or her

government, prior to looking at the other conditions. This will also help us later in defining the

Latin American perspective on the conditions of policy divergence and problem clarity.

The Latin American level of importance will not necessarily be reflected in the United

States. One frequent effect of asymmetry is that issues of peripheral importance to U.S.

policymakers are central concerns to the leaders of smaller nations.29 The corollary is that the

central concerns of Latin American leaders, especially those from smaller countries, are likely to

exist only on the margins of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The first question is a relatively

simple one: Does the Latin American countrys issue matter to the United States?30 This first

dimension is largely one of agenda-setting. If a Latin American leader wishes to change U.S.

policy, he must first have the United States attention.31

The second dimension concerns the content of policies and interests. In particular, the

researcher needs to compare U.S. policies with the goals and interests of the Latin American


7/40

7

government. In some cases, especially when the level of U.S. attention is low, the current U.S.

policy might not reflect U.S. interests in the sense realists would define them. Policy can be the

remnant of previous bureaucratic compromise or the product of drift. Regardless of the origins of

the policy, it conflicts with the interests defined by the Latin American government. The

question is, is a large change in U.S. policy required to satisfy Latin American interests, or would

small adjustments do? There are very different degrees of divergence, and the extent of that

divergence matters to both the likelihood of change at the strategies through which Latin

American leaders might achieve it.

The third dimension is perhaps the most difficult to assess empirically, but it is of

paramount importance. How clearly defined is the problem for both U.S. and Latin American

policymakers? A great deal of research in foreign policy analysis suggests that before

policymakers can rationally weigh the costs and benefits of policy options, they must first come

to an understanding of the problem they face. This step precedes any sort of rational choice

framework, and in itself is not a purely rational matter.32 Shifting problem definitions can

suggest very different policy options. I believe there are two situations in which we are likely to

see low levels of problem clarity. The first regards issues that are new or appearing on the

political agenda for the first time. Policymakers might try to understand these situations through

the use of metaphors, for example, or they could argue about the correct framing of the issue.33

The second involves a breakdown in the policy paradigm that had been applied to a problem.

Sudden moments of crisis might signal that a policy clearly has failed, and these times might

allow for shifts in both the understanding of a problem and the policies that are seen as possible

solutions to that problem.34 If U.S. conceptions of its interests are malleable, this offers another

opportunity for Latin American leaders to influence U.S. decisions not just through negotiating

but by shaping the definition of the problem itself.

35

This framework allows can indicate when Latin American leaders are unlikely to be able

to influence U.S. policygiven that they have much less ability to oblige the U.S. to shift its

stance. For example, if an issue scores high on all the dimensions, change is unlikely. An

example of this might be the Reagan administrations punitive policies toward Nicaragua.

Reagan and Sandinista Nicaragua


High X X X

Low

However, the other possible combinations of interest and interest divergence are more propitious.

When the U.S. does not place a high priority on an issue, but divergence is high, Latin American

leaders must try to get the issue onto the U.S. agenda. How they do so will depend largely on the

degree of problem clarity. In cases of low clarity, they might be able to reshape the U.S.

policymakers conceptions, given that the issue has not been one of salience. If the problem is


8/40

8

clearly defined, Latin American leaders are more likely to recast their issue to make it fit with an

overarching narrative. On issues where there is high interest and low divergence, changes in

policy are likely because they only be changes of degree. Cooperative negotiations are likely,

facilitated by a shared understanding of the problem the new policy is meant to address. Prima

facie, the conclusion of a treaty making Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone appears to

have been along this lines, though further research would confirm that.

Tlatelolco Treaty: Prohibition on nuclear weapons in Latin America


High X X

Low X

This led to a largely cooperative negotiation over the details of an agreement that both sides

want. Of course, the divergence was very low and the political costs to the United States

appeared to be minimal. However, the original treaty was not a U.S. imposition but a Braziliansuggestion that was embraced by many in the region.36 The cases of greatest interest to scholars

will be likely to involve high levels of policy divergence (hard cases for influence) or uncertainty

in problem definition. These conditions are likely to evolve throughout cases. In fact, the very

goal of Latin American strategies might be to change these conditions: agenda-setting strategies

try to increase U.S. interest on terms favorable to the Latin American leader.37

Methodology and case selection

Because the aim here is to develop the above framework, rather than to test hypotheses,

case selection has been guided by the logic of theory building. As George and Bennett note, atypological theory like the one above is useful for clarifying comparisons between cases, while

combining with-in and cross-case analysis.38 Both selected cases appearprima facie to have been

successful in the sense that there was a policy change in the direction of the Latin American

leaders goals. I have selected cases that provide a broad variation across the above conditions.

They also reflect broadly different contexts, one during and the other after the Cold War, along

with variation on other issues, like democratic governance. In addition, on their own merits thee

cases were perhaps the most important U.S.-Latin American issues of their respective eras.

The empirics combine archival work and interviews from each Latin American country

and the U.S. in an attempt to overcome the empirical blinders discussed above. In Panama, Iconducted archival work primarily in the foreign ministry, where I was given broad and direct

access to primary documents. I supplemented this in the National Library and at foundations. I

interviewed figures including former presidents, cabinet ministers, and treaty negotiators. In

Colombia, I worked in the administrative department of the presidency, the foreign ministry, the

defense ministry, and the Department of National Planning, as well as in various libraries. I

interviewed the foreign minister, the defense minister, and the director of planning from that


9/40

9

time, along with several others. I have integrated this data with work in U.S. archives, the

National Security Archive, and published sources from both the U.S. and Latin America.39

Case 1: The Panama Canal

Panamanians had waited for this moment for nearly as long as there had been Panamanians.Omar Torrijos, a military man dressed in a dark civilian suit, sat next to the president of the

United States in the ornate hall of the Pan American Union in Washington, D.C. The general led

a country of just over two million people, one of the worlds smallest in physical size and

population. The other, President Jimmy Carter, was the chief executive of the worlds leading

superpower. For both, the signing ceremony was a victory. However, there is little question that

the Panamanian victory was the larger of the two. It was Panama that had fought for decades

against what it considered the unjust treaty of 1903. It was Panama that spoke with a desperate

passion about its incompleteness as a nation, of its partial and wounded sovereignty, and of a

humiliation borne of daily experience. The treaties that sat on the table in front of Carter and

Torrijos carried great political costs for both. For Carter, they represented the main foreignpolicy fight of his first year. The treaties included major reversals and concessions to U.S.

positions from just a few years prior, including positions that had been tightly held by various

administrations over decades of negotiation. For Torrijos the treaties had risen nearly to the level

of his raison dtre over his nine years in power. How had Torrijos, and the small nation he led,

managed to rise to the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda? Once there, how did Panama

manage to influence the U.S. stance, in spite of the political costs those positions entailed?

In the front row of the Pan American Union sat a collection of Latin American leaders

many of whom held deep grudges against one another. Eighteen Western Hemisphere heads of

state bore witness to the signing ceremony.40

The Chilean General Augusto Pinochet, despisedby democrats like Venezuelas Carlos Andrs Prez, looked on as the Panamanian leader

achieved, with the stroke of a pen, the principal foreign policy goal in Panamas history. Over

the previous years, many of these individuals had championed Panamas cause, chastising the

United States for its inflexibility and calling for justice. A host of leaders from across the globe

had supported Panama. It was part of the political genius of Omar Torrijos, who had seized

power in a military coup and ruled without the electoral consent of his population, that he was

loved by leading democrats in his region. He astutely managed contradictions, drawing support

internally and internationally by trumpeting his nationalism and demanding justice. Carlos

Andrs Prez said the man he most admired in Latin American politics was Omar Torrijos, said

treaty negotiator Adolfo Ahumada. And now [Hugo] Chvez says the same thing!41 Torrijos

was able to oppose the United States while working with it. He was able to befriend Fidel Castro

by sending conservative, wealthy businessmen as his emissaries. Torrijos was an extremely

smart person, said his former foreign minister. Street smart.42

Much of the focus on the Torrijos-Carter Treaties has been on the role of President

Carterhis political calculations and the backlash engendered amongst the new right in the


10/40

10

United States.43 Scholars have examined how the anticipated reactions of the U.S. Senate

constrained executive negotiators.44 However, with the exception of one extraordinarily detailed

history of the negotiations,45 the case has not been the object of great attention in the study of

Latin American international relations. The narrative in this chapter focuses on the goals and

strategies of the Panamanian government, and on the interaction that approach with the United

States. Robert Pastor, both a participant in and a student of the treaty negotiations, wrote that

Panama implemented a very sophisticated strategy to achieve a nearly impossible mission

Panamas success can be understood only if one abandons the regions stereotypes of the United

States.46 This case stretches from 1972 until the signing of the treaties in 1977 (excluding

Senate ratification and House implementation legislation). In this brief version, I focus on a

handful of crucial moments, leaving out much background and only summarizing between these

key points. It is a story of frictions, frustrations, and failuresbut finally of common ground.

Assessing the case, 1972

Though the complicated history of the United States and Panama stretches back to themid-1800s and the construction of the isthmian railroad, the immediate context for this case

study begins in October 1968, when a group of young military officers overthrew Arnulfo Arias,

just elected to the presidency for the third time in contested elections. After dramatic internal

squabbles amongst coup plotters, General Omar Torrijos emerged as the unchallenged

commander of the National Guard and the supreme chiefthough not presidentof Panama.

Torrijos decided early on to create a different relationship with the United States. He decided that

many of his goals, both domestic and regarding the return of the Panama Canal, could be better

accomplished without permitting democracy. He judged that those goals justified the repression

of real political organization and expression. This included banning political parties, dismissing

the legislature, and tightly controlling the media. Though Torrijos did not reach the levels of

violence of his contemporaries in Argentina or Chile, coercion was part of his undemocratic

repertoire. Though many of his former friends and followers believe that Torrijos was ready to

step away from power and usher in democracyhaving increased somewhat the space for free

expression in 1980the generals early and accidental death makes the question unanswerable.

In 1970, when Torrijos had consolidated his grip on power, he was faced with a key

question regarding the canal and the relationship with the United States. Following an outbreak

of bloody riots and protests in the Canal Zone, the earlier government of Marco Robles had

negotiated in 1967 a three-in-one treaty with the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. It would

abrogate the original 1903 pact; create a joint, but U.S.-led canal administration; and increase

tolls to give a direct share to Panama. Most importantly, the treaty contained an expiration date,

December 31, 1999, though this date did not include defense and continued to give the United

States bases and defense rights until 2004or with a new canal, until 2067.47 Sensing

opposition, neither Robles nor Johnson presented the treaty to their legislatures. Torrijos

government had three options regarding the 1967 treaty, wrote the foreign minister Juan Antonio

Tack. It could accept it and submit it for ratification, hoping the U.S. would do the same. It could


11/40

11

use the treaty as a starting point and try to negotiate revisions. Lastly, it could reject the treaties

in their entirety, seeking to launch entirely new negotiations.48 Torrijos and his advisors decided

to entirely reject the pact.

Unexpectedly, the United States took a much harder line than it had in 1967, little interest

in changing the status of the Canal. The Pentagon accepted renewed talks, but argued in 1970that US control over canal and defense should be non-negotiable for the indefinite future.49

By mid-1971, Panamas initial hopes collapsed into disappointment. Tack wrote that, [I]t

became obvious that the Panamanian positions from January 1971 were not acceptable to the

United States, and that the U.S. basic points of the position from December 1970 were not

acceptable to Panama.50Clearly, the treaties were Panamas top foreign policy priority.

However, the United States was not particularly interested in the issue, and less in making major

concessions. There was a great divergence between the interests of Panamaspeedy and full

transfer of the canal and abolition of the Canal Zoneand Nixon administration policy.

Furthermore, the issues involved were clearly defined for both Panama and the United States.

Panama Canal: Early 1970s


High X X

Low X

As the above rubric indicates, Panama faced a steep uphill climb. It would need both to gain the

United States attention to get the canal on the agenda, and also to get the United States to

radically alter its hard-line policy. How, then, did Panama eventually achieve its goal? To

explain that story, I focus on a handful ofkey episodes. The first involves Panamas coup insetting the international agenda. During 1972 and 1973, Panama gained a UN Security Council

(UNSC) seat, and then maneuvered around U.S. objections to hold an UNSC meeting in Panama.

Capitalizing on that attention, Panama got agreements in principle in the 1974 Tack-Kissinger

agreement. In 1975, Panama and the United States negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement

(SOFA) that would regularize the U.S. military presence there and eventually bring the Pentagon

onboard with the later treaties. Panamas ambitions were stalled by Nixons political crises and

then by Fords political weakness and timidity on the subject. Finally, Panama was able to

capitalize on the change of administration in Washington with the election of Jimmy Carter to

achieve major goalswhile deciding to give in on others in order to reach a deal.

The World Meets on the Isthmus

Early talks in 19701972 were a disappointment, leading Torrijos to challenge the decades-long

U.S. position that the canal was to be discussed bilaterally and confidentially. If Panama wanted

even modest concessions, it would get them only if it respected these U.S. conditions. Torrijos

was not interested in modest concessions, but in a dramatically different relationship. General


12/40

12

Torrijos had told [lead negotiation Robert Anderson] that so long as Panamanian aspirations

were not fully met, Panama would not sign a treaty, even if it was necessary to wait for a new

generation of Americans to achieve Panamanian demands, he would continue negotiating until a

new generation had taken over the country's leadership.51

In late 1972, Torrijos appointed a new ambassador to the United States, filling theposition with a 27-year-old, loyal recruit. Torrijos told his new ambassador, Gonzlez Revilla,

You are not being requested to go to Washington because you are an expert in either [the

treaties or history]. Torrijos wanted the young man to take a look, a fresh look. Then I came

back and my report to Torrijos was, Have you ever solved a problem that you dont have?

Gonzlez Revilla said. And he said, Wait, what are you talking about, what do you mean?

I mean, have you ever solved a problem you dont have? Well of course, nobody does

that, he remembered telling Torrijos. Our problem simply does not exist in the agenda of U.S.

problems.52Torrijos gathered his advisors, and they decided to adopt a new approach. So then

he realized that he needed to create an issue, and he did it brilliantly, Gonzlez Revilla added.He went to the third world. Non-aligned. He started to travel a lot. Within Latin America and

out of Latin America. Latin America, principally with the democratic governments.53 In fact,

Panama had already begun taking steps toward internationalizing the canal issue. Panama fired

the first salvos in international organizations, pushing for and obtaining Latin American support

for a 1972 UN Security Council term. When the Security Council held an extraordinary meeting

in Addis Ababathe first in the developing worldBoyd used the forum to equate the U.S.

presence in Panama to the colonial and racial oppression faced by his African colleagues. The

attack caught the U.S representative, George H. W. Bush, off guard.54 Boyd also suggested, as an

improvisation of his own accord, that an UNSC meeting be held in Panama.55 The U.S.

condemned Boyds departure from bilateralism, with U.S. negotiator David Ward privately

warning, The Panamanian presentation of a complaint against the United States in the Security

Council had provoked adverse reactions in many circles of the U.S. government, in the executive

and legislative, which is his opinion would reverse progress by at least three years.56 Though

the Panamanian representative had put himself out on a limb, the support the idea garnered from

Torrijos was just as strong as the resistance it engendered in the United States.

Meanwhile, Torrijos engaged in intensive personal diplomacy to secure the support of his

democratic neighboring countriesthe most influential would be Daniel Oduber in Costa Rica,

Alfonso Lpez Michelsen in Colombia, and Carlos Andrs Prez in Venezuela.57 In March 1972,

Boyd invited UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to visit Panama to gain a better appreciation

of how the stagnated negotiations threatened peace. I told Mr. Waldheim that if the current

negotiations for a new treaty failed, the Panamanian government, with the goal of winning

international public support for its just cause, had the intention of appealing to the United

Nations.58 U.S. representatives tried throughout 1972 to mobilize allies to oppose a meeting in

Panama, employing arguments ranging from fiscal strain and organizational headaches to

increased regional tensions.59 U.S. lead negotiator Anderson told both Boyd and foreign ministry


13/40

13

advisor Jorge Illueca that regardless of what happened in the Security Council or any U.N.

organism, the U.S. would continue considering these problems as internal to the two

countries.60 Despite these pressures, Panama received favorable responses to its inquiries from

most Security Council members, and by November was moving ahead with plans for a meeting

in Panama City.61 Meanwhile, U.S.-Panama negotiations approached complete collapse in

December 1972. There was little common ground and the talks were further complicated by

internal struggles within both the U.S. and Panamanian governments. Frustrated at the

bargaining table, the multilateral component of Panamas approach tookever-greater importance.

Panamas strategy at the United Nations and through Torrijos personal diplomacy had two main

goals. The first was to raise the issues profile on the international agenda, and thereby gain the

attention of more important actors who set the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The second was to

increase the diplomatic costs to the United States of failing to resolve the problem. On these

points, the gambit was a remarkable success. On January 26, 1973, with eager support from

China, the Soviet Union, France, Peru, and others, the Security Council approved Panamas

initiative to host a meeting.

62

The United States recognized that it had been outmaneuvered andput aside its opposition, hoping that it could minimize the damage.63

In March 1973, the attention of world leaders shifted to Panama, and Panama was ready.

The government had honed its message, aimed both abroad and at buttressing Torrijos image

amongst the Panamanian people. Torrijos sought the moral backing of the world.64 The United

States was less prepared, despite its fear the meeting would be effective, anti-Yankee

propaganda. George Bush had left his position as U.S. permanent representative to the United

Nations. In his place, John Scali, a relative diplomatic novice led the U.S. delegation.65 In the

Councils opening session on March 15, Panamas chief of government took the stage to

welcome the delegates. Panama understands the fight of countries that suffer the humiliation ofcolonialism, Torrijos proclaimed. He closed with an appeal to the United States. Highest

leaders of North America, it is nobler to amend an injustice than to perpetuate an error.66 Early

on, the U.S. opposed any draft resolution on the grounds that the United Nations should not be

involved in bilateral affairs. For us, Panama will essentially be a damage-limiting operation,

Secretary Rogers wrote Scali before the meetings. No possible glory can come to us (or the UN)

from it.67 Scali warned that the U.S. would veto any resolution that did not adequately consider

its interests, while also saying that the U.S. had no intention of introducing its own resolution.68

On the second day, Panama and Peru introduced a resolution that demanded the abrogation of the

1903 treaty, re-affirmed Panamas sovereignty over the Canal Zone, and called for immediate

Panamanian jurisdiction. Panama initially showed some willingness to work to the United

Statesif the U.S. supported a resolution that was not too watered down. Instead, the United

States sought to block any text on the canal, becoming increasingly isolated. A revised

Panamanian resolution gained wider backing.69 The United States continued to claim that the

United Nations had no place in the matterthough the new draft used more agreeable language.

By the time the China and Russia announced they would back the revised resolution, the U.S.

was isolated and just beginning to consider a counterproposal.70


14/40

14

Many in Torrijos circle had concluded that, having already isolated the United States,

forcing it to veto would be a major public relations victory.71 Torrijos did realize that a veto

would serve Panamas interest, but the Panamanians did not stop seeking U.S. support for their

resolution. The U.S. repeatedly insisted on referring to U.S. legitimate interests in the canal in

any resolution. Panama, knowing it had the support of nearly the full council, refused to

compromise on the point.72 To drive home the point, Manuel Antonio Noriega, second in

command of the National Guard, made an ominous call to the U.S. delegation, telling Scali that

if he planned on casting a veto, it would be best to do it from Panamas Tocumen airport. The

call, Torrijos later told the U.S. ambassador was not sent as blackmail or threatened violence,

but was just a helpful piece of close U.S.-Panamanian cooperation on security for the meeting.73

The U.S. offered its first counterproposal on the conferences last day.74 It was too little,

too late. Finally, the council voted on Panamas resolution, with thirteen votes in favor. Great

Britain abstained. Scali cast the third Security Council veto in U.S. history on direct orders from

the White House,

75

saying that the present resolution addresses the points of interest to Panamabut ignores those legitimate interests important to the United States.76 Foreign Minister Tack

closed the meetings, saying, The United States has vetoed Panamas resolution, but the world

has vetoed the United States.77Now that Torrijos had the United States attentionnegative as

it washe pushed for another change to the negotiating approach between the two countries.

Instead of focusing on details, Torrijos and advocated starting with broad principles.78 This

suggestion would pay dividends in the wake of the contentious Security Council meeting.79

In trying to block the Security Council meeting in Panama, and later in trying to halt

Panamas resolution, the Nixon administration repeatedly warned that any such publicity would

set back the negotiations for years. This was the main bargaining chip the U.S. sought to employ,and it failed spectacularly. The Nixon administration had faced a small, military-led country

without a trained civil or diplomatic service, without any economic or military power, and it had

been beaten on difficult ground.80 Why? The Panamanians had decided that they negotiations

were stalemated, even though they continued to engage in them sporadically. The United States

failed to grasp that the piecemeal concessions that had worked with previous Panamanian

governments would not satisfy Torrijos. The meeting produced an immediate breakdown, but

also a serious reevaluation on the U.S. side. Panamanian negotiators moved from their polemic

criticisms of the United States to push for specific goals, including the removal of longtime

negotiator Robert Anderson. They began to pick up on divisions within the U.S. government,

which hadbeen exacerbated by the U.N. meetings. Due to Andersons stubbornness and his

increasingly obvious isolation from his own team and his superiors, Panamanians concluded that

continuing negotiations with him was useless. State Department officer Morey Bell even told his

Panamanian counterpart that Anderson would be replaced.81

While the meetings succeeded on the world stage, they also got the attention of an

audience of one. Kissinger took note in a way that he previously had not. A month before the


15/40

15

meeting, Kissinger had told Scali that he didnt have any very clear views on [Panama].82 The

international attention forced Kissinger to clarify his own position. William Jorden, Kissingers

assistant for Latin America, later reflected, I believe that what really made Kissinger understand

he was sitting on a potential powder keg was the U.N. Security Council meeting in early 1973.83

The meeting empowered Jorden, who was predisposed to a treaty, to advance his views in the

NSC. Jorden penned text on Panama for Nixons annual address to Congress on foreign policy,

marking the first time the president had directly addressed the issue in such a prominent venue.84

Nixon called for a fresh look at the status of the canal.85

Kissinger goes to Panama

Tack and Torrijos had decided that the previous approach of focusing on details and trying to

negotiate up to the bigger issues was doomed. Instead, they shifted to broad principles that could

later be used to structure the discussions on details. On May 24, 1973, Tack handed Rogers a

letter that included eight principles,86 which mostly reiterated Panamas key demands: 1) the

abrogation of the 1903 treaty, 2) an end to perpetuity, 3) the complete end of U.S. jurisdiction at

treatys end, 4) elimination of the Canal Zone, 5) a fair share of economic benefits, 6) limiting

U.S. activities to the maintenance, operation, and defense of the Canal, 7) limitation of U.S.

military activities, and 8) mutually agreed upon options for any new construction.87

Though Rogers discussed the proposal directly with President Nixon, the timing could

hardly have been worse.88 Both the Panama team and the Nixon administration were in upheaval.

Congressional hearings on Watergate had started;Nixons attention was clearly elsewhere. A

month after the meeting, word leaked that the veteran diplomat Ellsworth Bunker was being

considered as a new chief for the delegation.89 The energetic seventy-nine-year-old was

internationally recognized and well respected in the Department of Defense, and Panama told

U.S. officials that Bunker would be an excellent choice.90 The summer also brought Rogers

resignation and replacement by Kissinger. By September 1973, Bunker and Kissinger were

confirmed to their new positions and started a burst of progress. Panama still was not the central

issue for Kissinger, but it was at least on his radar. He gave Bunker wide latitude and support

with the Pentagon, which he saw as key to any agreement.91Bunkers initial trips to the

Panamanian resort island of Contadora resulted in friendly and productive talks on Tacks eight

points. After Bunkers departure, Morey Bell stayed on Contadora to hammer out language on

the principles with Ambassador Gonzlez Revilla. The two men knew one another from

Washington. They worked through several drafts of the eight points, which had evolved fromTacks proposals through Bunkers modifications to become a joint document. There were many

changes in wording from Tacks letter, but the primary effect of the eight points remained the

same.92 As both sides recognized, the eight principles contained substantial ambiguity and failed

to address issues such as the length of the treaty, beyond an allusion to the end of perpetuity.93

By mid-January, word leaked out that the U.S. and Panama had agreed on a statement of

principles and that Kissinger would travel to Panama to sign them. News of progress shook


16/40

16

treaty opponents from their slumber. At the same time, the Panamanians showed great

appreciation for the progress they had seen since Bunkers arrival, and stated a new level of

flexibility and patience. Panamanian interlocutors acknowledged the political constraints Nixon

faced, with Torrijos telling his ambassador, If they want a treaty in a few months, that is good,

but if they want to have it next year or even later, thats good too, and we will wait.94

Convinced by Bunker, Kissinger planned a whirlwind visit to Panama. Torrijos met

Kissinger at the airport, joining him in his motorcade through Panama City to the site of the

ceremony. Tack and Kissinger signed the eight principles at a lively ceremony. The Panamanian

crowd roared at the second principle, declaring an end to the hated perpetuity clause of 1903.

The secretary directed his speechbeyond Panamas borders to call for a new dialogue with

Latin America.95 The eight principles, elaborated by Bunker, Tack, and their assistants, now bore

the name Tack-Kissinger. After the signing, Kissinger met Torrijos at the Panama City apartment

of Rory Gonzlez, a close personal friend whose home often served as a getaway for the general.

The two powerful men chatted comfortably. Torrijos noted that he didnt expect Kissinger to

have all the answers to the problem with Panama, nor did he expect miracles. The ceremony

provoked hopes for a quick treaty in Panama, even as the signing spurred loud opposition in the

United States. Tack used to say, if we have these eight points, the treaty, we will write it down

in a couple of months, Gonzlez Revilla reflected. This conceptual agreement, its got

everything.96 It would not be so easy. The day after the ceremony, a Congressional campaign

began, opposing any treaty that would return the canal to Panama. Democratic Representative

John Murphy alleged that the Torrijos government was unstable and linked to drug trafficking

even warning that a coup was in the offing. Senator Strom Thurmond continued his bombastic

opposition, calling called the Tack-Kissinger principles a pseudotreaty which will cause grave

harm to United States interests.

97

Stagnation and small agreements

The negotiating teams, including Bunker, reconvened on Contadora after Kissingers departure,

and the amount of work remaining eroded some of the optimism. Despite the principles, the U.S.

negotiators were still working under the same guidelines as their predecessor, including a 50-

year treaty, with longer options for a sea-level canal. Given that he had no instructions to change

the date, Bunker avoided the issue, fearing that an insistence on 50 years would scuttle the

progress.98 The inflexible instructions frustrated both sides. Gonzlez Revilla felt Nixon and

Kissinger had used the eight principles as a way to prolong the negotiations without making

progress. After the eight points, the first round of negotiations was absolutely ridiculous. The

position of the US had gone back to the worst position in the last ten or fifteen years. He

pointed to the old negotiating guidelines as evidence that nothing was being done. What

Kissinger was doing, I think, playing with the same guidelines, but with more brilliance.99

In fact, it appears Kissinger did want to conclude the treaties. In April, he urged Tack to

make a negotiating breakthrough before further opposition to the treaties was able to mobilize.


17/40

17

However, they were not his top priority;100 for Nixon, they were never of more than marginal

importance.101 As the teams on Contadora tried to take the next steps, in Washington, the House

Judiciary Committee was discussing impeachment and a special prosecutor prepared a request

for the White House tapes. Nixon faced an ever-growing battle with the Congress, and he had no

incentive to pick another fight on an issue he carried little about. Treaty talks were stuck on these

major points when President Nixon announced on August 8, after months of intrigue, that he

would resign rather than face trial on articles of impeachment. As the news broke in Washington,

Kissinger sent Ambassadors Bunker and Jorden an urgent, personal note for Tack to assure him

that the change of president will not in any way affect the negotiation. Kissinger intended to

press ahead for a new treaty.102 During President Fords first months, there was no word of

what direction he would take. Negotiations continued through August 1974, with a decision to

negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), but progress elsewhere was slow.

Frustrated by the pace and feeling pressure from the left, Torrijos responded by again

shaking the monkeys chain, as he liked to put it. After months of waiting to hear a proposal onduration, Torrijos wanted to cause alarm. He approached democratic Latin American leaders

about reinstating, en masse, diplomatic ties with Cuba.103The U.S. tied Panamas Cuba policy

with treaty negotiations, but U.S. pressures steeled Torrijos determination to demonstrate his

independence. He knew the decision would greatly placate students and other leftists. At the

same time, he did not want to give Panamanian businessman and foreign investors the idea he

might enact widespread, Cuban-style nationalizations. He knew the U.S. government would be

watching him closely, too. He deftly played to both sides. To open relations with the

hemispheres most socialist state, Torrijos sent a delegation headed by Panamas best-known,

free-market economist, Nicols Ardito Barletta.104 The decision helped Torrijos shore up his left

flank just as the slowly moving negotiations turned to the questions on which he was most opento criticismneutrality and defense.

On the SOFA, Bunker presented a draft based on agreements the United States had used

elsewhere.105 Given the years of resistance from the U.S. Department of Defense, the military

arrangements were handled surprisingly swiftly. This was perhaps more surprising given

Torrijos choice to head the SOFA negotiating teamthe notoriously anti-gringo Rmulo

Escobar Bethancourt, rector of the Universidad de Panam. His deputy was student leader and

lawyer Adolfo Ahumada. The choice played well domestically. Torrijos concluded that, if a

leftist like Rmulo could work out a SOFA with the American, Panamas Marxists and activist

students would not likely oppose it.106 Bunker and Tack signed the final accords March 6.107

The SOFA was resolved without any serious problems, Ahumada said. [T]he SOFA opened

the doors to the rest of the negotiations. The negotiations took off when the U.S. military

could breathe calmly about their presence in Panama. At the same time, Panama had started a

process of reducing the fourteen military bases on the isthmus.108


18/40

18

The major problem confronting the U.S. team was the near-total lack of engagement of

President Ford, whose ambivalence led to a frustrating, though not unproductive, year. Panama

became more assertive making its own proposals, especially on the issue of lands and waters. In

those talks, Panama often argued that the creation of a friendly environment [is] indispensable

to effective defense.109 That is, the best way to ensure the security of the canal was to have a

content Panamanian population that took pride in it. The point was not, strictly speaking, a new

one for the Panamanian negotiators, but it gained currency with U.S. officials who frequently

interacted with the PanamaniansJorden and Bell. This began to redefine the issue for the

United States. Panama not only negotiated certain points, but advanced a new type of

conventional wisdom regarding how the security of the canal could best be achieved. This

process worked slowly during the months in which progress was largely stalemated because of

Fords unwillingness to settle bureaucratic disputes between State and Defense. When Ford did

offer new instructions, they changed so little that U.S. negotiators used them with reluctance.

The U.S. position of seeking at least 40 years for defense, with options for a post-treaty presence

and new canal construction, rang of perpetuity. The failure of the new guidelines had beenforetold, and the U.S. presidential elections in 1976 guaranteed the lack of progress continued.

A new president

The election of a Democratic president, Jimmy Carter, brought hope to the Panamanian team,

though Carter had spoken cautiously during the campaign. Carter decided before inauguration to

attack the Canal negotiations early on. Both Panamanian and U.S. participants credit Carters

political willespecially his decision to address the treaties while his popularity was highestas

crucial to the treatieseventual ratification. What is sometimes lost, however, is that Carters

team was able to conclude the treaties with a few months of hard work because of significant

advances made during the previous years. The fact that the treaties figured so high on the Carter

agenda was a testament to a long Panamanian struggle to put them there. Panamanian pressure,

aided by friendly Latin American presidents, continued even in the pre-inaugural period. Days

after the election, Venezuelan President Carlos Andrs Prez declared the canal an international

concern and called on Carter to move quickly to address the impasse.110 Prez raised the issue in

his congratulatory letter to Carter, saying Carters responsibility was to approve the new treaty

which will put an end to a situation which identifies a great nation with colonial practices.111

In the days before inauguration, Carters intentions on the canal became clearerand

more favorable to Panama. Carter described his decision as both a matter of justice and as

necessary to ensure the canals safetyusing an argument similar to that advanced during years

by Panama about the importance of a friendly population.112 Once in office, Carter signaled the

issues importance in two ways. His first presidential directive ordered a review of U.S. policy

on the canal negotiations. Second, Carter appointed Sol Linowitz as a temporary, special envoy

for the negotiations. Panama also was reviewing its position. The foreign ministry was

increasingly open to an arrangement in which the United States and Panama guaranteed the

neutrality of the canal after the treatys expirationwithout the physical presence of U.S. troops.


19/40

19

The arrangement would be enshrined in a cooperation treaty that would be renewed

periodically.113 Two weeks after inauguration, Foreign Minister Boyd shuttled to Washington to

meet the new secretary and review the main issues in the negotiations. Boyd insisted the treaties

expire by 2000. Secretary Vance said this was a possibility, if the U.S. retained certain defense

rights beyond that date. Boyd considered this a feasible compromise, but the idea had not yet

gained Torrijos approval. This point exposed a split within Panamas government, where many

insisted on a guarantee by Panama alone or through the United Nations.114 Boyd was undercut by

Gonzlez Revilla when Panamas embassy stated that Torrijos would support neutrality under a

UN framework, but not a U.S. guarantee. Torrijos added, in declarations made live on television,

that the foreign minister would no longer be a permanent member of the negotiating team. 115

Boyd, who five years prior had launched the internationalization of Panamas cause at the United

Nations, quit in disgustmaking the announcement on TV without warning Torrijos.

The first negotiations under the Carter administration began in mid-February, again on

Contadora. They started poorly. The Panamanian scene was still unsettled by Boyds departure.

He had been replaced by Gonzlez Revilla, who was well known and liked by many in the U.S.

government. The initial position from Bunker and Linowitz did not meet Torrijos expectations.

In particular, the presentation of U.S. defense after the treatys expiration sounded too much like

perpetuity for the general to accept. The two sides were testing one another. Did Torrijos want a

treaty or a constant issue to harp on? Was Carter ready to back away the never he articulated in

the campaign? The February breakdown led Linowitz to reconsider the treaty format, and helped

produce the final, successful approach. The cornerstone of the strategy would be to divide one

treaty into two. The first of the two treatiesand we would insist on agreement on this treaty

before we would proceed to the secondwould deal solely with security questions, the authority

of the United States to protect the canal from armed challenge of any kind, in partnership withPanama or, if necessary, unilaterally. The second treaty would deal with Panamanian

sovereignty in the Canal Zone, money matters, control of the company that operated the canal,

the rights and privileges of American citizens working for the canal company (an immensely

complicated question, and very emotional for the individuals concerned), and the logistic details

of the presence of American forces on Panamanian soil.116 This two-treaty formula became the

centerpiece of the next round of talks.

An exchange of letters between Carter and Torrijos improved the disposition of both

teams, seeming to convince each that the other wanted a treaty. Carter noted their common

interests and called for a balanced agreement. He told Torrijos he looked forward to meetingthe leader to sign the accords.117 On many issues, though, the negotiators remained distant.

Linowitz spoke of a treaty lasting until 2000, while Escobar now pressed for 1990. When the

U.S. team sought to clarify questions of neutrality, Panama pushed for the transfer and lands and

facilities like the railroad, the ports of Balboa and Coln, and Ancn Hill. Escobar Bethancourt

even invoked Carters letter against his counterparts, saying that the president had proposed a

new spirit for arriving at a treaty. Thats the spirit that should be reflected in this meeting.118


20/40

20

Gabriel Lewis Galindo, Torrijos choice for ambassador in 1977 could hardly have been

more different than his choice in late 1972. Whereas Gonzlez Revilla entered as a 27-year-old

known for his leftist leanings and proximity to the general, Lewis Galindo was a businessman

from a wealthy family. Lewis Galindo could could say no to Torrijos, something that a lot of

people could not do.119 Lewis Galindos reception also differed from that accorded to Gonzlez

Revilla, who got the distinct impression when he arrived that the Panama Canal was not a

problem anyone in Washington was trying to solve. In contrast, the new ambassador was

received the day after his arrival by Warren Christopher, acting secretary in Vances absence.

Christopher told Lewis, I hope that we will have a new treaty before the first snowfall.120 The

State Department made arrangements for Lewis Galindo to present his credentials to the

president as soon as Carter returned to the country. That meeting marked the beginning of a

close, personal relationship between Lewis Galindo and the president.121

Panama insisted on resolving questions on high-profile lands, like Ancn Hill, which

towers above Panama City before addressing what the U.S. considered big issues. The solution

on Ancn is emblematic of how many of questions, after years of divergence, were finally

solved. Panama insisted on the return of the whole hill, while the U.S. needed parts to operate

communications and other facilities. The two sides were taking past one another. If the United

States would give Panama the whole hill, Panama would give you all the necessary facilities for

the operation and defense of the Canal. As Royo told Linowitz and Bunker, our aspiration and

your interests are wed happily. Escobar Bethancourt explained that jurisdiction over all of

Ancn was a matter of pride for the Panamanian peoplesomething not affected by having U.S.

experts work there for some years.122 All the Panamanians coincided in thisgive us the

territory and we will let you use it to run the Panama Canal during the treaty period. The U.S.

was stuck in the mindset of the Pentagon, and not of the partnership Carter pledged,

123

failing torealize how a marginal issue to the United States mattered deeply to Panama.124

To get the treaties, Panama had to give up several major demands. Perhaps the largest

was a large package of financial compensation as reparation for the decades of free U.S. use of

its territory.125As payment for seven decades of nearly free use of Panamas land and waters, the

chief Panamanian negotiator presented his counterpart with a demand for over $1 billion as a

lump-sum, up-front payment. Panama calculated that the United States actually owed Panama

more than $6 billion, but in the spirit of cooperation and out of respect for President Carter, they

lowered the total. Panama also wanted an increased annuity payment of $300 million per year.

The negotiations returned to crisis mode.

126

The United States held that for the Senate and U.S.public, the concept would be a deal breaker. Furthermore, Carter never considered it. The United

States would be turning over an asset of incredible value. Why should it pay for the privilege?

Bunker and Linowitz accepted that Panama had been drastically undercompensated for the use of

its land. Both agreed that Panama should derive greater benefits from the canal tolls. This point

had been uncontested in 1975, and accepted even in the Nixon administrations 1971 policy

review. On other issues, Panama had been willing to risk the treaty talks to call the U.S. bluff


21/40

21

that it could go no further in its two-level game. That was before Panama had achieved so

many of its goals. With a largely acceptable draft of the treaty being prepared, Panama had more

to risk. Would Panama once again try to face down the United States?

At first, it appeared so. Though the U.S. increased toll compensation and offered some

other foreign aid, the sides were distant on the question of a lump payment. However, LewisGalindo and Ardito Barletta, both close to Torrijos had come to believe that the compensation

demand would kill the treaty in the U.S. The United States turned to the same Latin American

leaders who had so effectively pressed Panamas case in the past, while Carter stressed to

Escobar Bethancourt, Lewis Galindo, and Royo127 that an economic payment of the type they

sought was impossible. They convinced Carter that only direct communication to Torrijos, who

held Carter in very high esteem, could succeed in getting the general to back away from what he

saw as a just demand. Carters letter highlighted the major concessions the U.S. had made on

land-use and insisted the U.S. had given as much as it could.128Carters letter was a crucial

element in convincing Torrijos to scale back his demand for compensation. Ardito Barletta

hashed out an agreement that included a compromise on tolls, a package of loans, U.S.

investment for public housing, and some cash.

Even with the major issues laid to rest, much work remained in drafting the treaties. The

U.S. team headed to Panama City with an impending deadline. Sol Linowitzs appointment

would expire on August 10. The final days were tense, with Panama presenting especially tough

language, testing the U.S. to get any final advantage, and then retreating slowly to previous

agreements. In the late afternoon of Linowitzs final day the two sides stepped out of the Holiday

Inn where they had been working. Standing in front of the gathered throng of reporters,

Linowitz, Bunker, Escobar Bethancourt, and Royo announced that the basic elements of the

treaties were ready.129 After dealing with three presidents over seven years of negotiations,

General Omar Torrijos had gotten much of what he started out seeking. The treaties still faced an

intense Senate ratification fight and in a plebiscite in Panama.130 On October 23, about 800,000

Panamanians headed to the polls, with 506,805 of them, more than 67 percent, voting to approve

the new treaties.131 The only province to vote against the treaties was San Blas, home to the

autonomous Kuna tribe. The Panamanian people had given the treaties their stamp of approval

less than two months after the two leaders had signed them at the OAS. The Senate would take

considerably longer to do so, but voted on March 16 to ratify the first treaty, and April 18 the

second. The vote was the closest treaty ratification in U.S. history.

Case conclusions

Omar Torrijos government began seriously assessing its options regarding the canal in

1970. After deciding to reject the 1967 treaty, it vigorously pursued its main goalsan abolition

of the Canal Zone and a handover of the canal to Panamanian authority. Before it could pursue

these goals in negotiations with Washington, however, Panama learned that it would need to gain

attention from a much higher level in the United States. To do that, it radically altered the


22/40

22

bilateral approach that had dominated U.S.-Panama relations from their inception. Panama made

the canal an international issue, linking its own struggle with those of its neighbors and a host of

unlikely allies across the globe. All the while, it managed to walk a careful line of nudging the

United States without provoking too harsh of a reaction. At the bargaining table, Panama also

adjusted its plan by getting the U.S. to agree to broad, ambiguous principles in 1974. It then tried

to hold the U.S. to an increasingly favorable interpretation of each point. On every item of the

Tack-Kissinger principles, the U.S. stance gradually gravitated to Panamas position. Even as

Panamas interpretation of the problem became the conventional wisdom in some casesthe

best way to secure the canal was to have a happy Panamanian populationthe small country still

faced a constant struggle to overcome U.S. inaction. At several points, U.S. political problems

feuds between State and Defense, the Watergate scandal, Fords weakness, the 1976 elections

bogged down the negotiation. The power of the larger country was often the power to repeatedly

delay. The power of the smaller country, especially one led by a military dictator whose control

was rarely in doubt, was to maintain a single-minded focus. The Panamanian leadership, which

unlike the U.S. was comprised mostly of the same men throughout, exhibited an ability to learnfrom U.S. responses and to evolve its understanding of the U.S. political process.

Comparing the goals Omar Torrijos, as enunciated in 1972, with the final treaty, it is

clear that Panama attained most of its objectives. First, the treaties eliminated perpetuity. On

the issue of duration, Panama began seeking a full transfer of the canal by 1995. After more than

five years of negotiations, Panamas fallback position of 2000 was accepteda remarkable

concession from the 1972 U.S. goal of perpetual defense rights, or perhaps an extension on the

order of 90 years. On the Canal Zone, it achieved an immediate elimination of the zone, with de

facto jurisdiction transferred over three years. Regarding lands, there was an immediate or short-

term reversion of the vast majority. This included the most important sites, such as the ports, therailroad, and Ancn. Panama also achieved direct and immediate participation in the operation of

the canal, which increased over the treatys lifespan. Panama demanded an end to U.S. military

activities not related to canal defense, naming the School of the Americas. This institution left

Panama three years after ratification. Today, the former building serves as a luxury hotel for

Panama Canal tourists. Other U.S. military activity was regularized under the SOFA. While the

U.S. military presence officially ended in 1999, during the last years of the treaty, the presence

was minimal. Panamas original demand for neutrality was largely secured in the neutrality

treaty, though the U.S. refused Panamas preference for a United Nations mandate. Instead the

neutrality guarantee was held in the OAS, where the U.S. did not have to worry about the Soviet

Union or China. Regarding compensation, Panamas goals early in the 1970s were less clear.Certainly the final package did not approach the massive totals they felt they were owed. It did

result in a major increase in revenue derived from tolls.

Panama insisted that it should have the right to determine where and whether a new canal

was construction. In August 1977, Torrijos and Carter agreed to a broad phrasing on the issue of

a sea-level canal. The final result was that Panama, after the expiration of the treaty, voted to


23/40

23

expand the canal on its own, without U.S. participation. The nation decided via referendum to

make a huge investment to build news sets of locks to accommodate much larger ships and

secure the canals importance to world shipping for years to come. That expansion is expected to

be complete in 2014, just in time for the one-hundredth anniversary of the canals opening.

Finally, Panama demanded exclusive use of the Panamanian flag. It later agreed that both flags

could be flown at military institutions, but this faded along with the U.S. presence. Today, a huge

Panamanian flag waves atop Ancn Hill, serving as a landmark and a reminder for Panamanians

in the city below.

Case 2: Plan Colombia

As Andrs Pastrana prepared to take the oath of office, many of the institutions of the

Colombian state were crumbling around him. The government exercised only titular control over

much of the national territory. A host of armed groupsguerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug

traffickersoperated nearly unchecked. Colombias principal cities, including Bogota, had

remained largely isolated from the decades-long conflict, but by 1998, armed fronts of theFuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) encroached on the oases of urban

safety. FARC encampments moved closer to Bogota, while bombings in the city brought home

the intense danger. Head to head with the FARC, the Colombian army was often overmatched,

sometimes letting towns slip out of control of the Colombian state. The FARC were adding

soldiers and amassing weapons; unlike government troops, they seemed to have little trouble

obtaining resources. Colombia faced a sharp recession that was only exacerbated by the violence.

In addition, the Colombian government faced a crisis of legitimacy. A series of drug-money

scandals had engulfed Pastranas predecessor, Ernesto Samper, leading to international aid cuts

and public anger. Samper had spent his entire term embroiled in scandal after audio tapes made

clear that his campaign had taken millions of dollars from the kingpins of the Cali drug cartel.132

His denials (later recanted) fell on deaf ears in Colombia and increased the ire of a hostile U.S.

ambassador. The Colombian Army was seen as tainted by ties to paramilitary groups, who were

guilty of massacres, forced displacements, torture, and other human rights violations. The

strength of the paramilitaries furthered eroded the reach and legitimacy of the government. As a

result of opposition to Samper and concern about human rights, U.S. aid to the South American

country had plummeted. Most of the aid that remained was funneled directly to the Policia

Nacional, with the conspicuous purpose of further marginalizing Samper. The armys morale

was disastrously low; its material conditions were perhaps worse, with only a handful of

functioning helicopters to pursue enemies across the countrys mountainous jungles. Facingoverwhelming challenges, and lacking many tools with which to address them, President

Pastrana surveyed his options and crafted a strategy, which involved intense collaboration with

the United States, and lead to the creation of Plan Colombia.

Set against the background of hostility that engulfed U.S.-Colombian ties during the

Samper administration, it is perhaps surprising that under Colombias next president, the country

became the third-largest recipient of U.S. aid. More surprising, perhaps, is that much of that aid


24/40

24

went to the Colombian military, which a U.S. official said in June 1998, did not pass the test

with human rights groups, the US Congress, or the media.133Though Plan Colombia has been

used to describe a wide swath of U.S.-Colombian cooperation from the late 1990s to the present,

I focus here on the overlapping mandates of the Colombian President Andrs Pastrana and U.S.

President Bill Clinton, once again excluding the important role of the U.S. Congress in the final

Plan Colombia from this analysis.

Because of the complex and controversial nature of this case, it is important to note

several things this chapter is not trying to do. It is not seeking to justify Plan Colombia in

particular or the war on drugs more broadly. According to a broad range of both academic and

policy students Plan Colombia did not accomplish goals set out in the U.S. war on drugs in terms

of reducing drug availability or purity or increasing street prices. There is no question those goals

have not been met in some forty years.134Nor does this chapter try to examine the Plans effect

on serious problems in Colombiadisplacements, human rights violations, paramilitary links to

the government. Its purpose is to re-examine the case in light of the guiding question of this

dissertation: how did Colombian leaders seek to pursue their goal via a change in U.S. policy?

Context

The intense strain on U.S.-Colombian relations during the presidency of Ernesto Samper created

the immediate context for Pastranas presidency. The combination of a U.S. president trying to

appear tough on drugs and a Colombian president soiled by substantiated accusations proved a

poisonous combination that drove relations to their nadir, while seriously weakening the

Colombian state at home and abroad.135 Before his inauguration, Samper was tarnished by

allegations that his presidential campaign had been funded by drug traffickers, corroborated by

cassette recordings of major kingpins. The scandal took down top Colombian officials. Samperfaced harsh reactions from the U.S. and domestic opposition, which intensified as embarrassing

details about administration corruption came to light.136 In 1996 and 1997, the U.S. went on the

decertify Colombia under U.S. counternarcotics aid laws, signaling that Colombia was not

cooperating in the war on drugs. Decertification cut off most U.S. aid programs. Much of the aid

that remained, given under a national security waiver, was deliberately channeled around the

president through the head of the Colombian National Police.137 The Clinton administration

denied a visitors visa to Samper, causing a major embarrassment. However, the aid cuts and bad

relations helped weaken the Colombian state at precisely the most inopportune time.138 The

nature of the countrys drug trafficking, armed groups, and decades-old conflict were rapidly

changing. For the first time, in the 1990s, coca plants were cultivated in Colombia on a large

scale. While the Colombian government was starved of revenue because of a deep recession and

a sharp aid reduction, the FARC captured hundreds of millions of dollars in funding from

drugs.139 In the months before Pastrana took power, the Colombian military was in retreat. The

FARC routed the Colombian armys supposedly elite unit in March 1998. The incoming

president would later summarize his limited tactical options: It was clear then, in the middle of


25/40

25

1998, that the Armed Forces were not capable of mounting a large offensive against the illegal

groups because they did not have the means or human and logistical resources to do so. 140

In 1997, theMandato Ciudadano por la Paz, or the Citizens Mandate for Peace

instructed voters in municipal elections to deposit a white card alongside their ballot as a demand

for peace. Though the cards were not officially counted, Pastrana and others cited 10 millionvotes for peace as a demand to address the conflict.141 Pastrana and Serpa competed to be seen

as the most pacifistic candidate. While Pastrana did have a true interest in his peace agenda, even

as a candidate he did not plan on betting the house on a negotiated solution. Peace would require

a military strategy as well. In a meeting with Peter Romero at the U.S. embassy, Rodrigo

Lloreda, a top Pastrana deputy who would later be appointed defense minister, stressed the

difficulty of combining political and military realities in Colombia. On peace, Lloreda told us

Pastrana knows the guerrillas must be weakened militarily before they come to the negotiating

table, but this was not a popularly acceptable campaign theme.142

Goals and evaluation, 1998

Pastranas goals were largely dictated by the failures of his predecessor, Ernesto Samper.

Pastrana set out many of his goals clearly in his campaign speech at the Hotel Tequendama on

June 8, 1998, emphasizing peace negotiations with insurgents, rural development, and political

reforms.143 One of Pastranas main goals was to receive international funding for development

and assistance from international financial organizations to restructure Colombian sovereign

debtwhat Pastrana called a Marshall Plan for Colombia. In his inaugural address, Pastrana

called Plan Colombia a combination of alternative development projects that will channel the

shared efforts of governments and multilateral institutions with those of Colombian society.144

Colombia, the United States, and the FARC, 1998


High X X (Samper)

Low X (Pastrana) X

In fact all the major Colombian presidential candidates realized they would have an opportunity,

if they wished, to take advantage of significant U.S. interest. The United States was concerned

about the situation in Colombia, and Pastrana was dedicated to gaining international assistance,

most likely from the United States, to address a host of problems. Under Samper, there had been

a major gap between Colombian interest and U.S. policy. That policy remained in place when

Pastrana came into office, but the United States tone and actions shifted rapidlyand had

already started to become less hostile while Samper was in office.

However, there was a major debate in both countries about the nature of the problem.

Was the question just drug traffickers? How should the FARC be defined? These questions

played a major role in the relationship, and shifting answers favored new policy alternatives.


26/40

26

Archives and interviews point to shifting understandings of Colombias problems in both the

Colombian and American administrations. The actors ways of seeing the conflictor perhaps

more to the point, the armed actors participating in the conflictmingled. The two governments

jointly explored policy responses. In the balance, the Colombians achieved several of their initial

priorities in their foreign policy toward the United States. Importantly, Pastrana also managed to

preserve several aspects of his policies that were unpopular with important sectors of the United

States. Pastrana continued negotiations with the FARC during most of his presidency, until these

talks had abjectly failed to produce results. To facilitate the incipient peace process, Pastrana

maintained azona de distension, also called el despeje, a significant geographic area in which the

army would not pursue the FARC, and which served as a safe haven for conducting peace talks.

Both the peace process and the despeje were routinely criticized in the U.S. Congress.145

Pastrana summarized his goals: It was urgent to reform and modernize the military

forces, recover our international relations, launch a plan of social investments, fight drug

trafficking and seek reconciliation.146 Pastrana stated these goals as a candidate in his address at

Tequendama and restated them at the beginning initiation of his presidency. Reiterating his call

for a Marshall Plan, Pastrana spoke at length about drug trafficking and its relationship to the

Colombian conflict, arguing that the prolongation of fighting benefited only drug kingpins. The

speech also included a statement that Colombia would move away from as peace talks with the

FARC faltered, that Colombia faced two clearly different wars, one against drug trafficking

and the other against groups with soc

Long-MACLAS 2012 Paper

Documents

Transcript of Long-MACLAS 2012 Paper